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SPY SATS and French Spot Junta Army
Subject: Re: SPY SATS and French Spot Junta Army Deal
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Dawn Star wrote:
> We're looking at one meter! resolution. Understand?
> AND We're talking French space sat technology, spy resolution, they are very
> good on this stuff, maybe close and up to speed of amricans, but for
> sure they dont have the numbers or the crunchers or the manpower and
> reach of the US NASA govt spy system, but the French do have SPOT and
> they are selling commecial army deal to the junta:
>
> read this: you ought to update it and post what you find on the net/ds
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National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 13 [Image]
U.S. Satellite Imagery, 1960-1999
by Jeffrey T. Richelson
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Introduction
The use of overhead platforms to observe events on the earth can
be traced to the French Revolution, when France organized a
company of aerostiers, or balloonists, in April 1794. The United
States employed balloons during the Civil War, although little
intelligence of value was obtained. In January 1911, the San
Diego waterfront became the first target of cameras carried
aboard an airplane. Later that year the U.S. Army Signal Corps
put aerial photography into the curriculum at its flight training
school. Between 1913 and 1915 visual and photographic
reconnaissance missions were flown by the U.S. Army in the
Philippines and along the Mexican border.1
During World War II the United States made extensive use of
airplane photography using remodeled bombers. After the war, with
the emergence of a hostile relationship with the Soviet Union,
the United States began conducting photographic missions along
the Soviet periphery. The aircraft cameras, however, could only
capture images of territory within a few miles of the flight
path.
On some missions aircraft actually flew into Soviet airspace,
but even those missions did not provide the necessary coverage of
the vast Soviet interior. As a result, beginning in the early
1950s the United States began seriously exploring more advanced
methods for obtaining images of targets throughout the Soviet
Union. The result was the development, production, and employment
of a variety of spacecraft and aircraft (particularly the U-2 and
A-12/SR-71) that permitted the U.S. intelligence community to
closely monitor developments in the Soviet Union and other
nations through overhead imagery.
The capabilities of spacecraft and aircraft have evolved from
being limited to black-and-white visible-light photography to
being able to produce images using different parts of the
electromagnetic spectrum. As a result, imagery can often be
obtained under circumstances (darkness, cloud cover) where
standard visible-light photography is not feasible. In addition,
employment of different portions of the electromagnetic spectrum,
individually or simultaneously, expands the information that can
be produced concerning a target.
Photographic equipment can be film-based or electro-optical. A
conventional camera captures a scene on film by recording the
varying light levels reflected from all of the separate objects
in the scene. In contrast, an electro-optical camera converts the
varying light levels into electrical signals. A numerical value
is assigned to each of the signals, which are called picture
elements, or pixels. At a ground receiving station, a picture can
then be constructed from the digital signal transmitted from the
spacecraft (often via a relay satellite).2
In addition to the visible-light portion of the electro-magnetic
spectrum, the near-infrared portion of the spectrum, which is
invisible to the human eye, can be employed to produce images. At
the same time, near-infrared, like, visible-light imagery,
depends on objects reflecting solar radiation rather than on
their emission of radiation. As a result, such imagery can only
be produced in daylight and in the absence of substantial cloud
cover.3
Thermal infrared imagery, obtained from the mid- and
far-infrared portions of the electromagnetic spectrum, provides
imagery purely by detecting the heat emitted by objects. Thus, a
thermal infrared system can detect buried structures, such as
missile silos or underground construction, as a result of the
heat they generate. Since thermal infrared imagery does not
require visible light, it can be obtained under conditions of
darkness--if the sky is free of cloud cover.4
Imagery can be obtained during day or night in the presence of
cloud cover by employing an imaging radar (an acronym for radio
detection and ranging). Radar imagery is produced by bouncing
radio waves off an area or an object and using the reflected
returns to produce an image of the target. Since radio waves are
not attenuated by the water vapor in the atmosphere, they are
able to penetrate cloud cover.5
However imagery is obtained, it requires processing and
interpretation to convert it into intelligence data. Computers
can be employed to improve the quantity and quality of the
information extracted. Obviously, digital electro-optical imagery
arrives in a form that facilitates such operations. But even
analog imagery obtained by a conventional camera can be converted
into digital signals. In any case, a computer disassembles a
picture into millions of electronic Morse code pulses and then
uses mathematical formulas to manipulate the color contrast and
intensity of each spot. Each image can be reassembled in various
ways to highlight special features and objects that were hidden
in the original image.6
Such processing allows:
* building multicolored single images out of several pictures
taken in different bands of the spectrum;
* making the patterns more obvious;
* restoring the shapes of objects by adjusting for the angle
of view and lens distortion;
* changing the amount of contrast between objects and
backgrounds;
* sharpening out-of-focus images;
* restoring ground details largely obscured by clouds;
* conducting electronic optical subtraction, in which earlier
pictures are subtracted from later ones, making unchanged
buildings in a scene disappear while new objects, such as
missile silos under construction, remain;
* enhancing shadows; and
* suppressing glint.7
Such processing plays a crucial role in easing the burden on
photogrammetrists and imagery interpreters. Photogrammetrists are
responsible for determining the size and dimensions of objects
from overhead photographs, using, along with other data, the
shadows cast by the objects. Photo interpreters are trained to
provide information about the nature of the objects in the
photographs--based on information as to what type of crates carry
MiG-29s, for instance, or what an IRBM site or fiber optics
factory looks like from 150 miles in space.
