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The BurmaNet News: August 4, 1999



------------------------ BurmaNet ------------------------
 "Appropriate Information Technologies, Practical Strategies"
----------------------------------------------------------

The BurmaNet News: August 4, 1999
Issue #1329

HEADLINES:
==========
JANE'S: SET TO REJECT THE LESSONS OF HISTORY 
SHAN: YAWDSERK INVADES NORTHERN SHAN STATE 
XINHUA: MYANMAR ESTABLISHES TIES WITH AZERBAIJAN 
NATION: KARENS RELEASED 
NATION: SIGN REFUGEE CONVENTION AND EARN RESPECT 
ANNOUNCEMENT: NEW ABSDF PUBLICATION AVAILABLE 
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JANE'S INTELLIGENCE REVIEW: BURMA LOOKS SET TO REJECT THE LESSONS OF HISTORY 
1 August, 1999 by Kay Merrill

To the casual observer, it might have seemed that the State Peace and
Development Council (SPDC) in Rangoon showed only a passing interest in the
collapse of Suharto's military-backed regime in Jakarta. However, Burma has
long looked upon Indonesia as a role model and, as Kay Merrill reports, the
country would do well to profit from the lessons that Suharto was forced to
learn the hard way. 

When President Suharto of Indonesia was forced to resign in May 1998 after
widespread and often violent demonstrations, his removal barely rated a
short wire service story on the inside pages of Burma's state-controlled
daily newspaper, the New Light of Myanmar. 

To the casual observer, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in
Rangoon showed only a passing interest in the dramatic collapse of the
military-backed regime, which had ruled Indonesia more than 30 years, and
the fall from power of a major political figure who had come to dominate
Southeast Asian affairs.

Yet the newspaper's low-key report was deceptive. In fact, Burma's ruling
military hierarchy watched developments in Indonesia very closely, and even
drew lessons for the survival of its own government. 

HISTORICAL LINKS 

When Burma's armed forces (the Tatmadaw) took back direct control of the
country in 1988, the new State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC)
looked first to China for diplomatic and military support, but it turned to
the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) for models of political
and economic development. 

Singapore was an early focus of attention and remains a close ally, but it
was Indonesia that held a special attraction for Burma's new military
rulers. Observing Suharto's 'New Order' government, the SLORC saw an
example of how a military regime could achieve internal stability and
economic growth without losing international respectability and the
external assistance needed to promote further development. 

Burma had long felt that it had much in common with Indonesia. Both had
experienced Western colonial rule and, to a greater or lesser extent, had
fought against it. The young nationalists of both countries had supported
the Japanese overthrow of the Western powers in Asia during the Second
World War and welcomed the military training which Japan's armed forces had
provided for them. After the war, these nationalist armies led the
resistance which was mounted against the return of the colonial powers, and
leading nationalist figures in both countries later rose to wider political
prominence. Also, as newly independent Asian countries caught between the
two competing superpowers, Burma and Indonesia helped form the Non-Aligned
Movement at Bandung in 1955. 


After the 1960s, there were other similarities. Burmese President Ne Win
felt a strong personal kinship with President Suharto. Both were career
military officers who had relied on loyal supporters within the armed
forces to seize power: Ne Win in 1962 and Suharto in 1966. They had both
used the army ruthlessly to consolidate their political positions and to
introduce systems of government which, while ostensibly civilian and
democratic, thinly disguised the continuance of military rule. Despite
persistent criticism of their human-rights records and accusations of
personal corruption, both leaders cherished the notion that they had
rescued their country from internal disorder and external threats,
including Chinese-backed communism. 

After 1988, when the SLORC was re-assessing Ne Win's disastrous political
and economic policies, Burma's new generation of military rulers was
attracted to the Indonesian concept of dwi fungsi (dual function) under
which the armed forces formally exercised both military and socio-political
roles. Such a system not only offered the SLORC an alternative to the
enormous and moribund bureaucratic structure left behind by Ne Win's
abandoned Burma Socialist Programme Party, but it also justified more
direct intervention in the administration of the country by the armed
forces. This interest culminated in the visit to Indonesia by a large
Burmese study group led by the SLORC's first secretary, Lieutenant General
Khin Nyunt, in 1993. 

