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(PT 2) 1999 REPORT TO THE CHR BY TH



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POSTED IN 2 PARTS.

PART 2

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III.  MISSION TO THAILAND

25.   The Special Rapporteur has previously addressed the situation in the
ethnic minority States, especially those along the Myanmar/Thai border, in
his reports to the General Assembly (A/51/466, annex, paras. 37-51 and
A/52/484, annex, paras. 69 142) and to the Commission on Human Rights
(E/CN.4/1997/64, paras. 65-100).  His initial concern related to reports of
military attacks and looting on civilian settlements, forced relocation of
the ethnic groups, forced labour for development and industrial projects
and portering for military operations.  In his last report to the
Commission on Human Rights, the Special Rapporteur called upon the
Government of Myanmar to take immediate steps in order to put an end to the
forced displacement of persons, to prohibit the practice of forced labour
and forced portering and to prevent arbitrary killings, and confiscation of
property in the ethnic minority areas.
26.   The Special Rapporteur visited Thailand in order to inquire into the
current situation of the displaced persons on the border of Myanmar with
Thailand, and on the human rights violations committed against ethnic
minorities and others who had been subjected to various forms of repression
by the Government.  The itinerary of the Special Rapporteur included
Bangkok, Kanchanaburi, Mae Sot, Chiang Mai, Mae Hong Son and camps in the
Tak province with large populations of displaced persons.  During these
visits he was received by representatives of the Thai authorities and met
with representatives of international non governmental organizations  and
representatives of several ethnic groups.  During his visit, the Special
Rapporteur received the testimonies of a total of 50 persons selected from
among newly arrived persons from Myanmar, mostly Karen, Shan and Karenni.
The information and views obtained in the course of his visits are
reflected below under the relevant subject headings.

A.  The problem of displacement

27.   Internal displacement in Myanmar represents a particular case of
human tragedy resulting from conflict between the Government and different
ethnic groups.  It is estimated that over half a million displaced
persons, living in Mon, Karen, Shan and Karenni States, are in need of
humanitarian assistance. Since the independence of Myanmar in 1948, the
country has suffered from unresolved conflicts between most of the ethnic
minorities and the central authorities in spite of a number of ceasefire
agreements.  These conflicts precipitated insurgencies in several parts of
the country which have resulted in large numbers of internally displaced
persons and a considerable number who have sought refuge in neighbouring
countries, particularly Thailand, Bangladesh and India.
28.   The Special Rapporteur is not in possession of independently verified
statistics on the number of displaced persons in Myanmar, but local and
international NGOs estimate the number in Karen State to be between 100,000
and 200,000.  Unofficial estimates place the current number in Shan State
to be over 300,000  and in Karenni State, 70,000.  Finally, there are
reportedly
about 40,000 persons displaced in Mon State.
29.   By the end of June 1998, the refugee camp caseload of displaced
persons from Myanmar living in Thailand was 112,841.  The breakdown by
ethnic group was as follows:  86,823 Karen, 12,665 Mon, 13,353 Karenni.  In
addition, there were a number of Shan displaced persons who were not living
in refugee camps but were scattered mainly throughout the north of
Thailand.  It is generally believed that tens of thousands of people from
Myanmar have entered Thailand during the last three years.

B.  The main causes of displacement

30.   The problem of displacement in Myanmar is complex and open to so many
different interpretations that a comprehensive assessment is difficult. The
causes of displacement are numerous and differ from one region to another,
although certain common features and trends can be discerned.
31.   The role of the army, in this context, is paramount.  Since
independence, it has exercised a strong influence over the governing of the
ethnic states.  Many Karen, Karenni and Shan do not perceive the army as a
national army, and soldiers, particularly ethnic Burmese, generally behave
towards the local population as if they were enemies.
32.   Violence against civilians would appear to have been a fundamental
component of the overall military strategy of the Myanmar army.  That
strategy is designed first to secure resources from the local population,
in particular food, combatants and workers, and second to weaken the
resource base of insurgent groups and their capacity to govern.  To this
latter end, the army not only has undertaken systematically to destroy most
of the villages but also, as the local economy is largely based on
agriculture, forcibly to displace the rural population so as to disrupt
agricultural production.
33.   In flagrant violation of the basic rules of humanitarian law,
civilians living in rural settlements have been attacked.  In some cases,
this has resulted in massacres, in others in disorderly flight to safety,
often separating families.  Those who are captured are often subjected to
rape and arbitrary killing, or are held captive to grow food for the army,
or made to provide forced labour or portering for the army.
34.   After these general observations, it is appropriate to specify the

main causes of displacement.  These are counter insurgency operations,
forced labour and portering restrictions on farmers and land confiscation. 
Each is discussed separately below.  Displacement is also attributed to
major development projects undertaken by the Government in the process of
which large numbers of persons are removed from the lands designated for
the projects without being assisted in relocation or being appropriately
compensated.

1.  Counter insurgency operations

35.   Counter insurgency operations by the army have had an important
impact on the displacement of the population, both with regard to the
number of persons displaced and the methods employed.  These operations
have also contributed to the massive uprooting of the rural population by
deliberately relocating large numbers of civilians from numerous villages
as part of the military strategy against the insurgents.  Despite a number
of ceasefire agreements signed by the Government and representatives of
ethnic groups, the army is still engaged in counter-insurgency operations
in Karen, Shan and Karenni States. 
36.   Although the practice of forced relocations by the military as a
means of controlling the population in the ethnic regions is not new, the
scale of the relocations increased significantly after 1996.  The victims
of displacement are mostly peasants, including members of ethnic groups
such as the Karen, Karenni, Shan and Mon, who live in areas of insurgency
and are victimized by counter-insurgency activities or are caught in the
crossfire between the army and the insurgents.
37.   Numerous testimonies received by the Special Rapporteur indicate that
the civilian population living in or near the combat zone is generally
forced to move:  in these "grey zones" (zones controlled or influenced by
the insurgents) the armed forces often resort to searches, destruction and
burning of houses, and confiscation of property and food to force the
people to move, temporarily or permanently.  Testimonies indicate that no
distinction between insurgents and non-combatants is generally made and
that the inhabitants of these zones are subjected to indiscriminate
torture, beatings and arbitrary arrests by the army. 
38.   In order to cut the main links between the insurgent groups and the
civilian population, entire communities living in the border area between
Myanmar and Thailand are moved to relocation sites which are subject to
strict military control.  Expulsion orders are issued by the army coupled
with the warning that anyone trying to remain in their homes will be shot
on sight.
39.   The following information provided to the Special Rapporteur is
illustrative of the widespread recourse to forced relocation and the
consequent violation of most basic rights.  Central Shan State has
witnessed one of the largest forced relocation programmes, which still
continues. From March 1996 the army has ordered village after village in
eight townships (Larng Kher, Murng Nai, Nam Zarng, Lai Kha, Murng Kerng,
Kun Hing, Ke See and Murng Su) to move to a total of 45 relocation sites. 
The estimated number of people relocated is over 100,000 from over 600
villages.  When relocated, the population is left to fend for itself to
find work, food and sanitary and education facilities.  In Karenni State,
throughout June and July 1996, orders were given to more than 100 villages
located between the Pon and Salween Rivers instructing villagers to move to
relocation sites near army camps in Sha Daw and Ywa Thit townships.  The
estimated number of people affected was 20,000-30,000, most of them ethnic
Karenni.  The army's purpose is apparently to isolate the population in
that area from Karenni insurgents of the Kayinni National Progressive Party
(KNPP).  Army officers are reported to have warned that those who remained
in the deserted villages would be considered insurgents or "enemies".  
40.   In addition to displacement caused by deliberate action, many persons
are said to have left for fear of being attacked when the military fronts
move close to their places of residence.  To avoid losing their homes and
sources of livelihood, many communities have resisted displacement as long
as possible and have developed different strategies for survival.  Several
displaced persons living in camps in Thailand described to the Special
Rapporteur how people in their village would hide in the forest and return
when it was safe to tend to their farms.  As the situation worsened, many
families fled the village.  Since fighting was spreading to different parts
of the district, they did not know where to go to find shelter and after
one week they returned.  The village was finally attacked and the houses
destroyed.