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Click on any of the following images to view a larger version of
the photo.
CORONA, ARGON, and LANYARD
In its May 2, 1946 report, Preliminary Design for an
Experimental World Circling Spaceship, the Douglas Aircraft
Corporation examined the potential value of satellites for
scientific and military purposes. Possible military uses included
missile guidance, weapons delivery, weather reconnaissance,
communications, attack assessment, and "observation."8
A little less than nine years later, on March 16, 1955, the Air
Force issued General Operational Requirement No. 80, officially
establishing a high-level requirement for an advanced
reconnaissance satellite. The document defined the Air Force
objective to be the provision of continuous surveillance of
"preselected areas of the earth" in order "to determine the
status of a potential enemy's warmaking capability."9
Over the next five years the U.S. reconnaissance satellite
program evolved in a variety of ways. The success of the Soviet
Union's Sputnik I and II satellites in the fall of 1957 provided
a spur to all U.S. space programs - as any success could be used
in the propaganda war with the Soviet Union. In the case of U.S.
reconnaissance programs, Sputnik provided a second incentive. The
clear implications of the Sputnik launches for Soviet ICBM
development increased the pressure on discovering the extent of
Soviet capabilities - something that the sporadic U-2 flights
could only do in a limited fashion.10
The Air Force program was first designated the Advanced
Reconnaissance System (ARS), then SENTRY, and finally SAMOS.
Management responsibility for SAMOS was transferred from the Air
Force to the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA),
established on February 7, 1958, and then back to the Air Force
in late 1959.11
Concern about the the length of time it would take to achieve the
primary objective of the SAMOS program - a satellite that could
scan its exposed film and return the imagery electronically - led
to President Dwight Eisenhower's approval, also on February 7,
1958, of a CIA program to develop a reconnaissance satellite. The
CIA program, designated CORONA, focused on development of a
satellite that would physically return its images in a canister -
an objective which had been a subsidiary portion of the SAMOS
program.12
While all the various versions of the SAMOS program would be
canceled in the early 1960s, CORONA would become a mainstay of
the U.S. space reconnaissance program for over a decade. It would
take over a year, starting in 1959, and 14 launches before an
operational CORONA spacecraft was placed in orbit. Nine of the
first twelve launches carried a camera that was intended to
photograph areas of the Soviet Union and other nations. All the
flights ended in failure for one reason or another. The
thirteenth mission, a diagnostic flight without camera equipment,
was the first success - in that a canister was returned from
space and recovered at sea.13
Then on August 18, a CORONA was placed into orbit, orbited the
Earth for a day, and returned its canister to earth, where it was
snatched out the air by a specially equipped aircraft on August
19. The camera carried on that flight would be retroactively
designated the KH-1 (KH for KEYHOLE) and was cable of producing
images with resolution in the area of 25-40 feet - a far cry from
what would be standard in only a few years. It did yield,
however, more images of the Soviet Union in its single day of
operation than did the entire U-2 program.14
The next successful CORONA mission would be conducted on December
7, 1960. This time a more advanced camera system, the KH-2, would
be on board. From that time, through the end of the CORONA
program in 1972, there would be a succession of new camera
systems - the KH-3, KH-4, KH-4A, and KH-4B - which produced
higher-resolution images than their predecessors, ultimately
resulting in a system that could yield images with approximately
5-6' resolution. In addition, two smaller programs - ARGON (for
mapping) and LANYARD (motivated by a specific target in the
Soviet Union) - operated during the years 1962-1964 and 1963
respectively. All together there were 145 missions, which yielded
over 800,000 images of the Soviet Union and other areas of the
world.15
Those images dramatically improved U.S. knowledge of Soviet and
other nations capabilities and activities. Perhaps its major
accomplishment occurred within 18 months of the first successful
CORONA mission. Accumulated photography allowed the U.S.