MODERN TIES 

Ever since Burma regained its independence in 1948, the Tatmadaw has played
a significant role in the country's government and participated widely in
both economic and social affairs. Before 1988 these activities were
constrained by the army's small size and pre-occupation with internal
conflicts. Over the past 10 years, however, the situation has changed
dramatically: Burma's armed forces, which numbered about 186,000 in 1988,
have been expanded to their current levels, numbering nearly 400,000. In
large part, this has been to permit the army's greater use as a direct
extension of the Rangoon government - particularly in the more remote areas
of the country. The commanders-in-chief of the three services, for example,
have civil administrative functions as well as exercising their normal
security roles, as do the 12 regional military commanders and many of their
subordinates. In some parts of Burma units of the armed forces are the only
signs of a central government presence. 

The SLORC's attempts to create a tame civilian parliament, initially
through the means of a constitutional convention, also seem to have been
inspired by the Indonesian model. As is still the case in Jakarta, the
proposed parliament in Rangoon would have a civilian face but be controlled
by armed forces appointees and supporters. It would exercise certain
administrative and ceremonial functions, but real power would remain firmly
with the armed forces hierarchy. Under such a constitution, the new Burmese
president would be a former military officer (as was the case in Indonesia
under Suharto). In late 1993 the SLORC even created a mass organisation
called the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), which in
many ways mirrored Indonesia's state-controlled Golkar Party. There are
already clear signs that the Rangoon regime plans to use the USDA to
mobilise and co-opt the civil population into public support for the new
parliament and other state institutions. 


In trying to follow the Indonesian model, however, the Burmese leadership
made a fundamental mistake: it failed to recognise that the Indonesian
socio-political system which at first seemed so attractive was in fact more
than 30 years old. It was already becoming increasingly difficult to
sustain in the much more complex and sophisticated Indonesia of the 1980s
and 1990s. President Suharto had belatedly recognised that he needed
civilian expertise to manage a modern economy and there were even some in
Indonesia's armed forces (ABRI) who advocated less direct involvement in
national politics. The growing middle class demanded a greater say in the
management of their country. Indonesia's impressive economic boom also
proved to be illusory, based as it was on over-confidence, nepotism and
weak financial institutions. Corruption was rife. As quickly became
apparent last year, the 'New Order' government was a lot more fragile than
it appeared. 

In misreading the Indonesian situation so badly, however, the SLORC (and
its successor, the SPDC) may perhaps be forgiven, as President Suharto and
his supporters made the same mistake. 

BURMA ALONE 

In the face of Indonesia's comprehensive political, economic and social
collapse, Burma's military leaders have been asking themselves whether they
need to revise their own strategy to perpetuate military rule and improve
the country's ailing economic fortunes. In the past, when such obstacles
have been struck, the natural course for the Burmese leadership has been to
retreat into the past. In these circumstances, attempts have been made to
play down events, including in the state-controlled news media (Suharto's
overthrow last year was publicly portrayed in Burma almost as an orderly
and constitutional transfer of power). Also, senior government figures have
been quick to deny that the experience of other regional countries is
relevant to Burma, citing its unique character and historical
self-sufficiency. At the same time, however, policies which smack of
isolationism and xenophobia have been introduced or strengthened. All the
signs are that, in the wake of Suharto's downfall, this will happen again. 

Despite the extreme hardships caused to the civil population by its
doctrinaire and self-sufficiency policies, Burma's military government has
always prided itself on its ability to withstand the political and economic
shocks which have shaken its neighbours. Burma has considerable natural
wealth and has enjoyed diplomatic, military and economic support from
countries such as China and Singapore since 1988. In addition, the low
level of international investment in Burma and its relative isolation from
global markets has spared it many of the problems which the Asian financial
crisis has caused other countries in the region. As a consequence, the
Rangoon regime has been able to survive despite sanctions imposed by the
Western democracies on trade, aid and finance, as well as persistent
criticism of its human-rights record in international fora. In some
sectors, such as defence, Burma has even become stronger. 


This record, backed by very strong feelings of national identity, has
encouraged Burma's military leaders to believe that their country is
relatively immune to the effects of popular movements of the kind which
have brought down autocratic regimes in places like Indonesia, the
Philippines and South Korea. In that sense at least, Burma is seen as being
more like China. In 1989, for example, the Beijing government responded to
popular demonstrations in Tienanmen Square very much as the Rangoon regime
did to widespread pro-democracy demonstrations in 1988. 

