Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first)

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Websites/Multiple Documents

Description: About 7,390,000 results (August 2017) About 26,800,000 results (February 2018)
Source/publisher: www via Google
Date of entry/update: 2017-08-27
Grouping: Websites/Multiple Documents
Language: English
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Description: About 153,000 results (August 2017)
Source/publisher: Various sources via Youtube
Date of entry/update: 2017-08-20
Grouping: Websites/Multiple Documents
Language: English, Burmese (မြန်မာဘာသာ)
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Description: "The Advisory Commission on Rakhine State was founded [on August 23, 2016] as a neutral and impartial body which aims to propose concrete measures for improving the welfare of all people in Rakhine state. It is composed of six local and three international experts, and is chaired by Kofi Anna...At the behest of the Ministry of the Office of the State Counsellor of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar and in collaboration with the Kofi Annan Foundation, the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State has been founded as a neutral and impartial body which aims to propose concrete measures for improving the welfare of all people in Rakhine state. It is composed of six local and three international experts, and is chaired by Kofi Annan. In its work, it considers humanitarian and developmental issues, access to basic services, legal questions including citizenship and the assurance of basic rights, and security to all people in all communities. It will submit its final report and recommendations to the Government of Myanmar in the second half of 2017."
Source/publisher: Advisory Commission on Rakhine State
Date of entry/update: 2017-02-04
Grouping: Websites/Multiple Documents
Language: English
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Source/publisher: Wikipedia
Date of entry/update: 2017-10-18
Grouping: Websites/Multiple Documents
Language: English
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Description: "...Responding to the rescue of nearly 400 Rohingya refugees from the Bay of Bengal after a two month-long failed attempt to reach Malaysia, Amnesty International’s South Asia Director, Biraj Patnaik, said..."
Source/publisher: Amnesty International
2020-04-16
Date of entry/update: 2020-04-19
Grouping: Websites/Multiple Documents
Format : PDF
Size: 5.01 MB
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Description: About 137,000 results (February 2018)
Source/publisher: Google
Date of entry/update: 2018-02-22
Grouping: Websites/Multiple Documents
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Description: About 51,400,000 results (August 2018)
Source/publisher: www via Google
2018-08-27
Date of entry/update: 2018-08-27
Grouping: Websites/Multiple Documents
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Description: About 38,900 results (0.31 seconds)
Creator/author: Jacques P Leider
Source/publisher: Google Search
2019-10-30
Date of entry/update: 2019-10-30
Grouping: Websites/Multiple Documents
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Description: "The internal conflict in Myanmar refers to a series of ongoing insurgencies within Myanmar that began shortly after the country, then known as Burma, became independent from the United Kingdom in 1948. The conflict has been labeled as the world?s longest running civil war....."Main fronts: Kachin State... Kayah State... Kayin State... Rakhine State... Shan State..."
Source/publisher: Wikipedia
Date of entry/update: 2018-01-02
Grouping: Websites/Multiple Documents
Language: English
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Description: "ADVOCATING AND AMPLIFYING THE VOICE OF THE ROHINGYA WITH INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, GOVERNMENTS, CORPORATIONS, AND CIVIL SOCIETY...The Rohingya are a Muslim minority group from the northern Rakhine State in western Burma. Despite having lived in Burma for generations, the Rohingya are considered ?foreigners” by the Burmese government. The Burmese government has isolated the 1.3 million Rohingya in Burma. Burma?s 1982 Citizenship Act denies the Rohingya people citizenship. They are limited in their rights to marry, have children, work, obtain healthcare, and go to school. Fleeing violence, over 140,000 Rohingya live in what many describe as ?concentration camps” where they face severe restrictions and are denied basic necessities including medical care. Since 2012, an estimated 100,000 Rohingya have fled Burma by boat. Apart from the risk of drowning, many of those who flee fall into the hands of human traffickers, and are forced to work on rubber plantations or in the sex trade. Ultranationalist groups in Burma have also dehumanized the Rohingya through rampant hate speech. This demonization of the Rohingya, coupled with the government?s denial of their rights, has created an environment in Burma that, according to the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, puts the Rohingya at grave risk of mass atrocities and even genocide..."
Date of entry/update: 2017-11-16
Grouping: Websites/Multiple Documents
Language: English
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Description: Tools for humanitarian assistance..."For up-to-date relevant information including maps, contact list, initial assessment form and 3W data...3W maps/reports for 2012 can be found HERE. 268 organizations were contacted to provide inputs for this round of the 3W (Who is doing what, where) exercise. Amongst them, 87 agencies provided updates – (1) Embassy/Donor (3) Red Cross societies, (12) UN Agencies, (25) LNGOs and (46) INGOs. The 3W products reflect implementing agencies? projects in 329 townships, 4,089 village tract and 11,479 villages throughout the country...".....If this site does not have the latest situation reports, go to the Alternate URL - the OCHA myanmar page at http://reliefweb.int/country/mmr
Source/publisher: Myanmar Information Management Unit (MIMU)
Date of entry/update: 2012-07-04
Grouping: Websites/Multiple Documents
Language: English
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Description: "...This week, Myanmar’s government issued two presidential directives in response to the ICJ’s January order that the government and military prevent genocide of the Rohingya Muslim ethnic group and preserve evidence of crimes that could amount to genocide.The court ordered Myanmar to report on its compliance by May 23 and then every six months while Gambia’s case alleging that abuses against the Rohingya violated the Genocide Convention proceeds...."
Source/publisher: Human Right Watch
2020-04-09
Date of entry/update: 2020-04-12
Grouping: Websites/Multiple Documents
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Description: Timely reports on the humanitarian situation in Myanmar - from UN, Government and media sources.
Source/publisher: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA)
Date of entry/update: 2012-07-31
Grouping: Websites/Multiple Documents
Language: English
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Description: Various articles, photos videos, profiles, campaigns etc. on the Rohingya. Unfortunately, the material is not precisely dated.
Source/publisher: Restless Beings
Date of entry/update: 2014-08-21
Grouping: Websites/Multiple Documents
Language: English
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Description: News and articles about Rohingya, ရိုဟင်ဂျာ အကြောင်း သတင်းနှင့် ဆောင်းပါးများ
Source/publisher: Rohingya Blogger (RB)
Date of entry/update: 2012-08-11
Grouping: Websites/Multiple Documents
Language: Burmese/ မြန်မာဘာသာ
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Description: Several recent stories on the Rohingyas
Source/publisher: Al Jazeera
Date of entry/update: 2017-09-03
Grouping: Websites/Multiple Documents
Language: English
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Source/publisher: "Democracy Now"
Date of entry/update: 2018-02-07
Grouping: Websites/Multiple Documents
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Description: 1600+ results - December 2012; 2500 - August 2013
Source/publisher: "New Age" (Bangladesh)
Date of entry/update: 2012-12-24
Grouping: Websites/Multiple Documents
Language: English
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Source/publisher: United Nations Information Centre, Yangon
Date of entry/update: 2017-10-18
Grouping: Websites/Multiple Documents
Language: English
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Description: Judgement of the Peoples? Tribunal on Myanmar... Rohingya: The silence of Aung San Suu Kyi and the betrayal of human rights...Rohingya crisis ruled as genocide by Permanent Peoples? Tribunal...17 RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PEOPLES? TRIBUNAL ON MYANMAR...PRELIMINARY JUDGMENT AND DISPOSITIONS...VIDEO OF JUDGMENT?S ANNOUNCEMENT (22.SEPT.2017)
Source/publisher: Permanent Peoples? Tribunal
Date of entry/update: 2017-11-26
Grouping: Websites/Multiple Documents
Language: English
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Description: The Rohingya Issues written by Jacques P Leider. 31 books.
Creator/author: Jacques P Leider
Source/publisher: "Academia.edu" (USA)
2019-10-30
Date of entry/update: 2019-10-30
Grouping: Websites/Multiple Documents
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Description: Extensive and wide-ranging online collection of useful documents. The archive ends in October 2016 when Network Myanmar closed. The main link here, however, contains some updates beyond the 2016 cut-off.
Source/publisher: Network Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2014-09-25
Grouping: Websites/Multiple Documents
Language: English
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Description: Reports from October 2007
Source/publisher: UN Country Team in Myanmar
Date of entry/update: 2013-04-30
Grouping: Websites/Multiple Documents
Language: English
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Description: "A month after the prime minister of Bangladesh raised concerns about the possibility of Rohingya repatriation, UNHCR representatives in Myanmar met with the junta’s education minister on February 7 to discuss repatriation. Meanwhile, Bangladeshi officials are reluctant to act in any way that might be perceived as taking sides between the junta and the ethnic Arakan Army; Bangladesh has perhaps started to understand there is a new sheriff in Rakhine, just across the Naf River. But what do AA victories mean for the Rohingya repatriation promoted by the UNHCR and the governments of Myanmar and Bangladesh? Our answer is that after 45 years of persecution of the Rohingya: Not much. The Rohingya also know that safety conditions have actually become worse in Rakhine since they fled. The million stateless Rohingya refugees living in Cox’s Bazar is still one of the world’s most intractable refugee situations. Their Myanmar homeland insists they are foreigners from Bangladesh; their Bangladeshi hosts insist that they belong in the land of their birth, Myanmar. The rebellious AA insist that they can be part of a new Rakhine, but only if they meet AA conditions, and not as equals. And to top it off, the junta’s military has started to conscript the few Rohingya still in Myanmar to fight against the AA. Humanitarians from the UN, meanwhile, have tired of an impoverished population that has poor English, few urban skills, and is easily dismissed as different and even primitive. Thus, even as hundreds of Rohingya are drowning at sea, the border post to Bangladesh has been captured by AA forces, and Sittwe itself may come under siege, Myanmar, Bangladesh and the UNHCR avoid the subject of resettlement in third countries, claiming simply that “Rohingya refugees require sustained, predictable and adequate financial support to live safely and decently, and to prepare for a sustainable return.” This would perhaps be promising, except that of course the voluntary repatriation policy was tried before, beginning in 1978, the first time UNHCR became involved in a Rohingya refugee movement. The Tatmadaw has repeatedly expelled the Rohingya as a way to reinforce Burmanization policies adopted after the military coup in 1962. Persecuted by Tatmadaw; viewed as primitive by global community? For centuries, Rohingyas lived in Rakhine, predating the British East India Company in 1824, and more were brought in by British colonizers to farm between 1824 and 1938. Many were Muslim but engaged in a range of religious practices also seen in neighboring British Bengal. In 1962, the hyper-nationalist Burmese Buddhist forces of the Ne Win regime seized control, and defined the Rohingya as ineligible for citizenship unless they could prove their ancestors were in Rakhine before the 1824 British conquest. General Ne Win’s military insisted that the Rohingya were foreign citizens and initiated mass deportation of 200,000 in 1978. A quick repatriation occurred with the help of UNHCR. Most were pushed back to Myanmar after an experienced UN observer remarked that the lack of food and basic sanitation in the camps led to them becoming “death traps.” A similar episode happened in 1990 when the military deported 250,000 Rohingya, using Islamophobia to divert attention of the ethnic Bamar from the developments of 1988 pro-democracy movements. And just as in 1978, a quick repatriation was arranged with UNHCR help. History repeated in 2012 when Rakhine was again cleared of Rohingya. The repatriation back to Myanmar was not as aggressive but the refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar just grew larger. Then finally in 2017, the greatest expulsion of all was undertaken by the Burmese military, and perhaps another 800,000 Rohingya fled after the Tatmadaw burned villages, committed massacres, and ethnically cleansed Rakhine of its Rohingya population. And still, now seven years later, the international response is ambivalent, even as some 30,000 Rohingya babies are born each year, and hundreds of thousands of young children grow up in refugee camps where radicalization is a predictable by-product. Trapped by righteousness of historical narratives The Rohingya ultimately are trapped between competing and complex historical narratives. Myanmar’s nationalist Burmanization narrative continues to insist that the Myanmar people are defined by government-determined nationalities called Taingyingtha, which are considered sub-groups of the dominant Burmese Buddhist majority. By such definitions, Rohingya were foreigners and intruders from British Bengal; righteousness by this logic demands that they return to its successor state, Bangladesh. And of course, Bangladesh’s own citizenship definition excludes Rohingya because the British in 1824 classified Rohingya as Burmese. To complicate matters further, the Buddhists of Rakhine themselves are in revolt against the Burmese military and have occupied border posts between Myanmar and Bangladesh. The AA’s General Twan Mrat Naing recently told the BBC that, if “Rohingyas or Bengalis or Chittagonian Muslims” would like to enjoy the benefits of equal treatment under [Arakan] law, they must get along with other ethnic groups and abandon contesting “doctored” historical narratives and claims of Rohingyas. In other words, ethnic Rakhine communities, which root their own identity in historical claims of Buddhist Arakan dominance, have attitudes toward the Rohingya that are similar to the heirs of the Konbaung Kingdom ruling from modern Naypyitaw. For all that, nobody has seriously asked the Rohingya where they fit in a future Myanmar or Rakhine. As a result, the million Rohingya are trapped in Cox’s Bazar as wards of the international humanitarian regime represented by the UNHCR. There they are accused of being freeloaders in the international humanitarian system which created the camps in the first place. There they have been repeatedly excluded from their rights as refugees. Jeff Crisp, formerly of the UNHCR, described the Rohingya as being among the most disadvantaged refugees not only because they are caught between Burma and Bangladesh, but because the Rohingya were assumed by the UNHCR to be primitive, and repatriation to Myanmar considered the only solution. They were excluded from the mass resettlement assistance successfully extended to Indochinese, Yugoslavians, Ukrainians, Europeans and millions of others who moved beyond refugee camps while retaining their right to eventually return. And then there is the demography problem… In short, the Rohingya refugee problem cannot be resolved through wishful thinking of the UNHCR, Myanmar or Bangladesh governments about mass repatriation. About 30,000 Rohingya have been born every year in the camps since 2017, a rate that will accelerate soon. Indeed, a 2022 survey showed that 22% of the refugees were under 5 years old, which means they were mostly born in the camps after 2018. Doing nothing is to court a long-term disaster, from the radicalization of the young population, or perhaps a Bay of Bengal typhoon. What this means is that there are now over 1 million Rohingya trapped in the camps. Without resettlement policies, the number will begin doubling every 20 years or so, meaning 1 million will become 2 million. The basic demographic reality is that the population will be young, energetic, and excluded. The question is only what their energies will be turned toward: engagement with the modern world, or rebellion and dreams of violent return. Looking forward: Resolution of refugee problems But the Rohingya situation is not the first seemingly intractable refugee crisis. Indeed, probably the most intractable is the Palestinian refugee crisis which has festered in the Middle East since 1948, and which despite the successful resettlement of millions of Palestinians across the Middle East (2 million in Jordan alone), continues to produce explosions, even in 2024. It is well beyond this article to suggest solutions for the Palestinian refugee situation, except to note that the Palestinian situation is a warning of how badly things can go wrong when there is too much wishful thinking about quick repatriation. But not all refugee situations turn into the Palestinian situation in Gaza. Also relevant for Rohingya refugees is how the Indochinese refugee situation was resolved after perhaps 3 million fled between 1975 and 1990. Perhaps 250,000 died at sea, but the remainder made it to neighboring countries, especially Thailand, China, Hong Kong, Malaysia, and the Philippines. There they were housed in camps like those in Cox’s Bazar today. There was also of course great hope that “all” would return to Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. But most did not. The largest numbers are in the United States, China, and in the case of Cambodians, in Vietnam. More such refugees and their descendants are still in Thailand. Similarly, the aftermath of the Yugoslav wars in the 1990s saw millions resettled in Europe. Decades earlier, 10 million European refugees from World War II were dispersed across Europe, North America and, in the case of the survivors of the Holocaust, to Israel. Following the Bangladesh Revolution in 1972, India and Bangladesh cooperated to resettle 10 million refugees back in Bangladesh – an exception to the general rule that a good proportion of refugees end up resettled outside the home country. Indeed, the current president of Bangladesh, Sheikha Hasina, was herself a refugee in the 1980s. Unresolved refugee crises today also include the millions of Syrians who are hosted mostly in the Middle East or Germany, Ukrainians who have taken sanctuary in European countries, and Venezuelans who are being hosted in Colombia, Ecuador, and other neighboring countries. Refugee problems require regional solutions All this is a way of saying that the Rohingya situation does not need to end up like Gaza, and will not if there is a concerted international effort to address the needs of the Rohingya from a regional perspective, just like was done with the former Yugoslavians, Europeans, and Ukrainians. Myanmar’s war-torn zones are likely to remain unsettled, and in the short term will offer little potential for refugee return – in fact, a premature return to AA territory is likely to victimize the Rohingya further. The mid-term solution is of course to integrate Rohingya into the burgeoning cities of South and Southeast Asia, where there are labor shortages. Indeed, this is happening with Venezuelans in Colombia and Ecuador; Ukrainians in Europe; and Syrians in Turkey and the Middle East. This does not mean that the refugees give up their right to return to a homeland. But spreading responsibility means that the generosity of single hosts is not stretched, and radicalized refugee groups seeking violent return are less likely to develop. Prospects for the Rohingya to return to Myanmar in future can be retained, despite the current uncertainty over when a peaceful return may be possible. And indeed the Rohingya will be the best to judge this. The frustrating aspect, from the perspective of the existing nation-state system, is that such a regional solution implies letting the Tatmadaw get away with atrocities, at least in the short term. It also runs the risk of incentivizing further bad behavior by the Tatmadaw or perhaps even the AA. This is a puzzle for the regional and international actors to ponder. But, to reduce the risk of catastrophe, the UNHCR, ASEAN, and nearby countries need to be more willing to share the burden of hosting Rohingya refugees, which currently falls primarily on Bangladesh, albeit reluctantly. Tony Waters is a Visiting Professor at Leuphana University, Germany, and formerly at Payap University Chiang Mai. R.J. Aung (a pseudonym) is a former peace and development worker in Yangon and Thailand, and a native of Yangon..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2024-03-06
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-06
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Description: "More than three years since a military coup in Myanmar led to a surge in conflict across the country, the United Nations estimates that almost two million people have been internally displaced by the ongoing violence, while thousands more have fled to neighbouring countries. In Rakhine State – an area in the west of Myanmar that has seen a particular increase in fighting since November 2023 – the humanitarian crisis created by this conflict comes on top of several other pre-existing emergencies, the most significant of which is the continuing fallout from large-scale and violent attacks against the area’s Rohingya ethnic minority in 2017, which drove hundreds of thousands to flee for their lives across the border into Bangladesh. More than six years later, close to one million Rohingya remain trapped in miserable conditions in the overcrowded camps of Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, while many of the estimated 600,000 Rohingya who remain in Myanmar are confined to dismal fenced camps or rural villages, are prohibited from moving without approval from the authorities, and face ongoing persecution in their daily lives. Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) has been responding to the needs of the region’s Rohingya communities for more than three decades. In Myanmar, we operate two humanitarian medical projects in Rakhine State, where we are one of the only providers of essential health services for many Rohingya, who have been stripped of their citizenship by the ruling authorities. As a direct result of this imposed statelessness, the Rohingya endure discrimination and exclusion across all aspects of their lives, including restrictions on their freedom of movement, education and livelihoods opportunities, as well as access to healthcare. (Elsewhere in Myanmar, we also operate in the conflict-affected areas of Shan and Kachin.) MSF is also the largest provider of health services in the Rohingya refugee camps in Bangladesh, where we run hospitals and provide critically needed primary and secondary care, including sexual and reproductive healthcare and mental health services for a population with few other options. In Malaysia, MSF runs clinics for Rohingya patients, many of whom endure appalling conditions and indefinite confinement in immigration detention centres. As a result, MSF has seen first-hand the deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Myanmar, and the continued suffering of the Rohingya, whose statelessness leaves them with nowhere to go —facing indefinite encampment in squalid conditions in Bangladesh, unable to return safely to Myanmar, and unwelcome in other parts of the region. We have also borne witness to the failure of the international community to find a solution to this crisis, and to the increasing global indifference to the plight of the Rohingya, as the world’s attention has been drawn to other emergencies. Stateless and in need of assistance That indifference is particularly alarming given the dependence of many Rohingya on humanitarian assistance for survival. In Bangladesh, Rohingya refugees do not have the right to leave their camps and are not legally allowed to work. That leaves them trapped and dependent on international support — support that has been reducing year on year, leaving them stuck in increasingly deplorable living conditions. Meanwhile, the Rohingya still in Rakhine State also depend on international humanitarian agencies for some of their most fundamental needs. And yet, not only have the authorities in Myanmar often deliberately blocked humanitarian activities in Rakhine State (where renewed violence is also currently making it extremely difficult for our teams to operate), but what response exists remains critically under-funded by humanitarian donors. A crisis where Canada makes a difference Canada is an important actor in this context. Since the start of the current Rohingya displacement crisis in 2017, when violence drove so many Rohingya from Myanmar into Bangladesh, Canada has played a leading role in the international response, both as a donor and through its humanitarian diplomacy. Canada’s willingness to take action, starting with the appointment of a Special Envoy to Myanmar in the first months following the August 2017 attacks, through to the launch in 2018 of Canada’s strategy to respond to the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar and Bangladesh, was based on recommendations made in Special Envoy Bob Rae’s report that same year. This highlighted the urgency of the crisis to other member states in the international community at a critical time, as did Canada’s efforts to fund and help facilitate the global humanitarian response in Cox’s Bazar. Through its official strategy, Canada committed to “alleviating the humanitarian crisis; encouraging positive political developments in Myanmar; ensuring accountability for the crimes committed; [and] enhancing international cooperation.” Canada must renew its Rohingya and Myanmar strategy In March 2024, however, Canada’s strategy (which was renewed for a second phase in 2021) is set to expire, and these objectives remain mostly unmet. In part that is because the context has changed: since the coup of 2021, for example, the situation for people in Myanmar has deteriorated significantly. At the time of writing, communities in many of the areas where MSF is present remain in grave danger while their villages are used as battlegrounds. Meanwhile, the emergence of a number of other international crises have directed the world’s attention away from Myanmar, Bangladesh and the Rohingya. But that loss of global attention is precisely why Canada’s continued engagement on this emergency is so crucial. It is also why MSF is calling on Canada to renew its strategy for a third phase – because we are already seeing the impact that reduced donor engagement is having on our Rohingya patients and their communities. In Cox’s Bazar alone, some of our facilities are becoming increasingly overburdened as other humanitarian actors depart for lack of funding. Our teams are also seeing the consequences of reduced water and sanitation services, increased violence in the camps (including sexual violence), and outbreaks of disease amid deteriorating conditions. In Myanmar, Rohingya and other communities in Rakhine are facing increasingly desperate circumstances as assistance continues to dwindle and conflict further reduces humanitarian activities. A global humanitarian priority As an independent humanitarian medical organization, MSF will continue to deliver critically needed care ourselves to displaced Rohingya in Bangladesh, Myanmar and beyond, whatever the commitment by international humanitarian donors may be. But we can’t do it alone. So it is crucial that Canada and other governments continue to make the Rohingya a priority for humanitarian assistance funding. And since financial support alone will not solve this crisis (nor alleviate the conflict in Myanmar), sustained diplomatic engagement is also essential. Such efforts should focus on ensuring a safe and sustainable future for the Rohingya, and an end to their statelessness. Through the launch of its strategy in 2018, Canada made an important commitment to these objectives, and to the Rohingya people. As the global response to their suffering continues to wane, and amid the deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Myanmar – and in the face of a growing number of other international crises consuming global resources and attention – that commitment is needed now more than ever..."
Source/publisher: Doctors Without Borders
2024-02-23
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-23
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh, February 23, 2024 — IRC teams on the ground in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, are reporting growing numbers of people arriving at the Myanmar border as conflict continues to push people out of their hometowns. With over 2.7 million people internally displaced in Myanmar - 800,000 of whom have been displaced since October 2023 - the humanitarian crisis in the region is likely to worsen at an alarming pace. Despite the Bangladesh government refusing to accept any more refugees, citing the large numbers they have been hosting for over six years, the IRC is monitoring the situation and preparing to scale up our refugee response inside Cox’s Bazar refugee camp, should this decision change. Already, Cox’s Bazar is home to one million Rohingya refugees who fled persecution in August 2017. Since then, they have remained trapped in inadequate living conditions, including overcrowding and poorly built shelters prone to flooding or catching fire. This week, IRC Bangladesh held a two-day exhibition and panel event, “Through the Lens of Hope: Rohingya Crisis Unfolded” calling on world leaders to highlight their growing needs retrain their attention and remember those people who have been living in camps in Cox’s Bazar for years without adequate shelter or support. The overall humanitarian situation in Cox’s Bazar is poised to worsen and, as the conflict in Myanmar continues to escalate close to the border, especially in Rakhine State, Bangladesh urgently requires the support of the international community, including donors, to properly support those who are seeking safety from the conflict. The IRC began responding to the Rohingya crisis in August 2017 and launched its response officially in March 2018. With over 400 staff in Bangladesh and operating across 27 camps across the district, our teams provide essential healthcare to the host community as well as the Rohingya population in Cox’s Bazar, as well as reproductive and maternal healthcare, child protection, education, prevention and response to Gender-Based Violence, and Emergency Disaster Risk Reduction (EDRR)..."
Source/publisher: International Rescue Committee
2024-02-23
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-23
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: The military has suffered numerous battlefield setbacks in Rakhine state and elsewhere in recent months.
Description: "Myanmar’s junta is offering freedom of movement to Rohingya Muslims restricted to camps for the displaced in Rakhine state as part of a bid to entice them into military service amid the nationwide rollout of a conscription law, according to sources in the region. The enactment of the People’s Military Service Law on Feb. 10 has sent draft-eligible civilians fleeing from Myanmar’s cities, saying they would rather leave the country or join anti-junta forces in remote border areas than fight for the military, which seized power in a 2021 coup d’etat. Myanmar’s military is desperate for new recruits after suffering devastating losses on the battlefield to the ethnic Arakan Army, or AA, in Rakhine state. Since November, when the AA ended a ceasefire that had been in place since the coup, the military has surrendered Pauktaw, Minbya, Mrauk-U, Kyauktaw, Myay Pon and Taung Pyo townships in the state, as well as Paletwa township in neighboring Chin state. But rights campaigners say the junta is drafting Rohingya into military service to stoke ethnic tensions in Rakhine state, while legal experts say the drive is unlawful, given that Myanmar has refused to recognize the Rohingya as one of the country’s ethnic groups and denied them citizenship for decades. Some 1 million ethnic Rohingya refugees have been living in Bangladesh since 2017, when they were driven out of Myanmar by a military clearance operation. Another 630,000 living within the country are designated stateless by the United Nations, including those who languish in camps for internally displaced persons, or IDPs, and are restricted from moving freely in Rakhine state. Residents of the Kyauk Ta Lone IDP camp in Rakhine’s Kyaukphyu township told RFA Burmese that junta forces, including the township administration officer and the operations commander of the military’s Light Infantry Battalion 542, took a census of the camp’s Muslims for the purpose of military service on Monday. Junta personnel compiled a list of more than 160 people deemed eligible for conscription and informed them they would have to take part in a two-week military training program, according to one camp resident who, like others interviewed for this report, spoke on condition of anonymity due to security concerns. “The township administration officer came … and told us that Muslims must also serve in the military, but we refused to follow his order,” the resident said. “Then, the military operations commander arrived here along with his soldiers, and forced us to do so under the military service law. They collected the names of more than 160 people.” Freedom of movement Some 1,500 Rohingyas from around 300 families have been living at Kyauk Ta Lone since ethnic violence forced them to flee their homes in Kyaukphyu 12 years ago. Since taking the census on Monday, junta officers have repeatedly visited the camp, trying to persuade Rohingya residents to serve in the military with an offer of free movement within Kyaukphyu township, said another camp resident. “They won’t guarantee us citizenship,” he said. “But if we serve in the military, we will be allowed to go freely in Kyaukphyu.” Other camp residents told RFA they “would rather die” than serve in the military, and suggested the recruitment drive was part of a bid by the military to create a rift between them and ethnic Rakhines – the predominant minority in Rakhine state and the ethnicity of the AA. No date was given for when the training program would begin, they said. After receiving training, the recruits would be assigned to a security detail along with junta troops guarding routes in and out of Kyaukphyu, and dispatched to the battlefield “if necessary.” Rohingya IDPs are afraid to serve in the military, but are unable to flee the camp because it is surrounded by junta troops, residents added. Other recruitment efforts The military service census at the Kyauk Ta Lone IDP camp came as Rohingyas in the Rakhine capital Sittwe, the Rakhine townships of Buthidaung and Maungdaw, and other parts of Kyaukphyu reported that junta troops have been arresting and collecting data from members of their ethnic group as part of a bid to force them into military training. On Monday and Tuesday evening, military personnel arrested around 100 Rohingyas of eligible service age from the Buthidaung villages of Nga/Kyin Tauk, Tat Chaung, Pu Zun Chaung and Kyauk Hpyu Taung, said a resident who also declined to be named. “People doing business in the village were arrested. Village elders were also arrested,” said the resident, who is also a Rohingya. “At least one young person from every house was arrested and taken to the army. The parents of those who were arrested are quite worried now.” Junta troops said that the AA had established camps near the Rohingya villages and residents would have to undergo military training to defend the area, he added. They said the residents would be equipped with weapons and returned to their villages after the training was complete. Rohingyas in Sittwe and Maungdaw, where an AA offensive is now underway, also reported junta census efforts and pressure to join military training. They said that larger villages are expected to provide 100 people for training, while smaller ones should send 50 residents. Law does not apply A lawyer who is representing Rohingyas in several legal cases told RFA that the People’s Military Service Law “does not apply” to members of the ethnic group because they do not have citizenship status in Myanmar. He added that the junta's attempt to recruit Rohingyas is part of a bid to drive a wedge between them and the people of Myanmar, many of whom oppose the military regime. Nay San Lwin, an activist on the Rohingya issue, said that the junta hopes to divert attention from its losses to the AA in Rakhine state by igniting tensions between ethnic Rakhines and Rohingyas. “If the Rohingyas are forced into their army, there could be a lot of problems between the Rakhines and the Rohingyas,” he said. “That's what they want. Once that happens, they’ll drop all support for the Rohingyas as usual. But the main reason is to use the Rohingyas as human shields.” Nay San Lwin noted that as successive governments in Myanmar have denied the Rohingya citizenship, there should be no pressure to force them to serve in the military. The junta has released no information on efforts to recruit Rohingyas in Rakhine state and attempts by RFA to contact junta Deputy Information Minister Major Gen. Zaw Min Tun and Rakhine State Attorney General Hla Thein, who is the junta’s spokesman in the region, went unanswered Thursday. The AA issued a statement on Wednesday calling on ethnic Rakhines to take refuge from junta oppression – which it said includes unlawful arrests, extortion, forced military recruitment, and extrajudicial killings – in AA-controlled territory, instead of fleeing to other areas of the country. Conscription eligibility According to Myanmar’s compulsory military service law, men aged 18-35 and women aged 18-27 face up to five years in prison if they refuse to serve for two years, while highly skilled professionals aged 18-45 must also serve, but up to five years. More than 13 million of the country’s 54 million people are eligible for service. Conscription is slated to be implemented at the end of April 2024, with a goal of recruiting up to 60,000 service members each year, in batches of around 5,000 people..."
Source/publisher: "Radio Free Asia" (USA)
2024-02-22
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-23
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "On 7 February, Obaidul Quader, Bangladeshi Minister for Road Transport and Bridges, told the media that Rohingya refugees from Myanmar will no longer be allowed to enter his country. “They have already become a burden for us,” Quader curtly opined. The statement came amid reports of the continuing violence between the Arakan Army (AA) and the Myanmar military which have resulted in the intrusion of Myanmar security force personnel and civilians, including Rohingya, from Rakhine state into neighbouring Bangladesh. While the minister didn’t elaborate on the official steps to prevent such an inevitable influx, the recent developments have yet again underlined the pitiable plight of the Rohingya, whose lives have swung perilously between despair and demise. De-humanising existence in Bangladesh It is easy to blame Bangladesh for being unreceptive to the Rohingya. However, it has been the forced host, according to the UNHCR, to nearly one million refugees, 975,350 Rohingya from 202,836 families.[1] on its territory for the past seven years. Fifty-two percent of this population are children. They live in cramped, bamboo-and-plastic camps in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh’s border district with Myanmar, as well as in Bhasan Char, a nearby island, where more stable facilities were provided to ease the pressure on Cox’s Bazar. International aid for the upkeep of the refugees has declined steadily over the years, burdening Bangladesh. In February 2023, the World Food Programme announced a reduction in the value of its food assistance to $10 per person from $12.[2] The amount was further reduced to $8 in June, even as the percentage of refugees who did not have adequate food consumption increased from 79 percent to 90 percent. Donor budgets had been stretched by the pandemic, economic downturn, and competing global crises. This meant that families were either having less nutritious food or the parents were forced to eat less or skip some of their meals so that their children could eat. In December 2023, however, a $87 million grant from the United States allowed the amount to return to $10 per person.[3] Shortage of food and consequent rampant malnutrition, huge issues in themselves, aren’t the only challenge for the Rohingya. In 2023, the camps in Bangladesh witnessed cyclones and landslides. Multiple fires, some of which have been labelled as “planned acts of sabotage” by investigators,[4] have periodically gutted a large number of shanties. Human trafficking has increased significantly, as have crime and gang violence within the camps, resulting in deaths and serious injuries. The inmates aren’t allowed to work, and children don’t have access to education. The widespread vulnerabilities have been exploited by alternative agendas. These include those who exploit the desperate desire to escape. Over the years, Rohingya, both those from Myanmar and the camps in Bangladesh, have sought to flee from despair by undertaking perilous journeys on rickety and leaky wooden boats in the Andaman Sea and Bay of Bengal, hoping to reach Malaysia and Indonesia. Over time, more women and children are undertaking such journeys. Total numbers have grown dramatically, picking up between November and April, when the seas are calmer. According to the UNHCR, in 2023, nearly 4,500 Rohingya embarked on deadly sea journeys in Southeast Asian waters, of whom some 569 perished or went missing.[5] This number of reported missing or dead persons is the highest since 2014. Compelling such desperation is the stark reality that the prospect of ever returning to their homes in Myanmar has dwindled. Always bleak, given the hostile attitude of the Myanmar military, who have refused to give the Rohingya citizenship and protect them on their return, the possibility of return is now negligible. The ongoing violence between the AA and the Myanmar military has dashed those hopes even further. Shattered Malaysian Dreams As of the end of January 2024, there were 108,310 Rohingya refugees in Malaysia registered with the UNHCR.[6] UNHCR says its statistics “do not map or reflect new arrivals into the country.” The attraction of Malaysia as a land for a better life and opportunities notwithstanding, recent incidents involving the Rohingya point to the opposite. In Malaysia, most refugees, especially those who enter the country illegally after arriving by sea, are considered undocumented migrants. Malaysia is not a signatory to the United Nations’ Refugee Convention of 1951. It does not have any laws to recognize and provide for those fleeing persecution and conflict. The country has no system to process asylum applications. The refugees have no right to work, receive education or healthcare. They can only register with the local UNHCR office, and get a recognition card that provides them some measure of protection and support, including limited access to healthcare, education, and other services provided by the UN and its partners. However the UNHCR card is only an identity document and has no formal legal value in Malaysia. The refugees, therefore, live a precarious existence as “illegal migrants,” doing odd low-paid jobs in restaurants, retail, and other service sectors, as well as agriculture and construction, but are always at risk of arrest. The fact that they are mostly semi-literates or illiterates has exacerbated the situation. Without legal protection and proper contracts, they are not entitled to receive Malaysia’s national minimum pay of Ringgit 1,500 (US$329) per month or Ringgit 7.21 ($1.64) an hour. Worse still, in recent times, the country’s immigration department has accelerated a crackdown on undocumented migrants, arresting them and sending them to immigration detention centres, which since 2019 have been beyond the reach of the UNHCR.[7] Frequent riots have broken out in these poorly managed centres, leading to, on at least two occasions, inmates escaping and subsequently getting rearrested after a manhunt. In early February 2024, 131 Myanmar men, including 115 Rohingya, escaped such a facility in Perak state. One of them was hit by a vehicle on the highway and killed.[8] Earlier, in April 2022, more than 528 Rohingya refugees, including children, fled a temporary detention centre in Penang state, and six were killed trying to cross the highway. Most of the others were rearrested. Media reports have highlighted the plight of underage Rohingya girls, travelling from Myanmar and Bangladesh, being forced into abusive marriages with Rohingya men already in Malaysia.[9] Traditionally, parents of Rohingya brides are expected to pay grooms a dowry amount, which can be high, depending upon the suitability and demand of the groom. The journeys from Bangladesh and Myanmar to Malaysia often add to the spiral of exploitation. Boats have sunk, killing all on board. On many occasions, traffickers themselves have sexually abused the girls. Living on the fringes of the fringe, such girls, are not part of any statistics on Rohingya who live in Malaysia. The Indonesian Pushback Compared to Malaysia, Indonesia has received fewer Rohingya arrivals, although there has been a steady increase in arrivals to the two western islands of the country. Between November and December 2023, an estimated 1,500 Rohingya landed in north Sumatra. Another approximately 1,500 Rohingya have arrived in Aceh, the westernmost province of Indonesia. Around 70 percent of these refugees are women and children. Most of them are housed in temporary shelters, which have become overcrowded with fresh arrivals. Life of refugees, especially the children, in overcrowded shelters is far from ideal. They do not have the freedom to go out of the cramped shelters. Like Malaysia, Indonesia, the world’s largest Muslim-majority country, is not a signatory to the UN Convention on Refugees. Though it has a record of taking in refugees if they arrive, it has become far less receptive to refugee arrivals. While some Indonesians sympathise with fellow Muslim Rohingya, others blame them for consuming scant resources and coming into conflict with the locals. Consequently, the Rohingya have faced the ire of the residents who don’t want them in their communities and have frequently protested such arrivals. In December 2023, for instance, a mob of Indonesian university students attacked the basement of a local community hall in Banda Aceh, the capital of Aceh province, where 137 Rohingya were taking shelter. Videos of the incident showed the students, many wearing jackets with different universities’ insignias, running into the convention centre’s basement, chanting, “Kick them out” and “Reject Rohingya in Aceh.”[10] Elsewhere in Aceh, residents have tried to prevent Rohingya boats from reaching the shore and surrounded the tents of Rohingya on beaches and other temporary locations, demanding that they be relocated.[11] The Indonesian navy, too, in December 2023 forcibly pushed a boat packed with refugees back to international waters after it approached Aceh’s shores.[12] Those in the temporary shelters have faced an organized online misinformation campaign, which also targets the local UNHCR staff. Anonymous accounts on Instagram, TikTok, and X have spread false information and have also identified UNHCR staff in Aceh, publishing personal information (“doxing”), leading to numerous online threats. Then-President Joko Widodo blamed the surge in the arrivals of Rohingya on human trafficking and pledged to work with international organisations to offer temporary shelter. He appealed to the international community for help and intensified patrols of its waters due to a sharp rise in Rohingya refugees. Plan of Action Although inadequate amounts of humanitarian funds do keep coming to the agencies working with the Rohingya, amidst other ongoing humanitarian catastrophes, this crisis is clearly at risk of sliding off the global, and certainly regional, priority list. While the world, as well as the most prominent regional organization, ASEAN, has been shown to have little leverage with the military junta in Myanmar, there is no other country that can (or will) step forward to deal with the basis for the crisis. Since Myanmar will not, Rohingya options are limited— either to survive in the dehumanizing environment the Bangladeshi refugee camps provide or to attempt high-risk sea journeys that, even when ending with a successful landing either in Indonesia or Malaysia, provide little hope of upliftment. The UN agencies are desperately working with impacted states and other stakeholders, including refugees, to develop a comprehensive regional response to address these dangerous journeys. However, there are few signs of progress. This regional and global amnesia to the crisis has to end. The root causes of these dangerous maritime movements must be addressed. The international community must step up to make good on pledges made at the Global Refugee Forum in Geneva in December 2023, which included “advancing solutions and enhancing self-reliance for Rohingya refugees to provide hope and reduce the compulsion to take dangerous boat journeys.”[13] Meantime, conditions in Bangladesh need to be drastically improved. And those already in countries like Indonesia and Malaysia must be allowed to live a life of dignity, with the right to movement and employment. Dr. Bibhu Prasad Routray is the Director of Mantraya. This analysis has been published as part of Mantraya’s ongoing “Fragility, Conflict, and Peace Building” project. All Mantraya publications are peer-reviewed. END NOTES [1] UNHCR, “Rohingya Refugee Response/Bangladesh: Joint Government of Bangladesh – UNHCR Population Factsheet”, 31 January 2024. [2] “U.N. to cut food aid for Rohingya refugees, citing fund shortfall”, Reuters, 17 February 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/un-cut-food-aid-rohingya-refugees-citing-fund-shortfall-2023-02-17/. [3] World Food Programme, “WFP’s Rohingya Refugee Operation in Bangladesh Receives Major Funding Boost of US$ 87 Million from the United States”,13 December 2023, https://www.wfp.org/news/wfps-rohingya-refugee-operation-bangladesh-receives-major-funding-boost-us-87-million-united [4] Ruma Paul, “Bangladesh panel says fire at Rohingya camps ‘planned sabotage’”, Reuters, 12 March 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/bangladesh-panel-says-fire-rohingya-camps-planned-sabotage-2023-03-12/. [5] UNHCR, “Urgent action needed to address dramatic rise in Rohingya deaths at sea”, 23 January 2024, https://www.unhcr.org/us/news/briefing-notes/unhcr-urgent-action-needed-address-dramatic-rise-rohingya-deaths-sea. [6] UNHCR, “Figures at a glance in Malaysia”, https://www.unhcr.org/my/what-we-do/figures-glance-malaysia. [7] “Dozens of Rohingya refugees flee Malaysian immigration detention centre”, Al Jazeera, 2 February 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/2/dozens-of-rohingya-refugees-flee-malaysian-immigration-detention-centre. [8] “More Than 100 Rohingya Flee Malaysian Detention Center”, Voice of America, 2 February, 2024, https://www.voanews.com/a/more-than-100-rohingya-flee-malaysian-detention-center-/7467813.html. [9] Kristen Gelieneau, “‘I feel trapped’: Scores of underage Rohingya girls forced into abusive marriages in Malaysia”, Associated Press, 13 December 2023, https://apnews.com/article/rohingya-refugees-bangladesh-myanmar-malaysia-migration-f481e725f97d1b004a474e5facb10144. [10] “Indonesian students evict Rohingya from shelter demanding deportation”, Al Jazeera, 27 December 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/12/27/indonesian-students-evict-rohingya-from-shelter-demanding-deportation. [11] Human Rights Watch, “Indonesia: Protect Newly Arrived Rohingya Refugees”, 16 January 2024, https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/01/16/indonesia-protect-newly-arrived-rohingya-refugees. [12] “More Rohingya refugees arrive in Indonesia despite rejection from locals”, Associated Press, 31 December 2023, https://apnews.com/article/indonesia-myanmar-rohingya-refugees-202c304c3a1a9c447511960063e4e822. [13] UNHCR, “Urgent action needed to address dramatic rise in Rohingya deaths at sea”, op.cit. Dr. Bibhu Prasad Routray Dr. Bibhu Prasad Routray served as a Deputy Director in the National Security Council Secretariat, Government of India and Director of the Institute for Conflict Management (ICM)’s Database & Documentation Centre, Guwahati, Assam. He was a Visiting Research Fellow at the South Asia programme of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore between 2010 and 2012. Routray specialises in decision-making, governance, counter-terrorism, force modernisation, intelligence reforms, foreign policy and dissent articulation issues in South and South East Asia. His writings, based on his projects and extensive field based research in Indian conflict theatres of the Northeastern states and the left-wing extremism affected areas, have appeared in a wide range of academic as well policy journals, websites and magazines..."
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Source/publisher: "Eurasia Review"
2024-02-22
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-22
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Theme: Camp Coordination and Camp Management..."
Source/publisher: CCCM Cluster, UN High Commissioner for Refugees via Reliefweb (New York)
2024-02-20
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-20
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Description: "The Burmese Rohingya Organisation UK (BROUK) today petitioned a Court in Argentina to issue international arrest warrants for Senior General Min Aung Hlaing and six other Myanmar officials responsible for the genocide against the Rohingya people. “This is a historic and unprecedented step towards accountability for the decades-long genocide against the Rohingya people. It shows that our long fight for justice is starting to bear fruit,” said Tun Khin, President of BROUK. “The Argentinian judiciary has already committed to investigate these crimes. Now, we ask the Court to act on overwhelming evidence that these seven individuals are responsible, and to immediately issue international arrest warrants. Those committing genocide should have nowhere to hide from the law.” Today’s development is part of the investigation in Argentina into the role of Myanmar’s civilian and military leaders in committing genocide and crimes against humanity against the Rohingya. Under the principle of universal jurisdiction, such crimes can be investigated anywhere in the world regardless of where they were committed. The case was opened in 2021 based on a petition by BROUK. The Argentinian prosecution has initially focused its investigation on a massacre in a Rohingya village in Rathedoung township, Rakhine State, on 27 August 2017. Myanmar military and police attacked the village, killing hundreds of Rohingya people through indiscriminate fire, mutilating bodies of victims, torching houses, and committing widespread rape and sexual violence against women and girls. Moving forward, the Prosecutor will continue the investigation into other villages and areas in Rakhine State that were subjected to “clearance operations” in 2017. BROUK’s request for an arrest warrant names seven individuals responsible for the attack, but arrest warrants can potentially be issued for more perpetrators as the case progresses. Those named for now include senior military leaders with command responsibility for the massacre, such as Min Aung Hlaing, Myanmar’s Commander-in-Chief and current leader of the military coup in 2021, and Soe Win, Deputy Commander-in-Chief. The request also names two lower-ranking officials, a village Chairman and a police officer, who were direct perpetrators of killings and rapes during the attack. They are accused of genocide and crimes under the Argentinian penal code including aggravated murder, sexual abuse and torture. In its 2018 report, the Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar recommended that Min Aung Hlaing and other perpetrators should be prosecuted for the Rohingya genocide. The request is based on detailed and credible evidence uncovered during the case’s investigation phase. This included eyewitness testimony from seven Rohingya genocide survivors, who traveled to Buenos Aires to testify in court in June this year. The First Instance Federal Court Number 1 in Buenos Aires and the Prosecutor will now consider BROUK’s request for an arrest warrant. If the Court accepts it, it will automatically trigger a request to Interpol to issue international arrest warrants for the individuals identified. BROUK also asked that ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), the European Union, African Union, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and States such as the US, the UK and Canada that have imposed economic sanctions and travel bans on perpetrators are notified about the arrest warrant. “Those responsible for this genocide, including the horrific crimes committed on 27 August 2017, must be held to account, whether they planned them or carried them out directly. This massacre caused unimaginable suffering and is, in many ways, on its own enough to prove that a genocide is taking place. Sadly, however, it is only one of many examples of the violence and abuse Rohingya have faced for decades,” said Tun Khin. The case in Argentina is the first universal jurisdiction case anywhere in the world concerning the Rohingya genocide. Since the case opened, BROUK has further intensified its investigation against the Myanmar military and those abetting their crimes, including by requesting information from Facebook on how anti-Rohingya hate speech was shared on the platform. During the investigation, the UN Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM) has extended support to the Prosecutor in Argentina. BROUK’s efforts complement other international justice processes against the Myanmar military, such as the cases at the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court. These efforts have taken on new urgency since 1 February 2021, when the Myanmar military tried to seize power through a coup. Since then, the military and its proxies have killed thousands of people opposing its rule and arrested tens of thousands. “Our fight for justice is not just for the Rohingya, but for all victims of the Myanmar military, regardless of what ethnic groups they belong to. The military has terrorized Myanmar and its people for decades, and repression has only intensified since the coup almost two years ago,” said Tun Khin. “We commend the Argentinian judiciary´s decision to investigate the crimes committed by the military. If our request for an arrest warrant is accepted, it would be a historic development that brings hope to millions of victims. It would also show Min Aung Hlaing and other officials that the eyes of the world are on them.” Background The seven individuals identified in BROUK’s request for an arrest warrant are (all titles refer to their positions at the time of the massacre on 27 August unless otherwise noted): Min Aung Hlaing, Commander-in-Chief and 2021 military coup leader Soe Win, Deputy Commander-in-Chief Aung Kyaw Zaw, Commander of the Bureau of Special Operations No. 3 Maung Maung Soe, Chief of the Army's Western Command Aung Aung, Commander of the Army’s Light Infantry Battalion No. 33 Kyaw Shay, police officer Aung San Mya, village Chairman For more information, contact Tun Khin on +447888714866..."
Source/publisher: Burmese Rohingya Organisation UK
2023-12-06
Date of entry/update: 2023-12-06
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Description: "At least 200 civilians have been killed and 335,000 displaced in Myanmar (Burma) since 27 October when a group of ethnic armed resistance organizations – known as the Three Brotherhood Alliance – launched a campaign against the ruling military junta. “Operation 1027” has galvanized other groups across the country to join in attacks against the junta, making the current fighting the “largest in scale and most extensive geographically” since the February 2021 coup, according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Clashes have been particularly heavy in northern Shan, Sagaing, Chin, Rakhine and Mandalay states where armed resistance groups have reportedly targeted military bases and outposts, as well as trade routes. In Rakhine State, a year-long informal ceasefire between the junta and the Arakan Army ethnic armed group ended on 13 November when the group launched attacks. According to OCHA, 20,000 people have fled the fighting since mid-November in Pauktaw township alone. The junta has cut off access to the town and trapped hundreds of people in the crossfire, while also obstructing access to camps for internally displaced Rohingya..."
Source/publisher: Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
2023-11-29
Date of entry/update: 2023-11-29
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "New report exposes how Rohingya genocide is intensifying amid aid restrictions and armed conflict The Myanmar military junta is continuing to ignore the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) orders to protect the Rohingya as state policies are pushing hundreds of thousands of people to the brink of bare survival in Rakhine State, the Burmese Rohingya Organisation UK (BROUK) said today in a new report. The report, Struggling to survive, documents how Rohingya people live increasingly desperate lives amid widespread restrictions on humanitarian aid by the junta. Due to restrictions on their freedom of movement, access to healthcare and livelihoods, Rohingya communities are almost entirely dependent on humanitarian aid. At the same time, the Myanmar military and armed groups have tortured, killed and arbitrarily detained Rohingya people as renewed armed conflict threatens to put even more civilians in the firing line in Rakhine State. “There is no doubt that the Myanmar military is still trying to erase the Rohingya from the face of the earth. Our report exposes how genocidal practices in Rakhine State are not only continuing, but have even intensified over the last six months,” said Tun Khin, President of BROUK. “Rohingya women, children and men are struggling to survive. Further curbs on aid access, coupled with conflict-related violations, have only made this situation more alarming. The international community must act once and for all to end this ongoing genocide.” BROUK’s report is timed to coincide with reporting deadlines imposed on Myanmar in the genocide case The Gambia brought to the ICJ in 2019. In 2020, the “World Court” ordered Myanmar to ‘take all measures within its power’ to protect the Rohingya, and to submit reports every six months on its compliance. A desperate situation in Rakhine State The report lays bare how policies by the military junta, known as the State Administration Council (SAC), continued to subject Rohingya people to extreme hardships in May-November 2023. Many of these amount to the genocidal acts outlined in the Genocide Convention. A stark example is the SAC’s failure to protect people in the context of Cyclone Mocha that hit Rakhine State in May 2023, killing some 400 Rohingya and destroying homes, clinics, and sanitation facilities in IDP camps. Long-standing and arbitrary restrictions on Rohingyas’ freedom of movement prevented many from evacuating camps and villages to seek safety. In the cyclone’s aftermath, the regime has blocked humanitarian aid to Rohingya communities, with devastating consequences. Six months after the cyclone, the 140,000 Rohingya confined to IDP camps have been subjected to increasingly unsanitary, degrading conditions, without enough food, water, or basic shelter. The junta’s restrictions on humanitarian access and lengthy delays in issuing travel authorisations to humanitarian organisations have prevented timely repairs to shelters and sanitation facilities, as well as the delivery of adequate food and nutrition supplies. Discriminatory policies and practices prevent Rohingya from accessing adequate medical care and have led to further preventable deaths since the cyclone. All Rohingya in Rakhine State continue to live in an open-air prison, with the junta taking no steps to end severe and long-standing restrictions on their freedom of movement and access to education, health care and livelihoods. Threats, extortions and arbitrary detentions are routinely used by security forces against Rohingya. Despite the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine State, Myanmar continues to push ahead with attempts to repatriate Rohingya refugees from Bangladesh. These moves are opposed by Rohingya refugee communities themselves, while UNHCR has clearly stated that conditions in Rakhine State are not safe for refugees to return in dignity and safety. BROUK’s report highlights that ‘model villages’ for the returnees have been constructed in areas where atrocity crimes during the 2016-2017 ‘clearance operations’ are known to have taken place, in breach of the ICJ’s order instructing Myanmar to ‘prevent the destruction of and ensure the preservation of evidence’ related to alleged genocidal acts. Armed conflict in Rakhine State Renewed armed conflict threatens to put Rohingya civilians at greater risk of harm. On 13 November, a fragile ceasefire between the Arakan Army (AA) and SAC forces collapsed, sparking armed clashes in Rakhine State. Rakhine and Rohingya civilians have already been killed and injured by indiscriminate shelling by SAC forces over the past week. Meanwhile, the Arakan Rohingya Solidarity Army (ARSA) has been increasingly active in the region in recent months, following a crackdown on the group inside Bangladeshi camps. Armed clashes between ARSA and the AA in July have added to fears that Rohingya civilians will increasingly be caught in the crossfire. BROUK has documented a catalogue of human rights abuses by the AA and ARSA towards Rohingya civilians, including abductions, extortions, arbitrary arrests, and ill-treatment amounting to torture. In late September, for example, the AA imposed a lockdown on Rohingya villages in southern Buthidaung, and abducted and brutally beat 10 Rohingya men falsely accused of ARSA sympathies. Similarly, a few weeks earlier, ARSA are widely suspected of killing a Rohingya elder they accused of providing transportation to AA and SAC soldiers. The Myanmar military has further arbitrarily arrested and tortured Rohingya men on accusations of ties to the AA or ARSA, in an act of collective punishment. The high price of international inaction BROUK calls on the international community to immediately take action to end Myanmar’s genocide against the Rohingya. This must include pressure to lift aid restrictions in Rakhine State, strengthened sanctions against the junta, and support for international justice efforts. BROUK welcomes recent moves by the governments of the UK, Canada, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Germany and Maldives to formally lend support to The Gambia’s genocide case at the ICJ. BROUK urges the international community to find concrete ways to leverage the provisional measures ordered by the ICJ, to ensure they fulfil their purpose of protecting the Rohingya. This includes securing public hearings at the UN Security Council on the junta’s continued breaches of the order and seeking consequences for non-compliance. “Time is running out for the more than 600,000 Rohingya still living inside Rakhine State. The world must immediately take steps to pressure the Myanmar junta to lift all restrictions on aid as well as Rohingyas’ access to hospitals, schools and livelihoods,” said Tun Khin. “At the same time, international justice is the only way to hold the military to account for its decades of violence against not just the Rohingya, but all people in Myanmar. More states must lend support to efforts to hold the junta to account for its atrocity crimes.”..."
Source/publisher: Burmese Rohingya Organisation UK
2023-11-21
Date of entry/update: 2023-11-23
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "In Rakhine State, 51,590 individuals have been displaced across 10 townships due to the ongoing AA-Tatmadaw conflict. Additionally, 4,472 individuals have been displaced in Paletwa township in Chin State, bringing the total number of displaced persons to 56,062. As of August 2023, a further 4,174 individuals newly displaced remain in Mrauk-U, Kyautaw, Sittwe, Myebon, Minbya, Rathedaung, Buthidaung, and Ponnagyun townships. In collaboration with partners and other UN agencies, UNHCR is responding to the humanitarian needs and continues to provide assistance to affected communities. Since January 2023, UNHCR provided core relief items, emergency shelter support, dignity kits and cloth masks to some 44,917 individuals in Mrauk-U, Kyauktaw, Ponnagyun, Myebon, Sittwe, Pauktaw, Paletwa, Buthidaung and Rathedaung townships..."
Source/publisher: UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva) via Reliefweb (New York)
2023-09-15
Date of entry/update: 2023-09-20
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "On 25 August 2017, the world witnessed the beginning of the forced displacement of more than 750 000 Rohingya people from Rakhine State in Myanmar, fleeing violence and persecution from the Myanmar military. The vast majority of them settled temporarily in the Cox’s Bazar District of Bangladesh, whereas others fled across the region. Six years later, and despite international efforts and calls on Myanmar to create the conditions for their return to their homeland, the crisis is still alive now which is the shame for the international community. Almost half a century has passed since 2017, but Myanmar has not taken back a single Rohingya to their country. Instead, drama has been created around the return at various times. Despite the sincere efforts of the Bangladesh government, Myanmar has always given an ax blow to the possibility of Rohingya return. On November 23, 2017, a 19-point agreement was signed between Bangladesh and Myanmar due to the concerted efforts of the Bangladesh government and international criticism. In the light of that agreement, Myanmar initially plans to take back 3,450 Rohingyas divided into seven groups. The deal did not see the light of day on the issue of proof-of-citizenship. In 2019, the Gambia filed a case against the Myanmar government at the International Court of Justice, which is still ongoing. During the hearing of that case, all their lawyers and counsel, including Aung San Suu Kyi, avoided the word ‘Rohingya’ and their citizenship. Surprising but true, in February 2021 there was a political change in Myanmar, but there was no change in opinion. Rohingya shelter project has been established in Bhasanchar along with Cox’s Bazar to improve the quality of life of Rohingyas on behalf of Bangladesh government. The Bangladesh government is doing everything possible to ensure all the benefits of the Rohingyas. There is little cooperation from Myanmar. There are many questions about the strong role of the international community. On June 18, 2021, the resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on the issue of Myanmar discussed the country’s various problems, especially democratic problems, state of emergency, political prisoners, restoration of democracy, but the issue of Rohingya return did not find a place. Due to the long process of return of Rohingyas, murders, kidnappings, shootings, torture, drug trafficking and other criminal activities are a regular occurrence in the camps. The activity of several armed groups in the camps is an open secret. According to the information of Cox’s Bazar District Police, there are more than 2500 cases against Rohingyas from 2017 to 2022, with more than 5000 accused. More than 10 terrorist groups including Arsa, RSO, Nabi Hussain Group, Munna Group, Dakat Hakim Group are active. It is said that behind these groups are the invisible hands of various groups in Myanmar. On September 29, 2021, Rohingya leader Muhibullah (Master Muhibullah) was killed at around 8:30 pm. He was vocal about the return of the Rohingyas. As a result of the efforts of the Bangladesh government, the issue of Rohingya return is gaining importance at the international level. The Rohingya return process is delayed due to international political turmoil and Myanmar’s indifferent attitude. Among the reasons being used as a political tool behind this delay are citizenship, voluntary return and living conditions for the Rohingya in Myanmar. The 1982 military government barred the Rohingya with the Burma Citizenship Act. Since then, Myanmar has refused to recognize Rohingya as citizens of their country. Myanmar is using Rohingya citizenship as a tool in this return process. The international community has always been silent on the issue of citizenship law. So far, two final attempts to return the Rohingyas have failed due to objections regarding the security of the Rohingyas. In the light of the agreement of November 2017, a joint working committee of the two countries was formed to solve the Rohingya problem in Dhaka on December 19 that year. Then Myanmar started the politics of delay in the name of checking the list. An initial attempt at a comeback in 2018 ended in failure. A Chinese-brokered repatriation initiative failed in 2019, citing concerns that the Rohingya’s environment in Rakhine state is not suitable for return. Negotiations on Rohingya return stalled in February 2021 after Myanmar’s military coup d’état changed the government. However, the hope is that in 2023, China has taken the initiative to continue trying to return the Rohingyas as a mediator between Bangladesh and Myanmar without international intervention. Diplomatic level discussions are already ongoing. However, again two things are left out in this process. The first is the consent of the Rohingya and the second is the place of return. As part of this process, a group of Rohingya went to Rakhine state for the first time in May this year to see if there is a habitable environment. According to the media, after returning to the camp in Cox’s Bazar, some of them agreed to return to Myanmar after seeing the environment there, while others said they did not agree. There is also a demand for all the family members to go back to the original village together. In the early stages, camps or model villages in northern Maungdu and nearby areas of Myanmar came up for repatriation. Just as it is not clear whether all Rohingya family members will be taken in together, Myanmar has given birth to new politics over whether Rohingyas will be taken back to their villages or returned to model villages. Again, whether this return process is delayed by the turmoil of international politics has also given rise to renewed discussions. Especially, after the US plans to set up a resettlement program for the Rohingya came to light. However, the international community should forget all political differences and take the humanitarian aspect into serious consideration and help the Rohingya return immediately. Bangladesh’s top priority is Rohingya repatriation, as more than 1 million Rohingya have been staying here for 6 years. Efforts are underway to repatriate a small group to Rakhine under a pilot project. Bangladesh wants international organizations to help in this. A section of the international community is playing politics with the Rohingyas in the camps in Cox’s Bazar. Due to this, their repatriation process is becoming difficult at times. The international community and the great powers did little to pressurize the Junta to repatriate the Rohingya. Prior to Junta, the international community also failed to convince the democratic government to repatriate the Rohingya and bring the perpetrators to justice. Bangladesh has tried bilaterally, trilaterally, and multilaterally for the past six years for a viable solution. It has left no stone unturned, yet found nothing. Bangladesh eagerly wants to explore the initiative as something is better than nothing. Owing to bilateral political, economic, connectivity, and economic issues, Bangladesh itself has to solve the problem. While Bangladesh is trying heart and soul to repatriate the Rohingya to their birthplace, the NGOs are not doing enough for the most persecuted community of its time. Advocacy networks such as UNHCR, HRW, and Amnesty International failed to create effective pressure on Myanmar. Like the NGOs, the Great powers also failed to pressurize Myanmar effectively. The declining fund, deteriorating camp conditions, growing insecurity, and adverse impact of the refugees on the host community have made Bangladesh a desperate host looking for reducing the burden, where its international partners are only performing their formal duties within a set boundary. This crisis is also destabilizing regional security. It is important to note that aid for the Rohingya is decreasing daily. The current Ukraine conflict has the entire world on edge. Although the world community has lost sight of the Rohingya humanitarian issue as a result of the war in Ukraine. Furthermore, it also has the responsibility of international community to provide an external guarantee for Rohingya’s safety upon repatriation..."
