Burma's economic relations with China

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Description: "The Meeting: On 25-26 September 2023, China hosted the Global Sustainable Transport Forum in Beijing. Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng attended the opening ceremony and read a congratulatory letter from Chinese President Xi Jinping. The forum, reported by Chinese media, was an opportunity for China to stress that it is committed to ‘promoting global transport cooperation and providing the world with new opportunities through its own development.’ In attendance, among others, was Mya Tun Oo, deputy prime minister and transport minister of the State Administration Council (SAC), formed by the Myanmar military. On the sidelines of the meeting, he reportedly discussed the Muse-Mandalay rail project with the Chinese. The Project The proposed Muse-Mandalay railway project (MMRP), unveiled in 2011, is a major part of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) and the broader Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) of China that includes the construction of a Pan-Asian Railway Network running through Myanmar, Vietnam, Thailand, and Cambodia. Proposed to be built by Myanmar’s state-run Myanma Railways and the China Railway Eryuan Engineering Group (CREEG), the MMRP would link Kunming, the capital of China’s southern Yunnan province, and Mandalay in central Myanmar through the Muse border in Shan State. It is projected as a 431-kilometre-long standard-gauge railway project with an estimated cost of US$9 billion. Under the CMEC framework, the proposal is also to further extend the line from Mandalay to the Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone (KP SEZ) and the New Yangon City, the two other key sites of China-Myanmar infrastructure projects. China is developing a deep-sea port at Kyaukphyu, a city on the Bay of Bengal in Rakhine State. An 800-kilometre China-Myanmar Oil and Gas Pipeline, which began operations in 2009, has been running from Kyaukphyu through Mandalay and Magway regions, and northern Shan state. Once completed, the rail line will allow Chinese trade to bypass the congested Strait of Malacca between Malaysia and Indonesia and boost development in landlocked Yunnan. More crucially, Beijing wants to avert the worst-case scenario of a foreign power disrupting its oil shipments from the Middle East by blockading the straits. Mya Tun Oo’s visit to China included a trip to the headquarters of China Railway Group Co Ltd, where he reportedly discussed a feasibility study for Muse-Mandalay and Mandalay-Kyaukphyu rail sections. The Myanmar military’s official media said that he also met Vice Premier He Lifeng and Chinese Transport Minister Li Xiaopeng to discuss transport cooperation, the acceleration of existing projects, and the possibility of new projects. Delays, Opposition, and the Restart There are widespread apprehensions as to the MMRP’s impact on the environment and Myanmar’s sovereignty. The Myanmar military has remained unconcerned with either of these dangers. The MoU between the two countries was signed in 2011 when the Military headed a quasi-civilian government. However, work on the project halted in 2014 after strong protests and activism in the Rakhine state. In 2018, the project was revised during the National League of Democracy (NLD) government’s term. The preparation of the bilateral MoU for the MMRP project was executed in 2019. The railway projects were among the 33 agreements signed by President Xi Jinping during his visit to Myanmar in January 2020. To date, however, the project has remained largely in the planning stage, delayed further by the onset of COVID-19 and then the coup of February 2021. The Myanmar military’s urgency to move ahead with the project emanates from its bid to please China, which provides it with diplomatic protection in international forums. For the SAC to continue, in a widespread civil war situation, support from China remains a critical factor. The Symphony Chinese bid to access the Bay of Bengal, through the CMEC, has synchrony with the Myanmar military’s avowed aim of establishing the country as an economic corridor and attracting Chinese investment. This has assumed more significance due to the country’s growing isolation, which appears to have hurt the regime. The frequency and intensity of engagement between the two countries, in fact, has picked up, as have expressions of commitment to their economic relations. Lately, indications to this effect have been provided by military chief Min Aung Hlaing. In September of this year, at the Myanmar Economic Committee, he hailed the potential trade benefits of a Kyaukphyu-Mandalay railway. He said the regime also assessed the feasibility of a Muse-Mandalay railway and even suggested building another line between Chinshwehaw and Lashio near the Chinese border. Not surprisingly, nine SAC ministers visited China in September, reflecting the regime’s deepening ties with Beijing. On 26 September, Mya Tun Oo attended the Comprehensive Transport Investment Promotion Conference in Beijing and said that his government was committed to establishing Myanmar as an economic corridor by firmly partnering in the BRI project as well as the Mekong-Lancang Cooperation projects. The latter is a sub-regional cooperation mechanism jointly established by China, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam in 2017. In March 2023, media reports indicated that work might have started on the MMRP project. The military spokesperson observed that “field inspection and reports have been completed. The implementation to resume the projects is still being discussed [sic].” Consultations may have indeed begun between the two sides to kickstart the long-delayed project. The military is expected to take care of the domestic concerns, whereas Beijing appeared to have taken responsibility for dealing with the ethnic armed organisations that operate in northern Myanmar in Shan and Rakhine states. In late February 2023, China’s special envoy for Myanmar affairs, Deng Xijun, held meetings with the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the United Wa State Army (UWSA), and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) to discuss trade and economic cooperation with a focus on the MMRP. Deng reportedly pushed the insurgents to reach some form of a cease-fire with the military government. In July, three groups — the MNDAA, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), and the Rakhine Arakan Army (AA) – released a joint statement (in Burmese and Chinese) vowing to protect international investment in their regions, which are home to several key Chinese-led projects, and also to “crush perpetrators of violence” in Shan and Rakhine states. The Tail Piece Both Myanmar and China continue to grow dependent on each other. Myanmar’s military critically depends on Beijing for its survival. For China, Myanmar remains a key constituent of its BRI project. The project is not intended to benefit the hosts but the Chinese economy and its strategic expansion. The final chapter in the MMRP project, however, is yet to be written. While Myanmar and Chinese state-run media would like to highlight the swift progress achieved, the current civil war situation poses a substantial challenge to actual implementation. The opposition’s Peoples Defence Forces (PDFs) and the EAOs that operate in Kayah and Sagaing regions remain bitterly opposed to all military initiatives, including the MMRP. Defeating this opponent will be necessary for the military to execute the project. That feat has not been achieved in the last two-and-a-half years since it grabbed power. The coming months are likely to witness the continuation of the military’s efforts to bring stability to the areas through which the project passes. This translates into more violent action against the opposition with severe collateral damages. About the author: Dr. Bibhu Prasad Routray is the Director of Mantraya. This analysis has been published as part of Mantraya’s ongoing “Fragility, Conflict, and Peace Building” and “Regional Economic Cooperation and Connectivity in South Asia” projects. All Mantraya publications are peer-reviewed..."
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Source/publisher: "Eurasia Review"
2023-10-13
Date of entry/update: 2023-10-13
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Description: "A new report by the Kachin Women’s Association Thailand (KWAT) links escalating abuses by SAC troops in Kachin and northern Shan State to the regime’s attempts to secure transport routes for expansion of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. The report documents a sharp increase since mid-2022 in the number of casualties of aerial bombardment, up to nearly 200, and in the number of villagers forced to be human shields, up to 221, compared to the previous fifteen months. Other widespread SAC abuses documented by KWAT include thirty incidents of shelling into populated areas, inflicting 61 civilian casualties, and arbitrary arrest of 441 people, including Kachin religious leader Dr. Hka Lam Samson. Dozens of those arrested have disappeared. Mapping shows most SAC abuses clustered along the main transport routes in northern Burma, vital gateways for development of BRI infrastructure. KWAT analyzes this as a deliberate strategy of collective punishment to secure control of key transport arteries. “With conventional warfare failing against resistance forces, the regime is increasingly resorting to attacks against civilians,” said KWAT spokesperson Ja Ing KWAT exposes that the devastating airstrike on the concert in Hpakant last October, which inflicted over 170 casualties, was direct retaliation for heavy SAC losses suffered a day earlier during a failed attempt to seize KIA positions on Lung Ja mountain – the highest vantage point in southeast Kachin State, overlooking key transport corridors to China. The attacks and abuses have fueled fresh displacement of nearly 14,000 villagers during the past fifteen months, even as the regime has been pushing ahead with plans to close down existing camps in northern Burma housing over 107,000 IDPs. KWAT is calling urgently for increased diplomatic and economic pressure on the SAC regime to stop their attacks on civilians throughout Burma, and for donor countries to step up aid to existing and newly displaced IDPs, prioritizing cross-border channels. KWAT also calls on China to halt its planned acceleration of BRI projects in Burma. “China is taking a huge risk by pushing ahead with BRI projects in partnership with the military regime,” said Ja Ing “There are no guarantees of security, and China will find itself complicit in the mounting atrocities associated with the planned projects.”.....ကချင်အမျိုးသမီးများအစည်းအရုံး-ထိုင်းနိုင်ငံ (KWAT) ၏ ဤအစီရင်ခံစာသစ်တွင် ကချင်ပြည်နယ်နှင့် ရှမ်းပြည်နယ် မြောက်ပိုင်းရှိ စစ်ကောင်စီတပ်ဖွဲ့ဝင်များ၏ အခွင့်အရေးချိုးဖောက်မှုများ ပြင်းထန်လာမှု အခြေအနေ များသည် တရုတ်နိုင်ငံ BRI-ပိုးလမ်းမ စီမံကိန်း တိုးချဲ့ရေးအတွက် သယ်ယူပို့ဆောင်ရေးလမ်းကြောင်းများကို လုံခြုံရေး ပေးရန် စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ ကြိုးပမ်းမှုနှင့် ဆက်စပ်ပုံကို ချိတ်ဆက်ဖော်ပြထားသည်။ လွန်ခဲ့သည့် ၁၅ လနှင့် နှိုင်းယှဉ်လျှင် ၂၀၂၂ ခုနှစ် နှစ်လည်ပိုင်းမှစ၍ လေကြောင်းတိုက်ခိုက်မှုကြောင့် ထိခိုက်သူ ၂၀၀ နီးပါးနှင့် လူသားဒိုင်းအဖြစ် အတင်းအဓမ္မ ခိုင်းစေခံရသူ ရွာသူရွာသားဦးရေမှာ ၂၂၁ ဦးထိ သိသိသာသာ တိုးမြင့်လာကြောင်းကို အစီရင်ခံစာမှ မှတ်တမ်းတင်ထားသည်။ KWAT မှ မှတ်တမ်းတင်ထားသော စစ်ကောင်စီမှ ကျယ်ကျယ်ပြန့်ပြန့် ကျူးလွန်နေသော အခြားချိုးဖောက်မှုများ ထဲတွင် အရပ်သား ၆၁ ကို ထိခိုက်သေဆုံးစေခဲ့သော လူနေထူထပ်သော ဒေသများသို့ လက်နက်ကြီးပစ်ခတ်မှု အကြိမ် ၃၀ နှင့် ကချင်ဘာသာရေးအကြီးအကဲ ဒေါက်တာ ခလမ်ဆမ်ဆွန် အပါအဝင် လူပေါင်း ၄၄၁ ဦးအား မတရားဖမ်းဆီးခြင်းတို့လည်း ပါဝင်သည်။ ဖမ်းဆီးခံရသူများထဲမှာ ဒါဇင်ပေါင်းများစွာသည် ယနေ့ချိန်ထိ ပျောက်ဆုံး နေဆဲဖြစ်သည်။ မြေပုံများအရ စစ်ကောင်စီကျူးလွန်သော ချိုးဖောက်မှု အများစုသည် BRI-ပိုးလမ်းမ စီမံကိန်းအောက်ရှိ အခြေခံအဆောက်အအုံများ၏ အရေးကြီးသော တံခါးပေါက်များဖြစ်သော မြန်မာနိုင်ငံမြောက်ပိုင်းရှိ အဓိက သယ်ယူပို့ဆောင်ရေးလမ်းကြောင်းများတစ်လျှောက်တွင် ဖြစ်ပွားသည်ကို ပြသနေသည်။ ၎င်းအခြေအနေသည် အဓိက သယ်ယူပို့ဆောင်ရေးသွေးကြောများထိန်းချုပ်မှုကို ကာကွယ်ရန် စုပေါင်းပြစ်ဒဏ်ပေးခြင်းကို ဗျူဟာတစ်ခုအနေဖြင့် စစ်ကောင်စီမှ ရည်ရွယ်ချက်ရှိရှိ လုပ်ဆောင်နေခြင်းဖြစ်သည်ဟု KWAT မှ လေ့လာသုံးသပ်သည်။ “ခုခံတော်လှန်ရေးတပ်တွေကို သမားရိုးကျ စစ်ဆင်ရေးရှုံးနိမ့်လာတော့ စစ်တပ်က အရပ်သားတွေကို ပစ်မှတ်ထားတိုက်ခိုက်တဲ့ နည်းလမ်းကို ပိုပြီးသုံးလာကြတယ်ဟု KWAT ၏ ပြောရေးဆိုခွင့်ရှိသူ” ဂျာအိန်က ပြောသည်။ ပြီးခဲ့သည့် အောက်တိုဘာလအတွင်းက ဖားကန့်မြို့ ဖျော်ဖြေပွဲတွင် ဖြစ်ပွားခဲ့သော လူပေါင်း ၁၇၀ ကျော် ထိခိုက်ခဲ့သည့် ပြင်းထန်သည့် လေကြောင်းတိုက်ခိုက်မှုသည် ထိုတိုက်ခိုက်မှုမတိုင်မီ တစ်ရက်အကြိုတွင် ဖြစ်ပွားခဲ့သော စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ ကချင်ပြည်နယ်အရှေ့တောင်ဘက် တရုတ်နိုင်ငံသို့ အဓိက ကုန်သွယ်ရေး လမ်းစင်္ကြန်များကို အပေါ်စီးမှမြင်ရသည့် အမြင့်ဆုံးနေရာဖြစ်သော လုံဂျာတောင်ပေါ်ရှိ KIA စခန်းများကို သိမ်းယူ ရန်ကြိုးပမ်းမှုတွင် အကြီးအကျယ် အထိနာခဲ့မှုအတွက် တိုက်ရိုက်လက်တုံ့ပြန်မှုဖြစ်သည်ဟု KWAT မှ ဖော်ထုတ် ထားသည်။ စစ်ကောင်စီသည် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ မြောက်ပိုင်းရှိ IDP ၁၀၇,၀၀၀ ကျော်နေထိုင်သော ရှိရင်းစွဲ စစ်ဘေးရှောင် စခန်းများကို ပိတ်သိမ်းရန် အစီအစဉ်များ ဆက်လက် တွန်းအားပေးလုပ်ဆောင်နေသော်လည်း လွန်ခဲ့သော ၁၅ လ အတွင်း တိုက်ခိုက်မှုများနှင့် အခွင့်အရေးချိုးဖောက်မှုများကြောင့် နောက်ထပ် ရွာသူရွာသားပေါင်း ၁၄,၀၀၀ နီးပါးကို နေရပ်စွှန့်ခွာ ထွက်ပြေးစေခဲ့သည်။ KWAT အနေဖြင့် စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတဝှမ်းရှိ အရပ်သားများအပေါ် ပစ်မှတ်ထားသော ပြင်းထန်သည့် တိုက်ခိုက်မှုများကို ရပ်တန့်ရန် ၎င်းတို့အပေါ် သံတမန်ရေးနှင့် စီးပွားရေးဆိုင်ရာ ဖိအားများ တိုးမြှင့်ပေးရန်နှင့် အလှူရှင် နိုင်ငံအနေများဖြင့် နယ်စပ်ဖြတ်ကျော်လမ်းကြောင်းများကို ဦးစားပေးကာ ရှိရင်းစွဲနှင့် နောက်ထပ် တိုးပွားလာသော IDP များအတွက် အကူအညီများ တိုးမြှင့်ပေးရန် အရေးပေါ် တောင်းဆိုလိုက်သည်။ တရုတ်နိုင်ငံ အနေဖြင့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံရှိ ၎င်းတို့၏ BRI-ပိုးလမ်းမ စီမံကိန်းတိုးမြှင့်လုပ်ဆောင်မည့် အစီအစဉ်များကို လည်း ရပ်တန့်ရန် KWAT မှ တောင်းဆိုထားသည်။ “တရုတ်နိုင်ငံဟာ စစ်တပ်နဲ့ ပူးပေါင်းပြီး BRI-ပိုးလမ်းမ စီမံကိန်းတွေကို ရှေ့တိုးလုပ်ဆောင်ခြင်းအားဖြင့် ကြီးမားတဲ့ အန္တရာယ်တွေကို ယူနေတယ်”ဟု ဂျာအိန် ကပြောသည်။ “စီမံကိန်းတွေအတွက် ဘာလုံခြုံရေးအာမခံချက်မှလည်း မရှိဘူး။ ပြီးတော့ စီစဉ်ထားတဲ့ စီမံကိန်းတွေနဲ့ ဆက်နွယ်နေတဲ့ တိုးမြင့်လာတဲ့ ရက်စက်ကြမ်းကြုတ်မှုတွေထဲမှာပဲ တရုတ်နိုင်ငံကပါ ကြံရာပါ ဖြစ်လာလိမ့်မယ်”..."
