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15-OCT-99:BURMA-TIME FOR U.N. ENGAG



WRITTEN 27 OCTOBER 1999, 6:00AM

BURMA: TIME FOR U.N. ENGAGEMENT
(A REPORT TO 54TH SESSION OF UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY)
*************************************************
 15  October 1999 
 by  Dr U Ne Oo Adelaide, Australia

I. Burma in the Year 1998-1999

In reviewing this year's human rights and political developments in
Burma, one can only describe it as a year of stalemate and setbacks [1].
The international community's efforts to bring dialogue to Burma were
unsuccessful mainly because of the ruling military junta's refusal to
enter negotiation with the opposition party, The National League for
Democracy. The autocratic military rulers in Burma are beginning to
reveal their true colours with regard to the issues of democracy and
human rights, free-market economy and open society. As the junta have no
will to share state power, it ignored the offer by the opposition to
accommodate the military within a new democratic administration. Despite
promises made in 1988/89 to transform Burma to a free-market economy,
the non-progressive Burmese military leaders have been seen in recent
years to retreat back to isolationist economic policies of the socialist
era [2] . On account of the severity of the military's repression of
opposition,  combined with the continuing non-cooperation with the
United Nations and international community, it can be concluded that the
military junta has no intention to negotiate with the opposition or to
relinquish state power. 

As a direct consequence of the lack of observance in the rule of law and
due processes, corruption within government has become common. There is
disturbing evidence emerging about Burmese military units as well as 
top-ranking officials being involved in the illicit drug trade. The
Burmese military government has been well known for its complicity in
drug money-laundering activities from the time it came into power in
September 1988. Recently, reliable reports have indicated that some top
level Burmese military leaders have been involved in the production and
sale of heroin and amphetamine-type-stimulants to neighbouring countries
and to the world [3] . 

As the year ends, the junta has made no effort to solve the protracted
refugee problem in Burma. The military government continues to use
forced labour, forced relocation and to confiscate  agricultural land,
especially in ethnic minority areas. The result has been  further
outflows of refugees to neighbouring countries. The problems for
internally displaced people as well as `dispersed people' (a form of
internal displacement)  continue  within the country [4]. 

Because of escalating human rights problems, the UN General Assembly
since 1991 has been strengthening its resolution on Burma. The military
junta, however, has adopted an attitude of `non-cooperation' towards the
General Assembly resolutions and United Nations' human rights mechanism.
Due to the junta's non-cooperation, the International Labour
Organisation expelled the junta delegate from participating in ILO
meetings. 

Large scale and protracted refugee problems in neighbouring countries,
continuing political instability and human rights abuses against Burmese
citizens and the increasing production and distribution to the world of
illicit drugs indicate that the situation in Burma has become a threat
to  international peace and security. The UN and international community
must take practical steps to solve the problems in Burma. 

It is world renown fact that the Burmese democracy leadership is
committed to non-violent endeavours in bringing about political changes
in Burma. However, because the military at the top-ranking level are now
involved in institutionalised corruption,  non-violent political action
alone will not be adequate to redress the problems. The United Nations
Security Council and international community must intervene where
necessary to deal with Burmese military leaders who are
directly involved with the illicit drug trade. The United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights must also launch an investigation into the
serious human rights violations, such as death in custody cases and the
massacres that took place in Shan State in Eastern Burma [5] . Efforts
should also be made to bring justice to the criminals involved in the
drug trade as well as the perpetrators of human rights violations
against the citizens of Burma. 

The situation in Burma calls for a serious engagement of the UN and the
international community. An integrated approach which links humanitarian
action with the protection of human rights will be needed to tackle
Burma's refugee and displaced peoples problem. International
humanitarian action should be formulated within the framework of 
peacekeeping and longer term democratic institution building. Political
and human rights problems must be addressed in a comprehensive manner
and tackled in an integrated fashion by concerned actors, i.e.national
political forces, the United Nations and the international community.
The United Nations General Assembly must firstly set the rule of
engagement with both the military junta and the democratically elected
legislators. 