intelligence community to dispel the fear of missile gap, with
earlier estimates of a Soviet ICBM force numbering in the
hundreds by mid-1962 becoming, in September 1961, an estimate of
between 25 and 50. By June 1964 CORONA satellites had
photographed all 25 Soviet ICBM complexes. CORONA imagery also
allowed the U.S. to catalog Soviet air defense and anti-ballistic
missile sites, nuclear weapons related facilities, submarine
bases, IRBM sites, airbases - as well as Chinese, East European,
and other nations military facilities. It also allowed assessment
of military conflicts - such as the 1967 Six-Day War - and
monitoring of Soviet arms control compliance.16
In February 1995, President Clinton signed an executive order
that declassified those images. 17
[Image]
[Source: CIA/National Reconnaissance Office]
A KH-4A image of Dolon airfield, which was a major Soviet
long-range aviation facility located in what is now the Republic
of Kazakhstan. The image shows two regiments of Tupolev (Tu-16)
Bear bombers. The main runway is 13,200 feet long.
The KH-4A camera system was first introduced in August 1963.
Resolution ranged from 9 to 25 feet.
[Image]
[Source: CIA/National Reconnaissance Office]
A KH-4B image of the Moscow, with an insert of the Kremlin. In
the enlargement of the Kremlin, individual vehicles can be
identified as trucks or cars, and the line of people waiting to
enter Lenin's Tomb in Red Square can be seen. According to the
CIA, the photograph "illustrates some of the best resolution
imagery acquired by the KH-4B camera system."
The KH-4B was first introduced in September 1967 and generally
produced images with 6 foot resolution.
[Image]
[Source: CIA/National Reconnaissance Office via Federation of
American Scientists]
A KH-4B of image, taken on February 11, 1969 of a Taiwanese
nuclear facility. The United States intelligence community,
relying on CORONA and other forms of intelligence, has closely
monitored the nuclear facilities of both adversaries such as the
Soviet Union and the PRC and those of friendly nations such as
Taiwan and Israel.
The Next Generations
The primary objective of the CORONA program was to provide "area
surveillance" coverage of the Soviet Union, China and other parts
of the world. Thus, CORONA yielded single photographs which
covered thousands of square miles of territory - allowing
analysts to both examine images of known targets and to search
for previously undetected installations or activities that would
be of interest to the U.S. intelligence community.
The GAMBIT program provided an important complement to CORONA.
Initiated in 1960, it yielded the first "close-look" or
"spotting" satellite. The emphasis of GAMBIT operations, which
commenced in 1963 and continued through part of 1984, was to
produce high-resolution imagery on specific targets (rather than
general areas). Such resolution would allow the production of
more detailed intelligence, particularly technical intelligence
on foreign weapons systems. The first GAMBIT camera, the KH-7,
could produce photos with about 18 inch resolution, while the
second and last model, the KH-8 was capable of producing
photographs with under 6 inch resolution.18
While the Air Force concentrated on the high-resolution systems,
the CIA (after numerous bureaucratic battles) was assigned
responsibility for the next generation area surveillance program.
That program, which came to be designated HEXAGON, resulted in
satellites carrying the KH-9 camera system - capable of producing
images covering even more territory than the CORONA satellites,
with a resolution of 1-2 feet. Eighteen HEXAGON satellites would
be launched into orbit between 1971 and 1984, when the program
terminated.19
In late 1976, a new capability was added when the satellite
carrying the KH-11 optical system was placed into orbit. Unlike
its predecessors, the KH-11, also known by the program code names
KENNAN and CRYSTAL, did not return film canisters to be recovered
and interpreted. Rather, the light captured by its optical system
was transformed into electronic signals and relayed (through a
relay satellite in a higher orbit) back to a ground station,
where the signals were recorded on tape and converted into an
image. As a result, the U.S. could obtain satellite images of a
site or activity virtually simultaneously with a satellite
passing overhead.20
The 1980s saw a number of inadvertent or unauthorized
disclosures of U.S. satellite imagery. In 1980, as a result of
the fiasco at Desert One, where U.S. forces landed in preparation
for an attempt to rescue U.S. hostages held in Iran, KH-11
imagery of possible evacuation sites in Tehran was left behind.