This is not to say that the SPDC is oblivious to the dangers of
demonstrations of the kind which occurred in Jakarta last year. Much like
Indonesia, Burma is a large country made up of many disparate ethnic,
social and religious groups, few of which feel any particular loyalty
towards the central government. Like President Suharto and ABRI, Ne Win and
the leaders of the Tatmadaw have long subscribed to the view that only by
having a strong national government in Rangoon, supported by loyal armed
forces, can these potentially destructive centrifugal forces effectively be
countered and the country kept together. In recent years senior Burmese
officials have been fond of citing the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia as
examples of how a weak government, without the determination or means to
enforce its will, inevitably leads to internal unrest and the fragmentation
of the country. The example of Indonesia, with its problems at the centre
and troubles in Kalimantan, Aceh, Ambon, East Timor and Irian Jaya, will
now doubtless be added to this list. 

Also, Burma's intelligence agencies have taken careful note of the fact
that the rioting which took place in Indonesia last year was greatly
exacerbated by the spiralling cost of rice. They know that the rice price
is also a very sensitive issue in Burma, which has a long history of
economic discontent rapidly becoming more overtly political in tone. As a
consequence, the SPDC is currently putting additional effort into keeping
the price of rice down through increased production, double cropping and
improved distribution systems. If it was felt to be necessary, the Rangoon
regime would probably even be prepared to restrict rice exports, despite
its critical need for foreign exchange, in order to keep the lid on renewed
popular unrest. 

In any case, should there be signs of a major breakdown in internal
security in Burma, then it would be dealt with far more harshly than was
the case in Indonesia. In 1988, for example, the Tatmadaw shot down more
than 3,000 unarmed pro-democracy demonstrators in the streets of Burma's
major cities. Many more were imprisoned and tortured. This could well
happen again. Indeed, according to one recent visitor to Rangoon, there are
many senior military officers in Burma who feel that President Suharto's
greatest mistake last year was not to crack down very hard on the
protesters in Jakarta as soon as serious demonstrations started to occur.
Had he done so, their argument runs, then Suharto would have been able to
nip the disturbances in the bud and remain in power. 


In making this judgement, the Burmese army officers concerned clearly
assume that, as in 1988, their soldiers would remain loyal to the regime
and be prepared to follow even the harshest orders. Yet this may not be the
case. With the massive expansion of the armed forces over the past 10 years
the Tatmadaw has lost much of the cohesion and professionalism which marked
its earlier days. Also, in the 1990 general elections, many in the armed
forces actually voted for Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy.
As a consequence, there are many in the Burmese democracy movement now who
hope that, in the event of another outbreak of popular unrest, at least
some elements in the Tatmadaw would behave as their Indonesian counterparts
appear to have done, and urge restraint - even in the face of a concerted
challenge to continued military rule. This possibility has also been
recognised by the regime itself, which has taken concerted measures to
detect any signs of a mutiny. 

LESSONS LEARNED? 

Indonesia's collapse and Suharto's downfall offer Burma's leaders a number
of important lessons - if they are prepared to learn them. Yet the chances
are that they will either misread the signs, or come to their own
self-serving conclusions. 

Judged on its past record, there seems little prospect that the Rangoon
regime will follow Indonesia's lead and, reluctantly or not, investigate
ways to make the transition to a more open, democratic and civilian
government. Nor are there any signs that the SPDC will recognise, as did
Suharto, that military skills alone are insufficient to run a modern
country in today's world. On the contrary, the Indonesian experience seems
only to have hardened the SPDC's resolve to hang on to power and encouraged
it to strengthen its isolationist and repressive policies. The measures the
Rangoon regime is now taking seem to be formulated on the basis that if it
can ignore or suppress such trends in Burma, then the rest of the world
will pass it by. 

[Kay Merrill is a freelance author specialising in Asian affairs.]

*****************************************************
 
SHAN HERALD AGENCY FOR NEWS: YAWDSERK INVADES NORTHERN SHAN STATE
29 July, 1999 

Reliable sources both from the border and the north report that the Shan
States Army led by Yawdserk has since early June been penetrating Northern
Shan State. 

The Surhkhanfah Column, about 900 strong, commanded by Lt. Murngzuen,
Yawdserk's second-in-command, began crossing the Maenam Lawng, that divides
Southern Shan State from the North and entered Lashio District beginning
the first week of June. 

Their purpose seems to be to occupy the areas under SPDC-sponsored
Anti-Insurgency Militia units led by ex-MTA commanders, Bo Mon and Ma
Kuowen. According to some ceasefire sources, Yawdserk had vowed to reach
the Chinese border in the Mao Valley. 

