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The BurmaNet News: June 9, 1999



------------------------ BurmaNet ------------------------
 "Appropriate Information Technologies, Practical Strategies"
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The BurmaNet News: June 9, 1999
Issue #1289

HEADLINES:
==========
SHAN: ASSISTING THE MILITARY IN THE WAR ON DRUGS
WORKING PAPER ON AID TO BURMA: SELECTIONS
BKK POST: BORDER GATEWAY TO CASINO CLOSED 
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SHAN HERALD AGENCY FOR NEWS: ASSISTING THE BURMESE MILITARY IN THE WAR ON
DRUGS: IS IT GOING TO WORK?
APRIL & MAY, 1999  INDEPENDENCE VOL. 16, NO. 3 

EDITORIAL

On 7 January 1999, the U.S. Government decertified Burma on Drugs.
Nevertheless, reports about foreign agencies, especially that of the United
States, doing their best not only to "laud" the junta's "drug efforts" at
every
opportunity but to channel financial and material assistance to it have not
ceased. There is, as a consequence, well grounded widespread fear that there
will be, as in the 1974-88 period, a resumption of aid to the military most
hated and feared by its people, and that it will be using the aid again, not
against drugs but against its people and its political opponents.

However, the American experience in Latin America as summed up by Peter
Zirnite
(Reluctant Recruits: the US military and the War on Drugs, August 1997)
provides sufficient lessons against Americans opting for the easier way out to
aid the junta by following the late Deng Xioping's most well-known maxim, that
the color of the cat is not important as long as it catches mice.

In the Latin American countries, Uncle Sam has not only employed its own
personnel but also inevitably those of the native armed forces.  The report
card shows it has resulted in some "great" successes i.e. the arrests of drug
traffickers, for example, the notorious Noriega, eradication of coca fields,
destruction of processing labs and disruption of transportation.

However, the fact, as admitted by the White House's most zealous drug
warriors,
is that "gains have been more tactical than strategic". Moreover, they "have
been episodic and temporary", as the 'enemy" adapts quickly to enforcement
strategies.

The result:

Seizures of thousands of metric tons of Cocaine and eradication of more than
55,000 hectares of Coca plants between 1988 and 1995, "have failed to reduce
the supply of illegal drugs in the United States or their avail ability".
"Eradication  ... is offset by expanded cultivation".

Amnesty International USA and Human Rights Watch/Americas reported "counter
insurgency units ... (being) responsible for some of the worst human rights
atrocities in recent years".

Worst, the region's armed forces are increasingly playing a significant role
within the society just as straggling civilian elected governments are
striving
to keep them in check.

This comes at a time when the Cold War has ended and the world is supposed to
be moving towards more democratic societies. Needless to say, these native
armed forces are reemerging as a threat to democracy and human rights. The
outgoing Bolivian President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozado put it this way: "When
you have a corrupt chief of police, you fire him. When you have a corrupt
chief
of the army, he fires you".

Therefore, it is not surprising that the War on Drugs there, as it is here, is
not winning the hearts and minds of the people, which is fundamental for drug
control efforts to succeed. On the contrary, it is pushing people who are
economically dependent on Coca cultivation into the arms of the enemy. One
former Peruvian regional commander, "noting that each of the 150,000 Cocaleros
(Coca planters) in the Upper Huallaga Valley was a Potential subversive", put
it this way: "Eradicate his field and the next day, he will be one".

Thus, while some militarists argue that " strengthening civilian institutions
to increase their effectiveness in countering drug trafficking is not a viable
approach anywhere in the near term", facts prove that increasing military
involvement may be even more detrimental.

One big mistake, as noted by the writer, is that "US assistance is (being)
provided prior to improvement in human rights performance or demonstrated
political will on the part of aid recipients to hold accountable those
responsible for abuses".

SHAN, therefore, hopes that these lessons are taken seriously by the
policy-makers in both Washington and Bangkok.

The writer, however, warns against too much hope. Because, as he put it:
"As in
Vietnam, it is easier from a political standpoint to plunge ahead rather than
conduct a serious reassessment".

But SHAN also remembers the words of General Mc Caffrey, who became the
head of
the UNDCP in March 1996. Which was also quoted by the writer.

"At the end of the day, I would suggest that this actually isn't a war to be
won by anybody's army... At the end of the day, prosecutors, law enforcement
officers, teachers, school superintendents, religious leaders, that is who the
front line troops are".

He might have added that these front line troops should be led by a popularly
elected government.

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THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS, AID, AND GOVERNANCE IN BURMA: SELECTIONS 
24 May, 1999

[BurmaNet Editor's Note: The foreword to this paper appeared in the BurmaNet
News on June 7,1999 (issue #1287).  Below are selections from the same working
paper, "The Humanitarian Crisis, Aid, and Governance in Burma."   It was
presented at a workshop on Humanitarian Aid to Burma.  You can view the entire
paper at:  

http://www.burmafund.org/Research_Library/Humanitarian Aid to Burma.htm]

An Introduction

Professor Amartya Sen, recipient of the 1998 Nobel Prize in Economics, has
written extensively on hunger, famine and its causes. He has observed that:
"People in economic need also need a political voice....no substantial famine
has ever occurred in any country with a democratic form of government and a
relatively free press." Burma, a country of 48 million people, has an
extraordinarily undemocratic government, an unfree press and not
uncoincidentally, its population is facing what a confidential UNICEF report
termed a "silent emergency."