Source/publisher: Kachin Women’s Association Thailand
2023-10-09
Date of entry/update: 2023-10-09
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Less than a decade ago, Wan Kuok Koi, better known as “Broken Tooth”, was incarcerated in a purpose-built top-security detention facility on Coloane, one of the two islands that once formed part of the old Portuguese possession of Macau off the coast of southern China. He was arrested in May 1998 after a bomb exploded in a minivan belonging to Antonio Marques Baptista, nicknamed “Rambo”, the new crime-busting head of the then Portuguese territory’s police force. No evidence of his involvement in that attack was ever revealed in court. Instead, he was brought to justice on old charges related to intimidation of employees at the Lisboa Casino in Macau, loan-sharking and suspicion of being a member of “an illegal organization”. In plain language, that meant a triad, the secret societies that are the Chinese equivalent of the Mafia. After a lengthy and complicated trial—where one witness after another was struck by sudden bouts of amnesia and could not remember anything—he was nonetheless sentenced to 15 years in prison and had all his assets confiscated in November 1999, a month before Macau reverted to Chinese rule and became, like Hong Kong, a “Special Administrative Region” (SAR) of the People’s Republic of China. Among the many outlandish ventures Wan was accused of running, and made public by jurists during the trial, was a weapons business in Cambodia, where he allegedly sought to trade in rockets, missiles, tanks, armored vehicles and other kinds of military equipment in the then civil war-wracked country. Few envisioned that he would ever re-emerge as what he had always claimed to be—just “a prominent businessman”. But that is exactly what happened when he was granted early release in December 2012. Wan had by then spent 13 years and 10 months behind bars. Leveraging old connections, Wan nestled himself back into the casino business in Macau and, after a few years, launched a cryptocurrency called Dragon Coin. He also established three entities operating out of Cambodia: The Hongmen History and Culture Association; the Dongmei Group, which is officially headquartered in Hong Kong; and the Palau China Hung-Mun Cultural Association, supposedly based in the Pacific Ocean nation Palau. The designations said it all. Hongmen, or Hung Mun in Wan’s native Cantonese dialect, is the name of the original underworld triads formed in the 18th century. According to a Dec. 9, 2020 statement by the US Treasury Department, the Hongmen History and Culture Association in particular soon spread its influence across Southeast Asia, first in Cambodia—and then in Myanmar. Wan’s Dongmei Group is a major investor in the casino enclaves near Myawaddy that were established after a faction of the Karen National Union and its Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) broke away, entered into ceasefire agreements with the Myanmar military, and became a Border Guard Force (BGF). The first such enclave was Shwe Kokko, which was built on the ruins of a former KNLA military base known as Kawmoorah, or Wangkha, which was overrun by the Myanmar military in 1995. The BGF that gained official control over the enclave is led by Saw Chit Thu, a former KNLA officer whose army protects all activities at Shwe Kokko. Officially called Yatai New City and locally known as “Chinatown”, the project was launched in April 2017 and when completed is supposed to include luxury housing, hotels, shopping malls, trade centers, factories, golf courses, casinos, and perhaps even an airport. Shwe Kokko was soon followed by two other, similar self-governing “special economic zones” near Myawaddy, the so-called Huanya International City and the Saixigang Industrial Zone. Wan’s Dongmei Group and its network of shady affiliates are major investors in those projects. Wan is also known to be involved in projects in Mong Pawk southeast of the Panghsang (Pangkham) headquarters of the United Wa State Army on the border between Myanmar and China. According to a July 2020 report by the United States Institute of Peace, “The Dongmei Company itself appears to have incorporated as a business in Hong Kong on March 3, 2020, but is operating out of Kuala Lumpur. Wan promotes the project through the official public WeChat of the Hongmen Association, as well as in partnership with a Guangdong-based representative of the Huaguan Holding Company.” It is evident that Wan has powerful connections and is protected by high-level officials in China. According to a researcher who is following developments in Myanmar’s frontier areas, “Wan Kuok Koi clearly has tremendous influence across China, Hong Kong and Macau, close relations with the local government in Guangdong province, and very deep ties with the [Chinese Communist] Party’s united front organizations and Overseas Chinese Associations. In my view, the Party sees him as useful in doing a lot of its political work—both in Hong Kong and Macau, and in Southeast Asia more broadly.” But how has it been possible for a former convicted felon and alleged leader of an organized crime group to become an influential and seemingly untouchable business tycoon? While criminals may live outside the law, they have never been outside society. In China especially, there has always been a symbiosis between law and crime. The links between officialdom and secret societies became obvious to the outside world in the run-up to Hong Kong’s return to the “motherland”, which eventually happened in 1997. On April 8, 1993, Tao Siju, chief of China’s Public Security Bureau, gave an informal press conference to a group of local reporters in the then still British territory. After making it clear that the “counter-revolutionaries” who had demonstrated for democracy in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square in 1989 would not have their long prison sentences reduced, he began talking about the triads: “As for organizations like the triads in Hong Kong, as long as they are patriotic, as long as they are concerned with Hong Kong’s prosperity and stability, we should unite with them.” Tao also invited “the patriotic triads” to come to China to set up businesses there. The statement sent shockwaves through Hong Kong’s then professional police force and there was an uproar in the still independent media. But the people of Hong Kong should not have been surprised. Deng Xiaoping, the father of China’s economic reforms, had over the years hinted at the existence of connections between China’s security services and some Hong Kong triads. In a speech in the Great Hall of the People in October 1984, Deng had pointed out that not all triads are bad. Some of them were “good” and “patriotic”, he said. Before Hong Kong was handed over to Beijing, and people could demonstrate their support for pro-democracy groups inside China, certain “patriotic triads” were Beijing’s eyes and ears in the territory. They infiltrated trade unions and even the media and reported their findings back to the authorities inside China. In July 2019, by which time Hong Kong had been a supposedly self-governing SAR for more than two decades and local people were demanding democratic reforms, masked men equipped with wooden sticks and metal rods stormed into a train station in Hong Kong, assaulting people returning home from a pro-democracy protest. In other incidents, thugs were seen beating up pro-democracy demonstrators and removing tents and barriers they had set up. Needless to say, no action was taken against the perpetrators. Wan may have spent more than a decade in a Macau prison, but he nevertheless fits the profile of a “true Chinese patriot” and, therefore, has proven useful to China’s security services. According to the World Hongmen History and Culture Association’s public profile, it is a patriotic organization supportive of China’s worldwide infrastructure project, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and advocates the transfer of Taiwan to control by the authorities in Beijing. The association has also criticized what it calls “separatists” in Hong Kong, meaning the territory’s pro-democracy movement, and condemned US “interference” in Chinese politics. Like many other Chinese organized crime figures, Wan has humble roots. Born in the slums of Macau in 1955, he joined at an early age one of the many violent youth gangs in the territory and reportedly still bears scars from his street-fighting days. He was shot and wounded twice and severely injured when he was attacked by a rival gang armed with meat cleavers. He lost several teeth in another fight, which earned him the nickname “Broken Tooth Koi”. He later rose through the ranks of the street gangs and became a full-fledged member of the 14K triad and eventually became the boss of its Macau chapter. As such, he commanded a band of several hundred young ma jai, or “horse boys”, which ran various street protection and extortion rackets that sometimes led to gunslinging turf wars with rival gangs. And he even clashed, briefly and verbally, with the media. In early 1997, an unsigned letter was sent to several newspapers in the area saying: “Warning: From this day on it is forbidden to mention Broken Tooth Koi in the press, otherwise bullets will have no eyes and knives and bullets will have no feelings.” Outlandishly dressed in a striped suit, boldly designed shoes, flashy silk shirts and with a couple of mobile phones attached to his belt, he could be seen dining with his men at the most exclusive restaurants in Macau. He seemed untouchable until his arrest in 1998, and now appears to have established, or perhaps even re-established, a working relationship with Chinese authorities. Today a rich and free man, Wan has had his broken teeth fixed and can smile confidently at his new transnational business empire. Interests in Myanmar’s frontier areas form an important part of his intricate network of overseas enterprises—but international public and private investigators tracking his activities are not convinced of what he claims to be benevolent pursuits of happiness. In Cambodia, Wan claims to be involved only in the establishment of schools where people can learn more about “Chinese culture”. The US Treasury believes otherwise and claimed in that statement issued on Dec. 9, 2020 that he is “a leader of the 14K triad” which engages in “drug trafficking, illegal gambling, racketeering” as well as “bribery, corruption and graft.” The Treasury Department went on to accuse him of “corruption, including misappropriation of state assets, the expropriation of private assets for personal gains, and corruption related to government contracts or the extraction of natural resources.” The Irrawaddy was not able to contact Wan for this article, but the Treasury Department has announced that it has blocked any holdings he may have in the US and banned all transactions between him and US nationals under the Global Magnitsky Act. Named after Russian tax lawyer Sergei Magnitsky, who died in a prison in Moscow in 2009, the act was originally signed into law by then US President Barack Obama in 2012. Amended in 2016, it authorizes the US government to sanction foreign government officials worldwide who are human rights offenders, freeze their assets, and ban them from entering the US. At the same time, the Treasury Department blacklisted and imposed sanctions on Wan’s three main enterprises: the World Hongmen History and Culture Association, the Palau China Hung-Mun Cultural Association and the Dongmei Group. Shwe Kokko soon became a hub for all kinds of illegal activities and Wan’s networks are engaged in lucrative pursuits in the Huanya International City and the Saixigang Industrial Zone as well. Casinos are perfect vehicles for money laundering, and cross-border smuggling is rampant. Hundreds of people from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and as far away as Kenya have been lured by promises of well-paid jobs “in the IT industry” in Thailand—only to find themselves working in online scam operations run by Chinese syndicates across the border in Myanmar. Many Thai women, hoping to get jobs as waitresses in various establishments, were tricked into sex work in the area’s casinos. The exact nature of Wan’s connections with local authorities on the Thai side of the border may be a matter of conjecture and has never been investigated thoroughly. But it is obvious to anyone visiting the area around Mae Sot that construction material, equipment for the casinos, food and other supplies are coming from the Thai side. All new cross-border establishments north and south of Myawaddy also rely on electricity from Thailand. On June 5, Thailand ceased providing Shwe Kokko with power, but that only led to a brisk trade in generators in Mae Sot. All these developments should serve as a warning to Western peacemakers who have repeatedly lauded various ceasefire agreements between some ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and the Myanmar military, the most extensive being the so-called “Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement” concluded in 2015. A ceasefire agreement with only promises of business opportunities—which so far has been all that the Myanmar military has promised the EAOs—and no political settlement can only lead to one thing: the border rebels become border bandits. It is, as we have seen across the border at Mae Sot, a recipe for disaster. And BGF commander Saw Chit Thu is not the only example of a rebel commander-turned-resourceful private entrepreneur after entering into a non-political ceasefire agreement with the Myanmar military. He has not managed to secure any political concessions for the Karen or brought prosperity to his community, but, in November 2022, the junta awarded him the title of Thiri Pyanchi, one of the country’s highest honors. A similar development can be seen in Kachin State, where a former Communist Party of Burma unit in the eastern part of the state made peace with the Myanmar military as far back as 1989. First known as the New Democratic Army-Kachin, it quickly became engaged in opium and heroin trafficking, illegal logging with massive sales of timber to China, and even the production of guns, which have been sold on the black market. Other, smaller former EAOs have also become involved in—to say the least—unsavory business activities. So-called BGFs under the ultimate command of the Myanmar military exist not only among the Kachin and the Karen but also in the Pa-O area south of the Shan State capital of Taunggyi and in the Kokang area of northeastern Shan State. China’s role in this imbroglio appears ambivalent. When Myanmar still had democratically elected members of parliament, the scams and rackets in Shwe Kokko were raised by civilian politicians and questions were asked during public hearings in Naypyitaw. In June 2020, a tribunal was even set up to investigate the Yatai New City in Shwe Kokko and developments there were halted—at least temporarily. After the 2021 coup, investors in Yatai New City were allowed to resume their construction activities, expanding the area and their range of criminal enterprises. In 2020, the Chinese Embassy in Yangon expressed its “support” for the then government’s efforts to investigate Yatai New City, saying in a statement that China was “strengthening law enforcement and security with Myanmar” to crack down on “cross-border illegal and criminal activities such as illegal gambling and telecommunications fraud.” But it was far from clear that Beijing had any intention of pursuing the well-connected Wan on any of the various accusations made by the US Treasury Department. Some of Wan’s old associates are back in prison in Macau, serving time in the Coloane facility for money laundering and racketeering. Wan may also have to stay clear of his old Macau stomping ground, where he is too well-known and anything he did would be embarrassing for the local SAR authorities. But Cambodia and Myanmar are not a problem, and his interests there coincide with those of China. According to the USIP report, Chinese state-owned companies such as the China Railway 20th Bureau, which has investments in construction projects outside China, and MCC International, another company involved in infrastructure projects, are working closely together with the Yatai New City project. Guojing Consulting, an affiliate of official think-tank the Center for International Economic Exchanges, has signed a partnership agreement with Yatai New City. All those endeavors are part and parcel of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor and Beijing’s BRI. Wan and enterprises run by him and his associates represent the new face of Chinese investment in Myanmar—and the criminalization of the country under the current junta. Not only have construction activities at Shwe Kokko, or the Yatai New City, resumed, but the Huanya International City and the Saixigang Industrial Zone have also seen a revival, with criminal networks running new areas and an even wider range of enterprises. The impact of those developments, and the possibility of more potentially disastrous “ceasefire agreements” between some EAOs and the military, could, in the long term, turn Myanmar into a failed state where only China would be able to pick up the spoils. And with the outside world preoccupied with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, there seems to be little hope of Myanmar regaining some of the international attention it once had..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2023-07-17