2.  Forced labour and portering

41.   The second reason has to do with the particular phenomenon of forced
conscription of civilians into compulsory labour duties for the military
authorities.  No pay is given for such labour and the period of service can
last for months.  This practice disrupts family life and prevents people
from carrying on their daily work in order to earn a living.
42.   The Special Rapporteur received reports that villagers throughout
Shan State are being forced by the SPDC to work without payment.  The
people most seriously affected are those who have been forcibly relocated,
as they have been forced to leave their land and become wage labourers and
thus cannot afford to work without pay for the military.
43.   It is common practice for the military to force villagers to go and
work on military bases, either for constructing or maintaining barracks,
bunkers or fences, or performing menial tasks like cleaning, weeding, and
fetching firewood or water.  Even children are forced to do this kind of
work: on 29 May 1998, SPDC troops are reported to have forced 10-15 boys
between the ages of 14 and 16 to work at the military bases of LIB 524 and
IB 246. They were not fed, and were even beaten up by the soldiers.
44.   The Special Rapporteur has received reports that villagers are being
forced to grow food for the army.  In June 1998, villagers in Kengtung are
reported to have been forced by the SPDC to grow chili peppers, beans and
garlic on land that was confiscated from them.  And on 11 July, SPDC base
LIB 102 apparently ordered the civilian population to provide labourers for
weeding soya bean and corn farms owned by the military in Murng Pan.  Ten
persons from each village, from some 15 villages each day, had to bring
their own food and tools.  Villagers of Kengtong, Murng Nai, said they had
been forced in September 1998 to plant yellow beans for the army, then tend
the plots and do weeding and fencing for troops at local bases.
45.   Throughout 1998, The Special Rapporteur received reports of villagers
from Murng Pan, Larng Khur, Murng Nai, Murng Ton and Nam Zarng being forced
to work for the army for periods of up to two weeks splitting rocks near
the Salween River crossing of Ta Sarng in Shan State.  The battalions
concerned were IB 225, IB 64, IB 65 and LIB 333.  The rocks were conveyed
by the army to  big cities like Yangon where they were sold for 12,000-15,000
kyats per truckload.
46.   Since 4 July 1998, villagers from the Kengtong area are reported to
have been forced to drive their oxcarts to carry teak lumber from Kengtong
to the SPDC military base of IB 43 at Kunhing.  During July and August 427
oxcarts were used.
47.   Since April 1998, villagers in 21 villages in the Nam Kham area of
Northern Shan State, bordering on China, are reported to have been forced
to work on a dam over the Nam Mao River.
48.   Throughout 1998, the SPDC military are reported to have been taking
porters from the main towns throughout central and southern Shan, where the
Shan resistance is operating.  The SPDC had been sending out regular
military patrols from its bases around the area, each time demanding groups
of porters from the civilian population.  The households provided porters
on a rotation
basis, and if someone could not go, they were made to pay 8,000-10,000
kyats to hire a replacement.

3.  Restrictions on farmers

49.   Because of the massive displacement of the population, farming has
apparently been drastically reduced.  This has led to food shortages among
the rural population generally and has provoked voluntary displacement to
other areas in search of assistance and security.
50.   The army is reported to be increasingly placing restrictions on the
kinds of crops grown by the local farmers, forcing them to grow crops for
the troops which they will either consume themselves or sell.  On 4 May
1998, in Murng Pan, IB 66 is reported to have ordered farmers to grow no
more than a small amount of garlic, whereas farmers had traditionally grown
this crop for export to Thailand.  They were told they had to grow soya
beans for the army instead.  On 23 June, IB 286 in Kaesee told villagers
from Murng Nawng and Murng Nang (who had been forcibly relocated) that they
needed licences to grow rice and if licenced, they had to give half their
rice crop to the army. If they had no licence, their rice fields would be
confiscated.  On 2 July, SPDC IB 99 in Larng Khur is reported to have
ordered all sugarcane farmers to clear two thirds of their sugarcane farms
and grow soya beans and yellow beans for the army instead.  One farmer who had
apparently been granted permission to continue farming as usual was reported to
have been beaten, kicked, tortured and then shot to death on 3 August 1998.  In
September, the  villagers of Kengtong, Murng Nai, were said to have been forced
to cultivate yellow beans for the SPDC troops at local bases.

4.  Land confiscation

51.   Another important cause of displacement relates to land confiscation.
The majority of the population lives by agriculture.  Farms tend to be
small and constitute the only income for families.  Moreover, land is
culturally part of a person's identity.  The Special Rapporteur was told
that very few legal titles to land exist.  This permits the military to
confiscate the land that had traditionally belonged to peasants and farmers
living in Karenni, Karen and Shan States and to redistribute it to military
officials and soldiers.
52.   Since June 1998, the authorities are reported to have issued orders
for the confiscation from the people in Tachilek of 1,000 acres of land
stretching along the Tachilek-Kengtung main road.  The confiscated land has
been bulldozed, divided into small patches and sold to those who can afford
it. People from nine villages have been affected.  On 4 June 1998, the
Golden Triangle Military Command Commander ordered LIB 422 to confiscate 13
plots of land and rice fields owned by villagers of King-Ka in Zone 2 in
Kengtung to expand the military base.  The villagers were given a small
plot of land each to build a house on, but they had to buy it.  They were
still forced to pay their rice quota to the SPDC even though their land had
been taken from them.
53.   While development and industrial projects such as railway
construction, and the creation of tourist attractions are being carried out
in areas inhabited by minorities, many people are having their lands
confiscated without any compensation and are forced to move to designated
sites.

C.  Patterns and consequences of displacement

54.   The Special Rapporteur has ascertained from his contacts with those
who have sought refuge in the camps on the Thai side of the Thai Myanmar
frontier that since 1996, there are two distinct categories of internally
displaced persons in the ethnic States:  the "displaced" and "dispersed". 
The first category consists mostly of families who were forced to go to
relocation sites or army camps, while the second category includes persons
who instead fled to the mountains or the jungle, trying to avoid the main
roads and to hide from the military.  It is much more difficult to identify
the dispersed, since they are not concentrated in a group but are literally
dispersed throughout the country.  While visiting the camps, the Special
Rapporteur spoke with both categories of displaced persons who subsequently
fled to Thailand, and in the context of the present report the term
"internally displaced" implies both categories.
55.   Testimonies received by the Special Rapporteur, as well as
observations made by representatives of non-governmental organizations,
indicate that the victims of displacement are mostly villagers and farmers
who were living in remote areas of Karen, Shan and Karenni States.  Most of
them have not been officially registered and do not possess any
identification cards or other documents.