[....]

Potential Donor Responsibilities

The National League for Democracy has made clear its position on foreign donor
aid in communications with the UN Development Program. Two main principals
were
put forward: when providing humanitarian aid to Burma, United Nations agencies
have an obligation to work in close cooperation or consultation with the
elected NLD leadership; and that "aid should be delivered to the right people
in the right way."

Consecutive UN General Assembly resolutions recognizing the right of Burma's
citizens to participate freely in the political process implies that donor aid
should not be provided in such a way as to impede or frustrate this right. And
this responsibility of UN agencies not to frustrate the political rights of
Burma's people extends to those NGOs selected as grantees to implement UN
projects. The difficulty here is that donors are currently strongly
discouraged
from consultation with the NLD, and that indigenous NGOs have been politicized
by the military regime through purges of all members with NLD associations.
The
regime has thus politicized the humanitarian aid process.

The NLD argues that aid should be extended on the basis of humanitarian,
rather
than political needs, and not on whether recipients stand in favor with the
authorities. This has not been the practice under SPDC. An example of current
politicized aid under the regime occurred between December 1998 and January
1999 in Kyaukpadaung Township, Mandalay Division.

The World Health Organization was then funding the provision of free polio
vaccines for all of Burma's children. However, personnel of the Ministry of
Health were charging 10 kyat per family for the vaccine, and local government
authorities forced villagers to purchase the vaccine. As a consequence,
approximately 300 children in the area received the dose of oral polio
vaccine,
while over 500 had received it previously when it was provided without charge,
as intended by the donor. (In order to prevent a polio epidemic from breaking
out, doctors recommend at least a 90 per cent vaccination coverage rate.) Here
donor aid failed to meet its objective (full coverage against polio) and
corrupt local officials used the donor-sponsorship as an opportunity to
further
impoverish local people.

There are many other examples of this kind of programmatic failure under the
current regime.

Development Policy Failures

The health, vital indicators, educational levels, development status, and
human
rights situation of the people of Burma have deteriorated over the last eleven
years of military rule. This regime's efforts at development have failed.
While
the inclination to redress the humanitarian crises created by the regime's
policies with donor aid, such aid channeled into a system that created the
crisis is unlikely to solve it. The regime's development policy failures are
many and there is little indication that they are learning from their
mistakes.

Among the mistakes made by the authorities is their under-investment in
development and excessive spending on the military and police forces. The SPDC
reports that 60% of its operating budget goes to the military. The actual
level
may be higher. Further mistakes include declining expenditures for health care
on a per capita basis. In 1995 health care expenditures were 62 kyats/person,
among the lowest in the world. Other mistakes are crippling the ability of the
economy to provide the kind of growth that would alleviate suffering.

According to a recent report by the United Nation's Working Group on Burma,
the
SPDC's efforts to reform the economy do "not have the underpinnings of
sustainable long-term growth. The agriculture sector, which accounts for the
greatest part of Burma's economy, is under strict input and out-put price
restrictions that have impoverished the 60 per cent of the population who are
small farmers. Foreign investment in capital-intensive areas is promoted, but
there is little investment in productive and labor-intensive sectors;
investment-led growth potential is minimal. Rising budget deficits are causing
sharp inflationary pressures.

Corruption, mismanagement, and the expanding narcotics economy pose equally
severe threats to the development of a legitimate economy. Opium poppy
cultivation, measured in acreage under poppy cultivation, has more than
doubled
since 1988.

Long-term development goals are also neglected. This best evidenced of
which is
the closure of the universities for 8 of the last 10 years. Efforts to control
political expression and information flows, as well as the inclination of the
authorities to cover up serious human emergencies for political reasons
prevent
the feedback necessary to redress complex emergency situations. For example,
information on AIDS epidemiology, natural disasters, forced migration, and
refugee repatriation is repressed. Burma has the world's most severe Internet
censorship law and information technology (e-mail and Internet) is restricted
to 200 carefully screened licensees. The restrictions are not only legal, but
also financial. The costs of 1,000 USD/license, leaves the Internet out of the
range of virtually all Burmese civilians.

Current Humanitarian Assistance Operations in Burma

A number of international NGO and UN organizations now maintain humanitarian
assistance programs in Burma. Their experience provides useful case-studies to
assess the impact of aid to relieve the humanitarian crisis.

Among the problems aid providers are encountering are bureaucratic
inefficiencies and delays. All NGOs require a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU)
from the respective government ministries to operate in the country.
Currently,
about one-third of NGOs based in the country are waiting for government
permission for their proposed activities. Some have waited over a year for
permission to begin activity--others have waited over 15 months only to be
denied. Even an MOU does not guarantee NGOs independence in selection of
project sites, hiring and other issues related to project implementation and
evaluation.