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-17
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Description: "In 2022, China’s former foreign minister Wang Yi visited Myanmar, but he did not meet with the regime’s leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. On May 2 2023, the general warmly welcomed Wang’s successor Qin Gang. The minister expressed China’s support for the regime regardless of the situation and promised deeper economic cooperation. He further promised to support Myanmar’s efforts ‘to maintain stability’. In March 2021, China condemned the violence against civilians, halted investments and engaged with the exiled National League for Democracy (NLD)’s members. This support changed dramatically in 2023 as China began a new diplomatic approach. On 4 April 2023, the secretary of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) Yunnan Provincial Committee Wang Ning arrived in Naypyidaw. Later that month, an envoy from the CCP came and met former junta leader Than Shwe — now 90 years old — who had nurtured closer relations with China than Min Aung Hlaing. The envoy also met former president Thein Sein. These meetings were intended to ask the former leaders to advise Min Aung Hlaing, who is known to be anti-Chinese, to forge closer ties. China’s strategy intertwines economic, political and military dimensions. Since the military coup, China has invested US$113 million in Myanmar. The China–Myanmar Economic Corridor provides an important economic link between the two countries. The plan for a high-speed railway between Yunnan and Rakhine — which was shelved in 2014 — is now back on the table, as is a windmill project in Rakhine, a hydroelectric power station in Kachin state and a gas power plant. For Myanmar, supplies of food, fertiliser and stable electricity are urgent, and China is addressing this through infrastructure. Since February 2023, the 770 kilometre-long Chinese-operated oil pipeline from Rakhine to Yunnan has been used to transport Russian oil to China. The pipeline begins at the deep-sea port in Kyaukphyu on Ramree Island and is very important to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. On the political and military front, China worries about the border regions, where fighting between Myanmar’s military and ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) often land both bombs and refugees on the Chinese side. Qin visited the United Wa State Army, Kachin Independent Army, Arakan Army and other China-friendly northeast EAOs before he saw Min Aung Hlaing. Qin has urged Yunnan to strengthen its border defence. China worries that the People’s Defense Force (PDF) will attack its investments in Myanmar. PDF attacked one of the stations on the pipeline in February 2022. In May 2023 a series of anti-Chinese protests arose — reflecting mounting resentment towards Chinese investments for neglecting the locals and the environment. The resistance has called for a boycott of Chinese products. There has also been speculation that China is helping to construct a base on the 11 km-long Great Coco Island, which is located 300 kilometres away from Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal. The island has a radar station and an airfield. Another sign of China’s offensive strategy in the region was a visit by Chinese diplomats to Bangladesh to accelerate the repatriation of Rohingya refugees, despite poor conditions in the Rakhine settlement camps. The strategy in Myanmar is also part of China’s attempts to counter US influence in the region. The United States’ 2021 Burma Act will provide support to the National Unity Government and the resistance. This may have convinced China to support Min Aung Hlaing. Chinese envoys have not been allowed to meet Aung San Suu Kyi and China is not happy with the NLD ban. Despite these concerns, a strategic triad alliance between China, Russia and Myanmar is emerging. Perhaps this is a convenient relationship for the three partners, but it is viewed cynically by Myanmar’s civilians. Demonstrations have intensified and the pipeline has been attacked three times since Qin’s visit. The parallel National Unity Government has declared Chinese investments illegal. For Min Aung Hlaing, the alliance is a question of survival. He badly needs economic, political and military support and so has chosen to ignore resentment against increased Chinese influence. Meanwhile, China’s Ambassador to Myanmar Chen Hai met with Myanmar’s Home Affairs Minister and urged him to crack down on the internet fraud and gambling hub Shwe Kokko run by Chinese criminals on the border with Thailand. The Ambassador urged Myanmar to rescue the people trafficked and trapped by Shwe Kokko. But their headquarters are guarded by the Border Guard Forces of the military, which have stakes in the business. China clearly wants Min Aung Hlaing to get control over matters affecting Chinese interests before it sends an invitation for an official visit to Beijing. The military uses its Russian fighter aircraft and helicopters to bomb civilians, while troops have been burning villages and murdering civilians. The resistance is without a firm coherent command, needs more international help and depends on EAOs opposing the regime. But the resistance will not give up until there is substantial change. Any mediation seems impossible and the generals are used to cope with international sanctions. China’s support of Min Aung Hlaing is bad for the resistance and the humanitarian crisis. If China’s support for Myanmar continues to be guided by a desire to serve its own interests, prospects for changing the situation will remain dim..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "East Asia Forum" (Australia)
2023-06-17
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-17
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Description: "Anti-China protests have broken out across Myanmar following last week’s meetings between Beijing’s foreign minister Qin Gang and Myanmar’s military dictators. China stepped up its engagement with Myanmar’s regime with the visit by the most senior Chinese representative to Naypyitaw since the 2021 coup. Qin met junta boss Min Aung Hlaing and former dictator Than Shwe. Following the visit, activists, students’ union members and general strike committees across the country launched an online campaign, sharing the message, “Hey China: stop killing Myanmar’s people by supporting fascist criminals,” in Chinese and English. Protests were staged in Yangon and Yinmabin, Salingyi and Letpadaung in Sagaing Region, where the Chinese flag was burned. Following the February 2021 coup, the Chinese Embassy in Myanmar faced daily protests in which hundreds of thousands of protesters demanded that their neighbor stop supporting the military. China said the takeover was an internal affair not requiring foreign intervention and failed to denounce deadly crackdowns on protesters, despite widespread international condemnation. At the time there were calls for a boycott of Chinese products and threats to China-backed projects and pipelines. In the following months, there were a few attacks on China’s pipelines in Mandalay Region. Letpadaung General Strike Committee in Salingyi, which is home to the Chinese-run copper mines, stated that the Chinese meetings fueled anti-China anger. “We strongly say that our people do not want any country or government to cooperate with the regime,” the committee announced. Yangon activists warned China that public anger would grow if it continued to work with the junta. On Tuesday, a flash mob in the city called on China to respect the will of the people and to respect Myanmar’s sovereignty, instead of protecting dictators Min Aung Hlaing and Than Shwe. Prominent activist Dr Tayzar San wrote that the neighbors would have to coexist after the fall of the dictatorship and there were many good examples of friendly, close bilateral relations over centuries. Positive relations cannot be built with a terrorist regime, the activist said. “If the Chinese government continues to support the fascist military like this, China will enter the list of Myanmar’s common enemies. We have a serious message and both countries will face the consequences,” Dr Tayzar San added. Myanmar’s civilian National Unity Government also criticized Qin’s visit saying the “terrorist” junta offers no stability with its brutal killings, arbitrary arrests and arson attacks. It said public consent was the only way to achieve long-term stability in Myanmar..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2023-05-10
Date of entry/update: 2023-05-10
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Description: "The trade relationship between Myanmar and China continues to flourish despite the growing domestic instability in Myanmar. Myanmar-China relations have often been described as ‘Pauk Phaw’—a fraternal relationship—owing to its political, economic, and diplomatic ties. The two countries share a 2129-km-long border and have deep historical and cultural ties. The relationship underwent a transformation post-1988 as the Western nations sanctioned Naypyidaw for human rights abuse and political instability due to the coup. It was during this time that Beijing became the largest trading partner of the Southeast Asian neighbour and to this date continues to be so. While the dynamic relations between the two have witnessed several ups and downs in the past owing to the wariness of Myanmar authorities towards Chinese intent—be it weaponising ethnic groups, debt scares, or, unsustainable projects—the relationship has always maintained its strong course despite all odds. One significant factor in this is the steady economic ties that have grown in importance over the past two decades. In recent years, China has become one of Myanmar’s largest trading partners. According to the Ministry of Commerce, Myanmar, the bilateral trade between April 2022 and half of January 2023 in the financial year 2022-2023, reached up to US$2159.412 million. Myanmar conducts cross-border trade with China through border posts situated in Muse, Lweje, Chinshwehaw, Kampaiti, and The other border points namely the Lweje border . While the other two border points the Kampaiti border earned trade Significant partner . . Additionally, has helped expand the economic scope within Myanmar. The Greater Mekong Subregion Economic Cooperation comprising China, Lao PDR, Cambodia, Thailand, Vietnam, and Myanmar also, presented a forum to pool in each other’s strengths and fortify cooperation in trade and investment. Since Myanmar opened its door to foreign investment in 1988, the approved Chinese investment amounted to 26 percent of total FDI in Myanmar till 2019. China has been investing consistently in physical infrastructure projects under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) through China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC). Several projects under the CMEC, for instance, the Mee Ling Gyaing LNG terminal, Kyaukphyu SEZ, deep seaport, upgrading of the Mandalay-Muse Road that will facilitate the Muse-Mandalay railway line are examples of Chinese economic interest within the nation. China has been investing consistently in physical infrastructure projects under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) through China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC). Myanmar’s exports to China are primarily agricultural products, such as rice, beans, and sesame seeds. In 2019, agricultural exports accounted for 83 percent of Myanmar’s total exports to China. Myanmar is also exporting more minerals, such as jade and copper, to China. In contrast, China’s exports to Myanmar are primarily manufactured goods, such as machinery, electronics, and textiles. The growing trade relationship between Myanmar and China has been driven by several factors. First, China’s demand for Myanmar’s natural resources has increased as its economy has grown. Myanmar is rich in natural resources such as oil, gas, timber, and minerals, and China has invested heavily in these sectors. Myanmar exports of pearls, precious stones, metals, and coins to China were US$12.31 million in 2021. Second, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has played a significant role in increasing trade and investment between the two countries. Myanmar is a key part of the BRI, with several infrastructure projects underway, including the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC). The CMEC includes a deep-sea port at Kyaukphyu, an industrial park, and a high-speed rail link between Kunming in China and Mandalay in Myanmar. Many of these projects are stated to be on track even post-coup. Apart from connectivity routes, Chinese companies are now implementing many resource-sharing links whereby power projects including hydropower plants are being constructed in several locations. In October 2022, the US$180-million,135-MW power plant in the Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone (SEZ) was inaugurated. Challenges However, the trade relationship between Myanmar and China has not been without its challenges. One of the most significant challenges is the issue of trade imbalance. Myanmar has been running a large trade deficit with China for several years. Between 2022-2023 till mid- This trade imbalance is a concern for Myanmar, as it can make the country dependent on China for its imports and vulnerable to economic pressure. Another challenge is the perception of the activists and the majority of the population in Myanmar that Chinese companies are exploiting the country’s natural resources without providing significant benefits to the local population. , which was suspended in 2011 due to public opposition. There in the past. China has been criticised over the sustainability of its loans to developing countries, as well as its poor record in terms of generating occupations and adhering to ecological standards. The debt scare aspect has been another element that economists have been wary about. China’s development model as observed in other nations often encompasses state-led infrastructure projects for which natural resources are required as a warranty. China has been criticised over the sustainability of its loans to developing countries, as well as its poor record in terms of generating occupations and adhering to ecological standards. There have been successive claims by different scholars that much of the Chinese lending to other countries is “hidden”. Prominent organisations like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the World Bank, are serious concerns over transparency. Post-coup, the conditions have deteriorated as the general public is indignant with the Chinese actions of continuing business as usual with the military regime as well as shielding it from international spectators. This has led to growing aggression over Chinese-led businesses for instance the vandalising of Chinese companies during 2021-2022. It may be important to recall that Myanmar is not ignorant of the Chinese advances and has been careful in its earlier stances to balance Chinese trails within the region either by ruling against the projects like the Myitsone dam, negotiating proper deals, for instance, the cost of Kyaukphyu project was reduced by almost 80 percent and Myanmar’s share in the project was increased from 15 to 30 percent. It has also partnered with other players in the region like Japan and India. However, the present coup creates more uncertainty in terms of the continuous people’s and ethnic armed group movements against the regime. Thus, the present regime in Myanmar will need to keep its balancing act intact as it opens its business with other partners and pursues its ambition to stay afloat amidst the harsh waters of protests..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Observer Research Foundation
2023-03-31
Date of entry/update: 2023-03-31