"As a result of the forced relocations during the last three years, the
southern areas are depleted", said another source. "That may be one of the
reasons for the penetration into the north where there has been no war
since Khun Sa's surrender in 1996". 


On 21-22 June, Maj-Gen Tin Aung Myint Oo, Commander of the Northern
Command traveled to Wanpong to meet Col. Parngfah, Chief of Staff of the
Shan States Army North and Commander of the 1st Brigade, and persuade the
ceasefire groups to prevent Yawdserk from crossing their areas into the
North. Their minimum demand was that the SSA-N did not lend assistance to
Yawdserk. 

On 24 June, SPDC's battalions, lB 68 and lB 71, fired at each other by
mistake in Mawha area. "There were some casualties on both sides", said the
source. "But the exact numbers of the dead and wounded are not known". 

People, according to the source, are worried that Yawdserk and Parngfah
might he fighting each other instead of fighting against the SPDC. "Shans
fighting against Shans- we don't want it any more", said the source. 

There is also concern that Yawdserk's expansion into the north might spark
another massive forced relocation drive by the junta. 

N.B. The Shan State Army a.k.a the Shan States Army North together with the
Shan State National Army a.k.a Shan States Army Central have ceasefire
agreements with the SPDC. The Shan States Army South of Yawdserk, however,
has been denied a truce by the junta. 

*****************************************************

XINHUA: MYANMAR ESTABLISHES DIPLOMATIC TIES WITH AZERBAIJAN 
2 August, 1999 

YANGON (Aug. 3) XINHUA - Myanmar established diplomatic relations with
Azerbaijan Tuesday at ambassadorial level, according to a press communique
issued by the Myanmar Foreign Ministry. 

Azerbaijan is the 78th country in the world with which Myanmar has
established diplomatic ties since its independence in 1948. 

Since 1988 when the present government came to power, Myanmar has
established ties with more countries including Peru, Venezuela, Colombia,
Papua New Guinea, Brunei, Brazil, South Africa, Kenya, Kuwait and Ukraine. 

Myanmar has opened 29 embassies, two permanent missions and two
consulates-general in various parts of the world, according to the ministry. 

*****************************************************

THE NATION: KARENS RELEASED
3 August, 1999 

Mae Hong Son - Burmese troops yesterday handed over four Karens who were
kidnapped by unidentified armed intruders from a border shop at Ban Mai
Sapae, Muang district, on July 23. 

After several rounds of talks between border police and Burmese troops and
a plea from a missionary to Rangoon, the four who included a former Burmese
student, two Karen soldiers and a missionary, were released to Thai
officials at Ban Doi Saeng, Tambon Pang Mu, Maung district. The four were
sent to Ban Pang Trac-tor temporary camp for questioning.

*****************************************************

THE NATION: SIGN THE REFUGEE CONVENTION AND EARN WORLD RESPECT 
2 August, 1999 by Kavi Chongkittavorn

EDITORIAL & OPINION 

The recent spate of incidents along the Thai-Burmese border involving
refugees, drugs and the demarcation line require a new thinking on the part
of Thailand. 

One of the most important ways to gradually settle the Thai-Burmese border
issues is to deal with the influx of Burmese refugees differently. In fact,
the time has come for the Thai government to give full protection to
innocent refugees living along the Thai-Burmese border. To do so, the Chuan
government must accede without delay to the United Nations Convention
relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951. 


By dragging its feet on this, as the government has done over the past
four decades, would only hold Thailand and its national security interests
hostage to the porous Thai-Burmese border as well as the junta leaders in
Burma. 

The recent announcement by the National Security Council that Thailand
would repatriate 90,000 Burmese displaced persons within three years is a
retrogressive step, given the long history of Thai hospitality and
diplomacy. Those refugees who are safe inside Thailand should be allowed to
stay and those who want to return voluntary should be able to do so
anytime. The refugees, however, must not be forcibly sent back. Such an
action would not only contravene Thai social responsibility, but it also
violates United Nations principles. 

Even with the ongoing economic crisis that hit the country two years ago,
Thailand remains a popular destination for the destitute escaping from
political oppression and poverty in their bid to seek jobs and a better
life. Above all, the Thais are hospitable people. Most of these people are
coming from Burma these days. They can literally cross the 2,420-kilometre
Thai-Burmese border at will, albeit under the watchful eyes of the border
patrol police. 