An effect NGOs are at risk of causing is that the provision of can free
government resources for other less benevolent uses. In the Burmese context,
humanitarian assistance enables the authorities to reallocate budgetary
resources in other activities, such as, security and defense. In the presence
of constant pressure from the World Bank and IMF to reduce government
spending,
the infusion of humanitarian assistance may also lead the government to cut
already meager spending on social services while maintaining high levels of
spending on security and the military.

Another risk entailed by providing humanitarian aid in Burma is that by
privileging populations favored by the authorities, NGOs risk funding the
regime's pacification campaigns. Finally, the presence of humanitarian and
relief agencies has been used by the junta to counter charges of human rights
violations and convey an impression of international legitimacy. Indeed, given
the limited scope and lengthy delays encountered by NGOs seeking to operate in
Burma, it is plausible that an appearance of legitimacy is the junta's
principal reason for allowing NGOs entry at all.

Recommendations for an operational framework for humanitarian aid

1.The international humanitarian and aid community should develop a strong
consensus on assistance to Burma. As a minimum, aid and development programs
must be transparent and carefully and independently monitored. 

2.Humanitarian aid providers should be in regular consultation with the
National League for Democracy in Rangoon, including the timely provision of
such technical assessment reports and other documentation necessary to make
consultation meaningful. Ethnic leaders should also be regularly consulted
regarding projects in their communities. 

3.In order to address the humanitarian crisis, donors need to recognize, and,
where possible, move toward addressing the root causes of the humanitarian
crisis--the unresolved political crisis initiated by SLORC's seizure of state
power in 1988.

4. Politically-based discrimination against particular categories of
recipients
(members of NLD and democratic movement in the case of Burma) is a
violation of
humanitarian principles. Aid tied to excluding elected leaders serves as
direct
support of the junta.

5. Donor organizations and governments are encouraged to create opportunities
for feedback and dialogue on technical policy issues and current practices
causing humanitarian hardship.

6. In the severely constrained political environment of 1999, international
organizations planning to respond the crises in Burma will likely need to
devise innovative relief strategies to meet the dual challenges of
humanitarian
emergencies and political exigencies. Such ideas might include:

6.1. cross-border assistance programs to expand the existing relief parameters
in the border areas;

6.2. an emphasis on capacity-building and training in relief delivery thus
strengthening the capability for sustainable self help and long term
development;

6.3 advocacy on part of the development community to influence the parties in
Burma to end the underlying political stalemate;

6.4 a decision making process that gives a greater role to the people of Burma
to participate in the discussions about aid initiatives that affect their
lives
and determine their futures.

7.The development of independent religious and community based NGOs in
operating humanitarian projects should be a conditionality of aid. 

8.The international community must increase its activities, through the United
Nations, ASEAN and with Burma's trading partners to push for a resolution of
the political crisis. Without such a resolution, the policies of the current
authorities will continue to both cause immense suffering and to prevent its
relief.

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BANGKOK POST: BORDER GATEWAY TO CASINO CLOSED
8 June, 1999 by Thirawat Kamthita

Pass helps local trade, says governor

Thais can no longer cross into Burma through the Sop-Ruek temporary checkpoint
in Mae Sai to gamble at the Golden Triangle casino.

Governor Vijarn Chaiyanant of Chiang Rai confirmed the restriction when he met
members of the House local administration panel, who had queried the decision
last October to open the checkpoint.

Samphan Lertnuwat, a local New Aspiration MP, called on the governor to close
the checkpoint, saying the casino, which is to open soon and is 1km away,
would
benefit directly.

Mr Vijarn said the opening of the checkpoint had nothing to do with the casino
but was aimed purely at promoting trade among people from Burma, Laos and
Thailand.

"Only Burmese and Laotians can use the checkpoint to cross into Ban Sop-Ruek
and Ban Wang Lao during the day," he said. "Thai people cannot cross the
border
from this checkpoint." Local gamblers had to use the Chiang Saen pass, 10km
away.

The casino is reportedly owned by Prasit Pohsuthon, an elder brother of Mr
Prapat, a deputy interior deputy minister and a member of Chart Thai.

Boosarin Tiyapairat, manager of the provincial administration organisation,
had
supported the opening. Most Chiang Rai councillors felt local people would
benefit, she said, but a few local politicians had opposed the opening.

Pol Lt-Gen Viroj Pao-in, a Chart Thai MP and panel member, inspected the
checkpoint and the Chiang Saen border pass and said the governor had acted
within his authority. Furthermore, the temporary checkpoint had undoubtedly
helped boost local trade.

The Ang Thong MP, who is deputy chairman of the panel, said confusion erupted
over the governor's decision to open the checkpoint amid attempts to link
it to
the gambling den.

"Whether there is a casino on the other side of the checkpoint or not is
irrelevant since it is beyond our borders," Pol Lt-Gen Viroj added.
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