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Description: "China’s appointment of a new special envoy to Myanmar in December last year followed the United Nations’ first resolution on Myanmar in 74 years, and the US Congress’ passage of the Burma Act. Observers say it was not a political coincidence. The Burma Act authorizes funds and technical assistance for anti-junta forces in Myanmar, including EAOs. The US has pledged to continue to support Myanmar opposition forces inside and outside of Myanmar. The UN resolution demands an end to violence and urges the military junta to release all political prisoners, including ousted leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. China’s new special envoy Deng Xijun met seven of Myanmar’s ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) in China’s Yunnan Province in the last week of December. Then he flew to Naypyitaw and met junta chief Min Aung Hlaing. In less than a month, he visited the headquarters of the powerful EAOs including the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the United Wa State Army (UWSA) and the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA). His visit was different from previous ones. Politics Interestingly, the Chinese envoy was accompanied by the Mandalay-based Chinese consul. The consul did not participate in talks with the EAOs, and the reason Deng brought the consul along with him was not clear. Secondly, he visited displacement camps in Laiza, the location of the KIA headquarters in Kachin State. It was followed by reports that China would provide assistance in health and education for EAOs as well as displaced civilians, indicating a new level of relationship between China and EAOs at the border. Thirdly, Deng echoed his predecessor Sun Guoxiang, and urged EAOs to join peace talks and sign the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA). But while Sun said he was acting according to Beijing’s policy, Deng stressed that his urging of the EAOs came at the request of Myanmar junta chief Min Aung Hlaing. The flurry of activity by Deng after the US Congress’ passage of the Burma Act indicates that China does not want to see US aid and influence reaching EAOs based along the Chinese border. China will be cautious about potential US influence and possible spying efforts that will come along with its assistance. It will use even greater caution now as tensions are rising over the Taiwan issue. This is why China has made a move to cement ties with EAOs at the border and provide them with non-military assistance. Myanmar people are interested to see whether China will pressure the EAOs to stop fighting the Myanmar military regime, as some of them are fighting alongside resistance forces from central Myanmar. Of the EAOs based in northern and northeastern Myanmar along the border, only the UWSA and the NDAA have de facto control of their own territories, so it is inevitable that the five others will continue to fight the Myanmar military to achieve greater status. The Myanmar military’s policy is that EAOs must disband and turn themselves into militias or border guard forces under its control as per the 2008 Constitution. This will not be acceptable to the KIA, the Shan State Progress Party, the Arakan Army (AA), the Ta’ang National Liberation Army and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), which have high political ambitions and relatively strong armies. So, it is important to keep an eye on the moves of the Chinese special envoy in this regard. Economy Some Chinese investment projects have come back to life following the activities of the Chinese special envoy, the Chinese ambassador and the consul to Myanmar. The first one is the Letpadaung copper mining project. Around the end of February, junta troops shelled and raided around eight villages near the copper mine. Soon after junta troops were deployed along the road to the mine, 150 to 250 people believed to be Chinese employees of Wanbao Co. arrived at the copper mine in five vehicles from Monywa. In a May 5, 2022 statement, Wanbao said mining had been suspended since the coup, but employees were paid their basic salaries, and only a maintenance team was working for maintenance of the mines. There have been reports lately that Wanbao is contacting its Myanmar employees to return to work. The second one is an agreement with Chinese companies to install wind turbines in Ann, Thandwe and Gwa townships in Rakhine, western Myanmar. The project is scheduled to start in December this year and to be completed in 2025. The Chinese ambassador attended the agreement signing ceremony, and it is the only Chinese investment project officially announced since the coup. The project emerged as a result of the ceasefire between the Myanmar military and the AA in Rakhine. The third is construction of the Ruili-Mandalay-Kyaukphyu railroad linking China’s Ruili with Kyaukphyu in Rakhine, an important part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Neither the Myanmar regime nor China have officially talked about the project, but media outlet Frontier Myanmar, citing senior officials of Myanma Railways, reported that the regime and a Chinese company carried out an environmental impact assessment on the railroad construction in 2021-22, and that the first section of the railroad linking Ruili and Mandalay is in the process of being constructed. This is part of the reason China has urged EAOs in northern Myanmar to observe ceasefires and hold talks with the Myanmar military regime. Shortly after the coup, the Myanmar military granted approval to the China-backed, US$2.5-billion power plant in Meelingyaing in Pathein, Ayeyarwady Region. China has not made any move regarding that project. But it is no coincidence that some Chinese investments have resumed following the trips of the Chinese special envoy this year. Military The area along the Chinese border with northern Shan State is overseen by the Myanmar military’s North-Eastern Command. In 2021-22, its presence in the area comprised a light infantry division and seven military operations commands. Surprisingly, the regime has pulled out three military operations commands or around 30 battalions from the area since early this year, after over 1,000 troops trained by the MNDAA—most of them fighters from central and southern Myanmar who decided to take up arms against the regime following the coup—finished their military training. Why has the Myanmar military pulled out a large number of troops while its enemy has got over 1,000 new soldiers? Perhaps the regime is taking advantage of the fact that China wants to de-escalate military tensions in northern Shan State for its Ruili-Mandalay railroad. Thanks to the troops it has pulled out of Shan, the regime has been able to send reinforcements to Kayah (Karenni) State, and Yedashae and Pinlaung, where People’s Defense Force groups (PDFs) and the Karenni Nationalities Defense Force are active, as well as to Karen State. Conclusion The latest developments in politics, the economy and the military situation in Myanmar following the UN resolution, Congress’ passage of the Burma Act, and moves by the Chinese special envoy, are interesting. Besides the US and the West, China might also consider the steps of the Indian nationalist government, which is blindly supporting the regime to establish a foothold in Myanmar. After both China and Russia declined to exercise their veto power and block the UN’s resolution on Myanmar, the regime came to understand that Russia will not go against China regarding important decisions on Myanmar. Since then, the regime has made moves to improve ties with China, after getting too close to Russia over the past two years. Again, the regime is saying China is Myanmar’s good neighbor. The regime might also be considering seeking advantage in the competition between China and India. The regime replaced its foreign minister in February, appointing a former Myanmar ambassador to the US to the post. Political observers suggest the regime is planning to approach the US. We have seen complicated diplomatic moves alongside hostilities over the past two years. The parallel National Unity Government (NUG) says it is the only government that can guarantee stability and safety for foreign investors. We need to monitor the policies and moves of US and Western governments that directly engage the NUG and EAOs; of China, which has avoided getting too close to the NUG though it is engaging with both the regime and EAOs in northern Myanmar; and of Russia and India, which are closely cooperating with the regime. Following his meeting with EAOs, Deng met junta chief Min Aung Hlaing on Monday in Naypyitaw, the second such meeting since the envoy’s appointment. The two vowed to cooperate in various sectors including the economy. The two discussed the role of China in border security and internal peace in Myanmar. It appears their ties have improved since the previous meeting. The main question is whether China will turn a blind eye to the wishes of the Myanmar people in its involvement in the Myanmar issue. If it overly focuses on its rivalry with the US and ignores the wishes and popular revolt of the Myanmar people, it will face a stronger response from Myanmar people. We must pay special attention to Deng’s shuttle trips between the junta chief and EAOs in northern Myanmar. According to credible sources from the border, Deng and seven EAOs in northern Myanmar plan to meet soon for a third time, this time collectively. China has officially supported ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus on Myanmar. One of the points is a visit by the ASEAN special envoy to meet all parties concerned. Neither the ASEAN envoy nor the Chinese envoy have yet been able to do this. If Deng fails to meet all parties concerned and his moves help support the regime politically, economically and militarily, the Myanmar people, especially the armed resistance who are fighting the regime, will not accept it. If the situation goes on like this, Deng’s move will do more harm than good for the Myanmar people, and anti-Chinese sentiment will rise again, which could result in further complications..."
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Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2023-03-09
Date of entry/update: 2023-03-09
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Description: "The recent arrest of a controversial Chinese businessman by Thai police for running an illegal online casino would not have impact on his mega project and gaming venture in Myanmar, said an official from the company that is operating the project near the Thai border. She Zhijiang was arrested in Bangkok last week. He is the subject of an international arrest warrant for allegedly running an illegal online casino, Thai police said Saturday. Chinese and other media reports say the 40-year-old has been on the run from Chinese authorities since 2012. He has had controversial mega projects and gaming ventures in Cambodia and at Shwe Kokko in Myanmar’s Karen state, as well as a lottery venture in the Philippines. An official from Myanmar Yatai International Co., Ltd, which is developing the Shwe Kokko project, told The Irrawaddy on Monday that he had learned about the arrest. “It won’t have any impact on Shwe Kokko. He may be arrested for his activities in other countries,” he said, requesting anonymity due to the sensitivity of the issue. Initiated as a new city project near the Thai border in 2017, the US$15-billion project is a collaboration between the BGF—a Myanmar military-backed armed group led by Colonel Chit Thu formerly known as the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA)—and a Hong Kong-registered company, Yatai International Holding Group (IHG). Myanmar Yatai International Co., Ltd is registered in Myanmar as a collaboration between IHG and Chit Lin Myaning, a company run by the Karen Border Guard Force (BGF) active in the Shwe Kokko area near Myawaddy Township in Myanmar’s Karen State. She Zhijiang is the chairman of Yatai Group. However it was halted and investigated by the National League for Democracy (NLD) government in 2019 due to a lack of transparency, land confiscations, confusion over the scale of construction and the growing influx of Chinese money as well as suspected illicit activity involving casino businesses. The Chinese Embassy in Yangon expressed support for Myanmar’s move to investigate the irregularities. In 2020, however, Yatai IHG’s management continued its gambling operations in the new city, which was only partially finished, in spite of a coronavirus lockdown. That year, both Thai and Chinese citizens were arrested in Mae Sot by Thai border police after entering Thailand illegally. Those arrested confessed to having worked at casinos within Shwe Kokko. Their testimony indicates that both online and traditional casinos are still operating in Karen State. Colonel Chit Thu told The Irrawaddy on Monday that the new city project is currently halted. He couldn’t say exactly how it would be affected by the arrest of She. “I think he was arrested for what he was involved in before the Shwe Kokko project,” the colonel said. When asked about gambling in the new city, he said Shwe Kokko is not a gambling city. “We only have a little casino venue,” he said. Interpol issued a red notice for She in May 2021. He faces criminal charges in China related to running a casino and could face a maximum penalty of 10 years in jail, AFP reported. Between January 2018 and February 2021, She — who heads up a “criminal gang” — colluded with others to register companies, and research and develop online gambling platforms, the red notice says. The notice adds that online gambling websites including Hongshulin, Yigou and Yiyou International were set up and 330,000 gamblers were recruited..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2022-08-15
Date of entry/update: 2022-08-15
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Sub-title: The toxic rare earth mining industry at the heart of the global green energy transition
Description: "China has long dominated the world's supply of heavy rare earths, minerals needed to build electric vehicles and wind turbines. Demand for these products is skyrocketing as we rush to meet climate goals, but there is a problem at the root of the supply chain. The processes used to extract heavy rare earths are highly polluting, ravaging landscapes and poisoning waterways. As concerns over the environmental toll of extraction have grown in China over the past decade, more and more domestic mines have been shut down. Yet global demand is growing rapidly, and China remains the world's largest processor. But with many of its own mines now closed, where is China's supply of these minerals coming from? A six-month investigation by Global Witness followed the outsourcing of this highly toxic industry across the Chinese border into Myanmar. There, heavy rare earth mining has exploded so quickly that within just a few years a mountainous corner of Myanmar, known as Kachin Special Region 1, has become the world's largest source of supply. This region is a semi-autonomous territory run by militias that are affiliated to Myanmar's brutal military regime. The mining is illegal under Myanmar's laws, and hardly exists on paper. Yet the damage that global demand for products manufactured by international companies is fuelling in this remote, lawless part of the world is all too real for the communities who are now risking their lives to defend their land. LEACHING MYANMAR'S MOUNTAINS For Zau*, a local worker, the mining boom is a rare chance to make money. He is paid 3,800 yuan ($600) in cash every month, around twice the average salary in Myanmar. He works in the shadows, at a mine near the Chinese border, for a company that has no permits. On paper, Sin Kyaing Company is owned by a local militia leader called Lagwi Bawm Lang. But like other Burmese companies in the rare earth mining industry, it is really a front for illegal investment by Chinese businesspeople. Zau's job is to remove vegetation and drill holes into the mountains. Then ammonium sulphate solution is injected into the holes, effectively liquefying the earth. Once the chemicals have percolated through the mountainside, the solution is drained into bright blue collection pools, where minerals are precipitated out in a process called in-situ leaching. After this mountain has been leached, Zau and his colleagues will abandon the contaminated site, moving to the next place and starting all over again. “In my opinion, the mountains will definitely collapse one day,” Zau told Global Witness, alluding to the risk of landslides. Despite being paid well, he is worried about the harm the chemicals are causing to the water supply, and therefore to the health of local people. “People from the surrounding villages are facing difficulties getting drinking water,” he said. “Even healthy people like us feel dizzy if we inhale these odours for a long time.” The mountains beneath Zau's feet are rich in ores of dysprosium and terbium, the two most valuable of the heavy rare earth metals. Described by an industry expert as “basically irreplaceable”, we rely on them for a whole range of clean energy and smart tech products – from the smartphone you may be using to read this story, to your energy-conserving home electronics. But their most important use, representing 90% of their value, is in permanent magnets, which are needed to make motors and generators for electric vehicles and wind turbines. The stakes are high: it would be almost impossible to build a low-carbon future without these products, and many of them currently do not work well without heavy rare earths..."