Both the Karens and the Shans, the two major minorities that have relied on
Thailand's generosity, have long historical links with the Thais. Their
peoples have been summarily suppressed and intimidated, forcing them to
cross over to the Thai side for safety reasons. These minorities are still
waging a war of liberation against the Burmese security forces. 

Although Thai-Burmese relations have improved over the past months, it has
not yet reached the level of mutual trust that warrants major breakthroughs
in refugee issues, drugs suppression, and above all, border security. 

Beginning this year, the Foreign Ministry has become more accommodating
with Rangoon in the hope that it could influence positive changes in Burma.
As the new Asean chairman, Thailand wants to ensure some progress in
Burma's political situation, as well as improvements along the Thai-Burmese
border. 

In recent months, the border security in northern Thailand with adjacent
areas to Burma has become very tense. These areas have now become great
sources of heroin and amphetamines before they reach the rest of the world.
The Burmese side has yet to provide full cooperation to wipe out this
illicit trade. Like Thailand, the international community is increasingly
willing to cooperate with Burma on drug-related issues while maintaining a
firm position on human rights and democracy. 

Army chief Gen Surayud Chulanont, since he took over this powerful position
eight months ago, has adopted a no-nonsense policy on the Thai-Burmese
border. Any border incursions by the Burmese forces would be responded to
with the strongest measures possible. The security forces have been
instructed to be professional and to avoid shady transactions. Transparency
along border areas has since increased tremendously. 

Last July, Thailand invited the UN High Commissioner for Refugees to play a
bigger role in taking care of the Burmese refugees living in settlements
along the Thai-Burmese border. It was a good decision. But the government
needs to go further in facilitating the work of UNHCR and other
international relief organisations. After all, Thailand has nothing to hide. 


Thailand should utilise the good office of UNHCR by expanding the
organisation's access to the border areas. Existing facilities in Mae Hong
Son and Kanchanaburi are no longer sufficient to deal with situation. 

UNHCR and other international relief organisations have assisted Thailand
to cope with its refugee problems on humanitarian grounds. But to guarantee
the refugees' safety, Thailand needs to do more. These border refugees have
from time to time resettled in new camps deep inside the Thai territory to
ensure that they would be safe from possible attacks and incursions from
the Burmese military. And they should be allowed to remain. Moving them
back would gravely endanger their lives. 

Thai officials have been engaging in a self-indulgence game by arguing that
Thailand has done more than its fair share to assist and provide shelter to
the refugees for the past 30 years. Thailand's cooperation with the
international community over the Cambodian refugees epitomised Thai
generosity, they said. So, there is no need to accede to the 1951 convention. 

To persist on this line of argument is totally missing the point. Thailand
must come out of the closet in dealing with its refugees, an issue that
will not go away as long as human security in neighbouring countries does
not improve. The four decades of engaging the Karen refugees and their
armed elements should provide valuable lessons for the Thais. Thai
authorities have to recognise that these issues are long-standing and need
a coherent and well-defined policy -- not a knee-jerk policy every time
there is an incursion by the Burmese troops. 

The Chuan government must weigh carefully the pros and cons in dealing with
the refugees. By acceding to the 1951 convention, Thailand will be a
responsible partner of the world community. What kind of achievements has
the country attained in the past by avoiding its international commitment
on refugees, other than more agonies and internal conflicts? 

After all, this is not a zero-sum game. It will also be the first step in
tackling complicated border issues, particularly the refugee problems, as
they can be effectively dealt with in a transparent manner and with the
assistance of the international community.

*****************************************************

ANNOUNCEMENT: NEW ABSDF PUBLICATION AVAILABLE 
3 August, 1999 

We'd like to inform you that ABSDF had released a new publication. The
title of the book is "Letters to Dictator (Part II)" and it is published in
Burmese. The book contains letters from U Aung Shwe, Chairman of the
National League for Democracy, to chairman of SPDC from August, 1997 to
May, 1999. It addresses several important incidents of suppression of the
military regime of Burma on the National League for Democracy. 

Anybody who wants to get hard copy can send an order to ABSDF documentation
centre by e.mail or postal mail to following addresses:

E.mail address: dawn@xxxxxxxxxxxx 
Postal Address: P.O Box 23 
Maesariang P.O. 
Maesariang 58110 
Thailand

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