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FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW - December 9, 1999

BURMA

Worst of Friends

Beneath the surface of Burma andThailand's
renewed entente cordiale, ties are still strained

By Shawn W. Crispin in Bangkok and Bertil Lintner in Chiang Mai

Ever since Thailand released the Bur=ADmese dissidents that occupied =
Bur=ADma's
embassy in Bangkok in October, relations between the two countries have =
been
in a bad way. Days after the siege, Burma's military government closed =
all formal crossing points along the Thai bor=ADder.Tit for tat, Thai =
authorities proceeded t6 repatriate thousands of the.100,000 or more =
illegal Burmese and ethnic-minority migrants who live in Thailand. By =
sending them home, it threatened to destabilize the hinterlands where =
the junta's grip on power is most tenuous.

On November 23,Thai Foreign Minister Sunn Pitsuwan appeared to patch =
things
up with Lt.-Col. Kilin Nyunt, Burma's mili=ADtary intelligence chief and =
one of the lead=ADers of its State Peace and Development Council, or =
SPDC. The following day, Burmese authorities reopened all major official =
border crossings to commerce, while Thailand appeared to turn a blind =
eye to the many migrants who slipped back across the border to their =
jobs in Thailand. According to Surin, Thai-Burma relations returned to a =
"cordial and official" status.

But there are strong signs that this rap=ADprochement was only partial. =
And increas=ADingly contradictory signals emanating from the Burmese =
junta suggest a renewed bout of tension within Rangoon's military =
lead=ADership.

Consider: In public, Khin Nyunt may have reached an accord with Surin, =
but privately he was striking down earlier agreements with Thai =
corporate interests. Only four days before Surin's visit, Khin Nyunt =
slashed to 2,500 from 3,500 the number of seats Thai Airways may fly =
into Burma every week, in hopes of raising the fortunes of its own =
beleaguered national carrier, Myanmar Air.

Meanwhile, the junta continued to play hardball. with the Thais over =
fishing agree=ADments. Just two days after showing a friendly face to =
his counterpart Surin on border issues, Burmese Foreign Minister Win =
Aung announced that Rangoon would review all fishing agreements signed =
with Thailand because of "duplicated licence numbers for a dozen ships." =
Thai ships had also, on occasion, fished in nonpermitted areas, he said.

Even more drastically, according to Thai military sources in the =
northern province of Mae Hong Song, regional Burmese mili=ADtary =
commanders have been instructed to shoot down any Thai aircraft that =
enter Burmese airspace as the military prepares for its annual offensive =
against ethnic=AD minority insurgents. The Thai military has issued =
similar orders in response.

The two-month diplomatic stalemate over the border accentuated the =
neigh=ADbours' increasingly divergent approaches to foreign policy. when =
relations seemed des=ADtined to hit bottom in mid-November, Thai =
Interior Minister Sanan Kachornprasart proposed sending former army =
commander Gen. ChettaThanarajo to Rangoon to help heal the wounds by =
paying a yisit to Burmese army commander Gen. Maung Aye, an old friend. =
But Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai intervened, insisting that Thai foreign =
policy was the exclusive domain of Surin's Foreign Ministry. As Surin =
said later: "The military is now completely sidelined from internal Thai =
politics."

That's not the case in Burma, though; there, the military is politics. =
Ac=ADcording to diplomatic sources in Thailand, Khin Nyunt was in favour =
of a softer line toward Thailand after the embassy seizure, but Gen. =
Maung Aye, the army chief, wanted the border closed. Ultimately, hard =
economic reality forced the junta to backtrack on the closure: Over the =
last decade, many Burmese border towns have become dependent on =
im=ADported Thai goods. "There's no way the Burmese military government =
can return to isolationism," says Bhansoon Ladavalya, a professor of =
political science at Chiang Mai University and former member of =
Thai=ADland's National Security Council.