56.   Cases of forced evictions seem to occur with great frequency and as a
matter of policy.  All the people interviewed by the Special Rapporteur
stated that they were given at most one week's notice to move and were told
that they would be shot if they did not comply.  They were forced to leave
their land, their crops and most of their animals.  Much of the property
was reportedly immediately stolen or confiscated by the army.  In some
cases, there was adequate time to prepare for departure, so that families
or even entire communities could leave together.  If not, or if attacked,
they had to flee in a disorderly manner, sometimes with the husband, wife
and children going in different directions.
57.   The internally displaced persons in Myanmar rarely flee in large
numbers.  They usually  move in small groups of a few families or
individuals. The areas of expulsion are numerous and spread throughout the
country, including in the border areas with Thailand.  The displaced's own
perceptions of where food and security might be found are determining
factors in deciding upon the destination of their flight.  The displaced
usually move to neighbouring rural areas or to the jungle; others go
directly to relocation sites and from there to camps located in Thailand,
or directly to Thailand where they often join relatives or friends from the
same area.  In this regard, the Special Rapporteur was often told during
the mission that the army is planting landmines in order to prevent the
population from using the routes which take them to their paddy fields or
to the Thai border.  According to information received, each battalion in
the front line area (along the Myanmar Thai border) was issued with about
200 landmines and ordered to plant  them.  
58.   The two main considerations which led people to flee were security
concerns and the need to have a source of livelihood.  These could at times
be contradictory concerns.  On the one hand, fear of losing one's land
constituted a motive for staying if the harvests were sufficient, while on
the other hand, fear of attacks was a motive for departing.  Conversely,
the need to find a source of subsistence had to be weighed against the fear
of being caught by the army after having been ordered to move to a
relocation site.
59.   Another problem affecting the displaced is the disintegration of
families and communities.  The Special Rapporteur noticed a large number of
widows and orphans among the displaced in camps in Thailand.  However,
numerous communities have remained more or less together in spite of
displacement and have maintained many of their cultural traditions.  This
helps to alleviate to some extent the acute problems of displacement and
would no doubt facilitate the process of return to the areas of origin.
However,  very few returns to areas of origin seem to be taking place. 
Continued insecurity coupled with destroyed infrastructure suggest that
displaced persons had compelling reasons for wanting to remain in the camps
in Thailand.
60.   As far as the security situation in the areas of return are
concerned, reports continuously reaching the camps speak of, for example,
forced labour and portering, arbitrary arrests, detentions and executions
by the Myanmar military of persons suspected of sympathizing with
insurgents, with no recourse to formal judicial proceedings.  In addition,
returnees were finding their homes destroyed and their land either burnt or
occupied by the army. In such cases, the returnees had no recourse to
justice, either because the judicial system did not exist or because it was
not functioning independently. The displaced, moreover, had very few
resources and means by which to return home.  The infrastructure of entire
villages had been destroyed and many homes levelled by warfare and looting.
Finally, it would seem that the local authorities had no intention of
dealing with the assistance and protection problems of the returnees.
61.   The Special Rapporteur was told that, for the peasants who had lost
their land, either because they had to sell it very cheaply before they
fled or because it was destroyed or taken by the army, return is not
possible.  Where the armed conflict is continuing, return is also not an
option.  


1.  The situation of the dispersed in the jungle

62.   Following orders to leave their homes, many villagers avoid moving to
relocation sites and usually move first to a nearby rural area or go to the
jungle, trying to work in their fields during the day and returning for
safety at night.  They can remain in hiding for several months as long as
they are able to find sufficient food to survive.  These villagers live in
fear that the soldiers will find them, especially in the dry season.  It
was reported, for example, that at the start of the dry season in 1998,
local army troops shot on site at villagers hiding in the Mi Chaung Theit
area.
63.   Apart from the lack of security, the lack of food is clearly the main
problem facing families living in the jungle.  Families supplement their
rice porridge by eating wild roots, leaves and fruit.  Many families
interviewed said that they could not cultivate their crop safely and that
when they were discovered their fields and paddies were burned.  As a
result, without any source of income and without enough food to survive,
they try to find their way to Thailand.  In addition, people living in the
jungle have limited access to health care.  They have to rely on an
insufficient and informal health-care network in the form of "mobile health
teams", which provide medicines and vaccinations.  However, it was reported
that these mobile teams could not cover all the areas where the displaced
hide and live.

2.  The situation of the displaced in relocation sites

64.   According to testimonies received, relocation sites, as well as the
living conditions in the sites, may vary from one place to another.
Displaced  persons in refugee camps in Thailand describe the sites as
either a large, empty stretch of land surrounded by fences or barbed wire
and near a military camp or as the centre of a large village where the army
has forced villagers to congregate.  The military outpost is normally in
the centre of the village. 
65.   No particular arrangements are made by the authorities to receive the

new forced arrivals.  There seems to be a food and a health crisis and a
general lack of adequate housing and basic services.  Villagers have to
build their own makeshift huts and provide their own food.  Family members
living in the relocation sites are often requested to do various tasks for
the army. Each family also has to provide one person to work for the army. 
They perform various duties such as building the fences, cleaning the
compound or guarding the site.  The interviews did not make clear to what
extent facilities for education and access to health care, especially for
children, are available.
Unemployment is a major problem in the relocation sites.  The displaced are
used to working their own land and it is difficult to start any sort of
work to generate income.  When they are able to find work, they are easily
exploited.  According to testimonies received, many displaced persons,
including children, work as daily workers (porters), whose salaries are
around US$ 2 per week, for 12-hour working days.  Others work in
construction.
Those who find such jobs are considered to be fortunate, since they have an
income.
66.   The villagers are not entitled to leave the compound without a pass,
for which they have to pay.  Their freedom of movement is extremely limited
and, in all cases, subject to authorization from the local military
battalion.
Attempting to flee is said to be interpreted by the authorities as proof of
participation in or sympathy with the insurgency and of an intention to
report on the abuses committed by the army.  Some are required to obtain
safe conduct passes or pay high fees at checkpoints for a "permission" to
leave.  Other sources have reported incidents of women and children being
shot at while fleeing in areas near the border with Thailand.

3.  Special problems affecting women and children

67.   Many of the displaced, in particular women and children, reported
that they had been terrorized and subjected to inhuman treatment before
taking refuge in Thailand.  It was reported that Myanmar soldiers raped and
abused women during incursions into the emergency zones or in the
relocation sites.
In some areas, women who work in the fields still face significant risks of
being targeted and victimized.
68.   The Special Rapporteur has noted the serious psychological problems
facing women and children affected by the crisis.  Abuses against women,
especially in the course of violent events, reportedly ranged from having
seen their children or husband killed to being raped and losing their home
and means of subsistence.  Interviews held in the course of a short visit
to a village revealed that many had suffered from such abuses.  It should
be mentioned that cultural inhibitions linked to subjects such as sex and
the serious social implications of rape and assaults on women compound the
problem of lack of outlets for expression and foment deep hatreds.
69.   Female-headed households were less able to become self-reliant and
were therefore more in need of assistance.  In some cases, they were
assisted by other families, for example, in setting up shelters.  The
numerous children who had been orphaned or separated from their families
constituted  a particularly vulnerable group.  In general, there was a
willingness on the part of local families or other displaced persons to
adopt the children, at least until their parents could be traced if they
were still alive.
70.   Some of the most serious problems the displaced and dispersed
populations face are in the health domain, largely because of the lack of
health services.  Children are particularly affected by chronic
malnutrition, malaria, diarrhoea and dysentery.  The right to health is
seriously jeopardized in those circumstances.
71.   Displaced children living in the jungle suffer high mortality and
malnutrition rates and their flight from their homes often puts them beyond
the reach of any assistance or protection.  Frequently, displaced children
have witnessed the murder of their parents or the destruction of their
homes.
As a consequence, many children suffer from fear and parents, caught in the
day-to-day struggle for survival, often have little energy to devote to
caring for them.
72.   Rather than attending school, many displaced children have had to
help support their families.  In any event, many schools are reported to
have been destroyed or closed.  Public education is officially free;
however, many schools are under funded and parents have to pay tuition so
that the school can operate.  Many displaced children do not speak Burmese
and have difficulties in communicating with their teachers.  Many children
who used to go to school in their native village and learned their native
language have to restart their schooling upon arrival in the relocation
sites because they are prevented from learning in their own language.  This
is not only a negation of sound pedagogical principles but a violation of
the right to freedom of expression which includes the right to receive and
impart information so necessary in the educational field.