II. Intransigence of Military Leadership 

Despite the international community and democratic opposition's desire
to promote reconciliation with the military leadership, the Burmese
military junta is refusing to enter into meaningful dialogue with the
National League for Democracy, the main opposition party. By observing
the  behaviour of the military junta it can be concluded that the
military authorities will not voluntarily engage in dialogue or pave the
way for a transition to democracy. The international community and the
United Nations must employ more vigorous and effective strategies in
dealing with the situation in Burma in order to prevent a possible
escalation of political and human rights conflict in Burma. 

As for the questions of human rights in Burma, the UN General Assembly
first considered it in 1991 and the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights
was appointed in subsequent year. The military government, on the other
hand, has never admitted there is a human rights problem in Burma nor
has it agreed with the UN General Assembly appointing the Human Rights
Special Rapporteur. Not surprisingly, the Burmese junta has adopted the
attitude of `non-cooperation' towards the United Nations and its human
rights mechanism [6] . It follows that the communications from the
Special Rapporteur have not been officially replied to by the Burmese
military government [7] . The ILO Commission of Inquiry for forced
labour in Burma has also received the same treatment from the military
government. 

The military government's non-cooperation with the United Nations, 
combined with continuing refusal to authorise the visit of the Special
Rapporteur to Burma calls for more substantial effort to be made by UN
General Assembly in implementing its resolution. In particular, the UN
General Assembly should point out in its resolution that the junta's
non-cooperation with the United Nations mechanisms indeed are in
violation of United Nations Charter 55 & 56. 

This report focuses on four subjects described in the UNGA resolution:
(1) forced labour (2) the situation of refugees (3) repression of
political dissidents and (4) the question of the transition to
democracy. Because the UN General Assembly resolutions  are non-binding
on its member states and, therefore, the United Nations cannot enforce
compliance of the Burmese military government. However, one possible
solution is for the UN General Assembly to spell out the details of its
resolution in a more descriptive manner. In this way, the international
community and all concerned political actors can follow through in
implementing the resolution. 
  
2.1 Forced Labour 

The practice of forced labour under the current military regime has been
extensively documented by international human rights organisations and
especially by the UN Special Rapporteur since 1992. The General Assembly
in its 1996 Session took another step to authorise the International
Labour Organisation (ILO) to conduct an inquiry into the practice of
forced labour by the Burmese military Government. The ILO's Governing
Body consequently set up its commission of inquiry and its finding and
recommendations were brought to the attention of the 53rd UN General
Assembly in 1998. The 53rd Session of UN General Assembly urged the
Government of Myanmar  to ``... implement the recommendations of the ILO
Commission of Inquiry regarding the implementation of the Forced Labour
Convention, and encourages further communication between the Government
and the ILO". The ILO, in accordance with its competence and mandate,
took measures to rewrite the Village and Towns Acts in Burma. 

>From the outset of that inquiry, the Burmese military government ignored
the invitation from ILO Commission of Inquiry to participate in the
discussion. The ILO's request to rewrite Village and Town Acts and for
the compliance with other recommendations were not met. Since the
Burmese military junta failed to comply with the request of the ILO
Director-General, the ILO Governing Body subsequently expelled the
delegate of SPDC/SLORC from participating in future meetings [8] .  It
is  clear that to redress the situation of forced labour on the ground,
the UN General Assembly must authorise the sending in of in-country
human rights monitors to Burma. 

2.2 Refugees and Internally displaced people 

The plight of Burma's refugees and displaced people continues in 1998-99
because the United Nations and international community's failure to
tackle the root causes of displacement. The extent of the problem of
refugees and displaced people in Burma is summarised in the United
States Committee for Refugees' yearly report as: [9] 
  
"More than 238,000 Burmese refugees   were in neighboring countries in 
1998: 140,000 in Thailand, 40,000 in  India, 53,000 in Bangladesh, 5,100
in  Malaysia, and an unknown number in China. About 350,000 Burmese 
lived in  refugee-like circumstances in Thailand. Many may have fled
Burma because they feared   persecution. An estimated 500,000 to one
million Burmese were internally displaced. Although a general lack of
access and information made this number difficult to verify, a May 1998
USCR site visit to Burma confirmed that internal displacement is a
significant crisis there."