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Source/publisher: Eurasia Review
2023-08-21
Date of entry/update: 2023-08-21
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Sub-title: Indian authorities summarily imprison Rohingya refugees for years
Description: "(COX’S BAZAR and BANGKOK, July 28, 2023)—The Government of India should immediately and unconditionally release indefinitely detained Rohingya refugees and end the arbitrary arrest and detention of refugees, said Fortify Rights today. The government should also investigate violations within its detention facilities and hold officials found responsible to account. In a new investigation, Fortify Rights documented evidence of Indian authorities beating Rohingya refugees, denying them due process rights, and indefinitely detaining hundreds, in some cases for several years. Indian authorities have detained Rohingya refugees in at least New Delhi, Jammu, Manipur, and Assam for immigration-related offenses. “The Indian government must end its indefinite detention of refugees and investigate the violent crackdown and beatings of Rohingya refugees in detention,” said Zaw Win, Human Rights Specialist at Fortify Rights. “No one should be imprisoned for being a refugee – a status no one willingly chooses. Indian authorities must protect Rohingya who have fled an ongoing genocide in Myanmar.” Fortify Rights interviewed 14 people in India, including 12 Rohingya refugees, three of whom are currently detained in India. Fortify Rights also obtained and reviewed photographs and video footage from inside detention centers in India. On July 24, 2023, Indian police reportedly arrested more than 70 Rohingya refugees in the northern state of Uttar Pradesh. Earlier, in a separate incident, on July 18, 2023, hundreds of Rohingya refugees detained in Jammu protested their indefinite detention, including through a hunger strike. Indian authorities responded with tear gas and beatings, injuring several refugees. Two days after the incident, a Rohingya infant present during the incident reportedly died. Fortify Rights did not independently confirm the child’s cause of death. A Rohingya refugee, 30, originally from Buthidaung Township in Myanmar’s Rakhine State, has been detained in India for five years. He told Fortify Rights how Indian authorities arrested and beat him on May 1, 2018, at the India-Myanmar border in Manipur. He said: “[The Indian authorities] beat us with a rod asking us why we were ‘crossing the border illegally’ . . . They beat us very often. They beat my leg and knee. They beat us inside the custody [detention center].” Later, and without legal representation, the authorities brought the man to court, summarily convicted him, and sentenced him for entering India without permission. “I have been in detention for the last five years,” he told Fortify Rights. “It is hell here in detention . . . We want to be free.” Another detained Rohingya man (location withheld for security reasons) told Fortify Rights that Indian authorities arrested him in December 2020 for immigration offenses under Section 14 of India’s Foreigners Act, 1946. He remains in detention after being summarily convicted and sentenced to one year in prison. He said: [The Indian authorities] detained me . . . It was on the bus . . . in Karimganj District in Assam . . . they took us to prison . . . [I have] stayed in detention for more than two and a half years now. Going through the court like this, I have become so hopeless. Fortify Rights confirmed from the court documents that the court sentenced him to one year in prison. Despite serving this sentence and being a refugee recognized by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the U.N. agency mandated to protect refugees, Indian authorities continue to detain him. He told Fortify Rights: “UNHCR provided us with their cards, which means, from what I understand, that they must protect and help their cardholders as refugees . . . If a UNHCR-recognized refugee has to continue to stay in jail even after finishing his sentence, he is not safe.” Another Rohingya refugee originally from Maungdaw Township in Rakhine State and now detained in India (location withheld for security reasons) told Fortify Rights how Indian authorities detained him while he was traveling in Assam: We showed [the Indian authorities] our [UNHCR] refugee identification card. The policemen told us that the Indian government does not accept refugee identification for travel. So, they took us to the court. It was in Assam that we were arrested. We were detained for nine months in a detention center in Assam. From 2021 to 2022, Indian authorities transferred this refugee between three different detention facilities. He said, “After three years, we were told that we would be moving [to a different facility] . . . We were told that our prison period had finished, and we were moved to the refugee camps, but it is not a camp; it is a detention center.” Indian authorities effectively denied him legal representation. At the time of writing, he remains in indefinite detention. Speaking about the conditions in the detention center, he told Fortify Rights: “UNHCR is not helping us in detention . . . We are not fed well in detention. They provide rice with lentils . . . There is no education for our children . . . We are hardly surviving.” Fortify Rights also spoke to relatives of those detained and some who fled to Bangladesh and other neighboring countries out of fear of arrest or being forcibly returned to Myanmar. A Rohingya man, 49, originally from Maungdaw Township, told Fortify Rights that he fled India to Bangladesh fearing arbitrary arrest by Indian authorities. Another Rohingya man told Fortify Rights that he witnessed Indian authorities arrest and separate a refugee family in Narwal, Jammu in May 2021. Fortify Rights obtained and reviewed video footage of the incident, which shows a Rohingya woman being arrested by authorities, put into a vehicle, and separated from her infant child. The Rohingya man who witnessed the incident said: In a family of a husband, wife, and four children, the police only arrested the mother and one child. A breastfeeding infant was not taken with the mother. The people are very traumatized by how the police forcefully separated the infant from the mother. Then the people tried to flee the area . . . I have videos of the breastfeeding child being left behind when the police arrested the mother. Fortify Rights also received and reviewed a mobile-phone audio recording from July 19, 2023, between a Rohingya relative and a family member inside a detention center—the location of which is withheld for security reasons. In the audio recording, a Rohingya woman explains that Indian authorities had beaten her, and she pleads with her relative to tell the authorities not to beat her, saying: “[A]t night, we will be beaten, and [I] already have been beaten so badly . . . Please ask my brother to ask [the police] not to beat me . . . Please tell them not to beat me.” She also pleaded in the audio recording to be granted bail and have a lawyer represent her. At the time of writing, she remains in detention. Indian authorities have also cracked down on Rohingya en masse in detention. Most recently, on July 18, 2023, Indian authorities violently cracked down on Rohingya refugees in Hiranagar Detention Center in Jammu. According to mobile-phone video footage obtained and reviewed by Fortify Rights and substantiated by interviews with refugees, Rohingya detainees staged a protest against their indefinite detention. Some took part in a hunger strike, calling for their release. Indian authorities responded with tear gas and beatings, injuring several refugees and reportedly killing a detained infant. Mobile-phone footage reviewed and on file with Fortify Rights shows the aftermath of the protest and crackdown by authorities in the detention center. On July 20, 2023, two days after the crackdown, Fortify Rights spoke to a relative of a detainee at the Hiranagar Detention Center. He said: “When I [spoke to] him, he told me, ‘There are people who got injured as [the authorities] fired teargas [at us]. . . We are doing a hunger strike here.” Media reports and Rohingya advocates allege that the Rohingya child who died in the Jammu detention facility died from injuries related to tear gas inhalation. Indian authorities denied the allegation to Indian media, claiming the death was unrelated to the crackdown. A Rohingya refugee community leader in India, knowledgeable of the incident, told Fortify Rights that some Rohingya in the Hiranagar detention facility “have been detained for more than two years.” On July 18, 2023, Superintendent of Kathua District Detention Center Koushal Kumar told journalists: “[Rohingya refugees] tried to break open the gate and come out, but we closed the gate . . . I cannot [say] the exact number of persons injured.” On July 19, 2023, the Rohingya Human Rights Initiative, a leading Rohingya organization in India, said they “strongly condemn” the Indian authorities’ crackdown on Rohingya refugees and called for “an immediate end to the human rights abuses and arbitrary detention.” India should conduct an independent investigation into the violent incident at the Hiranagar Detention Center and release those detained, Fortify Rights said today. “We’re concerned that the recent violence against Rohingya in India could lead to renewed calls to force them back to Myanmar, and that must be avoided at all costs,” said Zaw Win. “Refugees have rights, and India is obligated to respect those rights.” On March 5, 2021, the Government of Jammu and Kashmir invoked powers under Section 3(2)(d) of the Foreigners Act of 1946 and Section 2(d) of the Citizenship Act of 1955 to convert Hiranagar Detention Center in Kathua District to a “holding center” to detain Rohingya with immigration-related offenses. Section 2(b) of the Citizenship Act, 1955 defines “illegal migrants” as foreigners who entered India without a valid passport or travel documents or those who entered with a valid passport or travel document but remained in the country beyond the permitted period. The Foreigners Act regulates the entry of foreigners into the country, their presence, and departure. Section 3(2)(d) of the Foreigners Act empowers the central government to issue orders removing or restraining the presence of foreigners in specific areas. Customary international law and Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which India is a state party, forbids the arbitrary, unlawful, or indefinite detention of any person, including refugees and migrants. Refugees may only be detained as an exceptional measure of last resort following an individualized assessment and after the exhaustion of all alternatives to detention. Article 21 of the Indian Constitution protects this right stating that “No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.” Moreover, Article 22 of the Constitution protects all persons arrested and detained. These protections include the right to know the grounds of arrest and detention, the right to a lawyer, and the right to be presented before a court. India has also signed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and ratified the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD). As emphasized by the UN Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and related intolerance in 2019, Indian authorities’ discrimination against Rohingya, who are an ethnic minority, violates India’s obligations under the UDHR, ICCPR, and CERD. While the Foreigner’s Act empowers the Indian central government to place restrictions on groups of foreigners, such restrictions should not override its commitments under CERD. Any restrictions also should not violate refugee rights to equality before the law and the equal protection of the law guaranteed under Article 14 of the Indian Constitution. India has signed but has not ratified the U.N. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (UNCAT). As a signatory, India is bound to follow the principle of non-refoulement, which is a peremptory norm of international law. Article 3 of UNCAT enshrines the principle of non-refoulement, prohibiting states from returning any person on its territory or under its jurisdiction to a country where they face persecution. India’s previous returns of Rohingya to Myanmar, which is committing genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity against the Rohingya people, violated this peremptory norm. India should also sign and ratify the 1951 U.N. Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, said Fortify Rights. In 2019, Fortify Rights documented Indian authorities beating and threatening to return Rohingya refugees to Myanmar while forcing dozens into Bangladeshi territory. All Rohingya in that instance were UNHCR-recognized refugees. “India should provide a safe haven for Rohingya fleeing genocidal attacks and other international crimes in Myanmar,” said Zaw Win. “Rather than continuing their persecution, the Indian government should allow Rohingya refugees access to legal status, education, livelihoods, and freedom of movement.”..."
Source/publisher: "Fortify Rights"
2023-07-28
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-28
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Description: "Mukesh Kapila I clung atop a palm tree praying furiously while cyclonic winds threatened to whip me away. It was the early 1970s and I was a humanitarian volunteer on Moudubi island in the Bay of Bengal. I was teaching and living in the island’s ramshackle school. That first visit to Bangladesh was in the dark shadow of its 1971 Liberation War which saw three million killed in genocidal atrocities. It was soon after Supercyclone Bhola had already cost 0.5 million lives in 1970. Fully expecting that by now the island would have disappeared under rising seas, I am heartened to see just the opposite. A google-maps flyover reveals a bustling Moudubi and a lively Facebook page extols my former school’s many achievements. The plucky survival of this tiny speck is a metaphor for a nation once described as a “basket case” meriting just a two-hour stop-over by US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger. Today Bangladesh is a lower-middle-income country. It’s 169 million people have seen poverty headcount halve and income jump to US$2500 per capita (in current dollars) from US$400 at the Millennium. Many more Bangladeshi children survive birth, grow up healthy and educated to live longer and productively. The nation has got better at coping with frequent disasters and its population will stabilise by mid-century as growth rate falls below 1% annually. But it still ranks modestly at 129th (out of 191 ) on the Human Development Index and its resilience is under test. It is the sixth most climate-vulnerable country, even as it confronts many social, economic, and political challenges, in common with other developing countries. I returned many times to see how Bangladesh navigates an increasingly perilous world. This was in different official capacities in the British government, International Red Cross Red Crescent, and United Nations I learnt that key was the grim determination and natural resourcefulness of its people. Also the supportive partnerships its government has built with many nations and international organisations to attract aid, trade, and financial investment. My latest visit took me to Cox’s Bazar. Recalling the darkest days of the 1970s when 10 million Bangladeshis found safety in India, it is Bangladesh’s turn now to provide a safe haven for one million Rohingya fleeing Myanmar. Cox’s Bazar is the world’s largest refugee settlement and the Rohingya live in some 33 heavily-congested camps that are frequently devastated by fires, cyclones flooding, and disease outbreaks. Nevertheless, it is an enterprising and energising place. Bangladeshis are naturally generous and the authorities have diverted significant national resources to help the Rohingya while facilitating some 100 countries, international organizations, philanthropies and NGOs to come and bolster Bangladesh’s own humanitarian endeavors. I saw that despite the challenging and fragile physical environment, commendable efforts addressed critical refugee needs starting with infrastructure for shelter, sanitation, and clean water. Healthcare facilities provide clinical services, immunizations, maternal and childcare. Tackling malnutrition and preventing communicable diseases get special attention. In an echo of Bangladesh’s own development journey, fostering hope, empowering communities, and rebuilding productive lives are recognised as important to enhance future prospects for the refugees. Learning centres provide basic education, vocational training and skills development to thousands of refugee children and youth. Bangladesh has also established legal aid services to guide refugees seeking justice and protection in collaboration with international partners. That includes registering and documenting all refugees to further safeguard their rights. The Rohingya have been fleeing Myanmar for at least 50 years, with big purges in 1978, 1992, 2012, and the biggestever exodus in 2016. No one becomes a refugee out of choice, and none want to stay exiled longer than necessary. Neither do they wish to depend on the charity of others. “We don’t want to be confined in camps. We want to get back our land, and we will build our own houses there,” said Oli Hossain. Another refugee, Abu Sufian, added that “We want nothing but a safe, voluntary, dignified, and sustainable repatriation.” Rohingya prospects were discussed recently in Geneva between Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Filippo Grandi. Long-term solutions require most refugees to eventually return home with a minority settling permanently in Bangladesh or third countries. The Muslim Rohingya fled their Buddhist-dominated homeland in Rakhine state where they had lived for centuries because the Myanmar state and military denied their ethnic identity, cancelled their citizenship and inflicted terrible violence and atrocities that are alleged as genocide in a case working its way through the International Court of Justice. There are no prospects of meaningful Rohingya returns while Myanmar’s repressive regime continues and the nation remains embroiled in other internal conflicts. Overall, these have forcibly displaced around 3 million Myanmar people, mostly minorities living at the periphery of this vast nation. Re-settlement in other countries is relatively modest. Malaysia hosts around 150,000 Rohingya, Thailand nearly 100,000, and small numbers live precariously in India, Nepal, and Indonesia. Hundreds of fleeing Rohingya have lost their lives in perilous sea crossings. Safer migration and re-settlement in Asia-Pacific or in the West should be possible if nations act in solidarity according to their Refugee Convention obligations. The energy and enterprise of the Rohingya make them an asset to any country that admits them. The global refugee system is heavily-stretched, and a refugee may, on average, spend twenty years in limbo before finding a durable solution. That is both inhumane and a waste of human resources. Recognising that most of the Rohingya are likely to stay in Bangladesh for some time before returning home means helping the Bangladesh authorities and international agencies to care for them in a more sustained manner. Also, enabling the refugees to depend less on humanitarian aid and contribute more to their host country’s economy and development. Fairness also requires helping the approximately 538,000 local Bangladeshi population to benefit equitably from hosting their Rohingya guests. De-congesting Cox’s Bazar by voluntarily relocating some of the Rohingya to safe parts of the country can ease and distribute the burden. But the challenges are considerable. The Rohingya Humanitarian Response Plan of the United Nations and partners seeks US$875.9 million for 2023 of which only 28% had been received at mid-year. Recently, Rohingya food rations have had to be cut… again and again. Discontent and insecurity are to be feared in a geopolitically sensitive part of the world. Of course, there is also much pain and suffering in other parts of the world. But there are still enough resources to go around even under current difficult global scenarios. The world’s dispossessed should not be put into undignified competition with each other. Neither Bangladesh nor the Rohingya should be left alone and the international community must be more generous in playing its part. This can be a collective win-win and breathe genuine meaning into this year’s World Refugee Day slogan to bring “hope away from home”..."
Source/publisher: E-International Relations
2023-07-13
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-13
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Restrictions on Humanitarian Access, Supplies, Movement Threaten Millions
Description: "The Myanmar junta’s increasing obstruction of humanitarian aid in the month since Cyclone Mocha has put thousands of lives at immediate risk and endangered millions of people. The junta’s aid blockages have hindered every aspect of the cyclone response and turned an extreme weather event into a man-made catastrophe. Governments should press the junta to lift all restrictions on aid delivery without relenting on the need to hold junta officials responsible for their ongoing human rights abuses. (Bangkok) – The Myanmar junta’s increasing obstruction of humanitarian aid in the month since Cyclone Mocha has put thousands of lives at immediate risk and endangered millions of people, Human Rights Watch said today. Since the cyclone made landfall on May 14, 2023, junta authorities have refused to authorize travel and visas for aid workers, release urgent supplies from customs and warehouses, or relax onerous and unnecessary restrictions on lifesaving assistance. The persistence of Cyclone Mocha’s damage and resulting illness and deaths reflect the junta’s new as well as existing restrictions on aid. Donors, regional bodies, and the United Nations should press the junta to lift all restrictions on aid delivery without relenting on the need to hold junta officials responsible for past and ongoing human rights abuses. “The junta’s moves to block aid have turned an extreme weather event into a man-made catastrophe,” said Shayna Bauchner, Asia researcher at Human Rights Watch. “Donors should press the junta to drop their politically motivated obstruction and allow desperately needed aid to reach all cyclone survivors.” Cyclone Mocha was one of the strongest cyclones to ever hit the region, with maximum sustained winds of 250 kilometers per hour leaving a trail of destruction. The UN estimates that 7.9 million people were affected, with 1.6 million in need of urgent aid across 5 Myanmar states and regions, Rakhine, Chin, Sagaing, Magway, and Kachin. Hundreds were killed and hundreds of thousands of buildings damaged. Telecommunication outages have delayed outreach and needs assessments, further isolating communities. Human Rights Watch interviewed aid workers and people in affected communities who described how the junta’s failed relief response has been deliberate. Humanitarian aid staff, who asked that their names not be used for fear of junta retribution, told Human Rights Watch that since the cyclone, the junta’s access restrictions have hindered their agencies’ ability to conduct needs assessments, distribute relief supplies, and provide emergency medical care. Many aid workers, local activists, and villagers expressed the view that the junta was seeking to use the cyclone response to legitimize and bolster its control. On June 8, after weeks of appeals by humanitarian organizations for unrestricted access, the junta formalized its obstruction by issuing a blanket suspension of travel authorizations for aid groups in Rakhine State, reversing initial approvals granted in early June. The ban followed a letter requiring the UN and international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) to hand over all domestic distribution of relief supplies to junta authorities. Meanwhile, villagers have continued to report massive levels of unaddressed needs, including destroyed shelters, injuries and waterborne illnesses, malnourishment, and lack of access to food and clean water. “It is unfathomable that humanitarians are being denied access to support people in need,” the acting UN resident and humanitarian coordinator, Ramanathan Balakrishnan, said following the suspension. “Just when vulnerable communities need our help the most, we have been forced to stop distributions of food, drinking water, and shelter supplies. This denial of access unnecessarily prolongs the suffering of those without food to eat or a roof over their head.” The junta named 18 generals to oversee “rehabilitation processes” in disaster-affected townships, led by the junta’s deputy prime minister, Adm. Tin Aung San, and its minister of border affairs, Lt. Gen. Tun Tun Naung, both of whom are sanctioned by the United States, European Union, and Canada. The generals assigned to townships in Rakhine State include Brig. Gen. Sunny Ohn, who served as deputy commander in Rakhine State during the military’s 2017 campaign of crimes against humanity and acts of genocide against the Rohingya, and Lt. Gen. Aye Win, who led two investigations in 2017 that covered up military atrocities. The junta’s actions have been felt by those in need. “The junta isn’t doing anything on its own and won’t let international organizations help,” a Rohingya man from Thae Chaung camp in Rakhine State told Human Rights Watch. “Why they’re doing that, I don’t understand. Children are suffering. We need shelter, we need food, we need medical support. The monsoon season is just starting. We fear more rain.” The junta’s interference in relief operations disregards multiple international calls regarding humanitarian aid, most notably the five-point consensus from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the December 2022 UN Security Council resolution, which urged “full, safe and unhindered humanitarian access.” The junta’s grave violations of international human rights and humanitarian law have only increased since the December resolution. The Security Council should urgently pass a follow-up resolution instituting a global arms embargo, referring the situation to the International Criminal Court, and imposing sanctions on the junta leadership and military-owned businesses. The global humanitarian response has received only 15 percent of the US$887 million needed for the year, $333 million of which is earmarked for the cyclone response. Donors should increase funding while seeking ways to channel aid through local civil society groups, rather than through junta authorities, given the military’s track record of corruption and misuse of disaster assistance funding and material. Effective aid delivery hinges on engaging local partners that have the networks and experience to navigate a difficult environment, Human Rights Watch said. “Governments seeking to help the people of Myanmar facing this or future humanitarian crises need to recognize that the military junta will only be a dangerous obstacle to reaching that goal,” Bauchner said. “The lives of countless thousands of people across the country are at risk because of generals who are determined to maintain their tight grip on power at any cost.” Humanitarian Catastrophe Since the February 2021 military coup, Myanmar’s junta has carried out a nationwide campaign of crimes against humanity and war crimes, deliberately blocking aid from reaching millions at risk, as a form of collective punishment. The blockages sustain the military’s longstanding “four cuts” strategy, in which the armed forces maintain control of an area by isolating and terrorizing the civilian population. One week before Cyclone Mocha, the UN Children’s Fund, UNICEF, reported that “humanitarian access continues to deteriorate because of bureaucracy, multiple checkpoints, movement restrictions, conflicts and roadblocks.” The number of people needing assistance in the country has grown from 1 million before the coup to 17.6 million, according to the UN, with almost half the population now living below the national poverty line. About 1.2 million people displaced by conflict and insecurity were living in areas affected by the storm. Since the coup, the junta has arrested hundreds of local aid and healthcare workers. In October 2022, it imposed a new Organization Registration Law requiring domestic and international organizations to register with the junta and submit quarterly updates on their activities, with criminal penalties of up to five years in prison for failing to comply. The law prohibits organizations from direct or indirect contact with any opposition groups, and requires organizations seeking to deliver emergency disaster relief to obtain approval from local junta administrators by submitting information on funding, materials, and proposed projects. The junta’s obstruction of aid violates international human rights law obligations regarding the rights to life, health, and shelter. All parties to an armed conflict are obligated to facilitate rapid and unimpeded impartial humanitarian assistance to all civilians in need, and are forbidden from withholding consent for relief operations on arbitrary grounds. Expert guidance commissioned by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) states that in exceptional situations, such as when a country is unlawfully impeding lifesaving assistance, international organizations may, without the country’s consent, “conduct temporary humanitarian relief operations to bring life-saving supplies to a people in extreme need, when no alternatives exist,” and when they would not “seriously impair the territorial integrity of the state.” Inadequate Warning Authorities were effectively detaining about 600,000 Rohingya in camps and villages when the storm hit Rakhine State, having long denied them freedom of movement and other basic rights, amounting to a system of apartheid. Rohingya told Human Rights Watch that while local junta authorities made evacuation announcements a few days before the cyclone, they provided little support to find shelter or transportation, and did not adequately communicate the storm’s risks. Some Rohingya said they tried to take shelter at Sittwe University and in other concrete buildings but returned home because the sites were full. “Authorities made an announcement about an incoming cyclone but they didn’t tell us how devastating it could be,” a Rohingya man living in Rakhine’s Dar Paing camp said. “They just told people to leave their homes, but didn’t say where to go. No one from the junta or NGOs came to help move people. So people stayed in their shelters and were injured or died. We thought it would be like the other storms we face every year. We never realized it would be so catastrophic.” From Rakhine State, the cyclone moved inland to the country’s northwest, where the civilian population has faced military attacks, displacement, movement restrictions, and internet shutdowns for over two years. Villagers from Matupi, Kanpetlet, and Mindat townships in Chin State, all under martial law, reported that the junta closed major roads after the cyclone hit. In Sagaing and Magway Regions, where almost a million people have been displaced by airstrikes and fighting since the coup, flooding has destroyed large swathes of farmland, while shifting landmines and unexploded ordnance increased the risk to villagers. Post-Cyclone Blocking of Aid The junta’s restrictions on access, movement, banking, and the import and transport of critical nutrition, housing, and medical supplies have hindered every aspect of the cyclone response. In early May, in preparation for the cyclone, international agencies submitted travel authorization requests for pre-approval, a highly bureaucratic and arbitrary process. For weeks, the junta delayed issuing new travel authorizations and visas for emergency relief staff and experts, leaving many groups reliant on local partners and existing field staff who themselves were affected by the cyclone. Following negotiations, some travel authorizations were issued in early June, only to be revoked in the June 8 order blocking all existing access for aid groups in Rakhine State. “The humanitarian access situation in cyclone-hit Rakhine State has deteriorated,” OCHA reported on June 9. “The suspension of access in Rakhine brings a stop to activities that have been reaching hundreds of thousands of people.” Humanitarian staff reported that some access requests were briefly approved by state-level junta authorities before being overturned by the junta in the capital, Naypyidaw. OCHA, which is coordinating the emergency response, submitted a detailed two-week plan for the transport and distribution of supplies in Rakhine and Chin States to junta authorities in Naypyidaw the week of May 22. After weeks with no response, OCHA reported on June 9 that “initial approval for humanitarian distribution and transport plans across 11 townships have also been rescinded.” On June 7, the junta issued a letter to the UN asserting that beyond Yangon, Myanmar’s largest city, all domestic distribution of relief supplies would be managed by the relevant state-level junta authorities. The junta has claimed that it is overseeing an extensive, effective disaster response. Junta spokesman Maj. Gen. Zaw Min Tun told the BBC that the junta “has allowed local and international organizations helping recovery efforts in line with rules and regulations.” A junta diplomat in Thailand claimed baselessly in an opinion article that the junta’s early warning system and relief efforts have demonstrated its “management capability, efficient action, and ability to plan long-term.” Residents from coastal Rakhine State said there was no support for search-and-rescue operations after the storm. “How many are still missing, no one knows,” the man from Thae Chaung camp said. “I saw many bodies afterward. I attended ten funerals including two of my relatives. The junta could have evacuated us to buildings in town, but they did not. If the diaspora hadn’t sent some assistance after the cyclone, many more Rohingya would have died.” Local aid workers told Human Rights Watch about new roadblocks and increased scrutiny at military checkpoints, amplifying the risk of arbitrary detention, harassment, and confiscation of supplies. Junta officials have blocked staff from transporting food, housing materials, and medical goods between townships, at times demanding they turn the supplies over to the junta. The authorities have also exacted bribes at Sittwe airport from staff bringing in cash and supplies. The junta’s General Administration Department has denied local activists’ requests to collect aid for storm victims. “The INGOs and NGOs are unable to provide assistance to us,” a man from Sittwe said. “The junta authorities told them that if any humanitarian wants to help us, they have to work with the junta. It makes it difficult for them to help us independently. So we are suffering. We do not have shelters now, or any aid.” On May 23, junta officials detained and interrogated five ethnic Rakhine aid workers transporting relief supplies from Sittwe to Ponnagyun township for alleged connections with “illegal” media outlets. They released the aid workers the following day. On June 2, officials arrested eight aid workers at a junta checkpoint in Mrauk-U while they were trying to distribute supplies. The Arakan Army, an ethnic armed group, along with its political wing, the United League of Arakan, has requested international support for its relief efforts, having strengthened its control across central and northern Rakhine State since the coup. Local activists expressed concerns that the junta was using the cyclone response to regain a foothold in the state, by both enforcing restrictions to undermine the Arakan Army’s efforts as well as reinforcing junta troops through its own minimal outreach. On May 19, the junta threatened to take legal action against media reporting “false news” about the cyclone, including reports with higher death tolls. The statement claimed that 97 people died, and only because they had refused to be evacuated by the junta. The opposition National Unity Government tallied more than 450 deaths. Shelters Destroyed Humanitarian agencies said that in camps and villages in low-lying central and northern Rakhine State, nearly all shelters were damaged or destroyed, along with latrines, wells, and other infrastructure. “All of Sittwe is damaged,” a Rohingya man said of the Rakhine State capital. “It looks like a graveyard.” About 140,000 Rohingya have been confined to camps in central Rakhine State since 2012, sheltered in bamboo longhouses designed to last just two years. For more than 10 years, the authorities denied aid agencies’ requests for adequate land and resources to improve safety in the flood-prone former paddy fields and low-lying coastal areas where the camps sit. Fewer than half of all camp shelters had received any repair over the past two years. The resulting damage has been massive, with most Rohingya interviewed by Human Rights Watch saying that shelter is their greatest need. Many people who lost their houses have been living in tents made of debris along roads, in paddy fields, or in other overcrowded and ad hoc displacement sites. Markets have begun to reopen but prices for building materials and food have skyrocketed. “So many Rohingya in the camps are living under an open sky,” the man from Dar Paing camp said. “My shelter was fully destroyed but we survived. People are using htamein [skirts] as temporary roofs. No one is coming to help us.” In the northwest, roadblocks and ongoing fighting are preventing people from reaching towns to buy building materials, while local aid workers have been blocked at checkpoints from moving supplies and cash. Food Aid Withheld A humanitarian agency reported that “80 per cent of households surveyed in Rakhine stated their communities and neighbors are struggling to access food.” Residents of some camps and villages in Rakhine State said they had received small rations of rice, beans, and oil from junta officials following the cyclone. “But it was finished after two days,” a man said. Some villagers reported being charged for rice and roofing sheets delivered by local junta officials to cover “transportation costs.” Others have relied on community donations to avoid starvation. Aid workers said that the supplies distributed by junta officials – extremely limited in scope, without consideration of communities’ needs – appear to be little more than a propaganda opportunity, with photos splashed across state media. Local media reported that a military ceremony allegedly providing supplies to survivors in Matupi township was nothing more than a photo op, with junta officials leaving with the aid that they were photographed distributing. The World Food Programme had been distributing food assistance but, even prior to the June 8 suspension, the organization was facing dwindling supplies, transport restrictions, and difficulty reaching northern Rakhine and the northwest due to lack of travel authorizations. “Wider access for distributions is urgently needed, along with permission to transport humanitarian supplies from in-country warehouses and into Myanmar from other countries,” OCHA reported. Cyclone flooding has caused massive destruction to paddy fields, seed storage, livestock, and other means of agricultural and fishing livelihoods, exacerbating the vulnerability of populations already facing losses due to conflict and the country’s economic freefall. The coup triggered widespread infrastructure collapse and a severe devaluation of the Myanmar currency, leading to increasingly dire banking and supply chain crises and shortages of food, medicine, and other essentials. The UN Food and Agriculture Organization estimated that about 327,000 hectares of agricultural land were affected by flooding, and at least half of all fishing equipment in Sittwe was damaged or destroyed. Disease, Damaged Health Facilities Communities have been reporting outbreaks of diarrhea and skin infections, particularly among children, while health workers warn of heightened risks of waterborne and communicable diseases in the weeks ahead. “We’re facing a shortage of drinking water,” the man from Dar Paing camp said. “During the cyclone, the sea water entered our ponds. We are still tasting water like salt.” The cyclone caused significant damage to hospitals and clinics, compounded by the junta’s severe restrictions on health care. Rohingya in Sittwe and Pauktaw camps reported little to no access to mobile health services. “So many injured Rohingya still need medical attention,” a man from Sittwe said. “Some kind doctors came from Yangon to help us, but it’s not enough.” “Health partners continue to face persistent challenges in accessing the most severely affected areas,” OCHA reported on June 9. “Wider access is crucial to effectively extend health services, allocate resources, and carry out early warning and outbreak investigations.” Following the suspension of its travel authorizations, Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders or MSF) Myanmar tweeted: “This will desperately hurt communities as we will be unable to open primary healthcare clinics, facilitate emergency referrals or provide much needed emergency relief items. People impacted by the cyclone … will continue to suffer enormously if this decision is not reversed.” The UN reported that “the impact of Cyclone Mocha will deprive more children and pregnant and lactating women of access to timely and lifesaving nutrition treatment and support, contributing to increased morbidity and mortality.” Humanitarian agencies reported that the junta is denying access to even assess nutrition needs and disseminate guidance on feeding infants in emergencies. Rates of severe acute malnutrition have spiked this year, yet only nine percent of children in need received lifesaving nutrition treatment in the first quarter of 2023, with assistance “severely hampered by access constraints, restrictive humanitarian space, displacement, and uncertainty around the importation of nutrition therapeutic products.” For 2 years, junta authorities refused to provide customs clearance for 77 cases of medicine, healthcare equipment, and nutrition supplements. Urgent Need for Protection “Increasing protection risks require urgent attention,” OCHA reported, “including threats to safety and security, unexploded ordnance (UXOs), sexual and gender-based violence, loss of civil documentation, looting, extortion, and robbery. New negative coping mechanisms observed include borrowing money at high interest, and children begging for food due to the lack of job opportunities, which might lead to child labor, exploitation, and abuse.” OCHA also reported cases of suicide attempts, “primarily among women and girls who were affected by the cyclone and are experiencing psychological distress after the storm.” Landmines and improvised explosive devices that may have been dislodged by landslides and flooding pose an ongoing risk, especially as people clear debris in previously safe areas. Myanmar was one of only a handful of states to use antipersonnel landmines in 2022, with casualties spiking since the coup. Over 60 percent of landmine incidents in the first quarter of 2023 took place in areas affected by Cyclone Mocha, and landmine contamination has been reported in almost 300 villages since the storm. On May 24, one person was killed and five were injured by a landmine in Hakha, Chin State, where post-cyclone landslides had been reported..."
Source/publisher: Human Rights Watch (USA)
2023-06-20
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-20
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Description: "UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Tom Andrews, said there were reports that Bangladeshi authorities were using deceptive and coercive measures to compel Rohingya refugees to return to Myanmar. “Conditions in Myanmar are anything but conducive for the safe, dignified, sustainable, and voluntary return of Rohingya refugees,” Andrews said. “Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, who commanded the forces that launched the genocidal attacks against the Rohingya, now leads a brutal military junta that is attacking civilian populations while denying the Rohingya citizenship and other basic rights,” he said. Bangladesh officials have stated that an initial group of 1140 Rohingya refugees will be repatriated to Myanmar at an unspecified date and 6000 will be returned by the end of the year. Actions by Bangladesh authorities suggest that the first return could be imminent. Bangladesh authorities have reportedly threatened arrest, confiscation of documents, and other forms of retaliation for those who resist the government’s plans. “There are also reports of refugees being promised large sums of money, if they agree to return. These promises are allegedly being made even as food rations are being cut to $.27 per person per day for those in the Bangladesh camps. It remains unclear where the funds for repatriated families will come from,” Andrews said. Under the pilot project, Rohingya refugees will not be allowed to return to their own villages, many of which were razed to the ground during the genocidal attacks of 2017. The refugees would pass through “reception” and “transit” centers in Maungdaw Township, after which they would be moved to a designated area of 15 newly constructed “villages” – places they will not be allowed to leave freely. In March, Bangladesh authorities facilitated two visits by Myanmar junta authorities (SAC) to the Bangladesh camps. According to reports, at least some of the refugees were coerced into participating in ‘verification’ interviews with SAC officials. Bangladesh and SAC officials also coordinated a ‘go and see’ visit to Rakhine State for some Rohingya refugees. Bangladeshi officials said the refugees had expressed “general satisfaction” with arrangements made for their return, but these assurances were contradicted by reports that those who participated in the trip had unequivocally rejected the repatriation plans. “The return of Rohingya refugees under these conditions would likely violate Bangladesh’s obligations under international law and expose Rohingya to gross human rights violations and, potentially, future atrocity crimes,” the Special Rapporteur said. “I implore Bangladesh to immediately suspend the repatriation pilot programme,” Andrews said. “I also urge the international community to stand with Rohingya refugees in both word and deed. This must include reversing the failure to provide a humane level of support for Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh who are unable to pursue livelihoods, continue to face hunger and malnutrition, and whose children have very limited educational opportunities,” the expert said..."
Source/publisher: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (Geneva)
2023-06-08
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-08
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Description: "Bangladesh and Myanmar are planning a pilot project to repatriate more than 1,000 Rohingya refugees. In May, Bangladesh camp officials led a group of 20 Rohingya refugees on a visit to Rakhine State in Myanmar. Refugees International Director for Africa, Asia, and the Middle East Daniel P. Sullivan released the following statement: “Refugees International is extremely concerned about plans to repatriate Rohingya refugees to Myanmar. The returns would come at a time when the Rohingya homeland is ruled by a military junta that continues to commit atrocities across the country and that is made up of the same people that led the genocide against the Rohingya in 2017. More than 130,000 Rohingya in Myanmar remain confined to internal displacement camps, while others face serious constraints on their freedom of movement. The junta’s response to the recent cyclone that killed hundreds of Rohingya, including denial of much needed aid, only further highlights the vulnerability of Rohingya in the country. Two previous repatriation exercises resulted in no volunteers coming forward, but—as Refugees International has documented—did spread fear widely among the Rohingya refugees. That fear is being echoed in the latest talks of repatriation. While most Rohingya with whom Refugees International has spoken want to return home, they simply do not feel that the conditions are currently safe. Not only is the safety of any returnees in serious question, but Rohingya are already reporting deception and coercion in the process. This includes camp officials allegedly veering from official public policy by promising payments for those who volunteer to repatriate while at the same time threatening to confiscate ration cards of those who do not. The reduction of aid, specifically cuts in daily rations by the World Food Program, from $12 a day a couple of months ago to just $8 a day as of June 1, is also worrisome as it may indirectly further incentivize Rohingya to make dangerous and uninformed decisions to return. Any return of Rohingya refugees must be safe, voluntary, dignified, and sustainable, in line with international standards. UN leadership and donor countries must make clear that conducive conditions for legitimate returns do not currently exist and demand that Bangladesh and Myanmar refrain from further endangering this community of genocide survivors.” Refugees International has been covering the conditions facing Rohingya for several years, including a report in December 2022, Hope Amid Despair: Finding Solutions for Rohingya in Bangladesh, highlighting the deteriorating conditions in the refugee camps, recommending solutions, and calling for Bangladesh to refrain from repatriation. To schedule an interview, please contact Refugees International’s Vice President for Strategic Outreach Sarah Sheffer at  [email protected]..."
Source/publisher: Refugees International
2023-06-02
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-02
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Description: "Media Release from Burmese Rohingya Organisation UK Burmese Rohingya Organisation UK (BROUK) today published its latest report ‘Preventable deaths in Cyclone Mocha and the Rohingya genocide’, on the Burmese junta’s continued defiance of the provisional measures ordered by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Gambia’s genocide case against Myanmar. The order is aimed at protecting the Rohingya, who the ICJ described as ‘extremely vulnerable’. Until the case concludes, Myanmar is obliged to report on its compliance with the ICJ’s order every six months, with its latest report due on 23 May 2023. On 14 May, Cyclone Mocha struck Myanmar’s Rakhine State, leaving a trail of destruction. BROUK’s new report examines the circumstances which led to the preventable deaths of hundreds of Rohingya in Cyclone Mocha, in the context of the ongoing Rohingya genocide. Hundreds of Rohingya have been killed and injured after Rohingya were left behind in internment camps in Rakhine State. To date, the junta continues to block vital humanitarian aid from reaching impacted Rohingya communities. “In the context of the regime’s policies of persecution towards the Rohingya, what the United Nations describes as ‘waiting for access’ is genocide right in front of our eyes,” said Tun Khin, President of the Burmese Rohingya Organisation UK. The report focuses on the regime’s ongoing commission of the genocidal act of ‘deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about the destruction of a group in whole or in part’, in this case the Rohingya. The authorities instigated and participated in the 2012 violence which forcibly displaced more than 140,000 Rohingya, then detained them in overcrowded, flood-prone internment camps surrounded by barbed wire where they have remained for over a decade. The junta’s response to Cyclone Mocha was willfully negligent. The regime failed to evacuate all the Rohingya who were in danger from the cyclone and has blocked humanitarian aid. BROUK points out that the regime’s obstruction of humanitarian aid may cause additional preventable deaths among extremely vulnerable Rohingya survivors. The Rohingya community in Thet Kay Pyin camp in Sittwe are already reporting an outbreak of diarrhoea among children in the camp due to unclean water sources, which can quickly spread and prove fatal if left untreated. BROUK’s report finds that the Burmese military are continuing to violate the provisional measures ordered by the ICJ amid an ongoing genocide. The British government, penholder on Myanmar at the United Nations Security Council, has not yet convened a meeting of the UN Security Council to discuss the violation of the provisional measures. “The International Court of Justice and the UN Security Council are fully aware that the Burmese military are violating the provisional measures but are not even talking about it, let alone taking action,” said Tun Khin. “What was the point of imposing provisional measures to prevent genocide if there are no consequences if they are ignored? This sets a dangerous precedent that will be watched by authoritarian regimes worldwide. We don’t just have ongoing genocide of the Rohingya, we also have ongoing failure of the United Nations Security Council and the rest of the international community to do anything about it.” BROUK urged the British government and the wider international community to secure public hearings at the UN Security Council on the junta’s breaches of the ICJ’s order and to coordinate concrete follow-up actions. BROUK also renewed its calls to the ICJ to amend or issue further provisional measures to order Myanmar to allow all humanitarian actors immediate, unrestricted, and sustained access to Rakhine State and the rest of the country. This would benefit not only Rohingya survivors of Cyclone Mocha, but all the people of Myanmar who are suffering due to the regime’s obstruction of humanitarian aid. The Burmese military are violating the provisional measures in many other ways, including through denial of the Rohingya identity and citizenship, restrictions on travel and access to essential services, and deliberate blocking of humanitarian assistance, leading to mental and bodily harm and preventable deaths. The junta criminalises and imprisons Rohingya who attempt to flee these appalling conditions of life, including children. The report concludes that the proactive attempts by the junta to prevent the Rohingya from escaping the conditions of life inflicted on them demonstrate its ongoing genocidal intent..."
Source/publisher: Burmese Rohingya Organisation UK
2023-05-25
Date of entry/update: 2023-05-25
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: On January 18, prominent advocate Dil Mohammed was abducted from a Rohingya camp in No Man’s Land. He has not been heard from since.
Description: "A steadfast Rohingya advocate emerged amid the chaos in the volatile borderlands between Myanmar and Bangladesh. Dil Mohammed, a Rohingya refugee who became the de facto spokesperson for the No Man’s Land Rohingya encampment, navigated a complex web of political and military forces to champion the cause of his people. But on January 18, as the encampment burned to the ground in a harrowing attack, Dil Mohammed was apprehended by the long-dormant Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO), which had recently re-emerged. No news of his fate has emerged since. Dil Mohammed’s life was not always marked by strife. Born on January 2, 1966, in Mae Dee Village, Qunthi Bin Village Track, Maungdaw Township, Arakan State, Myanmar, to parents Nazumiya and Hazara Khatun, his early years were filled with education and – despite the difficult context for Rohingya in Myanmar – opportunity. Dil Mohammed matriculated at the University of Yangon in 1987 and graduated with a degree in psychology. He then worked as an interpreter and field manager for the World Food Program for five years, later starting his own shrimp and agricultural businesses. His linguistic skills caught the attention of officials, and he began working as an interpreter at “flag meetings” between the Myanmar and Bangladesh border guards. In 2014, he played a pivotal role in the high-profile retrieval of a Bangladeshi border guard’s body. However, his life took a drastic turn in 2017 when he became a refugee for the second time amid a harrowing military crackdown on the Rohingya population. Instead of entering Bangladesh, Dil Mohammed chose to stay in the No Man’s Land (NML) between the two countries. The NML was a precarious place, where Rohingya refugees like Dil Mohammed found themselves caught between the forces of Myanmar and Bangladesh, facing harassment, flooding, ration reductions, and the infiltration of armed groups. Despite the dangers, Dil Mohammed emerged as a prominent spokesperson for the NML residents, frequently speaking to the press and meeting with international delegations, including U.N. Special Rapporteur Yanghee Lee and Nobel peace laureates Tawakkol Karman and Mairead Maguire. Enjoying this article? Click here to subscribe for full access. Just $5 a month. Dil Mohammed’s second son, Shuiab, described his father as “a kind and easygoing man, both as a parent and as a community leader.” He emphasized that Dil Mohammed was “always approachable and understanding,” but when confronting Myanmar authorities like the Border Guard Police (BGP), Tatmadaw, and NASAKA (Myanmar’s much-maligned former border security force), he was “firm and resolute.” Shuiab added that many Rohingya knew his father never hesitated to stand up to these forces for the rights and dignity of their people. And there was much to threaten the Rohingya. Dil Mohammed and the NML population found themselves caught in the midst of intense fighting between the Arakan Army (AA), the Myanmar military, and the presence of armed organizations like the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) in the borderlands, especially in 2022. The AA’s ambition to establish autonomy has driven their strategy to seize control of Myanmar’s borders with Bangladesh and India. Dominating these border areas would enable the AA to play a crucial role in trade with the neighboring countries and potentially open a new overland arms supply route from areas in Bangladesh where insurgent groups, including ARSA, have long operated. As a result of these strategic objectives, the borderlands became a battleground, with the AA and the Myanmar military as the dominant forces, while ARSA strived to retain its foothold. According to Myanmar government documents, ARSA engaged in skirmishes with the Myanmar military in 2022 and became a target for both Bangladesh’s and Myanmar’s border forces. This intense fighting led to casualties, injuries, and unexploded ordnance that threatened the safety and stability of the NML population. Despite being overstretched by conflicts in other regions, the Myanmar military showed no signs of conceding the lost border territories to the AA. Troop movements in the area indicated that the military had not abandoned its efforts to regain control of the border areas. Consequently, the specter of renewed fighting in the region continued to loom over the NML population, forcing them to navigate a dangerous and uncertain existence. This context made Dil Mohammed’s advocacy efforts even more crucial for his community. But the very same prominence that made Dil Mohammed a lifeline for his community also put him in the crosshairs of powerful factions. Rumors circulated that he was a member of ARSA, casting a shadow over his reputation. Dil Mohammed’s family and close associates vehemently denied these claims, arguing that while he had to engage with ARSA, he was never a supporter. They also pointed out that if his interactions with ARSA were enough to consider him a member, then he could be seen as working for Bangladesh as well, given his equal contact with their authorities. In January 2023, the Rohingya Solidarity Organization targeted the NML encampment. The attack left the settlement in ashes, and Dil Mohammed was taken into custody. Since then, his whereabouts and fate have remained a mystery. For more than three months, his family and former residents of No Man’s Land have waited in mournful anticipation for news of the man who once bravely championed the cause of his people. In an ironic twist, Dil Mohammed’s friendship with Ko Ko Linn, the leader of RSO, put him at risk. The two men had been classmates and maintained a close relationship. Ko Ko Linn had urged Dil Mohammed to leave NML and join him in Bangladesh as recently as 2022, warning him of the dangers in the border zone. However, unbeknownst to Dil Mohammed, it would be Ko Ko Linn’s own forces that would ultimately pose the greatest threat to his safety. Strangely, diaspora Rohingya organizations have remained reticent about his capture and the devastating attack on the NML camp. Their silence has been particularly conspicuous given the deaths of a Rohingya woman and a Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI) officer during the November 14, 2022, attack on the NML and the deaths of several Rohingya in the attack of January 18. Enjoying this article? Click here to subscribe for full access. Just $5 a month. The Arakan Rohingya National Alliance, a recently established Rohingya organization seeking to become the sole representative of the Rohingya people, expressed condolences for the Bangladeshi DGFI officer but remained silent about the Rohingya woman, the destruction of the camp that displaced 4,500 people, and the multiple fatalities that occurred during the January attack. This reticence has been taken by NML residents as evidence of the organization’s lack of validity in the lives of the Rohingya. This silence can also be seen in the context of a shifting political landscape in the region. In recent years, significant changes have occurred in the political climate and power dynamics involving the RSO, ARSA, Bangladesh, and Myanmar. Two key moments that triggered these changes were the coup in Myanmar on February 1, 2021, and the murder of Mohibullah, a prominent Rohingya leader, in September of that same year. Consequently, ARSA fell out of favor, prompting Bangladesh to search for a cohesive strategy to cultivate a Rohingya force capable of advancing its interests in both the refugee camps and Myanmar. It is within this shifting landscape that the RSO resurfaced to prominence after a period of dormancy. Meanwhile, despite the Bangladeshi authorities frequently dismissing the existence of ARSA within Bangladesh, the organization progressively found itself implicated in various criminal activities, as indicated by police charge sheets. These charges ranged across a wide spectrum of crimes, ultimately leading to the erosion of ARSA’s influence and standing in the region. Today, Dil Mohammed’s tireless advocacy for his people is remembered by his former NML community members, now dispersed in the camps inside Bangladesh. They lament the tragic silencing of a champion for the Rohingya. As they search for answers, they are left with several questions. First, is Dil Mohammed in the custody of the RSO or Bangladeshi authorities? Leaked documents suggest that Bangladesh undertook a joint operation with Myanmar’s military to raid the NML back in November 2022. Eyewitness accounts of the raid on January 18, when Dil Mohammed was abducted, suggest that the RSO forces had powerful backing, as the duration and intensity of the attack surpassed anything seen before. Second, why has Dil Mohammed been held for four months with no communication with his family? They are uncertain about his well-being and whether he is even alive. One possible reason for his continued detention could be his prior key role in the borderlands of the Maungdaw region of Myanmar, both before and after 2017, which may have made him privy to sensitive information. Dil Mohammed’s unique position in the borderlands might make him a liability for some factions, who fear the consequences of his release. Meanwhile, his former community members are left to grapple with the silence of the very organizations meant to support them..."
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Source/publisher: "The Diplomat" (Japan)
2023-05-19
Date of entry/update: 2023-05-19
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Description: "May 19 (Reuters) - Myanmar's military-controlled media said on Friday 145 people were killed when Cyclone Mocha hit the country this week, in stark contrast to reports from rights groups and residents who fear hundreds may have died. The impoverished western state of Rakhine bore the brunt of the storm that on Sunday tore down houses, communication towers and bridges with winds of up to 210 kph (130 mph), and triggered a storm surge that inundated the state capital Sittwe. The junta said in a statement that as of May 18 a total of 145 people had been found dead, including 91 in camps for internally displaced people. Earlier this week it had said three people were killed by the storm. Reuters could not independently verify the number of casualties. Some residents contacted by Reuters said earlier this week that more than 400 people had been killed and many more were missing, adding that the survivors were struggling with a lack of food and medical supplies. Rakhine has a large population of Rohingya Muslims - around 600,000, a persecuted minority that successive governments in predominantly Buddhist Myanmar have refused to recognise. "Relief groups of respective states...are working on rescues and rehabilitation work along with charity civil society groups," the junta said in the statement shared on its Telegram channels and on Myanmar Radio and Television (MRTV). However, the United Nations and other non-governmental organisations said relief efforts were stalled as they awaited permission from the junta to deploy personnel and much-needed food, water and medical supplies to the affected regions. Storm-damaged bridges and roads blocks uprooted trees were also holding up aid, the international agencies said. Some 400,000 people were evacuated in Myanmar and Bangladesh ahead of the cyclone making landfall, as authorities scrambled to avert heavy casualties from one of the strongest storms to hit the region in recent years..."
Source/publisher: "Reuters" (UK)
2023-05-19
Date of entry/update: 2023-05-19
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Junta says 100 Rohingya died from Cyclone Mocha, but others have counted more than 400.
Description: "Myanmar’s junta says that 100 Rohingya died from last weekend’s Cyclone Mocha – and that news outlets that say it’s higher will be sued. The shadow National Unity Government, made up of former parliamentarians and opponents of the military, which took control of the country in a 2021 coup, puts the number at 455 – more than four times higher. Reports by media that more than 400 were killed “were baseless and have frightened the public,” a junta statement Friday said. “We will take action against those media using existing laws.” The storm that hit the coast of Rakhine state and parts of Bangladesh last weekend, flooded villages and battered camps where displaced Rohingya have lived for years. Authorities evacuated the Rakhine population before the storm and accommodated 63,302 of the 125,789 Rohingyas from 17 refugee camps who needed to be evacuated, the junta statement said. Those who died in the storm were people who didn’t comply with the authority’s evacuation procedure and remained in their homes on their own accord, the military said. Radio Free Asia reported earlier this week that many people couldn’t evacuate because emergency shelter centers quickly became overcrowded. Some 130,000 Rohingya have lived for more than a decade in internally displaced persons camps in and around Sittwe, the capital of Rakhine. The deaths of so many villagers from the storm was a result of their poor living standards in restricted camps near the seashore, Rohingya activists told RFA. Many villagers weren’t properly informed of the coming cyclone, they said. Two Rohingya villagers told RFA that it has been difficult to collect every dead body that was washed into the sea after the storm struck the coast. The junta said Friday that 18 army officers would be assigned to each township to oversee rehabilitation work for the 18 townships in Rakhine and Chin state that were affected by the storm. In those areas, transportation infrastructure and some telephone networks have been out of service, and there are still areas where food, medicine and shelters haven't arrived. NUG’s statement on Wednesday said more than 42,000 acres of agricultural land in four states and regions were destroyed by the storm..."
Source/publisher: "RFA" (USA)
2023-05-19
Date of entry/update: 2023-05-19
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Returnees to Myanmar Would Face Junta’s Crimes of Apartheid, Persecution
Description: "(Bangkok) – Bangladesh and Myanmar are organizing returns of Rohingya refugees from Bangladesh to Myanmar’s Rakhine State without consulting the community or addressing the grave risks to their lives and liberty, Human Rights Watch said today. On May 5, 2023, Bangladesh officials, in coordination with Myanmar junta authorities, took 20 Rohingya refugees to Rakhine State to visit resettlement camps as part of renewed efforts to repatriate about 1,100 Rohingya in a pilot project. Donor governments and United Nations experts should call for a halt to any Rohingya repatriation until conditions are in place for safe and sustainable returns. “Bangladesh authorities shouldn’t forget the reasons why Rohingya became refugees in the first place, and recognize that none of those factors have changed,” said Shayna Bauchner, Asia researcher at Human Rights Watch. “Bangladesh is frustrated with its burden as host, but sending refugees back to the control of a ruthless Myanmar junta will just be setting the stage for the next devastating exodus.” About 600,000 Rohingya remain in Rakhine State, confined to squalid camps and villages that leave them exceptionally vulnerable to extreme weather events such as Cyclone Mocha, compounded by the junta’s severe restrictions on humanitarian aid. Human Rights Watch spoke with five Rohingya refugees who were part of the go-and-see visit. They said that the detention-like conditions and lack of full citizenship rights were not conducive to a safe return. “We aren’t at all satisfied seeing the Rakhine situation,” a Rohingya refugee said. “It’s another trap by Myanmar to take us back and then continue the abuses like they have been doing to us for decades.” Rohingya refugees have consistently said they want to go home, but only when their security, access to land and livelihoods, freedom of movement, and citizenship rights can be ensured. The Rohingya delegation visited the Hla Poe Kaung transit camp and Kyein Chaung resettlement camp in Rakhine State’s Maungdaw township. The camps were built by Myanmar authorities on Rohingya land that Myanmar security forces burned and bulldozed in 2017 and 2018. The transit camp is surrounded by barbed-wire perimeter fencing and security outposts, similar to the confinement in the Rohingya detention camps in Sittwe and other townships in central Rakhine State. “I could see my village,” a Rohingya refugee said of the visit. “The Hla Poe Kaung transit camp land used to be my home. My house was destroyed, my school is now a health center. Three whole Rohingya villages used to be where the transit camp is now. Myanmar authorities are trying to confine us in camps like in Sittwe.” Myanmar authorities have held about 140,000 Rohingya arbitrarily and indefinitely in camps for more than 10 years. Recent measures to ostensibly close the camps appear designed to make the Rohingya’s segregation and confinement permanent. The camps, which have been in constant disrepair due to Myanmar authorities’ restrictions, were severely damaged by Cyclone Mocha on May 14. “We asked the Myanmar authorities why our villages were turned into displacement camps,” one Rohingya refugee said. “They said they didn’t have any other options. They didn’t answer our questions about whether we would ever be given back our land. If these camps are temporary, then why haven’t the Rohingya living in the central Rakhine camps been able to return to their original villages?” Conditions in Rakhine State have not been conducive to voluntary, safe, or dignified returns of Rohingya refugees since 2017, when more than 730,000 Rohingya fled the Myanmar military’s crimes against humanity and acts of genocide. The prospect of safe returns has decreased since the February 2021 military coup in Myanmar, carried out by the same generals who orchestrated the 2017 mass atrocities. Myanmar junta officials provided the visiting Rohingya with booklets titled, “Facts on the Arrangement of the Myanmar Government for Reception and Resettlement of Displaced Persons on their Return under the Pilot Project,” dated April 2023. The booklet, written in Burmese, English, and Bangla, states that returnees will be housed at the Hla Poe Kaung transit camp for up to two months, then relocated to one of two resettlement camps with prefabricated houses or a land plot in one of 15 “designated villages,” where they can build a home through a cash-for-work program. The booklet states that security personnel will be deployed “to ensure the rule of law and security in the areas where the returnees reside or pass through.” Myanmar authorities have long invoked “security concerns” as the rationale for violating the rights of Rohingya to travel outside of their camps and villages in Rakhine State. The junta claims in the booklet that the UN Development Programme, the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations will be involved in the pilot project. The UNHCR said in a recent statement that “visits are an important part of voluntary refugee returns, providing a chance for people to observe conditions in their home country first-hand ahead of return and contributing to the making of an informed decision on return.” However, the agency reported in March that it is not involved in the pilot repatriation discussions and that “conditions in Myanmar’s Rakhine State are currently not conducive to the sustainable return of Rohingya refugees.” The junta’s systematic abuses against the Rohingya amount to the crimes against humanity of apartheid, persecution, and deprivation of liberty. Since the 2021 coup, security forces have arrested thousands of Rohingya men, women, and children for “unauthorized travel.” The junta has imposed new movement restrictions and aid blockages on Rohingya camps and villages, increasing water scarcity and food shortages. A major concern among Rohingya on the trip was the booklet’s reference to National Verification Cards (NVCs), documentation that does not grant Myanmar citizenship. Rohingya have widely rejected the NVC process, seeing it as marking them as foreigners in their own country. NVC-holders have not been granted meaningful freedom of movement, while threats and coercion to force Rohingya to accept the card have been hallmarks of the process. “Why do we have to apply for NVCs when we’re born there and have proof of being from Myanmar,” a Rohingya refugee on the visit said. “Rohingya who have NVCs are still not granted freedoms like the other ethnicities. They are linking every right like freedom of movement, access to livelihoods, education, health care, with accepting the NVC. But that would make us aliens in our own land. They should grant us full citizenship and accept us as Rohingya.” Rohingya are effectively denied citizenship under Myanmar’s 1982 Citizenship Law, leaving them stateless. In March, a delegation of Myanmar junta officials visited the Cox’s Bazar camps in Bangladesh, which house about one million Rohingya refugees, to interview Rohingya for “verification” for the “pilot repatriation” process. Rohingya told Human Rights Watch that they were deceived or coerced by Bangladesh administrators into meeting with the delegation. Another visit by junta officials reportedly scheduled for mid-May was postponed due to Cyclone Mocha. In April, China held tripartite talks in Kunming with Bangladesh government and Myanmar junta officials on restarting repatriation ahead of the monsoon season. Some refugees said Bangladesh authorities coerced them to join the go-and-see visit and told them to speak positively to the media about the conditions in Rakhine State. Bangladesh intelligence officers have harassed at least two refugees who publicly criticized the Maungdaw camps. Security forces have increased surveillance of Rohingya on the pilot repatriation list, with officers informing them to prepare for returns. Mohammed Mizanur Rahman, Bangladesh’s refugee relief and repatriation commissioner in Cox’s Bazar, told BenarNews that they plan to start repatriations in May, but will not force any refugees to return. Junta officials have also been visiting Rakhine State in preparation for their submission to the International Court of Justice in the Genocide Convention case brought by Gambia, initially due April 24. In March, the junta requested a 10-month extension, claiming, among other reasons, that it “needed more time in order to take statements from witnesses who were presently living in camps in Bangladesh or would soon be repatriated to Myanmar.” The court extended the deadline only one month, to May 24. The timing of the pilot repatriation project appears to be part of the junta’s broader efforts to feign progress in its treatment of the Rohingya to the court, Human Rights Watch said. Since 2017, the Bangladesh government has respected the international principle of nonrefoulement, the right of refugees not to be returned to a country where their lives or freedom would be threatened. But Bangladesh authorities have also been intensifying restrictions on livelihoods, movement, and education, creating a coercive environment designed to force people to consider premature returns. “Bangladesh should continue to uphold its policy of not forcing Rohingya refugees to return to Myanmar under current conditions,” Bauchner said. “Donor governments should help ease this difficult situation by supporting Bangladesh to create opportunities for Rohingya to learn and work so that they’re better prepared to go home when that day comes.”..."
Source/publisher: Human Rights Watch (USA)
2023-05-18
Date of entry/update: 2023-05-18
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "The MAU monitors transport routes to track flows of commercial goods between towns. This rapid CTR presents pre-cyclone baseline data to support of aid delivery following Cyclone Mocha; the data do not reflect post-cyclone conditions. Data are based on MIMU shapefiles and KIIs with market actors. Reports available at www.themimu.info/market-analysis-unit Source and Volume of Goods Most supply of goods to Rakhine State arrives via three central/southern roads from Central Myanmar and by sea from Yangon. Supply to Rakhine State via road arrives through Ann (via Magway), Toungup (via Pyay) and Gwa (via Ayeyarwady Region). Within the state these feeder routes are linked by a single transportation artery running from Gwa in the south to Sittwe in the north. Supply volumes are largest north of Toungup, particularly along the road to Sittwe. Supply via sea from Yangon, while less frequent, delivers supply in large volumes. On Rakhine State's northern borders, supply from Chin State is rare (indeed, Paletwa is dependant upon northern Rakhine for supply), and imports from Bangladesh are limited, informal and poorly-mapped. In central and northern Rakhine State, waterways exist alongside roads as critical supply channels. Waterways duplicate and in some cases supercede road-based supply in the state's north. Waterways are particularly critical network links for locations like Pauktaw, Paletwa (Chin State), Myebon, and Mrauk-U, and they are important for connecting Kyaukphyu and Sittwe to Yangon by sea. Moreover waterways are critical for last-mile travel: some townships like Rathedaung have large areas with few roads, making waterways critical for reaching villages. Yet water-based supply routes in Rakhine State see less regular traffic than roads, with some major water routes seeing regular trade throughout the week but lessthan-daily. Route Quality and Seasonal Effect Major supply routes in Rakhine State have decent quality roads, yet most routes are very susceptible to poor weather. Road quality in Rakhine State is best in central/southern areas and along the major north-south cooridor, and it is worst in remote areas of the north. The conditions created by Cyclone Mocha—like seasonal monsoon conditions in general—can badly impact road and waterway transportation. Some key routes in the far north invariably worsen in heavy rain, and few throughout the state are consistantly reliable. Route conditions are often uncertain poor weather, including those critical for reaching towns like Buthidaung, Pauktaw, Paletwa, and Minbya..."