VERSION FRANCAISE <http://www.birmanie.int.ch/~asb/cdh/rappcdh99.html>


IV.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
  
A.  Conclusions

73.   The Special Rapporteur has previously reported that Myanmar law and
orders of the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) themselves
violate basic freedoms, including the freedoms of expression and
association. The Government of Myanmar continues to intimidate its citizens
and prevents them from exercising their fundamental rights to freedom of
association and expression by prosecuting persons for criminal and
treason-related offences.
The Special Rapporteur notes that many citizens are still being arrested
for peaceful expression of their ideas.  As mentioned above, political
party leaders and their members are being held, for an undetermined period,
against their will and without any charges being brought against them. 
Moreover, it is evident that the total State domination of the media,
together with the existence of a wide range of SLORC orders criminalizing
freedom of expression, seriously undermines the exercise of this right as
well as the right to freedom of association.
74.   Conditions in Myanmar prisons fall short of international standards,
i.e. the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of prisoners, the Basic
Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners and the Body of Principles for
the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment.
75.   The non-acceptance by Myanmar of the customary ICRC procedures for
visits to places of detention is highly prejudicial to the amelioration of
conditions of detention in Myanmar.
76.   The phenomenon of displacement would appear to be limited largely, if
not exclusively, to ethnic minorities.  The problem is not new and
originates mainly from the absence of a political solution dating back to
colonial times and before.  The ceasefire agreements concluded in recent
years are a beginning to a solution but are likely to be fruitless until
serious and meaningful measures are taken to engage in a political dialogue
which includes the ethnic minorities.
77.   The army has been implicated in human rights abuses resulting in
displacement.  This is partly attributable to the fact that the armed
forces constitute the only institution vested with law enforcement.  The

armed forces are occasionally involved in restoring public order, although
no specific training is given for this task and those involved in such
operations merely resort to the use of military equipment and military
tactics.  In such cases a number of provisions of international
humanitarian law, such as article 17 of Protocol II Additional to the
Geneva Conventions, which prohibits the displacement of civilian
populations for reasons related to the conflict, are relevant and must be
observed.
78.   Impunity remains a very serious problem.  Retaliatory massacres of
villagers and massive human rights violations of civilians have occurred.
In all these instances the right to life and security of the person, in
particular of women and children, are violated.  In addition, corruption,
which is on the rise, is a serious problem particularly as law enforcement
and the administration of justice are casualties of military rule.
79.   As observed earlier, none of the displaced persons living in Myanmar
itself or in Thailand will be able to return home immediately, as their
houses and land have been destroyed or others have moved onto their land. 
Deeply embedded insecurity and fear also prevent return.  Where return to
the home areas becomes impossible, alternative solutions are required to
ensure the  basic rights to life, protection of personal security and from
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, health, education and family unity,
among others.

B.  Recommendations

80.   Since the situation of human rights in Myanmar is worsening and the
repression of civil and political rights continues unabated, the Special
Rapporteur feels bound to renew the detailed recommendations he made in
paragraphs 7 to 97 of his last report to the Commission on Human Rights
(E/CN.4/1998/70) and in paragraphs 61 to 63 of his interim report to the
General Assembly (A/53/364).
81.   In addition, in view of the ever growing humanitarian crisis in Shan,
Karen and Karenni States, in particular, assistance to the displaced and
other conflict-affected persons should become a priority for the
Government.
82.   Because the displaced and other conflict-affected persons have a wide
variety of urgent needs, the Government should seek the assistance of the
international community, through the United Nations system and its
specialized agencies, governmental and intergovernmental organizations, as
well as non governmental organizations, in assessing the nature and extent
of the assistance needs and in responding to those needs in a rapid and
flexible manner.
83.   Clearly, the military solution that has been adopted by the
Government in the ethnic areas has become a serious problem rather than a
solution. A political solution in the ethnic areas in the context of the
political dialogue recommended in paragraphs 79 of the Special Rapporteur's
last report to the Commission has become urgent in order to prevent a
worsening of the present humanitarian disaster.
----------------------------------------------------
Notes
1/ "Forgotten victims of a hidden war: internally displaced Karen in
Burma", published by Burma Ethnic Research Group and the Friederich Naumann
Foundation, April 1998
2/ "Dispossessed : forced relocation and extrajudicial killings in Shan
State", Shan Human Rights Foundation, April 1998
3/ Burmese Border Consortium, "Regugge relief programme - Programme report
for the period January to June 1998", July 1998
4/ Ibid.

