[Fwd: THE CALL OF REVOLUTION ON 9.9

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Subject: [Fwd: THE CALL OF REVOLUTION ON 9.9.99]

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Subject: THE CALL OF REVOLUTION ON 9.9.99 
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<bold>THE CALL OF REVOLUTION ON 9.9.99

</bold>

<bold>W</bold>ith whatever name they call it, it is a clarion call to the
people of Burma not to waste any more time to bring down the ruthless
military junta, come what may! Nine years have passed since holding the
general elections in which the National League for Democracy (NLD) led by
Ms Aung San Suu Kyi won a landslide victory. Yet the generals remained
entrenched in their power and show no signs of abdication. They seem
unmindful to the world's collective disapproval.=20


In spite of world-wide criticism and sporadic anti-junta actions, the
State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) regime seems quite
comfortable. They feel in no way threatened with the call like four nines
and regard it as a few more noises that will pass off as non-events. The
military has reasons to think so. The NLD has been almost denuded. The
junta has not only doubled the size of the armed forces to an estimated
450,000 personnel but also increased the pervasive surveillance activity
of its intelligence arm-- the Directorate of Defence Service Intelligence
(DDSI) and a number of other intelligence agencies-- which has
infiltrated into almost all dissident groups and monitor their activities
including phone, fax and e-mail links. Persons noticed of having involved
in any semblance of dissent are picked up and thrown behind the bar. More
importantly, they are well prepared for any eventuality this time rather
than 1988 when they were caught by surprise.


On the diplomatic side there is a lot of relief for the SPDC. The EU
seems to have changed its tack from its previous tough stance. It sent a
delegation to Rangoon in the month of July to start a new relationship
with SPDC.  The SPDC did not have to cope with an avalanche of criticism
at the latest meeting of the ARF (the Association of South East Asian
Nations' regional forum) in Singapore unlike previous year. The tune and
tenor of the utterances by the US Secretary of State, Ms. Madelaine
Albright, at this year's ARF session points to Washington's qualitatively
different concerns now. Ideas of the involvement of the World Bank and
the UN to grant economic aid to SPDC has been mooted with a view to goad
it into dialogue with Ms Suu Kyi. UN special envoy Mr. Desoto and some
World Bank officials are due to visit Rangoon very shortly to fathom
these possibilities.=20


On the other hand the opposition democratic activists envisage that this
is the best time to incite an uprising forcing the junta to sit on the
negotiating table.  They contend that the Burmese economy is in a
shambles, investors have fled, universities are mostly closed and common
men have to pass a life of such extreme hardship that it has reached to
the proportion of the blowing point of 1988.


However, both Burmese oppositions and international quarters eager for a
change in Burma seemed to have failed to understand the peculiar
character and mentality of the ruling junta as well as that of the
Burmese masses, thus wavering in their indecisiveness. One thing should
be clear to all. The military junta cannot be persuaded to relinquish
power contrary to what some quarters still hope for, unless it is
compelled to do so by whatever means it may be. At the same time a mass
uprising to the extent of forcing the junta to quit cannot be organised
contrary to what some Burmese opposition politicians wish for. As long as
the military remains united in Burma neither persuasion nor the so-called
uprising could succeed. The unique character of the Burmese army is that
the whole institution has become like a particular class among Burmese
people which has neither sympathy nor love for their suffering countrymen
belonging to a different class. Their main concern is how to defeat the
other class and remain ever attached with power. Excepting a few military
top brass, behind whom the intelligence network follows like their
shadows, all others who are at the helms of affairs bear the same
mentality and are absolutely drunk with power. They would never allow
personal differences to supersede their common interest. The ordinary
soldiers are brainwashed systematically or coerced to worship them. This
is the only reason why even after the massacre of 3000 innocent
countrymen in 1988, the military remained undivided.


But for the armed forces of other third world countries, their position
is different. They are patriotic; they would not allow themselves to be
used by the dictators up to any length and breadth at the cost of the
country. Although the Philippines army stood behind Marcos initially,
they disowned him when they realised that their support to Marcos shall
affect the interest of the country, thus making peoples power triumph.
The same situation was with the President Suharto of Indonesia. There is
a new dimension, however, in the case of Shah Reza Pehlvi in the Iranian
revolution. The Iranian army had unflinching support for the Shah because
they had been raised as a privileged class by the Shah to defend his
interest. However the mass uprising in the Iranian revolution was so
powerful, so massive and people so readily embraced martyrdom that the
Shah's army could not withstand and control the upsurge. They were forced
to give in. The loyalty demonstrated by the Iranians to the call of
Ayatollah Khomeini was unique in the sense that Iranians took the call as
their religious obligation according to their faith. That kind of loyalty
and response could not be expected by any mundane leaders in Burma,
either by Ms Suu Kyi or anyone else.


The possible way out for Burma could have been to apply gunboat diplomacy
of the US which succeeded recently in Haiti. But it seemed impossible in
Burma given her geographical proximity with her lone backer, China, and
ASEAN countries which shall not agree to any kind of foreign intervention
in their area.


Application of economic sanctions or arms embargo would be least
effective to compel the junta to leave because unlike other third world
countries which are dependant on foreign donation and loan, the Burmese
regime could roll on very easily with the vast natural resources at their
disposal, the black money they earn from narcotic trade and a neighbour
ready to fulfil all their military requirements. Economic sanctions in
Burma could have only adverse effects on the population which the junta
does not bother at all.=20


The only perceivable way to get rid of this military junta is to wage a
relentless national revolution unitedly by the whole Burmese people
irrespective of whether they are ethnic Burman or other ethnic
nationalities. It is the only way by which an oppressed nation can win
over a strong enemy. The SPDC shall surely face the same fate of former
dictator Mobuto of Zaire (now the Republic of Congo) if a sustained, well
co-ordinated and well-planned movement is launched against it.


The last 50 years of insurgency was waged mainly by the ethnic national
minorities and to some extent by Burmese people on ideological basis
which could not assume the shape of a national revolution. However, the
pre-requisite condition to succeed in such a case is the need for a
strong national unity irrespective of caste, creed and religion. Efforts
to forge national unity and solidarity has been made albeit the presence
of some thorny issues still to be resolved. Unfortunately the Rohingyas
of Arakan having a major population in Burma still continue to remain
outside the mainstream opposition forces due to their ambivalence
attitude. A well thought out strategy in this direction shall have to be
chalked out and implemented without further delay in response to the call
of 9999.


Central Committee

Arakan Rohingya National Organisation (ARNO) =20