Source/publisher: Myanmar Information Management Unit (Myanmar) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
2023-05-16
Date of entry/update: 2023-05-16
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: About 1,000 people trapped by seawater rescued amid damage to homes, electricity infrastructure and mobile phone masts
Description: "Rescuers have evacuated about 1,000 people trapped by seawater 3.6 metres (12ft) deep along western Myanmar’s coast after a powerful cyclone injured hundreds and cut off communications in one of Asia’s least developed countries. Strong winds injured more than 700 of about 20,000 people who were sheltering in sturdier buildings on the highlands of Sittwe township such as monasteries, pagodas and schools, according to a leader of the Rakhine Youths Philanthropic Association in Sittwe. Seawater raced into more than 10 low-lying wards near the shore as Cyclone Mocha made landfall in Rakhine state on Sunday afternoon, said the rescue group leader, who asked not to be named due to fear of reprisals from the authorities in the military-run country. Residents moved to roofs and higher floors, while the wind and storm surge prevented immediate rescue. “After 4pm yesterday the storm weakened a bit but the water did not fall back,” the leader said. “Most of them sat on the roof and at the high places of their houses the whole night. The wind blew all night.” Water was still about 1.5m (5ft) high in flooded areas on Monday morning but rescues were being made as the wind calmed. The leader asked civil society organisations and authorities to send aid and help evacuate residents. At least three deaths had been reported earlier in Myanmar, and several injuries were reported in neighbouring Bangladesh, which was spared the predicted direct hit. Mocha made landfall near Sittwe township with winds blowing up to 209km/h (130mph), Myanmar’s Meteorological Department said. By Monday morning it was downgraded from its severe status and was steadily weakening over land, according to the India Meteorological Department. High winds crumpled cell phone towers during the day, cutting off communications. In videos collected by local media before communications were lost, deep water raced through streets and wind blew off roofs. Myanmar’s military information office said the storm had damaged homes, electricity infrastructure, mobile phone masts, boats and lampposts in Sittwe, Kyaukpyu, and Gwa townships. It said the storm also tore roofs off sports facilities on the Coco Islands, about 260 miles (418km) south-west of the country’s largest city, Yangon. Volunteers previously said shelters in Sittwe did not have enough food after more people arrived there seeking help. Rakhine-based media reported that streets and the basements of houses in Sittwe’s low-lying areas had been flooded. Rakhine-based media reported that streets were flooded, trapping people in low-lying areas in their homes as worried relatives outside the township appealed for rescue. More than 4,000 of Sittwe’s 300,000 residents were evacuated to other cities, and more than 20,000 people were sheltering in monasteries, pagodas and schools on higher ground in the city, said Tin Nyein Oo, who is volunteering in Sittwe’s shelters. Mocha largely spared the Bangladeshi city of Cox’s Bazar, which initially had been in the storm’s predicted path. Authorities had said they evacuated about 1.27 million people before the cyclone veered east. “The level of risk has reduced to a great extent in Bangladesh,” said Azizur Rahman, director of the country’s meteorological department. Several deaths were reported as a result of the storm. A rescue team from eastern Shan state announced on its Facebook page that it had recovered the bodies of a couple buried when a landslide hit their house in Tachileik township. Local media reported that a man was crushed to death when a tree fell on him in Pyin Oo Lwin township in central Mandalay region. Myanmar state television reported that the military government was preparing to send food, medicine and medical personnel to the storm-hit area. After battering Rakhine, the cyclone weakened and was forecast to hit the north-western state of Chin and the central regions on Monday. Strong winds with rains continued in Saint Martin’s Island in the Bay of Bengal, it was reported, with leading Bengali-language daily Prothom Alo saying about a dozen islanders were injured and around 300 homes destroyed or damaged. One woman was critically wounded, it said. UN agencies and aid workers in Bangladesh had positioned tons of dry food and dozens of ambulances with mobile medical teams in refugee camps that house more than a million Rohingya people who fled persecution in Myanmar. In May 2008, Cyclone Nargis hit Myanmar with a storm surge that devastated populated areas around the Irrawaddy River delta. At least 138,000 people died and tens of thousands of homes and other buildings were washed away..."
Source/publisher: "Associated Press" (New York) via "The Guardian" (UK)
2023-05-15
Date of entry/update: 2023-05-15
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Description: "There are grave concerns about the condition of around one million people living in Myanmar’s Rakhine state where the powerful cyclone Mocha made landfall today, Islamic Relief’s head of programmes for Myanmar and Bangladesh has said. This includes around 150,000 Rohingya refugees living in camps in the Sittwe and Pauktaw townships of Myanmar, and over 600,000 Rohingya, alongside Rakhine people living in the countryside of Rakhine state. The centre of the cyclone made landfall on coast of Myanmar’s Rakhine state near Sittwe township with wind speeds up to 209 kilometres per hour. The full extent of the damage in the country is still unclear but there are concerns the destruction in the nearby camps and rural areas will be severe. Heavy rain and strong winds have already brought localised flooding across Rakhine, with communities fleeing to higher ground to try and find safety. Houses have been impacted, trees have been felled, power lines have gone down and the main mobile tower in Sittwe collapsed. Islamic Relief believes the damage in the countryside could be worse than in the towns because the people tend to be poorer and live in buildings which are more vulnerable. The state of Rakhine where the cyclone hit most severely is a conflict zone and already has around 6 million people in need of humanitarian assistance living within its borders. Sharif Ahmed, Islamic Relief head of programmes for Myanmar and Bangladesh, said, “The needs in Myanmar are huge. Rakhine was already a poverty hit state before the powerful cyclone Mocha hit. The impact of this cyclone will be very high in Myanmar’s Rakhine state because of the existing conflict and the extremely poor socio economic condition of the people in Rakhine state. Poverty is very high and is the primary reason this storm will have such a destructive impact on these people and their lives.” Islamic Relief is preparing to respond through local partners in Myanmar with food supplies and temporary shelter for those who need help and is planning efforts to clear the damage in refugee camps near Cox’s Bazar in Bangladesh. The cyclone struck Bangladesh less severely than expected with the world’s largest refugee camp which is near Cox’s Bazar in the south east of the country not as badly hit as expected. But there’s still danger rains from the storm could destabilise the mud foundations of the buildings in those camps..."
Source/publisher: Islamic Relief (Birmingham) via Reliefweb (New York)
2023-05-14
Date of entry/update: 2023-05-14
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Description: "The MAU tracks market prices in Central and Northern Rakhine State and Chin State. Data are collected from three vendors per product per market in the last week of each month. Data and product specifications are available online through the MPR dashboard at www.themimu.info/market-analysis-unit. KEY FINDINGS Rice prices increased by 6-12% in most markets in April, although pulses and palm oil prices were stable; Palm oil prices were just 17% above April 2022, after eight months of fairly calm oil markets; Vegetable prices rose for a second straight month following a seasonal pattern for this time of year; Prices for hygiene products were again stable, remaining 40-70% above April 2022 levels; Meat/fish prices increased significantly in April, registering their largest increases in five months; Kyauktaw, Rathedaung and Minbya saw steep hikes in April, while Paletwa and Pauktaw prices were stable; Further price increases are likely in May—particularly for essential foods but perhaps also NFIs—as cyclone preparation absorbs existing inventory. Product-Level Price Changes Essential Foods – Rice prices increased widely in April, although prices for pulses and palm oil were fairly stable. Rice prices increased by 6-12% in half of all markets monitored in April, although higher rice prices after the Thingyan holiday are not unusual. Prices for palm oil and pulses were stable in most cases, although they fluctuated by 10-20% in isolated cases. Vegetables – Vegetable prices increased for a second straight month in April. Eggplant and long bean prices rose widely, often up 40% or more. Townships were evenly split between stable and rising prices for most other vegetables monitored (often rising in the range of 10-20%); lower prices were rare. Only garlic saw falling prices, down 4-13% in a few cases. Hygiene Products – Prices for hygiene products were very stable in April, except in Kyauktaw where prices rose. Soap prices increased by 11-25% in multiple markets, but price shifts were otherwise fairly isolated for hygiene products. The only falling prices were toothpaste prices in two markets Meat and Fish – Meat/fish prices rose in April, marking their clearest increase since November 2022. Chicken and fish paste prices rose at least 7% in most markets monitored in April, while fresh fish and shrimp prices rose at least 13%. Dried fish prices were more stable, although they too rose 4-8% in some cases. Only Paletwa and Pautaw saw occasionally-lower prices. Other NFIs – NFI prices were stable or rising in April, with most price increase in the range of 5-14%. Prices for towels and longyis increased at least 5% in most markets, while plastic tarps, blankets and cooking pots rose 3-7% in a few markets. Isolated stockouts affected umbrellas and mosquito nets, but most other NFI prices were stable..."
Source/publisher: Myanmar Information Management Unit (Myanmar) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
2023-05-12
Date of entry/update: 2023-05-13
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "When Myanmar’s Rakhine, Bangladesh edging closer day by day, trying to resolve Rohingya crisis through a ‘Rohingya return pilot project’, there is an another news of hope for the people of Myanmar and Bangladesh specially Rohingyas. The Bangladesh Consulate in Sitwest, Rakhine, Myanmar organized an exchange and prayer meeting with senior Buddhist monks and Buddhist religious leaders of various pagodas on Thursday (May 4). At that time, the students of Sittwe University’s Rakhine and Muslim Students’ Union along with members of the consulate and their families were present at the event. Along with discussions on Buddhist theology and Buddha’s words, prayers were offered for the country’s people and communal harmony and peace in the region. Mission chief Zakir Ahmed gave chivara to senior Buddhist monks. All present were entertained with lunch. According to the Bangladesh Consulate, the Bangladesh Consulate is in close contact with important religious leaders in order to maintain peace and communal harmony in Rakhine. In continuation of this, this discussion and prayer meeting was organized with very influential Buddhist monks and Buddhist religious leaders. However, discriminatory policies of Myanmar’s government since the late 1970s have compelled hundreds of thousands of Muslim Rohingya to flee their homes in the predominantly Buddhist country. Most have crossed by land into Bangladesh, while others have taken to the sea to reach Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. Beginning in 2017, renewed violence, including reported rape, murder, and arson, triggered an exodus of Rohingya, as Myanmar’s security forces claimed they were carrying out a campaign to reinstate stability in the country’s western region. We saw the mass Rohingya exodus to Bangladesh from Myanmar’s Rakhine in 2017. The prolonged refugee crisis was started then. The reason for Rohingya’s exclusion is the so-called political Buddhism in Myanmar. Political Buddhism is when excluding Buddhism, the Burmese ethnicity and aggressive nationalism are used to exclude and persecute minority groups perceived as non-Burman. political Buddhism was an important element to Rohingya’s exclusion in Myanmar. But Rohingya’s persecution can somewhat be explained by the influence of political Buddhism, however that was not the complete story. For many, popular images of Buddhism have often included those of monks in saffron-colored robes, meditating peacefully on windswept mountains, revering all forms of life while seeking higher states of enlightenment. Often spurred on by Buddhist monks, local mobs and government forces have reportedly burned hundreds of Rohingya villages to the ground in Myanmar’s Rakhine state, slaughtering many of their Muslim inhabitants as hundreds of thousands have fled to neighboring Bangladesh. Many of the country’s Buddhists are afraid their own faith is in jeopardy, viewing the Rohingya Muslims as a threat. The military, as well as many monks, have used this fear to stoke a “Buddhist nationalism” that combines religious and civic identities. In the context of such clichés, it has been jarring, many say, to see very different images coming out of Myanmar. Many monks, barefoot and clothed in the traditional robes of Burmese Buddhist monasteries, have been at the forefront of the violent repression of the Rohingya Muslim minority, which the United Nations has characterized as ethnic cleansing. However, it is a very good initiative taken by Bangladesh and Myanmar in a sense that it is a trust building measurements between Bangladesh and Myanmar utilizing public diplomacy. The religious element will be crucial in resolving the conflict in Myanmar. We don’t have to get into the political issues but focus on bringing back peace. The influential Buddhist community in Myanmar can take the initiative to settle political issues and restore democracy, solve Rohingya refugee crisis. They can help dispel hatred of Burmese people towards Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar through social media activities, religious ceremony, public ceremony etc. When the Rohingyas could enter Rakhine state under the recently taken Rohingya return pilot project, a glimpse of hope that the precarious situation for Rohingya could be resolved emerged. Obviously, a tremendous amount of work remains integrating Rohingya into the Burmese society. Clearly, the infected conflict between Buddhists and Muslims in Myanmar will not end if the divisive climate of political Buddhism persists. The Buddhist community must play role in this regard. It is true that even Myanmar Junta has deep and stable respect for the Buddhist monks in Myanmar. Using this opportunity, Buddhist monks must play role in promoting communal peace in Myanmar for ensuring greater interreligious peace and harmony. Rakhine’s Buddhist society can play an effective role in this regard. The relations of Buddhists between Myanmar and Bangladesh are well established. Burmese Buddhist can do it very easily. Buddhism is more related to establishment of Peace and non-violence. Buddhists can play a significant role in this regard. They can exercise the path shown by the founder of Buddhism, Gautama Buddha. Buddhist will be recognized as the Avatar of human rights if the Buddhist community plays a role in solving the Rohingya crisis. It will ensure the regional, to some extent world, peace and communal harmony. The jarring images coming out of Myanmar, too, seem ironic, since Buddhist monks have been one of the primary forces of democratic change. In 2007, many helped lead what is now known as the “Saffron Revolution,” a movement of mostly nonviolent protests against Myanmar’s long-standing military dictatorship. Nearly a decade later, their efforts helped Aung San Suu Kyi, the dissident who spent years under house arrest and who won the Nobel Prize in 1991, to become the country’s first democratically-elected leader in 2016. The Rohingya crisis is a complex issue involving a range of political, economic, and social factors. While Buddhism is the dominant religion in Myanmar, it is important to note that the Rohingya crisis is not a religious conflict, but rather a humanitarian crisis. But it is true that Buddhists form a majority in Myanmar and that they are supposed to practice self-restraint against killing any lives if they truly follow the philosophy of Buddhism. However, Buddhism can play a significant role in finding a solution to the crisis by promoting peace, compassion, and understanding. One of the core teachings of Buddhism is the concept of non-harm and compassion towards all sentient beings, including those who may be perceived as enemies or different. Buddhist leaders and organizations can use their influence to promote dialogue and reconciliation between different communities, and to advocate for the rights of the Rohingya people. Buddhist teachings can also be used to promote mindfulness and awareness of the suffering of others, which can help to foster a more empathetic and compassionate response to the crisis. In addition, Buddhist organizations can provide support to Rohingya refugees, including food, shelter, and healthcare. They can also work to promote education and economic opportunities for refugees and displaced persons, which can help to build resilience and self-sufficiency. Overall, while Buddhism alone cannot solve the Rohingya crisis, it can play a positive role in promoting peace, compassion, and understanding, and in providing support and aid to those who have been affected by the crisis. If the Rohingyas is repatriated finally in Rakhine under the pilot project, the Buddhist monks must play their responsible due role..."
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Source/publisher: "Eurasia Review"
2023-05-10
Date of entry/update: 2023-05-11
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "The Rohingya are the most persecuted minority group in the world. Such persecution has forced Rohingyas into Bangladesh for many years, with significant spikes following violent attacks in 1978, 1992, and again in 2016. More than 700,000 Rohingya were forced to flee from Myanmar following a brutal military crackdown in 2017. Currently, Bangladesh has been hosting nearly 1.2 million Rohingya refugees for six years. At this point, there are more Rohingyas in Bangladesh than in Myanmar. Due to this massive refugee crisis, the socio-economic and security situation of Bangladesh is worsening and there seems to be no other way except a repatriation, which has been a hanging case for the last six years. The issue remained at a deadlock and to bring momentum, Bangladesh needed an initiative from Myanmar. A breakthrough finally happened on May 05, when a team of 20 Rohingya accompanied by seven Bangladesh government officials visited two of 15 villages in Rakhine State, at the invitation of the Myanmar government. Bangladesh welcomes the pilot project The Rohingya team left for Myanmar on Friday via the transboundary Naf River to visit a settlement in Rakhine State. The visit was considered a part of a “confidence-building measure” for repatriation to encourage Rohingyas for a self-willing return. This is the first time any Rohingya delegation visited Rakhine to assess the situation there as the Rohingyas have not volunteered to return home despite two attempts, arguing that the situation was not conducive. Earlier, Bangladesh and Myanmar signed an agreement to repatriate this huge number of Rohingyas to Myanmar in 2017 and 2019. These attempts failed to repatriate the Rohingyas because the Rohingya refused to return to their homeland for fear of fresh persecution and lack of a congenial environment for repatriation. Bangladesh has raised the issue at every international forum, with the support of many countries. But Myanmar had been indifferent to international laws and norms. Finally, it is taking this symbolic step, most possibly to “lighten the responsibility” in its next submission to the International Court of Justice in May regarding the Rohingya genocide. The foreign ministry of Bangladesh welcomed this effort and appreciated Myanmar’s willingness. The development comes amid a series of events that took place for Rohingya justice and repatriation. The UN refugee agency said it was aware of Friday’s trip, which was taking place “under a bilateral arrangement between Bangladesh and Myanmar”. Some experts and rights activists have observed that the UN’s involvement in the visit would be more conducive for the parties involved in the pilot project to initiate the repatriation. However, Refugee returns must be voluntary, in safety and dignity and no refugee should be forced to do so. And this pilot project is following those steps sincerely. Facilities offered by Myanmar Upon their arrival, Myanmar authorities briefed the team about the possible benefits they would likely get in the villages. After the Rohingyas return, each family will be given a house in the model village, land for agriculture, fertilizer, and seeds. The government will provide Rohingyas ‘with national verification cards (NVC)’ and within half a year would be able to travel outside Maungdaw Township. Hospitals, mosques, and playgrounds are being housed in the model villages, which were not present in Rohingya settlements in the past. The model village of Mangdu is much better than the Rohingya camps in Bangladesh in every possible way. For those who will stay in the model village, each family will be allocated one acre of land for cultivation. Those families who wish to build their own homes can do so and the regime will pay for them. There will be no barbed wire fence around the villages. A Maungdaw official informed the team that Rohingya children will be allowed to study and go to Sittwe University. Most Rohingyas who are now living in Maungdaw, are working, and moving freely in Maungdaw city, the returnee will enjoy the same. Response from the Rohingya It is undeniable that this visit by the Rohingya team marks a new beginning of the Rohingya repatriation. Rohingya repatriation will largely depend on the voluntariness of the Rohingyas, and their confidence in security and equal rights as citizens of Myanmar. The purpose of the visit was to inspect infrastructure built in Rakhine’s Maungdaw Township with grants from the governments of Japan, India, and China for the “repatriation and resettlement of refugees”. Regarding that, no member of the delegation team had any complaints. Rohingya refugees, who have spent nearly six years living in overcrowded and squalid camps in Cox’s Bazar, have been hopeful of the scheme since it became public knowledge in March. Though their queries about security or recognition of their right to citizenship in Myanmar has not been answered. But the bilateral talks have just begun, so there is always room for bargaining as Rohingyas have international support. Soon a team from Myanmar would visit the Rohingya in Cox’s Bazar to try and convince them to be repatriated. Bangladesh and international concerned communities are optimistic about Rohingya repatriation this time. There was a need for a ‘pilot repatriation project’ to send back refugees where both countries have historical experience and references to repatriate Rohingyas. Through this initiative and China’s mediation, both countries can resolve the long-pending Rohingya crisis. As every refugee has an inalienable right to return to their place of origin and such returns must also be voluntary, this confidence-building measure will play a crucial role to encourage Rohingyas to return their home..."
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Source/publisher: Eurasia Review
2023-05-08
Date of entry/update: 2023-05-08
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Executive Summary: Since the 1 February 2021 coup, Rohingya communities in Rakhine State have endured tightening movement restrictions, a lack of job opportunities, rising living costs, and even greater precariousness in terms of their legal status. The nearly 1 million Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh have not fared much better, facing such a sharp deterioration in conditions that some told this analytical unit they suspect authorities to be deliberately destroying any prospect for a dignified life in order to force Rohingya to leave Bangladesh by whatever means possible. Rohingya people in both countries — especially youth — resort to high risk, illegal travel to third countries like Malaysia, where they reportedly believe that increased access to education and opportunities will result in a more secure and fulfilling future. Respondents in Bangladesh and northern Rakhine State still report significant numbers of individuals in their communities undertaking dangerous journeys abroad; however, it is difficult to verify whether the number of Rohingya doing so has increased, because exhaustive data on successful arrivals at intended destinations is not available. While large-scale Rohingya movement away from Myanmar and Bangladesh and on to Malaysia and elsewhere has been ongoing for at least the last 10 years, several significant shifts have taken place recently. Checkpoints have proliferated across Myanmar as the State Administration Council (SAC) struggles to secure control over the country, increasing the risk that Rohingya people will be caught if they violate movement restrictions by travelling beyond their state or township boundaries. Indeed, there are regularly 20–30 arrests per week.[1] Despite this, crackdowns on maritime trafficking and disastrous, high-profile pushback incidents involving boats carrying desperate Rohingya people[2] have led overland routes to become more prevalent relative to the sea routes favoured in the past. Those facilitating these journeys are reported to include, at a minimum, members of the Arakan Army (AA) and the Myanmar military–affiliated Border Guard Police (BGP). Women and girls are the most likely members of the Rohingya community to undertake the journey abroad by any route, and they are also at the highest risk of experiencing a range of abuses en route and upon arrival, including rape and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). Moreover, research by this analytical unit has found that, due to their dire circumstances in Bangladesh and Myanmar, many — if not most — Rohingya people likely lack the agency, options, and information to make a fully volitional, informed choice with respect to high-risk migration to Malaysia or beyond. With conditions likely to deteriorate further in the near term across Rohingya communities in both Bangladesh and Myanmar, the pressure and push factors that render Rohingya individuals prime targets for exploitative migration schemes will only continue to intensify over time. Acutely vulnerable on both sides of the border, Rohingya people will be at critical risk of further victimisation by transnational criminal networks for the foreseeable future. Upon examination of the facts and circumstances pertaining to Rohingya movement as conveyed to this analytical unit in over 160 interviews in 2022, it appears that the experience of many — perhaps most — Rohingya individuals seeking to reach Malaysia and other countries fits one basic fact pattern. First, these individuals are coerced or otherwise deceived into making the journey; second, they are clandestinely harboured and transported along perilous routes over a period of several months; third, they are subjected to exploitation upon arrival to their destination, in line with the apparent intentions of those facilitating their movement.[3] These steps appear to fulfil each of the three elements of the crime of trafficking in persons as defined and proscribed under international law.[4] In instances where various actors facilitate Rohingya persons’ unlawful crossing of one or more international borders simply in exchange for financial or material benefit — in other words, where movement is facilitated for purposes other than exploitation — the fact pattern would fulfil the criteria of migrant smuggling, rather than trafficking.[5] In prosecuting any crime that is defined, in part, by a specific intent on the part of the perpetrator, that intent element is often the most difficult to establish. Trafficking is no different; as regards ongoing Rohingya movement, establishing the intent of the actors facilitating that movement — in order to determine whether it is facilitated for the purpose of exploitation — is a challenge.[6] A definitive account of the facts and circumstances surrounding each journey is unavailable; although this analytical unit has conducted over 160 interviews with Rohingya community members with varying degrees of knowledge and direct experience of exploitative migration schemes, this analytical unit has not undertaken a broader investigation to identify the specific intent of those facilitating Rohingya movement or to establish their potential criminal liability. Such an investigation lies beyond the scope of this research and beyond the expertise of this analytical unit. However, consistent statements shared with this analytical unit by Rohingya community members suggest intention to exploit travellers is, in many if not most cases, contributing to the trend in Rohingya outflows from Myanmar and Bangladesh. Based on these statements, it would seem the movement of Rohingya individuals from these countries to Malaysia and elsewhere is best generally categorised as ‘trafficking’ rather than ‘smuggling.’[7] Wherever trafficking is suspected to occur, identifying the criminal activity as ‘trafficking’ rather than ‘smuggling’ can help enable the recognition and protection of the rights of victims. In part, this is because the most widely ratified international protocol that defines and prohibits human trafficking outlines a broad range of support to be provided to victims,[8] while the protocol outlawing migrant smuggling merely affords victims protection from prosecution.[9] Regardless of which criminal definition is most pertinent in the case of those facilitating Rohingya people’s movement, interviews indicate that Rohingya individuals transferred to Malaysia and elsewhere experience a range of serious abuse over the course of their journeys. International human rights law stipulates that all victims of such abuse be provided with appropriate assistance, protection, and remedies.[10] Rohingya individuals who have been subjected to abusive migration schemes should thus be afforded a far higher level of support than they are now receiving. This paper aims to contribute to a clearer understanding of the experiences of Rohingya individuals who have attempted perilous international journeys, as well as the pressures facing Rohingya individuals remaining in Myanmar and Bangladesh, in order to help to inform a stronger, better coordinated, and more comprehensive response to the crisis of exploitative migration schemes targeting Rohingya people..."
Source/publisher: Center for Operational Analysis and Research, Danish Refugee Council, Durable Solutions Platform
2023-03-28
Date of entry/update: 2023-05-05
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "[Nandini Shinde is a Catalyst for Change Fellow at Migration and Asylum Project, an initiative of the Ara Trust, where she works as a legal representative for refugees in their refugee status determination. She has a background in international criminal and humanitarian law. Radhika Goyal is a Policy Associate with Accountability Counsel where she advocates for international financial institutions to be more accountable to the communities they impact. She has previously worked with forcibly displaced populations.] Six years into one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises, where 700,000 Rohingya refugees fled Myanmar for safety, the Rohingya refugee crisis has become a ‘protracted situation’ according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ (UNHCR) given definition. Various efforts have been made by the international community in the past years to settle the issue, including recent efforts at repatriation despite the lack of safe conditions in Myanmar. But without a sustainable solution in sight, the Rohingya community continues to live in uncertainty as refugees in countries around the world, particularly in South and Southeast Asian States including Bangladesh, Malaysia, Pakistan, Indonesia, India and Thailand. A uniting factor in this region is the non-ratification of the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees, resulting in ad-hoc policies that govern refugee status and protection. Countries in the region have adopted different responses towards the Rohingya refugee crisis. The States’ varied response has also resulted in a lack of uniformity in the strategy adopted by country specific UN agencies working on this issue; while Bangladesh co-leads the Joint Response Plan, which coordinates aid by multiple agencies including UNHCR, IOM and UNFPA, Thailand does not allow UNHCR to even conduct the refugee status determination process. Depending on the country of asylum, Rohingyas face a variety of protection concerns related to livelihood, education, health, legal and other related challenges. This article sheds light on key challenges faced by Rohingyas in the region. It proposes a regional response mechanism to address protection concerns in individual host States and plan for realistic durable solutions. Further, host States are urged to call for the launch of a global Support Platform in the upcoming Global Refugee Forum in December 2023, to promote international responsibility sharing and boost regional coordination. Rohingya Experiences in the South and Southeast Asian Region Access to Asylum and Legal Status Despite the international recognition of the grave crimes committed against the Rohingya community in Myanmar, there is no surety of access to asylum upon entry in many of the States in the region. Moreover, States have established ad hoc and temporary mechanisms to regulate the legal status of refugees. Today, Bangladesh conducts a joint registration exercise with international organizations, yet fails to recognize Rohingyas as refugees and instead categorises them as Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals (FDMNs). Rohingyas in Malaysia are considered to be “illegal immigrants” upon entry and live under the threat of detention, though UNHCR does provide them refugee cards on contact. Other States like Thailand have either summarily detained refugees or adopted a concerning pushback policy, redirecting refugees towards other host States. It is imperative that States in the region provide asylum to the Rohingyas, regularize their legal status as refugees and consequently extend protection to their rights. Though these States are not bound by the Refugee Conventions to protect refugee rights (as they are not parties to them), international human rights law and customary law oblige all States to uphold human rights that are essential to the survival, dignity and well-being of all people in their jurisdiction. Advocacy measures in these States by civil society or even UN agencies have so far been unable to create meaningful change in their refugee response. In this context, a regional response mechanism, with global support, can build international pressure and encourage State-to-State dialogues, that promote equitable responsibility sharing based on State capacity to host refugees. Global support can also alleviate the financial burden on the developing host States, while also equipping them with the necessary tools to safeguard the status of Rohingyas. Protection of Basic Human Rights in Host States States in the region have hesitated to officially recognize Rohingyas as refugees to avoid the consequent responsibilities of upholding their basic human rights and facilitate access to socio-economic services including livelihood, shelter, education and health care. This hesitation is justified in part, given the economic struggles of the States in this region, particularly their inability to meet basic needs of their own nationals. Rohingyas end up living in deplorable conditions, often in restrictive refugee camps or in urban settlements, without access to education and livelihood opportunities, and entirely dependent on aid. It would not be reasonable to demand that host States provide access to socio-economic rights without addressing their technical and financial limitations. The region urgently needs support from third party countries, international organizations, international NGOs and other relevant stakeholders. Currently, there exists country specific mechanisms such as the Joint Response Plan that coordinates efforts, including funding, of the relevant stakeholders to provide humanitarian aid in Bangladesh, which hosts a majority of Rohingya refugees. Similar support is required to assist other States also hosting a substantial Rohingya population. Regional Trafficking Routes Even as host States have eschewed a regional perspective of the Rohingya crisis, a growing network of human traffickers have built regional routes. Various reports highlight a large number of intersecting trafficking routes, not only from Myanmar to host States, but also among host States. Traffickers exploit the vulnerabilities as well as the dissimilar treatment of Rohingyas in host States by offering false hopes of positive treatment in another State, leading them to undertake treacherous onward journeys. As a result, the trafficking of Rohingyas, under false promises of marriage or employment opportunities or better standard of living, is rampant. Addressing cross-border trafficking necessitates regional coordination as it allows States to monitor trafficking channels and key operators. Moreover, uniformly upholding basic human rights standards will reduce the need for Rohingyas to take on onward movement. Durable Solutions There is a call for repatriation from both the Host States and the Rohingya community. Recent developments around repatriation include a pilot project between Bangladesh and Myanmar to repatriate around 1000 Rohingyas. But voluntary, sustainable, safe, and dignified repatriation remains a pipe dream. Repatriation as a legitimate durable solution requires accountability from Myanmar, meaningful participation of Rohingyas and, lastly, a guarantee of safety in Myanmar. An international and regional coordinated response will alleviate pressures on host States and have the highest chances of preventing a similar crisis in the future. Until then, Rohingyas are only presented with the option of integration in host States and resettlement in third countries. In reality though, integration or resettlement of almost one million Rohingyas suffers additional challenges presented by lack of resources or that of political will. Both require third party countries and other relevant stakeholders to share responsibility. Third party resettlement further should not be limited to Rohingyas from a specific State, and must include holistic and equitable considerations of the economic and demographic capacities of all host States. A Call for Cooperation A majority of Rohingyas are hosted by low and middle-income countries that have their own economic and development challenges. Given this reality, it is unfair to hold any developing nations in the South Asian and the Southeast Asian region entirely accountable for refugee protection. UNHCR’s Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) acknowledges this disparity and notes that countries hosting refugees make an “immense contribution from their own limited resources” [See Paragraph 14, Chapter III]. On this basis, the GCR advocates principles of equitable responsibility sharing among third party countries, international organizations, and other relevant stakeholders. It also prioritizes building the overall capacity of States and host communities to cope with large scale refugee situations. GCR provides a potential avenue to mobilize support and cooperation for Rohingya refugees in the South Asian and Southeast Asian region. Its core objectives of easing pressure on host States, enhancing refugee self-reliance, expanding access to third country solutions and supporting conditions for return with safety and dignity perfectly align with current and future needs of the Rohingya population. In particular, under the GCR, host countrie/s can request the activation of “Support Platforms” to address protracted refugee situations where host States require additional support from the international community. Support can be in the form of financial and material aid, or even technical expertise for strengthening humanitarian responses. These Platforms also allow for a high degree of ownership and flexibility for host States to identify specific needs and curate comprehensive action plans in response. Examples include Support Platforms created to address the forced displacement in Central America and Mexico, and to address the Afghan refugee crisis. Host States in the South Asian and the Southeast Asian region should request the creation of a similar Support Platform to coordinate a regional response for the Rohingya refugee crisis. The Support Platform will allow coordination among various stakeholders and serve as a focal point platform to advance partnerships among States, international organizations, financial institutions, civil societies, and academics. Concerns like trafficking and durable solutions, that necessitate a regional approach and the involvement of humanitarian agencies, will directly benefit from such a multi-stakeholder and partnership approach. It will allow the States in the region to streamline funding towards humanitarian aid, and to equitably distribute the funding according to national and local needs. Based on the current needs of both host States and the Rohingya refugees, funding is needed to address protection, education, livelihood, health, amongst many other concerns, to eventually promote self-reliance amongst Rohingya refugees. Simultaneously, host States will also get the opportunity to strengthen their capacity to mitigate the impact of the refugee crisis on the host community. Easing the burden on host States in the region could also halt the ongoing premature discussions on repatriation. The Global Refugee Forum (GRF), organised under the GCR framework, provides States, international and regional organisations, financial institutions, civil society and other stakeholders, an opportunity to enable responsibility sharing and contribute financial support, technical expertise and policy changes. In GRF 2019, for example, relevant States, including Iran and Pakistan, launched a Support Platform to mobilise aid for the Afghan refugee situation. The upcoming GRF in December 2023 similarly is an opportune moment to activate a Support Platform for the Rohingya refugee crisis. It could be crucial to garner the required global and regional coordination to ensure that Rohingyas refugees do not lose yet another half a decade to statelessness and uncertainty..."
Source/publisher: Opinio Juris
2023-04-27
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-27
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language:
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Description: "[Nandini Shinde is a Catalyst for Change Fellow at Migration and Asylum Project, an initiative of the Ara Trust, where she works as a legal representative for refugees in their refugee status determination. She has a background in international criminal and humanitarian law. Radhika Goyal is a Policy Associate with Accountability Counsel where she advocates for international financial institutions to be more accountable to the communities they impact. She has previously worked with forcibly displaced populations.] Six years into one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises, where 700,000 Rohingya refugees fled Myanmar for safety, the Rohingya refugee crisis has become a ‘protracted situation’ according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ (UNHCR) given definition. Various efforts have been made by the international community in the past years to settle the issue, including recent efforts at repatriation despite the lack of safe conditions in Myanmar. But without a sustainable solution in sight, the Rohingya community continues to live in uncertainty as refugees in countries around the world, particularly in South and Southeast Asian States including Bangladesh, Malaysia, Pakistan, Indonesia, India and Thailand. A uniting factor in this region is the non-ratification of the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees, resulting in ad-hoc policies that govern refugee status and protection. Countries in the region have adopted different responses towards the Rohingya refugee crisis. The States’ varied response has also resulted in a lack of uniformity in the strategy adopted by country specific UN agencies working on this issue; while Bangladesh co-leads the Joint Response Plan, which coordinates aid by multiple agencies including UNHCR, IOM and UNFPA, Thailand does not allow UNHCR to even conduct the refugee status determination process. Depending on the country of asylum, Rohingyas face a variety of protection concerns related to livelihood, education, health, legal and other related challenges. This article sheds light on key challenges faced by Rohingyas in the region. It proposes a regional response mechanism to address protection concerns in individual host States and plan for realistic durable solutions. Further, host States are urged to call for the launch of a global Support Platform in the upcoming Global Refugee Forum in December 2023, to promote international responsibility sharing and boost regional coordination. Rohingya Experiences in the South and Southeast Asian Region Access to Asylum and Legal Status Despite the international recognition of the grave crimes committed against the Rohingya community in Myanmar, there is no surety of access to asylum upon entry in many of the States in the region. Moreover, States have established ad hoc and temporary mechanisms to regulate the legal status of refugees. Today, Bangladesh conducts a joint registration exercise with international organizations, yet fails to recognize Rohingyas as refugees and instead categorises them as Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals (FDMNs). Rohingyas in Malaysia are considered to be “illegal immigrants” upon entry and live under the threat of detention, though UNHCR does provide them refugee cards on contact. Other States like Thailand have either summarily detained refugees or adopted a concerning pushback policy, redirecting refugees towards other host States. It is imperative that States in the region provide asylum to the Rohingyas, regularize their legal status as refugees and consequently extend protection to their rights. Though these States are not bound by the Refugee Conventions to protect refugee rights (as they are not parties to them), international human rights law and customary law oblige all States to uphold human rights that are essential to the survival, dignity and well-being of all people in their jurisdiction. Advocacy measures in these States by civil society or even UN agencies have so far been unable to create meaningful change in their refugee response. In this context, a regional response mechanism, with global support, can build international pressure and encourage State-to-State dialogues, that promote equitable responsibility sharing based on State capacity to host refugees. Global support can also alleviate the financial burden on the developing host States, while also equipping them with the necessary tools to safeguard the status of Rohingyas. Protection of Basic Human Rights in Host States States in the region have hesitated to officially recognize Rohingyas as refugees to avoid the consequent responsibilities of upholding their basic human rights and facilitate access to socio-economic services including livelihood, shelter, education and health care. This hesitation is justified in part, given the economic struggles of the States in this region, particularly their inability to meet basic needs of their own nationals. Rohingyas end up living in deplorable conditions, often in restrictive refugee camps or in urban settlements, without access to education and livelihood opportunities, and entirely dependent on aid. It would not be reasonable to demand that host States provide access to socio-economic rights without addressing their technical and financial limitations. The region urgently needs support from third party countries, international organizations, international NGOs and other relevant stakeholders. Currently, there exists country specific mechanisms such as the Joint Response Plan that coordinates efforts, including funding, of the relevant stakeholders to provide humanitarian aid in Bangladesh, which hosts a majority of Rohingya refugees. Similar support is required to assist other States also hosting a substantial Rohingya population. Regional Trafficking Routes Even as host States have eschewed a regional perspective of the Rohingya crisis, a growing network of human traffickers have built regional routes. Various reports highlight a large number of intersecting trafficking routes, not only from Myanmar to host States, but also among host States. Traffickers exploit the vulnerabilities as well as the dissimilar treatment of Rohingyas in host States by offering false hopes of positive treatment in another State, leading them to undertake treacherous onward journeys. As a result, the trafficking of Rohingyas, under false promises of marriage or employment opportunities or better standard of living, is rampant. Addressing cross-border trafficking necessitates regional coordination as it allows States to monitor trafficking channels and key operators. Moreover, uniformly upholding basic human rights standards will reduce the need for Rohingyas to take on onward movement. Durable Solutions There is a call for repatriation from both the Host States and the Rohingya community. Recent developments around repatriation include a pilot project between Bangladesh and Myanmar to repatriate around 1000 Rohingyas. But voluntary, sustainable, safe, and dignified repatriation remains a pipe dream. Repatriation as a legitimate durable solution requires accountability from Myanmar, meaningful participation of Rohingyas and, lastly, a guarantee of safety in Myanmar. An international and regional coordinated response will alleviate pressures on host States and have the highest chances of preventing a similar crisis in the future. Until then, Rohingyas are only presented with the option of integration in host States and resettlement in third countries. In reality though, integration or resettlement of almost one million Rohingyas suffers additional challenges presented by lack of resources or that of political will. Both require third party countries and other relevant stakeholders to share responsibility. Third party resettlement further should not be limited to Rohingyas from a specific State, and must include holistic and equitable considerations of the economic and demographic capacities of all host States. A Call for Cooperation A majority of Rohingyas are hosted by low and middle-income countries that have their own economic and development challenges. Given this reality, it is unfair to hold any developing nations in the South Asian and the Southeast Asian region entirely accountable for refugee protection. UNHCR’s Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) acknowledges this disparity and notes that countries hosting refugees make an “immense contribution from their own limited resources” [See Paragraph 14, Chapter III]. On this basis, the GCR advocates principles of equitable responsibility sharing among third party countries, international organizations, and other relevant stakeholders. It also prioritizes building the overall capacity of States and host communities to cope with large scale refugee situations. GCR provides a potential avenue to mobilize support and cooperation for Rohingya refugees in the South Asian and Southeast Asian region. Its core objectives of easing pressure on host States, enhancing refugee self-reliance, expanding access to third country solutions and supporting conditions for return with safety and dignity perfectly align with current and future needs of the Rohingya population. In particular, under the GCR, host countrie/s can request the activation of “Support Platforms” to address protracted refugee situations where host States require additional support from the international community. Support can be in the form of financial and material aid, or even technical expertise for strengthening humanitarian responses. These Platforms also allow for a high degree of ownership and flexibility for host States to identify specific needs and curate comprehensive action plans in response. Examples include Support Platforms created to address the forced displacement in Central America and Mexico, and to address the Afghan refugee crisis. Host States in the South Asian and the Southeast Asian region should request the creation of a similar Support Platform to coordinate a regional response for the Rohingya refugee crisis. The Support Platform will allow coordination among various stakeholders and serve as a focal point platform to advance partnerships among States, international organizations, financial institutions, civil societies, and academics. Concerns like trafficking and durable solutions, that necessitate a regional approach and the involvement of humanitarian agencies, will directly benefit from such a multi-stakeholder and partnership approach. It will allow the States in the region to streamline funding towards humanitarian aid, and to equitably distribute the funding according to national and local needs. Based on the current needs of both host States and the Rohingya refugees, funding is needed to address protection, education, livelihood, health, amongst many other concerns, to eventually promote self-reliance amongst Rohingya refugees. Simultaneously, host States will also get the opportunity to strengthen their capacity to mitigate the impact of the refugee crisis on the host community. Easing the burden on host States in the region could also halt the ongoing premature discussions on repatriation. The Global Refugee Forum (GRF), organised under the GCR framework, provides States, international and regional organisations, financial institutions, civil society and other stakeholders, an opportunity to enable responsibility sharing and contribute financial support, technical expertise and policy changes. In GRF 2019, for example, relevant States, including Iran and Pakistan, launched a Support Platform to mobilise aid for the Afghan refugee situation. The upcoming GRF in December 2023 similarly is an opportune moment to activate a Support Platform for the Rohingya refugee crisis. It could be crucial to garner the required global and regional coordination to ensure that Rohingyas refugees do not lose yet another half a decade to statelessness and uncertainty..."
Source/publisher: Opinio Juris
2023-04-27
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-27
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "In August 2017, several hundred thousand Rohingya fled violence and persecution in Myanmar, seeking refuge in Cox’s Bazar in neighboring Bangladesh. In the years since, the Bangladeshi government has provided a safe haven for the refugees. Yet there are signs of increasing discontent in the Bangladeshi host community over insecurity, economic costs, and other negative effects of the refugee camps. As this report explains, addressing this potentially combustible situation will be vital to ensuring a sustainable humanitarian effort in Cox’s Bazar. Summary More than 950,000 Rohingya refugees currently live in camps in the area of Cox’s Bazar, in southeastern Bangladesh, after fleeing religiously motivated violence in Rakhine State, Myanmar. This study expands on a small but growing body of research that documents increasing hostility among the Bangladeshi host community toward the Rohingya. Host community members see the effects of Rohingya refugees on their lives and communities as mostly negative and are frustrated by continuing assistance to the refugees, whom they view as having received sufficient aid. Host community members rarely interact with refugees, but interaction is often negative when it occurs. Host community members are also losing confidence in the ability of government to address their concerns, and many see violence as an acceptable response to their grievances. Rohingya refugees view intercommunity relations with Bangladeshis as far less tense than do host community members. A range of conflict mitigation approaches that involve citizens, the Bangladeshi state, and the international community is urgently needed to alleviate intercommunity tension and forestall potential conflict. About the Report This report examines the perceptions and experience of conflict, governance, and politics among Bangladeshis and Rohingya refugees in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh. The analysis utilizes survey and focus group research funded and published by the International Republican Institute, a democracy-assistance organization headquartered in Washington, DC. The report was commissioned by the South Asia program at the United States Institute of Peace. About the Author Geoffrey Macdonald is a senior adviser in the Asia Division at the International Republican Institute (IRI) and a visiting expert in the South Asia program at the United States Institute of Peace. From 2018 to 2022, he was IRI’s resident country manager in Bangladesh. Isabella Mekker is a senior program associate at IRI. Lauren Mooney is a senior manager for conflict prevention and stabilization at IRI..."
Source/publisher: United States Institute of Peace
2023-04-12
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-12
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Repatriation to Myanmar Under Military Junta Threatens Lives, Freedoms
Description: "(Bangkok) – Bangladesh authorities should suspend plans to send Rohingya refugees back to Myanmar, where their lives and liberty would be at grave risk, Human Rights Watch said today. Rohingya told Human Rights Watch that they were lied to, deceived, or otherwise coerced by Bangladesh administrators into meeting with a recent delegation of Myanmar junta officials as part of a “pilot repatriation” effort to return about 1,000 refugees. Some were told the meetings concerned possible resettlement to a third country. “Voluntary, safe, and dignified returns of Rohingya refugees to Myanmar are not possible while the military junta is carrying out massacres around the country and apartheid in Rakhine State,” said Meenakshi Ganguly, South Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “Bangladesh authorities should stop deceiving these refugees to get them to engage with junta officials when it’s clear that Rohingya will only be able to return safely when rights-respecting rule is established.” Conditions in Myanmar’s Rakhine State have not been conducive to voluntary, safe, or dignified returns of Rohingya refugees since 2017, when more than 730,000 Rohingya fled the Myanmar military’s crimes against humanity and acts of genocide. The prospect of durable returns has grown ever more distant since the February 2021 military coup in Myanmar, carried out by the same generals who orchestrated the 2017 mass atrocities. Bangladesh has appropriately not compelled these refugees to return and should continue that policy with the support of international donors, Human Rights Watch said. A delegation of 17 Myanmar junta officials visited the Cox’s Bazar camps in Bangladesh, which house about one million Rohingya refugees, from March 15-22, 2023. The officials interviewed 449 Rohingya from 149 families in the Teknaf camps for “verification” for the pilot repatriation process, media reported. A junta official told Agence France-Presse that the pilot program could start as early as mid-April. Human Rights Watch spoke with 15 Rohingya about their verification interviews. Not one said that they had been informed in advance that they would be meeting with junta officials about being returned to Myanmar. All 15 said they had been interviewed several times by Bangladesh authorities over the past two years, but had never been told that their names were listed for possible return. “I wasn’t informed that I would be interviewed by the Myanmar delegation,” said a Rohingya man interviewed by junta officials on March 15 along with 10 family members. “I was called beforehand by the camp-in-charge [CiC, a Bangladesh official], who told me to be present on the interview date at my shelter. When I asked why, he said I would be interviewed for the opportunity to go abroad for resettlement. I never realized it was a Myanmar delegation I was going to meet, or that it was about repatriation.” He said that the CiC had threatened him: “He said that if we weren’t present for the interview, we’d be forced by the police to appear. So, I doubted that it was about resettlement options, and worried it was about repatriation instead.” A majhi (Rohingya community leader) who was interviewed by the delegation on March 21 said that he was also not informed about the reason for the interview or those that preceded it, and was similarly threatened by Bangladeshi officials with police intervention when he resisted. “Even as majhis, we were not told why we were being called several times by the CiC office to give family information,” he said. “They gave us false hope that a group was coming to meet us for an opportunity to resettle. From my block, my family and another family’s names appeared on the list. When we found out that it was the Myanmar delegation we had to meet, we tried to oppose it, but the authorities here threatened us. Some families from other camps fled their shelters fearing they’d be forced to return.” Two prior repatriation attempts undertaken in November 2018 and August 2019 failed, with Rohingya refugees unwilling to return due to the ongoing persecution and abuse in Myanmar. In January 2022, the Bangladesh government and Myanmar junta renewed discussions around repatriation, announcing joint plans to “expeditiously complete the verification process.” While Bangladesh’s Foreign Minister A.K. Abdul has declared that “early repatriation” is a top priority, he told BenarNews in March 2023 that Bangladesh would not force refugees to return to Myanmar. Bangladesh officials reported that the 449 Rohingya were interviewed to verify their identities and places of origin, joining a list of over 700 refugees already confirmed for the pilot repatriation. A Rohingya woman interviewed on March 15 with her newborn baby and six other family members said, “They were asking for family information and where we lived when we were in Rakhine. They filled up about four to five pages of documents. We weren’t shown what was written on them. Then they took our thumbprints.” Rohingya interviewed on the first day were required to provide thumbprints, which was reportedly stopped after community leaders raised concerns with the Bangladesh authorities. About 600,000 Rohingya remain in Rakhine State under the junta’s oppressive rule, facing systematic abuses that amount to the crimes against humanity of apartheid, persecution, and deprivation of liberty. The junta has imposed new movement restrictions and aid blockages on Rohingya camps and villages, increasing water scarcity and food shortages, along with disease and malnutrition. Since the 2021 coup, security forces have arrested thousands of Rohingya men, women, and children for “unauthorized travel.” The refugees said that the junta officials asked them about their relatives in Rakhine State. “My family members who are still in Rakhine live in fear of persecution by the military or insurgent groups,” a Rohingya man interviewed by the delegation on March 16 said. “Now, if they end up in trouble because of me, who will protect them?” Rohingya refugees have consistently said that they want to go home, but only when their security, access to land and livelihoods, freedom of movement, and citizenship rights can be ensured. The refugees said the delegation refused to answer any questions about whether their land would be returned or if they would be granted citizenship and other rights and freedoms. “If they really wanted to take us back, they wouldn’t hesitate to answer any of our questions and ensure our rights,” said another camp majhi interviewed by the delegation. “They only want to take us back to Rakhine because they’re under pressure. We know they won’t let us go back to our land, they’ll put us in that camp settlement forever. We’ll only go back when they publicly commit to giving us the same rights as citizens in Myanmar and getting our land and properties back.” In early March, junta officials took several diplomats to Rakhine State’s Maungdaw township to visit the Nga Khu Ya reception center and Hla Poe Kaung transit camp. The camps, built on Rohingya land in 2018 to process and house returnees, are surrounded by barbed-wire perimeter fences and security outposts. Junta officials have also been visiting Rakhine in preparation for their submission to the International Court of Justice, due by April 24, in the Genocide Convention case brought by Gambia. Activists and refugees allege that the pilot repatriation project is part of broader junta efforts to feign progress in its treatment of the Rohingya to the court. The United Nations refugee agency, UNHCR, provided unmarked UN boats to transport the junta delegation to Cox’s Bazar. In response to criticism, UNHCR said that while it is not involved in the pilot repatriation discussions, it “supports efforts that could lead to the verification of all refugees and pave the way for eventual return,” which in this case included “providing logistical support to members of the Myanmar delegation to cross into Bangladesh for the technical verification process.” UNHCR did assert that “conditions in Myanmar’s Rakhine State are currently not conducive to the sustainable return of Rohingya refugees.” Fully informed and voluntary returns depend, among other key factors, on providing refugees with objective and accurate information about conditions in areas of origin. UNHCR should not be providing logistical support to officials operating under the same military leaders who oversaw the grave crimes the Rohingya fled, in service of a repatriation plan that contravenes international standards, Human Rights Watch said. Since 2017, the Bangladesh government has respected the international principle of nonrefoulement, the right of refugees not to be returned to a country where their lives or freedom would be threatened. But Bangladesh authorities have also been intensifying restrictions on livelihoods, movement, and education that compound refugees’ vulnerability and dependence on aid and appear designed to coerce refugees into considering returning to Myanmar. Bangladesh should formalize and expand education and employment opportunities to bolster Rohingya’s self-reliance for their eventual return or resettlement. “For future returns to be truly voluntary, the Bangladesh authorities need to allow Rohingya to live freely, without enforcing pressures pushing them to go back,” Ganguly said. “Donors should increase support for a more sustainable life for Rohingya today, which will help them develop the skills and independence needed for the day when safe returns are possible.”..."
Source/publisher: Human Rights Watch (USA)
2023-03-31
Date of entry/update: 2023-03-31
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Description: "One year ago, the United States made a historic determination: the atrocities committed against the Rohingya by the Burmese military constitute genocide and crimes against humanity. Secretary of State Antony Blinken made this announcement in front of Rohingya and Holocaust survivors at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. This statement was a long-awaited recognition of the brutal persecution and violence suffered by this predominantly Muslim community from Burma's Rakhine State. Recognition was an important step. Now we must focus on protecting the Rohingya who have been displaced and those who remain in Burma. The Rohingya suffered decades of violence, discrimination, marginalization and persecution—including a crescendo of violence that spurred the genocide determination. Their plight continues to this day. The very military that committed genocide against them staged a coup in February 2021. Since then, the military has cracked down on civilians across the country. All of the structures that led to the persecution of the Rohingya remain in place. And since the coup the military has introduced even more repressive measures, including growing restrictions on the remaining 600,000 Rohingya’s freedom of movement with increasing security checkpoints, arrest, detentions, and extortion while keeping the apartheid-like conditions in most of Rakhine state, where many live, largely inaccessible to independent monitors. At the same time, the situation of the approximately one million Rohingya in refugee camps in Bangladesh drastically deteriorated. With practically no educational or economic opportunities and surrounded by rampant crime, refugees become prey to human traffickers. According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 2022 saw a massive increase in the number of people fleeing by boat over the previous year, and it was the deadliest year for these attempts to flee over sea since 2014. Rohingya refugees today are forced to choose between an array of dangerous options: they could embark on a perilous journey by boat to other southeast or south Asian countries; they could return to Burma, where they would face a risk of genocide; or they could remain in Bangladesh where they face growing insecurity and hopelessness. For decades, the world focused on supporting Burma’s pro-democracy movement, perhaps with the hope that building democracy would naturally benefit all groups in the country. Yet even as Burma was making steps toward democracy, the violence against the Rohingya was culminating in genocide. The world cannot repeat the mistakes of the past. As policymakers in the US and elsewhere try to push back the brutality of Burma’s military and support a future democracy, we cannot lose sight of the vulnerable communities who may be targeted along the way. The Rohingya crisis must be addressed as part of a larger problem in Burma—the absence of human rights and democracy. The military dictatorship that ruled Burma for years has systematically oppressed ethnic and religious minorities, including the Rohingya. To tackle the ongoing persecution of the Rohingya and the fight for democracy in Burma, both issues must be addressed together. As the world has learned through the experience of the Rohingya people—genocide was committed when it appeared the country was becoming more democratic—no genuine democratic change can be built on the backs of the persecuted. One year ago, Secretary Blinken reaffirmed the US "commitment to accompany Rohingya on this path out of genocide—toward truth, toward accountability, toward a home that will welcome them as equal members, that will respect their human rights and dignity, alongside that of all people in Burma." The US has provided significant humanitarian assistance for the Rohingya, but needs are growing among Rohingya who have been plunged into a state of perpetual hopelessness. The US can do more, and other countries, and regional organizations, notably the Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN) must step up too to provide humanitarian assistance, promote accountability, and press the Burmese military to cease its violent campaigns. First and foremost, the US and the international community should continue to advance efforts to hold accountable those responsible for genocide and crimes against humanity. This includes sanctions on MOGE—a state-owned oil and gas company—and other relevant military-owned businesses, which would reduce the funds available to Burma’s military to pursue its brutal acts. The US and others could continue support for the ongoing justice processes including the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar and cases in international and domestic courts. Protecting the Rohingya from further violence and persecution is another critical priority. The international community must work proactively with Burma’s civilian leadership and civil society actors to ensure support for an effective transitional justice process to prevent future atrocities and persecution, ensuring that Rohingya have a prominent—and equal—place in a future Burma. This would require a restoration of full citizenship for Rohingya, restoration of equal rights as an ethnic group of Burma and genuine inclusion of Rohingya in decisions that will shape the country’s future. The US and other countries should also bolster humanitarian support for those who have suffered mass atrocities and ensure the protection and well-being of refugees in the region. Countries in south and southeast Asia should protect Rohingya refugees, including rescuing those stranded at sea and protecting refugee populations within their territory. Lastly, the United States and the international community must support Rohingya by listening to the voices of Rohingya and enabling Rohingya participation in all fora related to their and Burma’s future, improving access to resources and formal education for Rohingya women and youth, and supporting Rohingya civil society. The Rohingya have suffered for too long and have endured unimaginable violence and persecution. It is time for the world to stand with them and support their journey toward justice, equality, and freedom. Wai Wai Nu is founder and executive director of Women's Peace Network in Burma, and a former Genocide Prevention fellow with the Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide. Naomi Kikoler is the director of the Museum's Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide..."