Source/publisher: "Global Witness" (London)
2022-08-09
Date of entry/update: 2022-08-09
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Description: "Namkham villagers suffer from year-long electricity cut by China due to border dispute Residents of Nawng Kham village in Namkham township, northern Shan State, have been suffering from electricity shortage since China cut off their power supply in July 2021 over a border demarcation dispute. Nawng Kham village, comprising 161 households, lies on the northern bank of the Mao (Shweli) river close to the Chinese border. Although Nawng Kham is only two kilometers north of Namkham town, there are no connecting power lines across the Mao/Shweli river, so Nawng Kham villagers have relied for years on electricity from the nearby village of Nawng Hsawng in China. In October 2020, Chinese authorities began building a double layer of fencing, 15 to 20 meters apart, along the border close to Nawng Kham, citing the need to prevent the spread of Covid-19. The fencing, 7 meters high on the China side and 5 meters high on the Burma side, cut through fields straddling the border, causing a loss of income for some farmers. Then, without warning, on July 10, 2021, workers from China began building a new layer of fencing which encroached into the fields of Nawng Kham villagers. Nawng Kham residents came out and stopped them, and called the Namkham township administrator and land survey department officials to the site. They also called officials from the China side, but the Chinese officials did not appear. On July 18, 2021, at 6 am, about 50 workers from China again returned to the same place, and used a backhoe to begin digging holes for the fence posts. Again, villagers from Nawng Kham went to stop them, forcing the Chinese workers to abandon their backhoe and digging tools and retreat to the China side. At that time, three Chinese military trucks were patrolling on the other side of the border. On the same day, villagers again called the Namkham township authorities to come and solve the dispute with the Chinese authorities, saying they did not want to lose their land. It was then agreed by both sides to stop building the new fencing. The Chinese workers filled in the holes already dug and took back their digging equipment. Two days later, on July 20, 2021, at 10 am, the Chinese electricity supply to Nawng Kham was suddenly cut off from Nawng Hsawng village. The villagers appealed to the Chinese electricity officials in Ruili, who said they had instructed the villagers of Nawng Hsawng to reconnect the electricity, but the power was not reconnected for three months. During this time, the Nawng Kham villagers had to buy diesel generators and solar panels for their electricity. Poorer families had to rely on candles. On October 10, 2021, the Chinese electricity authorities fined Nawng Hsawng village 7,000 yuan for failing to provide electricity to Nawng Kham, and the power was reconnected that evening. However, on October 19, 2021 there was a fire in a house in Nawng Kham, and the electricity was again cut off. The Nawng Kham villagers again contacted the Chinese electricity officials to reconnect the power, but the officials said they were too busy to deal with the issue, and finally did not even answer phone calls from the villagers. The electricity has been cut off until today. The Nawng Kham villagers have been buying electricity from the China side for 20 years. They paid for the installation of Chinese meter boxes in 2002, each meter box costing 560 yuan. They originally paid 1 yuan per unit of electricity, but after the Shweli 1 hydropower project became operational in 2009, the cost was reduced to 0.6 yuan. Local villagers assume the power cut is because of their opposition to China’s attempts to extend the border into their lands. The disputed location is precisely where China is planning a new cross-border road and bridge over the Mao/Shweli River to Namkham, which locals fear may cause further loss of land. Given that China is already gaining significant benefits from the Shweli 1 hydropower project in Namkham, it is regrettable that Chinese authorities are withholding electricity from local Namkham residents for household use. The Shweli 1 project is a joint venture between China’s Yunnan United Power Development Co. Ltd. and Burma’s Ministry of Electric Power, built under a 40-year Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) agreement. Out of the project’s installed capacity of 600 megawatts, 400 MW is for use in Burma, while 200 MW is for export to China. However, a large portion of the hydropower from Shweli 1 is sent directly via a high voltage transmission line to the Tagaung Taung nickel processing plant near Tigyaing in Sagaing, operated by China Nonferrous Metal Mining Group. Nawng Kham residents have already suffered impacts from other Chinese investment projects, including China National Petroleum Corporation’s transnational oil and gas pipelines, which pass only 200 meters west of their village. In 2010, when the pipelines started being laid, local farmers received unsatisfactory compensation for the digging up of their fields, while suffering from increased Burma Army security and laying of land mines. In 2011, a farmer called Loong Aung Nyunt from Aung Myat Thar ward in Namkham town stepped on a land mine in his field near where the gas pipeline was being laid, and was seriously injured. Villagers living near the pipelines remain in fear of possible leakage or explosion. Nawng Kham residents were also impacted by the construction of the Longjiang hydropower dam on the Mao/Shweli river in Yunnan province in 2010. Thousands of downstream villagers in northern Shan State have faced livelihood disruption due to sudden fluctuations in the river level, causing grounding of ferry boats and flooding of farmland. The dam’s blockage of sediment has also accelerated river bank erosion, a problem worsened by Chinese-sponsored sand mining, including next to Nawng Kham. Most of the sand is exported for construction projects inside China, causing problems of dust pollution during transport..."
Source/publisher: Shan Human Rights Foundation
2022-07-05
Date of entry/update: 2022-07-05
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi will travel to Myanmar this weekend for a regional meeting in what will be Beijing’s highest-profile visit since the military seized power. Wang will attend a foreign ministers’ meeting of the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation mechanism in the UNESCO World Heritage town Bagan in Mandalay Region. The Chinese foreign minister’s visit comes on the heels of the regime’s recent transfer of Myanmar’s detained State Counselor and democracy leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi to solitary confinement in a prison from house arrest. It also comes in the wake of attacks by anti-regime armed resistance groups on Chinese projects in the country for harboring regime soldiers, who have killed civilians and torched villages nearby. Recently, Chinese-owned Wanbao Mining Company in Sagaing Region was attacked with explosives and its power cables were blown up. The company condemned the attacks but didn’t comment on the sheltering of regime troops in its compound. Some armed resistance groups are now openly challenging Chinese projects in Myanmar and have condemned China’s support for the regime. Amid these attacks, there are reports that China wants to negotiate with the regime to send trained security guards to protect Chinese interests and mining projects in central Myanmar. Hundreds of Chinese nationals have reportedly entered Myanmar through two major checkpoints including Chinshwe-haw in Laukkaing Township, in Shan State’s Laukkaing District. Several ethnic armed groups based along the China-Myanmar border believe that the Chinese have negotiated with the regime to deploy more security guards at the targeted projects in Myanmar. The question now is whether Wang will meet coup leader Snr-Gen Min Aung Hlaing in Myanmar this time. If they meet, will Wang raise the issue of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, who was transferred from house arrest to prison last week? Or it will their talks focus more on extracting assurances from the regime that it will protect Chinese interests and projects in Myanmar? After the coup, massive anti-China protests broke out in Myanmar and Chinese factories came under attack. The attacks on China-linked businesses and China’s natural gas pipelines prompted Beijing to request an emergency meeting with regime officials, at which the Chinese side urged the junta to tighten security measures. Wang is no stranger to Min Aung Hlaing or Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, and last visited Myanmar in January 2021, just weeks before the coup. On that occasion he met with the country’s civilian President U Win Myint and the State Counselor, as well as military chief Min Aung Hlaing. Since the coup, with Western governments imposing sanctions in response to the junta’s violent crackdown on dissent, the regime has turned increasingly to allies including China and Russia. In April, current regime Foreign Minister Wunna Maung Lwin was invited to visit China and received a warm welcome from Wang. Beijing said it would help safeguard Myanmar’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity “no matter how the situation changes”. Wang told his Myanmar counterpart that Beijing “has always placed Myanmar in an important position in its neighborly diplomacy” and wants to “deepen exchanges and cooperation.” Wang’s comments amounted to Beijing’s most unambiguous statement of support to date for the military regime. Last year, Yun Sun, an expert on Myanmar-China relations with the Stimson Center, a US think-tank, said, “I think the Chinese can see that this military coup is successful and is here to stay.” China is one of the top investors in Myanmar (as well as a major arms supplier) and has strategic infrastructure projects in the country, including energy pipelines that give Beijing a critical link to the Indian Ocean. For Beijing, ultimately the question boils down to: Who can protect its interests and geopolitical objectives in Myanmar? China insists it is sticking to its classic “non-interference” policy—one of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence that is core to its foreign policy. In reality, given China’s enormous overseas interests and global economic power, it will do what is necessary to protect its business interests and counter security threats. Myanmar is no exception. Therefore, China will need the regime’s assurance that it can protect its interests in Myanmar from those hostile ethnic armed groups and newly formed resistance groups that now pose immediate threats to Chinese projects. In contrast, in June, US State Department Counselor Derek Chollet, making a visit to Southeast Asia, said the military is suffering “serious losses” in its fight against its own people, who have been resisting military rule in the country. Given the ongoing crisis in Myanmar, Chollet said the regime was finding itself increasingly isolated, not just internationally but at home. “They’re not winning. They’re losing territory. Their military is taking serious losses,” he told The Irrawaddy in a recent interview. More than 2,000 people have been killed in the military’s crackdown on dissent since the coup, according to a local monitoring group. Thousands of villages have been burned down and activists and politicians have been locked up in prisons. Several politicians and activists have been taken away and next morning family members have been told to claim the dead bodies. The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) in February said it had stepped up its emergency response to assist hundreds of thousands of internally displaced people in Myanmar as their number crossed the 800,000 mark—a doubling since last year’s military coup. Myanmar citizens are well aware of China’s self-interest, and therefore Wang’s visit to Myanmar will be keenly monitored. Any endorsement of the regime and General Min Aung Hlaing will backfire. The threats to Chinese interests are real. It is about time China engaged with opposition forces in Myanmar..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2022-07-01
Date of entry/update: 2022-07-01
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Sub-title: Chongqing-Mandalay railway route is launched, saving 20-day delivery time
Description: "A new international railway route from Southwest China's Chongqing Municipality to Mandalay, southern Myanmar, has officially started operation, with the first freight train departing from Chongqing on Monday, which will arrive in Mandalay about 20 days earlier than what it takes on traditional routes. The new route is expected to strengthen Chongqing's connectivity with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) members, said Ba Chuanjiang, an official from Chongqing. The train loaded with 60 TEUs of machinery equipment, electronic components, auto parts, departed from the Liangjiang New Area in Chongqing on Monday, which will head to Mandalay, passing through Lincang, in Southwest China's Yunnan Province, Chinese media outlet cnr.cn reported on Tuesday. The successful operation of the new route opens another logistics path for exports from Chongqing and neighboring regions, as products can reach Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia through the seaport of Mandalay, according to Yuxinou Logistics, a local rail logistics company operating the Yuxinou (Chongqing-Xinjiang-Europe) Railway. Chongqing will further promote the integration and development of other transportation methods from the metropolis to Myanmar, while the returning train from Myanmar to Chongqing could be loaded with products of Myanmar and other Southeast Asian countries, said Xi Dan, manager of Yuxinou Logistics. The total route is 2,000 kilometers starting from Chongqing, passing Lincang and the Mengding-Chinshwehaw border gate to Mandalay. The delivery time is 15 days, which is 20 days shorter than the traditional route and the logistics cost can be lowered by 20 percent. The route will shorten the transportation distance and time, while optimizing the international logistics model for transporting goods from the inland region of the western part of China to many ports in the Middle East and Europe. The new route comes as China and ASEAN members are bolstering logistics connectivity after the launch of the China-Laos Railway, a major project under the China-proposed Belt and Road Initiative, in December 2021. The railway has seen significant passenger and freight transportation, underscoring the booming trade between China and ASEAN. As of earlier this month, the China-Laos Railway had handled more than 2.7 million passenger trips and 2.9 million metric tons of cargo since it opened, according to official data..."