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<font face="Courier New, Courier">POSTED IN 2 PARTS.<br>
<br>
PART 2<br>
<br>
****************<br>
<br>
III.&nbsp; MISSION TO THAILAND<br>
<br>
25.&nbsp;&nbsp; The Special Rapporteur has previously addressed the
situation in the<br>
ethnic minority States, especially those along the Myanmar/Thai border,
in<br>
his reports to the General Assembly (A/51/466, annex, paras. 37-51
and<br>
A/52/484, annex, paras. 69 142) and to the Commission on Human
Rights<br>
(E/CN.4/1997/64, paras. 65-100).&nbsp; His initial concern related to
reports of<br>
military attacks and looting on civilian settlements, forced relocation
of<br>
the ethnic groups, forced labour for development and industrial
projects<br>
and portering for military operations.&nbsp; In his last report to
the<br>
Commission on Human Rights, the Special Rapporteur called upon the<br>
Government of Myanmar to take immediate steps in order to put an end to
the<br>
forced displacement of persons, to prohibit the practice of forced
labour<br>
and forced portering and to prevent arbitrary killings, and confiscation
of<br>
property in the ethnic minority areas.<br>
26.&nbsp;&nbsp; The Special Rapporteur visited Thailand in order to
inquire into the<br>
current situation of the displaced persons on the border of Myanmar
with<br>
Thailand, and on the human rights violations committed against
ethnic<br>
minorities and others who had been subjected to various forms of
repression<br>
by the Government.&nbsp; The itinerary of the Special Rapporteur
included<br>
Bangkok, Kanchanaburi, Mae Sot, Chiang Mai, Mae Hong Son and camps in
the<br>
Tak province with large populations of displaced persons.&nbsp; During
these<br>
visits he was received by representatives of the Thai authorities and
met<br>
with representatives of international non governmental
organizations&nbsp; and<br>
representatives of several ethnic groups.&nbsp; During his visit, the
Special<br>
Rapporteur received the testimonies of a total of 50 persons selected
from<br>
among newly arrived persons from Myanmar, mostly Karen, Shan and
Karenni.<br>
The information and views obtained in the course of his visits are<br>
reflected below under the relevant subject headings.<br>
<br>
A.&nbsp; The problem of displacement<br>
<br>
27.&nbsp;&nbsp; Internal displacement in Myanmar represents a particular
case of<br>
human tragedy resulting from conflict between the Government and
different<br>
ethnic groups.&nbsp; It is estimated that over half a million
displaced<br>
persons, living in Mon, Karen, Shan and Karenni States, are in need
of<br>
humanitarian assistance. Since the independence of Myanmar in 1948,
the<br>
country has suffered from unresolved conflicts between most of the
ethnic<br>
minorities and the central authorities in spite of a number of
ceasefire<br>
agreements.&nbsp; These conflicts precipitated insurgencies in several
parts of<br>
the country which have resulted in large numbers of internally
displaced<br>
persons and a considerable number who have sought refuge in
neighbouring<br>
countries, particularly Thailand, Bangladesh and India.<br>
28.&nbsp;&nbsp; The Special Rapporteur is not in possession of
independently verified<br>
statistics on the number of displaced persons in Myanmar, but local
and<br>
international NGOs estimate the number in Karen State to be between
100,000<br>
and 200,000.&nbsp; Unofficial estimates place the current number in Shan
State<br>
to be over 300,000&nbsp; and in Karenni State, 70,000.&nbsp; Finally,
there are<br>
reportedly<br>
about 40,000 persons displaced in Mon State.<br>
29.&nbsp;&nbsp; By the end of June 1998, the refugee camp caseload of
displaced<br>
persons from Myanmar living in Thailand was 112,841.&nbsp; The breakdown
by<br>
ethnic group was as follows:&nbsp; 86,823 Karen, 12,665 Mon, 13,353
Karenni.&nbsp; In<br>
addition, there were a number of Shan displaced persons who were not
living<br>
in refugee camps but were scattered mainly throughout the north of<br>
Thailand.&nbsp; It is generally believed that tens of thousands of people
from<br>
Myanmar have entered Thailand during the last three years.<br>
<br>
B.&nbsp; The main causes of displacement<br>
<br>
30.&nbsp;&nbsp; The problem of displacement in Myanmar is complex and
open to so many<br>
different interpretations that a comprehensive assessment is difficult.
The<br>
causes of displacement are numerous and differ from one region to
another,<br>
although certain common features and trends can be discerned.<br>
31.&nbsp;&nbsp; The role of the army, in this context, is
paramount.&nbsp; Since<br>
independence, it has exercised a strong influence over the governing of
the<br>
ethnic states.&nbsp; Many Karen, Karenni and Shan do not perceive the
army as a<br>
national army, and soldiers, particularly ethnic Burmese, generally
behave<br>
towards the local population as if they were enemies.<br>
32.&nbsp;&nbsp; Violence against civilians would appear to have been a
fundamental<br>
component of the overall military strategy of the Myanmar army.&nbsp;
That<br>
strategy is designed first to secure resources from the local
population,<br>
in particular food, combatants and workers, and second to weaken 
the<br>
resource base of insurgent groups and their capacity to govern.&nbsp; To
this<br>
latter end, the army not only has undertaken systematically to destroy
most<br>
of the villages but also, as the local economy is largely based on<br>
agriculture, forcibly to displace the rural population so as to
disrupt<br>
agricultural production.<br>
33.&nbsp;&nbsp; In flagrant violation of the basic rules of humanitarian
law,<br>
civilians living in rural settlements have been attacked.&nbsp; In some
cases,<br>
this has resulted in massacres, in others in disorderly flight to
safety,<br>
often separating families.&nbsp; Those who are captured are often
subjected to<br>
rape and arbitrary killing, or are held captive to grow food for the
army,<br>
or made to provide forced labour or portering for the army.<br>
34.&nbsp;&nbsp; After these general observations, it is appropriate to
specify the<br>
<br>
main causes of displacement.&nbsp; These are counter insurgency
operations,<br>
forced labour and portering restrictions on farmers and land
confiscation. <br>
Each is discussed separately below.&nbsp; Displacement is also attributed
to<br>
major development projects undertaken by the Government in the process
of<br>
which large numbers of persons are removed from the lands designated
for<br>
the projects without being assisted in relocation or being
appropriately<br>
compensated.<br>
<br>
1.&nbsp; Counter insurgency operations<br>
<br>
35.&nbsp;&nbsp; Counter insurgency operations by the army have had an
important<br>
impact on the displacement of the population, both with regard to
the<br>
number of persons displaced and the methods employed.&nbsp; These
operations<br>
have also contributed to the massive uprooting of the rural population
by<br>
deliberately relocating large numbers of civilians from numerous
villages<br>
as part of the military strategy against the insurgents.&nbsp; Despite a
number<br>
of ceasefire agreements signed by the Government and representatives
of<br>
ethnic groups, the army is still engaged in counter-insurgency
operations<br>
in Karen, Shan and Karenni States. <br>
36.&nbsp;&nbsp; Although the practice of forced relocations by the
military as a<br>
means of controlling the population in the ethnic regions is not new,
the<br>
scale of the relocations increased significantly after 1996.&nbsp; The
victims<br>
of displacement are mostly peasants, including members of ethnic
groups<br>
such as the Karen, Karenni, Shan and Mon, who live in areas of
insurgency<br>
and are victimized by counter-insurgency activities or are caught in
the<br>
crossfire between the army and the insurgents.<br>
37.&nbsp;&nbsp; Numerous testimonies received by the Special Rapporteur
indicate that<br>
the civilian population living in or near the combat zone is
generally<br>
forced to move:&nbsp; in these &quot;grey zones&quot; (zones controlled
or influenced by<br>
the insurgents) the armed forces often resort to searches, destruction
and<br>
burning of houses, and confiscation of property and food to force
the<br>
people to move, temporarily or permanently.&nbsp; Testimonies indicate
that no<br>
distinction between insurgents and non-combatants is generally made
and<br>
that the inhabitants of these zones are subjected to indiscriminate<br>
torture, beatings and arbitrary arrests by the army. <br>
38.&nbsp;&nbsp; In order to cut the main links between the insurgent
groups and the<br>
civilian population, entire communities living in the border area
between<br>
Myanmar and Thailand are moved to relocation sites which are subject
to<br>
strict military control.&nbsp; Expulsion orders are issued by the army
coupled<br>
with the warning that anyone trying to remain in their homes will be
shot<br>
on sight.<br>
39.&nbsp;&nbsp; The following information provided to the Special
Rapporteur is<br>
illustrative of the widespread recourse to forced relocation and 
the<br>
consequent violation of most basic rights.&nbsp; Central Shan State
has<br>
witnessed one of the largest forced relocation programmes, which
still<br>
continues. From March 1996 the army has ordered village after village
in<br>
eight townships (Larng Kher, Murng Nai, Nam Zarng, Lai Kha, Murng
Kerng,<br>
Kun Hing, Ke See and Murng Su) to move to a total of 45 relocation sites.
<br>
The estimated number of people relocated is over 100,000 from over
600<br>
villages.&nbsp; When relocated, the population is left to fend for itself
to<br>
find work, food and sanitary and education facilities.&nbsp; In Karenni
State,<br>
throughout June and July 1996, orders were given to more than 100