However, among hardline junta cadres such backtracking is reinforcing =
disaffec=ADtion with Burma's liberalization experi=ADence, however =
timid. In 1997 Khin Nyunt led the charge for pushing Burma into the =
Association of Southeast Asian Nations in hopes of attracting more =
foreign invest=ADment into the country. But only two months after =
joining the club, the regional economic meltdown started and Asean =
membership suddenly appeared to many junta hardliners to be more of a =
politicaL liability than an economic asset.

"Maung Aye and the hardliners in the SPUC are satisfied with the status =
quo," says a Chiang Mai-based political analyst who tracks Burmese =
politics. "Re and his allies see where global market forces got Suharto, =
and they are scared," he adds, referring to Indonesia's toppled =
president.

Both the powerful military intelligence arm and the army no doubt =
understand the importance of at least the veneer of unity to maintain =
their grip on power. But the controversy over opening up the economy has =
heightened tensions between Khin Nyunt and Gen. Maung Aye. Indeed, both =
are already jockeying to consolidate their influence with the =
increasingly powerful regional commanders. And as Prime Minister Than =
Shwe edges ever closer to retirement, the power struggle between the two =
promises to become more pro=ADnounced-and the foreign-policy signals =
more erratic.=20


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<DIV align=3Djustify><FONT color=3D#0000ff size=3D3><STRONG>FAR EASTERN =
ECONOMIC=20
REVIEW - December 9, 1999</STRONG></FONT></DIV>
<DIV align=3Djustify><FONT color=3D#800000><FONT =
size=3D+0></FONT></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV align=3Djustify><FONT color=3D#800000><STRONG><FONT=20
size=3D+0>BURMA<BR><BR></FONT><FONT size=3D4>Worst of=20
Friends</FONT></STRONG></FONT></DIV>
<DIV align=3Djustify><FONT size=3D4><BR></FONT><FONT =
color=3D#800000><STRONG>Beneath=20
the surface of Burma andThailand's<BR>renewed entente cordiale, ties are =
still=20
strained<BR><BR></STRONG></FONT>By Shawn W. Crispin in Bangkok and =
Bertil=20
Lintner in Chiang Mai<BR><BR>Ever since Thailand released the =
Bur&shy;mese=20
dissidents that occupied Bur&shy;ma's<BR>embassy in Bangkok in October,=20
relations between the two countries have been<BR>in a bad way. Days =
after the=20
siege, Burma's military government closed all formal crossing points =
along the=20
Thai bor&shy;der.Tit for tat, Thai authorities proceeded t6 repatriate =
thousands=20
of the.100,000 or more illegal Burmese and ethnic-minority migrants who =
live in=20
Thailand. By sending them home, it threatened to destabilize the =
hinterlands=20
where the junta's grip on power is most tenuous.<BR><BR>On November =
23,Thai=20
Foreign Minister Sunn Pitsuwan appeared to patch things<BR>up with =
Lt.-Col.=20
Kilin Nyunt, Burma's mili&shy;tary intelligence chief and one of the=20
lead&shy;ers of its State Peace and Development Council, or SPDC. The =
following=20
day, Burmese authorities reopened all major official border crossings to =

commerce, while Thailand appeared to turn a blind eye to the many =
migrants who=20
slipped back across the border to their jobs in Thailand. According to =
Surin,=20
Thai-Burma relations returned to a "cordial and official" =
status.<BR><BR>But=20
there are strong signs that this rap&shy;prochement was only partial. =
And=20
increas&shy;ingly contradictory signals emanating from the Burmese junta =
suggest=20
a renewed bout of tension within Rangoon's military=20
lead&shy;ership.<BR><BR>Consider: In public, Khin Nyunt may have reached =
an=20
accord with Surin, but privately he was striking down earlier agreements =
with=20
Thai corporate interests. Only four days before Surin's visit, Khin =
Nyunt=20
slashed to 2,500 from 3,500 the number of seats Thai Airways may fly =
into Burma=20
every week, in hopes of raising the fortunes of its own beleaguered =
national=20
carrier, Myanmar Air.<BR><BR>Meanwhile, the junta continued to play =
hardball.=20
with the Thais over fishing agree&shy;ments. Just two days after showing =
a=20
friendly face to his counterpart Surin on border issues, Burmese Foreign =