Source/publisher: "Global Times" (Beijing)
2022-05-24
Date of entry/update: 2022-05-24
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Description: "The early 2000s saw a boom in the banana farming sector in southern China. By 2008, the fruit had become an increasingly popular target of investment, with low supply and soaring prices, and banana plantations were set up across China, as well as in Myanmar and Laos. In rural areas of Laos and Myanmar, farming bananas for export to China is a key avenue of employment: thousands of local people are employed in a business which spans thousands of hectares of land. A 2017 report from Plan International revealed that Chinese-owned banana plantations in northern Laos’s Bokeo Province alone cover more than 11,000 hectares, generate US$100 million in annual exports and make up 95 per cent of all exports in the region. At the same time, a Mekong Region Land Governance report stated that in 2019 northern Myanmar’s Kachin State was estimated to have 170,000 hectares of land converted into banana plantations. The Chinese-owned plantations in Southeast Asian countries use Chinese technology to make tissue-cultured bananas, green in color and bigger than the normal yellow fruit. Most of the plantation workers are aware of shoddy working conditions, yet choose to engage in this work because it pays more than other options. Banana exports bring in more money than any other crop. Despite this, individual workers continue to make an estimated US$200-300 per month, even as the industry rakes in over US$200 million annually. Landowners leasing their land to the Chinese-run plantations are aware of the many drawbacks associated with banana farming, but still rent out their land, or are sometimes deceived into doing so, because of the limited market for traditional crops as well as the high rents they receive. But the consequences of that appear quickly, as local people struggle with land, environmental and health issues. The plantations are run and overseen by Chinese employers and while the labor tending to the plantations are from Myanmar or Laos, they are often migrants from other parts of those countries. This is the preferred practice in Kachin State. The plantation owners would rather hire migrants than local residents, who are more likely to complain about problems. Migrants, on the other hand, get no help in the event of any disputes. They are largely underpaid, receiving an average 6000 kyats, or US$3.28 per day, but there is no one to help them with their problems. Working conditions are exceedingly poor, the plantations are rife with toxic chemicals used in farming the fruit, including Chlorpyrifos, which can cause serious health problems such as lung cancer and lead to death. Taking into account the dire environmental and health hazards, the government of Laos imposed a ban on new plantations and contract extensions in 2017. However, this ban was rescinded in 2018 following a hit to the country’s exports, with the plantations being asked to implement better management and comply with local laws relating to the use of agricultural chemicals. Despite these superficial attempts at reform, a study carried out in 2021 by the International Water Management Institute and the National Agriculture and Forest Research Institute in Laos found chemical contamination in soil and water resources, arising from the banana plantations in the northern parts of the country, which has a hazardous impact on the environment and people’s health. The chemicals used in the plantations end up in the surrounding water sources, contaminating the rivers and creeks. Workers have reported that while they used to drink the water from the streams and wash with it, they cannot do so anymore for fear of their health, as the contaminated water is pumped back to those sources. Polluted water has also adversely affected the local marine life, killing off fish stocks. Plantations often employ ‘worker couples’, a hired pair [sometimes, but not always, husband and wife] that live full-time on the plantations as laborers for months on end. Paid for the whole season, the worker couple can make up to four million kyats, or US$2,300. However, that is dependent on the harvest. If the crop is damaged before the harvest, workers are often left unpaid. The worker-couples have to put up with harrowing working and living conditions. From residing in ramshackle shelters without any showers or washrooms, to carrying up to 60kgs at the time of harvest, the laborers put in immense efforts. The living quarters for the workers consist of metal sheds with just enough space for a bed, with them having to go to the toilet outside and wash in streams which may well be contaminated. While children under the age of 16 are not allowed to work on the plantations, in practice that rule is often flouted with some plantations employing 14-year-olds. Previously, workers were not allowed to go home and were under threat of being fired if they left the plantation for more than a week. However, the COVID-19 pandemic has led to stricter rules, with workers not being allowed to leave even to buy food or other necessities. Instead, they are forced to buy them from Chinese-run stores at inflated prices. Following these increasingly exploitative practices, over 500 workers on a Chinese-owned plantation in central Laos quit their job, reports Radio Free Asia. Workers also complained of exhausting working hours, late or no pay, as well as exposure to toxic, banned chemicals which threatened their health. Despite two local men employed at a Chinese-owned plantation in central Laos’s Borikhamxay Province reportedly dying from exposure to toxic chemicals earlier this year, the employers have never made any provision to provide workers with healthcare if they fall sick, or to pay any compensation in case of death. There have been incidents where workers report being beaten up at the Chinese-owned plantations by employers for ending their work day early on account of exhaustion. Despite the dangerous working conditions, the lack of basic amenities, mistreatment and exploitation, there continues to be a slew of workers coming in to toil on these foreign-owned plantations, because they need jobs and lack other options to earn a good income. There are no checks in place to protect the interests of the workers and migrant laborers, and abuse and exploitation of the workers continues to take place. The themes of socialism and common prosperity that the ruling Chinese Communist Party holds so close to its heart do not seem to extend beyond the country’s own borders, with the Chinese-owned plantations unaccountable for the welfare of their workers and unwilling to take any responsibility when issues crop up. It remains to be seen if Chinese businesses in foreign countries will move towards making any efforts to secure the rights of their local workers, or if the system of oppression and inhuman work conditions remain in place for the foreseeable future. Yan Naing is a pseudonym for a keen observer of Myanmar-China affairs..."
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Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2021-11-23
Date of entry/update: 2021-11-23
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Sub-title: China-Laos railway will open on December 2 but it's not clear the BRI-built line will extend anytime soon to wider SE Asia
Description: "Laos will never be the same again on December 2, the day the first high-speed train on the Belt and Road Initiative-built railroad is scheduled to roll into the capital Vientiane arriving from the southern Chinese province of Yunnan. Running for 414 kilometers from the border with China, the new line will transform Laos from a land-locked to land-linked country, as the Chinese state news agency Xinhua has trumpeted in several dispatches on the US$6 billion project. According to Xinhua, Laos’ underdeveloped economy will blossom as the new modern train speeds in Chinese tourists and businesspeople, facilitates faster and greater trade, and thus enhances Laos’ connectivity and post-pandemic economic recovery. Beijing is seeking to showcase the China-Lao train as a Belt and Road Initiative success story, one that encourages other Southeast Asian states to more firmly embrace the $1 trillion infrastructure-building scheme that has stalled on various fronts in the neighboring, resource-rich region. That includes stop-and-go progress on a similar rail line in Thailand and a port project in Myanmar, both of which are key to the BRI’s vision of a better-connected regional economic sphere with China at its powerful center. That trade-geared vision is all the more important to China’s economic security as tensions continue to rise with the US and its allies in contested sea lanes. There is no doubt that the China-Laos railroad is a remarkable feat of engineering. The deal between China and Laos was first struck in 2015 and work began in December 2016. Since then, Chinese engineers have built 75 tunnels, 165 bridges and 20 stations through some of the most mountainous terrain in all of Southeast Asia, according to a Chinese general manager of the Lao-China Railway Company (LCRC), the joint venture that will operate the railroad. The only railroad in Laos before the BRI-funded project was launched was a 3.5-kilometer Thai-built meter-track built in 2009 across the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge to Dongphosy village, 20 kilometers east of Vientiane, and a seven-kilometer, 600-millimeter narrow gauge line that was built in the late 19th century when Laos was a French colonial possession. The latter bypassed some waterfalls on the Mekong in the south, but was closed in the 1940s. Today, only some rusted locomotives remain on Don Khon island in the Mekong. The new, 21st-century project is only the beginning of a massive infrastructure drive that aims to transform all of mainland Southeast Asia. If all goes to plan, the railroad will continue from Vientiane across a planned new bridge on the Mekong River to Nong Khai in Thailand and then, eventually, all the way down to Singapore. But there are downsides to the grand plan which has put Laos heavily in debt to China. Around US$3.6 billion of the railway’s total $5.97 cost has been financed a loan from the Export-Import Bank of China and the remainder by the LCTC, which is comprised of three Chinese state-owned firms holding 70% and a Lao state-owned enterprise with 30%. But even the Lao share of the project’s expense is covered in part by loans from China. The bills are coming due while Laos’ $20 billion economy is weighed down by an estimated $12.6 billion in foreign debt, including US$5.9 billion owed to China for the railroad and other projects. Fitch Ratings described Laos’ external debt repayment profile as “challenging” in an August 9 report with around $422 million due over the remainder of 2021 “and an average of $1.16 billion due per annum between 2022 and 2025.” To fulfill those requirements without having to take out more loans, and then most likely from China, will be more than a “challenge”, the Fitch report said. Concerns are rising that Laos will soon be submerged in debts it can’t service and thus will fall victim to what critics of China’s lending practices call sovereignty-eroding “debt-traps.” Unable to make repayments in hard currency, Laos has already turned to repaying loans to China through debt to equity swaps. In September last year, Vientiane ceded majority control of the debt-ridden state utility Électricité du Laos to China Southern Power Grid Co to cover debts owed. Reports noted at the time that means Laos’ national power grid is now de facto controlled by a state-owned Chinese company. That erosion of sovereignty is no doubt ringing alarms in other Southeast Asian nations – not least Thailand – that Beijing is pressing to more fully commit to its BRI. Thailand already has an extensive railroad network but with one-meter gauge tracks while the China-Lao high-speed trains will roll on a standard 1,435-millimeter. That means that an entirely new railroad would have to be built on the Thai side and beyond. Even Malaysia and Singapore have meter-gauge railroads that would not be suitable for China’s high-speed trains. Whether China’s plans will materialize in the foreseeable future is an open question. Strict Covid-19 travel restrictions in China and much of Southeast Asia have raised new questions about the desirability and feasibility of the BRI’s vision of fast and open borders. Thailand seems more interested in connecting Bangkok with Nakhon Ratchasima in the northeast, Chiang Mai in the north, and to beach resorts like Pattaya and Hua Hin, than being part of some broader Chinese scheme for the entire region. Most of those plans, despite Bangkok’s years of repeated assurances to Beijing the plan is on track, remain on the drawing board. The only visible progress so far is the construction of a new railroad hub at Bang Sue, a northern Bangkok suburb, which will replace the old, downtown Hualampong Central Station. From Bang Sue, new railroads will branch out to different destinations in Thailand. In Malaysia, tentative agreements for the construction of high-speed railroads involving Chinese partners were allowed to lapse in May. That leaves Myanmar as the only reasonably secure outlet for China to connect its railroad networks with Southeast Asian markets other than little landlocked Laos. That route, dubbed the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, forms a vital part of the BRI as it would provide the Chinese with direct access to the Bay of Bengal and Indian Ocean ports. A railroad has been built from China’s Yunnan province capital of Kunming to Ruili, a border town opposite Muse in the far north of Myanmar’s Shan state. Another newly-built line, ceremonially opened on August 25, stretches from Sichuan’s provincial Chengdu to Lincang in Yunnan, with a road connection to the border at Chinshwehaw in northeastern Shan state. But ever since those Chinese-side projects were launched more than a decade ago, skeptics have pointed out that widespread insurgencies across the border in Myanmar would make it difficult, if not impossible, to extend those lines through northern Shan state to the central city of Mandalay. From there a new railroad was planned down to the old capital Yangon and, more importantly, the deep seaport at Kyaukphyu on the Bay of Bengal in Myanmar’s western Rakhine state. On October 22, 2018, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for a railroad from the border to Mandalay was signed between the now-ousted Myanmar government and China Railways. Another MoU for the route from Mandalay to Kyaukphyu was signed on January 10 this year. The China Railway Eryuan Engineering Group has carried out some feasibility studies along the route from the border to Mandalay but little, if any, concrete progress has been made on the ground. The Covid-19 pandemic is now running rampant in Myanmar, prompting China to close the border. And the insurgencies in northern and northeastern Myanmar have only intensified since the MoUs were signed less than a month before Myanmar’s destabilizing February 1 coup. The railroad to Vientiane could thus be the beginning and end of China’s lofty BRI plans for the region, particularly as China starts to turn inward and the economy shows new signs of overleveraged weakness. In the end, China may not achieve the access to Southeast Asian ports it has so long desired while Laos is stuck with a hefty bill for infrastructure that is of marginal use and questionable commercial viability without wider connections..."