villages<br>
located between the Pon and Salween Rivers instructing villagers to move
to<br>
relocation sites near army camps in Sha Daw and Ywa Thit townships.&nbsp;
The<br>
estimated number of people affected was 20,000-30,000, most of them
ethnic<br>
Karenni.&nbsp; The army's purpose is apparently to isolate the population
in<br>
that area from Karenni insurgents of the Kayinni National Progressive
Party<br>
(KNPP).&nbsp; Army officers are reported to have warned that those who
remained<br>
in the deserted villages would be considered insurgents or
&quot;enemies&quot;.&nbsp; <br>
40.&nbsp;&nbsp; In addition to displacement caused by deliberate action,
many persons<br>
are said to have left for fear of being attacked when the military
fronts<br>
move close to their places of residence.&nbsp; To avoid losing their
homes and<br>
sources of livelihood, many communities have resisted displacement as
long<br>
as possible and have developed different strategies for survival.&nbsp;
Several<br>
displaced persons living in camps in Thailand described to the
Special<br>
Rapporteur how people in their village would hide in the forest and
return<br>
when it was safe to tend to their farms.&nbsp; As the situation worsened,
many<br>
families fled the village.&nbsp; Since fighting was spreading to
different parts<br>
of the district, they did not know where to go to find shelter and
after<br>
one week they returned.&nbsp; The village was finally attacked and the
houses<br>
destroyed.<br>
<br>
2.&nbsp; Forced labour and portering<br>
<br>
41.&nbsp;&nbsp; The second reason has to do with the particular
phenomenon of forced<br>
conscription of civilians into compulsory labour duties for the
military<br>
authorities.&nbsp; No pay is given for such labour and the period of
service can<br>
last for months.&nbsp; This practice disrupts family life and prevents
people<br>
from carrying on their daily work in order to earn a living.<br>
42.&nbsp;&nbsp; The Special Rapporteur received reports that villagers
throughout<br>
Shan State are being forced by the SPDC to work without payment.&nbsp;
The<br>
people most seriously affected are those who have been forcibly
relocated,<br>
as they have been forced to leave their land and become wage labourers
and<br>
thus cannot afford to work without pay for the military.<br>
43.&nbsp;&nbsp; It is common practice for the military to force villagers
to go and<br>
work on military bases, either for constructing or maintaining
barracks,<br>
bunkers or fences, or performing menial tasks like cleaning, weeding,
and<br>
fetching firewood or water.&nbsp; Even children are forced to do this
kind of<br>
work: on 29 May 1998, SPDC troops are reported to have forced 10-15
boys<br>
between the ages of 14 and 16 to work at the military bases of LIB 524
and<br>
IB 246. They were not fed, and were even beaten up by the soldiers.<br>
44.&nbsp;&nbsp; The Special Rapporteur has received reports that
villagers are being<br>
forced to grow food for the army.&nbsp; In June 1998, villagers in
Kengtung are<br>
reported to have been forced by the SPDC to grow chili peppers, beans
and<br>
garlic on land that was confiscated from them.&nbsp; And on 11 July, SPDC
base<br>
LIB 102 apparently ordered the civilian population to provide labourers
for<br>
weeding soya bean and corn farms owned by the military in Murng
Pan.&nbsp; Ten<br>
persons from each village, from some 15 villages each day, had to
bring<br>
their own food and tools.&nbsp; Villagers of Kengtong, Murng Nai, said
they had<br>
been forced in September 1998 to plant yellow beans for the army, then
tend<br>
the plots and do weeding and fencing for troops at local bases.<br>
45.&nbsp;&nbsp; Throughout 1998, The Special Rapporteur received reports
of villagers<br>
from Murng Pan, Larng Khur, Murng Nai, Murng Ton and Nam Zarng being
forced<br>
to work for the army for periods of up to two weeks splitting rocks
near<br>
the Salween River crossing of Ta Sarng in Shan State.&nbsp; The
battalions<br>
concerned were IB 225, IB 64, IB 65 and LIB 333.&nbsp; The rocks were
conveyed<br>
by the army to&nbsp; big cities like Yangon where they were sold for
12,000-15,000 kyats per truckload.<br>
46.&nbsp;&nbsp; Since 4 July 1998, villagers from the Kengtong area are
reported to<br>
have been forced to drive their oxcarts to carry teak lumber from
Kengtong<br>
to the SPDC military base of IB 43 at Kunhing.&nbsp; During July and
August 427<br>
oxcarts were used.<br>
47.&nbsp;&nbsp; Since April 1998, villagers in 21 villages in the Nam
Kham area of<br>
Northern Shan State, bordering on China, are reported to have been
forced<br>
to work on a dam over the Nam Mao River.<br>
48.&nbsp;&nbsp; Throughout 1998, the SPDC military are reported to have
been taking<br>
porters from the main towns throughout central and southern Shan, where
the<br>
Shan resistance is operating.&nbsp; The SPDC had been sending out
regular<br>
military patrols from its bases around the area, each time demanding
groups<br>
of porters from the civilian population.&nbsp; The households provided
porters<br>
on a rotation<br>
basis, and if someone could not go, they were made to pay
8,000-10,000<br>
kyats to hire a replacement.<br>
<br>
3.&nbsp; Restrictions on farmers<br>
<br>
49.&nbsp;&nbsp; Because of the massive displacement of the population,
farming has<br>
apparently been drastically reduced.&nbsp; This has led to food shortages
among<br>
the rural population generally and has provoked voluntary displacement
to<br>
other areas in search of assistance and security.<br>
50.&nbsp;&nbsp; The army is reported to be increasingly placing
restrictions on the<br>
kinds of crops grown by the local farmers, forcing them to grow crops
for<br>
the troops which they will either consume themselves or sell.&nbsp; On 4
May<br>
1998, in Murng Pan, IB 66 is reported to have ordered farmers to grow
no<br>
more than a small amount of garlic, whereas farmers had traditionally
grown<br>
this crop for export to Thailand.&nbsp; They were told they had to grow
soya<br>
beans for the army instead.&nbsp; On 23 June, IB 286 in Kaesee told
villagers<br>
from Murng Nawng and Murng Nang (who had been forcibly relocated) that
they<br>
needed licences to grow rice and if licenced, they had to give half
their<br>
rice crop to the army. If they had no licence, their rice fields would
be<br>
confiscated.&nbsp; On 2 July, SPDC IB 99 in Larng Khur is reported to
have<br>
ordered all sugarcane farmers to clear two thirds of their sugarcane
farms<br>
and grow soya beans and yellow beans for the army instead.&nbsp; One
farmer who had apparently been granted permission to continue farming as
usual was reported to have been beaten, kicked, tortured and then shot to
death on 3 August 1998.&nbsp; In September, the&nbsp; villagers of
Kengtong, Murng Nai, were said to have been forced to cultivate yellow
beans for the SPDC troops at local bases.<br>
<br>
4.&nbsp; Land confiscation<br>
<br>
51.&nbsp;&nbsp; Another important cause of displacement relates to land
confiscation.<br>
The majority of the population lives by agriculture.&nbsp; Farms tend to
be<br>
small and constitute the only income for families.&nbsp; Moreover, land
is<br>
culturally part of a person's identity.&nbsp; The Special Rapporteur was
told<br>
that very few legal titles to land exist.&nbsp; This permits the military
to<br>
confiscate the land that had traditionally belonged to peasants and
farmers<br>
living in Karenni, Karen and Shan States and to redistribute it to
military<br>
officials and soldiers.<br>
52.&nbsp;&nbsp; Since June 1998, the authorities are reported to have
issued orders<br>
for the confiscation from the people in Tachilek of 1,000 acres of
land<br>
stretching along the Tachilek-Kengtung main road.&nbsp; The confiscated
land has<br>
been bulldozed, divided into small patches and sold to those who can
afford<br>
it. People from nine villages have been affected.&nbsp; On 4 June 1998,
the<br>
Golden Triangle Military Command Commander ordered LIB 422 to confiscate
13<br>
plots of land and rice fields owned by villagers of King-Ka in Zone 2
in<br>
Kengtung to expand the military base.&nbsp; The villagers were given a
small<br>
plot of land each to build a house on, but they had to buy it.&nbsp; They
were<br>
still forced to pay their rice quota to the SPDC even though their land
had<br>
been taken from them.<br>
53.&nbsp;&nbsp; While development and industrial projects such as
railway<br>
construction, and the creation of tourist attractions are being carried
out<br>
in areas inhabited by minorities, many people are having their 
lands<br>
confiscated without any compensation and are forced to move to
designated<br>
sites.<br>
<br>
C.&nbsp; Patterns and consequences of displacement<br>
<br>
54.&nbsp;&nbsp; The Special Rapporteur has ascertained from his contacts
with those<br>
who have sought refuge in the camps on the Thai side of the Thai
Myanmar<br>
frontier that since 1996, there are two distinct categories of
internally<br>
displaced persons in the ethnic States:&nbsp; the &quot;displaced&quot;
and &quot;dispersed&quot;. <br>
The first category consists mostly of families who were forced to go
to<br>
relocation sites or army camps, while the second category includes
persons<br>
who instead fled to the mountains or the jungle, trying to avoid the
main<br>
roads and to hide from the military.&nbsp; It is much more difficult to
identify<br>
the dispersed, since they are not concentrated in a group but are
literally<br>
dispersed throughout the country.&nbsp; While visiting the camps, the
Special<br>
Rapporteur spoke with both categories of displaced persons who
subsequently<br>
fled to Thailand, and in the context of the present report the term<br>
&quot;internally displaced&quot; implies both categories.<br>