Minister Win Aung announced that Rangoon would review all fishing =
agreements=20
signed with Thailand because of "duplicated licence numbers for a dozen =
ships."=20
Thai ships had also, on occasion, fished in nonpermitted areas, he=20
said.<BR><BR>Even more drastically, according to Thai military sources =
in the=20
northern province of Mae Hong Song, regional Burmese mili&shy;tary =
commanders=20
have been instructed to shoot down any Thai aircraft that enter Burmese =
airspace=20
as the military prepares for its annual offensive against ethnic&shy; =
minority=20
insurgents. The Thai military has issued similar orders in =
response.<BR><BR>The=20
two-month diplomatic stalemate over the border accentuated the =
neigh&shy;bours'=20
increasingly divergent approaches to foreign policy. when relations =
seemed=20
des&shy;tined to hit bottom in mid-November, Thai Interior Minister =
Sanan=20
Kachornprasart proposed sending former army commander Gen. =
ChettaThanarajo to=20
Rangoon to help heal the wounds by paying a yisit to Burmese army =
commander Gen.=20
Maung Aye, an old friend. But Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai intervened, =
insisting=20
that Thai foreign policy was the exclusive domain of Surin's Foreign =
Ministry.=20
As Surin said later: "The military is now completely sidelined from =
internal=20
Thai politics."</DIV>
<DIV align=3Djustify>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV align=3Djustify>That's not the case in Burma, though; there, the =
military is=20
politics. Ac&shy;cording to diplomatic sources in Thailand, Khin Nyunt =
was in=20
favour of a softer line toward Thailand after the embassy seizure, but =
Gen.=20
Maung Aye, the army chief, wanted the border closed. Ultimately, hard =
economic=20
reality forced the junta to backtrack on the closure: Over the last =
decade, many=20
Burmese border towns have become dependent on im&shy;ported Thai goods. =
"There's=20
no way the Burmese military government can return to isolationism," says =

Bhansoon Ladavalya, a professor of political science at Chiang Mai =
University=20
and former member of Thai&shy;land's National Security Council.</DIV>
<DIV align=3Djustify><BR>However, among hardline junta cadres such =
backtracking is=20
reinforcing disaffec&shy;tion with Burma's liberalization =
experi&shy;ence,=20
however timid. In 1997 Khin Nyunt led the charge for pushing Burma into =
the=20
Association of Southeast Asian Nations in hopes of attracting more =
foreign=20
invest&shy;ment into the country. But only two months after joining the =
club,=20
the regional economic meltdown started and Asean membership suddenly =
appeared to=20
many junta hardliners to be more of a politicaL liability than an =
economic=20
asset.</DIV>
<DIV align=3Djustify><BR>"Maung Aye and the hardliners in the SPUC are =
satisfied=20
with the status quo," says a Chiang Mai-based political analyst who =
tracks=20
Burmese politics. "Re and his allies see where global market forces got =
Suharto,=20
and they are scared," he adds, referring to Indonesia's toppled =
president.</DIV>
<DIV align=3Djustify><BR>Both the powerful military intelligence arm and =
the army=20
no doubt understand the importance of at least the veneer of unity to =
maintain=20
their grip on power. But the controversy over opening up the economy has =

heightened tensions between Khin Nyunt and Gen. Maung Aye. Indeed, both =
are=20
already jockeying to consolidate their influence with the increasingly =
powerful=20
regional commanders. And as Prime Minister Than Shwe edges ever closer =
to=20
retirement, the power struggle between the two promises to become more=20
pro&shy;nounced-and the foreign-policy signals more erratic.&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV align=3Djustify>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV align=3Djustify>
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