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Source/publisher: "Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
2021-10-03
Date of entry/update: 2021-10-04
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Description: "Since the “Going Out Policy” was initiated in 1999 by the Chinese Government to promote Chinese investments abroad, the footprint of Chinese enterprises has expanded considerably. This has been further accelerated by President Xi Jinping’s launch of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)1 in 2013, after which China committed to work “together with other countries to foster the environmentally-friendly and sound development of the Belt and Road, featuring peace and the exchange of wisdom, and to build a global economy more vibrant, open, inclusive, stable and sustainable.”2 These efforts have facilitated a massive expansion of Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI), which is valuable as developing countries need FDI to boost their development. To support these overseas development goals, the Chinese Government, state agencies and business associations continue to issue a growing matrix of policies, regulations and guidelines to establish social and environmental safeguards for its FDI. In regulating the diverse economic activities of private and state-owned enterprises overseas, these documents seek to reinforce social integrity, environmental protection, workplace and personnel safety, among many other goals. As Chinese businesses – particularly energy, construction, and mining and metals companies – continue to venture abroad3 , civil society and the media have reported an unfortunate increase in social, environmental and human rights violations – particularly in Asia, Africa and Latin America (See Section 3.1). All FDI from any country must now be informed by and directed to meet the twin challenge of addressing worsening inequality of power and wealth, while also tackling the challenges associated with climate change. It is therefore important for Chinese companies to ensure they address these issues. Between 2013 and 2020, the Business & Human Rights Resource Centre (Resource Centre) recorded 679 human rights abuse allegations linked to Chinese business conduct abroad, and 102 company responses to these allegations. In analysing the data further, this report intends to support civil society organisations in host countries of Chinese investments to make informed decisions about their advocacy for responsible business conduct of Chinese companies. This report also presents data and analysis to assist businesses, investors, the Chinese Government and governments of states hosting Chinese investments to take further action to fulfil the development commitments related to China’s international economic cooperation4 and the responsible business conduct guidelines established through the years..."
Source/publisher: Business and Human Rights Resource Centre (BHRRC)
2021-08-11
Date of entry/update: 2021-08-15
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Land confiscations, illegal casinos, money laundering, and environmental degradation plagues a Myanmar SEZ.
Description: "Like more than 100 areas in the Mekong River region earmarked as development zones, the Yatai Shwe Kokko Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in Myanmar was promoted as a way to spur economic growth and deliver material benefits to the local community. But instead the Chinese-backed U.S. $15 billion real estate mega-project along the Thaungyin River in southeastern Kayin state has gained notoriety in recent months as a bastion of illegal activity, according to a report released Wednesday by the Washington-based Center for Advanced Defense Studies (C4ADS), an independent research outfit that studies transnational organized crime networks. Shwe Kokko New City, as the area is called, was funded by Hong Kong-registered developer Yatai International Holding Group in partnership with the Chit Lin Myaing Company owned by the Kayin State Border Guard Force (BGF), an ethnic Karen force aligned with the Myanmar military. It includes the Myanmar Yatai Shwe Kokko Special Economic Zone. But the area became a hub for illicit activity because of weak national laws, a diffusion of responsibility, and a lack of development plans, says the 76-page report titled “Zoned Out: A Comprehensive Impact Evaluation of Mekong Economic Development Zones.” The study identified 110 official and unofficial foreign-invested EDZs in the Mekong region, including 40 in Cambodia, 15 in Laos, 20 in Myanmar, 16 in Thailand, and 19 in Vietnam, and used publicly available information to assess them in terms of economic development, illicit activity, and geopolitics. To assess the impact of EDZs, the researchers examined both quantitative indicators derived from personal activity intelligence, including mobile phone location data, change detection in satellite imagery, and nightlight data, along with qualitative research on illicit activity and geopolitical trends. Because of the strong correlation between nightlight data and economic activity, the researchers measured nighttime luminosity in the EDZs to objectively evaluate the relative economic performance of the zones. They also used information from publicly available reports that detailed illegal activities, including corruption, environmental degradation, land conflict, drug trafficking, and wildlife trafficking. Shwe Kokko is not the only example of an EDZ gone wrong. The study found that while the establishment of the zones speeds up development, the EDZs themselves can facilitate adverse outcomes that undermine economic growth benefits. They also found that limited data access concerning the Mekong region’s EDZs can hurt host governments and local communities, and that collaboration among stakeholders from government, grassroots organizations, the private sector, and civil society will increase transparency and better match objectives to end results. “Without proper management, EDZs can serve as staging grounds for multiple types of transnational illicit activity and geopolitical machinations,” the report says. “Further complicating the situation is a paucity of accessible data, leaving policymakers and observers alike struggling to draw informed conclusions on the effects of zones.” Lack of regulatory oversight In the case of the Shwe Kokko SEZ First, the developers allegedly received a 70-year land lease with the possibility of extending to 99 years, violating Myanmar law which limits lease terms to 50 years for official Economic Development Zones (EDZs). Then the BGF confiscated land for the site, but shortchanged residents paying them only U.S. $1,600 an acre — half the amount they sought. A lack of regulatory oversight enabled the illegal land confiscations along with Chinese gang activities once the project had been built, illegal casinos, money laundering, and environmental degradation, the report says. It also notes that She Kailun, Yatai International’s China-born chairman, had a previous conviction for operating an illegal lottery business that earned nearly U.S. $300 million. In response, Myanmar’s civilian-led government announced plans in January to address alleged irregularities, including the land confiscations, illicit activities, and local concerns about the impact of the casinos. The government also cracked down on Chinese criminal groups in the area and requested that the national military enforce the law in Shwe Kokko. When Myanmar’s military overthrew the government in a Feb. 1 coup, it became unclear what would happen next in Shwe Kokko. “A combination of legal ambiguity, limited host government enforcement, and poor zone management have created numerous negative externalities in Shwe Kokko, including increased criminal activity, decreased geopolitical power, and environmental degradation — all without delivering economic gain for the region itself,” the report says. Aung Naing Oo, minister of investment and foreign economic relations under the State Administrative Council, the official name of Myanmar’s military government, told RFA that the Myanmar Investment Commission had examined and approved the Shwe Kokko project during the previous civilian-led government, but determined that its scope was much larger than the original proposal. “Then we checked the project again and ordered that business activities not included in original proposal be stopped, he said. “Because the project was much larger and there were other issues such as land use, we ordered the project to be halted since previous government. They were ordered to do only what had been approved.” “The activities that were not included in the proposals were the building of hotels among other [sites],” he said. “We asked them to stop, [and] the order has remained unchanged…We have supervised them very closely about the suspension.” The report details other case studies of other zones plagued by illicit activities, such as the Boten SEZ in Laos, rife with illegal sales of wildlife, such as endangered pangolins, and the Golden Triangle EDZ, also in Laos, a hub for a hub for illicit drug and wildlife trafficking. An official in the Special Economic Zone Control Department of the Lao Ministry of Planning and Investment told RFA that he could not comment on whether there is illicit activity in the Boten and Golden Triangle SEZs. China ‘used its influence’ Cambodia’s Sihanoukville SEZ, considered part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, suffered from high crimes rates among other factors, the report said. “The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) promises benefits for local communities. In the case of the Sihanoukville SEZ, however, development was greatly undercut by increasing crime rates, rising rents, overwhelmed infrastructure, and the suppression of local culture in the city of Sihanoukville,” the report says. “China allegedly used its influence to pressure Cambodia to ban online gambling as part of a broader campaign against gambling by China. This ban further disrupted the city of Sihanoukville by devastating the local gaming economy and causing thousands to leave the city,” it said. The Cambodian Investment Board did not respond to an email request for comments on the report’s findings concerning the Sihanoukville SEZ. Emails sent to two contact addresses listed on the website of the Cambodian Special Economic Zone Board were undeliverable. Both government agencies deal with investment projects in SEZs. To improve the impacts of EDZs in the Mekong region, the researchers recommend the development of open, centralized repositories of information on EDZs, the use of emerging technologies such as nightlight capture, satellite imagery, and machine learning to create monitoring processes, and the convening of cross-sector interdisciplinary task forces to address negative impacts. “Through collaboration and data-driven analysis, host governments can ensure that EDZs serve the needs of the host country economy and the local population,” the report says..."
Source/publisher: "RFA" (USA)
2021-06-25
Date of entry/update: 2021-06-26
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Abstract: This article explains cross-border uses of force against ethnic armed groups along Myanmar’s bloody borders with China and Thailand. I trace the history of Burma’s ethnic disputes, its state-society relations, and the “modernization” of its military doctrine to understand how its state-building enterprise can shape the use of force along a state’s frontier. I treat each of the border regions as distinct subcategories to highlight variation in the micro-dynamics as well as types and conditions under which the use of state-orchestrated violence occurs. First, I point to the role of greater state-building – extractive, coercive, etc. – and how it influences the use of force along border regions. Second, I explore the modernization of Burma’s military and evolution of its doctrine – this includes early efforts by the tatmadaw’s post-1988 shift toward a more conventional counterinsurgency strategy. An implication of my theory is that more peaceful relations between states perversely can create the conditions for more cross-border violence, as there are greater opportunities for states to either “pool” border security or outsource the use of force to proxies or paramilitary forces.....Introduction: The world’s longest civil war rages on in the frontiers of Myanmar between a government historically dominated by its military and several bands of ethnic rebels, many of them seeking self-rule.1 At the same time, a number of other insurgencies, including one against a Muslim minority, the Rohingya, continue along Myanmar’s other frontier regions. Even as Myanmar begins to democratize, there has been little to no let-up in the violence along its periphery. To understand Myanmar’s use of force against these groups, one must understand the complicated origins of its military rule, its fitful attempts at state-building and shifts in its threat environment, both internal and external. This article posits that the Myanmar’s approach to counterinsurgency and application of force is a function of two simultaneous processes: First, the state under military rule has carried out aggressive state-building along its frontier as a way to further consolidate its boundaries, alternating between the use of local paramilitary forces and its own armed forces to quell these border regions, while purposely not eradicating these groups given that the military benefits from some level of a threat to legitimize its control.2 Simultaneously, Myanmar’s military (or tatmadaw) seeks to profit from cross-border trade (timber, jade, opium, etc.), both licit and illicit (see Lintner, 1999; Meehan, 2011). As a result, it has vacillated between military coercion and political accommodation as a means of bringing order to its frontiers while also enhancing its economy, capacity and legitimacy. To this day, these areas, hilly, remote, rich in natural resources and ethnic hodgepodges, have proved difficult to control and bring into the political fold. Second, Myanmar’s civil-military relations have gone through a series of institutional crises and challenges to the regime’s authority. Together with shifts in its threat environment, this has spurred on a modernization of its military doctrine (Maung Aung Myoe, 2009, pp. 16–46). During the first years of postcolonial rule (1948–1958), Myanmar’s military posture was based largely on fear of external invasion from China (ibid., p.11). Over the next few decades (1958–1988), its doctrine congealed around the threat of the country’s internal insurgency and ethnic armed actors along the periphery. Following 1988, military doctrine focused almost exclusively on modernization, as external threats took on renewed attention and the armed forces shifted towards a more conventional warfare stance (ibid., p. 11). Interestingly, its use of force against ethnic armed groups, even across borders into neighbouring states, would become more routinized as the military modernized itself after Ne Win stepped down in 1988. Part of this modernization process was to consolidate its borders and reduce the threat these groups posed while simultaneously guarding its border against conventional threats. The tatmadaw would rely increasingly on local border patrols, some of them comprising ethnic armed factions it was previously fighting. It was a counterinsurgency policy that mixed co-optation with coercion. Myanmar’s military rules over a fragmented society. The tatmadaw itself is riven by elite divisions, yet still rules as a leviathan-like entity. It views itself as a ‘modernizing’ force, despite claims to the contrary.3 The case of Myanmar reveals how military rulers, insulated from public opinion, perceive of state and non-state threats along its periphery, and how this perception shapes its military doctrine, at a time of rapid state-building. Its use of force is manifested by the centre’s exertions of greater control—economic, political and cultural—over its upland periphery.4 Despite greater civilian control, the government still retains a strong praetorian composition, which explains its aggressive use of force along its frontier (Ben-Eliezer,1997). Externally, despite relatively peaceful relations with its neighbouring states, and despite greater civilian control, Myanmar has taken a largely offensive approach to counterinsurgency, one that mixes conciliatory gestures to co-opt armed actors with the application of brute military force. This article argues that the peripheral threat is necessary for the tatmadaw’s claims to institutional authority and legitimacy, as well as for the military to profit from the booming economy along the border. The implications of my argument are that the state should have little incentive in seeing these areas become completely pacified and so will continue to wage a border war that mixes conventional counterinsurgency with political accommodation. This article proceeds as follows: First, I examine the country’s historical background of ethnic war, looking at the postcolonial roots of the conflict. Then, I discuss its early attempts at state-building, placing Myanmar in the larger literature. Next, I situate my case study in the broader literature on civil-military relations and explore the historical evolution of its military, how its military doctrine has evolved, and specifically its use of cross-border force against rebels in Thailand and China. I conclude with a recap of my theory.....Background of Ethnic Conflict in Myanmar: Myanmar is strategically located in Southeast Asia, wedged between two more powerful state rivals, China and India.5 It is a nation hemmed in by a horseshoe of hill country, ethnically diverse, impoverished and constituting what James Scott has referred to as a ‘negative space’ (Scott, 2009). The highlands of Kachin state along the northern Chinese border provide insurgents with a natural canopy to evade being targeted (Tucker, 2000). Likewise, the jungles between Myanmar and Thailand, rich in lumber and lucrative teal, are some of the world’s thickest. As John Seabury Thomson noted in 1957, ‘[The] topography of the country and its isolation from trade routes tended to make the [Burmese] people look inward rather than outward […]’ (Thomson, 1957, p. 269). That shapes the country’s view of itself in the wider region as well as its own poorly defined borders and helps explain why the country currently faces no fewer than a dozen armed ethnic conflicts. Besides the ethnically dominant Burman, which constitutes over two-thirds of the population, the government officially recognizes 135 distinct ethnic groups. Virtually all of the ethnic groups can be carved up further into various subgroups. The categories still in use today were mostly derived by the British administrators and missionaries, who made perceptions-based differentiations mostly based on a group’s language and culture. As one British official noted in 1931, ‘[S]ome of the races or tribes in Burma change their language almost as often as they change their clothes’ (Smith, 1991, p. 34). Interpreting Myanmar’s history by delineating it into various political-ethnic groups is problematic, if only because of these groups’ complex identities and overlapping cultures.6 Myanmar retains some of the strictest citizenship laws, which in theory require proof of ancestry present in Myanmar before arrival of the British in 1824. This has typically been a ploy to discriminate against non-Buddhist minorities, like the Rohingya, a Muslim minority not considered citizens of Myanmar (Tang, 2013)..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: 2018 SAGE Publications India via Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs