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Source/publisher: United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
2023-03-29
Date of entry/update: 2023-03-29
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Description: "On February 1st marked two years since the Military Junta known as Tatmadaw took over the power in Myanmar orchestrating a coup which removed the incumbent National League for Democracy ( NLD) government. Ever since the coup, massive protest erupted in parts of the country. The economy shrank by nearly 20 percent wiping out modest poverty reduction made over the past decade. In addition, millions of people are facing hunger and thousands of people feeling the nation to bordering countries, rendering the country on the verge of becoming a failed state. Amidst the chaos, the chances of finding a peaceful resolution to Rohingya Crisis is alarmingly getting slimmer. The exiled lawmakers and activists of NLD government toppled by the State Administration Council- the Junta officially called as, established a parallel government known as the National Unity Government (NUG). In September of that year, the NUG declared war on the junta and formed an armed division known as the People’s Defence Force. This ushered a brutal struggle between the army and civilian sect. The Junta has put up resistance at multiple fronts rendering it anguished to uphold its power. Military Regime and streams of hostilities If we examine the trail of Myanmar’s political history, it has always been ruled by a military junta ever since its independence from the British colonial rule in 1948. Asia analyst Ayesha Siddiqa, a senior fellow in the Department of Military Studies at King’s College London, says that shortly after independence, the country began a civil war between ethnic groups with a Burmese majority. At that time, the military entered politics in the name of security and in the absence of strong political institutions. “From the beginning, the Burmese army got involved in politics because there were divisions in the society. Disputes over the distribution of resources and the lack of strong political institutions. That’s how they became increasingly powerful in politics, and began to control it,” she said. General Ne Win led a military coup in 1962 and in 1974 instituted a new constitution based on an isolationist foreign policy and a socialist economic program that nationalized Burma’s major enterprises. This led to a deteriorating economic situation, black-market economy and wide spread corruption. This led to a massive protest in 1988 which ended in brutal military crackdown. In addition to economic turmoil, Myanmar’s government faced admonishments for lack of inclusion and representation of ethnic minorities. Namely the confrontation between the majority Bamar and non-Bamar population is behind the root of Rohingya Crisis. Stripping the Rohingya’s of their rights The formulation of the 1974 constitution stripped the rights of minorities and favoured the majority Bamar population. The first large scale Rohingya displacement began in 1978 when 200,000 people fled to Bangladesh, however, Myanmar later took them back in the face of western pressure. Finally, the 1982 citizenship law put the last nail in the coffin of Rohingya community’s any hope of gaining rights. The citizenship law proclaimed that people who were settled before the Anglo-Burmese War of 1824 were legally Burmese citizens. Although, there is strong evidence which supports that Rohingyas have been living in Mynmar prior to the war. The significant point about the present-day Rakhine is that Arakan had once been an independent state that had been taken over by the Konbaung rulers in 1785. Attempts have been taken to change the demographic of the Arakan population with that of the Bamar populace, and subsequent settlement have been successful. Presently, the Arakan Army consisting of Bamar and local ethnic groups are embroiled in an armed conflict with the Junta demanding autonomy. The politics of Arakan Since the advent of the coup, the Junta had shot live ammunition and massacred villages believed to be supporters of the opposition. At least 1,500 people have been killed by the military, estimated by the Thailand-based nonprofit Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma). By late 2021, the junta has arrested more than eight thousand people, including journalists, medical workers, and NLD politicians. By January 2022, clashes between the People’s Defence Force and the military spread across the country, reported by analysts. The Junta is increasingly getting wedged from having to put up with multiple fronts of resistance. This has been evident as the Junta agreed on a ceasefire with the Arakan Army. Founded in Kachin State in 2009, Arakan Army has witnessed a rapid rise. It has currently 30,000 active fighters, the largest among other militia groups. Previously, AA was against the rights of the Rohingya’s, in recent times its mother organization United League for Arakan (ULA) and its spokespeople have called for a peaceful repatriation of Rohingya Crisis. AA can benefit from incorporating the armed militia sect of Rohingya and increase its members. Future of Rohingya repatriation Bangladesh government has had to face tough times diplomatically in the face of Junta’s unhinged tactics to preserving its power. However, close association with the rebel groups can also backfire as it is still the Tatmadaw which holds the last say in foreign policy. Between the politics of Arakan and non-cooperation from the military regime, major international players must intervene to ensure a conducive environment for Rohingya repatriation. The presence of major geopolitical actors in the region play a significant role in peaceful solution of Rohingya Crisis. From a realist perspective, China and India have their own self-interest in relation with Mynmar, hence, Bangladesh must carefully juggle with the major powers’ interest as well as maintain cooperative relations with Mynmar in order to assure conducive environment for Rohingya repatriation. Recently the BURMA Act adopted by the United States has put sanctions and restrictions to the Junta regime. If Rohingya repatriation is to be realized, Bangladesh must work in multiple fronts with the regime and shadow government as well as the great powers to ensure it ensures a smooth sailing to the burning crisis..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Modern Diplomacy
2023-02-27
Date of entry/update: 2023-02-27
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Description: "A settlement of around 3,000 Rohingya refugees on the zero-line of the Myanmar-Bangladesh border was burnt last month amid the firing between the Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO) and the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA). Members of about 558 families lost their temporary shelters and fled inside Bangladesh. Bangladesh government has taken initiative to relocate these stranded people, of whom two-thirds are already registered under different camps in Ukhiya and Teknaf, while the rest are unregistered. As a part of the relocation process, at least 180 Rohingyas from 35 families were taken to a transit camp in Ukhiya’s Kutupalong. Tension continued to escalate in the Rohingya camps. Various armed organizations are involved in building reigns of terror around the Rohingya camps. Clashes between different groups, killings, rapes and abductions are regular incidents, which have created fear among the people throughout the camp. Amid rising tensions across the border, Myanmar has stepped up the repatriation of their nationals to their homeland in Arakan. In the meantime, local media reported that on February 5, Junta leaders, including International Cooperation Minister U Ko Ko Hlaing, Border Affairs Minister Lieutenant General Tun Tun Naung, Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement Minister Dr Thet Thet Khaing and Immigration and Population Minister U Myint Kyaing, visited Maungdaw on the Bangladesh border and instructed the authorities to prepare transit camps for repatriation. Since the military’s taking over power in 2020, this is the biggest step forward for Rohingya repatriation..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Daily Times"
2023-02-21
Date of entry/update: 2023-02-21
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Description: "The largest refugee exodus from Rakhine occurred over five years ago, in August 2017. Ever since, international policies for the Rohingya have insisted on voluntary repatriation to Myanmar as the solution for what was then one million and is now 1.1 million refugees living in and around Cox’s Bazaar. In 2017-2018, Cox’s Bazaar in Bangladesh became home to the biggest refugee camps in the world. Much ink was then spilled over how much blame should be apportioned to the Tatmadaw and how much to Aung San Suu Kyi’s NLD government. Since then, there has been the COVID epidemic and the February 1, 2021 coup in Myanmar, and the issue has faded from the international press. And very quietly, at least 100,000 new refugees were added to the camp population due to a surging birth rate. But in global terms, what was once the most important refugee crisis in the world was exceeded by the millions leaving Syria, Venezuela, and Ukraine, and who have been accepted albeit begrudgingly into societies of the Middle East, Europe, and Latin America. And still, the policy of the international community for the Rohingya is that all must repatriate to Myanmar as soon as possible. A repatriation policy, even before the 2021 coup, was foolish. Mass repatriation would have further victimized the Rohingya and destabilized Rakhine, even before the Tatmadaw sent the NLD government into prison, exile, and revolt after February 1, 2021. The reaction to a mass repatriation would destabilize the border region in a way that risks direct confrontation between the Burmese and Bangladesh militaries. So it is a good thing that the refugees have not yet returned. Nevertheless, the international community continues with its argument for mass voluntary repatriation to Myanmar, pointing out, accurately, that Myanmar’s military governments perpetrated the expulsions in the first place, so justice demands that they restore Rohingya rights. This is true in a legalistic sense, but given the political situation in Rakhine in particular, it is foolish. The Rohingya situation still contains the seeds for further humanitarian catastrophe.....Dangers in Cox’s Bazaar....To continue claiming that the Cox’s Bazaar refugee camps are the biggest in the world seems quaint in the context of refugee exoduses from Ukraine, Venezuela, and Syria. Oddly enough, these three crises, which involve vastly more refugees than the Rohingya situation, are dealt with better by the international community. In large part this is because Europe accepts the Ukrainian refugees as a regional problem; Latin America accepts the Venezuelans as a regional problem; and the Middle East and Europe (especially Turkey) accept the Syrian exodus as a regional problem. This means that many refugees get relief supplies from the international community, labor markets support others, and integration programs where refugees seek work until they can return voluntarily to their home country are common. This strains the capacity of countries like Turkey, Germany, and Colombia to protect refugees. In contrast, the Rohingya crisis is seen as a Bangladeshi and Myanmar problem, which permits other South Asian and ASEAN countries to look away and the UNHCR to maintain it is still “Working towards and preparing for the sustainable return of the Rohingya refugees… to Myanmar.” But working toward such a goal is dangerous and ill-advised. Cox’s Bazaar remains vulnerable to typhoons, as well as the predictable dangers found in refugee camps everywhere. In Cox’s Bazaar, the dangers are of young men becoming radicalized in the isolated refugee camp environment by Islamicists who appeal to legitimate grievances. For young women, there are babies, lots of them! As in most crises where refugees are from rural areas, babies are being born at a rate that means the 1 million camp population will become 2 million in about 2040, just 17 years from now. And finally is the fact that Cox’s Bazaar lies in the Bay of Bengal, where the world’s most destructive typhoons strike, as Bangladesh and Myanmar are well aware; massively destructive typhoons are central to the histories of both countries.....Refugee radicalization....Radicalization in refugee camp situations is common and predictable. The massive refugee camp that is the Gaza Strip of Palestine is an excellent example. This camp has been a source of political instability since it was established in 1948. Radicalized Rwandan refugee camps in central Africa triggered attacks on Congo by the Rwandan government in the 1990s, starting a regional war that has killed millions. In Thailand, refugee camps along the Cambodian border were used as bases by Cambodian factions from 1978 to the 1990s. The point is that young men coming of age in abject isolated refugee camps are vulnerable to militia recruiters feeding on injustices embedded in any refugee situation. That this is already happening in the Cox’s Bazaar camps should be of little surprise to the international community, Bangladesh, or Myanmar. The reality is that the longer a refugee camp lasts, the more likely that groups of its aimless young boys will join militia movements and criminal gangs. This typically begins a year or two after arrival, as it has with the Rohingya. The process will accelerate when, 15-20 years after the camps are established, the many boys born during the period after resettlement come of age to carry guns. The militaries of both Bangladesh and Myanmar are well aware of the security threat presented by the massive refugee camps near a sensitive border. The international community should be aware of the potential for escalation and conflict, including between the two nations, although the international community seems oblivious. Militia recruitment is less likely when refugee populations are away from borders, dispersed, and young men are offered the chances of schooling and jobs in a manufacturing or service economy.....Refugee baby booms and busts.....The reason the Rohingya will have a lot of soldiers in 15-20 years is that they are a rural farming population locked up in refugee camps, who still have high birth rates. What is more, the flight in 2017-2018 likely meant that the most vulnerable, including the elderly and the very young, died enroute or remained behind, and never arrived in Cox’s Bazaar. But the refugee mothers did arrive, and like most refugee populations, immediately began having more children. Bangladesh’s Home Minister Asaduzzaman Khan Kamal reported there are now about 35,000 births in the camps per year. This rate is expected to accelerate, no matter how aggressive the birth control programs are. This was the experience with Rwandan refugees who were provided with aggressive birth control programs in 1994-1996 that did not work. It was also the case with refugees from Laos and Cambodia who left for Thailand and the United States in the 1980s and 1990s. Refugee women who lose babies and pregnancies through the stresses of flight and resettlement deeply desire children. That situation, plus the fact that the weak, sick, and elderly died and remained behind, means that if nothing is done in Cox’s Bazaar, the population growth rate will likely reach 3% per year, as it has in other refugee populations. In the case of the Rohingya, this means births will exceed deaths by about 30,000 per year, and the population will double in size every 23 years or so. Demography for a refugee population like the Rohingya can indeed be destiny. It is easy to project how many school places, how many factory laborers, and how many soldiers will be available for militia recruitment in the next 10, 20, or 30 years. Basic math also tells us that when the population growth rate reaches 3% per year, there will be another million refugees in Cox’s Bazaar in just 23 years, even if there is no further catastrophe.....The obvious solution.....There is an obvious short-term solution to the Rohingya situation and the threat from typhoons, military confrontation, baby booms, and dependency in the Cox’s Bazaar camps. That solution is for the global community, and particularly countries in Asia, to resettle the Rohingya from Cox’s Bazaar into the cities of the broader region. Since the Rohingya exodus in 2017, two far larger refugee crises have been dealt with in this fashion. The 7 million “refugees and migrants” who left Venezuela are now in Colombia, and other Latin American countries. Eight million or more have fled mostly Ukraine to countries in Europe and Central Asia since 2021. And 6-7 million Syrian refugees have been absorbed by countries like Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, and Germany. Turkey is now unusually vulnerable since it has taken the greatest number; tragically, 1.7 million of them are in the 10 provinces affected by the massive earthquake that struck earlier this month. The irony for Asia today is that baby booms like the Rohingya population explosion are becoming a phenomenon of the past. The Rohingya’s rural Asian counterparts are shrinking rapidly with mass urbanization. In Asia’s cities, birth rates are exceedingly low, and countries like Thailand, Singapore, United Arab Emirates, Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea have high demand for unskilled labor. To compensate, they find ways for rural peoples from places like Myanmar to enter their country (legally and illegally), to fill labor shortages in the factory and service sectors. Somehow, though, the Rohingya refugee camps still exist, keeping a potential source of much-needed service and factory workers away from the workplace.....The problem of Myanmar politics.....Myanmar politics are of course what caused the Rohingya exodus, not Bangladesh politics, or the Rohingya themselves. Obviously, fairness dictates that the Rohingya have a right to return to Myanmar, and their land restored. This is true in a moral sense. But what is morally perfect does not always equate to responsible politics. Insisting on a perfect moral solution can lead to foreseeable problems, such as militia threatening regional peace, soaring birth rates, and annual risk from the Bay of Bengal’s typhoons. The right of return is still there for people who wait out the chaos in their own country after resettling abroad, even for decades. Some Southeast Asians waited a generation before returning to Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia from the United States in recent years. Indeed, Bangladesh is among countries that know the refugee problem best – millions of Bangladeshis fled to India during and after the revolution in 1971. The current prime minister was herself a refugee in India for a few years in the 1980s. The refugees returned because the Bangladesh Revolution ended quickly. The Rohingya, Venezuelans, Ukrainians, and others may not be so lucky, though. The world should handle the Rohingya according to the situation they are in, not the morally perfect one wished for. For the Rohingya crisis, this means sharing the burden across the region, just as is now happening in Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East. Tony Waters is the author of Bureaucratizing the Good Samaritan (2001) and has written about refugee issues since the 1980s, and for The Irrawaddy since 2018. He taught sociology at California State University, Chico, and Peace Studies at Payap University in Thailand before moving to his current post at Leuphana University in Germany. His latest book is a translation from Thai, The Man from Bangkok: San Francisco Culture in the 1960s by Rong Wongsavun..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2023-02-16
Date of entry/update: 2023-02-16
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Abstract: Frequently called the most persecuted minority in the world, the Rohingyas have suffered systematic violence and oppression in Myanmar since the 1970s. Today, the vast majority of the nearly three million Rohingyas are in exile, escaping state-sponsored human rights violations and persecution in the Rakhine state of Myanmar—a place they call “home”. Neighbouring Bangladesh, which currently hosts over a million displaced Rohingya, has been a ‘sanctuary’ for at least the last four decades. A sizable community has also emerged successively in other South-East Asian countries and pockets of Australia, Europe and North America. In this context, bringing together issues at the crossroads of (im)mobilities, online connectivity and the quest for identity, this study examines the role of social media platforms in forming and shaping new types of diaspora activism among the exiled Rohingyas. Drawing on yearlong online ethnographic findings, it unpacks how digital platforms constitute a space for togetherness, where diasporic Rohingya identities are constructed, contested and mediated. Analysing recurring themes and patterns of engagement on these web-based platforms, the paper looks at how diasporic civic and political e-activisms are transforming the very contours of Rohingya identity formation and their pursuit of recognition. Finally, focusing on such a creative constellation of socio-cultural and political issues in virtual space, we demonstrate how Rohingyas practice a politics of resistance and recognition when confronting the policy pretensions of Myanmar’s government. Introduction “In the first place, we do not like to be called ‘refugees.’“—Hannah Arendt. In her classic essay “We Refugees”, Hannah Arendt describes the endless cognitive anxiety amongst the Jews of Europe as they fled the continent and made a new life in exile (Arendt, 2017). She depicts how difficult it is to relate to the psychological effects of political non-existence unless one has traversed the liminal space of a refugee. The contemporaneous of forced displacement, statelessness and the relentless search for a ‘safe place’ and an ‘identity’ across the globe reminds us how recurring and prescient Hannah Arendt’s century-old observation remains. Set within such interconnected trajectories of violence, statelessness and an endless search for identity, this paper puts a spotlight on Myanmar’s displaced Rohingyas—a scattered community in the process of becoming a nascent diaspora as a result of their protracted displacement. Since 2017, after their mass exodus from the Rakhine state into neighbouring Bangladesh, exiled Rohingya communities have started highlighting their plight while asserting a distinct ethnic identity (Ansar & Khaled, 2022; Abraham & Jaehn, 2020). Considering their increasing involvement in social, cultural and political issues on social media platforms, this article explores how the Rohingya diaspora has coalesced in digital spaces to build a transnational identity and how their digital activism has evolved to include a political dimension over time. Frequently termed ‘the world’s most persecuted minority’, the Rohingyas have been subjected to persistent human rights violations, including ethnic cleansing, statelessness and possibly even genocide (Khaled, 2021; Ansar, 2020; Ibrahim, 2018; Alam, 2018). By introducing punitive policies, Rohingyas have been categorically denied a range of fundamental rights by the Myanmar government, including the freedom of movement, rights to education, primary health facilities, having family, marriage and employment (Ansar & Khaled, 2021; Uddin, 2020). Ethnic cleansing and persecution of Rohingyas in Myanmar and denial of their citizenship (therefore, effectively rendering them stateless) has been the political strategy of the successive military regimes. Today, the vast majority of the nearly three million Rohingyas is displaced, mostly in neighbouring Bangladesh, Malaysia, India and Thailand, as well as in in pockets across Europe, Australia and North America. The predicament of the Rohingyas essentially remain unresolved in exile. The ambiguity around Rohingya’ s legal status pertaining to their perceived statelessness, irregular migration and lack of comprehensive protection policies in the host countries add to their struggle to survive and sustain. Most Rohingya-hosting Asian countries deny their rights as refugees stipulated in the 1951 Refugee Convention. Their confinement in makeshift settlements and sprawling camps, ambiguous and/or undocumented legal status and host countries’ arbitrary practices create certain mobility constraints, which Aziz (2022, p. 1) refers to as “immobility turn” or limited mobility within “situations of unequal power”. Furthermore, mobility is linked to legality and capacity in modern nation-states, which Rohingyas lack in Myanmar due to draconian military laws banning social gatherings and community mobilisation (Ansar & Khaled, 2022, p. 281). In exile, this “arrested refugee mobilities” (Hoffstaedter, 2019) that the Rohingya community continues to endure produces both horizontal (i.e., spatial/geographic) immobility and vertical (social) immobility, which cyclically compound each other (Jernigan, 2019). Nevertheless, amid such challenges, a diaspora network has grown, especially since 2017, with considerable online imprints. We define the growing digital footprint of the Rohingya community as the emergence of a ‘Rohingya Digital Diaspora’. Highlighting their increasing online participation, our findings reveal how such engagement reinvigorates a collective identity, mobilises civic resistance and builds a virtual ‘community of hope’ by providing material and emotional support. Reflecting on these evolving Rohingya online engagements, this study makes a threefold contribution to digital diaspora studies. First, we examined how the (re)production of Rohingya identities on social media demonstrates their hybrid, multi-layered and fluid nature. Second, considering the constrained offline space and (im)mobility dynamics, we looked into how access to social media can yield an opportunity for ethnic and religious minorities such as Rohingyas for transnational lobbying, advocacy and agenda-framing towards building a strategic and positive consensus around their cause. Third, while celebrating “digital optimism”, a nuanced reflection on the offline inequalities, such as those manifested by age, gender, internet access, economic status and spatiality, needs to be adequately contextualised. The debate on Rohingya identity: the unfolding of belonging, exclusion and exile The nation-state centric identity has always been marked by a high degree of hybridity and ambiguity in post-colonial societies. In South and Southeast Asia, “questions surrounding nationality, citizenship, religion and identity are recurrent themes between the countries once united but separate nation-states now” (Sengupta, 2020, p. 114). Similarly, ethnic and religious identity and space are constantly being contested, refined and reorganised in the political landscape of Myanmar. This is particularly prominent in the bordering Rakhine state, where the formation of Rohingya identity has been heavily influenced by such fluidity (Ansar, 2020, p. 4). Several issues appear to be decisive when we explore the documentation and broad historical analysis of how questions of Rohingya identity and conflict in the Rakhine state have arrived at this stage. These include: the stripping of the Rohingya citizenship and their statelessness (Uddin, 2020; Holliday, 2014); the role of Rohingyas during the colonial period (Alam, 2018; Ibrahim, 2018); military dictatorship and the emergence of Taing-Yin-tha meaning “national races” (Cheesman, 2017); and religion and the perceived threat from Islam (Ansar, 2020; Kyaw, 2015; Wade, 2017). These are just some of the profound issues to unpack in order to understand the making of the current crisis. Broadly, three lines of arguments can be identified when exploring the Rohingya identity. First, some scholars claim a historic Rohingya presence in Myanmar (Uddin, 2020; Shafie, 2019; Ibrahim, 2018). Secondly, there are scholars who tend to discredit such narratives that argue Rohingya is a post-colonial political identity promoted by the Muslim political elites in Arakan as a tool to promote their fight for political autonomy after the Second World War (Leider, 2018; Tonkin, 2014). The third line of argument instead takes a critical approach between the two opposing narratives. Going beyond the polarising opinions, it argues that the fundamental question of the process of identity formation and the complex status of the ethnic and religious minorities in post-colonial nation-state formation should be in the spotlight (Ansar, 2020; Sengupta, 2020; Alam, 2018). One of the watershed moments in modern-day Myanmar’s identity politics is the emergence of Taing-Yin-tha, or “the indigenous races”, under the 1982 citizenship law introduced by the military dictatorship in Myanmar. The concept of Taing-Yin-tha emerged as a decisive political language that provides the guideline of which facts are accepted and rejected in determining membership in Myanmar’s political community. In contemporary Myanmar, Taing-Yin-tha has become an exemplary term of state: a contrivance for political inclusion and exclusion, political eligibility and domination (Cheesman, 2017, p. 462). The Rohingya were not included among the 135 official indigenous races. Consequently, some 2.5 million Rohingyas are excluded from Taing-Yin-tha, making them one of the world’s largest stateless populations. They remain the only community in independent Myanmar whose citizenship is “still unresolved and contested by the government and people”(Kyaw, 2015, p. 50). Going further, Uddin (2020, p.4) argues that Myanmar’s dealing with the Rohingyas is not just a manifestation of their non-citizenship; it is precisely a practice meant to “reduce the Rohingyas to a status lesser than that of human beings”, and thereby push them into a ‘subhuman life’. From diaspora to digital diaspora: revisiting a complex transformation Diaspora is a concept subject to various definitions and interpretations (Ponzanesi, 2020). It is defined “as a set of relationships between the homeland, which functions as a centre of gravity, and a periphery of nodes—communities, groups and individuals—who relate to the territory of origin as a centre of gravity but live in different parts of the world” (Ben-David, 2012, p. 461). Earlier studies mainly considered the dispersed population as diaspora, i.e., the Jewish, Greek and Armenian communities in exile. Today, this term shares meanings “with a larger semantic domain that includes words like an immigrant, expatriate, refugee, guest worker, exile community, overseas community, ethnic community” (Tölölyan, 1991, p. 04). While a distinction between various forms of diasporas is plausible, community belongingness, a sense of loss, nostalgia and transnationality are universal features embedded in almost all diaspora communities. The influence of information and communication technology in the past decade has not only transformed the ways and scales of interactions among diaspora members but also led to a substantial transformation in the modern understanding of diaspora (Marat, 2015; Lobbé, 2021; Bernal, 2020). From structured networks of migrant websites to more personalised WhatsApp and Facebook groups, the wide variety of digital layers is taking the notion of diasporic organisations to a new height (Dekker et al., 2018; Dumitriu, 2012). In this changing milieu, hybrid and multifaceted migrant identities are constructed and negotiated through various discursive means (Georgalou, 2021). The advancements and proliferation of such online communication technologies encouraged a new form of virtual diasporic connections and networks that is gaining prominence as the digital diaspora. This connection reminds the members of “where their roots are, their original home, their sense of belonging, their community” (Ponzanesi, 2020, p. 983). Emerging scholarship has started to accentuate the evolving nexus between technological advancement, the proliferation of social media and the ability of diaspora populations to create networks and become part of transnational diaspora networks (Alonso & Oiarzabal, 2010; Kapur, 2010; Alunni, 2019). In digital migration studies, research has made a significant contribution to understanding refugees’ engagement with social media and other digital tools to stay in contact with transnational families during their migration, as well as during their process of settlement in the host countries (Alencar et al., 2018; Kaufmann, 2018; Leurs & Smets, 2018). Recent studies on digital diasporas also bring together complex intersections of technology, culture, political economy and agency (Bernal, 2020). For instance, in contrast to the earlier opinion of celebrating digital media as liberating and empowering for marginalised groups (Titifanue et al., 2018), more critical analysis now raises questions regarding the outcome of digital empowerment and whether such tools can bring about changes in the political and social discourse (Taylor & Meissner, 2020; Latonero & Kift, 2018; Papacharissi, 2015). Scholars also attempted to reveal how big corporations and states use digital platforms to extend their centralised power and use it for surveillance purposes when necessary (Bircan & Korkmaz, 2021; Zuboff, 2019). Furthermore, social media posts and activities are being systematically monitored to validate or disprove the LGBTIQ identity of many refugees requesting asylum in European countries. Targeted social media campaigns and recruitment of paid agents to monitor the Facebook activities of migrants have also become one of the strategies for governments to control and counter immigration (Andreassen, 2021; Brekke & Thorbjørnsrud, 2020). Scholars have also started to highlight the potentially pernicious role of digital tools in stimulating ‘digital nationalism’ by dividing public debate through the establishment of filter ‘bubbles’ and ‘echo chambers’ in which individuals with homogenous political thinking promote ethnocentric ideas and content that align with their views and opinions. (Mihelj & Jiménez-Martínez, 2021; Cardenal et al., 2019; Dubois & Blank, 2017). There is also growing criticism of the dominant strand of literature on digital migration studies that are heavily focused on the Global North, particularly Europe. Such criticism has become more widespread following the so-called refugee crisis in Europe in 2015, which demands a decentralised approach to diaspora and forced migration studies and input from the perspective of the Global South (Leurs & Smets, 2018). For instance, despite the scale and extent of the Rohingya crisis in Southeast Asia, literature that offers a nuanced understanding of their digital resistance and resilience remains inadequate. To date, we have come across only a few studies that partly address the digital engagement of Rohingya refugees (e.g., Aziz, 2022; Ansar & Khaled, 2022; Abraham & Jaehn, 2020). Taking a gender lens, Ansar & Khaled (2022) presents how social media has widened the scale and scope of Rohingya women activists’ civic participation in exile. In his latest work on Rohingya digital engagements, Aziz shows how digital platforms compensate for the community’s social and spatial immobility through “digitally mediated transnational care” (Aziz, 2022, p. 01). In another recent contribution, he also presents how “the affordances of social media platforms” have facilitated Rohingyas negotiating their protracted experiences of suffering (Aziz, 2022a, p. 4082). With a mix of online and offline platforms, Abraham and Jaehn’s study (2020) shows how “diasporic Rohingya actions go beyond readily understandable demands for justice, accountability, redress” and consciously, or otherwise, take steps to reaffirm collective Rohingya identity (p. 1056). Adding onto these unfolding dynamics, this article brings an organic reflection on this ‘digital diaspora in the making’ and their forms of engagement in online platforms and its manifold implications. Theoretical and methodological framework The paper’s theoretical foundations are based on the premise that scattered and oppressed ethnoreligious minorities or endangered groups, frequently organised in diasporas, use the internet to “re-create identities, share opportunities, spread their culture, influence homeland and host-land policy, or create debate about common-interest issues using electronic devices” (Alonso & Oiarzabal, 2010, p. 11). In an “unevenly interconnected world”, digital platforms provide spaces and offer alternatives to tap resources and capacity building, creating links and connectivity for dispersed communities (Ponzanesi, 2020, p. 978). This virtual space acts as “crucial protagonists” (Marino, 2015, p. 01) to manifest “diasporic identity, political activism and sentiment towards homeland” (Marat, 2015, p. 01). Besides, the “low barriers to entry and exit, and non-hierarchical and non-coercive” nature of the internet provides diasporas with a complete package of ‘benefits’ to pursue their socio-political and cultural endeavour on digital platforms (Brinkerhoff, 2009, pp. 47–48). Apart from creating a transnational network of solidarity, it allows the “expression of diverse and contested views” of the community members (Titifanue et al., 2018, p. 02). Given the access to digital platforms by the exiled Rohingyas and the scale and extent of their virtual engagement, we have employed digital ethnography (Pink, 2013) as a method for observing their activities in virtual space. It is argued that such internet-based observations “can creatively deploy forms of engagement to look at how these sites are socially constructed and, at the same time, are social conduits” with ‘online traces’ such as retweets, hyperlinks and hashtags (Hine, 2009, p. 11). The rapidity with which people across several platforms keep up to date and their willingness to argue and voice opposing perspectives when appropriate via these interconnected networks is even more remarkable (Postill & Pink, 2012). These diverse and fast-changing characteristics have also led to more nuanced and innovative methods of using online ethnography (Pink et al., 2016). We use a ‘discourse-centred’ (Androutsopoulos, 2009) online ethnography and employ a ‘screen-based’ discourse analysis that concentrates on “systemic longitudinal and repeated observations of online-discourse” (Georgalou, 2021, p. 4). In doing online ethnography, it is also pertinent to acknowledge the limitations of virtual platforms on the findings. For instance, Dicks et al. (2005, p.128) caution that the internet should never be read as a ‘neutral’ observation space, as it always remains a fieldwork setting and, as such, a researcher’s data selection and analyses are always biased by agendas, personal histories and social norms. Besides, the drawback of these research options is that membership of these communities is inherently restricted to the digital ‘haves’ (or at least those with digital social capital) rather than the ‘have nots’, and ethnic/gender digital divides strongly persist (Murthy, 2008). Therefore, like any other data source, social networking websites should be treated in a nuanced or layered fashion and contextualised properly (Murthy, 2008, p. 846). Informed consent appears to be a crucial aspect of researching online communities. Whether and to what extent informed consent is required remains a contested topic (Willis, 2017, p. 3). According to Association of Internet Researchers (AoIR) ethical guidelines, public forums can be considered more public than conversations in a closed chatroom (Ess and AoIR, 2002: pp. 5, 7). Hence, ‘the greater the acknowledged publicity of the venue, the less obligation there may be to protect individual privacy, confidentiality, right to informed consent, etc.’ (Ess and AoIR, 2002, p. 5). Whiteman (2012, p. 9) also suggests it is preferable to take a contextualised approach to each online situation instead of adhering to generalised, context-free principles. Considering the above observations, the researchers sought ethical guidance from their respective institutions and received prior ethical approval before conducting their research. Furthermore, given the sensitivities of the topic, individual posts, images and tweets shared in this article are blurred to maintain confidentiality and any information that discloses the individual identity has been carefully revisited and avoided when referring to the data and images. For data collection, we followed two major social media platforms: Facebook and Twitter. We analysed relevant Facebook and Twitter accounts and determined the top ten accounts based on the number of followers, the frequency of postings and the volume of comments. The Facebook pages and Twitter accounts were identified using eight search terms: ‘Rohingya refugee’, ‘Rohingya genocide’, ‘Rohingya women’, ‘exiled Rohingya’, ‘Rohingya activist’, ‘Arakan Rohingya’, ‘United Nations and Rohingya’ and ‘Rohingya in Bangladesh’. The qualitative corpus comprised posts and tweets that were open to the public. The study covers the period from August 2019 to August 2021. One of the authors has near-native fluency in the Rohingya language and initially attempted to explore Facebook pages and Twitter accounts on the Rohingya language despite the absence of Rohingya script, which remains an oral dialect (Aziz, 2022a, p. 4073). It did not yield significant success, prompting searching for relevant online platforms and social media tools using English.Footnote1 For instance, UNHCR in Malaysia has a dedicated website on “The Rohingya language”, which is written in Latin alphabets.Footnote2 Therefore, language and its digital representation bring another important dimension when exploring the Rohingya community’s social media engagement. The use of English in contemporary diaspora presents an ‘interesting cleavage’, as a native language is often considered a salient marker of collective identity (Kumar, 2018). We avoid the discussion at length here as it goes beyond the scope of our study; nonetheless, it is a crucial aspect to shed light on in future research on the Rohingyas. Nevertheless, we do acknowledge there are other platforms, including more private platforms like WhatsApp (Aziz, 2022a). We did not pursue these, as our purpose was to retrieve online and easily accessible data to any random visitor to those webpages. For analysis, the transcripts of Facebook discussions and tweets were manually inserted into a dataset. This dataset was then transferred and analysed using Max Q.D.A. software to categorise the thematic contents, frequency of words, hashtags and recurring themes. Through this categorisation and coding, key themes emerged. These themes were then merged and clustered thematically, as detailed in the following section. From exile to online: emergence of a digital Rohingya diaspora Multiple trajectories, including the construction of a collective Rohingya identity, political and social mobilisation and solidarity with fellow Rohingyas through providing information and long-distance emotional and material support, have emerged as the recurring features of their digital engagements. The internet has effectively bridged geographical barriers amongst Rohingyas with similar concerns by functioning as a ‘mobilising structure’ (Kumar, 2018, p. 11). The proliferation of virtual engagements creates conditions where individuals come together on shared hopes, purposes and objectives, which Tsagarousianou (2007) defined as ‘co-presence’ and Marino (2015) refers to as ‘space making’. To detail out these manifold engagements, we conduct a two-pronged analysis of the Rohingya diaspora’s digital participation. First, we begin with a focus on the scale of engagement, bringing attention to their growing participation in digital space. Second, we take a more in-depth look at the domains of engagement, highlighting the key aspects that predominate in the interaction that takes place online. Scale of engagement Owing to rapid development and relatively easier access to technologies, more Rohingyas are embracing digital platforms to interact with one another and the greater international communities. For example, only three of the ten most followed Facebook pages were created before 2017. Table 1 presents an overview of the ten most popular (in terms of membership) Rohingya Facebook groups active in different parts of the world, where membership reaches as high as 223,000 as of August 2021 (see Table 1).Footnote3..."
Source/publisher: Nature.com
2023-02-15
Date of entry/update: 2023-02-15
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Sub-title: A recent Sinophone Borderlands public opinion survey sheds light on Bangladeshi views of the Rohingya, roughly a million of whom have been forced to seek refuge in Bangladesh.
Description: "February 15, 2023, marks the 2000th day since the start of the ethnic cleansing of the Rohingya. Although the historical background of the Rohingya crisis is much longer and more complicated, going back to World War II and including previous massacres/exoduses in 1978, 1991-92, 2012, and 2016, it was only in August 2017 that the news hit the global headlines and the story became well-known. In August 2017, the Kofi Annan Commission (established by Myanmar’s civilian National League of Democracy government to settle the Rohingya problem) prepared its report, a failed compromise. One day later, Myanmar military posts were attacked by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army, a guerrilla group operating in the Rakhine region. In their collective response, the Tatmadaw, Myanmar’s army, resorted to the worst retaliation possible. The Tatmadaw started a brutal campaign against the Rohingya. In the months that followed, more than 700,000 Rohingya fled to Bangladesh as the Tatmadaw committed ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, with “genocidal intent.” For Bangladesh, the crisis meant a new and unprecedented strain. The country has received Rohingya refugees since 1978, but the scale in 2017 was incomparable to previous exoduses. The official Bangladeshi position toward the Rohingya crisis has combined the acceptance of the refugees with the hope that the influx of people would only be temporary. Enjoying this article? Click here to subscribe for full access. Just $5 a month. On the one hand, Bangladesh openly welcomed the repressed group, presenting itself as a “good global citizen.” On the other hand, Dhaka later declared that the Rohingya must return to their origin country as soon as possible, and that it is Myanmar’s obligation to repatriate them while the international community and the United Nations must persuade Naypyidaw to do so. Since this never happened, Bangladesh and its citizens have to live with the consequences of the prolonged stay. As the religious, cultural, and humanitarian imperative to help oppressed brethren meets the socioeconomic tensions produced by forced immigration on such a scale, it is of vital importance to hear the voices of the Bangladeshi people. As part of the Sinophone Borderlands public opinion survey in Bangladesh in June-August 2022, more than 1,300 Bangladeshi respondents were asked an open-ended question about their perception of the Rohingya people. Respondents were drawn from all regions of Bangladesh and included a representative sample of age groups and genders. The timing of the survey coincided with the fifth anniversary of the brutal Tatmadaw offensive that sent Rohingya refugees fleeing across the border from Myanmar into Bangladesh. The survey question asked what first came to people’s minds when thinking of the Rohingya. The most common answers, as the word cloud above reveals, were “Muslim,” “tortured,” “helpless,” and “Myanmar.” This gives us a good idea of how Bangladeshis perceive the Rohingya people: as persecuted, helpless, Muslim people originally from Myanmar. The reason for the Rohingya being in Bangladesh is very clear to Bangladeshis, who provided responses such as “came from Myanmar,” ”tortured by Myanmar army,” or “brutality of Myanmar.” Also, the fact that the Rohingya people are predominantly Muslims is well-known and often highlighted in the responses (“tortured Muslims” or “persecuted Muslims,” for example). While the Rohingya are seen by many Bangladeshis as persecuted and expelled victims of the Myanmar army and people feel they should help them (see responses such as “expelled,” “victims,” “homeless,” “persecuted,” “neglected,” and “we should help”), there are also voices that see the Rohingya people as a threat (“destroying the Bangladeshi economy” or “harming Bangladesh”) and advocate for sending them back to Myanmar (“go back to Myanmar”). Issues such as drug dealing and a food crisis came up several times. Also, some label the Rohingya as foreigners who don’t belong to Bangladesh. That said, most Bangladeshis highlight the struggle for survival of the Rohingya people and express sadness over their situation and sympathy toward them. To conclude, the results of the survey show that among Bangladeshis, empathy toward the Rohingya, the repressed Muslim brothers and sisters, so far trumps tensions and challenges produced by their enforced, prolonged stay. Yet, the longer the Rohingya crisis is unresolved, the more probable a shift toward negative perceptions becomes..."
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Source/publisher: "The Diplomat" (Japan)
2023-02-15
Date of entry/update: 2023-02-15
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Description: "Despite having some ongoing crises worldwide, a piece of good news for the world is that Myanmar expresses its interest in taking back/repatriating some Rohingyas (estimated 700 Rohingya primarily) in Rakhine. Although the estimated number of refugees regarding Rohingya repatriation in Rakhine is very low, the significance of the issue seems to be very important. Myanmar military starts to understand that Rohingyas are the people of the Rakhine (Myanmar). It is appreciable that Myanmar understands the reality in the long run. But Myanmar should have goodwill and commitment to repatriate the Rohingyas. It would be pragmatic when Myanmar would ensure the implementation of its goodwill. Bangladesh is continuously emphasizing the efforts to facilitate early repatriation of the displaced people of Myanmar’s Rakhine state. However, it is a matter of hope to note that there is a sign of progress in negotiations over the repatriation of the Rohingya ethnic minority of Myanmar from Bangladesh who were subjected to expulsions from Myanmar in 2017. Earlier, Bangladesh signed a bilateral agreement with Myanmar on 30 October 2017 and on 30 October 2018 respectively. But the world didn’t see the implementation of the agreement. Although there are more than 1 million Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh. 0.7 million new ones have come, 0.4 million from before. Bangladesh has shown its humanity by sheltering these huge numbers of Rohingyas. Neighboring Myanmar, on the other hand, has always played a controversial role at home and abroad. Which is beyond diplomatic etiquette. According to various reports published in Bangladeshi newspapers recently, the junta government of Myanmar has sent a letter expressing its interest in taking back the Rohingyas. Myanmar’s junta says it is working to bring back Rohingya refugees who fled Rakhine State for Bangladesh following the military’s supposed counter-insurgency operations in 2017. Junta leaders, including International Cooperation Minister U Ko Ko Hlaing, Border Affairs Minister Lieutenant General Tun Tun Naung, Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement Minister Dr. Thet Thet Khaing and Immigration and Population Minister U Myint Kyaing, visited Maungdaw on the Bangladesh border on Sunday and instructed the authorities to prepare transit camps for repatriation. One Maungdaw resident said: “I heard they asked departments to make transit camps ready, that they would take back refugees from Bangladesh, that they would make preparations whether [Rohingya] come back or not.” Some Muslim and Hindu leaders from Maungdaw were summoned to Sittwe to meet junta ministers. Ko Khin Maung from a Rohingya refugee camp in Bangladesh said whether the Rohingya will return to Maungdaw depends on the junta’s honesty and the refugees have little trust in the repatriation program. “We do want to return. We are experiencing hardships, after staying for a long time in refugee camps. But the question is if we will be allowed to go back to our homes. It is not OK for us if we will just be held at the Hla Poe Kaung transit camp. The repatriation program will not be successful if the regime is dishonest,” he said. Rohingya rights activist U Nay San Lwin, co-founder of the Germany-based Free Rohingya Coalition, said the Rohingya would not return unless their rights are guaranteed. “The news of junta ministers making inspection tours at the border to take back refugees is no longer news to us. We are used to hearing such news. And refugees are not excited anymore. The military moves slightly when there are growing pressures from the international community and China. Nothing more than that,” U Nay San Lwin said. Recently, the regime sent back over 900 Rohingya detained in Yangon and elsewhere in Myanmar to Maungdaw. They will reportedly be accommodated at transit camps but The Irrawaddy could not independently verify this. The regime’s repatriation moves, according to some Rohingya activists, are an attempt to salvage its international reputation and help its case at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), where Myanmar faces genocide charges. A brutal military crackdown in the wake of Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army attacks on police outposts in Rakhine in 2017 forced more than 700,000 Rohingya to flee across the Bangladesh border. In response The Gambia in November 2019 brought a case at the ICJ, accusing Myanmar of committing genocide against the Rohingya. On November 23, 2017, Bangladesh and the now-ousted National League for Democracy government signed a repatriation agreement but there has been no progress. Bangladesh hopes to repatriate 750000 Rohingyas in various phases. And this repatriation is supposed to be done voluntarily and by ensuring a safe environment. The United Nations will also be involved in this process. The process of Rohingya repatriation has been stalled for a long time due to elections, military coups, and the Covid-19 pandemic in Myanmar. More than 700000 Rohingyas were forced to migrate to Bangladesh after the start of the military operation in Rakhine on August 25, 2017. Despite international pressure, the Myanmar government made an agreement with Bangladesh to take back the Rohingyas, but the repatriation has not started even today. On the contrary, Myanmar has repeatedly obstructed the repatriation process by resorting to various tactics. The international community has also not taken a strong stand on the Rohingya issue. On the contrary, they ended their ‘liability’ with boastful words. The Prime Minister of Bangladesh Sheikh Hasina has always shown humanity on the Rohingya issue. Myanmar’s current interest should not be manipulated in the end. In this case, Bangladesh must remain vigilant as always. If we want fruitful and durable repatriation of Rohingyas in Rakhine, now the international community must compel Myanmar to abide by some international customary law regarding the repatriation of the Rohingya. Myanmar government must fulfill such criteria: 1) Rohingya repatriation must be safe, continual, dignified, and sustainable based that is something Myanmar must guarantee. 2) They should amend the ‘1982 citizenship law. They must consider Rohingyas as a legal ethnic group in Myanmar. 3) Safe zone for Rohingyas must be ensured. 4) They must fulfill the requirements or proposals of the Kofi Annan Commission (The Advisory Commission on Rakhine State), Bangladesh Prime Minister’s proposals at the 74th, 75th, 76th UN General Assembly. 5) However, analysts advise Bangladesh to be cautious if Myanmar now wants to take back 700 people. They must keep their words. Myanmar must confirm it will take back all stranded Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh. 6) They must be committed that the process would be a continual process. All Rohingya would be repatriated gradually. 7) Bangladesh needs to increase diplomatic contacts Bangladesh needs to take a holistic stance on the Rohingya issue in various forums regarding the proposed Rohingya repatriation. Third parties such as UNHCR, Aasen even third countries can be included in the process. 8) Myanmar must act as a friendly neighbour with Bangladesh. It isn’t possible for Myanmar and Bangladesh to interchange the neighbours. Basically, Myanmar and Bangladesh must engage with neighbourly spirit. Myanmar and Bangladesh must strengthen their ties to resolve the long-pending Rohingya crisis. Whole South Asia and Southeast Asia could benefit from resolving this regional humanitarian crisis. 9) Myanmar must have goodwill to engage positively with Bangladesh. The world wants to see a fruitful and sustainable solution to the Rohingya crisis. Rohingya crisis solution would be essential for the safe and dignified repatriation of Rohingya people to Myanmar from Bangladesh. However, Myanmar’s proposed Rohingya repatriation process must be smoothly implemented, continual, sustainable..."
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Source/publisher: "Eurasia Review"
2023-02-13
Date of entry/update: 2023-02-13
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Description: "Myanmar’s junta says it is working to bring back Rohingya refugees who fled Rakhine State for Bangladesh following the military’s supposed counter-insurgency operations in 2017. Junta leaders, including International Cooperation Minister U Ko Ko Hlaing, Border Affairs Minister Lieutenant General Tun Tun Naung, Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement Minister Dr. Thet Thet Khaing and Immigration and Population Minister U Myint Kyaing, visited Maungdaw on the Bangladesh border on Sunday and instructed the authorities to prepare transit camps for repatriation. One Maungdaw resident said: “I heard they asked departments to make transit camps ready, that they would take back refugees from Bangladesh, that they would make preparations whether [Rohingya] come back or not.” Some Muslim and Hindu leaders from Maungdaw were summoned to Sittwe to meet junta ministers. Ko Khin Maung from a Rohingya refugee camp in Bangladesh said whether the Rohingya will return to Maungdaw depends on the junta’s honesty and the refugees have little trust in the repatriation program. “We do want to return. We are experiencing hardships, after staying for a long time in refugee camps. But the question is if we will be allowed to go back to our homes. It is not OK for us if we will just be held at the Hla Poe Kaung transit camp. The repatriation program will not be successful if the regime is dishonest,” he said. Rohingya rights activist U Nay San Lwin, co-founder of the Germany-based Free Rohingya Coalition, said the Rohingya would not return unless their rights are guaranteed. “The news of junta ministers making inspection tours at the border to take back refugees is no longer news to us. We are used to hearing such news. And refugees are not excited anymore. The military moves slightly when there are growing pressures from the international community and China. Nothing more than that,” U Nay San Lwin said. Recently, the regime sent back over 900 Rohingya detained in Yangon and elsewhere in Myanmar to Maungdaw. They will reportedly be accommodated at transit camps but The Irrawaddy could not independently verify this. The regime’s repatriation moves, according to some Rohingya activists, are an attempt to salvage its international reputation and help its case at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), where Myanmar faces genocide charges. A brutal military crackdown in the wake of Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army attacks on police outposts in Rakhine in 2017 forced more than 700,000 Rohingya to flee across the Bangladesh border. In response The Gambia in November 2019 brought a case at the ICJ, accusing Myanmar of committing genocide against the Rohingya. On November 23, 2017, Bangladesh and the now-ousted National League for Democracy government signed a repatriation agreement but there has been no progress. Rohingya refugees have been widely referred to as “Bengalis” by Myanmar’s authorities, implying they are interlopers from Bangladesh..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2023-02-09
Date of entry/update: 2023-02-09
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Sub-title: What are the prospects of a dignified repatriation for the Rohingya?
Description: "The year 2022 was a “year of confluence” for the Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh, where many positive developments happened in favour of their repatriation. Alternatively, there were some negative developments as well where new impediments emerged to hinder the repatriation process. Though Bangladesh has successfully included the Rohingya crisis in the international discussion and displayed significant developments to initiate repatriation, pathetically, more than five years have passed since the Rohingya influx in Bangladesh, but the repatriation of the 1.2 million Myanmar nationals has not seen light. However, the year 2022 marked a significant progress in the repatriation process, as the Rohingya themselves tried to draw the attention of the international community to express their desire to return to their home. On June 19, 2022, the Rohingya staying in various camps in Bangladesh organized a “Go Home campaign” and put forward their demands and expressed their interest to return to their homeland. In August, during the 5th anniversary of their exodus into Bangladesh, they reiterated the urgency of repatriation to their homeland. Moreover, the campaign is continued under the banner “Go Home Campaign 2023” demanding safe repatriation to their country on December 31 on the eve of the New Year. At this time, the Rohingya demonstrated with posters and placards saying “Enough is enough, let's go home, 2023 should be Rohingya home year.” Bangladesh government's decision to relocate Rohingya to Bhasan Char, to reduce the pressure on the overpopulated Rohingya camps in Cox's Bazar, was a discreet and timely move in 2022. After reaching a batch of 963 Rohingya in the 14th phase on October 17, so far around 30,079 Rohingya reached Bhashan Char. Despite initial hesitations, the US and Japan, the UN, and Canada joined the Bhasan Char project in August 2022. A ray of hope for the Rohingya refugees was lit, when the hearing of Gambia's case at the ICJ ended on February 28 last year. Significantly, on July 22, the court dismissed Myanmar's objections to jurisdiction over the case, and ordered Myanmar to respond to the complaint by April 24 of this year. The NUG, led by Aung Sung Su Kyi's NLD, responded positively that it would cooperate with the trial, and the pro-democratic party aims to establish relations with the local population in the Rakhine region to ensure the safe repatriation of the Rohingya. The year is also significant for many remarkable bilateral and multilateral initiatives, which are instrumental to propel the process of repatriation a step further. Bilaterally, on June 14, the 5th joint working group meeting between Bangladesh and Myanmar on the repatriation of the Rohingya was held, where the speedy return of the Rohingya to Myanmar was discussed. In her address to the 27th International Nikkei Conference, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina urged Asian countries to work closely for the safe repatriation of the Rohingya. Among the global powers, no other country than the US has made significant strides to solicit the crisis. On March 21, The US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken announced the violence against the Rohingya in Myanmar as genocide and crimes against humanity. In September, the US announced more than $170 million in additional humanitarian assistance for Rohingya inside and outside Burma, as well as for host communities in Bangladesh. In November, the US initiated a rehabilitation program for the Rohingya living in Bangladesh and introduced a historic “BURMA ACT.” From December 3 to 7, the US Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration Julieta Valls Noyes visited Rohingya Camps and discussed relocation programs. On December 8, 24 Rohingya left for the US from a group of 62 Rohingya, identified for resettlement. The role of China is also an important factor in facilitating Rohingya repatriation. Despite Beijing's controversial axis with Myanmar, during his visit to Bangladesh on August 6, China's State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi said that China is working sincerely to find a solution to the Rohingya crisis. Cambodian Deputy Prime Minister Prak Sokhon, ASEAN Chair's Special Envoy to Myanmar, also assured Bangladesh of making all-out efforts for a sustainable solution to the Rohingya issue. On the multilateral level, the Rohingya quagmire was discussed as a serious concern at numerous UN forums throughout the year. The UNGA unanimously adopted the resolution entitled "The situation of human rights of Rohingya Muslims and other minorities in Myanmar" for the first time on November 16, 2022. A Tripartite Memorandum of Understanding was signed between Myanmar, UNHCR, and UNDP to create an enabling environment for the repatriation of Rohingya in Rakhine State according to the resolution. This will play a significant role in strengthening the collective efforts of the UN member states for a sustainable solution to the Rohingya problem. Meanwhile, UNHCR High Commissioner Filippo Grandi has called on regional countries to come forward to repatriate the Rohingya, stressing the continuation of humanitarian assistance to the refugees. Since December 21, the Rohingya problem has become part of the regular activities of the UN Security Council, as the UNSC adopted a historic resolution on Myanmar for the first time, calling for an immediate end of ongoing violence. The proposal emphasized on solving the Rohingya problem with a particular emphasis. It also emphasized the speedy and full implementation of the five-point consensus adopted by ASEAN member states in 2021. Though the year was overwhelmed with many positive events, the Rohingya crisis witnessed several challenges throughout the year. Since August, fierce clashes and heavy gun fights broke out between the Arakan army and the Myanmar army along the Bangladesh border in North Maungdu and lasted for about three months. To reduce border tension, the 8th border conference between BGB and BGP was held from November 23 to 27. Meanwhile, in a meeting between BGB and BGP officials, Bangladesh's concerns regarding the quick repatriation of Rohingya were informed. From the security perspective, the failure to create an environment conducive to safe and sustainable voluntary return has exacerbated the Rohingya's frustration, leading to a variety of security concerns and instability. Till October 2022, 125 people have been killed in the Rohingya camps. Human trafficking and illegal trafficking of methamphetamine “Yaba” tablets from Myanmar to other neighbouring countries have increased alarmingly. In the last five years, 2,441 cases have been filed in Rohingya camps for various crimes including posession of weapons, drugs, rape, kidnapping, robbery, assault on police, murder, and human trafficking. Rohingya leaders and volunteers were the targets of these killings within the camps. The ongoing instability may spread organized crimes to other parts of the country, which will pose a regional and global security threat in the upcoming days. From the economic perspective, dwindling funds for the Rohingya camps also deteriorated the humanitarian crisis. In 2022, only 43% of the required amount of $881m under the Joint Response Plan (JRP) has been disbursed, which leaves room for consideration. As around 35,000 children are born in the camps every year, this increased population is gradually putting pressure on humanitarian assistance. From 2017 to 2023, the Rohingya problem remains unresolved and the crisis is becoming a “frozen and protracted” one over the years. A long-term plan must be developed to address a sustainable solution, which is nothing but dignified repatriation. In any situation, it is imperative to keep the flow of the relief and financial aid, and therefore, necessary measures should be taken on an urgent basis. On the political front, ARNA and other organizations working with the Rohingya must work together to create an enabling environment for repatriation. The ongoing awareness activities undertaken to resolve the crisis should also be continued. In addition, more robust steps must be taken to ensure the progress of initiatives taken in 2022 in the international arena. If these activities are implemented promptly, it is expected that the solution to the Rohingya problem will see the light of day in the forthcoming days..."
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Source/publisher: "Dhaka Tribune" (Bangladesh)
2023-01-29
Date of entry/update: 2023-01-29
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Description: "While conflict continues in Myanmar in the aftermath of the military coup, the political crisis in Rakhine State is often overlooked. Here the Rohingya emergency shows no sign of ending, but the growing strength of the United League of Army/Arakan Army is changing the landscape on the ground. In the aftermath of a ‘humanitarian’ ceasefire, Kyaw Lynn analyses political trends in this commentary, examining why the ULA/AA has become an influential actor in any likely resolution of the Rohingya crisis. Inter-community approaches and understandings will be key. While the question of Rohingya repatriation remains under grave challenge, the movement and exodus of the Rohingya population from inside and outside of Arakan (Rakhine State) has lately been increasing. According to the October report of the Burma Human Rights Network, the number of Rohingya arrested for travelling without official permission during 2022 is 2,075, which is higher than the previous year. In recent weeks, it was also reported that around 250 Rohingya people on two boats attempting to approach Malaysia were trapped in the Malacca Straits due to engine failure. The reports said that there was another boat carrying around 180 people but still missing. The implications are clear. For Rohingya people who seek to migrate to a foreign country the dangerous sea route has become a critical alternative because they are more likely to be arrested through land routes by car or train inside Myanmar. Meanwhile the process intended to protect the rights of the Rohingya people continues at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague. But this is doing little to alleviate the situation of Rohingya communities inside Arakan or in the refugee camps in Bangladesh who find less hope for their future. International actions appear to be at an impasse. As these crises continue, new questions have arisen during the past year in finding solutions to the Rohingya crisis with the emergence of a new actor, the United League of Arakan/Arakan Army (ULA/AA), in the politics of Arakan. This is especially the case in northern parts of Rakhine State bordering Bangladesh where the majority of the Rohingya population lives. To put the situation in context: the ULA is the political wing of the Arakan Army, which was established in April 2009 under the leadership of Gen. Twan Mrat Naing in an area controlled by the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) along the China border. Since this time, the group has been consistently training and arming new members while joining the armed struggle with allied forces, notably the KIO, (Kokang) Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army and Ta’ang National Liberation Army, against the Myanmar military, mostly in Kachin and northern Shan states. The group is also said to have a military base in territories controlled by the Karen National Union near the Thailand border, which is mainly used for logistics and new recruitment. While the first arrival of AA soldiers into the Arakan battlefield is difficult to exactly date, many observers have noted that, since 2015, AA soldiers with arms and military equipment can be found in forest areas of Paletwa township, Chin State, and bordering areas with Bangladesh and India. Subsequently, intensive and more frequent clashes against the Myanmar military in Rakhine State began in mid-2018, reaching a peak in 2019 and ending in late 2020 with a ‘de facto’ or ‘informal’ ceasefire just after the 2020 general election. The ULA/AA had emerged as a major force, with consequences that are still developing. This ‘first’ ULA/AA ceasefire brought new changes not just in Arakan politics but also to Myanmar as a whole. For nationwide politics, it means that the armed conflict between the Myanmar military and ethnic armed organisations is no longer confined to the China and Thailand borders. The ceasefire also demonstrated the de facto acceptance by Myanmar military leaders of the existence of the AA in Arakan, a position that they had previously rejected. Equally important, the truce caused a change in the gravity of the political centre from electoral political parties to armed groups, notably the ULA/AA, which controls executive functions and administers the judiciary in large swathes of territory in rural areas of the northern and central townships in Rakhine State. The scale of this build-up, in turn, increased tensions with an older but small, and less popular, Rakhine armed group known as the ‘Arakan Liberation Party/Army’ (ALP/ALA). A signatory of the 2015 Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, the ALP/ALA is mostly perceived as a force supporting the military State Administration Council (SAC) by both the ULA/AA leadership and the majority Rakhine population. In the past, there were attempts to merge the two movements together, but there have also been confrontations, including clashes on the Bangladesh and India borders. As a sign of the worsening situation, the ULA arrested at least ten ALP members during the past year, accusing them of collaborating with the SAC in surveillance activities and arresting civilians and ULA/AA members. In the latest incident on the evening of 4 January, the ALP/ALA’s military chief and two junior colleagues were assassinated in a car in the state capital Sittwe. The ALP accused the ULA, charges which the ULA denied. Instead, the party spokesperson pointed to internal divisions within the ALP leadership or the possibility of political manipulation by a third party (possibly the SAC) which wanted to further complicate relations between them. To date, however, neither side has provided effective evidence to support their positions, while the SAC has remained surprisingly silent about these deaths. As these events testify, Rakhine State today has ceasefires but it does not have peace. As in the rest of the country, new approaches are essential if lasting peace and justice are to be achieved. RELATED The Nature of Parallel Governance and Its Impact on Arakan Politics A Myanmar Commentary by Kyaw Lynn POST-ELECTION CRISIS IN POLITICAL TRANSITION MYANMAR COMMENTARY Article by Kyaw Lynn Publication date: 24 February 2022 The ‘de facto’ or ‘informal’ ceasefire For the moment, the Sittwe assassinations are dominating the media headlines. But it has not detracted attention in Arakan from the ULA/AA’s emergence as a potential actor in solving the Rohingya crisis. In particular, a state-building and nation-building agenda, announced by the ULA Chairman Gen. Twan Mrat Naing in April 2021, raised questions about how the ULA leadership intend to handle the role of the Rohingya community in Rakhine State. This is a question that became ever more pertinent during the first 20 months of ‘informal’ ceasefire following its 2020 inception. During this time, the ULA claimed to include the local Rohingya community in its military, judiciary and administrative sectors. The situation on the ground remained very difficult, exacerbated by the SAC coup in February 2021. But whether relations by the ULA towards the local Rohingya community were satisfying or not, some positive changes could be seen when it came to social cohesion and political inclusion with the ULA authorities in the field. This marked a new climate in inter-community affairs. A more challenging phase, however, began when armed clashes broke out between the Myanmar military and AA near Rohingya villages in Maungdaw and Buthidaung townships between August and November 2022. Unlike previous rounds of conflict, the negative impact of the fighting visibly affected not just the local Rakhine population but also the Rohingya and other minority communities. Negative consequences ranged from the blockage of trade, travel and humanitarian assistance to the displacement of villagers, civilian casualties and human rights violations. The ULA/AA was now visibly in the front-line of the Rohingya crisis in northern Rakhine State, a position that became even clearer when a new ‘humanitarian’ ceasefire was agreed with the SAC in late November. This resulted in affirming the AA’s ground control over many parts of Maungdaw and Buthidaung townships. In consequence, as 2023 begins, the ULA appears as one of the most responsible and visible stakeholders in any process of refugee repatriation from Bangladesh. Clearly, relations with the Rohingya community have approached a critical time. But the future path will not be easy, and there will be yet more complex scenarios ahead. Engagement by the ULA towards the Rohingya issue For the present, approaches by the ULA towards the Rohingya issue need to be analyzed based upon two key issues: its policy stand on the question of a repatriation process, and its governance policy toward the Rohingya community inside Arakan. On 19 September 2022, for the first time since the 2017 ‘regional clearance’ operations by the Myanmar military against the Rohingya population in north Arakan, the ULA/AA spokesperson stated the movement’s position on refugee repatriation from Bangladesh: "Some people consider the ULA has a responsibility for the resolution of the Rohingya crisis. If it is to be so, there shall be two things. First, the international community and Bangladesh should recognize the ULA/AA as the main stakeholder in the resolution of this crisis. Secondly, Bangladesh and other Great Powers, including the United Nations, should give full support and stand together with us." To date, there have been few visible responses from the Rohingya population or international community on the ULA’s position. But this policy statement can be seen as a more active move by the ULA leadership regarding refugee repatriation and resolution of the Rohingya crisis as a whole. In a highly difficult landscape, ULA leaders have always regarded the issue as a political suicide that could bring them into the ‘enemy’s trap’ – a reference to the political ‘divide-and-rule’ games played by the Myanmar military. Indeed, after the ULA statement, there were rumours of political plots in Rakhine State by the SAC involved from behind. These included the secret distribution during the night of pamphlets in markets and houses in urban areas of Mrauk-U and Sittwe asking: "Why are there Bengali people in the AA if they march in line with the “Way of Rakhita?" and ‘Do you know that the AA is supported by the OIC and Muslim countries?’ At the same time, some pro-SAC media also started to raise provocative questions like ‘Why did the AA say to receive back Bengali refugees if they are really fighting for the Rakhine people?’ As history has shown, there are no easy answers for those seeking to accelerate the finding of just solutions. The Rohingya crisis has become a complex admixture of various components, including the protection of human rights, the rights to citizenship, international investigations by the ICJ and International Criminal Court, grievances over communal violence, competing historical narratives, and perceived threats of political extremism. The outcome is a highly polarized environment and different opinions among the various actors, including between the majority Rakhine population and the Western international community, which has empathetically stood on the side of the Rohingya community regarding the rights to citizenship and human rights issues for most of the time. Despite these difficulties, it seems that the ULA leadership have decided they have to consider their stand on the two issues of repatriation and governance policy toward the Rohingya population as a matter of necessity rather than of choice. They cannot afford to disappoint the different sides if their key political destinations are to be achieved with tangible results. Currently, the ULA leadership appears to believe that building better relations with the remaining Rohingya population inside Arakan is fundamental and more pragmatic in showing their political will in inter-community relations not just to international observers but also to the rest of the Rohingya population outside of the state. Promoting reconciliation among the members of various communities in Arakan, as well as inclusion of Rohingya communities within local administration, are clearly essential. In this regard, the ULA authorities have been conducting two critical ‘missions’ to support the involvement of the Rohingya community in the state. The first mission is mainly implemented through the participation of various community members in the celebration of events like football matches, traditional wrestling ‘Krin’ festivals and music ‘live-show performances’ on culturally-important days in ULA-controlled rural areas. Rohingya community, religious, and youth leaders have been invited by ULA officials and media agencies allowed to publicize these gatherings with news and photos. Following a football event in January 2022 in Kyauktaw township, a Rohingya community leader said: "I believe that the essence of the football match held by the ULA is to achieve social cohesion and community reconciliation among the diverse groups, and we were also allowed to discuss and participate in it from the beginning." Through these activities, it is safe to argue that social interaction between Rohingya and Rakhine communities in ULA-controlled rural areas is comparatively higher than that in SAC-controlled urban and suburban areas. In the second mission to promote inter-community understanding, ULA governing bodies have included the local Rohingya population in various departments, including the military, police, administration, taxation and judiciary. In a well-publicized example, the ULA released a video in May 2020 in which a Rohingya soldier serving in the AA questioned some Rohingya locals in Buthidaung township regarding a criminal case in their own language. Similar confirmation can be found in the administrative sector in an interview with the Chairman of Minbya township Muslim Council who said: "The local ULA officers recognize and respect our organization. When they make a decision, they first consult and negotiate with the village administrators, including us, and there is very little corruption. As the ULA governance came to exist in my area, there are fewer crimes like theft, murder, and criminal gang activities." Despite these developments, there are still open questions over the extent to which the ULA leadership tolerates inclusion of the Rohingya community in decision-making processes and political representation in the longer-term. In addition, there have been accusations against AA soldiers over human rights violations during the recent clashes with the Myanmar military in Maungdaw and Buthidaung townships. In some cases, the ULA authorities investigated the cases and imprisoned the perpetrators with what were considered to be appropriate punishments. But challenges remain, and different perceptions continue. The ULA leadership and Rakhine community, for example, believe that conflict negatively impacts not only on the Rohingya but also Rakhine and other nationalities who are struggling for the sake of a better future for all people of Arakan. In contrast, a large segment of the Rohingya community might still consider their situation as between a rock and a hard place where they are still uncertain of gaining tangible benefits as political instability continues in the country. For community understandings to develop in Arakan, it is thus necessary that this difference in views over the reasons and consequences for armed struggle are reconciled with the formation of shared communication platforms in the different layers of society. Despite the current ceasefire, there are no roadmaps to peace in the territory today. The matrix of Arakan Politics Despite coming from various ideologies, parties and personal backgrounds, almost all the key Rakhine political leaders and actors agree on one crucial opinion when it comes to the priorities in Arakan politics. That is, they believe that the first and most fundamental issue is the lack of political self-determination; the second is the question of the Rohingya crisis; and the third is the issue of foreign investments in Arakan, especially from China and India, including resource and revenue sharing. In their thoughts, achieving the first political demand is critical for the resolution of the second and third issues. Thus, in their perception, it is essential to approach challenges from this structural perspective to resolve the Rohingya crisis. Moving forward from this viewpoint is difficult. In a more comprehensive framework in political conceptions, the Rohingya crisis can also be viewed as the negative consequence of having ill relations between three edges of a triangle: the Myanmar State, the Rakhine community and the Rohingya community in which they have very different perceptions. Although many observers analyze the root causes of the problem based on bilateral relations between the Rohingya community and Myanmar State (or ‘Burmese’ state/community in a broader sense), further factors include the hostile relations between the central state and Rakhine community as well as the ways in which the interests of the Rakhine and Rohingya communities have historically been marginalized or downplayed. Rakhine and Rohingya relations are of vital importance. Against this backdrop, there are two key reasons why the different dimensions to these relationships must be addressed as part of any solution to the Rohingya crisis. First, any critical development on the Rohingya issue that fails to accommodate the differences in opinion and strategy between the Myanmar State and leading Rakhine political organizations, such as the ULA/AA, will not be sustainable or achievable. In the current political climate, both the SAC and rival National Unity Government represent substitutes for the Myanmar State and, in future politics, one might endure as the only political entity. But, unlike other parts of the country, even a de facto or de jure peace agreement between the Myanmar military and Arakan Army will not be sustainable if they have disagreements or a lack of understanding regarding resolution of the Rohingya crisis. Equally important, inter-community relations must be addressed to bring lasting peace. This leads to the second reason for promoting reconciliation and shared objectives between the different communities. Although Rakhine and Rohingya populations presently seem to have more understanding and sympathy due to common sufferings (humanitarian crises and human rights violations) and a common enemy (Myanmar military), a shared vision regarding their respective places in future Arakan society is still needed. This situation is also analyzed in a recent report conducted by the Institute for Peace and Governance, an Arakan-based non-governmental organization.* As experiences around the world have shown, community reconciliation in a divided land like Arakan is a long-term process. It cannot be accessed without ‘forgiveness’ regarding past crimes among members of the communities in the first place. And it is also a process that includes five key steps: developing a shared vision of an interdependent and fair society; acknowledging and dealing with the past; building positive relationships; facilitating significant cultural and attitudinal change; and, finally, enabling meaningful social, economic and political change. For the moment, politics in Arakan have not reached such a stage. Currently, the state of reconciliation among the members of different communities varies on the basis of socio-economic interactions, political environment and existing relationships in a particular area. In general, inter-community interaction in central Arakan townships, such as Mrauk-U, Kyauktaw and Minbya, is comparatively higher than in the northernmost townships of Maungdaw and Buthidaung. Promoting community reconciliation will therefore be essential for the smooth implementation of a refugee repatriation process, and the success of this process will be the measurement of the state of reconciliation between the two communities. Equally important, recent developments in Arakan demonstrate that the role of the ULA/AA, which has both competitive power relations with the Nay Pyi Taw government as well as authority and influence over the Rakhine population, will be critical in bringing productive changes in the resolution of the Rohingya crisis. RELATED Arakan (Rakhine State): A Land in Conflict on Myanmar’s Western Frontier LAND POLICY IN MYANMAR ETHNIC CONFLICT IN MYANMAR Report by Martin Smith Publication date: 18 December 2019 Conclusion The Rohingya crisis remains challenging for all domestic and international actors, and there is no simple way of finding a magic solution. The political crisis in the country has deepened more and more since the February 2021 coup. The possibility of refugee repatriation from Bangladesh and the broader scope of resolving the Rohingya emergency are less hopeful. And the emergence of the ULA as a new actor in Arakan politics creates new questions about old problems in resolving the Rohingya crisis. Presently, the role of the ULA in addressing the Rohingya crisis is becoming more visible. This is especially apparent after the second round of armed clashes between the Myanmar military and AA since the 2020 ceasefire recently ended, resulting in de facto control by the ULA/AA of territories along the border with Bangladesh and rural areas in Maungdaw and Buthidaung townships. These areas are inhabited by a majority of the Rohingya population and are the places where repatriated refugees are to be rehabilitated. Thus relations between the ULA authorities and Rohingya community will have impact not only on the lives of the local people but the wishes of the refugee population in Bangladesh. In general, it can be summarized that there are two basic – and opposite – hypothetical viewpoints that can be taken regarding the emerging role of the ULA in addressing the Rohingya crisis. The first and more pessimistic position is that the appearance of the ULA/AA as a new actor in Arakan politics can be seen as an arming of Rakhine ethno-nationalism which is a challenge for the Rohingya people in Arakan and will only make the process of solving the crisis more complex. But the second and more optimistic view is that the emergence of the ULA as a more potent and visionary political actor – different from other Rakhine parties that seek to mobilize the people on the basis of ethno-nationalism to challenge the central government – will produce a more united landscape for all marginalized groups to work together. If this is the case, it is trusted that the new political dynamics will bring light for reconciliation between the different communities against common sufferings and the common enemy. Important shifts in the Arakan landscape are currently underway. While challenges lie ahead in relations between the ULA and Rohingya population, there have been positive developments, especially in inter-community relations and political inclusion. For this reason, a balanced viewpoint should be taken regarding current ULA-Rohingya relations. It is still early to be too optimistic. But it is also too late to be a pessimist..."