55.&nbsp;&nbsp; Testimonies received by the Special Rapporteur, as well
as<br>
observations made by representatives of non-governmental
organizations,<br>
indicate that the victims of displacement are mostly villagers and
farmers<br>
who were living in remote areas of Karen, Shan and Karenni States.&nbsp;
Most of<br>
them have not been officially registered and do not possess any<br>
identification cards or other documents.<br>
<br>
56.&nbsp;&nbsp; Cases of forced evictions seem to occur with great
frequency and as a<br>
matter of policy.&nbsp; All the people interviewed by the Special
Rapporteur<br>
stated that they were given at most one week's notice to move and were
told<br>
that they would be shot if they did not comply.&nbsp; They were forced to
leave<br>
their land, their crops and most of their animals.&nbsp; Much of the
property<br>
was reportedly immediately stolen or confiscated by the army.&nbsp; In
some<br>
cases, there was adequate time to prepare for departure, so that
families<br>
or even entire communities could leave together.&nbsp; If not, or if
attacked,<br>
they had to flee in a disorderly manner, sometimes with the husband,
wife<br>
and children going in different directions.<br>
57.&nbsp;&nbsp; The internally displaced persons in Myanmar rarely flee
in large<br>
numbers.&nbsp; They usually&nbsp; move in small groups of a few families
or<br>
individuals. The areas of expulsion are numerous and spread throughout
the<br>
country, including in the border areas with Thailand.&nbsp; The
displaced's own<br>
perceptions of where food and security might be found are
determining<br>
factors in deciding upon the destination of their flight.&nbsp; The
displaced<br>
usually move to neighbouring rural areas or to the jungle; others 
go<br>
directly to relocation sites and from there to camps located in
Thailand,<br>
or directly to Thailand where they often join relatives or friends from
the<br>
same area.&nbsp; In this regard, the Special Rapporteur was often told
during<br>
the mission that the army is planting landmines in order to prevent
the<br>
population from using the routes which take them to their paddy fields
or<br>
to the Thai border.&nbsp; According to information received, each
battalion in<br>
the front line area (along the Myanmar Thai border) was issued with
about<br>
200 landmines and ordered to plant&nbsp; them.&nbsp; <br>
58.&nbsp;&nbsp; The two main considerations which led people to flee were
security<br>
concerns and the need to have a source of livelihood.&nbsp; These could
at times<br>
be contradictory concerns.&nbsp; On the one hand, fear of losing one's
land<br>
constituted a motive for staying if the harvests were sufficient, while
on<br>
the other hand, fear of attacks was a motive for departing.&nbsp;
Conversely,<br>
the need to find a source of subsistence had to be weighed against the
fear<br>
of being caught by the army after having been ordered to move to a<br>
relocation site.<br>
59.&nbsp;&nbsp; Another problem affecting the displaced is the
disintegration of<br>
families and communities.&nbsp; The Special Rapporteur noticed a large
number of<br>
widows and orphans among the displaced in camps in Thailand.&nbsp;
However,<br>
numerous communities have remained more or less together in spite 
of<br>
displacement and have maintained many of their cultural traditions.&nbsp;
This<br>
helps to alleviate to some extent the acute problems of displacement
and<br>
would no doubt facilitate the process of return to the areas of
origin.<br>
However,&nbsp; very few returns to areas of origin seem to be taking
place. <br>
Continued insecurity coupled with destroyed infrastructure suggest
that<br>
displaced persons had compelling reasons for wanting to remain in the
camps<br>
in Thailand.<br>
60.&nbsp;&nbsp; As far as the security situation in the areas of return
are<br>
concerned, reports continuously reaching the camps speak of, for
example,<br>
forced labour and portering, arbitrary arrests, detentions and
executions<br>
by the Myanmar military of persons suspected of sympathizing with<br>
insurgents, with no recourse to formal judicial proceedings.&nbsp; In
addition,<br>
returnees were finding their homes destroyed and their land either burnt
or<br>
occupied by the army. In such cases, the returnees had no recourse
to<br>
justice, either because the judicial system did not exist or because it
was<br>
not functioning independently. The displaced, moreover, had very 
few<br>
resources and means by which to return home.&nbsp; The infrastructure of
entire<br>
villages had been destroyed and many homes levelled by warfare and
looting.<br>
Finally, it would seem that the local authorities had no intention
of<br>
dealing with the assistance and protection problems of the
returnees.<br>
61.&nbsp;&nbsp; The Special Rapporteur was told that, for the peasants
who had lost<br>
their land, either because they had to sell it very cheaply before
they<br>
fled or because it was destroyed or taken by the army, return is 
not<br>
possible.&nbsp; Where the armed conflict is continuing, return is also
not an option.&nbsp; <br>
<br>
<br>
1.&nbsp; The situation of the dispersed in the jungle<br>
<br>
62.&nbsp;&nbsp; Following orders to leave their homes, many villagers
avoid moving to<br>
relocation sites and usually move first to a nearby rural area or go to
the<br>
jungle, trying to work in their fields during the day and returning
for<br>
safety at night.&nbsp; They can remain in hiding for several months as
long as<br>
they are able to find sufficient food to survive.&nbsp; These villagers
live in<br>
fear that the soldiers will find them, especially in the dry
season.&nbsp; It<br>
was reported, for example, that at the start of the dry season in
1998,<br>
local army troops shot on site at villagers hiding in the Mi Chaung
Theit<br>
area.<br>
63.&nbsp;&nbsp; Apart from the lack of security, the lack of food is
clearly the main<br>
problem facing families living in the jungle.&nbsp; Families supplement
their<br>
rice porridge by eating wild roots, leaves and fruit.&nbsp; Many
families<br>
interviewed said that they could not cultivate their crop safely and
that<br>
when they were discovered their fields and paddies were burned.&nbsp; As
a<br>
result, without any source of income and without enough food to
survive,<br>
they try to find their way to Thailand.&nbsp; In addition, people living
in the<br>
jungle have limited access to health care.&nbsp; They have to rely on
an<br>
insufficient and informal health-care network in the form of &quot;mobile
health<br>
teams&quot;, which provide medicines and vaccinations.&nbsp; However, it
was reported<br>
that these mobile teams could not cover all the areas where the
displaced<br>
hide and live.<br>
<br>
2.&nbsp; The situation of the displaced in relocation sites<br>
<br>
64.&nbsp;&nbsp; According to testimonies received, relocation sites, as
well as the<br>
living conditions in the sites, may vary from one place to another.<br>
Displaced&nbsp; persons in refugee camps in Thailand describe the sites
as<br>
either a large, empty stretch of land surrounded by fences or barbed
wire<br>
and near a military camp or as the centre of a large village where the
army<br>
has forced villagers to congregate.&nbsp; The military outpost is
normally in<br>
the centre of the village. <br>
65.&nbsp;&nbsp; No particular arrangements are made by the authorities to
receive the<br>
<br>
new forced arrivals.&nbsp; There seems to be a food and a health crisis
and a<br>
general lack of adequate housing and basic services.&nbsp; Villagers have
to<br>
build their own makeshift huts and provide their own food.&nbsp; Family
members<br>
living in the relocation sites are often requested to do various tasks
for<br>
the army. Each family also has to provide one person to work for the
army. <br>
They perform various duties such as building the fences, cleaning
the<br>
compound or guarding the site.&nbsp; The interviews did not make clear to
what<br>
extent facilities for education and access to health care, especially
for<br>
children, are available.<br>
Unemployment is a major problem in the relocation sites.&nbsp; The
displaced are<br>
used to working their own land and it is difficult to start any sort
of<br>
work to generate income.&nbsp; When they are able to find work, they are
easily<br>
exploited.&nbsp; According to testimonies received, many displaced
persons,<br>
including children, work as daily workers (porters), whose salaries
are<br>
around US$ 2 per week, for 12-hour working days.&nbsp; Others work
in<br>
construction.<br>
Those who find such jobs are considered to be fortunate, since they have
an<br>
income.<br>
66.&nbsp;&nbsp; The villagers are not entitled to leave the compound
without a pass,<br>
for which they have to pay.&nbsp; Their freedom of movement is extremely
limited<br>
and, in all cases, subject to authorization from the local military<br>
battalion.<br>
Attempting to flee is said to be interpreted by the authorities as proof
of<br>
participation in or sympathy with the insurgency and of an intention
to<br>
report on the abuses committed by the army.&nbsp; Some are required to
obtain<br>
safe conduct passes or pay high fees at checkpoints for a
&quot;permission&quot; to<br>
leave.&nbsp; Other sources have reported incidents of women and children
being<br>
shot at while fleeing in areas near the border with Thailand.<br>
<br>
3.&nbsp; Special problems affecting women and children<br>
<br>
67.&nbsp;&nbsp; Many of the displaced, in particular women and children,
reported<br>
that they had been terrorized and subjected to inhuman treatment
before<br>
taking refuge in Thailand.&nbsp; It was reported that Myanmar soldiers
raped and<br>
abused women during incursions into the emergency zones or in the<br>