In 1981, Aviation Week & Space Technology published a leaked (and
degraded) KH-11 photo of a Soviet bomber at Ramenskoye Airfield.
In 1984, two images of Soviet aircraft, taken by a KH-8 or KH-9
satellite, were inadvertently published in Congressional
hearings. That same year, an employee of the Naval Intelligence
Support Center provided Jane's Defence Weekly with several images
taken by a KH-11 satellite of a Soviet naval shipbuilding
facility.21
[Image]
[KH-11 Photograph]
This 1984 computer enhanced KH-11 photo, taken at an oblique
angle was leaked, along with two others, to Jane's Defence
Weekly by naval intelligence analyst, Samuel Loring Morison. The
image shows the general layout of the Nikolaiev 444 shipyard in
the Black Sea. Under construction is a Kiev- class aircraft
carrier (shown in the left side of the photo), then known as the
Kharkov, along with an amphibious landing ship.
Morison was brought to trial, convicted, and sent to prison in a
controversial case.
[Image]
[Soviet Aircraft]
These satellite photographs, showing a MiG-29 FULCRUM and SU- 27
FLANKER, were shown to the House Appropriations Committee during
1984 budget hearings. They were then published, apparently by
mistake, in the sanitized version of the hearings released to
the public. During the 1985 trial of Samuel Loring Morison,
government prosecutors would acknowledge the photographs were
satellite images, produced by a system other than the KH-11.
Current Systems
The United States is presently operating at least two satellite
imaging systems. One is an advanced version of the KH-11, three
of which have been launched, the first in 1992.
The advanced KH-11 satellites have a higher orbit than that
exhibited by their predecessors--operating with perigees of about
150 miles and apogees of about 600 miles. In addition, they also
have some additional capabilities. They contain an infrared
imagery capability, including a thermal infrared imagery
capability, thus permitting imagery during darkness. In addition,
the satellites carry the Improved CRYSTAL Metric System (ICMS),
which places the necessary markings on returned imagery to permit
its full exploitation for mapping purposes. Additionally, the
Advanced KH-11 can carry more fuel than the original model,
perhaps 10,000 to 15,000 pounds. This permits a longer lifetime
for the new model--possibly up to eight years.22
A second component of the U.S. space imaging fleet, are
satellites developed and deployed under a program first known as
INDIGO, then as LACROSSE, and most recently as VEGA. Rather than
employing an electro-optical system they carry an imaging radar.
The satellites closed a major gap in U.S. capabilities by
allowing the U.S. intelligence community to obtain imagery even
when targets are covered by clouds.23
The first VEGA was launched on December 2, 1988 from the space
shuttle orbiter Atlantis (and deorbited in July 1997). A second
was orbited in March 1991, from Vandenberg AFB on a Titan IV, and
a third in October 1997. The satellites have operated in orbits
of approximately 400 miles and at inclinations of 57 and 68
degrees respectively.24
When conceived, the primary purpose envisioned for the satellite
was monitoring Soviet and Warsaw Pact armor. Recent VEGA missions
included providing imagery for bomb damage assessments of the
consequences of Navy Tomahawk missile attacks on Iraqi air
defense installations in September 1996, monitoring Iraqi weapons
storage sites, and tracking Iraqi troop movements such as the
dispersal of the Republican Guard when the Guard was threatened
with U.S. attack in early 1998. VEGA has a resolution of 3-5
feet, with its resolution reportedly being sufficient to allow
discrimination between tanks and armored personnel carriers and
identification of bomb craters of 6-10 feet in diameter.25
The LACROSSE/VEGA satellite that was launched in October 1997
may be the first of a new generation of radar imagery satellites.
The new generation will apparently have greater resolution, and
constellation size may be increased from 2 to 3.26
[Image]
[Source: Dept. of Defense]
An advanced KH-11 photograph of the Shifa Pharmaceutical Plant,
Sudan. This degraded photo, of approximately 1-meter resolution,
was officially released after the U.S. attack on the plant in
August 1998 in retaliation for attacks on two U.S. embassies in
Africa. The U.S. alleged, at least partially on the basis of soil
samples, that the plant was involved in the production of
chemical weapons.