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Source/publisher: Transnational Institute ( Amsterdam)
2023-01-26
Date of entry/update: 2023-01-26
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Sub-title: Dissecting Myanmar’s ‘Bengali-Burmese’ narrative and what it means for the repatriation of the Rohingya refugees
Description: "The racial identity of the Rohingya is probably the most widely discussed topic regarding the repatriation issue. The Myanmar government considers the Rohingya as British colonial and post-colonial migrants from neighboring Bangladesh. It argues that a distinct pre-colonial Muslim population is recognized as "Kaman," and that the Rohingya conflate their history with the history of Arakan Muslims in general to advance a separatist agenda. In addition, Myanmar's government does not recognize the term "Rohingya" and prefers to refer to the community as "Bengali." The term "Rohingya" emerged from colonial and pre-colonial terms Rooinga and Rwangya. The Rohingya refer to themselves as Ruáingga/ɾuájŋɡa. In Burmese they are known as "rui hang gya," while in Bengali they are called "Rohinga." The term Rohingya may come from Rakhanga or Roshanga, the words for the state of Arakan. The word Rohingya would then mean "inhabitant of Rohang," which was the early Muslim name for Arakan. "A Comparative Vocabulary of Some of the Languages Spoken in the Burma Empire" by Francis Buchanan, which was found and republished by Michael Charney in the "SOAS Bulletin of Burma Research" in 2003 says, among the native groups of Arakan, there are the "Mohammedans, who have long settled in Arakan, and who call themselves Rooinga, or natives of Arakan. The Classical Journal of 1811 identified Rooinga as one of the languages spoken in the Burma Empire. In 1815, Johann Severin Vater listed Ruinga as an ethnic group with a distinct language in a compendium of languages published in German. According to Jacques Leider, the Rohingya were referred to as "Chittagonians" during the British colonial period, and it was not controversial to refer to them as "Bengalis" until the 1990s. Leider also states that "there is no international consensus" on the use of the term Rohingya, as they are often called "Rohingya Muslims," "Muslim Arakanese," and "Burmese Muslims." He writes that even many Muslims in Rakhine prefer to call themselves "Muslim Arakanese" or "Muslims coming from Rakhine" instead of Rohingya. Others, such as anthropologist Christina Fink, use Rohingya not as an ethnic identifier but as a political one. Fink believes the Rohingya is a political movement that started in the 1950s to create "an autonomous Muslim zone" in Rakhine. Nevertheless, the term Rohingya wasn't widely used until the 1990s. Today the use of the name Rohingya is polarized. The government of Myanmar refuses to use the name. In the 2014 census, the Myanmar government forced the Rohingya to identify themselves as Bengali. Many Rohingya see the denial of their name as similar to denying their basic rights, and the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar has agreed. The Rohingya could accept the term "Bengali-Burmese race" in their National Registration Card (NRC) and accelerate the repatriation process. In Myanmar, racial identities like, Indian-Burmese or Chinese-Burmese are common. The racial identity of citizens in Kolkata is also Bengali, but that doesn't mean they are Bangladeshi. They are Indian citizens. The Rohingya should leave no stone unturned to return to their motherland. If this can open the door to repatriation, they should welcome it. The price they're paying is too high. Decades after decades they have been suffering. Killing, raping, burning their homes, ethnic cleansing etc. every crime has been committed against them. Millions were forced to leave their homeland. Those still living in Rakhine, are facing restrictions on their freedom of movement, access to state education and civil service jobs -- it is as though they are living in imprisonment. Not only that, thousands of new-born children of the Rohingya in different refugee camps in different countries are moving towards an uncertain future and a state-less identity. Their Bengali-Burmese ethnic identity does not mean that the Rohingya are not Myanmar nationals. Rather, it will eliminate one point of difference between the Myanmar government and the Rohingya community. The other demands of the Rohingya like nationality, freedom of movement, political participation etc, can be discussed and solved. But for that, the Rohingya must return to their country and fight for their rights. Taking refuge in another country renders any protest by them meaningless. On the other hand, as it is historically proven that the Rohingya Muslims are an integral part of Myanmar, the Myanmar government should not deny their citizenship. They can repatriate the Rohingya and then talk with them regarding their other demands. This will help them gain some international support. The decade-long suppression of the Rohingya must come to an end. It's our humanitarian duty to stand with them. An "ethnic cleansing" by the Burmese military must not be allowed to succeed. This is a test for the international community to give back the rights of Rohingya and repatriate them to their own homeland, Myanmar, with dignity and honor..."
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Source/publisher: "Dhaka Tribune" (Bangladesh)
2023-01-23
Date of entry/update: 2023-01-23
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Description: "A lasting solution to the Rohingya crisis lies in the safe, sustainable and dignified repatriation of the 1.2 million Rohingyas staying in Bangladesh to Myanmar. Dignified repatriation of Rohingyas is possible through appropriate measures and the creation of an enabling environment in Myanmar’s political and social environment, but progress in this regard is not promising. The leading representatives of the Rohingya community, who have been persecuted and tortured since Myanmar’s independence, have belatedly realized that they need a unified representation both inside Myanmar and abroad to actively tackle this problem. From 2017 till date, there has been an absence of active, regular presence and effective role of any group or organization representing the Rohingya community in the international arena. A larger coalition called Arakan Rohingya National Alliance (ARNA) has been formed with some of these leading organizations and senior Rohingya politicians working on the interests of the Rohingyas to secure and ensure the oppressed Rohingya community’s right to live with dignity and honour. Due to the lack of coordination among the organizations dealing with the interest of Rohingyas, these organizations failed to perform an effective role in highlighting Rohingya interests in the international arena. To secure the rights of Rohingyas in a new federal democratic union of Myanmar strong cooperation between organizations representing the Rohingyas is essential. According to the founding member of ARNA and co-founder of the Free Rohingya Coalition Ne San Luin, the most important task for the Rohingya leadership in the coming days is to increase cooperation and coordination between organizations. It is hoped that the ARNA will unite Rohingya leaders living at home and abroad to achieve the right of self-determination for the Rohingyas within the Federal Union of Myanmar. ARNA leadership stated that the Rohingya’s are not separatists, are willing to be part of the future Federal Democratic Union of Myanmar and willing to cooperate with all parties within Myanmar. ARNA brought together Rohingya organizations, politicians and activists on a common platform for the first time since the organized genocide and brutal military crackdown in 2017. According to ARNA, the Rohingyas are interested in living peacefully with other ethnic groups in Myanmar and want to work together with the National Unity Government (NUG) and the United League of Arakan (ULA). ARNA stated that the Rohingyas are committed to maintaining peaceful coexistence on the principle of unity in diversity. The Rohingya have also expressed their support and solidarity with other oppressed ethnic and religious minorities in the country. Alliance leaders approved the outline of the alliance on November 20, 2022. ARNA is still in its early stages and will soon include youth and women representing the Rohingya camps in Bangladesh. After the military coup the NUG was formed. They published a policy paper titled ‘Policy Position on the Rohingya in Rakhine State’ recognizing their identity as ‘Rohingya’. This recognition gives an idea of ​​the changing position of Myanmar’s pro-democracy parties. Earlier, the Myanmar government and military had been claiming that there was no such thing as ‘Rohingya’. Almost all the demands of the Rohingya’s are reflected in the commitments mentioned in the policy paper of the NUG. In addition to this, the commander in chief of the Arakan Army (AA), the military wing of Arakan’s ruling political party ULA said that they recognize the Rohingyas as “Muslim residents of Rakhine” and wants to ensure the human and civil rights of the Rohingyas. This acceptance is a positive step to solve the Rohingya problem and an indication of their changing attitude towards the Rohingyas. Acceptance of the Rohingyas in the political circles of Myanmar and in the local politics of Arakan will accelerate the resolution of the crisis. ARNA can advocate for this initiative in the international arena. The participation of Rohingyas in this political initiative is an important decision. ARNA leaders can continue to communicate with the NUG, AA and take initiatives to mend the divide and bring back the long-standing coexistence and tolerance of the two communities. On September 19, the ULA announced in a statement that the world community must come to an understanding with them in any matter related to Arakan. The repatriation of Rohingya needs to be discussed with AA and then ULA will develop a roadmap for Rohingya repatriation based on mutual consent. It is also an important event in the ongoing process. Recently, on the 75th Independence Day of Myanmar, the junta government awarded the prestigious state award to the Buddhist monk Ashin Wirathu, who was criticized for his radical nationalist sentiments and spreading hatred against the Rohingyas. It remains to be seen whether this has any negative impact on resolving the Rohingya issue. Wirathu came into the limelight by demanding that Myanmar’s Rohingya Muslim-owned businesses be boycotted and Buddhists are banned from marrying Muslims. In 2013, his photo was featured on the cover of the world-famous Time magazine and he was identified as the ‘Face of Buddhist Terror’. Wirathu is also referred to by many as the Buddhists ‘Bin Laden’. National League for Democracy (NLD) was working to end the ethnic violence in Myanmar. NLD co-founder Win Tin visited the Wirathu’s monastery in the city of Mandalay two months before his death in 2014 to discuss the acceptance of Rohingyas by the extremist Buddhist groups, but their meeting failed to bring any positive result for the Rohingyas. International human rights groups have accused Wirathu of helping the junta to foment hatred against the Rohingya community, saying Wirathu’s anti-Muslim role helped fuel the junta’s crackdown on the Rohingya in Rakhine State in 2017. ARNA should be ready to work to make the existing situation favorable to resolve the crisis. In December 2022, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution for the first time calling for an end to the violence in Myanmar, identifying the root causes of the Rohingya crisis and creating a favorable environment for their safe, sustainable and dignified return. The resolution adopted by the Security Council praised the government of Bangladesh for providing shelter, security and humanitarian assistance to the Rohingyas. The resolution also strongly highlights the negative impact of the current political unrest on the return of Rohingyas to Myanmar and the resulting regional security risks. According to China, there is no quick fix to the Rohingya issue. China expressed that, the ultimate solution to this crisis depends fundamentally and solely on Myanmar. Russia does not see the situation in Myanmar as a threat to international security and therefore believes it should not be addressed by the UN Security Council. India also abstained from voting on the resolution. ARNA should work with these powerful countries to create an environment conducive to speedy repatriation. Analysing the recent events, it can be seen that western countries are putting pressure on Myanmar in addition to providing humanitarian aid to solve the Rohingya crisis. Their positive attitude was expressed by passing the resolution in the UN General Assembly. ARNA has number of challenges in future and to deal with those they need to work with the international community. Since the attitude of China, India and Russia is still not positive, ARNA has to keep in touch with these countries and donor organizations to prepare the ground for solving the issue. Efforts should be made to soften the attitude of Buddhist organizations with the support of ASEAN and friendly Buddhist countries. The Nippon Foundation is in contact with the Myanmar government and AA, ARNA should also find a way forward to resolve the crisis by maintaining contact with them. For sustainable repatriation, the economic and social development of Rakhine state is important. This should be ensured by implementing the recommendations of the Kofi Annan Commission report with the help of donors, UN, countries investing in Myanmar and Western countries. ARNA should be active and find out measures to change the attitude of the common people in Myanmar and broadcast motivational programs aimed at hardline Buddhist organizations. ARNA should take initiatives for a permanent solution to the Rohingya crisis by closely working and developing relationships with NUG, PDF, AA, civil society, policymakers, lawmakers and other relevant organizations. They are not yet in a position to do so much in the beginning, but if they continue with organizational strength and sincerity, it is expected that they will be able to contribute significantly to the process of resolving the crisis. It is expected that ARNA will quickly gain recognition in the international arena and speed up the solution to the Rohingya problem by addressing the root causes..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Eurasia Review"
2023-01-22
Date of entry/update: 2023-01-22
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Description: "DHAKA – A Rohingya refugee was shot dead, two others injured and many displaced by shooting and fires at a camp in no man’s land between Bangladesh and Myanmar on Wednesday. Gunshots were also reported on Thursday from the Konarpara camp where Squadron Leader Rizwan Rushdee of the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI) and a young Rohingya woman were killed during an anti-smuggling operation on November 14. Bangladeshi intelligence and police sources told The Irrawaddy that there was fighting between groups linked to the Rohingya Solidary Organisation (RSO) and Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) broke at the Konarpara camp and sporadic firing carried on for several hours. “We have nothing to do with the firing as it took place inside the camp and also inside Myanmar,” said Naikhyangchhari police chief Mohammad Shahjahan on Thursday. Police said the border is mainly under Border Guard Bangladesh jurisdiction. The border force was unavailable for comment. A law enforcement agency source in Bandarban said one man in RSO “combat uniform” was shot dead and many others were injured on the border and inside Myanmar. Two intelligence agents said fighting between the RSO and “uncontrolled” ARSA was responsible for Rushdee’s death in November. ARSA denied involvement. DGFI Cox’s Bazar officer Mohammad Anwar Hossain on November 23 filed a case against ARSA commander-in-chief Ataullah Abu Ammar Jununi and 66 others for Rushdee’s death. Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders) in Bangladesh told The Irrawaddy on Wednesday that two injured people were treated at its Kutupalong clinic in Cox’s Bazar. Another victim was dead on arrival. “MSF can confirm that among the two injured patients who survived, one suffered a gunshot wound and has been referred for further treatment to another facility. The second patient, a child, sustained minor injuries after a bullet grazed his hand and damaged the tissue,” the charity said. The deceased man was Hamid Ullah, 24, while Mohid Ullah, 23, of Shalbagan Rohingya camp near Cox’s Bazar was admitted to a government hospital. Ullah’s brother-in-law Mohammad Shaker said he was an RSO member. Rohingya community leader Dil Mohammad told the media that the rival groups were fighting to control the refugee camp. Many Rohingya were later displaced after fires were set at the camp. “We have learned it was ARSA who set fire to escape from Konarpara. I saw over 100 Rohingya lose their shelters,” said a Bangladeshi visitor. Bangladesh Refugee Relief and Repatriation Commissioner Mohammed Mizanur Rahman said many of those displaced were seeking safety inside Bangladesh. “We put our law enforcement agencies on alert and asked them not to allow anyone inside into Bangladeshi territory as we are already overburdened and have no room to accommodate a single person,” he told The Irrawaddy. RSO or ARSA made no comment. Last month Bangladeshi home minister Asaduzzaman Khan announced that security at Konarpara would be increased, including extra fencing to reduce transborder crimes. He said around 4,500 Rohingyas in no man’s land would not be relocated but fences would be erected to prevent crime..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2023-01-19
Date of entry/update: 2023-01-19
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Sub-title: UN figures show number of those attempting to escape horrendous conditions in refugee camps increased from 700 in 2021 to over 3,500 in 2022
Description: "The number of Rohingya refugees taking dangerous sea journeys in the hope of reaching Malaysia or Indonesia has surged by 360%, the UN has announced after hundreds of refugees were left stranded at the end of last year. Rohingya in Bangladesh refugee camps have warned that human smugglers have ramped up operations and are constantly searching for people to fill boats from Myanmar and Bangladesh headed for Malaysia, where people believe they can live more freely. More than 3,500 Rohingya boarded boats in 2022 compared with 700 the year before, reviving a route between the Bay of Bengal and southeast Asia which was used to move thousands of Rohingya until 2015, when the discovery of mass graves in Thailand forced a crackdown. Shabia Mantoo, a UNHCR spokesperson, said smugglers are using “false promises and false hope” to lure desperate people, and that regional governments need to act to prevent trafficking and protect any Rohingya who arrive on their shores. She said: “Calls by UNHCR to maritime authorities in the region to rescue and disembark people in distress have been ignored or have gone unheeded, with many boats adrift for weeks.” Since 2017, more than a million Rohingya have lived in refugee camps in Bangladesh after fleeing massacres by the Myanmar military, while those still in Myanmar are frequently arrested when travelling beyond their districts. Several boats were left adrift during the last two months of 2022, with governments not responding to distress calls, leaving Indonesian fishers to rescue 450 people. Another boat with 100 Rohingya was rescued by the Sri Lankan navy. Zahid Hossain, a Rohingya teacher, said two of his friends were on a boat of 180 people that the UN believes capsized last month. Like him, both spent most of their lives in Bangladesh after their families fled Myanmar in the early 1990s, and were active in volunteering for NGOs. “They left the camp to seek a better life, and hoping in Malaysia there might be an opportunity for them and their families to build a future for their children. This long-lasting refugee life of 31 years has become an unbearable, poisoned life for them,” he said. “I found out about their drowning when I heard voice notes sent to us from another boat nearby that reached Indonesia after a bad storm.” Ali Kabir, an anti-trafficking campaigner who lives near the camps, said the problem was not being taken seriously, and people-smugglers have freely recruited and moved refugees without police action. “There are lot of people being moved, and sometimes when we tell them [the police] they don’t care – they say these people have become a burden.” Kabir said refugees are often held on boats while ransoms are demanded from their families, adapting a previous strategy of holding people in jungle camps which continued until Thailand discovered mass Rohingya graves in 2015. “The systems change, the routes change. Now there aren’t mass graves – they die at sea. The sea became the graveyard for them.” Rohingya people have complained that violent armed gangs are becoming increasingly powerful inside the camps. In a report on Tuesday, Human Rights Watch (HRW) accused Bangladesh’s Armed Police Battalion, assigned to tackle insecurity in the camps, of arbitrary arrests, harassment and extortion. “Abuses by police in the Cox’s Bazar camps have left Rohingya refugees suffering at the hands of the very forces who are supposed to protect them,” said Shayna Bauchner, Asia researcher at HRW..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Guardian" (UK)
2023-01-19
Date of entry/update: 2023-01-19
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "U Nay San Lwin is the co-founder of the Germany-based Free Rohingya Coalition, but better known on social media as Ro Nay San Lwin. Known for his Rohingya activism, he has described the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) as criminals who kill their own kind. U Nay San Lwin talked recently to The Irrawaddy about the Spring Revolution against the military dictatorship and the conflict in Rakhine State. What is your opinion of the Spring Revolution and the civilian National Unity Government (NUG)? The revolutionary spirit of young people in Myanmar and their desire to reform the country deserves praise. I’m proud that young people are this active after almost two years of revolution. If they keep on like this, I think the country will be liberated one day. About the leadership of the NUG, after the NUG was formed it released a statement describing its policy towards the Rohingya people. Although it has some weakness in recognizing the identity of the Rohingya, I welcome the NUG statement. The NUG has yet to cooperate with the Rohingya. About the genocide, the United States officially recognized [the Myanmar military’s 2017 operation against the Rohingya] as genocide and the case is also being heard at the International Court of Justice. What will be the NUG’s position? It has not recognized it as genocide. When will it recognize it? Rather than cooperating only when necessary, the NUG should cooperate extensively with Rohingya leaders and activists to find a solution to the issue. How will the Rohingya co-exist with the Rakhine people? What are the views of the Rohingya on the Arakan Army (AA) and the conflict in Rakhine? Rakhine ethnic people make up the majority in Rakhine. And the Rohingya make up the second largest population. The Rohingya were officially recognized as one of Myanmar’s ethnic groups after independence and granted full ethnic rights. There were different views about this policy after [military dictator] U Ne Win seized power. Rakhine scholars and politicians were involved in designing and backing the 1982 Citizenship Law [which denies the Rohingya citizenship]. [Rohingya] were not happy, but there were no attacks. [Sectarian strife] was created under U Thein Sein’s government to distract public attention from the [China-backed] oil and gas pipeline project in Kyaukphyu in 2012. There were casualties. The two communities became segregated. But, lately, the two communities are engaging again. Rakhine people and Rohingya people have reached a higher level of understanding. Previously, Rohingya students could not attend Sittwe University. But now some 200 to 300 Rohingya students are studying there. Rohingya and Rakhine student unions are cooperating. Previously, Rohingya people could not leave their camps to do shopping. But now there is trade between the two communities. So things have improved a lot. But there are still vague policies. We don’t know about the fate of Rohingya when the AA takes control of all Rakhine State and declares independence. Generally, they [the AA] have been saying that there will be full human rights and citizenship rights for Rohingya. But the situation on the ground is a little different from what the AA leaders say. Developments [in relations between Rakhine and Rohingya] youths are quite encouraging. But there is room for engagement between the leadership of the two sides. We will wait and see how the leaders of the two sides resolve things. We must try. What is your view on ARSA? There are suspicions that ARSA has ties to international terrorist organizations. About ARSA, their first operation took place on October 9, 2016. They attacked border police outposts in northern Maungdaw and Rathedaung townships then. About their coordinated attacks on 30 border guard outposts and police stations in 2017, I doubt that they are really that strong or have the weapons to carry out attacks on that scale. I think it was an excuse [for the Myanmar military to persecute the Rohingya]. In fact, Rohingya people were forced out of their homes. It was not a coincidence. When I went to Bangladesh, I met residents from every village and inquired what happened. The things that the military claimed happened didn’t occur. The attacks occurred just one day after an advisory commission led by former United Nations chief Kofi Annan issued its report [which provides a long-term solution for Rakhine State]. It couldn’t be a coincidence. There are alleged ties between the Myanmar military and ARSA. I have suspicions that they have ties, but I have no evidence. And ARSA has started to target people in the refugee camps in Bangladesh who oppose them and are advocating for Rohingya repatriation. ARSA assassinated our comrade who had become a community leader at the refugee camps. We have monitored the activities of ARSA in the refugee camps since 2016. We found that they are not working in the interests of the Rohingya people. There are also allegations that ARSA is involved in drug smuggling. If they are really working for the liberation of the Rohingya people, they wouldn’t be killing Rohingya people in the refugee camps. They have gone too far. I have assessed their policies and I can’t accept them. The Rohingya community can’t accept the ARSA. We have officially told the world that ARSA does not represent the Rohingya community. Are Rohingya people hopeful that they will be able to return to their homes in Rakhine once the military dictatorship is overthrown? Frankly speaking, we didn’t have hope in the past. Although the NLD government was in office, the military was in fact in control and the [NLD government] just echoed the military. So there was no hope then and there is no hope now either. If the NUG is consistent with its policies and returns to power as a legitimate government, there will be hope. After the coup last year, Min Aung Hlaing talked about repatriating Rohingya people and also sent a letter to the Bangladesh government about it. But the military then engaged in fierce fighting with the AA to create the impression that Rakhine is not safe and that repatriation is impossible. The military committed genocide against the Rohingya and its claim that it is now working to bring them back deceives no one. If it really wants to mend its ways, there are more than 130,000 internally displaced persons currently in camps in Sittwe [the Rakhine capital] and it must arrange for them to return to their homes. The military must show clearly how it has rebuilt villages for refugees to come back to. And it must also clearly state if they can enjoy citizenship rights. The regime is only talking the talk, and there is no hope for us. We can do nothing if the whole country is ruined. We are part of this country and we will do what we can to help the success of the revolution and a return to civilian administration. We have been advocating and finding ways to build a new federal, democratic country which guarantees equal rights for all the minorities, not just the Rohingya, when a civilian administration is restored. We are not leading the efforts, but only assisting the people leading those efforts. Only when peace is restored to the country, will we know the fate of our Rohingya people..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2022-12-26
Date of entry/update: 2022-12-26
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "GENEVA (22 December 2022) – Appealing for the immediate rescue of Rohingya refugees in distress on a vessel in the Andaman Sea, UN Special Rapporteur on Myanmar Tom Andrews said regional governments in South and Southeast Asia should prioritise safety and human rights and ensure coordinated search and rescue operations. He issued the following statement: “While many in the world are preparing to enjoy a holiday season and ring in a new year, boats bearing desperate Rohingya men, women and young children, are setting off on perilous journeys in unseaworthy vessels. One such boat carrying more than 100 Rohingya refugees has been at sea for weeks, and is reportedly now close to Aceh, Indonesia. Its engine has failed and those on board are running out of food and water. It has been reported that 16 passengers have already died, including at least one child. I call on all relevant maritime actors to immediately and urgently coordinate search and rescue for this boat and ensure safe disembarkation of those aboard before any further loss of life occurs. Too many Rohingya lives have already been lost in maritime crossings. Regional governments should prevent any further loss of life and urgently rescue and provide immediate protection to Rohingya stranded at sea. The duty to rescue persons in distress at sea is a fundamental rule of international law, is a norm of customary international law and is incorporated in international treaties. States must not push back boats out of territorial waters in an attempt to shirk international obligations. I urge all governments from the region to develop and coordinate a more humane regional response to those fleeing the junta’s brutal violence, including the Rohingya. This requires an absolute moratorium on any deportations or pushbacks to Myanmar, and the need for coordinated search and rescue at sea in line with international human rights standards. The international community must step forward and assist regional actors to provide durable solutions for the Rohingya. Increasing numbers of Rohingya have been using dangerous sea and land routes in recent weeks, which highlights the sense of desperation and hopelessness experienced by Rohingya in Myanmar and in the region. While details remain unclear, at least two other boats, each carrying over 100 Rohingya refugees, have also embarked on perilous journeys. Two weeks ago, a Vietnamese oil company vessel on its way to Myanmar rescued one sinking boat with 154 Rohingya refugees aboard. As they were close to Myanmar waters, they reportedly handed the group over to Myanmar authorities. It has been reported that those aboard were placed in migration detention in Myanmar and may now face criminal charges. Last weekend, the Sri Lankan Navy rescued a third trawler in distress, carrying 104 Rohingya, including numerous children, some unaccompanied. I wholeheartedly thank the Government of Sri Lanka for this intervention to rescue these vulnerable Rohingya refugees. Rohingya inside Myanmar who are unable to access sea routes have also been risking their lives by seeking out dangerous overland routes in an attempt to flee the country. Rohingya attempting to flee Myanmar who are detected outside Rakhine State are regularly charged with migration offences and jailed. On 5 December, I was distressed to learn of credible reports indicating that the bodies of 13 Rohingya men and boys, reportedly aged between 16 and 20 years old, were found in the north of Yangon. Reports indicate they died from lack of oxygen inside a vehicle while trying to reach the border area. All these tragedies point to unscrupulous smuggling and trafficking networks, some of whom are exploiting their desperation by putting lives at risk. I also have learned that a court order to stay the deportation of 104 persons who arrived by boat from Myanmar in February 2021 in Malaysia has been lifted by the Malaysian High Court, putting these people at risk of being returned to Myanmar. I reiterate my call that there must be an absolute moratorium on any forced returns of refugees and migrants to Myanmar.”..."
Source/publisher: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (Geneva)
2022-12-22
Date of entry/update: 2022-12-22
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Description: "Six-fold increase of mostly Rohingya people making risky journeys by sea from Myanmar and Bangladesh this year Over 100 people reported dead or missing at sea Rohingya continue to suffer discrimination and persecution in their home state of Rakhine in far western Myanmar ‘Regional governments must urgently coordinate and cooperate on search and rescue operations’ - Rachel Chhoa-Howard Responding to reports of at least one boat carrying Rohingya refugees stranded at sea, Rachel Chhoa-Howard, Amnesty International’s Southeast Asia Researcher, said: “Seven years after the Andaman Sea crisis, which saw an extensive loss of lives, Rohingya people continue to risk everything in dangerous journeys to escape persecution at home in military-run Myanmar, and the abysmal conditions in Bangladeshi refugee camps. “International humanitarian law requires the rescue of people at sea when they are in distress, and their delivery to a place of safety.  Swift action is needed to protect lives. Further delays to alleviate this suffering or any attempts to send Rohingya back to Myanmar where they face persecution are unconscionable. “Regional governments must urgently coordinate and cooperate on search and rescue operations. They must attempt to locate any boats in distress and ensure the people on board are allowed to disembark safely and receive proper medical support, food and water.” Search and rescue UNHCR has reported a six-fold increase of mostly Rohingya people making risky journeys by sea from Myanmar and Bangladesh in 2022, with 119 people reported dead or missing. Regional authorities have made extensive commitments to improve their coordination of search and rescue operations of boats in distress, after the loss of lives due to delayed response. Systematic assault on Rohingya villages In August 2017, more than 740,000 Rohingya women, men and children fled northern Rakhine State to neighboring Bangladesh after Myanmar security forces launched a widespread and systematic assault on Rohingya villages, including extrajudicial killings, destruction of property and sexual assault. More than 130,000 Rohingya people remain in squalid internment camps in Myanmar’s Rakhine State. Rohingya in Myanmar continue to face severe restrictions on freedom of movement, access to education and health services in a system that Amnesty has called apartheid. Myanmar military authorities routinely and arbitrarily detain Rohingyas for travelling outside of Rakhine state. Those detained are sent to prisons without the right to defend themselves or access to legal counsel. Conditions in Myanmar prisons are inhumane and do not meet international human rights standards..."
Source/publisher: "Amnesty International" (UK)
2022-12-09
Date of entry/update: 2022-12-09
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "DHAKA — Several Rohingya organizations and activists have united to form a group to demand human rights in Myanmar. The Arakan Rohingya National Alliance (ARNA) called for Rohingya unity and said the Muslim community was not secessionist. It said the Rohingya wanted to be part of a future federal democratic Myanmar to uphold peaceful coexistence through unity in diversity. The groups said it would work with the civilian National Unity Government (NUG) and United League of Arakan in Rakhine State to achieve full and effective equality and the right to self-determination, like other ethnic groups in Myanmar. An online press conference on Sunday aimed to unite the global Rohingya diaspora and announce the alliance’s intent to achieve self-determination for the Rohingya in Myanmar. Rohingya leaders thanked the Bangladeshi people and government for sheltering more than a million Rohingya refugees. They also condemned the killing of a Directorate General of Forces Intelligence officer, Squadron Leader Rizwan Rushdee, by a criminal gang on Myanmar’s border on November 14. An ARNA statement said: “For more than half a century, hundreds of thousands of Rohingya have been brutally murdered, raped and tortured by Myanmar’s military and regime-sponsored non-state actors. The violence reached a peak in 2017 when Myanmar’s brutal military led the worst genocide of the 21st century in northern Rakhine State, forcing more than a million Rohingyas to cross the border into Bangladesh where they currently live in squalid refugee camps aided by the Bangladesh government and international aid organizations. “This is the first time since the genocide of 2017 that a broad coalition of the Rohingya organizations, politicians and activists have joined together in a common platform, a development greeted with hope by the Rohingya people, including half a million stuck inside the open-air prison of Arakan [Rakhine].” Rohingya leader Nurul Islam will chair ANRA’s central executive committee and the prominent Dr Yunus and Reza Uddin will be the vice chairs. Other members include U Kyaw Min, Aman Ullah U Tun Khin, U Nay Saw Lwin, Dr Hla Myint, U Zaw Min Htut, Dr Habib Ullah and Dr Abu Siddique Arman. Retired Dhaka University international relations academic CR Abrar, a specialist on refugees, welcomed the move and said unity is essential for the persecuted community, many of whom are genocide survivors. Aung Kyaw Moe, a Rohingya activist and advisor for the NUG, told The Irrawaddy: “There is no such thing yet in the Rohingya community as representation. I wish one day it will exist. It must be secular, inclusive, and diverse and uphold human rights. “The Rohingya are an issue for Myanmar which impacts the region heavily and must be tackled with the core leadership of emerging youth and female leaders in Myanmar and civil society organizations leaders in Myanmar. “The diaspora may offer support but history suggests no issues in Myanmar will be solved by leaders overseas. While unity is needed more than ever in the Rohingya community, it needs to be initiated with principled and correct processes to avoid endangering the Rohingya.”..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2022-11-22
Date of entry/update: 2022-11-22
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Description: "The European Rohingya Council (ERC) condemns Arakan Army (AA) in the strongest terms for its atrocious crimes perpetrated against the Rohingya population in northern Arakan State of Myanmar. We also express our concerns on safety and security of the remaining Rohingya population in Arakan State where clashes between Myanmar Military and Arakan Army intensify. Since the fighting broke out between the military and the Rakhine insurgent group in August 2022, the Rohingya population is on the edge as both groups deliberately choose Rohingya villages in Buthidaung township as the battlegrounds. Hundreds of Rohingya civilians are either trapped in their villages or forced to flee to nearby villagers as both the military and Arakan Army shelled the villages in the presence of civilians. The fighting has also left between 800 and 900 Rohingya families stranded in Dhangkhali at the Myanmar-Bangladesh border after fleeing their villages. The Rohingya civilians trapped in villages and stranded at the borders are at high risk of hunger as Myanmar Military continues to place blockages in the northern Arakan. Moreover, land mines are being planted around the Rohingya villages and farms, causing injuries to Rohingya civilians. Over a dozen of Rohingya civilians including women and children have been injured in open firing at the civilians since the fighting broke out. On October 8, Sheikul Islam, a 48-year-old highly educated Rohingya teacher was shot death by Arakan Army’s sniper after he went to feed his animals at his house in Gu Dar Pyin, Buthidaung. Besides widespread arbitrary arrests, abductions and extortions, there are serious allegations and crimes of sexual abuses and rapes that Arakan Army has committed against Rohingya women and girls before and after the fighting erupted between the two armed groups. The conducts of Arakan Army are not dissimilar to those of Myanmar Military, which amount to crimes against humanity. It is also a clear violation of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) that sets out the responsibilities of the state and non-state armed groups during the armed clash. Arakan Army violates the responsibilities by its deliberate actions while Myanmar Military continues to fail to protect the Rohingya civilians through provisional measures set out by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The European Rohingya Council condemns both Arakan Army and Myanmar Military for their crimes against the remaining Rohingya population and calls on the international community to take preventive measures to protect the population in Arakan State. The European Rohingya Council also closely monitors and documents every crime that Arakan Army perpetrates against the Rohingya population in Arakan State..."
Source/publisher: The European Rohingya Council
2022-10-10
Date of entry/update: 2022-10-10
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Description: "DHAKA—A Rohingya teenager was killed and another man injured when a land mine exploded on the Myanmar-Bangladesh border adjacent to Bandarban district, Bangladesh on Sunday morning, officials said Monday. The victim, Omor Farok, 17, was a resident of Konarpara Rohingya camp in no man’s land, said community leaders. They named his injured companion as Abdu Yah. Gumdhum Rohingya camp leader Abdur Rohim said the youths had gone fishing on the border when they were caught in the blast. The body of Farok was recovered and buried in Konarpara cemetery. The injured man was rushed to nearby MSF Hospital in Ukhia, Cox’s Bazar. Bangladesh Border Guards said the incident occurred about 1 km inside Myanmar’s border, opposite Bangladesh border marker 35, at about 9 a.m. BGB Cox’s Bazar battalion commanding officer Lieutenant Colonel Md Mehedi Hussain Kabir reiterated that the explosion occurred inside Myanmar’s border. The BGB said land mines are not used inside Bangladesh territory as the country is a signatory to the United Nations Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines. Bangladesh signed the UN convention on May 7, 1998 and ratified it on Sept. 6, 2000. BGB officials said three mines have exploded on the border this year, killing one person and injuring two. Another ethnic minority youth, Aung Thein Tanchangya, was injured in a land mine blast on the same border on Sept. 16. He was sent to Chattogram Medical College Hospital but lost his left leg. Over 4,000 Rohingya have been living in the Bangladesh-Myanmar border strip since 2017 when hundreds of thousands took refuge in Bangladesh following a military crackdown in neighboring Rakhine State..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2022-10-03
Date of entry/update: 2022-10-03
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Shells landing in Bangladesh during fighting in Rakhine state led to diplomatic protests by Dhaka.
Description: "Hundreds of people were waiting to cross into Bangladesh from Myanmar, a small group of newly arrived Rohingya told BenarNews, amid fierce fighting close to the border that has sparked diplomatic protests over reports of artillery and mortar shells landing in Bangladeshi territory. One of the new arrivals said he saw “several hundred” people clustered along a river that separates Cox’s Bazar district in southeastern Bangladesh from Myanmar’s Rakhine state, and who were trying to cross the frontier several days ago. It was not immediately clear what happened to those other people apparently displaced by intense clashes in recent weeks between Burmese junta forces and Arakan Army (AA) rebels. In Bangladesh, where the government has tightened security along the border amid the violence in Rakhine, authorities have not confirmed reports of any new refugee arrivals or influx into Cox’s Bazar. Meanwhile, a Rohingya leader said that at least five Rohingya fleeing Myanmar had arrived at a Cox’s Bazar camp in recent days. “Two Rohingya families of five people, including two infants, have taken shelter at the Lambasia camp in Ukhia,” Muhammed Jubair, secretary general of the Arakan Rohingya Society for Peace and Human Rights (ARSPH), told BenarNews. The adults were identified as Abul Wafa, his wife, Minara, and another woman, Dildar Begum. Wafa said they fled from Buthidaung in Myanmar on Sept. 6 as junta and AA forces clashed. “The junta started torturing the Rohingya in Buthidaung,” he told BenarNews. “That’s why we came to Bangladesh to save our lives, but we are also hiding here.” “When we were entering Bangladesh, we saw several hundred Rohingya people, mostly women and children waiting to leave near the Naf River,” Wafa said. Two days earlier, on Sept. 4, the Foreign Ministry issued a news release expressing “deep concern” over mortars that reportedly landed on the Bangladeshi side of the frontier the day before. The release noted that Myanmar Ambassador U Aung Kyaw Moe was summoned regarding the incident, just as he had been summoned on Aug. 21 and 28. “During the meeting, the ambassador was also told that such activities are of grave threat to the safety and security of the peace-loving people, violation of the border agreement between Bangladesh and Myanmar and contrary to the good neighborly relationship,” the ministry said. On Tuesday, Home Minister Asaduzzaman Khan Kamal said he expected firing inside Myanmar along the border to end soon. “We heard that a group called Arakan Army was fighting with the government forces inside Myanmar. When the government forces attack the Arakan Army, some shells land inside our territory,” he told reporters. “Our Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB), as well as Foreign Ministry, have strongly protested the incidents by calling the ambassador of Myanmar.” Refugees’ accounts Jubair said Wafa and the others sheltered with a relative after arriving in Bangladesh before moving into another camp. Wafa said his group gave a boatman a piece of gold jewelry to carry them across the Naf River because they had no money to pay him. Dildar Begum, 22, said her husband, Syed Ullah, was killed by the “Mogh army” a month ago. She was referring to the Arakan Army although “Mogh” is a term that Rohingya also often use to refer to the Burmese military. “I fled with Wafa’s family to Bangladesh as there was no other option for me,” she told BenarNews. In Rakhine state, an official with the AA rebels denied that the group was targeting members of the stateless Rohingya Muslim minority. “The allegations on AA targeting Muslims are not just wrong but baseless accusations, because the fighting [in the state between Arakan Army and junta troops] has been more than a month,” Khine Thu Kha, a spokesman for the rebel group, told RFA Burmese. “We want to question back, did you guys see or hear any report of a Muslim killed or injured by the fighting? Did you hear any report or see anyone saying there was a shell or a bullet from AA falling in a Muslim village so far? Otherwise, it is just an accusation with other intentions to defame our organization.” Despite the claims made by the Rohingya, Md. Shamsud Douza, Bangladesh’s commissioner for Refugee Relief and Repatriation, said there was no official information about any new arrivals from Rakhine state infiltrating Bangladesh territory. “Clashes are occurring between two groups in Myanmar. It is very normal that it will create some tension on our border as a neighboring country,” he told BenarNews. “Our decision is very clear – we cannot allow even a single Rohingya to enter Bangladesh.” Robiul Islam, additional superintendent of police, said his unit was “not sure about a fresh entry of Rohingya but we are looking into the matter.” Sheikh Khalid Mohammad Iftekhar, a senior official of Border Guard Bangladesh, said the border police force had tightened security at the frontier to prevent any attempts by refugees to enter the country. From January to June, 478 Rohingya were denied entry and four were arrested, according to the BGB. Repatriation hopes A Rohingya who lives in Maungdaw, Myanmar, and asked to not be named for security concerns, said that the increasing conflict in the state had dampened Rohingya hopes for repatriation. “It will be difficult for them to return in this situation. The current situation will not allow them to come here,” the resident told RFA. “The situation here is not very good. There is no security. People here are fleeing to other areas because fighting is going on. In this situation, they will not be able to come back.” Fighting between the military and the AA resumed in July. Oo Maung Ohn, a resident of Maungdaw Township, blamed the resurgence in Rakhine State after a nearly two-year ceasefire on the junta. “Do you know why all this fighting resumed? They (the junta) closed the roads and started the fighting and they arrested many innocent people,” he told RFA. “They arrested village administrators, questioned them and hit them.” Rakhine State Attorney General Hla Thein, a junta spokesman, did not immediately respond to RFA requests for comment. Regional army chief visit camps Meanwhile, top army officers from 24 countries, including the United States, China and India, who were taking part in a conference in Dhaka, took a side trip on Tuesday to visit the Rohingya refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar. The delegation, including Bangladesh Army Chief Gen. S.M. Shafiuddin Ahmed and Gen. Charles A. Flynn, the American army chief in the Indo-Pacific, spoke with Rohingya leaders at the camps. The U.S. military did not immediately release details of those discussions. While delivering the keynote address during the first day of the conference on Monday, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina warned that the prolonged stay of more than 1 million Rohingya in the crowded Cox’s Bazar camps had become a serious security and stability concern. Most of those refugees, about 740,000, fled from Rakhine state during a Myanmar government crackdown five years ago. Within months, Bangladesh and Myanmar officials agreed to repatriate the Rohingya, but none have returned to their homeland under the program..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "RFA" (USA)
2022-09-13
Date of entry/update: 2022-09-14
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Description: "In January and February last year, the Myanmar Armed Forces launched two attacks in Arakan State. But the result was not good. 19 soldiers of the Myanmar army were killed by the Arakan forces. The Myanmar forces were forced to retreat after being chased. Myanmar also fired two mortar shells along the Thai border. The Thai government has not responded but is monitoring the matter. A few days ago, Myanmar fired mortar shells on the Bangladesh border. Bangladesh government protested strongly on two occasions. Let’s talk about Arakan. AA is an insurgent group based in Rakhine State (Arakan). Established on 10 April 2009, the AA is the military wing of the United League of Arakan (ULA). It is currently led by Commander in Chief Major General Toan Marat Naing and Vice Deputy Commander Brigadier General Neo Toan Aung. In the Kachin conflict, the AA fought alongside the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) against the Tatmadaw (Myanmar Armed Forces). Most AA soldiers were originally trained at the KIA Military Academy. Since 2014, AA has established its own training camp in Rakhine state. According to Myanmar Peace Monitor, the AA had more than 1,500 troops in 2014, including personnel stationed in Rakhine state near Myanmar’s border with Bangladesh. Irrawaddy said in September 2015 that the civilian wing of the AA has more than 2,500 soldiers and 10,000 personnel. In January 2020, the AA chief claimed that the group had more than 30,000 soldiers. 14 The Arakan Army (AA) was formed on 10 April 2009 with its political wing, the United League of Arakan (ULA). It describes Kachin State as the ‘temporary headquarters’ of Laizai. After training the young Arakan Army troops on 11 December 2011, the group planned to return to Arakan State and fight for self-determination. However, the outbreak of war in Kachin State in June 2011 rendered them incapacitated. As a result, with the support of the KIA, they took up arms against the Myanmar army. In 2014, AA launched another operation in Rakhine state near the Bangladesh border and another near the Thai-Myanmar border. As a result, it has become much stronger and its combat capabilities have been positively affected. In February 2015, the AA fought the Myanmar Nationalities Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), an ethnic armed group, and its ally, the Taeng National Liberation Army (TNLA), in their clash with the Myanmar Army. Hundreds of Tatmadaw soldiers are reported to have been killed in the clash. On August 27, 2015, clashes broke out between the AA and the Bangladesh Border Guard Force. Both sides exchanged fire near the Myanmar-Bangladesh border in Bara Modak area of ​​Thanchi in Bandarban district. On August 20, 2015, the Arakan Army Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) clashed. Ten of their horses were then seized by the BGB. The Arakan Army ostensibly advocates self-determination for the multi-ethnic Arakanese population, the protection and promotion of the national identity and cultural heritage of the Arakan people, and the ‘national dignity’ and best interests of the Arakan people. In an interview with Arakha Media (AKK) conducted in August 2021, the Commander-in-Chief of the Arakan Army clearly stated that the political objective of the armed revolution is to restore the sovereignty of Arakan. There has been no bargaining and there won’t be in the future. This is about Arakan Myanmar is an unstable country. There have been repeated military coups. Democracy has been blocked. The image of the military junta’s seizure of power has been written on Myanmar’s chest again and again. The history of persecution of minorities is also old in Myanmar. Since 1990, several countries including China, Russia and Ukraine started providing military support to Myanmar. China sells huge number of weapons to Myanmar to keep India under pressure. “Stockholm International Peace Research Institute” and “Global Firepower.com” sources say that the size of the Myanmar army is 516,000, including 46,000 regular and 1,10,000 reserve soldiers. In addition, Myanmar has a total of 264 military aircraft including 127 warplanes, 86 helicopters including 9 attack helicopters, 886 sophisticated tanks, 4 thousand 212 different types of missiles, 1 thousand 200 armored military vehicles, at least 200 missiles in air defense, 392 gun systems, 1200 anti-tank weapons, A total of 155 warships including 27 naval frigates, 40 patrol craft. Since the 1990s, Myanmar has focused on arms procurement. Even after signing the disarmament agreement, they have not stopped buying arms. On the contrary, it has become easier for Myanmar to buy weapons since 2012. In the meantime, Russia, China, Israel, Ukraine, India, Belarus, Belgium, Switzerland, Poland and other countries have sold a large number of weapons to them. China has already given Myanmar the most cooperation in the purchase of military equipment. They have sold the most warplanes, warships and ammunition to Myanmar. Russia and Ukraine are not far behind. Russia sold land-launched missiles to Myanmar. Ukraine has sold warships. On the other hand, Israel has sold tanks and armored personnel carriers. Al Jazeera published a news about it. According to their data, Myanmar bought the most aircrafts from China 120, Russia 64 and Poland 35. Russia (2971), China (1029) and Belarus (102) sold the most missiles to Myanmar. China (21), India (3) and the former Yugoslavia (3) have sold naval warships to Myanmar. China (125), Serbia (120) and Russia (100) sold various types of ammunition, artillery. Armored vehicles and tanks were sold by China (696), Israel (120) and Ukraine (50). Although Myanmar has a radical attitude, its military tactics are of poor quality. The power base is also weak. Many say Myanmar is playing war games. Wants to participate in this game with Bangladesh. But Bangladesh is a peaceful country. Bangladesh does not want to engage in war with any country. Bangladesh policy is to maintain friendship with everyone. Therefore, it is not right to think of Bangladesh as weak. Bangladesh armed forces are now world class. Bangladesh’s infantry is so advanced that it is one of the top nations in the world. It would be extremely foolish for Myanmar to think that the armed forces of Bangladesh are weak..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Eurasia Review
2022-09-12
Date of entry/update: 2022-09-12
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Burma Campaign UK is delighted that the British government has finally announced its intention to join the Rohingya genocide case at the International Court of Justice. Burma Campaign UK launched our campaign for the British government to join the case almost three years ago. “For decades the Burmese military have been allowed to violate international law without consequences, encouraging them to commit genocide and attempt another coup,” said Anna Roberts, Executive Director of Burma Campaign UK. “We are delighted that the British government has finally joined the Rohingya genocide case. They will bring vital additional resources and expertise, as well as sending an important political message.” The British government has faced sustained pressure to join the case, including from Rohingya civil society organisations, Rushanara Ali MP, Co-chair of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on democracy in Burma, the Foreign Affairs Committee, opposition political parties, more than 100 MPs, former Foreign Secretary Jeremy Hunt, and international human rights groups. The Burmese military has enjoyed impunity for decades, despite widespread documentation of numerous violations of international law, mainly against ethnic and religious minority groups. The sense of impunity encourages further violations of international law. The failure to act to prevent Rohingya genocide and then the failure to hold the military to account for Rohingya genocide would have encouraged the military to believe they could get away with the coup and subsequent violations of international law without facing serious consequences. The Rohingya genocide is not over. The laws and policies which are an integral part of the genocide continue, and the provisional measures ordered by the International Court of Justice to prevent ongoing genocide are being ignored by the military. Burma Campaign UK also welcomed the imposition of new sanctions on three businesses working with the military that are helping them to earn money and buy arms. The companies are Star Sapphire Group of Companies, International Gateways Group of Companies Limited (IGG), and Sky One Construction Company Ltd. Burma Campaign UK calls on the British government, as penholder on Burma at the United Nations Security Council, to convene a meeting of the Security Council to discuss progress in implementing the provisional measures, as the ICJ is a UN court, and its ruling is being ignored. The British government must also reverse cuts in funding to Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh. “This move by the UK is the result of years of advocacy by Rohingya communities, British MPs, members of the public and international human rights and humanitarian organisations,” said Anna Roberts..."
Source/publisher: "Burma Campaign UK" (London)
2022-08-25
Date of entry/update: 2022-08-25
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "The upcoming five-year anniversary of the Rohingya crisis must mark a turning point in the urgent quest to deliver justice to the victims and hold those responsible to account, Amnesty International said today. On 25 August 2017 Myanmar’s military began carrying out violent operations against the Rohingya population in northern Rakhine State, which resulted in grave crimes under international law, whole villages torched, and forced hundreds of thousands to flee into Bangladesh. “This solemn anniversary is a haunting reminder that not a single high-ranking Myanmar military official has been prosecuted for the egregious campaign of violence against the Rohingya,” said Amnesty International’s Ming Yu Hah, Deputy Regional Director for Campaigns. “Amnesty International stands in solidarity with the Rohingya people who are in Rakhine State and the estimated one million refugees living across the border in Bangladesh. Real justice is essential to ending the spiraling cycle of impunity engulfing Myanmar for many years.” "This solemn anniversary is a haunting reminder that not a single high-ranking Myanmar military official has been prosecuted for the egregious campaign of violence against the Rohingya." - Amnesty International's Ming Yu Ha, Deputy Regional Director for Campaigns Five years later, Rohingya in Rakhine State still lack freedom of movement and other basic rights such as access to adequate food, healthcare and education, problems compounded by the rising insecurity brought on by the 2021 military coup in Myanmar. Across the border in Bangladesh, Rohingya refugees are living in limbo with neither the opportunity to safely return to their homes in Myanmar nor a way to live peacefully in Bangladesh, where violence has been on the rise in refugee camps. “We face enormous hardship in the refugee camps,” San thai Shin, a Rohingya refugee in Bangladesh’s Cox’s Bazar camp, told Amnesty International in June. “We do not know how we can ever return to our homes. We are neither safe in the refugee camps nor in Arakan [Rakhine State in Myanmar].” “Our people are losing their lives to gang violence in the refugee camps, in environmental calamity, or by taking dangerous attempts to migrate to other countries through the deadly seas and other means.” Importantly, some international justice efforts are moving forward. In July 2022, the International Court of Justice dismissed Myanmar’s objections and decided that it has jurisdiction to continue proceedings instituted by the government of The Gambia against the government of Myanmar in 2019 on the basis of the Genocide Convention. “The International Court of Justice’s decision is a vital step in ongoing efforts to hold Myanmar’s government to account,” Amnesty’s Ming Yu Hah said. The International Criminal Court is also investigating crimes committed in 2016 and 2017 against the Rohingya population. Although Myanmar has not ratified the ICC’s Statute, the Court is examining alleged crimes committed partly in the territory of Bangladesh or other states. Amnesty International has called for the United Nations Security Council to refer the full situation in Myanmar to the International Criminal Court Prosecutor, so that an investigation of all crimes committed in Myanmar can be conducted. An investigation into other crimes in Myanmar is also being conducted in Argentina under the principle of universal jurisdiction, which permits national authorities to investigate crimes under international law committed anywhere in the world on behalf of the international community. The case, which was filed by the Burmese Rohingya Organisation UK (BROUK), hopes to hold senior military leaders to account for alleged responsibility in crimes against the Rohingya people. These efforts should be supported and other states should also take measures to investigate and prosecute the crimes before their national courts. “The Association of Southeast Asian Nations must also play a more forceful, decisive and leadership role in standing up for the Rohingya people and pushing for accountability in Myanmar,” Amnesty’s Ming Yu Hah said. “We reiterate our call on authorities to respect and ensure the participation of Rohingyas in the decisions that affect them in order to protect their human rights.” Background: More than 740,000 Rohingya women, men and children fled northern Rakhine State to neighboring Bangladesh, when in August 2017 Myanmar security forces launched a widespread and systematic assault on Rohingya villages, including extrajudicial killings, destruction of properties and sexual assault. The onslaught came in the wake of a series of what the military claims were insurgent attacks on police posts. Taking into account previous decades of violence against the Rohingya, an estimated one million Rohingya refugees now live in Bangladesh, while many of their homes in Rakhine State have been destroyed without a trace. The UN Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar previously called for Senior General Min Aung Hlaing and other top military officials to be investigated and prosecuted for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. Min Aung Hlaing assumed the role of Chairman of the State Administration Council following the February 2021 coup. In a report published earlier this month, since the coup Amnesty International documented the crackdown and arbitrary detention of those who exercise their right to freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly as well as enforced disappearances, torture and other inhuman treatment in detention. More than 2,000 people have reportedly been killed since the coup, and Myanmar arbitrarily executed four people after grossly unfair trials, the first use of capital punishment in the country in decades. A report by Amnesty International published in July showed that the Myanmar military is committing war crimes by laying banned landmines and around villages in Kayah (Karenni) State, while a report in May showed how the military uses air strikes and shelling as a form of collective punishment against civilians..."
Source/publisher: Amnesty International (UK)
2022-08-24
Date of entry/update: 2022-08-24
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Myanmar’s crackdown in 2017 forced a vast wave of refugees across the border into already crowded and unsafe camps – the result of decades of international political paralysis
Description: "In the 31 years since Anuara Begum’s family moved into their bamboo shelter in the Nayapara refugee camp, the only improvement they could make was replacing its tarpaulin roof with tin sheeting – less flimsy but hammer-loud when the rains come. Running from Myanmar’s military, their new home was built to be temporary, and so it proved when it took just 30 minutes for a fire last year to incinerate the metal and bamboo structures of a whole block of the camp. Fires in the camp have become commonplace in the five years since 700,000 Rohingya fled to Bangladesh, the August 2017 wave joining the approximately 300,000 already there from previous security crackdowns by the Myanmar military. The conditions those refugees now endure – living in fragile shelters, banned from education, work and travel – have been faced by several generations, who have run for decades from violence and discrimination at the hands of the Myanmar government. Begum, 23, was born in Bangladesh without any prospect of a safe return to the Myanmar she has never seen. “We have no peace of mind. The camp is like an open prison for us. Most people suffer with depression and trauma,” she says. “Since I was born, I have faced constant hardship. I have spent my entire life as a refugee, since 1999, and still I can’t find peace. “I cry when I see a fire. My family can’t sleep properly through the night because of our fear after the fire. My neighbours are constantly scared.” Rohingya people and aid workers say the refugees who arrived five years ago have been abandoned to the same fate as those before them, accusing the humanitarian agencies of decades of failure to ensure basic rights or to secure a safe return. One senior aid worker for an international NGO said the UN had consistently failed to challenge the Bangladeshi government over restrictive policies such as the demand that all homes be temporary, its restrictions on education and movement and the relocation of tens of thousands of people to Bhasan Char, an island camp vulnerable to extreme weather. “Basic shelter standards have not been met, and every year the camp burns down,” he said, asking for anonymity. Advertisement “They often blame climate change for this, which is, frankly, bollocks. The fault for those fires is on the UNHCR [UN refugee agency] and IOM [International Organization for Migration]. And they should be held accountable. Where the government has put punitive measures in place, they’ve never been challenged.” He said the Rohingya posed no significant security threat in Bangladesh, which should ensure more humane conditions. “It has been a failure and, on the five-year mark, the UN has to be close to saying that it’s failed. They won’t – they’ll say we did our best, and look at all of the things we’ve done. But they’ve essentially created a prison camp in Cox’s Bazar … it’s insane when you think about it.” Another frontline worker said humanitarian agencies are too concerned about maintaining good relationships with the government so they can continue operating in Bangladesh. “They’re very much reliant on those good relationships with the government and it was my impression that they value those relationships and development programmes more than the rights of Rohingya, who were not allowed to leave, to work or receive education,” he said. At least 7,000 Rohingya were killed in Myanmar’s Rakhine state over several weeks of “clearance operations” by the military, which began on 25 August 2017. Described as “a textbook example of ethnic cleansing” by the UN, the attacks were ostensibly to remove the fringe Rohingya armed group Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army, but targeted civilians instead. The military, and ethnic Rakhine villagers, used killing, arson and rape to drive hundreds of thousands of people to Bangladesh. The UN called it genocide. Such violence is not new. It was employed by the military in 1978 and 1991, creating similar but smaller refugee crises. Both times, Bangladesh carried out repatriation campaigns to force people back, with apparently little international resistance. A report, prepared in 2010 but never published, about the UNHCR’s role in the camps and during the repatriations, said that in 1978 and during the 1990s the agency “departed the furthest from its protection mandate and principles in any of its operations worldwide”. According to that report, seen by the Guardian, the agency cooperated with the government in repatriation efforts during the 1990s, despite concerns about lack of consent, intimidation and, on one occasion, a group of Rohingya being forced at gunpoint to board boats. A researcher who produced a separate report for the US Congress at the time said that, when invited by UNHCR to witness a repatriation, they were shocked to see Rohingya burst into tears when told they were being returned to Myanmar. The UN report also noted that Rohingya faced the same violence and controls when they were returned to Myanmar. Some found their home villages had been taken over as military bases. They faced increased taxes and more restrictions on their movements. Many made the journey back to Bangladesh. The report was particularly damning on the lack of involvement the Rohingya played in decision-making. It quoted a senior official who said in a meeting: “The Rohingya are primitive people. At the end of the day, they will go where they are told to go.” Rohingya people have repeatedly complained at not being consulted in the repatriation process, including when the UN signed a memorandum of understanding with Myanmar which did not address their main demand – the restoration of citizenship rights stripped away in 1982. UNHCR spokesperson Regina de la Portilla said it will ensure any future repatriation is safe and that informed consent is obtained, but that the conditions in Myanmar are not currently suitable for a return. “It’s clear that, this time around, the return needs to be voluntary, safe and sustainable, and that it can only happen if the basic rights and the human rights of the Rohingya in Myanmar are ensured,” she said. “This implies that they are granted documentation, have had services, have freedom of movement, and their safety is ensured.” A lack of opportunity in the camps has helped feed a trafficking network that has seen tens of thousands of Rohingya trafficked from Bangladesh and Myanmar to Malaysia. In 2015, the Thai government discovered mass graves at one of the jungle camps where refugees had been held captive. The trafficking network seemed dormant for several years after that but is now active again, with reports of boats arriving into southeast Asia. Last week, the Indonesian navy had to retrieve a sinking boat carrying more than 100 people. Rohingya complain that insecurity has spiralled in the camps, fuelled by armed gangs vying for dominance. Last year, the most prominent Rohingya civil society leader, Mohib Ullah, was assassinated in his office. Two other leaders were shot dead in the camps last week. Speaking at Nayapara refugee camp, Anuara Begum says gang members have threatened to abduct her if she continues to work with NGOs and advocate for girls’ education. “They said I’m a bad influence for the community. The miscreants threatened to kidnap me if I go outside any more,” she says. “I fear them now, and can only secretly go outside. I already feel dead inside.” All Bangladesh’s attempts to begin repatriations have failed, with no refugees signing up willingly to return. Last year’s military coup in Myanmar means the country is no safer for the Rohingya than in 2017. Progress towards justice has also been slow. A genocide case against Myanmar, taken by the Gambia to the UN’s International Courts of Justice, moved beyond the preliminary stage in a recent ruling, but the investigation by the international criminal court into forced deportations by the military has been slower. Evidence gathered by the Commission for International Justice and Accountability, and submitted to the ICC investigation, indicated that there was evidence the Myanmar military had for years planned operations to expel the Rohingya. De la Portilla said the UNCHR has tried to improve conditions within the temporary response framework set out by the government, with better sanitary systems, the ability to respond to fires, and gradually rolling out limited secondary education. But funding has become a major barrier, especially when global prices have soared for key items like gas, which prevents refugees having to cut firewood. Khin Maung leads the camp-based Rohingya Youth Association. He says UN rights chief Michelle Bachelet told the refugees at a meeting last week that conditions are not right for repatriation. “The military regime has no plan to take back Rohingya, it just shows fake willingness on social media to get legitimacy from the international community and Bangladesh government,” he says. “[Meanwhile], the conditions in the camps are not good. Nothing is changing at all and violence is increasing. “The Rohingya community must start political activism for self-determination. We have the right to struggle for our ethnic rights like other minority communities in their areas. Why not for our community? The solution is in our hands.”..."
Source/publisher: "The Guardian" (UK)
2022-08-23
Date of entry/update: 2022-08-24
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Sub-title: The UN human-rights chief says it’s not ‘safe’ for the Rohingya to return home, but ‘safe’ for whom?