Currently, an estimated 53,000 Rohingyas including 21,000 residual cases
under the care of UNHCR have been in Bangladesh. There has been little
progress in the UN supervised repatriation program for the Rohingyas
during this year. 

There are unknown numbers of ethnic Chin displaced persons in India's
North Eastern States of Mizoram, Manipur and Assam, in addition to
40,000 Burmese refugees which include student activists. Initial
investigations from local Chin human rights groups cited the forced
relocation from expanded military control and the accompanying forced
labor, extortion, confiscation of land, religious persecution, and
so-called ``Burmanization'' plan of the military government as the root
cause of the displacement. 
  
The largest number of Burmese refugees reside in Thailand. Root causes
for the flight of these refugee have also been forced labour, forced
relocation within the context of counter-insurgency campaigns and the
confiscation of property, i.e. food and basic items by government troops
[10].  Amnesty International in June 1999 reports  details of its
findings regarding  the refugees from Karen, Karenni and Shan States
[11] . Although there appears to be a decrease in the use of forced
labour in central Burma, all these reports indicate the continued
practice of forced labour and portering by government troops in ethnic
minority areas. One should also note that, since 1992,  Burmese military
in their counter-insurgency operation have been increasingly targetting
the civilian population instead of the rebels. 

As a result of the counter insurgency campaign in Karen State, i.e.
forced relocation, an estimated 480,000 Karen people (30 % of the
population) are internally displaced since 1992. In addition, 84,000
Karens took refuge in Thailand under the care of the UNHCR. 

In Karenni State, there have been 20,000-30,000 people forcibly
relocated since 1996. These people were forced to remain in
life-threatening conditions in the relocation centres,  lacking 
sanitation, safe drinking water, food and proper medical care. The
military use these displaced people in relocated sites as pool of forced
labour [12] . 

During March 1996 and April 1998, the Burmese military orderd more than
300,000 people who live in an area covering 70,000 square miles in Shan
State to move to relocation sites. These relocation orders were given as
counter-insurgency measures to cut off Shan rebels operating in that
area [13] . The increasing incidents of Burmese troops looting and
pillaging villagers' properties are confirmed by Amnesty International.
This is due to tatmadaw (army) officers not providing their troops with
adequate supplies therefore troops in effect live off the villagers [14]
 . 

In addition to these ethnic minority refugees in border camps, Thailand
also has to house an estimated 350,000 displaced Burmese and 2700
student dissidents. Thailand, in recent years, has allowed the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees to care for these refugees. It appear that the
time is appropriate for  the United Nations and the international
community to help solve the refugee problem in Burma. The Royal Thai
Government should address the Burmese refugee problem at this United
Nations General Assembly. The international community and the United
Nations must assist Thailand in solving the root causes of the Burmese
refugee problem. Recent cases of Kosovo and East Timor are good examples
of how international solidarity can bring a change to intractable
problems. These cases have also set an international precedence for
necessary humanitarian intervention whenever necessary. 
  
2.3  Repression of Political Dissidents 

After the  NLD  requested in August 1998 to convene the parliament in
Burma, SPDC/SLORC have intensified its campaign to destroy the
opposition. In suppressing political dissents, SPDC/SLORC goes to
extraordinary lengths to intimidate and destroy its opponents. The
SPDC/SLORC  counter any anti-government movement, including that of
non-violent resistance, as if it has been engaged in a military
operation. For example, to arrest a person believed to be responsible
for distributing anti-government leaflets in Pegu City, the Military
Intelligence units took hostage all relatives and family members
including the 3 year old daughter of that person [15]. The military
government's application of such terrorist methods appears to be
widespread throughout Burma . Recently, the NLD also reports a similar
incident. In Latputta Township in  Irrawaddy  delta, local authorities
have arrested the NLD Organising Committee members on politically
motivated charges. The witnesses who testified the innocence of these
NLD members were also arrested and sentenced to two years [16] . The
Military government does not even tolerate  wearing yellow as an
expression of dissent [17]. 
  