[Image]
[Source: Dept. of Defense]
A degraded advanced KH-11 photograph of the Zhawar Kili Base Camp
(West), Afghanistan, which housed training facilities for Osama
Bin Laden's terrorist organization.
The photograph was used by Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen
and General Henry H. Shelton, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff to brief reporters on the U.S. cruise missile attack on the
facility.
[Image]
[Source: Dept. of Defense]
One of over twenty degraded advanced KH-11 photos, released by
the Department of Defense in December 1998 during Operation
Desert Fox. The higher resolution, and classified, version of the
image was used by imagery interpreters at the National Imagery
and Mapping Agency to assess the damage caused by U.S.
airstrikes.
[Image]
[Source: Dept. of Defense]
A degraded advanced KH-11 photo of Al Sahra Airfield, Iraq, used
by Vice Adm. Scott A. Fry, USN, Director, J-3 and Rear Admiral
Thomas R. Wilson, USN, Joint Staff intelligence director in a
Pentagon press briefing on December 18, 1998.
[Image]
[Source: Dept. of Defense]
The arrows in this degraded advanced KH-11 image, used in a
Pentagon press briefing on December 19, 1998, show two areas
where the Secretariat Presidential was damaged due to Operation
Desert Fox airstrikes.
[Image]
[Source: Dept. of Defense]
Pre-strike assessment photograph of the Belgrade Army Garrison
and headquarters, Serbia.
[Image]
[Source: Dept. of Defense]
Post-strike damage assessment photograph of the Belgrade Army
Garrison and Headquarters, Serbia, attacked during Operation
Allied Force.
Commercial Imagery
The U.S. intelligence community has also used imagery, including
multispectral imagery, produced by two commercial systems
--LANDSAT and SPOT. The LANDSAT program began in 1969 as an
experimental National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
program, the Earth Resources Technology Satellite (ERTS).
Currently there are two operating LANDSAT satellites--LANDSAT 4
and LANDSAT 5--launched in 1982 and 1984.27
LANDSATs 4 and 5 operate in 420 mile sun-synchronous orbits and
each carries a Thematic Mapper (TM), an upgraded version of the
Multispectral Scanner (MSS) on earlier LANDSATs. A typical
LANDSAT images is 111 by 102 miles, providing significant broad
area coverage. However, the resolution of the images is
approximately 98 feet--making them useful for only the coarsest
intelligence tasks.
SPOT, an acronym for Le Systeme Pour l'Observation de la Terre,
is operated by the French national space agency. SPOT 1 was
launched in 1986, followed by three additional satellites at
approximately four year intervals. SPOT satellites operate in
about 500-mile orbits, and carry two sensor systems. The
satellites can return black and white (panchromatic) images with
33 foot resolution and multispectral images with 67 foot
resolution. The images are of higher-resolution than LANDSAT's
but cover less territory-- approximately 36 miles by 36 miles.28
U.S. intelligence community use of commercial imagery will expand
dramatically in the coming years if the new generation of
commercial imaging satellites lives up to expectations--which
include images with 1-meter resolution. Such imagery and the
reduced cost of attaining it when purchased commercially will
permit the U.S. intelligence community to fill part of its needs
via such commercial systems.
Among the commercial satellites that are expected to produce high
resolution imagery are the Ikonos satellites to be launched by
Space Imaging Eosat (which also operates the LANDSAT satellites).
The first of the satellites, scheduled to be launched in the
summer of 1999 from Vandenberg AFB, is designed to generate
1-meter panchromatic and 4-meter multispectral images. A similar
satellite is scheduled for launch in September 1998.29
Also promising to provide 1-meter panchromatic imagery and
4-meter multispectral imagery are the satellites to be developed
by EarthWatch and Orbital Sciences. EarthWatch's 1-meter
resolution Quickbird satellite is scheduled for launch in late
1998 or 1999. Orbital Science's OrbView-3 satellite is to be
launched in 1999. It is expected to have a 3-5 year lifetime and
produce images covering 5x5 mile segments with 1-meter
resolution.30
[Image]
[Source: Space Imaging]
An overhead photograph of Mountain View, California that that has
been digitally scanned to represent the one-meter imagery that
the Ikonos satellites are expected to provide.
Notes
1. William Burrows, Deep Black: Space Espionage and National
Security (New York, N.Y.: Random House, 1986), pp. 28, 32.
2. Farouk el-Baz, "EO Imaging Will Replace Film in
Reconnaissance," Defense Systems Review (October 1983): 48-52.