Description: "For the past five years, there has been much speculation about repatriation of Rohingya refugees. Recently, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Michelle Bachelet, added a new dimension to the issue. On August 16, she visited the Rohingya camp in Ukhia, an administrative region in Cox’s Bazar district, Bangladesh. The Rohingya expressed hope that she would promote their right to return to Myanmar. According to media reports, she tried to explain that the situation in Rakhine state is not yet favorable for the repatriation of Rohingya and advised them to wait and be patient. On August 25, 2017, the Myanmar military carried out a massacre of the Rohingya population in Rakhine state. The Bangladeshi government gave shelter to the Rohingya on humanitarian grounds. During the five years that have passed since then, Myanmar has tried to cover the issue of repatriation of the Rohingya under the cloak of various dramas. Myanmar has continually tried to convince the international community that it is serious about taking back the Rohingya, but its actual steps have fallen short. On November 23, 2017, a 19-point agreement was signed between the governments of Bangladesh and Myanmar regarding the repatriation of the Rohingya, but its practical reflection is still not visible. On August 22, 2019, Myanmar announced that 3,450 Rohingyas would be divided into seven groups and taken back to their own country. But that too remains unfulfilled. In 2019, after a hearing of the case imposed by The Gambia against Myanmar at the International Court of Justice, an interim order on January 23, 2020, did not include any direct instructions regarding the repatriation of the Rohingya. Then the Rohingya repatriation talks got stuck because of the Covid-19 pandemic and the military coup in Myanmar. On February 1, 2021, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing seized power. Although the resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on June 18, 2021, regarding Myanmar mentioned many issues including the country’s democratic problems, there were no instructions regarding a solution of the Rohingya crisis. As well, no action by the UN is yet visible on the implementation of the resolution adopted on the Rohingya issue at the 47th session of the United Nations Human Rights Council on July 12, 2021. The Rohingya crisis has various aspects including the indifference of the international community, the silence of the United Nations, and the issue of Rohingya citizenship. One thing to note here is the elimination of all voices from the oppressed population. Rohingya leader Mohibullah was instrumental in repatriation efforts. His meeting with US president Donald Trump in July 2019, his multiple visits to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, and such actions as organizing a mass meeting of Rohingya on the anniversary of their arrival in Bangladesh on August 25, 2019, were noteworthy. But on September 29, 2021, he was shot dead by gunmen in Lambasia Rohingya Camp East-West Block No 1. Although the details of the murder are not known, many believe that the Myanmar regime was behind it. What everyone is ‘waiting’ for As for Michelle Bachelet’s concerns about the situation in Rakhine state, the exact situation is not being disclosed to the international community by Myanmar. At times, it has tried to divert the attention regarding the Rohingya back to Rakhine by favoring some organizations like the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA). But the reality is that there are several economic projects being undertaken by China, India, Russia and others around Rakhine state. These include the Thelong Myanmar-China oil and gas pipeline project, including the construction of a deep-sea port, India’s Kaladan multi-purpose project, two hydropower projects, and a four-lane highway connecting Myanmar and Thailand and India. Other notable projects include investment by the Russian oil company Bashneft, and the Japanese government’s planned economic zone near Maungdoo, Rakhine. The Myanmar government is working diligently to implement these projects. Repatriation of Rohingya to Rakhine state could derail such economic plans. This goes a long way toward understanding why Myanmar continues to politicize the situation in the state. Based on all this, Michelle Bachelet’s “please wait” message takes on a new perspective. When will the wait be over?..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
2022-08-23
Date of entry/update: 2022-08-23
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "The recent debate in the media on the status of Rohingyas have brought their intractable problem to the forefront. A look at the facts is relevant to the issue to understand its legal and security dimensions as also deep-seated hatred between the Burmese and Rohingyas. The Rohingyas claim that they constitute an ethnic Muslim minority (predominantly Sunnis), who lived in Rakhine (earlier Arakan), speaking a distinct language since the 8th AD. There is evidence available that between 9th and 14th Century, they came into contact with Arab traders and got converted to Islam and the Mrauk U kingdom from 1429 to 1785, encouraged the settlement of Muslims in the Arakan area. According to Dr Francis-Buchanan a British geographer and physician, in 1785 Bamar- the ethnic Burmese group- occupied Rakhine and pushed out about 35,000 Rohingyas, who migrated to Bengal in British India to escape atrocities, while some others continued to stay there. On the other hand, the Myanmar government does not recognise Rohingyas as the citizens of Myanmar and hold the view that they are Bengali Muslims, who migrated either after 1823 or after 1948 or during the Bangladesh Liberation War in 1971. The Myanmar government views that Rohingyas actually belong to Chittagong. The rift between the Burmese and the Rohingyas worsened after Burma was annexed by the British in 1823. The British encouraged Bengalis mainly Muslims to settle in Burma to work in the paddy field and tea plantations. The Muslims were also given preference in top administrative positions as they were unhappy with the anti-colonial sentiments of Buddhists. While this improved the position of Rohingyas, the divide between Rohingyas and Burmese deepened taking a communal shape. During the World War II, the Burmese Buddhist welcomed Japanese, while Rohingyas supported the British. When in 1948, Burma gained Independence, Myanmar refused to recognise Rohingyas as the rightful citizens. Rohingyas supported the movement to join Pakistan that was not liked by Burmese. During the 1970-71 crackdown in Bangladesh, a number of Bangladeshis took shelter in Rakhine and Myanmar government forcibly expelled 2,00,000 Muslims that included Rohingyas. In 1982, when Myanmar government enacted the Citizenship Law, it identified 135 ethnic groups in the country that does not include Rohingyas. These 135 ethnic groups according to the Myanmar government had settled in the country prior to 1823. The Chairman of the ruling party and predominant leader Ne Win stated at the time of enactment of law that it was a means of distinguishing ‘pure blooded nationals’ from those who entered Myanmar during the colonial period, their descendants, and ‘mixed bloods’ (that is, the children of marriages between the two groups). The idea in the speech was that ‘pure blooded nationals’ should be ‘citizens’, while the others could become ‘associate citizens’ (who acquired citizenship through 1948 citizenship Law) or ‘naturalized citizens’ (who could provide “conclusive evidence” that he or his parents entered and resided in Burma prior to independence in 1948). There is no transition from associate and naturalised citizenship to full citizenship. Rohingya children born in Myanmar are denied citizenship. In 2012, riots broke out in Rakhine between Rohingyas and Buddhists in which 78 persons were killed and 1,40,000 persons were displaced according to government sources, though the actual number was much more. The Rohingyas formed an insurgent group known as Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), earlier known as Harakah al-Yaqin, under Attaullah abu Ammar Januni in 2013. He was Karachi born and grew up in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. Both Tatmadaw (Myanmar Army) and International Crisis Group accuse this group of receiving foreign funds and support. Reports indicate that in 2013, ISI had established contacts with Rohingyas to support the Indian insurgent groups based in Myanmar. Tatmadaw had also blamed China for supplying arms to both ARSA and Arakan Army, which is demanding self-determination in the state, though they term Rohingyas as Bengali Muslims. Since its formation, ARSA intensified attacks on the Myanmar security forces. In 2016-2017, ARSA killed officers and soldiers at the border, murdered and kidnapped civilians and launched attacks on more than 30 police stations in Myanmar. Tatmadaw also pointed out that Afghans and Pak fighters had trained ARSA recruits. Crucially, Tatmadaw blamed ARSA for killing 99 Bengali Hindus in the Kha Maung Seik massacre in 2017. The Myanmar government retaliated by burning Rohingya villages and killing Rohingyas. This followed a massive migration of Rohingyas to Bangladesh, Thailand and Malaysia. While a few entered India directly, others came via Bangladesh. Currently there are about one million Rohingyas in Myanmar but only 40,000 have been recognised as citizens. Rest of the Rohingyas are called ‘resident foreigners’ and were not included in the 2014 census. A little less than one million Rohingyas are in Bangladesh’s Cox Bazar camps. They are in miserable condition. Several Rohingyas have not registered and are living separately. Rohingya refugees have also sought refuge in Thailand (92,000) and India (21,000), with smaller numbers settling in Indonesia, Nepal and other countries across the region. In India there are more than 40,000 with maximum concentration in J&K (8,500). The Rohingya issue remains problematic. The Myanmar constitution does not consider them as legal citizens. With the formation of ARSA, Rohingyas are posing serious security challenges to Myanmar. Any hope of changing the Myanmar constitution in favour of Rohingyas appears to be a pipe-dream. Tatmadaw’s hold in Arakan and Kachin areas is not very strong and therefore the insurgents continue to operate there. Over the period, the religious divide between Burmese Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims has widened and reconciliation between them appears difficult. Bangladesh has consistently demanded that Rohingyas should be repatriated. However, voluntary repatriation is not possible as Rohingyas do not find the situation conducive for their return to Myanmar. As there is overcrowding in the Cox bazar camps, Bangladesh is relocating Rohingyas to Bhasan Char (Char Piya) island. At present there are 19,000 Rohingyas and Bangladesh is planning to send another 80,000 Rohingyas to Bhasan Char. While refugees are not permitted to work in Bangladesh, 30% of children ages 15-17 are working informally putting them at risk of exploitation. Bangladesh has also indicated that criminal activities are increasing involving Rohingyas. The UNHCR is trying to provide life-saving assistance but the funds are insufficient: in 2018 it was estimated that only 32% of the need is available. Its ability to create conditions conducive for the return of Rohingyas is negligible at present. For India, it is important that they are repatriated at the earliest. India does not have a refugee policy though refugees from neighbouring countries have come and are staying. The Foreigner’s Act of 1946 does not address the refugee policy. India is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol. India views that these only include political and civil rights and not economic rights and if the latter is included it would create a heavy burden on the country. The linkages of Rohingyas with external elements is a serious security concern particularly with their concentration in a sensitive state like J&K. They may easily be pushed to get involved in anti-national activities. Besides they have the potential to exacerbate the communal situation. While the best way is to repatriate Rohingyas, India does not wish to push them forcibly though they are termed as illegal migrants. Steps need to be taken in consultation with Tatmadaw. India needs the support of Naypyidaw not only for controlling North-East insurgents but also to push forward its policy of Act East for economic development. Immediately India should ensure that Rohingyas are not able to come illegally from Bangladesh. They should also be relocated to a place where their activities can be closely watched. Simultaneously, Myanmar should be nudged to take back Rohingyas, though it may take quite some time..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Times of India"
2022-08-21
Date of entry/update: 2022-08-22
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Description: "On a vacant patch of land in Sittwe, the capital of Rakhine state alongside the western flank of Myanmar, grass grows lengthy below the new solar. A home as soon as stood on this plot, although all hint of it’s lengthy gone. Mohammed, a 36-year-old Rohingya man, grew up in that home and lived there till 2012, when he and his household have been compelled to flee by a band of ethnic Rakhines wielding sticks and torches. That summer time mobs of Rakhine villagers and Burmese troopers razed Rohingya villages and killed lots of of individuals belonging to the long-persecuted Muslim minority group. Some 140,000 Rohingyas have been displaced within the melee and herded into camps, the place they’ve remained ever since. The pogrom of 2012 laid the groundwork for an even bigger bout of bloodshed 5 years later. In 2017 Burmese safety forces launched a marketing campaign of mass killing, rape and arson in northern Rakhine, in what the un has branded as genocide. Nearly 750,000 Rohingyas fled to Bangladesh, the place they stay on the earth’s largest refugee camp (see map). In the last decade because the rampage of 2012 and the 5 years because the genocide of 2017, the Rohingyas have been topic to circumstances designed to empty the life from the ethnic group, in accordance with the un. Crossing over into Bangladesh afforded some respite, at first. Yet the Bangladeshi authorities has lengthy since begun to view the refugees as a burden. Violence within the camps is rampant, with a lot of it dedicated by the Bangladeshi safety forces. No matter which aspect of the border Rohingyas discover themselves at the moment, their expertise is identical: starvation and distress surrounded by barbed wire. The Burmese military, which has run Myanmar for a lot of the previous 50 years, started persecuting Rohingyas many years in the past. It first tried to drive them off their land in 1978, utilizing the now acquainted instruments of homicide, arson and rape. Its excessive command considers them Bangladeshi interlopers, with no declare to Burmese citizenship—as do many different Burmese. It enshrined that view in legislation 40 years in the past, turning the Rohingyas into the world’s largest neighborhood of stateless folks. It was not till 2012, nonetheless, that the federal government started to herd Rohingyas into camps. This segregation, along with the imposition of a matrix of repressive legal guidelines, which embody restrictions on marriage and having kids, quantity to a system of apartheid, in accordance with Human Rights Watch (hrw), an advocacy group. After the genocide of 2017, this vice tightened. Today a few fifth of the Rohingyas who stay in Myanmar stay in what Fortify Rights, a strain group, calls “modern concentration camps”. One unlucky resident, Hla Maung, lives cheek by jowl with 11 kin in one of many cramped shelters into which households are crowded. These buildings have been initially designed to final two years. Many have been badly broken by monsoons and flooding over the previous decade. In April some 28,000 Rohingyas have been residing in shelters deemed by the un to be structurally unsound. Because worldwide assist businesses should apply to journey to the camps two weeks prematurely, they can not all the time restore shelters instantly. “Living conditions are, by design, squalid,” noticed hrw in a latest report. Harsh restrictions on motion make life tougher nonetheless. More than three-quarters of displaced Rohingyas can’t go away their camps in any respect, in accordance with a survey carried out in 2015 by the Centre for Diversity and National Harmony, a Burmese ngo. The relaxation could journey, however solely to a Rohingya ghetto in Sittwe or to Sittwe General Hospital, the only facility within the state that gives specialised therapy. Medical referrals are granted just for emergencies and even then getting the required journey authorisation can take days. Access to well being care within the camps is proscribed. In the extra distant ones, docs go to for simply a few hours a couple of times per week. Rates of illness and youngster mortality are larger within the camps than elsewhere within the state, in accordance with the International Rescue Committee, an assist organisation. Those who can go away the camps should get a “village departure certificate” which prices as much as 5,000 kyat ($3.45). Sometimes safety forces demand travellers current an id card proving their citizenship, which most Rohingyas lack. All Rohingyas should go by way of quite a few checkpoints manned by troopers who demand bribes, and to go away they need to typically additionally pay for a “security escort”, which prices as much as 20,000 kyat. These restrictions forestall Rohingyas from working, making it troublesome for them to complement the money or meals assist they obtain from ngos, which residents say is inadequate for his or her day by day wants. For the roughly 300,000-350,000 Rohingyas who haven’t been herded into camps, circumstances are nonetheless dire. They, too, are not often granted permission to get therapy at Sittwe General Hospital. And although they proceed to stay in their very own houses, a mesh of restrictions hems them in as effectively. They aren’t allowed to go away their districts with out authorisation. Security checkpoints strewn all through their villages are manned by troopers who implement curfews (from 6pm to 6am) and guidelines limiting gatherings in public areas to not more than 5 folks. Violations of those guidelines result in beatings or detention. These circumstances seem calculated to carry concerning the “slow death” of the Rohingyas, says the un. Their numbers in Myanmar have dropped precipitously. Before 2017 the nation was residence to as many as 1.3m Rohingyas. (No dependable numbers exist as they weren’t included within the final census in 2014, the primary in 30 years.) Now the inhabitants is nearer to 600,000. Most fled to Bangladesh. But many are more likely to have died due to the grim residing circumstances. There are dismaying parallels between the experiences of Rohingyas in Rakhine state and people within the refugee camps of Bangladesh. At first refugees might work in surrounding cities, recollects Hakim Ullah, who has lived within the refugee settlement in Cox’s Bazar district since 2017. Now they want permission to go away the camps. Shops and colleges within the camps have been demolished earlier this yr by the Bangladeshi authorities, who’ve banned paid work and personal schooling. “The refugee camps have become detention camps”, says Rahamat Ullah, a Rohingya civil-rights activist who lives in Cox’s Bazar. Nor have refugees traded freedom for security. Militant teams and felony gangs working within the camps usually commit murders, kidnappings and robberies. Bangladesh’s safety forces do a lot of the terrorising themselves, in accordance with stories from human-rights teams. The Armed Police Battalion, the specialist unit answerable for safety within the camps, acts “with impunity”, says Ashraf Zaman of the Asian Human Rights Commission, a strain group primarily based in Thailand. The battalion has reportedly overwhelmed kids and raped girls. The Bangladeshi forces are so brutal, that they remind Mr Hakim Ullah of the Burmese military. (Bangladeshi authorities didn’t reply to a number of requests for remark from The Economist.) As lengthy because the Burmese military is in energy, little concerning the Rohingyas’ situation is more likely to change. “Life in the camps is worse than prison,” says Mohammed, who now lives in a camp outdoors Sittwe. At least prisoners know the size of their sentence. Rohingyas have no idea if they may ever be launched. Even if they’re, many would haven’t any residence to return to. The authorities way back bulldozed the ruins of homes like Mohammed’s, and offered the land to builders—making it simpler to take away each final hint of the group..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Business Lend
2022-08-18
Date of entry/update: 2022-08-18
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: A Myanmar Commentary by Kyaw Lynn
Description: "Tensions are rising in Arakan (Rakhine State) where a ceasefire exists between the Myanmar military government and Arakan Army. On the surface, the relative stability contrasts with the chaos that has enveloped many other parts of the country following last year’s coup. In this commentary, Kyaw Lynn analyses the changing landscape highlighting that, while confrontations are occurring, neither side appears yet ready to return to open warfare. “Retaliatory” actions, though, are increasing. Twenty months after an informal ceasefire between the Myanmar military and Arakan Army (AA), social and political stability in Arakan (Rakhine State) are deteriorating, leading many local people to worry about the future. Many changes have taken place in the country since the introduction of this de facto ceasefire, not least the coup by the military State Administrative Council (SAC) in February 2021. And it now seems that both parties to the agreement – the Myanmar military and AA – are starting to recalculate their military strategies and political interests. Tit for tat actions have become commonplace. This was highlighted on 22 June, when SAC troops arrested 30 local Rakhine people in response to the AA arresting three government staff from the “Intelligence and Investigation Department” in Mrauk-U, the ancient capital of Arakan and one of the most conflict-sensitive townships in Rakhine State. Before this event, tensions were visibly growing between the SAC and the United League of Arakan (ULA), the political wing of the AA. In the preceding weeks, the AA had arrested military and police force members in Kyauktaw, Ponnagyun and Tin Nyo, Mrauk-U township, as well as Ramree in southern Rakhine State. As an explanation, the ULA-AA spokesperson Khaing Thu Kha told a party press conference on 14 June that they had been arrested in response to the growing number of ULA and AA members being seized by the SAC authorities in different parts of the state. “Hostage exchange” is possible, he said, if the SAC is willing. In the ULA-AA’s defence, he argued that the arrests were an “equivalent retaliation” for the SAC’s breaking the promises of the informal ceasefire not to arrest unarmed and non-uniformed members on both sides. Khaing Thu Kha also had sobering words of warning. During the press briefing, he repeatedly stated that the outbreak of “another war” could happen at any time and that mediation through third parties was not working. The people continue to watch the situation closely. But the past month has not shown any notable improvements, and it seems that the spate of arrests are just the tip of the iceberg in revealing deeper reasons for the changing trends in Arakan politics. A critical time is approaching. A ceasefire of distrust When the informal ceasefire was initiated in November 2020, it caused surprise for many people both inside and outside of the country. Coming in the aftermath of the 2020 general election, the timing seemed odd, and for many observers the real intentions of the leaders of the Myanmar military for accepting such a ceasefire were only revealed when they staged their coup on 1 February 2021. Until the ceasefire turning-point, it was Myanmar’s military leaders who had always refused to recognise the ULA-AA’s existence in Arakan and insisted that they would eradicate the movement by military means in line with their “black and white” definitions of combatting opponents. In essence, “white” areas are those that the government is perceived to control and “black” are under armed opposition which, military leaders say, must be destroyed. Certainly, in the months following the coup the SAC leaders sought to take advantage in Arakan by a combination of different measures. On the political front, the SAC attempted to build on the rivalry between the National League for Democracy (NLD) and Rakhine political parties – the Arakan National Party (ANP) and Arakan Front Party (AFP) – in the electoral space. To try and achieve legitimacy for the SAC, a number of ANP members were included in SAC administrative structures and Dr. Aye Maung, the AFP chair and a former ANP leader, was released from prison. Such gestures appeared more profitable for the SAC in Rakhine State where, given the electoral opposition to the NLD in many constituencies (especially in the north and centre of the state), the regime faced less protest reaction in urban areas when compared to other parts of the country following the coup. During these difficult months, the AA ceasefire further added to a lessening in security and political challenges faced by the regime after the SAC’s assumption of power – both in Arakan and Myanmar at large. For several months the security situation appeared more stable in Arakan in contrast to the chaos that had enveloped other parts of the country following the coup. This meant that, at the union level, the SAC military no longer needed to provide intensive operational attention to Rakhine State which, until the AA ceasefire, had been the most active conflict region in Myanmar. In line with this new strategy, the SAC leadership sought to contain ULA-AA activities on the one hand while taking profits from political stability and economic extraction on the other. Located on the country’s western seaboard, Rakhine State is an important source of revenue to the regime, including oil and gas pipelines that run to Yunnan Province in China. Containing the ULA-AA, however, did not prove a simple option after several years of warfare. To implement this policy, a raft of activities was laid out. These included re-building military and police apparatus across the state and adjoining Paletwa township in Chin State where the ULA-AA is also based; increasing intelligence surveillance; re-organising broken administrative structures by forcing village-tract leaders not to cooperate with the ULA authorities; and threatening ULA administrative and judiciary activities in territories that the SAC regards as its exclusive sphere of influence. The main focus of these pressures was generally in urban areas of northern Rakhine State as well as southern townships, such as Kyaukpyu, Ramree and Taungup, where there had been no strong AA movement during the previous round of conflict. At the same time, the SAC military presence was reinforced by the maintenance of trade and travel sanctions inside and along the borders of Rakhine State. In essence, although the truce was sustained, many people experienced a more difficult economic and security situation following the 2020 ceasefire. Inevitably, such behaviour proved unacceptable to the ULA-AA leadership. After several months of ceasefire initiation, the ULA-AA chief, Gen. Twan Mrat Naing, declared the movement’s policy of “state-building” and “nation-building” as the fundamental task of the Arakan people on 10 April 2021 on the 12th anniversary of the Arakan Army’s foundation. ULA-AA leaders also called for faster action to support progress on the ground in the ceasefire aftermath. After three years of intense conflict and deepening poverty, the ULA-AA wanted to prioritise reconstruction, resettle displaced peoples, build new infrastructure and promote socio-economic development for the general population while securing political stability in Rakhine State. For this reason, Yohei Sasakawa, Japan’s Goodwill Ambassador for the Welfare of the National Races in Myanmar and Chairman of the Nippon Foundation, had been welcomed to play a visible role in the initiation of the Arakan ceasefire. However, within months of the SAC coup, it quickly became clear that the situation was not developing as the ULA leadership had desired. While trying to crack down on the expansion of ULA administrative and judiciary systems in southern Rakhine State, the SAC was continuing to impose trade and travel restrictions on local communities across the territory. The ULA-AA spokesperson Khaing Thu Kha spoke openly of deepening concerns at the party press conference in June this year: “We, the ULA-AA, are waiting and watching such aggressive and inhospitable actions of the SAC authority as we want more freedom and better socio-economic conditions for our people while maintaining political stability in Rakhine State. However, if their actions are becoming more aggressive than we can tolerate, we want to warn that it could lead to an even greater deterioration in relations.” As tensions continue to deepen, many people are asking the same question: “What do we actually get from a de facto ceasefire like this?” Ceasefire in Arakan but fighting in other areas In his 2021 address on the 12th anniversary of the AA’s foundation, Gen. Twan Mrat Naing stated that the ULA-AA does not want the Civilian Disobedience Movement and other anti-military or pro-democracy movements to become active in Arakan because the organisation has its own “Way of Rakhita” philosophy to bring about social and political change. Since this time, many people in Arakan and outside became interested in what the “Way of Rakhita” means and how it can guide the civil and political movements in Rakhine State in the face of the complex political landscape that exists countrywide. There is, in fact, no official definition or document about the “Way of Rakhita”. But based on interviews and speeches by the ULA-AA leadership, it is usually summarised as a “way of thinking which is solely based on the national interest of Arakan people rather than any other philosophical or political values and principles.” In line with this philosophy, the ULA-AA leadership started to re-shape the politics of Arakan in new ways following the SAC coup. At the time, they thought this strategy would be better following the ceasefire in pursuit of their political goals and interests. In Gen. Twan Mrat Naing’s most recent speech, however, there was a very different tone. Speaking two months ago on the 13th anniversary of the AA founding, he said: “Comrades, be ready to fight when ordered!” It was an occasion that attracted attention. On the same day, the rival National Unity Government (NUG) and more than a dozen armed opposition groups, including the (Kokang) Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army and Ta’ang National Liberation Army, sent their own “congratulatory statements” in solidarity with the ULA-AA. Notably, a number of these movements are newly established since the coup and are engaged in anti-SAC military activities in other parts of the country. New groups include the Burma People`s Liberation Army, Student Armed Force, People’s Revolutionary Alliance (Magway), Karenni National Defence Force, Asho Chin Defence Force, Mara Defense Force and Chin Defence Force (Mindat). In some of their statements, they mentioned the support of the ULA-AA in terms of military training and equipment. This is not the only link that exists between the ULA-AA and anti-SAC movements. News has continued to emerge about AA soldiers fighting – or being present – in conflict frontline areas in Kachin and northern Shan States alongside other ethnic armed organisations since the SAC coup. In a recent example, six AA soldiers were killed in an air raid in Karen State in early July where they were stationed in territory administered by the Karen National Union (KNU). Technically, the KNU also has a ceasefire with the Myanmar military (initiated in 2012), and the air strike was considered a hostile act. But it is generally safe to argue that the AA, outside of Arakan, has not truly been under a ceasefire following the SAC takeover. Against this backdrop, relations between the SAC and ULA-AA leaderships have been stalling. A lower-level ULA political team attended the 73rd anniversary of Union Day, held by the SAC at Nay Pyi Taw in February, where they argued for the release of their members who have been arrested. But ULA-AA leaders declined a peace talk invitation by the SAC Chairman, Sen-Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, in May this year. Although two key ULA-AA allies in the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee – the United Wa State Army and National Democratic Alliance Army – chose to participate in the talks, the ULA-AA did not release an official statement explaining their refusal. But one informal response by the ULA Secretary Dr. Nyo Twan Awng appeared on social media: “The SAC still does not change its policy about ethnic rights for the peace talks.” Reflecting the deepening divide, the NUG then declared its recognition of the “Arakan People’s Government”, which is led by the ULA, at the end of May following an online meeting between NUG and ULA leaders. All such events are raising speculation in Arakan politics. During the past two years, changes have happened rapidly, and the path that the ULA-AA is following is sure to make the SAC leadership angry. However it is still too early to say that the ULA is totally on the side of the NUG against the SAC, and it will mostly like not want to choose one “government” over another in the struggle between the two camps: the SAC and NUG. In explanation of this ambiguity, the strategy of ULA leaders cannot be understood on the basis of dialectical thinking between the SAC or NUG but only realised through the “Way of Rakhita” philosophy, which is centred upon the “Arakan National Interest” and not subject to any outside political domain. The Rohingya crisis: old challenges and new questions Adding to the complexity of pressures, the question of the Rohingya community in Arakan is also becoming more difficult to answer. On 21 June, the ULA released a statement warning the people to avoid a recurrence of communal violence in Rakhine State due to a series of incidents that were causing tensions to rise and accused the SAC of being involved. These included the kidnapping of two ethnic Rakhine teachers in Maungdaw township, who were released one week later in exchange for 5 million takas on the Bangladesh side of the border, and the bullying and beating of a young Rohingya man in Pauktaw township. Subsequently, the ULA-AA leader Gen. Twan Mrat Naing accused the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army of being the culprit behind the kidnappings, stating that this was a grave disservice to efforts for social cohesion and trust-building among communities in Arakan as well as to Rohingya refugees who want to come back to their homes. The situation, however, is much changed since the first round of communal violence in 2012. Large segments among both communities today believe that they cannot allow another outbreak of violence in Rakhine State and, if this happened, it would only prove beneficial to the SAC which prefers the tactics of “divide and rule” to cause disharmony among different peoples and communities. At the same time, it needs to be recognised that community reconciliation in Rakhine State is not an all-finished task, and there is still no common vision about the future of Arakan. This theme was taken up in a recent International Crisis Group (ICG) report about the political situation in Arakan, which made a number of points suggesting the formalization of the informal ceasefire with the initiation of a Rohingya repatriation process.* The ICG recommendations, which are based on achieving tripartite relations between SAC, ULA and Bangladesh government, are quite welcoming on a peace and repatriation process. There are, however, still many challenges in implementing such a sensitive programme due to the rise in political instability and lack of common understanding between the different actors and communities that need to become involved. Despite the desire to avoid any repetition of communal violence, many different opinions still exist on the ground. For example, there has been a significant change in perceptions among the ethnic Bamar majority since the SAC coup as well as a NUG policy declaration towards addressing the Rohingya crisis. But these views cannot be regarded as the same as those of ULA-AA leaders nor the Rakhine majority population in Arakan. Similarly, while there is competition between SAC and NUG leaders over gaining international recognition for their governments in handling the Rohingya issue, the ULA-AA is much more focused on building local and international support for the achievement of an Arakan State as part of any process of resolving the Rohingya and other socio-political challenges. The SAC, NUG and ULA see the Rohingya crisis with very different priorities and perspectives. In summary, collaboration will be needed among different actors to solve the Rohingya crisis, and this will mean mediation among competing interests. But, at present, this will not be an easy task at all. The possibility of another war in Arakan For the moment, it is difficult to estimate the possibility of a resumption of armed conflict in Arakan, and how this might come about. Politics aside, there are other strategic interests that both parties to the ceasefire have to consider. Two, in particular, stand out: intention and capability. Both play important roles in the power competition between the two sides, with the expansion of either party – and hence its capacity – making the other doubtful about their rival’s intentions and vice-versa. As such, an increase in capability has the potential to change the intention of one side or the other at any time. Such is the state of play in Arakan. For this reason, one of the key factors hindering another outbreak of armed conflict in Arakan is the lack of a clear “war mission” for both parties. The current situation, both in Arakan and the country more generally, encourages both parties to keep to the ceasefire status quo and be generally defensive about developing and implementing another war strategy due to their limited capacities on the ground. It is also very difficult to relate the post-coup combat involving new People’s Defence Forces and other anti-SAC movements in other parts of the country, where there are no ceasefires, to the particular challenges in Arakan. In essence, both SAC and ULA-AA leaders may feel that they have more to lose than gain by returning to open conflict in Arakan at this time. If fighting breaks out, for example, the ULA-AA would be expected to try and “conquer and control” some of the urban areas and key communication channels in northern Rakhine State at the least, while the SAC would return to the familiar tactics of the Myanmar military in launching “regional clearance” operations against AA strongholds in rural and mountain areas. In the present impasse, however, both parties appear to have limited capability to carry these objectives out. For the ULA-AA gaining control of new areas requires new technology, human resource training and supplies of military equipment. In contrast, attempts at SAC “domination” will also face logistical challenges and strong resistance because the regime cannot provide enough soldiers or open new battlefronts due to the scale of fighting in other parts of the country. Such realities indicate that the return to war in Arakan may ultimately be determined by the changing military pendulum between the SAC and anti-SAC forces in central Myanmar and the different ethnic states around other international borders. The country is presently in a deep state of civil war in which Arakan has, in many respects, been an exception until now. But this does not mean that there will be no armed clashes between SAC and ULA-AA forces in the meantime. Conditions of what can be termed “limited war” still exist in areas like Paletwa township and other disputed areas where both sides have strategic objectives. Many lives could still be lost and properties destroyed, similar to the intense fighting between 2018-20, and this time the battlefields will be even closer to the major towns and villages, especially in northern Rakhine State. Until the present day, the AA is arresting military and police members in several front-line areas, while the SAC is apprehending civilians suspected of supporting the ULA-AA in such nationalist strongholds as Ponnagyun, Kyauktaw and Mrauk-U townships. Currently, more than 30 local people have been charged by the SAC authority under Article 505 of the Penal Code, accused of incitement or state defamation, although some have been released. Occasional clashes are still being reported, most recently in Maungdaw township where it was reported this week that 14 police and troops were captured and a number killed in a “retaliatory” AA attack for the air raid that killed six members in Karen State. And causing growing anger in local communities, the Rakhine Ethnic Congress reported in early July that six civilians had been killed and eleven wounded during the previous two months in explosions caused by landmines which the SAC military is planting outside its bases. All such incidents are putting pressure on the ULA leadership to fight back against the SAC. Many fear that, whether it suits the SAC or ULA-AA or not, the clock towards a return to open warfare is now ticking. In the international community, there is only one country which can seek to manage the unpredictable and changing dynamics in Arakan: that is China. With strategic and economic interests, Chinese officials have relationships with all sides on Myanmar’s political divides. The situation is different for Western governments. But there are still many things that they can try in order to prevent the outbreak of war in Arakan. They know that Western engagement with the SAC risks legitimatization of the regime which is an outcome that all wish to avoid. Instead, they can prepare in providing emergency and humanitarian assistance through different channels, including trans-border through the Bangladesh and India borders. There is also potential, as the ICG has suggested, that reaching a formal ceasefire agreement between the Myanmar military and the Arakan Army might – at some stage in the future – prevent a further humanitarian disaster and provide the chance for Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh to return to Arakan. This is not, however, the time for naivety nor failure to understand the complexity of challenges in Arakan and Myanmar at large. The aspirations, needs and perceptions of the people must come first. And, in this respect, the current trends in national politics are loading more weight into negative directions where the future of Arakan is concerned..."
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Source/publisher: Transnational Institute ( Amsterdam)
2022-07-22
Date of entry/update: 2022-07-22
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Description: "Introduction The nutrition situation and wasting treatment/ integrated management of acute malnutrition (IMAM) in Myanmar Globally, 45.4 million children under five years of age are wasted. In 2012, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) incorporated the World Health Assembly Resolution’s 2025 global targets to reduce and maintain wasting/ acute malnutrition to less than 5% but these targets are off track. In Myanmar, while wasting/ acute malnutrition has decreased from 13%3 in 1991 to 7%4 in 2018, the prevalence of wasting/ acute malnutrition remains above the global target and progress has likely deteriorated due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the coup d’etat in February 2021. Wasting/ acute malnutrition treatment in Myanmar is integrated into the existing health service delivery system where healthcare workers who provide wasting/ acute malnutrition services also treat children with pneumonia, malaria and other diseases. Integrated management of acute malnutrition (IMAM) or wasting/ acute malnutrition treatment is delivered by basic health staff (BHS), community volunteers, local/ international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and through government hospitals. Nutrition-specific service provision in Myanmar had been decreasing since 2017, prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, leaving many children untreated and thus increasing the risk of malnutrition, morbidity and mortality. Nutrition services, including active wasting/ acute malnutrition case detection, referral and treatment, have been severely disrupted by insecurity and increased access restrictions since 2017.5 Service provision, including outside of Rakhine, has been further reduced by the COVID-19 pandemic and the recent political instability. Scale-up and uptake of wasting/ acute malnutrition treatment in Myanmar remains low with only 42.3% of children with severe wasting/ acute malnutrition and 20.4% of children with moderate wasting/ acute malnutrition targeted receiving treatment in 2021.6 A recent barrier analysis of wasting/ acute malnutrition treatment in Rakhine State, Myanmar identified the following key challenges and barriers: ● Difficulties obtaining travel authorisation (TA) for service provision for international and national NGOs to operate and for caregivers to travel to health facilities to seek treatment leads to gaps in providing and accessing wasting/ acute malnutrition treatment services. Caregivers who often have to travel long distances to seek treatment and cannot afford the transportation costs do not seek treatment. Therefore, children are either not treated or treatment is delayed, increasing risk of mortality. ● There is limited coverage of treatment services even in locations where nutrition partners and governments are operational. There has always been a low coverage of treatment services in Rakhine State but since the coup d’etat, several outpatient therapeutic programme (OTP) sites provided through government health facilities that were operational have not provided consistent services and funding for those locations was at times discontinued due to the approach of limiting engagement with the de facto authorities. ● Obtaining a memorandum of understanding (MOU) required by organisations providing services is a long process and is typically inflexible in changing service activities and locations, making scale-up of wasting/ acute malnutrition treatment difficult..."
Source/publisher: Crown Agents and Humanitarian Assistance and Resilience Programme
2022-07-01
Date of entry/update: 2022-07-01
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: A degree of public sentiment toward the large refugee settlements has turned slowly against the Rohingya
Description: "Last week in Bangladesh, tens of thousands of Rohingya in the squalor of Cox’s Bazar rose in protest under the banner of “Go Home.” They chanted slogans, distributed leaflets and raised placards in different languages, each centering on this core message. The activists brought attention to 19 points of demand, including principally the large-scale repatriation of the Rohingya stateless population back to their homeland in Myanmar. Among the other important demands were more active involvement of the international community in a peaceful resolution to the conflict in the region and the full restoration of the rights of citizenship to the Rohingya that were stripped by the military junta in Myanmar in 1982. The hard reality is that it is unlikely that the Rohingya will be allowed to be securely repatriated any time soon. Since the mass exodus from Rakhine state of more than 700,000 Rohingya across the border in 2017, there have been a couple of attempts by the Bangladeshi government to negotiate with Myanmar to start such a process, but with few results. Even the trickle of refugees who were being allowed back has halted since the coup by the military in Myanmar last year, and conditions on the ground are still prone to conflict and not conducive for safe return. What is important to note this time is the background that has prompted the current protests. First, there is increasing international pressure on the military junta since the cessation of democratic rule. Second, the administration of US President Joe Biden in March took the important and overdue step of officially recognizing the genocide of the Rohingya. Last are the changing dynamics of the Bangladeshi government regarding its management of the Rohingya refugee crisis. The Bangladeshi government was universally praised in the early days after the large influx of Rohingya refugees for taking on this humanitarian crisis. But there are signs that the government and sections of the public are showing signs of weariness as the crisis has dragged on and with an increasing concern over the capacity of the state to handle the needs of such a population. A degree of public sentiment toward the large refugee settlements has turned slowly against the Rohingya, who are seen as taking away resources and jobs from the locals. The fact that the protests could take place at all is also notable, given that since the last protest by more than 100,000 Rohingya in 2019, such displays were ostensibly banned by the Bangladeshi administrators of the area. Yet in this case, it seems the current round of protests were conducted with the tacit support and encouragement of the local authorities, who perhaps see it in their interests to ensure that the momentum for repatriation is sustained, particularly in light of an upcoming election next year in Bangladesh. The burdens of and pressures on host countries sheltering such large refugee populations must be considered. Still, moving forward, it is critical to ensure that the standards expected for repatriation are not beholden solely to political considerations that could result in the Rohingya being involuntarily forced back in conditions that are dangerous and without any meaningful guarantee of rights provided by the Myanmar government..."
Source/publisher: "Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
2022-06-30
Date of entry/update: 2022-06-30
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Description: "Since August 2017, rampant persecution and violence in Myanmar’s Rakhine state has pushed hundreds of thousands of Muslim minority people, known as ‘Rohingyas,’ to abandon their homes and seek sanctuary in Bangladesh. According to UN estimates, 200,000 Myanmarese civilians have already sought refuge in Bangladesh following prior displacements. Many more have travelled to Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia, frequently with the assistance of human traffickers. In Myanmar, civilian and military authorities deny targeting Muslims in Rakhine and suggest that the international world is misrepresenting the severity of the violence, a viewpoint shared by extreme nationalists. The number of individuals living in Bangladeshi camps has risen to over 1.1 million, leading ASEAN to consider a meaningful reaction. The safe and voluntary return of refugees currently residing in Bangladeshi displacement camps was a topic of discussion during the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in January 2019. They finalized preparations for the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre) to analyze Rakhine’s needs. This would enable them to have a better understanding of the areas of collaboration that ASEAN may help in the repatriation process in order to increase refugee confidence and trust in returning home. ASEAN is working to create a secure and sustainable environment for refugees to return home. Cambodia’s Asean Chairmanship a great opportunity for Rohingya repatriation. Cambodian Chairmanship of Asean provides a great opportunity to facilitate safe and dignified return of the Rohingyas, now sheltered in Bangladesh, to Myanmar.There are a potential security risks to Bangladesh, Myanmar and to the greater region if the Rohingya crisis is left festering for a much longer period of time and vulnerability of the displaced people to radicalism, extremism, terrorism, cross-border crimes, etc. As chair and an active member of Asean, Cambodia can help resolve this crisis by being a mediator. Cambodia can play a holistic, significant and strategic role. It can raise the issue within the Asean platform. Cambodia can negotiate with Myanmar diplomatically and bilaterally as it has good relations with Myanmar. However, ASEAN was compelled to postpone the AHA Centre needs assessment due to recent escalation of hostilities between Myanmar’s government armed forces and the banned Arakan Army, an insurgent organization in Rakhine. At the 33rd ASEAN Summit in Singapore, ASEAN issued a statement expressing profound concern over the worsening humanitarian catastrophe in Myanmar. This is a great start toward acknowledging that Myanmar’s humanitarian catastrophe necessitates immediate regional response and informing Myanmar’s administration that more needs to be done. To address the Rakhine situation, ASEAN must exhibit its inventive spirit and practical problem-solving abilities. Member states must be prepared to collaborate bilaterally and via ASEAN with the afflicted nations. They can also interact with the UN and other foreign organizations working in Bangladeshi refugee camps independently. The safety of their families and their livelihoods were the two main concerns raised by refugees during Dr Vivian Balakrishnan’s (Singapore’s Foreign Minister) visit to a refugee camp in November 2018. By continuing to engage Myanmar and encouraging conversations on long-term peace options, ASEAN can address these issues. It is vital that solutions not only address the concerns of individuals returning to Rakhine from displacement camps, but also those of minority communities who are now living in deplorable conditions in the state. To ensure long-term peace and security in Rakhine, ASEAN can provide direct assistance in some sectors. Building schools, vocational training, and community healthcare facilities are all possible approaches. To alleviate suspicion, anxiety, and hostility among diverse groups, a reconciliation process must be implemented. Reconciliation is a long and laborious process, as seen in numerous countries with internal conflicts. Although there have been no systematic reconciliation efforts, the Myanmar government has established an Independent Commission of Inquiry. It remains to be seen if the process will be conducted professionally and fairly, and whether those guilty for the violence will be held accountable. Setting up a judicial redress system, akin to the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, which was set up to pursue the Khmer Rouge’s atrocities, might be very helpful in the reconciliation process. A nation or organization that has not been involved in the war, such as ASEAN, may be seen as a reliable partner in establishing such a tribunal. ASEAN may begin this process by compiling lessons learned from the war, forming support groups on the ground to better understand the problems of the state’s residents, and bringing diverse communities and the government together to transcend the past. ASEAN’s devotion to the principle of non-interference is its most significant impediment to taking a more active role in Rakhine. It comes up anytime ASEAN tries to talk about a significant issue in one of its member states. The importance of the non-interference rule in crisis situations has to be re-calibrated for ASEAN to work more successfully. A revision of the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response would be the clearest indication of ASEAN’s willingness to help (AADMER). AADMER only authorizes ASEAN to intervene in a humanitarian crisis if the afflicted member state requests it. Because Africa has endured several guerrilla wars and pandemics such as the Ebola outbreak, African experiences might be beneficial in establishing systems to deal with complicated humanitarian situations. Because ASEAN is Southeast Asia’s only regional organization, leaders cannot turn a blind eye to any sort of human misery. The task of establishing a strong and obvious humanitarian mandate under the AADMER will only get more difficult in the future..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Eurasia Review
2022-06-15
Date of entry/update: 2022-06-15
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: No Justice for Crimes Against Humanity Committed Since 2012
Description: "The Myanmar authorities have detained over 135,000 Rohingya and Kaman Muslims arbitrarily and indefinitely in Rakhine State for a decade, Human Rights Watch said in a web feature released today. Drawing on interviews with Rohingya and humanitarian workers from 2012 to the present, Human Rights Watch documents how the authorities have capitalized on the ethnic cleansing campaign launched in June 2012 to segregate and confine a population they had long sought to remove from daily life in the predominantly Buddhist country. Through individual accounts, images, and video, “‘Nothing Called Freedom’: A Decade of Detention for Rohingya in Myanmar’s Rakhine State” illustrates the Myanmar authorities’ crimes against humanity of apartheid, persecution, and imprisonment that have deprived Rohingya of their liberty and threatened their lives and livelihoods. “The Myanmar junta’s unyielding oppression of the Rohingya people is the foreseeable result of the military facing no consequences for its decade of ethnic cleansing and system of apartheid,” said Shayna Bauchner, Asia researcher at Human Rights Watch. “Concerned governments should now be doing what they should have done in 2012 – pursuing all avenues to hold Myanmar officials accountable for their grave crimes and delivering justice to the victims of their abuses.” Following the June 2012 violence, township and border guard officials began forcing Rohingya to move to camps that were soon sealed off with barbed wire fencing and military checkpoints. Severe constraints on movement, livelihoods, and access to humanitarian aid and health care have only worsened over the past decade, compounded by inhuman living conditions. Accounts from the camps and humanitarian agency documents reveal a growing tally of preventable deaths. The 2012 violence and resulting displacement coincided with Myanmar’s nascent transition to democratic civilian rule. Increased oppression in both policy and practice inflamed anti-Muslim sentiment throughout the country, which laid the groundwork for the more brutal and organized military atrocities of 2016 and 2017. Foreign governments, rather than seeking to hold accountable those responsible for the violence and ensuing apartheid state, began lifting sanctions and positioning themselves for the country’s political and economic opening-up. Instead, in February 2021, the security forces staged a coup and detained the country’s civilian leaders, thrusting Myanmar back under military rule. The junta has responded to broad-based opposition with a brutal nationwide crackdown that reflects the tactics long employed in Rakhine State. The coup has brought new movement restrictions and aid blockages to the Rohingya camps. Rising tensions and fighting in Rakhine State between the Myanmar military and the ethnic-Rakhine Arakan Army have left the Rohingya caught in the middle. The United Nations Human Rights Council and UN member states, at the June 15, 2022 panel discussion and in the proposed resolution on the Rohingya, should advance a strategy for accountability in Myanmar that dismantles the military’s longstanding impunity for grave abuses. “A decade is a grim milestone for the 135,000 Rohingya detained in Myanmar’s camps whose accounts of deprivation receive scarce international attention,” Bauchner said. “Sharing these stories and images is a way to remind governments of the staggering human cost of apartheid and persecution.”..."
Source/publisher: Human Rights Watch (USA)
2022-06-15
Date of entry/update: 2022-06-15
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Size: 3.15 MB (35 pages) - Original version
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Description: "Executive Summary: Rakhine State has avoided the violence that has engulfed the rest of Myanmar since the February 2021 coup. The quiet owes in part to an informal ceasefire, which ended two years of fighting between the military and the Arakan Army, a pro-Rakhine ethnic armed group, and which came into force a few months before the military seized power in Naypyitaw. The Arakan Army has spurned the growing de facto alliance between the National Unity Government (NUG)-led opposition and other ethnic armed groups, focusing on getting control of much of Rakhine State. Until recently, the military has been too distracted to try loosening the Arakan Army’s grip, but tensions have started rising. The parties could soon find themselves back in conflict. While each side has reason to be leery of a formal ceasefire, both would also have reason to welcome the breathing space it would create. Most importantly, Rakhine’s people would benefit. In parallel, the Arakan Army should rein in demands on humanitarian actors, which should coordinate their interaction with it, and Dhaka and Naypyitaw should engage the group on Rohingya repatriation. The two-year war that engulfed Rakhine State between late 2018 and 2020 significantly eroded Naypyitaw’s control of the region. Police and many other civil servants were often reluctant to leave major towns during the conflict due to the risk of attack or abduction and they remain wary of venturing into the countryside. Many local administrators resigned during this period due to threats either from the armed group or from the Myanmar military, which suspected them of collaborating with the enemy. The Arakan Army has since either replaced them with its own administrators in the areas it controls or co-opted the new appointees that the military regime has sent since the coup. As a result, the Arakan Army now directly or indirectly controls most rural areas in the centre and north of the state, while exerting significant influence in urban areas; it has also begun expanding farther south, as well as north toward the border with Bangladesh. Over the past year, the Arakan Army has further consolidated its control by rolling out a suite of public services through its administrative branch, the Arakan People’s Authority. These include a judicial system and police force, which operate parallel to the state’s, and some health-care services (including the provision of COVID-19 vaccines). As a result, many residents are turning to Arakan Army mechanisms, rather than those run by Naypyitaw, for basic services and to resolve disputes. The service provision strategy has deepened public support for the group and its governance, but it is not without risk: it could be a major drain on the armed group’s resources, harm its popularity if the services do not live up to expectations and attract pushback from Naypyitaw. The impact of these developments in Rakhine State has not been limited to the ethnic Rakhine community. The rise of the Arakan Army has brought positive changes for some hitherto ostracised Rohingya. While the overall situation for the Rohingya remains dire, some communities have improved access to public services and some are enjoying greater freedom of movement because of the Arakan Army’s non-enforcement of restrictions imposed by Naypyitaw. These testimonials should be considered in context, however; although Rohingya sources Crisis Group spoke to largely praised the Arakan Army and its administration, the community as a whole remains vulnerable and its members are generally not in a position to criticise the group for fear of reprisal. Myanmar’s military regime … made only token efforts to counter the Arakan Army’s expanding control. Myanmar’s military regime, which calls itself the State Administration Council, is focused on subduing resistance to the coup elsewhere in Myanmar and until recently made only token efforts to counter the Arakan Army’s expanding control. Part of the reason may be that locally based government and military officials, hunkered down in large towns, have little choice but to accept the facts on the ground. As a measure of the group’s growing influence, many state-run schools, which are still nominally under Naypyitaw’s control, have started playing an Arakan Army-written Rakhine anthem instead of the national anthem. There are even examples of active collaboration, such as Naypyitaw-controlled police working with the Arakan Army to resolve crimes and administrators from the two sides holding regular informal consultations. But cooperation is certainly not the state’s default posture. The junta has in some instances sought to scare both Rakhine and Rohingya communities away from working with Arakan Army mechanisms and institutions. Recently, it has adopted more aggressive tactics, setting up roadblocks and searching vehicles, reinforcing troops, increasing patrols and detaining people it suspects of supporting the group. The military is still too stretched to give much attention to Rakhine State, but there is a clear risk of a return to conflict. If the Arakan Army seeks to expand its influence consistent with its ambitious political aspirations – for example, into border areas or in southern Rakhine – it risks provoking the Myanmar military, which refers to itself as the Tatmadaw, into action. Similarly, a partnership with the NUG-led opposition – something many in Myanmar would welcome – could spark a return to war. While it would be difficult for the Tatmadaw to win this fight, the collateral effects of renewed conflict could be terrible for Rakhine State’s population, which is already reeling from neglect, a poor economy, communal violence and the earlier two-year war. Although there is no clear path toward peace and stability for Rakhine State, one step that could offer both the parties and the region an extended respite from fighting might be to formalise the informal ceasefire that has largely kept the peace for the past eighteen months. Such an arrangement would focus primarily on maintaining the peace, in particular by demarcating territory and establishing formal communication channels to help de-escalate in the event that tensions begin to build once again. Both the government and the Arakan Army have reason to be wary of such a step in that it would give the other party a chance to gather strength and prepare for renewed confrontation down the road. But each also has reason to embrace it. The military is preoccupied with the spiralling consequences of the coup that it launched over a year ago; a formal ceasefire would be a measure of insurance that it will not face another conflict that will stretch it further. As for the Arakan Army, such an arrangement could allow it to further consolidate its authority over the territories already under its control and gain recognition from outside actors, including both humanitarian organisations and neighbouring Bangladesh. While the extended respite could give the parties the chance to fortify themselves for further clashes, it would also create the possibility of a durable, peaceful solution emerging in the future – something outside actors could encourage. If the parties agree to solidify the current ceasefire into a formal agreement, it will also be important to improve certain other ad hoc arrangements with implications for people in Rakhine. For example, humanitarian organisations are increasingly concerned that they may soon face parallel sets of requirements to operate in Rakhine State – some imposed by Naypyitaw and others by the Arakan Army – which could create both administrative burdens and operational difficulties. The group should work to ensure that those in need are not cut off from humanitarian assistance because of paralysing new rules and humanitarian organisations should come together to present a united front should such rules become overly burdensome. Dhaka and Naypyitaw should additionally engage with the Arakan Army on the possible return of Rohingya refugees living in Bangladesh. While a formal ceasefire would offer neither party precisely what it wants, there would be enough in it for both sides that it could conceivably work. That in turn would allow Rakhine State residents to get what they need most: a continued break from violence and the corresponding opportunity to build toward a more peaceful future, one in which Rakhine and Rohingya can live in relative safety side by side..."
Source/publisher: International Crisis Group (Belgium)
2022-06-01
Date of entry/update: 2022-06-01
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Executive Summary: Introduction: Key nutrition services in Rakhine could not be implemented as planned in 2021. The nutrition dashboard for Rakhine (January to December 2021) showed that 41% of the target for severe acute malnutrition (SAM) treatment was reached (3,758 children out of 9,105 targeted), while for moderate acute malnutrition treatment (MAM) only 20% of the target was reached (6,425 children out of 31,509 targeted)..... Many more (185,401) children 6-59 months of age were screened with mid-upper arm circumference (MUAC) in 2021 as compared to the Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) target for the year of 87,327. The 4W overview (UNICEF August 2021) showed that MUAC screening was done in half of all villages and wards in Rakhine. The fact that many more children were screened and that substantially less were reached for MAM/SAM treatment (as compared to the annual targets) suggests that there is a discrepancy between screening and treatment..... Purpose: It is well-known that the context in 2020/2021 has been difficult and nutrition partners have faced many barriers, some of which were beyond their control. To increase coverage of nutrition services in Rakhine State, Myanmar, it is essential to understand and address the key barriers. This report aimed to identify key challenges and bottlenecks within the current situation and to develop realistic actionable solutions to overcome identified challenges for the treatment of wasting/ acute malnutrition as well as other nutrition services: infant and young child feeding (IYCF) services, blanket supplementary feeding programmes (BSFP), cash/food distributions and maternal and child cash transfer (MCCT) programmes)..... Methods: A secondary literature review and key informant interviews (KII) with key stakeholders were conducted to identify barriers and solutions. A workshop with the Nutrition Cluster was conducted virtually to validate the key findings and prioritise barriers and solutions. Information was triangulated to formulate seven key barriers and recommended solutions..... Findings: The following are the priority barriers and solutions identified. There are five priority barriers related to nutrition treatment services and two priority barriers related to other nutrition services..."
Source/publisher: Crown Agents, Humanitarian Assistance and Resilience Programme
2022-05-31
Date of entry/update: 2022-05-31
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency, is shocked and saddened by reports that more than a dozen Rohingya – including children – have perished at sea off the coast of Myanmar over the weekend. While details remain unclear, initial reports suggest the boat left Sittwe in Rakhine State, Myanmar on 19 May. It encountered bad weather in waters off Ayeyarwady Region, causing it to capsize near the coast of Pathein township on Saturday, 21 May. At least 17 people are feared dead, with distressing reports of bodies found on the shore and the local communities burying the dead. “The latest tragedy shows once again the sense of desperation being felt by Rohingya in Myanmar and in the region,’’ said Indrika Ratwatte, UNHCR’s Director for Asia and the Pacific. “It is shocking to see increasing numbers of children, women and men embarking on these dangerous journeys and eventually losing their lives.” In Myanmar, UNHCR is urgently seeking more information on survivors that have arrived on shore in order to assess their situation. Over the past decade, thousands of Rohingya have left by sea from the refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh and Rakhine State in Myanmar. “The root causes of these deadly journeys need to be addressed. Additionally, all countries in the region must come together to ensure the rescue and disembarkation of all those in distress at sea,” UNHCR’s Ratwatte added. UNHCR reiterates its warning that collective failure to act will continue to lead to tragic and fatal consequences. It is imperative to take action against criminals, smugglers and traffickers who prey on the most vulnerable. UNHCR and partners continue to actively engage refugee and host communities, raising awareness about the risks of falling victim to criminals responsible for these deadly journeys. Some 630 Rohingya have attempted sea journeys across the Bay of Bengal from January to May 2022. Women and children made up 60 per cent of people undertaking these perilous maritime crossings. The risk of abuse at the hands of smugglers and the peril of the sea journey itself are both exacerbated during prolonged journeys, when a safe harbour for disembarkation cannot be found..."
Source/publisher: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva)
2022-05-23
Date of entry/update: 2022-05-23
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: As conflicts continue and global priorities change, even the most sympathetic communities can lose their enthusiasm for hosting
Description: "Countries in Europe have opened their borders and homes to Ukrainians fleeing Russian aggression. Of course, Ukrainians are far from the first group of refugees to need shelter and welcome from host countries. Refugees are vulnerable people who, because of limited opportunities in refugee camps, can be exposed to human trafficking, criminal activities, drug peddling, prostitution and radicalization. There have already been concerns that Ukrainian refugees are being targeted for human or sex trafficking by organized groups and individuals. But a refugee crisis doesn’t simply end with placing vulnerable, often traumatized people in congested camps or even family homes. As conflicts continue and global priorities change, even the most sympathetic communities can lose their enthusiasm for hosting. Bangladesh, a highly populated country with its own challenges and resource constraints, has become in the last five years one of the leading countries hosting displaced people. More than one million Rohingya refugees from Myanmar entered Bangladesh in 2017, living mainly in makeshift camps in Ukhiya and Teknaf, two areas in the Cox’s Bazar district. In the early days, Bangladeshi communities were lauded for their response to the influx of Rohingya refugees, providing lifesaving assistance before the state, non-governmental organizations and the international community. The Bangladeshi government has been working with various humanitarian actors to ensure that various essential needs such as food, shelter, cooking materials, healthcare and education are met in the camps. But any positive camp conditions are overshadowed by government policies that restrict the Rohingyas’ movement and right to work. What’s more, in 2019 barbed wire was erected around the camps. Although host communities were initially highly compassionate and supportive, recently there has been tension. The situation is an example of how sympathetic communities can become frustrated, angry or even hostile over time. We believe this can offer some important insights into how the Ukrainian refugee crisis could play out if the enthusiasm and resources dry up in the coming months. We interviewed 20 members of the host community and 20 Bangladeshi humanitarian workers, who described a decline in sympathy towards the Rohingyas. The findings surprised us and may not be representative of the entire Rohingya population living in Bangladesh. We interviewed Rohingya refugees for a previous study and found that they felt extremely grateful to the Bangladeshi hosts for their hospitality. But, host communities’ increasingly negative perception of Rohingya refugees threatens their peaceful coexistence. As one humanitarian worker said: Many local people had to abandon their houses and land that are now located inside the Rohingya camps. After the settlement of Rohingyas in the camps, when [locals] tried to access or use their lands again, they were regularly countered by the Rohingyas who are very compact as a group. People [locals] once welcomed are now quite aggressive towards them, [which has] resulted in violent clashes. There have been many allegations leveled against the Rohingyas, including that they are involved in radical extremist activities and pose security threats. Bangladesh’s prime minister has openly called the Rohingyas a “burden.” Rohingyas in Bangladeshi camps have been lured by criminal gangs and human traffickers and become involved in various criminal activities and drug peddling. One community leader cited this as a factor behind the recent contempt, saying they are taking part in “evil deeds.” Bangladesh officially recognizes the Rohingyas as “Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals” instead of refugees, which prevents them from being able to work. Recent evidence suggests that as a result of this, many Rohingyas have resorted to petty crimes and theft. As one humanitarian worker told us: Previously, there were very few incidents but now, these are frequent. Every night something is being stolen from the houses of the local community. Also, thousands of humanitarian workers live here and usually possess mobile phones, laptops or other electronic items. Their houses are also targets for theft. Like in the early days of the current Rohingya crisis, there has been a certain amount of positivity and enthusiasm about hosting Ukrainian refugees. However, there might also be some early signs of exhaustion and a tinge of skepticism, as we have observed in Bangladesh. If a crisis is dealt with on an ad-hoc basis and not addressed as a long-term issue, refugees may turn to alternative risky opportunities which might put them in harm’s way. As we have seen in Bangladesh, this could jeopardize the whole objective of supporting the refugees. There are concerns about the resource availability that would be required to host the large number of Ukrainian refugees. Already, there is evidence that some Ukrainians may be taken advantage of through the systems designed to help them. It is important to have a longer-term plan for jobs, safety and healthcare among the hosting governments, EU, UN bodies and civil society organizations that are actively involved in hosting the Ukrainian refugees, so the situation does not follow the precedent set in Bangladesh. Palash Kamruzzaman is Senior Lecturer in Social Policy, University of South Wales, and Bulbul Siddiqi, Associate Professor in Anthropology and Sociology, North South University. This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article..."
Source/publisher: "Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
2022-05-11
Date of entry/update: 2022-05-11
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "A landmine explosion. Clashes. Homes destroyed. This is an all too familiar story in Myanmar, where many have lost their homes during clashes. Some have been unable to return to their villages for years. "We faced many challenges before we came back to our village," says Aung Saw Tun from his home in Rakhine State in Myanmar. "Being displaced, I am worried about where we will run for safety, as the risk of fighting remains." Aung Saw Tun was among hundreds who were forced to flee their homes as clashes led to crackdowns and the destruction of civilian houses across central Myanmar in 2020. Now, he and his family have returned to their village. But starting life from scratch brings with it new challenges, how to earn a living being one among many. Being forcibly displaced can mean relying on the goodwill of relatives, other families or humanitarian assistance. But such assistance rarely provides long-term solutions. For those who want to return home, to rebuild or restart their lives, the decision is often tied to whether they will be able to support themselves financially. "At the moment, we receive a subsidy and we run our own business," says Aung Saw Tun. "If possible, I would like to open a small shop at home while raising chickens." Aung Saw Tun and his family are part of an International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) project that helps displaced communities returning home to support themselves by creating livelihood opportunities. The project engages with communities to identify the ways in which they can support themselves and then provides them with financial assistance through cash grants to get them started. With the money he received through the project, Aung Saw Tun started a business making and selling traditional bamboo hats, and is now looking to expand into selling chickens. About 90 families, or more than 400 people, across Pha Yar Paung and Taung Pauk villages of Rakhine's Kyauktaw Township were supported through the project in late 2021 and early 2022. "I ran a pig farm in the past," says Hla Saw Khaing, who was also part of the cash grant project. "Because of the conflict, I could not afford to raise pigs myself, but now it is possible." As the primary carer for her mother, Hla Saw Khaing needs to work from home and has started raising pigs again from her yard. Hla Saw Khaing was forced to live in a displacement camp with her mother after her house was set on fire amidst clashes. "When I came back home from the camp, I was very sad because there was nothing left in my house," she says. "There was no food to eat. It was not good for our health. This was no place to live. I didn't even have 50 kyats left. It was very sad to lose everything." Not everyone who is forcibly displaced ends up staying in a temporary camp for shelter. Some stay with friends, or in monasteries or churches. Others, like Aye Yoin Thar, find shelter with relatives. When Aye Yoin Thar first returned to her village a year ago, emergency assistance from aid organisations helped to some extent, but it was no substitute for a safe and sustainable source of income. "We were unable to make ends meet," she says. "So, I brought vegetables from my garden and sold them for four or five months, but I haven't been able to do that since I have been sick." With the help of the ICRC, Aye Yoin Thar has been able to open a small grocery store, and already has plans to expand the family business. "Before the fire, our family made dough and ran a tea shop," she says. "We are thinking of doing the same again." In Rakhine, following the waves of displacement caused by clashes in 2012, 2017 and 2019, some families who were displaced are slowly starting to return home. Often facing ongoing safety concerns as well as the challenges of rebuilding a life and thinking of the future, the decision is a difficult one. Above all else, returning home should be a decision solely for those who are displaced. Opportunities for a safe and sustainable future, with health and dignity, need to be minimum conditions. No matter whether families stay or return after a conflict, planning for the future is vital..."
Source/publisher: International Committee of the Red Cross (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
2022-05-09
Date of entry/update: 2022-05-09
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: After three years of conflict in Rakhine State, internally displaced people (IDPs) face many challenges. Due to the armed conflicts between the Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) and the Arakan Army (AA) lasting from late 2018 to November 2020, many still live in makeshift shelters across the state.
Description: "People in Need (PIN) continues to deliver humanitarian assistance to conflict-affected populations in Rakhine State. Before the rainy season begins, it is essential to maintain and repair makeshift shelters. With financial support from the Myanmar Humanitarian Fund (MHF), PIN provided emergency shelter kits to 750 households, alongside shelter kits provided by UNHCR. Additionally, PIN provided 235 collective shelter sets to 11 internal displacement sites in Mrauk U and Kyauktaw townships, Rakhine State in 2021. Urgent requirements for sheltering U Ba Kyaw, a site leader at the Pya Hla IDP site in Mrauk U township, shares his concerns regarding the accommodation of IDPs sheltering there, “Our shelters are made of bamboo and tarpaulin, created in previous years as a temporary measure. Most of our shelters at the Pya Hla site where more than 900 people are sheltering are damaged and IDPs are facing difficulties living there. Among them, 50 households urgently need to reconstruct their entire home.” said U Ba Kyaw. “Before the rainy season, at least 50 households returned to their villages in Pauktaw township, but most of them returned soon after because Myanmar military troops are residing near their village. They are afraid and do not dare go back again.” He adds, “PIN distributed shelter kits and other necessities aids to us, it was very helpful. Pya Hla site is now sheltered in the compound of a Buddhist monastery. Some houses moved outside of the monastery compound and were rebuilt again. We need more support for shelters. However, international organisations and UN agencies provide us with shelter, food, and cash distributions. Thank you to these organisations and donors for supporting us.” PIN plans to support these needs by distributing an additional 230 emergency shelter kits to 9 displacement sites in 2022 with support from MHF. Shelter and NFI materials support for IDP sites Rakhine state is part of the most disaster-affected areas in Myanmar. It is regularly impacted by cyclones and floods, and displaced people are most vulnerable. During the rainy season, most IDPs are facing challenging living conditions in IDP sites. Temporary shelters, built in early 2019, need immediate repair or reconstruction. IDPs in these sites are reliant on aid assistance provided by international and national organisations. Daw War War Naing, a mother of three who lives in Wet Hla IDP site, Mrauk U township, says, “Our house needs to be repaired before the rainy season comes. We already face difficulties and prices are skyrocketing. We cannot afford to buy wood and bamboo to rebuild the house. That is why we are waiting for the shelter kits from international organisations and relevant governmental officials. Last year, PIN provided shelter kits that were useful for us. However, we need to repair or rebuild soon.” Daw Yin Nu Sein, a 62-year-old woman, lives at the Wet Hla IDP site with her granddaughter. She already rebuilt her small hut by borrowing money because it was destroyed by strong winds and weather. “I cannot wait until assistance comes because my small hut was already damaged. Even though I do not have money to rebuild the house, I borrowed it from others at high rates. This small hut cost 80,000 kyats (USD 50). Regardless of borrowing money, I was afraid that if heavy rain and strong winds came, we could not stay at our hut.” she explains. In 2022, PIN address the essential needs of IDPs as per their requests. Together with shelter kits supported by UNHCR, PIN distributes additional shelter kits, which include traditional building materials such as bamboo, myaw post, and thatching/nipa palm leaves for 9 targeted IDP sites in Mrauk U township, Rakhine State..."