As the military government ignores opposition requests to convene a
parliament, the leadership of the National League for Democracy set up
the 10-member Committee Representing the People's Parliament (CRPP) with
the support of 251 MPs. The CRPP in particular has the mandate to act on
behalf of the people's parliament. The Burmese military responded to the
formation of the CRPP with a large scale arrest on NLD members,
including 200 MPs [18] .   Since the formation of the CRPP, the SPDC has
orchestrated a no-confidence motion against at least 13 MPs, including 
one CRPP member. This was done by coercing MPs' constituents into
signing petitions and  withdrawing support for their representatives.
People may be coerced with fines, prison terms, threats of forced labor,
and forced resignation from jobs. Deception regarding the content of the
petitions has also been practiced [19] . 
  
The SPDC/SLORC Secretary-1 General Khin Nyunt's personal vendetta
against Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has also been a great obstacle to
achieving  political negotiation. In an attempt to exploit the personal
hardship of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, who was under pressure to meet her
seriously ill husband,  the military intelligence  have exerted pressure
in the hope that Aung San Suu Kyi would leave Burma. The result of such
a personal vendetta against Aung San Suu Kyi had particularly sad
consequences for the late Michael Aris [20]. 
  
In March 1999, the military government voluntarily allowed the
International Committee of the Red Cross to investigate and contact
freely all prisoners in Burma. Despite such a positive step, we continue
to receive report of the arrest and interrogation of suspected
dissidents [21] . Inhuman detentions have also been resulting in deaths
in custody of some supporters of the NLD. A well know example has been
the death of James Leander Nichols who is also the honourary
council to some EU countries. These inhuman practices must be
investigated by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights and  the
responsible persons must be brought to justice [22]. 

2.4 Questions on the Transition to Democracy 

On the question of political transition, the Secretary-General has been
authorised by UNGA to use his good office to  contact and mediate
between the disputing parties. However, the Special Envoy of
Secretary-General has mostly been refused entrance to Burma. It has also
become a common pattern that the UN Special Envoy would be allowed once,
and only once , to Rangoon while the General Assembly is in Session (so
that Burmese junta receives one positive note on resolution !). Then, he
be  refused  of visit to Burma at all other times. Therefore, the UN
Secretary-General's good office mission has not been effective for
mediation in Burma. The author believes that the Secretary-General's
good office should be formally expanded to include other high level
diplomats from major democracies in the form of the United Nations
Contact Group for Burma. 

As for the issue regarding the specific form of new administration, this
author believes the best arrangement is SPDC/SLORC's cabinet to function
as the  Executive branch and democratically elected parliament as the 
Legislature. Therefore, the UN General Assembly must recognise the CRPP
(i.e. Burma's Parliament) as legitimate body to work as the Legislature.
This can be done by UN General Assembly recognising the formation of
CRPP as well as the mandate of the CRPP. The UN General Assembly must
also call upon all governments and international bodies to support the
CRPP, as it has been made by the Inter-Parliamentary Union [23] : 
  
""The Inter-Parliamentary Union: 
     
Affirms that in demanding that Parliament be convened and in setting up 
the ?« Committee  representing the People's      Parliament ?», the
MPs-elect are merely defending the rights of their  constituents to take
part in the conduct of public      affairs through representatives of
their choice, as guaranteed under Article 21 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights,      and exercising their right to
discharge the mandate  entrusted to them in 1990; 

     Calls on its member Parliaments to press for respect for democratic
principles in Myanmar and  show, by whatever means      they deem
appropriate, particularly through support for the ?« Committee 
representing the People's Parliament ?», their      solidarity with
their colleagues from the Pyithu Hluttaw  elected
in 1990; ""

To the author's view, there is no question about political fairness in
the interim arrangement offered to the junta in 1998 [24] .The CRPP, so
far, has not been making moves to establish itself as an alternative
government of Burma. The international community and, especially, the UN
General Assembly must appreciate CRPP's role in current political
environment and must judiciously guide all concerned parties towards a
transition to democracy. 

III.  The Burmese military leaders' complicity in the drug-trade 

A sharp increase in opium-poppy cultivation had been reported after the
signing of the 1989 ceasefire agreement between the Burmese military and
Wa ethnic rebels -- formerly the Communist Party of Burma. As a return
for signing the ceasefire, the Burmese military had allowed Wa rebels to
freely engaged in opium businesses. The former drug-warlords have also
been given the opportunity to set up legal businesses within Burma. 