3. Richard D. Hudson Jr. and Jacqueline W. Hudson, "The Military
Applications of Remote Sensing by Infrared," Proceedings of the
IEEE 63, 1 (1975): 104-28.
4. Ibid.; Bruce G. Blair and Garry D. Brewer, "Verifying SALT,"
in William Potter (ed.), Verification and SALT: The Challenge of
Strategic Deception (Boulder, Co.: Westview, 1980), pp. 7-48.
5. Homer Jensen, L.C. Graham, Leonard J. Porcello, and Emmet N.
Leith, "Side-looking Airborne Radar," Scientific American,
October 1977, pp. 84-95.
6. Paul Bennett, Strategic Surveillance (Cambridge, Ma.: Union of
Concerned Scientists, 1979), p. 5.
7. Richard A. Scribner, Theodore J. Ralston, and William D.
Mertz, The Verification Challenge: Problems and Promise of
Strategic Nuclear Arms Verification (Boston: Birkhauser, 1985),
p. 70; John F. Ebersole and James C. Wyant, "Real-Time Optical
Subtraction of Photographic Imagery for Difference Detection,"
Applied Optics, 15, 4 (1976): 871-76.
8. Robert L. Perry, Origins of the USAF Space Program, 1945-1956
(Washington, D.C.: Air Force Systems Command, June 1962), p. 30.
9. Ibid., pp. 42-43.
10. On the impact of Sputnik, see Robert A. Divine, The Sputnik
Challenge: Eisenhower's Response to the Soviet Satellite (New
York: Oxford, 1993).
11. Jeffrey T. Richelson, America's Secret Eyes in Space: The
U.S. KEYHOLE Spy Satellite Program (New York: Harper & Row,
1990), pp. 26-30.
12. Kenneth E. Greer, "Corona," Studies in Intelligence,
Supplement, 17 (Spring 1973): 1-37, reprinted in Kevin C. Ruffner
(ed.), CORONA: America's First Satellite Program (Washington,
D.C.: CIA, 1995).
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.; Robert A. McDonald, "CORONA: Success for Space
Reconnaissance, A Look into the Cold War, and a Revolution in
Intelligence," Photogrammetric Engineering & Remote Sensing 61,6
(June 1995): 689-720.
15. McDonald, "CORONA: Success for Space Reconnaissance ...".
16. Robert A. McDonald, "Corona's Imagery: A Revolution in
Intelligence and Buckets of Gold for National Security," in
Robert A. McDonald (ed)., CORONA: Between the Sun and the Earth -
The First NRO Reconnaissance Eye in Space (Baltimore: American
Society of Photogrammetry and Remote Sensing, 1997), pp. 211-220;
Greer, "CORONA"; Frank J. Madden, The CORONA Camera System,
Itek's Contribution to World Stability (Lexington, Mass.: Itek,
May 1997), p. 6.
17. Executive Order 12951, Release of Imagery Acquired by
Space-Based National Intelligence Reconnaissance Systems,
February 24, 1995.
18. Richelson, America's Secret Eyes in Space, pp. 77-78, 359-60.
19. Ibid., pp. 105-21, 361-62.
20. Ibid., pp. 123-143, 362.
21. Burrows, Deep Black, photo section.
22. Richelson, America's Secret Eyes in Space, p. 231; Craig
Covault, "Advanced KH-11 Broadens U.S. Recon Capability,"
Aviation Week & Space Technology, January 6, 1997, pp. 24-25.
23. Bob Woodward, VEIL: The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981-1987
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987), p. 221.
24. Jeffrey T. Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community 4th ed.
(Boulder, Co.: Westview, 1999), p. 155.
25. Ibid.
26. David Fulghum and Craig Covault, "U.S. Set to Launch Upgraded
Lacrosse," Aviation Week & Space Technology September 20, 1996,
p.34;
27. Bob Preston, Plowshares and Power: The Military Use of Civil
Space (Washington, D.C.: NDU Press, 1994), pp. 55-56; Richelson,
The U.S. Intelligence Community, p. 159.
28. Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community, p. 159.
29. Joseph C. Anselmo, "Space Imaging Readies 1-Meter Satellite,"
Aviation Week & Space Technology, May 19, 1997, p. 26; "Ikonos 1
Undergoes Tests as Launch Nears," Space News, May 11-17, 1998, p.
19; "Commercial Developments," Aviation Week & Space Technology,
June 29, 1998, p. 17.
30. Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community, pp. 160-61.
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