Source/publisher: People in Need (People in Need)
2022-04-22
Date of entry/update: 2022-04-22
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: There is mounting evidence that the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army is targeting the Rohingyas in Malaysia with radicalizing propaganda.
Description: "Myanmar has been in a state of constant internal turmoil since the late 1940s, and one of the deadliest conflicts has been between the majority Buddhist population and the country’s Muslim minorities, especially in Rakhine State. There has been a long history of contention between the two communities in the region. As a result, more than a million Rohingyas have become refugees today, primarily in neighbouring Bangladesh, with others finding their way to Muslim-majority states like Pakistan, Indonesia, and Malaysia. Today, there are more Rohingyas outside Myanmar than remain inside the country. Rohingyas in Malaysia There are more than 100,000 Rohingyas in Malaysia, mostly living as refugees, and generally they are well-treated. A major plank of Malaysian policy has been to extend a humanitarian hand to the Rohingyas fleeing persecution in Myanmar. The Malaysian government, especially under the leadership of Prime Minister Najib Razak from 2009 to 2018, was welcoming to the Rohingyas and was one of the nations most critical of Myanmar’s hardline policy toward the community. Najib’s successor, Mahathir Mohamad, continued Malaysia’s critical policy towards Naypyidaw over its policies in Rakhine State. In July 2019, Mahathir said that Myanmar should either treat the Rohingyas as its nationals or give them a separate state. Over the years, the Malaysian security landscape has had to deal with some extremist Islamist groups operating in the country, such as the pro-Al-Qaeda Jemaah Islamiyah and elements that supported the self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS). There have been concerns raised about the possibility of segments of the Rohingya community in Malaysia coming under radical influence. Enjoying this article? Click here to subscribe for full access. Just $5 a month. Armed Rohingya Groups in Myanmar An issue that has plagued Rohingya refugee communities is the possible infiltration of radical or terrorist groups (or individuals). Given the fierce inter-communal conflict in Myanmar, some Rohingyas have advocated violence against the government, either to prevent the Myanmar state and its proxies from harming them or to seek independent statehood. While many members of the Rohingya diaspora remain in denial about this reality, a number of Rohingya groups have taken up arms, even though they remain largely weak and in no position to challenge the security apparatus in Myanmar. Some of these groups include the Arakan Rohingya National Organisation (ARNO), Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front (ARIF), Rohingya Solidarity Organisaton (RSO-Dr. Yunus faction), the Katiba al-Mahdi fi Bilad al-Arakan, the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO-Mohammad Zakaria faction) and its armed wing, the Rohingya National Army (RNA). Many of these groups operate in the Rohingya refugee camps in Bangladesh or along the Myanmar-Bangladesh border. Since 2017, one group has emerged as a key security concern for Myanmar, namely, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA). There have been rising concerns that some of these armed groups may have penetrated the Rohingya refugee community in Malaysia. While one does not see the mass radicalization of refugees in Malaysia, there is apparently some level of ongoing radicalization. This can be largely attributed to ARSA’s penetration in the Rohingya community even though this is publicly denied both by the group and the Rohingyas in Malaysia. Publicly, ARSA and its supporters have denounced the use of violence in achieving its political goal, which is to be the voice and sole representative of the Rohingyas. Despite that, ARSA has been blamed by the Myanmar security forces for several violent attacks on them along the Bangladesh-Myanmar border. ARSA has also denied that it is linked to any transnational jihadist terrorist group such as Al-Qaida or IS and remains largely ethno-nationalist in its ideology. ARSA’s Penetration of Malaysia’s Rohingya Community Evidence is emerging that ARSA and its supporters have been targeting Rohingyas in Malaysia for recruitment. The view that ARSA is weak and ineffective in Malaysia in its outreach to Rohingyas can be partly debunked by the online penetration ARSA has been making in Malaysia. This has taken place largely through YouTube channels and Facebook pages. The first example is a YouTube Channel called Rohingya Malay Kelas (Rohingya Malay Class) that was set up on December 23, 2019 and was recently renamed Rohingya Reality TV. Ostensibly, it is an instructional platform, aimed at teaching Malay and English language to the Rohingya refugees. Yet, when one analyses the more than 4,000 videos uploaded since 2019, there are several that propagate ARSA’s goals even if many others do not. On the whole, the channel’s videos have garnered more than 10 million views. On Facebook, the page RO Malay Kelas was created on May 8, 2020. Before the page was shut down recently by Facebook, it had garnered 1,817 followers. Its associated YouTube channel, Rohingya ARSA Supporters, was established on April 22 of the same year and 396 videos had been uploaded as of February 2021. The channel has since been shut down. Many of the videos uploaded on the channel were songs which are related to Rohingya culture, but mostly depicting the sad and tragic lives of the Rohingya community. The Rohingya ARSA Supporters channel clocked up 2,909,829 views during the time of its operation. YouTube and Facebook platforms are important means of ARSA outreach in Malaysia. This is evident from the fact that there are a number of video messages from the ARSA leader, Atta Ullah. The ARSA commander’s messages are mostly aimed at gaining support and legitimacy from the Rohingya refugees in Malaysia, and seeking financial, political, and even personnel support to challenge the Myanmar authorities. Enjoying this article? Click here to subscribe for full access. Just $5 a month. In addition to conveying messages of support and assistance from the Rohingyas for ARSA, an important aim of these platforms is to undermine the policies of the Myanmar government and even to criticize Rohingyas who are prepared to collaborate with the Myanmar authorities. In the same vein, Rohingya leaders residing in Malaysia who are seen as an obstacle to the ARSA’s cause have also been criticized. One particular video targeted Zafar Ahmad Abdul Ghani, the president of the Myanmar Ethnic Rohingya Human Rights Organisation in Malaysia. In the video, it was mentioned that Zafar Ahmad should refrain from referring to himself as a Rohingya community leader as he had no knowledge of the problems faced by the Rohingyas in Malaysia. Implications for Malaysia and the Wider Region Clearly, ARSA is active in Malaysia within the country’s Rohingya refugee community, and has been able to penetrate it through digital means. This suggests that ARSA is simply not an organization that operates in Bangladesh, Pakistan, or Saudi Arabia. Under the leadership of Atta Ullah, the group has carried out sporadic and violent attacks on Myanmar security forces along the Myanmar-Bangladesh border. The ability of ARSA to spread its message through online platforms such as YouTube and Facebook shows its adaptability and the success of its outreach, not just in Malaysia but also probably elsewhere in Southeast Asia where Rohingya refugees are found, such as in Indonesia and Thailand. The use of online platforms has become even more important since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, a time when more and more people are spending larger amounts of time in online spaces. The fact that videos continue to be produced on a weekly basis demonstrates the activism of ARSA and its intent to spread its influence in Malaysia. The full impact of this will only be known after COVID-19 wanes, when ARSA renews its attacks on Myanmar security forces within the country or Myanmar’s vital interests overseas, including in Southeast Asia. How deep, effective and dangerous ARSA’s radicalization and recruitment of these refugees is remains to be seen. However, as these measures and policies are being undertaken by ARSA, it only makes sense that Malaysia and the wider region should be on alert to anticipate the danger posed by this group..."
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Source/publisher: "The Diplomat" (Japan)
2022-04-13
Date of entry/update: 2022-04-13
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "The Arakan Rohingya National Organisation welcomes the US decision to recognise the Rohingya genocide. ARNO has been advocating in its discussions with the US Government for the genocide declaration since 2014 given the significant actions that have been taken since the 1960’s against the Rohingya. The 2017 genocidal purge in the Arakan was the latest in a long line of events that finally caught the international community’s attention in a manner that propelled many different processes into action. The US decision to recognize the Rohingya genocide comes at an important time not only as the Rohingya people continue to languish in Burma, but also for all our brothers and sisters in the Karen, Kachin, Chin, and Shan communities which are daily targets of violence at the hands of the Burmese military (Tatmadaw). Given the US position on the Rohingya genocide, ARNO welcomes the following actions by the US: First, the US should push the United Nations or similar actors to create a Burma/Myanmar Truth and Clarification Commission, as ARNO has repeatedly requested over the last few years, in order to document and clarify the historical and current record of the depth and nature of the Rohingya genocide. Since the February 2021 coup, it has become clear that the Truth and Clarification Commission should be broadened so that all ethnic minority groups in Burma can participate and work on the same challenges that they are facing at the hands of the Tatmadaw. ARNO encourages the United States to support a Truth Commission as it did for the Guatemala Historical Clarification Commission in the 1990s. Second, ARNO encourages the US to pursue a complete and total arms embargo on the Tatmadaw and known associates and allies which are also selling arms to the Tatmadaw. Finally, ARNO encourages the US to exercise Universal Jurisdiction through all possible avenues to prosecute the Tatmadaw and all known entities which have allowed for racism, corruption, and all avenues to exist which have and continue to enable the genocide. ARNO is grateful for continued US aid to the Rohingya in camps in Bangladesh, for its advocacy of Rohingya people throughout the world, and is grateful for its commitment to granting Rohingya people status in the United States to live a life that has enabled them and people within ARNO to continue advocating for their people..."
Source/publisher: Arakan Rohingya National Organisatioo
2022-03-22
Date of entry/update: 2022-03-23
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Youth groups made up of Rakhine and Rohingya members are coming up with solutions to shared challenges in Myanmar’s ethnically divided Rakhine State.
Description: "On a blue-sky winter’s day in Myanmar’s western Rakhine State, hundreds of people from two neighbouring villages – one populated by ethnic Rakhine people and the other by the minority Rohingya ethnic group – stream into an open field. The atmosphere is cheerful and festive as crowds gather around a large makeshift sports ground. As a football match between teams made up of Rakhine and Rohingya players commences, Myint Swe looks on with pride. “It took several weeks of planning for us to organize this event,” says the 32-year-old from Pyar La Chaung, the Rakhine village. Also watching from the sidelines is 20-year-old Maung Kyaw Maung from Pyin Chay, the Rohingya village that is 10 minutes away by foot from the Rakhine one. “Youths from both villages came together to make this possible,” he says. The duo is part of an eight-member youth group that organized the event. Officially called the Youth Development Committee, it is made up of four young people from the two villages who were elected by their respective communities to come up with solutions to shared challenges and to organize joint activities like the football match. Stories of collaboration across ethnic lines are relatively rare in Rakhine State, where ethnic and religious divisions have long impacted intercommunal relations. While the region has been largely spared the violence experienced in other parts of Myanmar following the military takeover of 1 February 2021, historical wounds from previous conflicts have yet to fully heal. There have been several waves of violence and displacement since the early 1990s. Among the most significant were intercommunal violence in 2012 and, five years later, the crisis that forced more than 740,000 Rohingya to flee across the border to Bangladesh. In total, some 1.6 million Rohingya are living as refugees, mainly in Bangladesh, Malaysia and India. Another 148,000 out of 600,000 Rohingya remaining in Myanmar are displaced across Rakhine State. See also: UNHCR steps up aid for displaced in Myanmar as conflict intensifies Their prospects for being able to return home in the near future remain slim. In addition to the continued insecurity affecting both the Rohingya and the Rakhine communities, Rakhine State is a region with limited economic opportunities. The Rohingya live in particularly precarious conditions after decades of being denied basic rights, including citizenship, freedom of movement and access to basic services such as education and health care. While improvements to living conditions have been made in the last decade, there has been no tangible progress in the areas of citizenship and documentation. As part of efforts to address these challenges, UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency, has been working with partners to foster greater social cohesion between the two ethnic groups, and reduce the likelihood of future intercommunal violence. The successful organization of the sports day event involving the Rakhine and Rohingya villages is the culmination of a year-long rural youth empowerment project run by ACTED, an international NGO and partner of UNHCR. “Youths play a special role in shaping intercommunal dynamics,” explains Htin Kyaw Min, a project manager at ACTED. “They can act as changemakers in strengthening dialogue, decision-making, and conflict resolution, not only within, but also between their communities.” “We have a lot in common.” The Youth Development Committee Maung Kyaw Maung and Myint Swe are part of, is one of six established by ACTED under the project. Members of each group are given training on leadership, peacebuilding, business development, vocational skills and first aid, among other things. They then work with village elders and administrators to identify needs and implement joint solutions benefitting both communities. The training has inspired members to come up with income-generating activities that serve both their communities. “The business development training gave us the idea to buy tables and chairs which are used for community events like today’s sports day. When not in use, we plan to rent them out to other villages to generate some income,” says Myint Swe. “We want to use the money earned to finish construction of a road linking both our villages.” By promoting social integration and economic empowerment for both the Rakhine and Rohingya communities, the youth empowerment project aims to foster conditions that will help restore the fundamental rights of the Rohingya and pave the way for them to return home safely. “We have a lot in common,” says Myint Swe, noting that both villages lack education, but especially the Rohingya one. “We try our best to help one another gain more skills. Knowledge is very important and helps to maintain peace.” “Previously, interaction between our villages was less frequent,” says Maung Kyaw Maung. “Now, we are on friendlier terms with each other.”..."
Source/publisher: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva)
2022-03-23
Date of entry/update: 2022-03-23
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Naing Naing Oo remembers meeting a group of children who had survived being stranded at sea. In a small boat, with little food, they drifted for days. "When we talked to them, we were inspired – they had been so strong," says Naing Naing. "They had survived." In her role working for the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) from Maungdaw in Myanmar's Rakhine State, Naing Naing was one of many who helped the children following the incident. "Now, when they see me, they recognise me," she says. "I cannot forget this thing." Naing Naing works as part of a team in Maungdaw that provides a range of support for families separated by violence. A parent who needs financial help to visit a son or daughter in prison. A person recently released from a police lockup who needs assistance making the long journey home. Families looking for lost loved ones after a clash. These are just some examples of cases where Naing Naing and her colleagues seek to provide support. It is work that is collaborative and unceasing. Naing Naing has been with the team since 2017, joining just as outbreaks of violence resulted in waves of displacement impacting hundreds of thousands of people in Rakhine. At that time, colleagues from across Myanmar were called in to help respond to the massive spike in humanitarian needs. Years later, working as part of a close-knit team remains a highlight for Naing Naing.   "The first thing I think of is the working environment, which is amazing," she says. "I have lots of support from my colleagues." Beyond the team, it is also the ability to work directly with people in northern Rakhine that is most rewarding. "I can work with communities – I can talk with and learn from them," Naing Naing says. "I feel great working for the ICRC because we are an organisation that doesn't take sides – I feel really comfortable explaining who we are to villagers, to other people, to my family." The ICRC has worked in Maungdaw, not far from the border with Bangladesh, since 2015. Activities range from emergency assistance – like food and health services – to helping communities build sustainable livelihoods, often together with partners such as the Myanmar Red Cross Society (MRCS). "Here, lots of people know about the ICRC because of our food distributions," Naing Naing says. "People also know our support in reconnecting families well." The communities surrounding Maungdaw, and neighbouring Buthidaung, are multilingual and multifaith. Naing Naing grew up here, with neighbours and classmates reflecting this diversity.   Her familiarity with Maungdaw, and the communities' familiarity with the ICRC, helps with the work. "I can explain our organisation is a humanitarian organisation," she says. "I explain we don't take sides; we don't discriminate based on belief or colour of skin – but they already know this from our activity." In 2022, the dual impacts of COVID-19 and the 2021 military intervention still overlay the legacies of ongoing conflicts across the country to make life more challenging for people in Myanmar. Despite the obstacles these overlapping impacts also pose for humanitarian work, the numbers tell a story of hope. Across Myanmar in 2021, we were able to help more than 4000 recently released detainees return home. We helped families visit loved ones behind bars more than 200 times and delivered close to 250 written messages. For Naing Naing, helping people feel comfortable enough to share their stories and needs is key to this work. "It depends on the person – I don't ask hard questions, I ask 'how are you?'" she says. "That's how we start the conversation..."
Source/publisher: International Committee of the Red Cross (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
2022-03-07
Date of entry/update: 2022-03-08
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Media release from Burmese Rohingya Organisation UK The Argentinian judiciary has asked the social media giant Facebook to clarify its role in fuelling the ongoing genocide against the Rohingya people and to share evidence crucial to holding the Myanmar military to account, the Burmese Rohingya Organisation UK (BROUK) said today. In an order issued on 24 February, but only recently shared with BROUK, the Federal Court in Buenos Aires requested Facebook to share evidence of anti-Rohingya hate speech on its platform, including from accounts linked to senior Myanmar military officials. The move is part of the universal jurisdiction case on the Rohingya genocide that was opened in Argentina last year after a petition from BROUK. “For years, Facebook has put profit before the lives of the Rohingya people. When military forces rampaged through Rakhine State in 2016 and 2017, Facebook turned a blind eye to the hatred that was being spewed on its own platform,” said Tun Khin, President of BROUK. “This order by the Argentinian judiciary is a crucial step towards accountability for a genocide that is still going on today. Facebook must come clean about what evidence it has gathered and what steps it has taken to ensure that its platform will never again be used to facilitate some of the worst crimes known to humanity.” In 2016 and 2017, the Tatmadaw (Myanmar military) launched vicious operations in Rakhine State which killed thousands of Rohingya women, men and children, and drove close to 800,000 to flee into Bangladesh. There is much evidence that Facebook, the overwhelmingly most popular social media platform in Myanmar, was used to vilify the Rohingya before, during and after the campaigns. The UN Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar in 2019 concluded that “Facebook is the leading platform for hate speech in Myanmar” and that the company has a responsibility to tackle its spread. While Facebook has since taken some positive steps – including strengthening monitoring in Myanmar language and banning military-linked accounts – activists and human rights groups have consistently said that the company’s efforts fall short of what is required. The Argentinian judiciary now plans to reach out to Facebook to ask for evidence of which accounts and pages have been blocked or deleted since 2016 for spreading anti-Rohingya propaganda. The order further asks which pages belong to specific senior military and civilian officials, including Min Aung Hlaing, the Tatmadaw Commander in Chief and architect of the military coup in Myanmar in February 2021. Facebook will also be asked to spell out how its own algorithms might have facilitated the spread of hatred against the Rohingya, and what steps the company has taken to prevent the dissemination of hate speech in the future. The request from the court order will proceed under the treaty signed by the Governments of Argentina and the USA on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters in 1990. “This order by the Argentinian judiciary is crucial in demonstrating that Facebook must do much more to stem the flow of hatred, not only against Rohingya but against repressed people all over the world,” said Tun Khin. “Facebook must also be transparent and share what information it has collected about anti-Rohingya propaganda on its platform. Such evidence will be key in holding the Myanmar military to account for its crimes against the people of Myanmar. Only justice can break the cycle of violence in Myanmar, and Facebook must play its part in making this a reality.” Background On 13 November 2019, BROUK petitioned Argentinean Courts to open an investigation into the role of Myanmar’s civilian and military leaders in committing genocide and crimes against humanity against the Rohingya. Under the principle of universal jurisdiction, such crimes can be investigated anywhere in the world regardless of where they were committed. On 28 November 2021, the Argentinian judiciary took the historic decision to accept the case and begin the first-ever universal jurisdiction trial anywhere in the world regarding the Rohingya..."
Source/publisher: Burmese Rohingya Organisation UK
2022-03-07
Date of entry/update: 2022-03-07
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "BIREUEN, Indonesia, March 6 (Reuters) - Over 100 Rohingya refugees from Myanmar arrived by boat on the shores of Indonesia's Aceh province in the early hours of Sunday, an NGO group at the scene said. Authorities were unsure for how long the 114 refugees, including 35 children, had been at sea, but some needed medical assistance when they arrived in Bireuen, Aceh, Nurul Yana Daba, a volunteer for the NGO Aksi Cepat Tanggap, told reporters. "One female refugee got swellings on her arms and legs and is unable to stand or walk, while one man, maybe because they've been at sea for too long, is a bit malnourished," Nurul said. Mukhtar, a local villager, said the Rohingya refugees walked into his village to seek help. "They were asking for protection. We will leave it to the government. We are taking them in because it's the humane thing to do," he said. Local official Alfian said villagers arranged food for the refugees but did not expect they would stay long at his village. In December, the Indonesian navy rescued more than 100 Rohingya refugees who were adrift on a sinking boat off the western coast of Indonesia. After initial resistance to let them disembark, the authorities relented and subsequently bowed to international pressure to give them refuge. Indonesia is not a signatory to the 1951 U.N. Convention on Refugees and is predominately seen as a transit country for those seeking asylum to a third country. More than 730,000 Rohingya fled Myanmar after a military-led crackdown in 2017, and were forced into squalid camps across the border in Bangladesh. U.N. investigators concluded that the military campaign had been executed with "genocidal intent". Some have fled by sea, sailing to countries such as Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia between November and April when the seas are calm. Hundreds of them came to Aceh in intervals in recent years..."
Source/publisher: "Reuters" (UK)
2022-03-06
Date of entry/update: 2022-03-06
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Description: "Foreign Minister Dr AK Abdul Momen has urged the British government and its parliament to keep up pressure on Myanmar for the “safe, dignified and voluntary” repatriation of the Rohingyas soon. He reiterated the call at a meeting with the British Parliamentary delegation on the eve of the latter’s visit to the Rohingya camps in Kutupalong and Bhasan Char on Sunday. UK’s Conservative Party MPs Thomas Patrick Hunt and Paul Bristow interacted with Rohingya leaders in Kutupalong and visited various facilities in the two camps. They reaffirmed their solidarity with the Rohingya and assured them of remaining seized with their legitimate demands for citizenship, security and freedom of movement in Myanmar. The UK MPs noted that the British people, especially the British Muslims, felt strongly about the Rohingya situation, and that the international community had a responsibility to stand by this large group of people generously supported by the government and the people of Bangladesh. Bristow recalled the UK’s humanitarian assistance to the tune of 320 million GBP since 2017 and said they would continue to raise the issue of further improving the living conditions of the Rohingya while they awaited their repatriation. Earlier, during their meeting with Foreign Minister Momen, the British parliamentary delegation exchanged views on further enhancing trade and investment between the two countries in the post-BREXIT context. They reiterated their appreciation for the multi-dimensional contributions being made by the British-Bangladesh diaspora in their respective constituencies as well as in the land of their origin or ancestors. Minister Momen hoped that there would be exchange of high level political visits between the two countries on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations. He recalled Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s various engagements during her visit to Glasgow and London in November 2021 and thanked the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) for undertaking the ‘Brit-Bangla Bandhan’ initiative. The UK delegation thanked the Bangladesh Foreign Minister for accompanying them during their visits to the greater Sylhet region over the last weekend. The delegation included, among others, Vijay Shamdas Daryanani, MP, Gibraltar Minister for Business, Tourism, Transport and the Port, Samantha Helen Cohen CVO, CEO of the Commonwealth Enterprise and Investment Council, and Zillur Hussain, MBE, Founder of Zi Foundation. Faruk Khan MP, chairperson of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Shamima Begum, MP were present. Drawing parallels: 50 years apart Arriving in Dhaka 50 years ago, meeting Bangabandhu, and the current growing concern for the Rohingya refugees..."
Source/publisher: "Dhaka Tribune" (Bangladesh)
2022-01-24
Date of entry/update: 2022-01-24
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Description: "While heavy fighting has been raging in Myanmar’s ethnic minority areas, and clashes between local resistance groups called People’s Defense Forces and the Myanmar military have occurred almost daily since last year’s coup, Rakhine State in the west of the country has been largely peaceful. The Arakan Army (AA), the state’s main rebel force, entered into an informal ceasefire agreement with the Myanmar military several months before the February 1 coup and, so far, the truce seems to be holding. But much to the military’s chagrin the AA, or more specifically its political wing, the United League of Arakan (ULA), has used the peace to build up a separate administration in the state with its own judicial bodies, revenue department, public security branches and other governmental institutions. The military, on the other hand, is stretched on many fronts across Myanmar and can hardly afford to send the number of troops that would be required to re-establish control over Rakhine State. But it is a fragile ceasefire agreement and it is still a question of who would attack whom first and when. If the generals decide to open a new front in Rakhine State, they would be up against a formidable adversary. From humble beginnings in 2009, the AA has grown into one of Myanmar’s most potent rebel armies. It was originally formed by a group of youngish nationalists led by Twan Mrat Naing, then only 31, and recruits from the many ethnic Rakhine who work in the Hpakant jade mines in Kachin State. Initially trained by the Kachin Independence Army, they first saw combat in 2012 when the military launched a massive offensive against rebel bases along the Chinese border. Three years later, AA troops fought alongside soldiers from the Palaung militia, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army, and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army in the Kokang area of Shan State in 2015. From then on, the AA grew rapidly and moved most of its operations to its home state of Rakhine. Thousands of young male as well as female nationalists flocked to join the AA, and bitter battles were fought with the Myanmar military. Twan Mrat Naing, now 43 and a Major-General, was born in the Rakhine capital Sittwe and studied law at university but left without getting a degree. In a recent interview with this correspondent, he emphasized the pride that many Rakhine feel for their state and its long and often turbulent history. Rakhine, formerly known as Arakan, was an independent Buddhist kingdom until it was invaded by the Burmese in late 1784 and then, the following year, annexed into the realm ruled by King Bodawpaya of the Konbaung Dynasty. Resistance against the occupation continued until the first Anglo-Burmese War in 1824-1826. The Arakan region, along with Tenasserim [now part of Tanintharyi Region] in the southeast, became British possessions. Peace prevailed until World War II, when Myanmar was occupied by the Japanese — and that caused serious divisions within Arakan. Most Buddhist Arakanese sided with the Burma Independence Army — and hence the Japanese — while large segments of the Muslim population in northern Arakan remained loyal to Britain, the colonial power. Immense atrocities were committed by both sides, and those wounds have never completely healed. The departure of the British in 1948 led to a virtual civil war in Arakan. Muslim mujaheed guerrillas — they were then not yet called Rohingya — established bases along the border with East Pakistan and, originally wanted to join independent Pakistan. The Communist Party (Red Flag) (CP[RF]), led by Bonbauk, or “bomb thrower” Tha Gyaw, also battled government forces and so did U Sein Da, a former monk known as “the King of Arakan.” The main Communist Party of Burma (CPB) also established strongholds in Arakan, while breakaway militants from CP[RF] formed a separate Communist Party of Arakan (CPA) and wanted to establish their own people’s republic. Over the years, most of the insurgencies fizzled out. In 1961, the last 500 mujaheeds surrendered as the then U Nu government agreed to set up an autonomous area known as the Mayu Frontier Administration encompassing Maungdaw, Buthidaung and western Rathedaung townships, where Muslims are in a clear majority. General Ne Win’s coup d’etat in 1962 put an end to those efforts and some Muslims formed new groups, notably the Rohingya Independence Force which in 1975 became the Rohingya Patriotic Front. But those groups were small and their activities limited to publishing leaflets and newsletters from their offices in Chittagong, Bangladesh. “Bonbauk” Tha Gyaw had surrendered in 1955 and U Sein Da in 1958. The main CP(RF) leader Thakin Soe was captured in 1970 at his Than Chaung camp near the Arakan Yoma mountains. The CPB’s local leader Kyaw Mya left Arakan in 1979 and went to Bangladesh, where the Chinese embassy helped him to continue on to China and then down to the party’s main headquarters at Panghsang in the Wa Hills in Shan State. His successor as local leader of the CPB, Ye Tun, surrendered during a general amnesty in 1980, and so did CPA leader Kyaw Zan Rhee. On the Thai border, a small group called the Arakan Liberation Organization and Army had been formed in 1972, but it had only a handful of soldiers who were based at Kawmoorah, a Karen National Union stronghold north of Mae Sot. Peace seemed to prevail in Arakan, which was renamed Rakhine State in 1974, but then came the 1988 nationwide democracy uprising. Some of the old fighters, among them Kyaw Zan Rhee and “Bonbauk” Tha Gyaw, resurfaced, took part in the pro-democracy movement and formed an overground, legal party called the Arakan People’s United Organization. Another, and stronger, legal political party called the Arakan League for Democracy (ALD) also emerged, and was led by Dr U Saw Mra Aung and the historian U Oo Tha Tun. The ALD took part in the 1990 general election but its MPs elect, like all the other elected politicians, were not allowed to take up their seats in Yangon. The elected National Assembly was never convened and instead a mainly military-appointed National Convention was convened to draft a new constitution. U Oo Tha Tun died in prison in 1991 and, in 1992, the ALD was banned. Against that backdrop — and given Arakan/Rakhine’s long history of resistance — it is hardly surprising that the new AA and the ULA have grown so fast and become what they are today. Or, as Myanmar specialist Martin Smith wrote in Arakan (Rakhine State): A Land in Conflict on Myanmar’s Western Frontier, which was published by the Netherlands-based Transnational Institute in December 2019: “Among [the many Rakhine groups] only the ULA could be considered as new. But, as its supporters point out, the ULA includes members from other organizations and is the latest in a long line of armed Rakhine movements that date back to independence in 1948. As such, the ULA has quickly become the most powerful force in Rakhine nationalism in many decades.” But the armed wing, the AA, is also facing formidable challenges. The most obvious one is logistical: how to get guns and ammunition from rebel-held areas in Kachin and Shan State — where the main source of military supplies are — to Rakhine? During the fighting before the ceasefire agreement was struck, the AA showed that it had remarkable firepower and the Myanmar military suffered heavy casualties. But if fighting resumes, how can the AA’s troops be resupplied? The other issue would be how to relate to the state’s Muslim population. In recent years, an extremely militant group called the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) has emerged. It launched several attacks on military and police outposts in 2016 and 2017 which, in turn, led to a massive counteroffensive and the flight of hundreds of thousands of Rohingya to Bangladesh. ARSA should not be considered an indigenous group — it was formed by Ataullah abu Ammar Jununi, a second-generation Rohingya. He was born in Karachi, Pakistan, and grew up in Saudi-Arabia, where he was groomed by Islamic fundamentalists. Ataullah has unleashed his fury even on what are supposed to be his own countrymen, among them Mohib Ullah, a Rohingya moderate and human rights activist, who was killed by ARSA in a refugee camp in Bangladesh on September 29, 2021. In a recent video, a visibly angry and agitated Ataullah exhorts his followers to “burn down” the dwellings of Rakhine Buddhists and “strike hard” against them. It may be easy for the AA to distance itself from ARSA, but the Rohingya question is bound to create controversies. While the AA and other Rakhine nationalists accept the fact that Muslims have been living in the area for centuries, and that many more settled in Arakan during the colonial era, they argue that most Rakhine consider the very name ‘Rohingya’ offensive and refuse to use it. According to their line of argument, it gives the impression that the Muslims are not a religious community but a distinct ethnic group, and, as some of the Rohingya claim, that they are the original inhabitants of the land. Rather offensively, nearly all political movements among the Rohingya also have a map of the entire Rakhine State in their emblems. Rakhine nationalists also argue that the name Rohingya was not used by anyone until the 1950s. Those who argue that there is separate Rohingya identity based in history usually quote a 1799 study by Scottish physician and geographer Francis Buchanan-Hamilton, who never went to Arakan but met some Muslims in the then capital Amarapura. He mentions that they referred to themselves as “Rooinga, or natives of Arakan” and then said little more. But, as Martin Smith points out: “After annexation [in 1826], the British do not appear to have used this name again. Muslims in Arakan were instead referred to by such terms as Arakanese Mohammedan, Bengali Muslim, Chittagonian, Kaman and Zerbadi…[and] it would be difficult to imagine a situation in modern-day Europe where discussions of citizenship or identity become based around the writings of an Asian traveler two centuries ago.” Be that as it may, but there are few questions in Myanmar today which are more than contested — and often heated — than disputes over the origin of the name Rohingya, and who and what they are. Internationally, the name Rohingya and their identity as such is almost universally accepted. But it’s an entirely different story in Myanmar, and then not only among the Rakhine. On this issue, most Burmans would be on the same side as the Rakhine nationalists. This year and next may reveal what the future holds for the new nationalist movement in Rakhine State. A lot depends on what happens in the rest of the country. On the one hand, the junta has not managed to consolidate its grip on the country and its coup last year may go down in history as the most unsuccessful attempt to seize power in modern Asian history. That works to the advantage of the ULA and its parallel administration as well as the resistance elsewhere in Myanmar. But, on the other hand, future developments depend on the extent to which the country’s abundance of resistance forces can coordinate their movements — and despite some alliances being forged — there is so far little evidence of that happening..."
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Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2022-01-20
Date of entry/update: 2022-01-20
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Ousted Rakhine State chief minister U Nyi Pu was sentenced to nine years in prison for corruption on Wednesday along with other National League for Democracy (NLD) ministers, according to lawyers. The detained finance minister U Kyaw Aye Thein, transport minister U Aung Kyaw Zan, agriculture minister U Kyaw Lwin and municipal minister U Min Aung were also given jail terms. The chief minister, U Kyaw Aye Thein and U Aung Kyaw Zan faced three corruption charges for violation of financial regulations on land use in Gwa Township and for using 86.5 million kyats of Rakhine State funds. The regime also accused the three of handing three state-owned buildings in Sittwe to a company they had links with to open a clothing factory and for giving the company 5.5 million kyats for maintenance of the building although the factory was not operational. The junta court in Sittwe Prison handed the three ministers a three-year sentence for each charge, according to U Aung Naing Win, U Aung Kyaw Zan’s lawyer. U Kyaw Lwin was given three years for the charge over land use in Gwa. U Nyi Pu’s daughter said: “I have no comment. People know if the lawsuits and verdicts are fair.” U Nyi Pu and U Min Aung were detained in February soon after the coup. U Kyaw Aye Thein and U Aung Kyaw Zan were detained in Yangon at the end of July. U Kyaw Lwin was detained on Ramree Island in Rakhine State in August. In August, the military regime said it had opened corruption cases against the ministers under Article 55 of the Anti-Corruption Law, which carries a potential 15-year sentence for anyone in political office involved in bribery. U Min Aung was sentenced to seven years in prison on Wednesday. He was also accused of accepting bribes to grant approval for markets to be built. In September, he was sentenced to two years and two months under the Natural Disaster Management Law and Peaceful Assembly and Procession Law for organizing anti-regime protests. U Nyi Pu, an NLD member, was sentenced to two years in prison with labor for sedition in October last year. The junta-appointed Rakhine State election body has also opened cases against U Nyi Pu and U Min Aung for alleged violation of electoral laws in the 2020 general election..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2022-01-19
Date of entry/update: 2022-01-19
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "A leaked memo shows how the Myanmar military is desperately trying to hide from international scrutiny of its atrocity crimes against the Rohingya and other people in Myanmar, the Burmese Rohingya Organisation UK (BROUK) said today. A memo from a senior official in the Myanmar military, issued on 6 January 2022 but made public this week, orders all military personnel not to answer letters related to arrest warrants or summons from the International Criminal Court (ICC) or the Argentinian judiciary. “It is outrageous, but far from surprising, that Myanmar military is now desperately trying to cover the tracks of its genocidal crimes against the Rohingya. This leaked memo shows clearly how the Myanmar junta can never be trusted to cooperate with international justice mechanisms in good faith,” said Tun Khin, President of BROUK. “This memo is, however, also a sign that the efforts to hold the junta to account for its atrocities are working. It shows that the international community must redouble all efforts to bring Min Aung Hlaing and his cronies to justice.” The ICC in November 2019 opened a case against Myanmar over crimes against humanity against the Rohingya. In December 2021, the Argentinian judiciary furthermore accepted a petition by BROUK to open a case against senior military officials over genocide and crimes against humanity in Rakhine State since 2016. The leaked memo makes specific references to both processes and to BROUK as an organisation, while ordering all military personnel not to “accept any letters or arrest orders” from the ICC or Argentinian Courts “related to travel restrictions or arrest warrants or summons”. It is signed by Captain Aung Ko Zaw. Apart from the judicial bodies, the memo also bans military personnel from accepting letters from “plaintiffs”, a reference to the many victims involved in the judicial processes. BROUK’s case in Argentina, for example, includes as witnesses six women who survived sexual violence during the military operation in Rakhine State in 2017. Last month, the independent media outlet Myanmar Now revealed that the junta had issued a separate order to all of its staff to not receive any notifications issued by international courts seeking to prosecute junta leaders. That order was signed by Tun Tun Oo, a former general appointed by the regime to serve as Myanmar’s Chief Justice. Myanmar has led a decades-long genocide against the Rohingya people. In August 2017, the Myanmar military and its proxies launched a vicious operation in Rakhine State, killing thousands of Rohingya and driving hundreds of thousands to flee into Bangladesh. Since seizing power in a coup on 1 February 2021, the Myanmar military has further driven Myanmar to the brink of ruin. The economy and public services have been decimated, while the junta has killed more than 1,400 people and arresting and torturing thousands of others. “The Myanmar military has terrorised all people in Myanmar for decades with impunity. The only way to break this horrific cycle of abuse is to ensure that those responsible are held to account,” said Tun Khin. “Myanmar military will never discipline itself, so international justice is the only answer. Instead of trying to sweep its own crimes under the carpet, the Myanmar military should cooperate fully with all international justice efforts, including by the ICC and in Argentina.” “This must also be a wakeup call to the international community to act. The UN Security Council must support a full referral of the situation in Myanmar to the ICC, while other countries should look to open universal jurisdiction cases like the one in Argentina.”..."
Source/publisher: Burmese Rohingya Organisation UK
2022-01-14
Date of entry/update: 2022-01-14
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: ":ရခိုင်ပြည်နယ်တွင်းက ကျေးရွာတချို့မှာ ဒီဇင်ဘာလအတွင်း ထူးခြားဖြစ်စဉ်များ ဆက်တိုက်ဖြစ်လာပြီး လူမျိုးရေး ပဋိပက္ခပုံစံ ဦးတည်တဲ့ အခြေနေမျိုးတွေ ဆက်တိုက်ဖြစ်လာတာတွေ့နေရတယ်လို့ ရက္ခိုင်အမျိုးသားအဖွဲ့ချုပ် ထုတ်ပြန်ချက်မှာတွေ့ရပါတယ်။ ဒီဇင်ဘာလ ၉ ရက်နေ့ မြောက်ဦးမှာ ညအချိန် မီးတိုက်ဖျက်ဆီးခဲ့ပြီး အဲ့ဒီနေ့မှာပဲ မြောက်ဦး လောင်းကြက်ရွာနား ရိတ်သိမ်းထားတဲ့ စပါးတွေကို တမင်သက်သက် မီးရှို့ဖျက်ဆီးတာတွေ ပြုလုပ်လာတယ်လို့ဆိုပါတယ်။ ဒါအပြင် ဒီဇင်ဘာလ ၁၁၊ ၁၂၊ ၁၃ နဲ့ ၁၄ရက်နေ့တွေမှာ ကျေးရွာတချို့ မုဒိန်းမှုနဲ့ မီးတိုက် ထူးခြားဖြစ်စဉ်တွေ ဆက်တိုက်ဖြစ်ပွားခဲ့တယ်လု့ိသိရပါတယ်။ ဒီလို ထူးခြားဖြစ်စဉ်တွေ ဆက်တိုက် ဖြစ်ပွားနေတာကြောင့် ကျေးရွာ မြို့များရှိ လူငယ်များအနေနဲ့ ပြည်သူ့အသက်အိုးအိမ် စည်းစိမ် လုံခြုံရေးနဲ့ မီးဘေးအန္တရာယ်ကင်းဝေးဖို့အတွက် လူစိမ်းအဝင်အထွက်များ သတိထားစောင့်ကြည့်ဖို့ ရက္ခိုင်အမျိုးသားအဖွဲ့ချုပ်က တိုက်တွန်းထားပါတယ်။..."
Source/publisher: United League of Arakan
2021-12-17
Date of entry/update: 2021-12-18
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Class-action lawsuit says the company’s failure to police content played a role in a brutal campaign against the group
Description: "Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh are suing Facebook for $150 billion over the company’s alleged failure to prevent its platform from being used to incite violence against the minority group. The class-action lawsuit was filed in the US on Monday by two law firms–Edelson PC and Fields PLLC–while British lawyers submitted a letter of notice to the company in London, Reuters reported. “The company's failures to police content and its platform's design contributed to real-world violence faced by the Rohingya community,” the complaint says. Social media companies enjoy strong protections from such legal action under a US law known as Section 230, which says online platforms are not legally liable for content posted by third parties. The complainants have said they will seek to apply Myanmar law if the US law is used as a defence, but there appears to be no precedent of a foreign law being used to successfully counter a Section 230 defence. On Thursday, 16 Rohingya youth representatives will file a separate complaint against Facebook to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), an intergovernmental group that issues guidelines for multinational companies. That complaint comes after the refugees tried unsuccessfully to secure “remedies” from the company in the form of funding for projects in camps in Bangladesh, where more than 900,000 Rohingya live in squalid conditions. “After more than a year of tense discussions with Facebook Human Rights Director Miranda Sissons and the rejection of a modest request for the multi-billion dollar company to fund educational programs in the camps, the youth have decided to file an official complaint,” said a statement from Victim Advocates International, a group that is assisting the refugees. The complaint will be filed in Ireland, home to Facebook’s Global Operations office. The complainants are asking Facebook to divert a small portion of its profits to supporting Rohingya refugees, to adjust its business model “through the lens of equity, human rights, and compassion” and to commit not only to financial reparations, but to a “culture change” aimed at preventing further abuses of the platform, the statement said. “We have decided to file a complaint… in the hope of starting a process that will allow us to reclaim our dignity, through demanding our right to a remedy, and to an education,” the refugees said in a joint statement. “We believe we are owed a remedy from Facebook,” they added. More than 730,000 Rohingya fled Rakhine State from August 2017 amid military-led mass killings, gang rape, and arson, in what rights groups and UN investigators said was part of a genocidal campaign against the group. UN investigators said in 2018 that the use of Facebook played a key role in spreading hate speech that fueled the violence. Monday’s lawsuit references claims by Facebook whistleblower Frances Haugen, who leaked several thousand internal documents earlier this year that highlighted the company’s failure to take effective action against abusive content in countries where hate speech is considered likely to cause the most harm. Facebook has previously admitted it was "too slow to prevent misinformation and hate" in Myanmar..."
Source/publisher: "Myanmar Now" (Myanmar)
2021-12-07
Date of entry/update: 2021-12-08
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Rohingya say they will now have to pay bribes to immigration officials to get permission slips to leave the township
Description: "Authorities in Buthidaung, northern Rakhine State, last week tightened travel restrictions against local Rohingya, requiring them to obtain a permission slip from an immigration office in order to leave the township. The November 25 order from township adminstrator Nay Oo said that some “Muslim people” had been travelling beyond their own townships, districts, states, and regions without a document known as a Form 4, and that this threatened local security and rule of law. The Rohingya have been subject to severe restrictions on their movements for years, one of numerous oppressive policies directed at the group that activists say form part of a genocidal campaign that came to a head with military-led mass killings in 2016 and 2017. Those who travel without permission slips will face legal action and the new rule will be in effect for two months from the date of issue, the order said. Until now, Rohingya in the township have needed a recommendation letter from their village administrator to travel outside the township, but did not need to ask immigration. A Rohingya resident of Buthidaung, who asked to remain anonymous, said the new restrictions would mean delays for people who need to travel to Maungdaw to seek medical help and would make it even harder for some Rohingya to earn a living. The permission slip from the township immigration office will only be eligible only for seven days, he said. “They are not going to let us travel without Form 4 anymore,” he told Myanmar Now. “We will need to get a recommendation letter from the village administrator first in order to get the permission slip from the immigration office.” “This is just discrimination; people of other ethnicities do not need Form 4. This is basically just systematic oppression,” he added. Another Rohingya from Buthidaung said it would be necessary to bribe local immigration officials to get the permission slip. “We have to wait if we don’t pay them. We need to pay them 5,000-10,000 kyat if we want it on the same day.” Immigration officials in Buthidaung did not respond to requests for comment. Nay Oo, the township administrator, said he was in a meeting when contacted by Myanmar Now for comment. It is unclear if similar restrictions have been applied anywhere else in Rakhine..."
Source/publisher: "Myanmar Now" (Myanmar)
2021-11-29
Date of entry/update: 2021-11-29
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "The Myanmar Humanitarian Fund continues to support the most vulnerable, such as women like Khadija who needs specialised health services for her daughter. *names changed to protect privacy In a village northwest of Sittwe in Rakhine state, Khadija and her five-year-old daughter Tasmin have become regular visitors to the Integrated Nutrition Centre which offers a range of life-changing support. Come rain or shine, they go to the centre for physiotherapy sessions that Tasmin urgently needs as she was born with cerebral palsy – a physical disability that affects her movement and posture. Like most others living in this small Rohingya village, Khadija cannot afford to pay for the specialised health services that are critical for her daughter’s development. “My husband is a seasonal daily wage earner so it is not always easy for him to be employed, and I do not have time to find myself a job as I take care of Tasmin around the clock. We cannot even bear the expense of her physiotherapy sessions,” Khadija explains. An estimated 140,000 Rohingya people in Rakhine remain displaced since intercommunal violence in Rakhine in 2012. Rohingya people living in both camps and villages continue to face significant challenges in accessing basic healthcare, education and livelihoods due to movement restrictions. The COVID-19 outbreak across the country has further aggravated their humanitarian situation, leaving them almost entirely dependent on humanitarian assistance to meet their basic needs. “I am overjoyed to see that my daughter can do remedial exercises without the need to travel far,” Khadija said. “I am really thankful for this kind of help. Our life would be in misery if it hadn’t been for the MHF. There is only one thing on mind, which is my daughter’s wellbeing. I want her to grow and reach her greatest potential.” Enabling national humanitarian partners to deliver critical assistance The Myanmar Humanitarian Fund (MHF) is a country-based pooled fund managed by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA). It supports both national and international humanitarian organisations to address emerging and chronic humanitarian needs of vulnerable people affected by crisis. Since 2007, the MHF has provided US$80 million to support life-saving assistance through 205 humanitarian projects. In 2021 alone, the MHF made $12.4 million available to support vulnerable people affected by the armed conflict in Chin, Rakhine, Kachin and Shan states, Magway region, and the south-eastern part of Myanmar.MHF projects funded in 2020 and 2021 are currently making a difference in the lives of almost 1.2 million people, of whom around 56 per cent are women and girls, 44 per cent children and a further 11 per cent people with disabilities. The MHF ensures disability inclusion is mainstreamed in all projects implemented with its funding, while encouraging inclusion of people with disabilities and their representative organisations. Removing barriers to accessing humanitarian assistance Myanmar continues to grapple with dire humanitarian situation, with 3 million people in need of critical assistance and protection services, as well as COVID-19 related support. The number of people in need includes displaced families from conflict-affected areas as well as those from outskirts of big cities like Yangon and Mandalay, where there are emerging humanitarian needs due to the impact of COVID-19 and disruption of services. The ongoing political developments since 1 February 2021, have further exacerbated existing vulnerabilities and protection risks, resulting in new displacement and reduced freedom of movement, access to protection, basic services and livelihoods for affected people..."
Source/publisher: UN Country Team in Myanmar via "Reliefweb" (New York)
2021-11-05
Date of entry/update: 2021-11-05
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: He was likely lynched by a mob, police say
Description: "Ads He was likely lynched by a mob, police say An alleged leader of the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) has been found dead at the Whykong Rohingya refugee camp in Teknaf upazila of Cox’s Bazar district. The deceased was identified as Mohammad Hashim, 32, son of the late Nurul Amin of camp No 22 of Unchiprang in Whykong union. Sub-Inspector Mahabubur Rahaman of Whykong police outpost said Hashim was probably lynched by a mob. "However, the exact cause of death will be clear after post-mortem," he said. Also read - Family blames Rohingya militants for Mohib Ullah murder According to police sources, Hashim used to assault Rohingya Muslims, presenting himself as an ARSA leader. Hashim was one of the masterminds behind the recent assassination of top Rohingya leader Mohib Ullah, the sources said, not ruling out his involvement in the subsequent madrasa attack. Also read - 6 hacked to death in Rohingya camp attack Md Hafizur Rahman, officer-in-charge of the Teknaf police station, said the body was sent to the Cox's Bazar Sadar Hospital morgue for autopsy..."
Source/publisher: "Dhaka Tribune" (Bangladesh)
2021-11-03
Date of entry/update: 2021-11-03
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Too often, we have seen the inability to nip unrest in the bud lead to nefarious parties being emboldened We firmly agree with Foreign Minister Dr AK Abdul Momen that the current situation in the Rohingya camps must be resolved as soon as possible, and to that end, local authorities and law enforcement agencies must take firm action to improve law and order. While news that the police have, so far, detained eight people over the recent attack on a madrasa in the camps that left at least six dead gives some reassurance, the larger story here is that, following this attack and the murder of Rohingya leader Mohibullah not too long ago, there is unease and volatility in the camps that must be extinguished as soon as possible. The fact that 25 Rohingya refugees have been murdered over the past one year is alarming to the extreme, more so because these camps are supposed to be safe spaces for these refugees who had to suffer through unimaginable horrors back home at the hands of the Myanmar army. This lack of safety in the camps also paints Bangladesh in a bad light, and threatens to devalue all the good work that has been done to shelter the Rohingya and provide them with the refuge that their own country could not. Too often, we have seen the inability to nip unrest in the bud lead to nefarious parties being emboldened and encouraged to do even more harm, and scale up to the point where the situation gets out of hand. As such, the authorities concerned have an obligation to improve the current condition of the camps, and put an end to any and all incidents of violence that continue to exist, along with identifying those who are instigating unrest in the camps. Failure to do so threatens not only the safety of the Rohingya within the camps, but also the safety of Bangladesh as a whole..."
Source/publisher: "Dhaka Tribune" (Bangladesh)
2021-10-24
Date of entry/update: 2021-10-24
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Nyi Pu is also facing corruption charges carrying 15 years’ imprisonment if he is convicted
Description: "A junta court in Sittwe sentenced Nyi Pu, the detained former chief minister of Rakhine State, to two years in prison with hard labour for incitement on Friday, according to his lawyer. Judge Win Naing of the Sittwe Township court delivered 66-year-old Nyi Pu’s verdict at a hearing held via video conference on Friday regarding charges filed under Section 505b of the Penal Code. Section 505b outlaws “any statement, rumour or report” likely to induce people to “commit an offence against the state.” Nyi Pu is the second chief minister and central executive committee (CEC) member of the ousted National League for Democracy (NLD) to be convicted by the junta of violating the statute since Myanmar’s February 1 military coup. On June 8, Aung Moe Nyo, another NLD CEC member and former chief minister of Magway Region, was also sentenced to two years in prison for incitement. Nyi Pu was among multiple members of Union and regional cabinets detained shortly after the military seized power from the elected NLD administration. The junta initially placed him under house arrest days after the coup, but transferred him to detention on February 10 after he posted a video on Facebook in which he expressed opposition to the coup. The NLD has published statements encouraging public resistance to and the rejection of military rule as long as its leaders, including State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi and President Win Myint, are in junta custody. The military authorities accused central members of the party, including Nyi Pu, of inciting the public to violence through the statements. Myo Myat Hein, a lawyer from Thazin Legal Aid Network representing Nyi Pu, said the judge concluded that he was among those responsible even though he was in custody at the time the statements were published. “The conclusion is that whether or not he attended the party’s meetings [regarding the statements] is a separate issue, but as a CEC member, he is responsible for those statements,” said the lawyer. Kyaw Thein, the junta’s deputy township administrator of Sittwe, filed an incitement charge against Nyi Pu on February 15. The plaintiff called on five witnesses to testify against him and Nyi Pu testified on his own behalf on September 28. Nyi Pu appeared calm as the judge handed out the verdict on Friday, Myo Myat Hein added. The former chief minister will be transferred to Sittwe prison from a detention centre at the township’s military cantonment, the lawyer said. He said he will consult with Nyi Pu regarding whether to file an appeal against the verdict. Kyi Kyi Oo, Nyi Pu’s daughter, said she had not been able to meet with her father since he was arrested in February and has demanded that she be granted a visit with him. She did not offer comment on Friday’s verdict. “We all know that [the military] arrests people unjustly and frames and convicts people unfairly,” she told Myanmar Now. Her sister, Moe San Suu Kyi, an NLD youth leader, was arrested by the junta authorities in Yangon on May 9 and has since been detained in Insein Prison. In addition to the incitement conviction, Nyi Pu is also facing three corruption charges filed at the Rakhine State High Court for which hearings are ongoing. Rakhine State’s municipal minister Min Aung, industry and transportation minister Aung Kyaw Zan, planning and finance minister Kyaw Aye Thein, and forestry and mining minister Kyaw Lwin are also named in the corruption charge levied against Nyi Pu. He stands accused of abusing his power during his tenure as chief minister and personally profiting while overseeing the implementation of land development projects in Rakhine State’s Gwa Township. Each charge carries 15 years’ imprisonment if he is found guilty..."
Source/publisher: "Myanmar Now" (Myanmar)
2021-10-09
Date of entry/update: 2021-10-09
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "The military coup in Myanmar has destabilized most of the country, but many in Myanmar’s Rakhine State, one of its poorest, see little difference between the old democratic regime and the military dictatorship. The Rakhine, or the Arakanese, have suffered through British and Japanese colonialism, poverty, exploitation, and human rights violations. An 18 month-long internet blackout, political disenfranchisement, violent military crackdowns, a lack of proper humanitarian aid, and poverty have contributed to the apathy felt by many ethnic Rakhines with respect to the new military dictatorship’s destruction of democratic traditions and institutions. Under the pretense of eradicating a local military group known as the Arakan Army which fights for Rakhine self-determination, the Burmese military has devastated the region while the democratic government turned a blind eye. JURIST has interviewed an ethnic Rakhine law student in order to better understand the persecution of ethnic Rhakines in Myanmar and their quest for independence. This interviewee will not be publicly identified due to ongoing security concerns. For more information on the latest developments, please follow our Myanmar coverage. 1) Tell us about the Rakhine people and your traditional home in the Rakhine State. The Rakhine State is a coastal territory in Southeast Asia. It is a mountainous area, bound on the west by Bangladesh. Legend holds hat the history of Rakhine dates back to 6,000 BC during the course of which has included rich cultural and literary traditions, and strong military protection. But the glory came to an end in 1785, after the invasion of the Burmese king. At present, there is a population of more than three million in Rakhine, from seven different ethnic groups, which combined make up the Arakanese, or the people of the Arakan Land. Most of the Rakhines live in Rakhine State, though there are also people of Arakanese descent in various other parts of Myanmar and India. 2) Being Rakhine in Myanmar, have you ever experienced discrimination or improper treatment because of your ethnicity? Historically, we Rakhines sought unity with other ethnic groups within the union of Myanmar. This attitude was reflected by the fact that the Rakhines banded together with other tribes of Myanmar in the anti-colonial fights against the British and Japanese. But ultimately our efforts seemed only to lead to broken promises and exploitation. Over time, we felt strongly that we were not being treated as equals by other parts of Myanmar. This seems to be related to the desire of others to exploit the abundance of natural resources in Rakhine State; geographically speaking, our land has all that it needs to become an economically important region; but most people who aren’t farmers in the region are jobless, and have to go abroad in search for work. Despite its wealth of natural resources, the Rakhine State has, over time, become one of the poorest states in the country, and all of our key sectors, from education, to health, to the economy, are in decline. There is no industry zone and most of the locals are jobless. They have to go elsewhere in the country or abroad in search of jobs. Poverty and illiteracy are proliferating, causing conditions to continue to fall. While the country amasses wealth from our natural gas, many parts of the Rakhine State are lacking in such basic essentials as electricity. The Rakhines feel like they don’t belong in their own country. In recent years, there has also been violence and enormous casualties and other problems in the Rakhine State. In particular, there was an internet blackout in the region, starting in June 2019, that set records because it lasted two whole years. During that time, there were many human rights violations by the military, a lack of information amid the rise of the COVID-19 pandemic, and as most of the country went online for their studies during the health crisis, young Rakhine people lost access to their education because it was impossible to take classes online during that time. The locals felt like they were in a different world compared to the other states of Myanmar. 3) How would you describe the relationship between the Burmese government and the Rakhine people in Arakan State in the two or three years before the military coup? Much of the current trouble started in 2015, when the National League for Democracy (NLD; [ed: Myanmar’s then-ruling party]) Government appointed one of their party delegates, Nyi Pu, as chief minister of the Rakhine State despite what appeared to be a landslide win in local elections for a representative of the Arakan National Party (ANP). In the aftermath, there were many battles between the Arakan Army and the federal military in Rakhine, and the locals had to flee for safety. The Parliament rejected proposals to provide much-needed resources for Rakhine refugees. The NLD Government claimed to be practicing democracy in Myanmar, but from our perspectives, they seemed to be misusing their authority. There were even allegedly personal threats made against government representatives who sought aid for the Rakhine people. These tensions continued into 2017 and 2018, at which point violence escalated and atrocities proliferated. On the 21st of June 2019, internet access was shut down in the Rakhine State, prompting many university students to protest, a lot of whom ultimately faced charges and imprisonment. Between military violence, arrests, and refugee status, so many civilians of the Rakhine State suffered, with no help from the government. In fact, it was worse than that; the NLD Government not only failed to lend a helping hand effectively but also restricted donations and supplies from the organizations saying that they needed to ask for permissions from the authorities first. Another worrying trend included the interrogations and arrests of many young boys who the Burmese military accused of having had connections with the Arakan Army. Reports of torture and even deaths abounded. For instance, a local carpenter, Zaw Win Hlaing, was arrested, and then was beaten so harshly that he developed a kidney condition that killed him. To make matters even worse, many such cases weren’t even reported because of the internet blackout. In July 2019, during a visit to a Rakhine township, [then-State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi] delivered a speech in which she said it was inconsiderate and cowardly to seek change with the use of weapons. While she didn’t mention the Arakan Army by name, it was obvious to the Rakhine People who she was referring to. The speech caused an uproar, locally. The local people felt that as a leader, she should have understood that oppression was the root cause of all of these issues, and she should have properly addressed the underlying problems, not just attempted to cast blame. It later emerged that the [then-] State Counsellor’s administration had ordered the military to “crush” the local Rakhine fighters. Against this backdrop, she praised federal military forces for their efforts in the Rakhine State, while as far as I know she never said a word of sympathy toward the Rakhine refugees. When social media caught wind of all of the troubles in the Rakhine State, our compatriots blamed the Rakhines and the Arakan Army. Since then, there has been a broad feeling of bitterness toward the government and the people of mainland Myanmar. So I think it can be said that the NLD Government was partially to blame for our lacking sense of belonging in our country. 4) How did Rakhine people react to the 2020 elections and the NLD victory? On a whole, the Rakhine people felt the 2020 elections were unfair. Only the residents of four of the 17 towns in the Rakhine State were allowed to vote. While this policy was blamed on armed conflict, things were relatively calm in some of the towns where people were deprived of this right. Furthermore, there was relatively low voter interest in the region compared to the 2015 elections, probably due in part to the sluggish information flow caused by the internet shutdown, and campaign limitations caused by the pandemic. Not to mention the the 2015 elections did not instill confidence that our votes would matter. All that said, I wouldn’t say there was a particularly strong local reaction to the NLD’s 2020 victory in large part because of compromised access to information; between the internet blackout and limited access to news, many people in the Rakhine State didn’t even know so many towns were unable to vote. 5) How do the Rakhine people feel about the military coup? Generally speaking, for the Rakhine People, the military coup doesn’t represent significant change, because the oppression we faced under the NLD Government and the Military were effectively one and the same. To us, it feels like we’re under the same dictatorship, but that’s now being led by a different figure head. 6) Would you support the return to power of Aung San Su Kyi? To be honest, most Rakhines have no interest in the return to power of Aung San Su Kyi due to bitterness over her decision to side with the military during our conflict. In recent years, she has ignored oppression and injustice in our region, opting instead to work with the military. We do hope eventually that Myanmar will end up with a government that prioritizes fairness and equality for people of all ethnicities. 7) What is Arakan Army doing now? Has the regional conflict subsided? The Arakan Army has not faced combat in several months. From what I understand, our regional military leadership has become the de facto authority of the Rakhine State, and is focused for the time being on state-building exercises, related to everything from public health and combating drug abuse, to technology initiatives and so on. 8) What do you hope the future will hold for the Rakhine people? We don’t know what might happen in the future or how long this period of unrest will endure in Myanmar. The Burmese government in exile (National Unity Government; NUG) lacks both the de facto and de jure power to improve matters in the country. We all hope this will be the very last dictatorship our country will endure, and that ultimately, members of all ethnicities will one day be able to celebrate our achievements together. If the revolution is a success and a federalist government is formed, I am optimistic that matters will improve. Furthermore, I have faith that we will continue to seek our independence. 9) Do you think that Rakhine will declare independence? Locals believe that the independence of Arakan fully depends on the Arakan Army, which, as mentioned before, has gained de facto power in some parts of Rakhine, and is thus in control of local administrations, the judiciary and more. And they are acting quickly; in some provinces, they have already implemented their new policies. Of course we believe that if the army gains more and more power, they may consider a declaration of independence, building an independent nation. We hope that if this happens, this secession will take place under good terms with Myanmar. 10) How do you think Rakhine Independence would affect the Rakhine people, Myanmar and Southeast Asia as a whole? Of course there will be growing pains any time a territory secedes from a country it has been a part of for a long time. Of course we may suffer some difficulties because of how intertwined our systems of education, economics and more are with those of mainland Myanmar. But we believe these difficulties will be worth it. Furthermore, we have a lot to offer the the region; we have excellent industrial potential, and a wealth of natural resources, including natural gas, which will help us from an international commerce perspective..."