As a result of this ceasefire policy in Shan State, there has been a
reduction in actual fighting between the Burmese army and Wa rebel.
However, since there are other rebel groups which continue resistance in
Shan State, the SPDC/SLORC continue to apply forced relocation scheme.
As a result, the Shan villagers are fleeing to Thailand to take refuge
[25] . On the other hand, local commanders and Burmese military units
began to be involved in the production of heroin. 

In the last few years, the ethnic rebels in Shan State have directed
their efforts into the production and sales of
amphetamine-type-stimulants. One reliable report indicates that
top-ranking junta leaders, including Secretary-1 of SPDC, are involved
in a share of this illicit drug trade [26] . 

The virtually free production and sales of illicit drugs have serious
impact on the region and on the world. Thailand, with its affluent
population and  the best economy in the region, has become the main
target of export for illicit drugs from Burma. Australia has also become
the main target for Burmese heroin [27]. 

With growing evidence of Burmese military authorities at its highest
level being involved in the illicit drug trade, the international
community should no longer ignore the impact and consequences of this
problem. The institutionalised corruption within the Burmese military is
not only a threat to international peace and security, but it is also an
obstacle to the peaceful resolution of political conflicts in Burma. The
UN General Assembly and especially the UN Security
Council must take immediate measures to solve the drug problem. As a
first step, efforts must be made to bring those military leaders
together with Burma's drug-lords before the International Criminal
Court. 

IV.  Assessment on New Initiatives 

During 1998-99, the International Community has had initiatives with the
aim of solving the political problem and improving the human rights
situation in Burma. In November 1998, the United Nations has made the
so-called `dollars-for-democracy' offer to the Burmese military junta.
In August-1999, the Australian Government also offered to set up a
national human rights commission in Burma. The following is an
assessment of these initiatives and a suggestion on how the UN General
Assembly may use its influence to help in these efforts. 

4.1  United Nations `Dollar-for-Democracy' deals 

The international media first reported the United Nations offer for
substantial (humanitarian) aid in return for dialogue in Burma in
November 1998. Initiatives for this arrangement were reportedly made in
October 1998 while the UN General Assembly was in session. The report
also suggested to rescind the NLD calling of parliament and, possibly,
holding of a new election. This suggestion raises two important
questions: (1) the operational issues for independent humanitarian
organisations (2) the suggestion to hold a new election. 

Regarding operational issues for humanitarian organisations, one
obstacle is SPDC/SLORC refusing to allow the operation of independent
NGOs within Burma. The National League for Democracy has also expressed
its view that the humanitarian agencies must consult with elected
representatives [28]. 

The suggestion for a new election has been frequently floated by the
international media. For example in 1992, a team of NGO experts from
International Council for Voluntary Agency recommended ``a process and
timetable to lead to new elections and a return to democracy.... and
 .... recognition of the results of the 1990 election" [29] . SPDC/SLORC
was also receptive to this suggestion at that time [30] . Some people
within the international community have often put forward suggestions
for a new election  simply because they have an illusion that an
election will solve this political crisis. 

Unfortunately, a new election will not solve problems such as framing a
new constitution, the role of military within government and the issues
of ethnic minorities. The best solution to all these problems is the UN
General Assembly to formally recognise the Committee Representing the
People's Parliament as well as the mandate of CRPP. In other words, a
new election should be held only with the approval of CRPP or Burma's
Parliament. 

4.2  Creation of a National Human Rights Commission 

During the ASEAN Ministers' meeting in July 1998, Australia's Foreign
Minister Alexander Downer put forward a suggestion to Burmese military
authorities to establish an independent human rights commission. In the
following weeks, Australia's Human Rights Commissioner has visited
Rangoon and met with both military authorities and leaders of NLD. The
Australian human rights community has the experience in assisting
establishment of such a commission in the Asia-Pacific Region, such as
in Indonesia in 1993. 