relocation sites.<br>
In some areas, women who work in the fields still face significant risks
of<br>
being targeted and victimized.<br>
68.&nbsp;&nbsp; The Special Rapporteur has noted the serious
psychological problems<br>
facing women and children affected by the crisis.&nbsp; Abuses against
women,<br>
especially in the course of violent events, reportedly ranged from
having<br>
seen their children or husband killed to being raped and losing their
home<br>
and means of subsistence.&nbsp; Interviews held in the course of a short
visit<br>
to a village revealed that many had suffered from such abuses.&nbsp; It
should<br>
be mentioned that cultural inhibitions linked to subjects such as sex
and<br>
the serious social implications of rape and assaults on women compound
the<br>
problem of lack of outlets for expression and foment deep hatreds.<br>
69.&nbsp;&nbsp; Female-headed households were less able to become
self-reliant and<br>
were therefore more in need of assistance.&nbsp; In some cases, they
were<br>
assisted by other families, for example, in setting up shelters.&nbsp;
The<br>
numerous children who had been orphaned or separated from their
families<br>
constituted&nbsp; a particularly vulnerable group.&nbsp; In general,
there was a<br>
willingness on the part of local families or other displaced persons
to<br>
adopt the children, at least until their parents could be traced if
they<br>
were still alive.<br>
70.&nbsp;&nbsp; Some of the most serious problems the displaced and
dispersed<br>
populations face are in the health domain, largely because of the lack
of<br>
health services.&nbsp; Children are particularly affected by 
chronic<br>
malnutrition, malaria, diarrhoea and dysentery.&nbsp; The right to health
is<br>
seriously jeopardized in those circumstances.<br>
71.&nbsp;&nbsp; Displaced children living in the jungle suffer high
mortality and<br>
malnutrition rates and their flight from their homes often puts them
beyond<br>
the reach of any assistance or protection.&nbsp; Frequently, displaced
children<br>
have witnessed the murder of their parents or the destruction of
their<br>
homes.<br>
As a consequence, many children suffer from fear and parents, caught in
the<br>
day-to-day struggle for survival, often have little energy to devote
to<br>
caring for them.<br>
72.&nbsp;&nbsp; Rather than attending school, many displaced children
have had to<br>
help support their families.&nbsp; In any event, many schools are
reported to<br>
have been destroyed or closed.&nbsp; Public education is officially
free;<br>
however, many schools are under funded and parents have to pay tuition
so<br>
that the school can operate.&nbsp; Many displaced children do not speak
Burmese<br>
and have difficulties in communicating with their teachers.&nbsp; Many
children<br>
who used to go to school in their native village and learned their
native<br>
language have to restart their schooling upon arrival in the
relocation<br>
sites because they are prevented from learning in their own
language.&nbsp; This<br>
is not only a negation of sound pedagogical principles but a violation
of<br>
the right to freedom of expression which includes the right to receive
and<br>
impart information so necessary in the educational field.<br>
<br>
<br>
VERSION FRANCAISE
&lt;<a href="http://www.birmanie.int.ch/~asb/cdh/rappcdh99.html"; eudora="autourl">http://www.birmanie.int.ch/~asb/cdh/rappcdh99.html</a>&gt;<br>
<br>
<br>
IV.&nbsp; CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS<br>
&nbsp; <br>
A.&nbsp; Conclusions<br>
<br>
73.&nbsp;&nbsp; The Special Rapporteur has previously reported that
Myanmar law and<br>
orders of the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC)
themselves<br>
violate basic freedoms, including the freedoms of expression and<br>
association. The Government of Myanmar continues to intimidate its
citizens<br>
and prevents them from exercising their fundamental rights to freedom
of<br>
association and expression by prosecuting persons for criminal and<br>
treason-related offences.<br>
The Special Rapporteur notes that many citizens are still being
arrested<br>
for peaceful expression of their ideas.&nbsp; As mentioned above,
political<br>
party leaders and their members are being held, for an undetermined
period,<br>
against their will and without any charges being brought against them.
<br>
Moreover, it is evident that the total State domination of the
media,<br>
together with the existence of a wide range of SLORC orders
criminalizing<br>
freedom of expression, seriously undermines the exercise of this right
as<br>
well as the right to freedom of association.<br>
74.&nbsp;&nbsp; Conditions in Myanmar prisons fall short of international
standards,<br>
i.e. the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of prisoners, the
Basic<br>
Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners and the Body of Principles
for<br>
the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or
Imprisonment.<br>
75.&nbsp;&nbsp; The non-acceptance by Myanmar of the customary ICRC
procedures for<br>
visits to places of detention is highly prejudicial to the amelioration
of<br>
conditions of detention in Myanmar.<br>
76.&nbsp;&nbsp; The phenomenon of displacement would appear to be limited
largely, if<br>
not exclusively, to ethnic minorities.&nbsp; The problem is not new
and<br>
originates mainly from the absence of a political solution dating back
to<br>
colonial times and before.&nbsp; The ceasefire agreements concluded in
recent<br>
years are a beginning to a solution but are likely to be fruitless
until<br>
serious and meaningful measures are taken to engage in a political
dialogue<br>
which includes the ethnic minorities.<br>
77.&nbsp;&nbsp; The army has been implicated in human rights abuses
resulting in<br>
displacement.&nbsp; This is partly attributable to the fact that the
armed<br>
forces constitute the only institution vested with law enforcement.&nbsp;
The<br>
<br>
armed forces are occasionally involved in restoring public order,
although<br>
no specific training is given for this task and those involved in
such<br>
operations merely resort to the use of military equipment and
military<br>
tactics.&nbsp; In such cases a number of provisions of 
international<br>
humanitarian law, such as article 17 of Protocol II Additional to
the<br>
Geneva Conventions, which prohibits the displacement of civilian<br>
populations for reasons related to the conflict, are relevant and must
be<br>
observed.<br>
78.&nbsp;&nbsp; Impunity remains a very serious problem.&nbsp;
Retaliatory massacres of<br>
villagers and massive human rights violations of civilians have
occurred.<br>
In all these instances the right to life and security of the person,
in<br>
particular of women and children, are violated.&nbsp; In addition,
corruption,<br>
which is on the rise, is a serious problem particularly as law
enforcement<br>
and the administration of justice are casualties of military rule.<br>
79.&nbsp;&nbsp; As observed earlier, none of the displaced persons living
in Myanmar<br>
itself or in Thailand will be able to return home immediately, as
their<br>
houses and land have been destroyed or others have moved onto their land.
<br>
Deeply embedded insecurity and fear also prevent return.&nbsp; Where
return to<br>
the home areas becomes impossible, alternative solutions are required
to<br>
ensure the&nbsp; basic rights to life, protection of personal security
and from<br>
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, health, education and family
unity,<br>
among others.<br>
<br>
B.&nbsp; Recommendations<br>
<br>
80.&nbsp;&nbsp; Since the situation of human rights in Myanmar is
worsening and the<br>
repression of civil and political rights continues unabated, the
Special<br>
Rapporteur feels bound to renew the detailed recommendations he made
in<br>
paragraphs 7 to 97 of his last report to the Commission on Human
Rights<br>
(E/CN.4/1998/70) and in paragraphs 61 to 63 of his interim report to
the<br>
General Assembly (A/53/364).<br>
81.&nbsp;&nbsp; In addition, in view of the ever growing humanitarian
crisis in Shan,<br>
Karen and Karenni States, in particular, assistance to the displaced
and<br>
other conflict-affected persons should become a priority for the<br>
Government.<br>
82.&nbsp;&nbsp; Because the displaced and other conflict-affected persons
have a wide<br>
variety of urgent needs, the Government should seek the assistance of
the<br>
international community, through the United Nations system and its<br>
specialized agencies, governmental and intergovernmental organizations,
as<br>
well as non governmental organizations, in assessing the nature and
extent<br>
of the assistance needs and in responding to those needs in a rapid
and<br>
flexible manner.<br>
83.&nbsp;&nbsp; Clearly, the military solution that has been adopted by
the<br>
Government in the ethnic areas has become a serious problem rather than
a<br>
solution. A political solution in the ethnic areas in the context of
the<br>
political dialogue recommended in paragraphs 79 of the Special
Rapporteur's<br>
last report to the Commission has become urgent in order to prevent
a<br>
worsening of the present humanitarian disaster.<br>
----------------------------------------------------<br>
Notes<br>
1/ &quot;Forgotten victims of a hidden war: internally displaced Karen
in<br>
Burma&quot;, published by Burma Ethnic Research Group and the Friederich
Naumann<br>
Foundation, April 1998<br>
2/ &quot;Dispossessed : forced relocation and extrajudicial killings in
Shan<br>
State&quot;, Shan Human Rights Foundation, April 1998<br>
3/ Burmese Border Consortium, &quot;Regugge relief programme - Programme
report<br>
for the period January to June 1998&quot;, July 1998<br>
4/ Ibid.<br>
<br>
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