Source/publisher: JURIST
2021-09-24
Date of entry/update: 2021-09-25
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Rohingya communities in villages and displacement camps in Sittwe and Buthidaung townships in Rakhine State say they have been facing food shortages for more than three months. Displacement camps holding hundreds of thousands of Rohingya in the west of Sittwe have received no relief aid since June, Khaung Dokka camp manager U Maung Maung Tin told The Irrawaddy. “We have not received cash allowances for some three months. We are having real hardships. Some already have no money to buy rice and have sold what they have to survive. The situation is that bad,” he said. Hundreds of thousands of Rohingya have been sheltering in camps along the Sittwe coast since sectarian strife targeted the Muslim community in 2012. Some make a living fishing, farming and doing casual work while the majority rely on international aid. “We can hardly buy food. We can’t go out due to COVID-19 [restrictions] and we have no work. There have been petty crimes, like stealing food, committed by those who are starving. WFP [World Food Program] staff told us that they are not giving aid because of orders from their managers,” said a Rohingya from the Sae Thamar Gyi displacement camp in Sittwe. The WFP previously provided a monthly allowance of 15,000 kyats (US$9) per head for the camp, he said. Rohingya villages in Buthidaung Township on the Bangladesh border have received no relief aid for more than three months, said a Muslim villager from Hteik Hto Pauk in the township. “We have received no food supplies for three months. People are being forced to sell or pawn their belongings as they can’t go out to earn a living due to COVID-19. Every day, we long for supplies and call to ask when they will come,” said the villager. There are more than 50,000 Muslims in several villages in Buthidaung Township and the WFP used to provide them with monthly supplies of rice, oil and other basics. By THE IRRAWADDY 23 August 2021 Rohingya communities in villages and displacement camps in Sittwe and Buthidaung townships in Rakhine State say they have been facing food shortages for more than three months. Displacement camps holding hundreds of thousands of Rohingya in the west of Sittwe have received no relief aid since June, Khaung Dokka camp manager U Maung Maung Tin told The Irrawaddy. “We have not received cash allowances for some three months. We are having real hardships. Some already have no money to buy rice and have sold what they have to survive. The situation is that bad,” he said. A displaced Rohingya woman. Hundreds of thousands of Rohingya have been sheltering in camps along the Sittwe coast since sectarian strife targeted the Muslim community in 2012. Some make a living fishing, farming and doing casual work while the majority rely on international aid. “We can hardly buy food. We can’t go out due to COVID-19 [restrictions] and we have no work. There have been petty crimes, like stealing food, committed by those who are starving. WFP [World Food Program] staff told us that they are not giving aid because of orders from their managers,” said a Rohingya from the Sae Thamar Gyi displacement camp in Sittwe. The WFP previously provided a monthly allowance of 15,000 kyats (US$9) per head for the camp, he said. Rohingya villages in Buthidaung Township on the Bangladesh border have received no relief aid for more than three months, said a Muslim villager from Hteik Hto Pauk in the township. A displaced Rohingya woman. “We have received no food supplies for three months. People are being forced to sell or pawn their belongings as they can’t go out to earn a living due to COVID-19. Every day, we long for supplies and call to ask when they will come,” said the villager. There are more than 50,000 Muslims in several villages in Buthidaung Township and the WFP used to provide them with monthly supplies of rice, oil and other basics. International non-governmental organizations are in talks with Rakhine State’s military authorities to provide relief supplies to Rohingya villages and displacement camps..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2021-08-23
Date of entry/update: 2021-08-23
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Authorities in Myanmar currently have no plan to include minority Rohingya Muslims living in densely-packed camps as they begin vaccinating priority groups against COVID-19 in western Rakhine State, the junta-appointed local administrator said. Hundreds of thousands of Rohingya fled to Bangladesh during military operations in 2017 and those who remain complain of discrimination and mistreatment in a country that does not recognise them as citizens. Local administrator Kyaw Lwin told Reuters from Sittwe township that the rollout had begun there with 10,000 vaccinations for priority groups such as the elderly, healthcare workers, government staff and Buddhist monks. There were no current plans for vaccinating any of the Muslims living in camps in Sittwe, he said. "We are only following orders," he said, declining to comment on whether the plan amounted to discrimination against the Rohingya, who say they can trace local roots back centuries. "It all depends on how many vaccines we receive and the instructions we get. So far we haven't received any instructions regarding that," Kyaw Lin said. Spokespeople for Myanmar's health ministry and the military authorities did not answer calls seeking comment on the vaccination plans. Myanmar's coronavirus response almost collapsed after a Feb. 1 coup as many health workers stopped work in protest, but the army is now trying to step up vaccinations as Myanmar faces its worst spike in infections. An average of nearly 300 people a day have died in recent days, according to official figures that medics believe are significant underestimates. CAMPS AFFECTED The densely packed shacks and muddy narrow alleys where Rohingya live behind barbed wire to separate them from the Buddhist majority in Sittwe have also been hit by the coronavirus, residents say. From the Thet Kal Pyin camp, Nu Maung, 51, told Reuters authorities had collected names for possible vaccinations if shots become available for those who are over 60, but there was no sign of that happening. He himself had suffered COVID symptoms, but he was unable to get to the hospital for tests, he said. "Many people are sick. A lot. A few people died, mostly older people," he said. Authorities have not given figures for infections in the camps. At two other camps near Sittwe, Phwe Yar Gone and Thet Kal Pyin, residents said the authorities had not sent anyone to prepare the ground for potential vaccinations. Fortify Rights group human rights specialist Zaw Win said it was shocking but unsurprising that Rohingya would not be a priority for vaccination. "Rohingya have long faced extreme restrictions on their rights and in their everyday lives, including the right to health," he told Reuters. "Rohingya we are speaking to in Northern Rakhine have expressed fear and distrust of the state medical system and what might happen to them if they try to go to hospital with COVID-19 symptoms." An estimated 140,000 displaced Rohingya live in Rakhine state. The vast majority of them are confined to camps, with those in or around Sittwe housing more than 100,000 people. Up to half a milllion more Rohingya remain in villages elsewhere in Rakhine. Rohingya residents of Maungdaw and Buthidaung, north of Sittwe, said some Rohingya villagers had been vaccinated, but that supplies had now run out. At least 700,000 Rohingya fled Rakhine for Bangladesh in 2017 during operations by the army under the command of Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, who is now prime minister and head of Myanmar's junta. U.N. investigators said the operations were carried out with "genocidal intent" but the army denied that and said they were aimed at countering terrorists. Vaccinations started this week in the camps in Bangladesh that house more than one million Rohingya refugees..."
Source/publisher: "Reuters" (UK)
2021-08-11
Date of entry/update: 2021-08-11
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Burma Campaign UK has now received reports that almost all the Arakan Army soldiers withdrew from Let Ma village on the afternoon of 2nd August, and that detained villagers have been released. Villagers were apparently forced by members of the Arakan Army to sign documents and be filmed stating that no human rights violations had taken place. We have also been informed that two villagers were abducted by the Arakan Army when they left. We call on the Arakan Army to immediately release the two villagers and to commit to ending all abductions and hostage taking of civilians. —————————————————————————————— Burma Campaign UK is alarmed by reports we are receiving from several sources that the Arakan Army has occupied and laid siege to Let Ma (Letma) Village, Minbya Township, Rakhine State. Burma Campaign UK is still attempting to clarify all details, but the risk to life appears so serious we believe it is vital to draw attention to this crisis now. According to information received by Burma Campaign UK, up to 300 Arakan Army soldiers began the occupation on 24th July. The Arakan Army had ordered villagers to provide meat, cow skins and 15,000 Kyat, which they describe as a tax. Some villagers refused as they also have to pay taxes to military controlled local government authorities. The family and relatives of 12 villagers who refused were illegally detained and kept imprisoned in a Mosque without food. A month old baby separated from her mother is reportedly unconscious. We are also receiving information that the occupying soldiers are stealing livestock from villagers. Lt. Colonel Zaw Min Htun and Major Khaing Kyaw are understood to be commanding the Arakan Army soldiers. Following some individuals posting about the siege on social media, Twan Mrat Naing, Commander-in-Chief of the Arakan Army, posted an apparent threat on his Twitter account today, stating: “We promote ethnic diversity and religious tolerance but can’t afford to provide safe haven and breeding ground for the terrorists and criminal gangs. Be aware that you are just about to turn your best friend into enemy by using your best tool of disinformation.” The link to the tweet is available here. We call on the Arakan Army to immediately withdraw from the village and to ensure there is no further loss of life and that no further human rights violations are committed..."
Source/publisher: "Burma Campaign UK" (London)
2021-08-02
Date of entry/update: 2021-08-04
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Sub-title: The National Unity Government’s plan to end discrimination against the Rohingya and replace the 1982 Citizenship Law could face opposition from among its own supporters – if the parallel government gets the chance to implement it.
Description: "In early June, the National Unity Government, a parallel administration set up by lawmakers elected last November, issued a new policy on the Rohingya promising to end human rights abuses against them and grant them citizenship. Discrimination and violence against the largely stateless Muslim minority have been a source of controversy within Myanmar and abroad for decades, and the NUG’s position is already proving divisive. The United Nations welcomed the change in policy, as have Rohingya leaders. However, some also question whether the NUG can even implement what it has proposed when it is still struggling to be recognised and function as Myanmar’s government. Due to the military coup, many people who in the past have stridently opposed recognising the Rohingya have remained quiet about the policy. Although some NUG supporters welcomed the new stance, most still seem unwilling to accept extending citizenship rights. Meanwhile, locals in Rakhine State were said to be unhappy they had not been consulted and questioned the NUG’s authority for issuing the policy.....Cautious support for the new policy: Many countries, including the United States, condemned the military coup on February 1 and expressed support for anti-coup protestors and the NUG. Despite this support, NUG representatives engaging with the international community and seeking support have faced tough questions about its position on the Rohingya. At a May 4 hearing held by the United States House of Representatives’ Foreign Affairs Committee, Myanmar’s permanent representative to the United Nations, U Kyaw Moe Tun, was questioned about the lack of Rohingya representation within the NUG and its position on granting citizenship. Representative Ted Lieu of California sent a clear message: “I cannot support the NUG and will oppose efforts for the United States to support your National Unity Government until you commit to having at least a representative of the Rohingya people and you commit to stopping the genocide.” On June 3, the NUG released its new policy, which commits to ending human rights abuses against the Rohingya and promises to grant them equal citizenship rights. In just one of the many striking departures from National League for Democracy policy, the statement used the term “Rohingya”. The NLD government had usually called them “Muslims living in Rakhine”, but after Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army attacks on police and military posts in August 2017 it even referred sometimes to “extremist Bengali terrorists”. The policy says the Rohingya should have the right to citizenship and should enjoy the same rights as other citizens in accordance with human rights law and in line with the principles of federal democracy. The NUG also promised that once a new constitution is drafted it would repeal laws used to repress the Rohingya, including the 1982 Citizenship Law, which discriminates against the Rohingya and other ethnic groups deemed non-indigenous. It also said it would abolish the National Verification Card process – the current pathway to citizenship for the Rohingya, but one that they have largely rejected. “This new Citizenship Act must base citizenship on birth in Myanmar or birth anywhere as a child of Myanmar citizens,” the policy states..."
Source/publisher: "Frontier Myanmar" (Myanmar)
2021-07-15
Date of entry/update: 2021-07-15
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Description: "July 5, 2021, Myanmar: Justice For Myanmar calls for an immediate suspension of the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project in response to recent Indian announcements regarding the Sittwe Port. On July 4, 2021, the Hindu Business Line reported that the Indian government awarded Bharat Freight Group subsidiary A to Z EXIM Private Limited a contract to operate and develop the Sittwe Port. This follows a tender for the dredging of Sittwe port and the Kaladan River, in which publicly-listed company Knowledge Marine and Engineering Works Limited (KMEW) is the sole remaining bidder. Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: "We condemn the Indian government for continuing business as usual following Myanmar's brutal and illegal attempted coup. India's Kaladan project has exacerbated conflict and threatens ethnic communities. Speeding ahead with the project now under the military junta is reckless and will put local lives at risk. We call for the project to be immediately suspended until there is democracy with the military fully under civilian control. We call on Indian companies, including Bharat Freight and KMEW, to immediately end their complicity with the Myanmar junta through their involvement in the Kaladan project." The Kaladan project was formalised in 2008 under the previous military dictatorship and is designed to provide an alternative maritime trade route for landlocked northeast Indian states. It involves a cross-border road, an inland water terminal in Paletwa and a seaport in Sittwe, areas where the Myanmar military has committed genocide, and continues to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity. A 2013 civil society report criticised the project for a lack of consultation, lack of transparency, land confiscation, environmental destruction and risks to cultural heritage..."
Source/publisher: Justice For Myanmar
2021-07-05
Date of entry/update: 2021-07-06
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Description: "Wherever they are and wherever they go, Rohingya children in south and southeast Asia face discrimination, exclusion, and denial of their most basic rights. For most of these children, these challenges begin in Myanmar, where the Rohingya community has suffered decades of state-sponsored persecution and violence. However, even after Rohingya families have left Myanmar – often in search of safety or a better life for themselves and their families – Rohingya continue to experience unequal treatment and denial of their rights, which over time has exposed them, their children, and their children’s children to ever-widening cycles of deprivation and marginalisation. This report examines the situation of Rohingya children in five countries in southeast and south Asia: Myanmar, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia. As places of origin, transit, and/or destination, these countries are home – either permanently or temporarily – to hundreds of thousands of Rohingya children. All countries are required under international law to respect, protect, and fulfil these children’s human rights. Yet too often these rights are denied. Based on in-depth desk research, key informant interviews, and analysis of national laws, the report examines three areas affecting Rohingya children’s lives and enjoyment of their rights: legal status and access to identity documentation; access to education; and risks to security and wellbeing, in addition to other child protection concerns. While not intended as a comprehensive examination of the situation, the report seeks to provide a snapshot of the challenges – in law, policy, and practice – that prevent Rohingya children in these countries from living their lives in safety and with dignity, equality, and respect for their rights.....LIFE ON THE MARGINS:Based on publicly available information and estimates by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and other credible sources, there are close to 700,000 Rohingya children in the five countries covered by this report. Rohingya boys and girls live lives on the margins of society across the region. Most lack any formal legal status – deprived of the right to a nationality in Myanmar and effectively rendered stateless as a result. Most Rohingya children inherit their de facto statelessness from their parents and – when they grow up – go on to pass it on to their children, perpetuating cycles of exclusion and marginalisation. Rohingya children also often struggle to access birth registration, which means they often have often no official record that they even exist. Failure to provide children with birth certificates exposes them to a range of age-related abuse and exploitation and can prevent them from exercising other rights and receiving legal recognition and protection as children. Across the region, Rohingya children struggle to access comprehensive, quality education. The reasons for this are varied and wide-ranging. In some countries, discriminatory policies prohibit Rohingya children from accessing formal education, while in others, policies which on paper should facilitate access to education are not enforced or fully implemented. In several countries where access to formal education is restricted, United Nations (UN) agencies, NGOs and Rohingya community groups have stepped into provide informal education; however, quality varies and lack of resources – including adequate funding, facilities and teaching staff – poses significant challenges. While primary-level education is generally more available, lack of schools and limited financial resources mean that secondary level students often struggle to continue their studies. Even when they do, education is often not accredited, which means that children leave school with no officially recognised qualification. Adolescent girls experience greater difficulties going to school as cultural attitudes deprioritise girls’ education and they face greater threats to their physical safety when traveling long distances to the nearest school. As a result, girls are much more likely to drop out of school, placing them at greater risk of early marriage and adolescent pregnancy. Without education, children grow up with limited opportunities to build a better life for themselves, and this can have devastating impacts on their emotional and psychological well-being. It also seriously limits their ability to earn an income, often condemning them to a life of poverty..."
Source/publisher: Save the Children (London)
2021-06-22
Date of entry/update: 2021-06-22
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "On 3 June 2021 the National Unity Government (NUG) of Myanmar issued its “Policy Position on the Rohingya in the Rakhine State.” In response, the Arakan Rohingya National Organisation (ARNO) with the Rohingya people cautiously welcomed this development. The announcement was a step in the right direction towards a credible solution for the Rohingya community of Myanmar. This process would need to be inclusive from the onset. In this regard, we encourage further direct engagement between the NUG and Rohingya representatives, and as such ARNO and our partners stand ready to play our part in what needs to be an inclusive process of engagement with Rohingya representatives. Against this background, we wished to emphasise the following in response to the policy position: We welcome the NUG’s clear acknowledgment of the violence and gross human rights violations inflicted upon Rohingyas, including the massive displacement inflicted on our people, with hundreds of thousands fleeing their homes in Rakhine State in the last decade. The brutality and crimes of the Tatmadaw against all civilians now in Burma is a sad reality the Rohingya people have experienced for many years. The NUG’s expression of sorrow and sympathy to the plight of the Rohingya helps to bring about genuine reconciliation. In parallel we welcome the NUG’s commitments to actively seek justice and accountability for all crimes committed by the military against the Rohingya and all other people of Myanmar. Such accountability process needs to be comprehensive and look beyond just the period of since 1 February. In this regard, we are encouraged by the NUG’s commitments towards reparation and justice in the future Federal Democratic Union Constitution. The cornerstone of the legitimate rights and demands of the Rohingya centre on our recognition as citizens of Myanmar. The NUG’s position towards repealing the 1982 Citizenship Law is critical in this regard, including the abolishment of National Verification Cards, and replacing it with a just and inclusive legislative process that recognises the legitimate rights of the Rohingya as citizens of Myanmar. Finally, we fully endorse the NUG’s position on the voluntary, safe, and dignified repatriation of Rohingya people who fled to neighbouring countries from Rakhine State due to the military’s brutality. It is critical for there to be a credible policy and plan in place by the NUG in addressing the refugee needs of the Rohingya and of all Burmese people who have been forced into refuge at the hands of the Tatmadaw. Underpinning the above is the need for genuine engagement and inclusion of Rohingya representatives. Such approach would ensure a just and durable solution for a future democratic Myanmar that we all seek. In particular we seek through this inclusion to urge the NUG to: Intensify the focus and preparations for a comprehensive accountability process. This requires the NUG to initiate a process that grants the International Criminal Court jurisdiction over crimes committed within Myanmar against the Rohingyas and other communities. To support credible accountability efforts, it is important that NUG acknowledges all past crimes against Rohingyas to ensure victims see justice served and the cycle of violence is not repeated. Accept the findings and recommendations of the UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar (IIFFMM). This includes an unequivocal acknowledgment that genocide and crimes against humanity have been committed against the Rohingya, as stated by the UN Fact-Finding Mission. Commit to a comprehensive and durable solution to safeguarding the universal rights of the Rohingya as indigenous to Arakan/Rakhine State and therefore to Myanmar. Indeed, the Rohingya are entitled to rights and privileges on a par with other ethnicities of Myanmar. Our inherent rights and ethnic identity should be safeguarded in a future Myanmar, including through the Federal Charter, new constitutional process and vision set out by the NUG. We recognise addressing these issues are complex and securing the fair and just solution would not occur overnight. We stand ready to work with our NUG partners along this process, and remain committed to joining hands with NUG and others in the Spring Revolution against the military dictatorship in all possible ways, and bring about a free, fair and democratic future Myanmar.
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Source/publisher: Arakan Rohingya National Organisation
2021-06-20
Date of entry/update: 2021-06-21
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "A 12-year-old boy in ragged clothing shoulders a child, his younger sister of 3 years, as they walk mile after mile, escaping their home, because their father was shot dead on the spot and their mother was raped in front of them and killed thereafter. They are fleeing with many others who have similar experiences. Some of them lost their parents, or brothers and sisters while others saw their entire families burn alive. Two pregnant women walk for miles with inexplicable hardship, but try their best to keep their babies inside alive. The group finally enters Bangladesh after walking one day and seven hours, crossing lands and hills, and riding by boat. Like this group, more than half a million Rohingyas have fled persecution in Myanmar to Bangladesh since the military crackdown started on August 25, 2017. Following an alleged attack on 30 police camps and one military base by the radical Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), Myanmar security forces indiscriminately fired on Rohingya civilians, burnt their houses down, raped girls and women, and killed hundreds of Rohingyas mercilessly. The intensity of atrocity was so extreme that the global community, including the United Nations, the European Union, human rights groups like International Organization of Migration (IOM), Amnesty International, and the Human Rights Watch, came forward to stand beside Rohingyas and condemn Myanmar for its deadly violence, severe brutality, and crimes against humanity. The United Nations Human Rights Council termed it as a "textbook example of ethnic cleansing" and major international media outlets like the New York Times, ABC News, and CNN have called it genocide. Many agencies working in the borderland of Bangladesh and Myanmar to support Rohingyas, particularly wounded ones, old people, children, and pregnant women, have said that this is one of the most devastating humanitarian catastrophes in the history of refugee crises. Myanmar's de facto leader, and also a Nobel laureate in peace, Aung San Suu Ki, has also been accused by the international community of supporting the genocide committed by the Myanmar security forces. The reason the Rohingyas, often called “the most persecuted people in the world," have been repressed and afflicted for decades is because of their identity as an ethno-linguistic and religious minority within the state structure of Myanmar. Additionally, a growing anti-Muslim Buddhist sentiment instigated by Ashin Wirathu, a Buddhist monk named by TIME “Burmese Bin-Laden,” has contributed to the current critical condition unsuitable for Rohingya Muslims’ peaceful living in Rakhine state. The citizenship of Rohingya people was taken away by the Myanmar Citizenship Law of 1982, which conferred citizenship to 135 nationals, excluding Rohingyas, even though they have been residents of Arakan, what is now called Rakhine state, since the eighth century. Following the independence of Burma, now Myanmar, in 1948, the Rohingyas were close to gaining state recognition, but after General Ne Win took power in 1962, the military regime started and this hope was lost. During this period of time, the Rohingyas underwent a brutal experience of human rights violations, atrocities, and a severe degree of oppression in their everyday experiences. Their lives were restricted, freedom of movement was cut off, education was halted, and even marriage became subject to military approval. Following the Citizenship Law of 1982, the Rohingyas started living in an “open jail” as they were confined to their villages. In 1978, a severe military crackdown took place in Arakan state that triggered a massive influx of 200,000 Rohingyas to Bangladesh. The second influx occurred in 1991 when around 250,000 Rohingyas took refuge in Bangladesh. Following an effective international pressure, under an agreement between Bangladesh and Myanmar, almost all in 1978 and some 236,000 Rohingyas in 1992 were repatriated, but a large number of them returned to Bangladesh because the situation of the Rakhine state remained unchanged. A big riot of Rakhine Buddhists supported by state agencies and Rohingya Muslims took place in June 2012, forcing around 120,000 Rohingyas to flee to Bangladesh. In October 2016, 87,000 Rohingyas left Myanmar to escape deadly military operation. However, 2017 has witnessed even more extreme atrocities committed by the Myanmar security force, compelling around 600,000 Rohingyas to flee and take refuge in Bangladesh. Of the 600,000, 50 percent are children, 30 percent are women (85 thousand are pregnant), 15 percent are old, and the remaining 5 percent are youth. Many reports and Rohingyas' narratives have confirmed that thousands of Rohingya youths were killed in Rakhine state by the security forces. Now, the majority of Rohingyas live in Bangladesh (1,100,000 [combined with previously living 500,000 and newly arrived 600,000]), 800,000 live in Myanmar, and the remaining 700,000 live in other countries (India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates). Due to their miserable lives and inhuman state of livings, the Rohingyas have become an ideal example of how people lead their lives in the presence of "everyday death." Many attempts are being made to resolve the Rohingya crisis, but nobody knows when, and how, Rohingya people will gain a peaceful life with due human dignity..."
Source/publisher: Berkley Center for Religion, Peace & World Affairs
2017-10-25
Date of entry/update: 2021-06-19
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Bangladesh Provided Myanmar Information that Refugee Agency Collected
Description: "The United Nations refugee agency improperly collected and shared personal information from ethnic Rohingya refugees with Bangladesh, which shared it with Myanmar to verify people for possible repatriation, Human Rights Watch said today. The agency did not conduct a full data impact assessment, as its policies require, and in some cases failed to obtain refugees’ informed consent to share their data with Myanmar, the country they had fled. Since 2018 the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has registered hundreds of thousands of Rohingya refugees in Bangladeshi camps and the Bangladesh government has issued them identity cards, which are needed for essential aid and services. Bangladesh then used the information, including analog photographs, thumbprint images, and other biographic data to submit refugee details to the Myanmar government for possible repatriation. “The UN refugee agency’s data collection practices with Rohingya in Bangladesh were contrary to the agency’s own policies and exposed refugees to further risk,” said Lama Fakih, crisis and conflict director at Human Rights Watch. “UNHCR should only allow data that it collects to be shared with countries of origin when it has properly obtained free and informed consent from participants.” Since 2016, over 800,000 Rohingya from Myanmar were expelled or fled crimes against humanity and acts of genocide across the border to Bangladesh. The Myanmar government continues to carry out the crimes against humanity of apartheid and persecution against the remaining Rohingya population. From September 2020 to March 2021, Human Rights Watch interviewed 24 Rohingya refugees about their registration experiences with UNHCR in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh and spoke to 20 aid workers, analysts, local activists, journalists, and lawyers who observed or participated in the Rohingya registration. Human Rights Watch sent detailed questions and its research findings to UNHCR in February and April, and received responses from UNHCR on May 10. UNHCR denied any wrongdoing or policy violations, stating that it had explained all purposes of the data gathering exercise and obtained consent. The agency said that its data collection efforts were aimed at finding durable solutions for the refugees and that no Rohingya were put at risk. In 2018, the Bangladesh government sought to supplement previous registrations by beginning a joint registration exercise with UNHCR. The government aimed to provide an identity card for refugees – called a “Smart Card” – that allows them to obtain aid and services. The government also sought to gather personal data collected by UNHCR to submit to Myanmar for repatriation eligibility assessments. UNHCR said this would help protect the refugees’ right of return. In a January meeting with Human Rights Watch, UNHCR said that field officers had asked Rohingya for permission to share their data for repatriation eligibility assessments, explaining that a Smart Card would still be issued to those who did not agree. However, at the time of the registration exercise, UNHCR staff said publicly that the data was not linked to repatriations, including on a September 2018 Rohingya community radio show, and in November 2018 comments to international media. Rohingya refugees had in fact staged protests in the camps that month partly out of concern that data collection would be used to facilitate forced returns. The refugees Human Rights Watch interviewed also gave a different account than UNHCR staff had outlined in the January meeting. All but one of the 24 said that UNHCR staff told them that they had to register to get the Smart Cards to access aid, and they did not mention anything about sharing data with Myanmar, or linking it to repatriation eligibility assessments. Three said they were told after giving their data that it might be used for repatriation purposes. One said he noticed after leaving the registration center that the box to share data with Myanmar, on a receipt printed out and given to refugees only in English, had been checked “yes,” although he was never asked. He was one of only three among the refugees interviewed who could read English. Human Rights Watch viewed the English-only receipt that UNHCR gave to Rohingya refugees after their registration. It includes a box noting “yes” or “no” as to whether the information can be shared with the Myanmar government. Human Rights Watch interviewed 21 refugees whose names were included in the list verified by Myanmar for repatriation. Twelve of the 21 people were added to repatriation eligibility assessment lists in 2019 – lists drawn up based on the data collected by UNHCR. The 21 said that after being registered they later learned that their information had been shared with Myanmar and their names were on lists of people verified for return. They all went into hiding in other camps because they feared being forcibly returned. So far, Bangladesh has not forced any Rohingya in the camps to return against their will to Myanmar. One of the 24 refugees interviewed said that the UNHCR field officer registering him asked if he consented to have his data shared with the Myanmar government. He said he felt pressure not to refuse: “I could not say no because I needed the Smart Card and I did not think that I could say no to the data-sharing question and still get the card.” UNHCR in this case did not seek free and informed consent, which would have required making certain that the refugees knew and understood the risks of sharing their and their family’s data with Myanmar, that they had the ability to opt-out without prejudice, and that they could get the Smart Card even if they did not agree. UNHCR staff told Human Rights Watch that they did not discuss any specific risks with Rohingya before registering them, and the Rohingya interviewed said they were not told about any such risks. Between 2018 and 2021, the Bangladesh government submitted at least 830,000 names of Rohingya refugees to Myanmar along with biometric and other data for each person, for repatriation eligibility assessments. Myanmar reportedly agreed to allow about 42,000 Rohingya to return. UNHCR told Human Rights Watch that it played no role in drawing up these lists but that the names and other data included in the lists submitted from 2019 onwards, including biometrics, came from analog versions of the data it had gathered during the joint registration exercise, for example, non-digital thumbprint images. In its global guidelines on sharing information on individual cases, UNHCR acknowledges the risks of sharing such information and says that “UNHCR should not share any [individual case] information with the authorities of the country of origin.” In the Myanmar context, risks include involuntary Rohingya returns to Myanmar, particularly given Bangladesh’s forced repatriation of Rohingya to Myanmar in the 1970s and 1990s. In those cases, UNHCR tacitly condoned Bangladesh’s coerced returns. Bangladesh’s submission of lists to Myanmar may also have put refugees, or at least the subset that Myanmar agreed to return, on track to receive Myanmar’s National Verification Cards (NVCs), which many Rohingya reject because they believe it undermines their claims to Myanmar citizenship. The UNHCR-Bangladesh exercise appears to have violated the agency’s policy on protecting personal data that it collects, which requires UNHCR to tell people in a language and manner they understand why it is collecting their data and whether it will be transferred to another entity. It also appears to have undermined the objective of UNHCR’s policies that aim to ensure that consent is not coerced. UNHCR’s Handbook on Voluntary Repatriation says that the agency should never directly link registration or other verification exercises with registration for voluntary repatriations because “[l]inking the two may create confusion for the refugees by giving the impression that one needs to register for voluntary repatriation in order to be entitled to assistance in the country of asylum. This may seriously jeopardize voluntariness.” Linking the eligibility assessment and registration for services did create confusion, Human Rights Watch said. Nearly all of the refugees interviewed did not understand that their data would be shared with the Myanmar government. In the one case in which the refugee was told that it would be, he said he felt he could not refuse consent without jeopardizing his access to services. UNHCR should have recognized that Bangladesh sharing data with Myanmar raised serious protection concerns. “[T]he idea of sharing data with Myanmar, or allowing data to be shared with Myanmar, on this community should have been out of the question until there were minimum guarantees in place – which there aren’t,” said an aid worker familiar with the process in Bangladesh. Finally, UNHCR has a policy requiring a data protection impact assessment before it enters into data transfer arrangements like the one in Bangladesh. However, staff said they did not carry out a “full-fledged” impact assessment, only undertaking several risk assessments prior to signing the data-sharing agreement with Bangladesh. The apparent failure to take into account the history of forced returns from Bangladesh to Myanmar, in those assessments, is important. UNHCR should not combine collecting people’s data for services or identity cards with data collection for repatriation eligibility, Human Rights Watch said. UNHCR should ensure that people who agree to have their data shared are able to withdraw that consent and know how to do so. The agency should only share data or allow data that it collects to be shared with countries of origin when it has taken all efforts to obtain free and informed consent. “Humanitarian agencies obviously need to collect and share some data so they can provide refugees with protection, services, and assist with safe, dignified, and voluntary returns,” Fakih said. “But a refugee has the right to control their data, who has access to it, and for what purposes, and UNHCR and other agencies should be accountable to those whose data they hold.” Purpose of the UNHCR-Bangladesh Registration Exercise In 2017, the Bangladesh government conducted its own registration of Rohingya refugees by collecting personal data, including biometrics, and collaborated with UNHCR through its Refugee Relief and Repatriation Commission to conduct a family counting exercise. In 2018, the government asked UNHCR to participate in a joint exercise to link the registration data that it had collected and the data collected by UNHCR in collaboration with the Refugee Relief and Repatriation Commission. UNHCR signed a data-sharing agreement with Bangladesh in January 2018. Following Myanmar and Bangladesh’s November 2017 repatriation agreement (the Arrangement on Return of Displaced Persons from Rakhine State), which required Bangladesh to conduct a “pre-verification” exercise to vet refugees before Myanmar would carry out its own assessment of return eligibility, Bangladesh and Myanmar also entered into an agreement outlining the verification and repatriation process, including collecting and sharing refugee data. The agreement stated that “[r]elevant information or data generated by, and available with, relevant UN agencies may be used for reference, as and when necessary … Bangladesh may provide verified lists of returnees from Bangladesh to the UNHCR Representatives for ascertaining voluntariness from prospective returnee families.” The annexed verification form requested extensive identifying data. UNHCR’s independent evaluation of its emergency response, published in December 2018, noted that for the lists Bangladesh would need to prepare for Myanmar, authorities would “require a level of detail about place of origin, family composition and so on” that the government had not obtained in its initial registration. UNHCR’s independent evaluation found that the agency saw the joint registration exercise as an opening to assist the “durable documentation” of Rohingya for potential returns. In its May 2021 written response to Human Rights Watch, UNHCR said that this unique verification process stems from the discriminatory nationality restrictions that Rohingya face, because most now lack official documentation proving they are from Myanmar. UNHCR officials said that as part of the joint registration exercise, field officers asked Rohingya two questions: first, whether they consented to have their data shared with partners for assistance in Bangladesh and, second, whether they consented to have their data shared with Myanmar to assess repatriation eligibility. They said the agency began the registration exercise in June 2018, collecting “a significant amount of information about the family, place of origin and relatives overseas,” and fingerprints, iris scans, photographs, and shared much of that data with the Bangladesh government. Following the joint exercise, Bangladesh issued refugees over age 12 identity cards known as Smart Cards, which are linked to their biometric data. UNHCR officials said that they advocated successfully to include the phrase “Forcibly Displaced Myanmar National/Person of Concern to UNHCR” on the cards, as well as a written commitment that the card bearer should be protected from being forcibly returned. The cards gave Rohingya valid identification and allowed them access to food, aid, health care, and other essential services. During the registration exercise, some Rohingya raised concerns that the data would be used to facilitate repatriations and be integrated into the Myanmar National Verification Cards (NVC) system – an inherently discriminatory process that identifies Rohingya as non-citizens. A visit to the Bangladesh camps in early 2018 by Myanmar’s social welfare minister, Dr. Win Myat Aye, stoked those fears. He said during the visit that NVC cards would help to verify the identity of refugees returning to Myanmar. Some Rohingya held protests against the registration exercise in late 2018, which in a few cases the camp authorities met with violence. A 2020 study by the Engine Room, an international organization working with data and technology to encourage social change, said a number of refugees spoke of fears around data sharing with Myanmar, telling them, “We are still having doubts about one matter ... they assured us that they won’t share our biodata with the [government of Myanmar], but what if they cheat us and share this data … [and] send us back to [Myanmar]?” In response to refugee concerns, UNHCR officials made confusing public statements about the purpose of the data collection exercise. For example, in November 2018, after protesters complained that Myanmar would access the data, a UNHCR official told Reuters that the data was being collected for a verification process that would help Rohingya refugees get better protection and ensure their access to services in Bangladesh and was “not linked to repatriation.” In its May 10, 2021 response to Human Rights Watch, UNHCR said that Reuters had selectively excerpted this statement without providing more context and that UNHCR staff consistently said that Bangladesh may share data with Myanmar to verify eligibility for returns, and this would not be linked to any “actual return movement.” In September 2018, a UNHCR assistant registration officer had addressed the issue on a Rohingya community radio show, Bala-Bura: There isn’t any association between the Smart Card and the repatriation to Myanmar. Repatriation is based on your own willingness and it doesn’t look like it could actually happen right now. It could only happen when there is peace in your country, when you get your rights back, when you get your house, land and properties returned, when you get the freedom of movement—these are the criteria for voluntary [returns]. And this [Smart Card] is to live in Bangladesh, to stay safely in Bangladesh, to get assistance- this card is being given to ensure all of that. There is not any association with the repatriation to Myanmar. When you receive that identity card or the “Smart Card,” the first advantage you will get is that you can stay peacefully and safely in Bangladesh. At the same time, the official said that Bangladesh would share some limited information on who people were and what village they came from with Myanmar but did not explain that this would be linked to repatriation eligibility assessments, nor that it would include additional data including photographs or thumbprint images. In a January 2019 operational update, UNHCR said the exercise was intended to ensure that refugees had identity documents and could use those documents to get services, and “contribute to ensuring a refugee’s right to return.” The statements from UNHCR officials contributed to refugees incorrectly believing that the data UNHCR collected was not going to contribute to anything related to potential returns. As one aid worker, who at the time was attending meetings between Rohingya leaders and UNHCR on this issue put it, “UNHCR kept saying to them [Rohingya leaders] the memorandum of understanding it signed with Myanmar had nothing to do with repatriations and nor did the joint registration exercise. It was basically ignoring the Rohingya and their concerns that there was a link.” Free and Informed Consent UNHCR predicates its assistance and protection on free and informed consent by beneficiaries. A 2020 UNHCR guide for making refugee status determinations, for example, states that UNHCR should inform an individual of: the extent of the information to be disclosed, the recipient of the information, the purpose of the disclosure and the likely use of the information. Consent must be sought each time the information is to be disclosed to a different third party or used for purposes which the Applicant was not informed about and would not have reasonably expected at the time of the initial consent. In addition, to be valid: consent must be informed, that is consent must be based upon a clear appreciation and understanding of the facts, implications and consequences, which obliges UNHCR to inform the person of the purpose(s) of data collection, and how the data is, or is likely to be, used. Consent must also be freely given, meaning that the individual must have a genuine choice and be able to refuse or withdraw consent without adverse consequences. While UNHCR policy allows for processing data without consent under some circumstances, including emergency situations, this should not override the need for consent or appropriate alternatives during registration exercises so as to not expose individuals or groups to harm, or otherwise jeopardize their protection. UNHCR staff told Human Rights Watch in 2021 that when registering Rohingya for the joint registration exercise in 2018, field staff asked refugees whether they consented to have their data shared with Myanmar to assess their repatriation eligibility. They said that Rohingya could have registered for the Smart Card even if they did not want their data shared with Myanmar. They contended that the vast majority of refugees consented but did not say how many refused. The Rohingya interviewed by Human Rights Watch disputed these claims. Human Rights Watch believes that combining registration required for services with consent to a repatriation eligibility assessment is contrary to the principle of free consent. Rohingya refugees require a Smart Card to get all services in the refugee camps. UNHCR’s policies provide that the agency should never directly link registration or other verification exercises with registration for voluntary repatriations. UNHCR disputed the relevance of this principle by arguing it applies to registration for voluntary repatriation, not sharing names to assess eligibility for return. But the aim of the policy – to ensure that consent is not coerced – should also apply in the registration exercise that UNHCR conducted with Bangladesh, Human Rights Watch said. Human Rights Watch found that UNHCR gave refugees mixed messages about how their data would be used and did not provide enough information for people to understand when, how, and for what purposes their information would be shared with the Myanmar government. UNHCR said that when communicating with refugees and media about the registration exercise, UNHCR staff members consistently noted the possibility that the government of Bangladesh may share the data with the government of Myanmar for the purpose of verifying their eligibility for return, but this would not be linked to any actual returns. In February, a UNHCR official said the question about sharing data for eligibility assessments during the joint registration exercise was a “tick box” on a consent form that each refugee signed. She claimed the agency “always asked this question and the refugees understood what we meant very quickly.” This is contrary to the experience of 23 of the 24 Rohingya refugees interviewed, who said that they believed at the time that the data collection was only to get the Smart Card and access to services, and a counting exercise. They said they did not sign a form, but instead gave their data in their own language to a field officer typing into a computer, and received a printed English language-only receipt with that data at the end of the interview. One Rohingya man who shared with Human Rights Watch the English language receipt said he was shocked to see that his data could be shared with Myanmar: When I got to the [registration] center no one there told me why they were collecting my data, it was assumed that I knew like everyone that it was in order to receive services and for a counting exercise. After they took my data, they printed out a receipt. I walked back to my tent, and then I looked at the paper, and noticed that on the top there was a tick box that the person at the center had marked as “yes” without ever asking me, that my data would be shared with Myanmar. I was so angry when I saw that, but I had already given my data, and I needed services, so I didn’t know what I could do about it. And I am one of the few people who probably even realized that. Most Rohingya do not read English. But why did they do that? Why don’t they ask the person in front of them instead of just clicking and maybe even causing us harm by doing that? The man said that before his data was collected, a senior UNHCR official told a community meeting he had attended that, “in the future, if you agree, UNHCR and Bangladesh will share your information with Myanmar so the government can verify where you are from,” but that he was never told this collection exercise would be for that purpose. Another Rohingya man said: UNHCR did not tell us it would be used for anything linked to repatriations. When the registration exercise started, we had said we didn’t want to participate because we were worried about repatriations, but the UNHCR staff told us, “We will not share your information with Myanmar until you give us permission to.” And then they never came back to us to ask if they could share our information. He added that when field staff collected his data, they did not discuss consent in any detail. In its May responses, UNHCR stated that Rohingya refugees were provided extensive counseling on the sharing of their information with Myanmar for the purposes of verification of eligibility for return, but at the same time acknowledged that in some cases a more thorough explanation and counseling for refugees may have helped them better understand the process and its purpose. UNHCR said that the vast majority of refugees in 2017 and 2018 were expressing a desire to return home “if conditions were conducive” – a sentiment that refugees also expressed to Human Rights Watch at the time. The Rohingya refugees have repeatedly said that they wish to return to Myanmar when it is safe and their citizenship rights, right to freedom of movement, and other human rights are guaranteed. But when Bangladesh started submitting names to Myanmar for repatriation eligibility assessments in 2018, Rohingya refugees told Human Rights Watch that they still did not feel safe to return. The one Rohingya man who said UNHCR did ask his consent to share his data with Myanmar said he felt pressure not to refuse. He added that he assumed, based on UNHCR’s mandate to protect vulnerable people, the data would only be shared at a time when safe and dignified repatriations were possible. “We would be very worried to have our full information shared without those conditions, especially now with the Myanmar military in control of the government,” he said. Bangladesh officials said that by early 2021 they had submitted lists with at least 830,000 names to Myanmar. Bangladesh’s foreign minister reported that the lists included all the data the government had on each individual, including biometric data. Myanmar authorities verified the eligibility of 42,000 people for return, though UNHCR considered the situation in Myanmar not conducive for safe refugee returns. Once they were verified for return, UNHCR interviewed those selected, and almost all said they did not want to return, with some going into hiding out of fear of forced repatriation. Human Rights Watch believes that biometric data should only be gathered when necessary and proportionate, and when fully compliant with privacy and data protection legislation and internal data retention and privacy policies. If biometric data collection (such as fingerprint images) is deemed necessary, in line with various data protection regulations and established principles of data collection in sensitive contexts, UNHCR should collect and store as little data as possible about vulnerable people. Implementation of UNHCR Policy UNHCR has a policy and practical guidance to protect personal data that it collects on beneficiaries and shares with third parties. The policy specifies that “before entering into data transfer arrangements with Implementing Partners or third parties which may negatively impact on the protection of personal data of persons of concern, UNHCR needs to carry out a Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA).” UNHCR told Human Rights Watch that it did not carry out a “full-fledged DPIA,” but undertook several risk assessments prior to signing the data-sharing agreement with Bangladesh and embedded and applied risk-mitigating measures into the agreement. In its assessments, UNHCR said it took into account “application of data protection provisions, refugees’ consent, UNHCR’s prior written authorization to disclose, limitations to the use of data, the format in which data are being shared, and balanced any identified risks against the benefits of upholding refugees’ right to return to their country.” It is important, though that it did not seem to take into account the context of historical involuntary returns from Bangladesh to Myanmar. A former senior UNHCR staff member said that while the agency has a policy in place, “UNHCR has not put procedures to enforce the policy. DPIAs are generally not conducted.” He added that while the policy document seeks “adequacy” with Europe’s General Data Protection Regulation, in practice staff deviate from the requisite standards including informed consent. UNHCR’s policy also dictates that when it collects personal data. it should inform the person “in a manner and language that is understandable” of the specific purpose for which the data will be processed and whether the data will be transferred to another entity. Twenty-one of the 24 Rohingya interviewed said they found out their names were on repatriation eligibility assessment lists only after the Myanmar government had verified them for return. UNHCR said it was unable to share a copy of its data-sharing agreement with Bangladesh without the government’s permission. Human Rights Watch asked the Bangladesh government for a copy of the agreement but has yet to receive a response. UNHCR said its protection staff in Bangladesh and Myanmar have monitored whether the sharing of refugee data has resulted in any harm to refugees or their families and had not identified any harm thus far. Potential Harm Involuntary Repatriations In a May meeting with Human Rights Watch, a UNHCR official defended the agency’s data sharing with Bangladesh – knowing that Bangladesh would, in turn, share this data with Myanmar as part of the process for verifying eligibility to return – by saying that UNHCR’s engagement would help to ensure that any returns would be voluntary. UNHCR said that an April 2018 memorandum of understanding between the agency and Bangladesh on the voluntary return of Rohingya to Myanmar includes a role for UNHCR to assist Bangladesh to register refugees who indicate a willingness to return and to ascertain the voluntariness of their decision after the eligibility for return is verified and confirmed between Bangladesh and Myanmar. It also states that UNHCR will assist in voluntary returns but only when the conditions for safe and dignified return are in place. In its May written response to Human Rights Watch, UNHCR repeated that Bangladesh is upholding its commitment not to involuntarily repatriate Rohingya and pointed out that in November 2018 and August 2019, Bangladesh did not force any Rohingya who had been verified for return to go back to Myanmar. It said that “UNHCR has insisted since the beginning of the Rohingya refugee crisis that the refugees have a right to return if conditions are conducive yet that this should be voluntary and on the basis of informed consent.” If the necessary conditions are not in place for safe and dignified return, UNHCR engagement on return is usually limited to planning, monitoring, counseling, advocacy, and ongoing analysis of obstacles to and conditions necessary for return, and identifying the necessary actions to address them. By indirectly assisting Bangladesh, through the collection of data, to draw up lists for verifying return eligibility, UNHCR has in effect assisted with potential repatriations, governed by the bilateral agreement between Bangladesh and Myanmar. This comes in the context of previous forced repatriation from Bangladesh to Myanmar, first in 1978 and then between 1992 and 1997, including UNHCR’s involvement in those episodes of mass forcible return, or refoulement. A study by the Stimson Center found: In the 1970s and 1990s, UNHCR made choices that prioritized relationships with the governments of Bangladesh and Myanmar over explicitly addressing human rights and protection concerns facing refugees… protection practices and norms such as individually interviewing refugees prior to return, were often sidelined in favor of maintaining these relationships. In 2021 Bangladeshi authorities have continued their rhetoric around the need for repatriations, including directly after the February 1 military coup in Myanmar. Human Rights Watch questions the extent to which UNHCR will be able to prevent forced returns should they be attempted, given its inability to prevent the Bangladeshi government from relocating – including involuntary transfers – Rohingya to facilities on the remote island of Bhasan Char, where they lack freedom of movement and sustainable livelihoods or education. The principle of nonrefoulement, the right of refugees not to be returned to a country where their lives or freedom would be threatened, is the cornerstone of international refugee protection, enshrined in article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. Although Bangladesh is not a party to the UN Refugee Convention, it is bound to uphold the principle of nonrefoulement as a matter of customary international law. Returning Rohingya to Myanmar would put them at grave risk of arbitrary arrest, torture and other ill-treatment, and possible death. An estimated 600,000 Rohingya remain in Rakhine State, confined to camps and villages without freedom of movement or access to adequate food, health care, education, and livelihoods. Approximately 130,000 internally displaced Rohingya have been arbitrarily held since 2012 in open-air detention camps. A 2020 report by Human Rights Watch found that that the repression imposed on the Rohingya amounts to the crimes against humanity of persecution, apartheid, and severe deprivation of liberty. The UN-backed Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar warned in 2019 that the Rohingya remaining in Myanmar faced a greater-than-ever threat of genocide in the face of ongoing marginalization and brutality by the authorities. The 21 Rohingya who told Human Rights Watch that their names had been on repatriation eligibility assessment lists and been verified for return fled their huts and went into hiding into other camps because they were afraid of being forcibly returned. One said his family fled because Bangladeshi security forces threatened that if they did not return to Myanmar, “then they would bulldoze our hut inside the camp.” Another Rohingya man said Bangladeshi authorities had told him he must return to Myanmar or he would be forced to, though he was not ultimately forced to do so. One aid worker who witnessed families fleeing their huts said that in November 2018, when authorities tried to get the first group of Rohingya that had been verified for return to leave, she saw camp leaders trying, and ultimately failing, to forcibly round them up and put them on buses. Denial of Citizenship and Potential Statelessness The Rohingya are a predominantly Muslim ethnic group who have lived for generations in Myanmar’s Rakhine State. They are not listed among the 135 national ethnic groups Myanmar recognizes and are effectively denied citizenship under the discriminatory 1982 Citizenship Law. Without citizenship, they are for practical purposes stateless, facilitating long-term and severe Myanmar government human rights violations, including deportation, arbitrary confinement, and persecution. Myanmar authorities have issued documents under successive “citizenship verification” systems, including “white cards,” or temporary registration cards, which were nullified in 2015. The end of the “white cards” was followed by the current National Verification Card (NVC) process, which has been marked by coercion and deceit. Rohingya are also registered on documents under repressive travel authorization and administrative procedures, such as household lists, Form 4s, and “Village Departure Certificates.” At the time of their registration in Bangladesh, many Rohingya were concerned that their data would be integrated into the Myanmar NVC system, which they believe would undermine their claims to citizenship. A 2019 repatriation assessment conducted by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) with support from the Myanmar government stated that all returning refugees will be registered for NVCs upon arriving at Rakhine State “reception centers.” Arbitrary Detention In line with its repatriation agreements with Bangladesh, the Myanmar government has built “reception centers” and “transit camps” in northern Rakhine State to process and house returnees. They are surrounded by high barbed-wire fencing and security outposts, similar to the central Rakhine State detention camps. Such camps, constructed on land from which the Rohingya had fled, including villages that were burned and bulldozed in their wake, would invariably limit basic rights, segregate returnees from the rest of the population, restrict freedom of movement, and exacerbate persecution. The ASEAN repatriation assessment outlines “strict security measures,” including the extensive presence of armed border guard police at the camps that raise grave rights concerns. One Rohingya man told Human Rights Watch that his name had appeared on a Myanmar government list of suspected members of the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), the ethnic Rohingya armed group. He said that around August 2019, he found out from a Bangladesh government-appointed representative in the camp that his name had been included on one of the repatriation eligibility assessment lists and he was verified for return. “I am worried that the Myanmar authorities added my name to the list as a trap, so they can bring me back to Myanmar and then arrest me for membership in ARSA,” he said. Recommendations Human Rights Watch appreciates the vital role that UNHCR plays in ensuring that Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh are issued identity documents and have access to basic services. Human Rights Watch also recognizes that Bangladesh authorities require some personal data to issue these documents. It is less clear, however, to what extent facial images, fingerprints, and other biometric data are necessary and proportionate to serve this purpose. As UNHCR guidelines recognize, there are significant risks that this information could be shared with refugees’ countries of origin and the personal information collected should only be shared with the country of origin after an individual confirms that they want to voluntarily return home. In its April 14 letter to UNHCR, Human Rights Watch included detailed recommendations for the agency to consider. These included investigating the manner in which data collection proceeded in Bangladesh in 2018. More broadly, Human Rights Watch recommends the following to UNHCR: Do not combine collecting data on individuals to provide services or identification documents with collecting data for repatriation eligibility assessment or repatriation. Data collection for repatriation purposes should remain a separate exercise, ideally with a strict firewall in the databases maintained; Instruct field officers to engage in detailed consent discussions with every person being considered for eligibility for repatriation, and for repatriation, which should include ensuring that refugees understand any risks of having their data shared and that they have the ability to opt-out without prejudice; Only share data or allow data that it collects to be shared by host countries with countries of origin, when individuals have given free and informed consent; Ensure that people who agree to have their data shared for repatriation purposes are able to later withdraw that consent, and are informed how to do so in a clear manner at the time they give initial consent; Impose restrictions and safeguards that limit the authorities who can access and share data within the government and prohibit access to this data by third governments and other parties; Carry out mandatory data assessments and, to ensure independence, use teams supervised by an independent body to conduct data impact assessments before engaging in new programming that requires sensitive data collection. Assessments of this risk should include an examination of the historical context of the communities and countries involved; and Ensure that all data collection, including biometric data, meets the requirements of necessity and proportionality. Human Rights Watch also recommends that donor governments play a greater role in ensuring rights-based data practices. This includes requiring agencies and organizations that collect sensitive data to use independently supervised entities for data protection impact assessments for new projects before data collection begins, and to conduct annual data protection audits..."
Source/publisher: "Human Rights Watch" (USA)
2021-06-15
Date of entry/update: 2021-06-15
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "A Muslim minority ethnic group in Buddhist dominated Myanmar, the Rohingya constitute about 4 percent of the country’s population. They inhabit the northern part of the Rakhine (formerly Arakan) State of Myanmar, one of the least developed parts of the country. Persecuted for decades by the Burmese State, their numbers inside Myanmar have diminished steadily over the years from well in excess of a million to a few hundred thousand. Denial of citizenship, religious persecution, killings, rape, massacres and refusal to provide even the most basic of human rights by subjecting them to forced labor, seizure of their land and property, extortion, denial of the freedom to travel to find work, and most humiliatingly placing restrictions on marriage and the number of children they can have has led to hundreds of thousands of impoverished Rohingya fleeing to neighbouring countries, especially Bangladesh, over the course of the last seven decades. The United Nations (UN) has described them as "the most persecuted minority in the world". At the core of the issue is the identity and religion of the Rohingya, with the Myanmar government refusing to acknowledge or use the term Rohingya, insisting on calling them ‘Bengali’ instead to highlight their alleged foreign origins. The largeststateless community in the world,the close to a million Rohingya living in appalling conditions in makeshift refugee camps in Bangladesh are confronted with an enormous humanitarian crisis. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) stated on 13 December 2017, that while there were 400,000 Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh in early 2017, by the end of that year this number had swelled to over 1,000,000. The scale of the crisis is put into clear perspective by the fact that in contrast to their swelling numbers in Bangladesh, only an estimated 180,000 Rohingya remain in their native Rakhine State in Myanmar. UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres recently termed the State of the Rohingya as "catastrophic" and "completely unacceptable". Their miserable condition is being sought to be exploited by radical Islamic organizations backed by the Pakistani intelligence agency Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) such as the Lashkar-e-Taibah (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), as well as by other Sunni militant organizations, to serve their own nefarious purposes. Rohingya insurgent organizations such as the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) are being set up, and the attacks against Myanmar security forces launched by these insurgents are providing the excuse for a highly disproportionate response by the Myanmar government, thereby exacerbating the already grave plight of the Rohingya. That the ISI-backed groups are also looking to direct the attention of radicalized elements from the Rohingya against the Sheikh Hasina-led government in Bangladesh and against India lends wider security ramifications to the issue. US Vice President Mike Pence assessed the situation aptly when he described the Rohingya expulsion as a "historic exodus" and a "great tragedy unfolding", adding that the situation may "sow seeds of hatred and chaos that may well consume the region for generations to come and threaten the peace of us all"..."
Source/publisher: European Foundation for South Asian Studies (Amsterdam)
2018-05-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-06-14
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "In the aftermath of the November general election the intense fighting between the national armed forces (Tatmadaw) and the Arakan Army came to an unexpected halt. Since the February coup of the State Administration Council, the situation has remained delicately poised. Political sentiment is very high. But Rakhine nationalism is presently on a different cycle to political movements in other parts of the country. In this commentary Kyaw Lynn outlines why the coming months will remain a time of high tension and uncertainty in Arakan politics. When political analysts in Myanmar and beyond discuss the role of ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) in the struggle against the military coup in February, the Arakan Army (AA) becomes one of the key political forces in shaping their dialogue and perceptions. The AA, the military wing of the United League of Arakan (ULA), is the only armed group that can challenge the power of the national armed forces (Tatmadaw) on Myanmar’s western frontiers. This became especially evident during the 2018-20 period when the ULA-AA demonstrated its sharp resistance against the power of the centralised Myanmar state. Behind the ULA rise, there were three key features: popular support among the Rakhine population, well-trained soldiers, and a younger leadership that read the evolving mood and political situation in the country perceptively well. Since the February coup of the State Administration Council (SAC), the situation has begun to change. Many searching questions are being asked, a challenge that is facing communities in every part of the country. In particular, intense fighting between the Tatmadaw and AA came to an unexpected halt in the aftermath of the November general election when voting was cancelled in a majority of townships in Rakhine State (Arakan). As the history books will show, this cessation in hostilities was three months in advance of the military takeover, causing many people to question the political stand of the ULA in the current crisis. Indeed some have even accused the ULA-AA of cooperating with the military SAC in seeking to control civil society and pro-democracy political movements in Rakhine State and adjoining territories in Chin State. It is important to stress, then, that the crisis is hardly black and white, and there are many local complexities with their roots in Arakan politics and Myanmar history. From what many would regard as a “realist perspective” among local leaders, the present military coup represents more of a clash and division between the central powers among the ethnic Bamar-majority in the country: in this case, between the armed forces of the Tatmadaw and National League for Democracy (NLD). In the post-coup context, some analysts believe that the political instability in central Myanmar (Burma Proper) will provide greater leverage for the ULA-AA to advance its “Way of Rakhita” philosophy in order to achieve its “Arakan Dream”. Many cautions nevertheless remain, and it is incorrect to argue that the ULA-AA is simply practising a policy of isolationism and neutralism while it waits to see how the current crisis unfolds. The situation is highly fraught, with new challenges emerging every day. The present unilateral ceasefires are informal; AA soldiers are participating in fighting against the Tatmadaw with EAO allies in other parts of the country; and, at the same time, ULA leaders have refrained from participating in the National Unity Government (NUG), formed by NLD MPs-elect and other anti-SAC actors to challenge the legitimacy of the SAC. In a complex and fast-changing landscape, few of the political choices are easy. There is also a further reason to consider why the ULA-AA may wish to abstain from the current political turmoil: the membership of the electoral Arakan National Party (ANP), which has won a majority of votes in the past two elections, in the SAC. For the present, the ULA-AA leadership has not made any remark on this issue publicly. But for the majority Rakhine population this is a very controversial issue. First, the ANP’s membership in the military council is different from that of participation in – or cooperation with – a coalition government after a general election. This is because the votes that the public gave in the polls are taken away as a consequence of the military coup. Thus it is very difficult to say that the ANP is a member of the council with the mandate of the Rakhine State electorate. And second, it is clear that ANP participation in the military council will not imminently bring about the political autonomy and economic self-development that Arakan’s peoples have long desired. Instead, if the unilateral ceasefires break down and human rights violations recur due to a resumption of conflict, ANP membership of the SAC will be challenged by a majority among the Rakhine population. In short, ANP participation in the SAC will not reflect the will of the ULA-AA but also the Rakhine public and other nationality groups in the state. The situation is delicately poised. As in other parts of the country, the coming months will remain a time of high tension and uncertainty in Arakan politics. The Way of Rakhita and the Arakan Dream The “Way of Rakhita” means to complete the end-goal of the “Arakan Dream”. In linguistic terms, it is difficult to agree a common and exact definition on these two concepts. But the general understanding is that the way of Rakhita – the Arakanese way or action of the Arakanese – signifies the achievement of a long-held political vision in Arakan: the restoration of Arakan sovereignty that was taken away, by conquest, with the ending of the Mrauk-U era in the 18th century. Equally important, both the Way of Rakhita and Arakan Dream are intended to be more inclusive for all ethnic and religious groups in Arakan compared to a more conservative Rakhine tradition in which ethno-nationalism is regarded the key to political autonomy. It needs to be added, too, that the emergence of ULA-AA movement in Arakan politics has caused the political motivation of a majority of people in Rakhine State to move more decisively towards supporting the demand for an autonomous Arakan state. Various nationalist movements have emerged to try and restore the political status of Arakan since the fall of Arakan Kingdom. But, during the following decades, none of those movements was able to bring the hope of success to the general population. Now, however, after two years of an intensification in armed struggle, it is not just the political elites but the general population who have become more confident in their calls for autonomy in Arakan. Presently, the Arakan political movement has reached its most prominent peak. This was recognised by the ULA-AA leader Gen. Twan Mrat Naing on the 12th anniversary of the part’s founding on 10 April 2021: “If we are to speak the reality, it can be clearly seen that it is our generation which is fighting effectively with the strongest leadership and unity among revolutionary movements since the fall of Arakan sovereignty in 1784. From this situation, let us endeavour to improve and continuously fight to achieve the highest destination with the devotion of both mental and physical strength.” Following these remarks, Twan Mrat Naing moved on to the questions of state building and nation building in Arakan. It is therefore interesting to look at these issues in relation to the modern-day Rakhine State. In general, it is difficult to identify the territory of Arakan based upon the “white”, “brown” or “black” colour categorisations in line with government definitions.* But it is now commonly said that that the majority of areas in northern Rakhine State, apart from urban Sittwe, are now under the influence of the ULA-AA, and the de facto administrative mechanisms are regulated on the basis of ULA-AA policies. This marks a significant change in the political landscape during the past five years, raising many questions about the potential course of events in the territory. According to Professor Redie Bereketeab, head of the “Conflict and State Building in the Horn of Africa” project, state building includes three main elements: institutionalization, bureaucratization and democratization. In definition, institutionalization refers to the enforcement of state authority over society through specifically-created political structures and organisations. Bureaucratization is associated with a process leading to a system of rule by administrative office. And democratization denotes the construction of institutions of divided power, providing the processes by which a system of democratic governance is set in motion. Out of these three processes, the first two are the most prominent tasks that ULA-AA authorities have been building up during the past two years. These include setting out an Arakan Authority, a judiciary system, local administrative structures and divisions (which are different from Myanmar government settings), and regulating taxation, health, education and other social issues. In term of legitimacy, however, it is hard to define ULA-AA administration as the legal-rational authority because it is mixed with other important elements, including charismatic leadership, nationalism and military-political performance. As a result, to move on to the next stage of democratization, the ULA-AA – as a revolutionary movement – still has many limitations, both at the individual level and in the division of power among leadership structures. Another main area of Twan Mrat Naing’s speech concerned nation building. Although there is no common definition, nation building is mostly defined as the task of constructing or structuring a national identity, using the power of the state as well as the participation of civil society actors. As modern history shows, this is an especially pertinent issue in Rakhine State at present. In a multi-ethnic land such as Arakan, national identity needs to be “supra-ethnic”, based upon political values and principles rather than cultural ones. But this task has become much more complicated during the past decade, with the exodus of over a million Rohingya people into Bangladesh and the displacement in Tatmadaw operations of over 200,000 Rakhine, Chin, Mro and other peoples in Rakhine State and the Chin State borderlands. It is vital that all groups participate in the challenges creating a national identity and making decisions on the future of Arakan society. But, in these processes, much may depend on how ULA-AA administration is perceived in handling inter-ethnic relations in areas where it is the dominant authority. It will also be important to see how political and civil society organisations react among the different communities towards the objective of agreeing national goals through consensus and shared inter-communication. For the moment, the impartiality, decisiveness and results-oriented manner, in most cases, of the current ULA judiciary system has been generally welcomed within minority communities, including the Rohingya, where its authority reaches. At least, ULA administration is not regarded as worse than Myanmar government practices. Nevertheless Arakan nation building will need to move on from the present situation of peaceful coexistence to an ethnically harmonious society which enjoys and celebrates cultural diversity of all kinds. There is still a long way to go. In summary, to sustain legitimacy and authority in pursuit of the Arakan Dream, much will depend on how effectively the ULA can change its administrative structures from the culture of a revolutionary liberation movement to one of civic governance in which all citizens are treated on the basis of transparent and equitably-defined rules and regulations. The Nature of Arakan Politics In 21st century society, there are two main political pulling forces that have evolved from Arakan’s past. The first has developed since the fall of Mrauk-U and continued for over two hundred years. The ultimate goal of this political force is to build power-seeking structures and institutions, such as the creation of an independent and autonomous Arakan state, and the means to carry this out are the combined forces of nationalism and collectivism. In the modern era, this movement is mainly represented by the ULA-AA as well as some smaller political organisations among the Rakhine population. The second force, in contrast, is quite new, developing since the second half of 20th century. But currently, following ten years of democratization, manifestations of this trend are extensive and intensive. The ultimate aim of this force is to create power-restraining institutions in the creation of an Arakan society that embraces democratic accountability and the rule of law, and the means to achieve this is liberal individualism. This grouping is broader and generally expressed by civil society organisations and individual activists, reformers and scholars. It should be mentioned, though, that the two forces should not be regarded as distinct. ULA leaders have expressed the pro-democracy values of the second force, while political actors among the second group support the nationalist values of the first force. As a result, Arakan society is presently seen to be more united and organised than during previous governmental eras in modern history. At the same time, it needs to be qualified that the key audience for the second trend in Arakan politics are the younger generation, whereas the majority of the Arakan population are in favour of the more overt nationalism of the first force. From this, two conclusions can be drawn. The consolidation of liberal individualism will face limitations until its supporters achieve recognisable rights and influence on the political stage. And, looking to the current trends and principles in Arakan politics and society, the politics of realism will be more impactful than those of political liberalism. * “White” refers to government-controlled, “brown” to mixed areas, and “black” to those controlled by EAOs. Arakan was historically a territory of much greater size than the present-day Rakhine State. Since Myanmar’s independence in 1948, the Arakan Hill Tracts, where the ULA-AA is also active, have been included under the administration of what has become the modern-day Chin State. Kyaw Lynn is a post-graduate student mastering in Political Science at the University of Yangon. He is also a freelance political analyst in Yangon as well as one of the founders of the Institute for Peace and Governance..."
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Source/publisher: The Transnational Institute (TNI)
2021-06-10
Date of entry/update: 2021-06-12
Grouping: Individual Documents
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