There is no doubt about the need for a human rights commission in Burma.
However, to the views of the author, a better approach may be that the
United Nations first authorised the deployment of an in-country human
rights mission, with the mandate to set up a national human rights
commission. The National Human Rights Commission in Burma may be set up
with the help of Australian expertise at appropriate time. The
independence of such a commission should be assured by the supervision
of UN Commission on Human Rights and Special Rapporteur. Such a
commission must also be approved by the elected representatives. The
United Nations General Assembly should therefore, as a first step, make
an arrangement to deploy an in-country human rights monitors to Burma,
along with other international humanitarian organisations. 

V. Recommendations 

At this UN General Assembly, the international community should support
the recognition of CRPP and Burma's Parliament as the Legislative body
for Burma and also make initiatives to solve Burma's refugee problem.
Efforts should also be made to curb heroine production and illicit drug
trafficking. The international community and United Nations must also
bring to justice to those responsible for human rights abuses and top
military officers involved in drug trafficking. 

5.1 Recommendation to the 54th Session of UNGA 

The 54th Session of United Nations General Assembly: 
  
-- Recognise formation of Committee Representing the People's
Parliament(CRPP) and highlight the mandate of CRPP in the UNGA
Resolution; 

-- Recognise Burma's refugee problem is a threat to the security of
Thailand and encourage Thailand and all Burma's neighbours to solve
Burma's refugee problem with the help of United Nations and UNHCR; 

-- Recommend sending in of in-country human rights monitors to Burma;
and request UN Security Council to create unhindered access to Burma for
all international human rights and humanitarian organisations and,
especially, the UN Human Rights Special Rapporteur; 

-- Take notice of problems of Burma producing and exporting illicit
drugs to neighbouring countries and increasing corruption within
Military Government of Myanmar and request UN Security Council to look
into these matters; 
     
-- Authorise the UN Commission on Human Rights to investigate the death
in custody of the members of the opposition and to set up a special
tribunal for massacre occurred in Shan State in 1997; 
     
-- Note that the Burma's non-cooperation of United Nations human rights
mechanism is the violation of UN Charter 55 & 56; 
     
-- Withdraw the voting rights of Burmese military delegation at all
United Nations forums, including the UN General Assembly; 
     
-- Impose international investment ban until Burma satisfactorily
improve its human rights records and cooperate with United Nations. 
     
-- Request UN Security Council to impose international arms embargo on
Burma. 


5.2 Recommendation to UN Security Council 

The United Nations Security Council: 
  
-- Recognize Burma's production and sales of illicit drug to
neighbouring countries is a threat to international peace and security; 
     
-- Take notes of top level Burmese military leaders are involved in
production and sales of illicit drugs; 
     
-- Demand Burmese military government immediately give unhindered access
to Burma for  international human rights and humanitarian organisations
and UN Special Rapporteur; 
     
-- Recognise the Burma's refugee problem is threatening security of
neighbouring countries and demand Burmese military government to
unreservedly cooperate with UN High Commissioner for Refugee to solve
this problem; 
     
-- Impose international investment ban and international arms embargo on
Burma. 

Footnotes: 

[1] Donald M. Seekins, ``Burma in 1998: Little to Celebrate'', Asian
Survey, Vol. XXXIX, No. 1, January/February 1999. 

[2] Mya Maung, ``The Burma Road to the Past", Asian Survey, Vol. XXXIX,
No.2 March/April 1999. 

[3] Desmond Ball, ``Burma and Drugs: The regime's complicity in the
global drug trade'', Working Paper 336, Strategic and Defense Studies
Centre, Australian National University, April 1999. 

[4] Report by UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in Myanmar,
E/CN.4/1999/35, 22 January 1999. Para. 47. 

[5] Amnesty International, ``Myanmar: Atrocities in the Shan State", AI
Index: ASA 16/05/98, 15 April 1998. 

[6] Report of Special Rapporteur on Situation of Human Rights in
Myanmar, A/53/364, 10 September 1998. 

     ``49. In conclusion on the subject of forced labour, the Special
Rapporteur wishes to
     make two observations. First, the proceedings and report of the
Commission of Inquiry
     of the ILO clearly indicate that the attitude of the regime in
Myanmar towards the
     Commission was the same as that which the regime had adopted
towards the Special
     Rapporteur, the Commission on Human Rights and the General Assembly
- that is to say,
     an attitude of total non-cooperation, in violation of the
obligations that Myanmar
     had freely undertaken under the Charter of the United Nations and
relevant ILO
     Conventions. Secondly, the conclusions of the Commission of Inquiry
of the ILO
     confirm all the serious concerns that the Special Rapporteur has
highlighted in his
     reports to the General Assembly and the Commission on Human Rights
concerning the
     laws on and the practice of forced labour in Myanmar.

[7] Ibid. Para. 17, 18. 

[8] Resolution on the Widespread use of Forced Labor in Myanmar, 83rd
Session of International Labor Conference, 2
July 1999. 

[9] United States Committee for Refugees, Country Report 1998. 

[10] Report by Special Rapporter for Human Rights in Myanmar,
E/CN.4/1999/35, 22 January 1999. 

[11] Amnesty International, ``Myanmar: the Kayin(Karen) state
militarization and human rights", AI Index ASA:
16/12/99; ``Myanmar: Aftermath, Three years of dislocation in the Kayah
State", AI Index ASA:16/14/99; and ``Myanmar:
Update on Shan State", AI Index ASA 16/13/99, 30 June 1999. 

[12] Amnesty International, AI Index: ASA 16/13/99, 30 June 1999. 

[13] United States Committee for Refugees, Country Report on Burma 1998. 

[14] Amnesty International, AI Index: ASA 16/13/99, 30 June 1999. 

[15] Amnesty International, Urgent Action 183/99, ASA 16/19/99, 27 July
1999. 

[16] NLD Statement 55(9/99),  13 September  1999. 

[17] Interview with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi on 5 October 1999, transcript
disseminated by ALTSEAN. " Four persons who
wear yellow dress on 9-9-99 were arrested and sentenced  to seven years
imprisonment, since opposition groups were
suggesting to wear yellow in solidarity with anti-government groups. 

[18] The CRPP Briefings by Alternative ASEAN Network on Burma. The text
can also be found in
http://www.physics.adelaide.edu.au/ ~ uneoo/crpplink.html. 

[19] CRPP Notifications:  No. 8, 16 February 1999; No. 10, 18 February
1999; No. 12, 24 February 1999; No. 13, 25
February 1999;  No. 17, 30 March 1999; No. 26, 5 May 1999. 

[20] 20/4/99: SPDC/SLORC, NLD and ASSK after the death of Micahel
Aris.(http://www.physics.adelaide.edu.au/~uneoo) 

[21] 9 October 99: BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. Scores of workers
at  Kyemon (The Mirror) newspaper were
arrested in late September by MI units and two were reported dead
because of torture. 

[22] Report by Special Rapporteur, A/53/364, 10 September 1999.
Recommendations: Para.61 

     ``61. Further, the Special Rapporteur recommends that an
independent inquiry be held
     into the circumstances of the deaths of Mr. Nichols in June 1996
and of U Thein in
     February 1998, while detained in Insein Prison, in the light of any
evidence that may
     be gathered from fellow prisoners and prison officials and, indeed
any other persons,
     so that action may be taken against the individuals who may have
been responsible for
     their deaths or harsh treatment.

[23] Inter-Parliamentary Union Resolution on Burma (Myanmar), 16 April
1999. 

[24] 05/01/98: Transitional Phase and Prospect for Change in Burma
(http://www.physics.adelaide.edu.au/~uneoo) 

[25] Amnesty International, ``Myanmar: Update on the Shan State", AI
Index: ASA 16/13/99, 30 June 1999. 

[26] Desmond Ball, `` Burma and Drugs: The regime's complicity in the
global drug trade '', Working Paper 336, Strategic
and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, April 1999. 

[27] Far Eastern Economic Review, 9 September 1999. 

[28] Conference on Humanitarian Aid to Burma, by the Burma Fund,
Washington, 24 May
1999.(http://www.burmafund.org/ ) 

[29] International Council of Voluntary Agencies, Mission to Burma
Report , 1992. 

[30] However, the SPDC/SLORC's position on the new election may now have
changed since the death of Michael Aris.
This is because the Burmese military no longer have the foundation to
exclude Aung San Suu Kyi from any new election
or participation in the government. 
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