2018-00-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-06-24
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "After more than two decades under authoritarian rule, the past five years have witnessed profound changes in Myanmar’s domestic politics. Albeit the flawed election in 2010, the newly elected government has symbolized the end of military regime and the restoration of civilian order. Furthermore, the new government has indicated its commitment to advance democratic transition by its progressive policies in liberalizing its economy and domestic press as well as reproaching the opposition leader, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, as the landmark step toward national reconciliation (Thuzar 2012). As the Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Marty Natalegawa, said after his visit to Myanmar, “Myanmar reform is irreversible” (Thuzar 2012). In order to understand how these reforms have been taking place, this paper will examine both external and internal factors as indispensable parts of these reforms. This paper will specifically focus on how major powers and domestic leadership affect the dynamics of political changes in Myanmar which eventually lead to the current reforms. This paper argues that both major powers and domestic leadership have contributed significantly to the dynamics of political changes in Myanmar. The diverging interests and policies among major powers have resulted in different approaches toward the military regime. While the policies of one major power have weakened the policies of others, these policies in overall have complementary effects in the democratic transition of the country. The engagement policies of China, India and ASEAN, for instance, have been crucial for the survival of the country while sanctions and pressure from US and other western countries have pushed the country forward to democratization. Likewise, different personal leaderships have resulted in different approach to democratization. A more conservative leader such as Than Shwe has succeeded in maintaining order and unity of the country, while the emergence of reformist leader, represented by Thein Sein, has advanced reform and democratization. In order to better elaborate these arguments, this paper will be divided into several parts. The first part will provide the historical background on Myanmar’s domestic politics since its independence to its current reform. The second part, then, will examine major powers’ interests and policies in Myanmar and how these external factors affect the dynamics of political changes in Myanmar. The third part, in turn, will examine the internal factors emphasizing the role of domestic leadership in this reform. Based on these discussions, the last part will conclude the findings by looking ahead the anticipated consequences of the aforementioned factors on the future trajectories of Myanmar’s democracy.....Historical Background: Nation building in Myanmar is perhaps the longest and the bloodiest compared to other countries in Southeast Asia. After gaining independence from Britain in January 4, 1948, Myanmar was torn into chaos under failed trial of multiparty parliamentary democracy in the first fourteen years. At the center, the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL) as the previously independent movement “who inherited the state” was apparent to be ideologically heterogeneous and failed to reach agreement on how to run the newly independent Myanmar (T. Than 1993). In the grassroots level, situation was worsening as ethnic minorities such as Karen, Kachin, Mon, and Chin revolted against the government (T. Than 1993). This has not mentioned Muslim Mujaheedin groups and communist elements who attempted to do similar actions (T. Than 1993). Under such circumstances, the government has, from the beginning, relied heavily on military intervention to appease these dissensions (T. Than 1993). While the charisma of U Nu has succeeded in maintaining this fragile regime for the first decade, the 1962 has seen relentless public dissents and significant economic decline. U Nu’s policy of installing Buddhism as state religion, followed by his resignation in early 1962 has exacerbated the situation even further (T. Than 1993). In order to prevent the state from disintegration, the Tatmadaw or Myanmar’s arms forces who previously stayed in the peripheries to halt the flow of Kuomintang refugees in the northern border has moved to the center and taken over the government under the name of Revolutionary Council (RC) (T. Than 1993). The Tatmadaw has learnt that its task was no longer promoting freedom and democracy as it did under British rule, but instead, maintaining peace and the rule of Law (T. Than 1993). Under the constitutional military regime of General Ne Win, the RC has redirected the trajectory of the state from chaotic democracy to the so-called Burmese Way of Socialism (BWS) and renamed the state as the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma (T. Than 1993). In order to maintain domestic order, the regime has cut off the relations with other states and focused on building socialism under one party system. These two elements, nationalism and domestic order, are key elements in understanding military rule in Myanmar and have characterized most of the subsequent development in its path to democratization. The ratification of new constitution and the general election in 1974 were evidences that Military were not merely struggling for power, but instead, restoring order within the state..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Sukmawani Bela Pertiwi
2013-00-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-06-19
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Topic: Myanmar/Burma, China, ASEAN, sanctions, pariah states, authoritarian transitions, Aung San Suu Kyi
Topic: Myanmar/Burma, China, ASEAN, sanctions, pariah states, authoritarian transitions, Aung San Suu Kyi
Description: "Abstract: Myanmar’s liberalizing reforms since late 2010 have effectively shed the country’s decades-long “pariah state” status. This article evaluates competing explanations for why Myanmar’s leaders made the strategic decision to pursue reform and opening. We examine whether the strategic decision was motivated by fears of sudden regime change, by socialization into the norms of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), or by the geopolitics of overreliance on China. Drawing on newly available materials and recent field interviews in Myanmar, we demonstrate how difficult it is for international actors to persuade a pariah state through sanctions or engagement, given the pariah regime’s intense focus on maintaining power. However, reliance on a more powerful neighbour can reach a point where costs to national autonomy become unacceptable, motivating reforms for the sake of economic and diplomatic diversification.....Acknowledgments: We gratefully acknowledge the participation of interviewees in Yangon, Naypyidaw, Seoul, and Washington, DC. Research assistance was provided by Andrew Choi, Esther Pau Sann Cing, Li Xuan, Li Zimeng, Wang Qichao, Wu Shangwei, Zhang Xiaorui, and Zhou Xin. We also wish to thank the editor, three anonymous reviewers, and participants at the 2014 Murdoch-Macau Colloquium on Political Change and Governance in Asia, whose comments greatly improved this article. We thank the Asan Institute for Policy Studies for supporting Leif-Eric Easley’s research travel to Myanmar in 2014. Research for this article was funded in part by a grant from the University of Macau (SRG2013-00057-FSS). For over two decades, Myanmar suffered the reputation of an international pariah. After the 1988 coup that inaugurated 22 years of military rule under the State Law and Order Restoration Council / State Peace and Development Council (SLORC/SPDC),1 Myanmar incurred international condemnation and sanctions for human rights violations, including annulling the National League for Democracy’s (NLD) electoral victory in 1990; detaining opposition leaders, including NLD General Secretary Aung San Suu Kyi; killing civilians during military campaigns against armed ethnic minority groups; violently suppressing civil protests in the 2007 “Saffron Revolution”; and muzzling free speech and the press.2 The junta appeared unmoved by sanctions and international exhortations to pursue reform and opening. Its apparent steps toward ending military rule under the 2003 “Roadmap to Discipline-Flourishing Democracy” were often marred by process irregularities, lack of inclusiveness and transparency, and restrictions on and sometimes violent repression of opposition parties. Though the SPDC held landmark elections for a civilian government in November 2010, supporters of democracy were not encouraged when the pro-military Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) swept the polls and elevated Prime Minister Gen. Thein Sein to the presidency. Many were surprised, however, when Thein Sein initiated extensive reforms in 2011: releasing political prisoners, loosening media and civil society restrictions, and allowing Aung San Suu Kyi and other opposition members to run for parliament. Myanmar’s pariah status quickly abated as a parade of foreign leaders visited the country and eased sanctions. In November 2015, Myanmar’s first general election under nominally civilian rule saw the NLD defeat the USDP in a landslide, marking a new era in Myanmar’s politics.3 The manner in which Myanmar pursued transformative reforms raises important questions. Why did the SPDC pursue reform and opening when it did? What motivated the strategic decision to pursue transformative policies? Several scholars have argued that domestic factors drove Myanmar’s reforms. Jones maintains that the junta’s co-optation of ethnic militias allowed it to resume a democratization process it had begun and aborted in 1990 and again in 1996.4 Bünte, along with Croissant and Kamerling, emphasizes the aging SPDC leaders’ desire to manage succession politics through institutionalization.5 Roger Lee Huang argues that the junta sought to retain political control but did not foresee the extent of reforms under Thein Sein, an assessment shared by MacDonald.6 Other scholarship emphasizes international factors as primary catalysts for reform. One argument is that Myanmar’s leaders implemented domestic reforms to pursue rapprochement with the European Union, the United States, and other sanctions-imposing countries, and to counterbalance China’s growing political and economic influence.7 Another possible factor behind Myanmar’s transition is the socializing role of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and more generally, Myanmar’s desire for international prestige.8 While more than one of these factors may have motivated Myanmar’s reforms, an “all of the above” answer leaves the country’s political transformation over-determined and under-examined. This article weighs the theoretical logic and empirical evidence for three competing explanations for Myanmar’s strategic decision to pursue transformative policies: first, junta leaders’ desire to maintain power and avoid sudden regime change; second, socialization into ASEAN norms; and third, the desire to reduce China’s political and economic influence over Myanmar.9 We base our research on numerous interviews with key informants in or engaged with Myanmar, as well as on primary documents. We find that while multiple factors motivated Myanmar’s strategic decision, the most important driver was concern about China’s growing influence. To frame the analysis, the next section defines pariah states and what it means to make a strategic decision to pursue transformative policies and exit pariahdom. We then briefly outline our interview methodology before discussing the timing of Myanmar’s transformative reforms. Subsequent sections review theoretical bases and empirical support for each of the three competing explanations. In the conclusion, we summarize our findings and discuss possible implications for other pariah states and for Myanmar’s political future..."
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Source/publisher: Pacific Affairs (Canada)
2016-09-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-05-28
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Description: "PetroChina International Singapore Pte Ltd sold a cargo of jet fuel into Myanmar in April, according to government import data reviewed by Reuters, the first such shipment since before the military seized power in a coup in February. Industry sources say suppliers have been particularly wary of selling jet fuel because it could be used in planes to bomb ethnic armed groups that have been supporting anti-junta protesters, as well as in civilian airliners. The shipment could raise new questions over China's role in Myanmar at a time when it has been accused by the junta's opponents of backing coup leader Min Aung Hlaing - an accusation rejected by Beijing. China's foreign ministry did not immediately respond to a request for comment. PetroChina, a listed company controlled by state-owned China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPET.UL), did not respond to requests for comment about the fuel shipment. The import data, which hasn't been published, shows PetroChina International shipped 13,300 tonnes of jet fuel and 4,000 tonnes of gasoline onboard tanker MT Yu Dong for discharge at Myanmar's Thilawa terminal on April 15. Western nations including the United States and Britain have condemned the junta for killing hundreds of civilians and have applied limited sanctions, but there are currently no international measures outlawing oil product shipments. And while the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), to which Myanmar belongs, has called for an end to violence and dialogue among the parties, it stopped well short of calling for sanctions in an April statement. China has not been so forceful in condemning the junta and has simply said it wants to see stability in its neighbour, drawing accusations from some of the junta's opponents that it is supporting the military authorities. "Given Beijing's desire to boost its influence in Naypyidaw, it seems unlikely that any Chinese state firm would be too concerned by the threat of backlash from the international community over doing business with Myanmar's government," said Henrick Tsjeng, an associate research fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Singapore's Nanyang Technological University. Activist group Justice for Myanmar condemned the fuel sale. "We're appalled that PetroChina is exporting jet fuel to Myanmar, doing business with the war criminals who are conducting indiscriminate air strikes against ethnic communities," said spokeswoman Yadanar Maung. Data from Singapore trade agency Enterprise Singapore confirmed a mid-April shipment of aviation turbine fuel into Myanmar. The fuel can be used by both commercial and military planes, possibly needing to be blended depending on the grade. Reuters saw no evidence that the fuel was destined for military jets. The junta spokesman did not respond to calls requesting comment. Military jets have carried out frequent bombing raids against ethnic armies opposed to the junta in northern and eastern Myanmar as fighting has surged since the Feb. 1 coup that toppled elected leader Aung San Suu Kyi. One of the forces that has been bombed, the Kachin Independence Army, told Reuters it had attacked seven oil trucks it suspected of bringing aviation fuel in by road from China this week. It did not comment on the PetroChina shipment. The Myanmar data showed PetroChina International sold the jet fuel to National Energy Puma Aviation Services Co Ltd (NEPAS), a joint venture between Puma Energy and Myanma Petroleum Enterprise (MPE). The gasoline went to three other local fuel importers. Puma Energy told Reuters NEPAS arranged for delivery of a cargo at the Thilawa terminal on April 15, but declined to comment on the type of fuel being offloaded. Puma Energy, a fuel storage and retail firm majority-owned by global commodities trader Trafigura, said it had suspended operations in Myanmar on Feb. 10 to ensure employee safety. Since then, operations of the NEPAS joint venture are being carried out by majority shareholder MPE, Puma Energy's spokesman said. MPE, owned by the Ministry of Electrical and Energy (MOEE) which is now under junta control, did not respond to a request for comment. In addition to the jet fuel, 79,500 tonnes of gasoline and 110,700 tonnes of diesel were shipped to Myanmar last month from Asia's oil trading hub, Enterprise Singapore's data showed. Myanmar last imported about 13,800 tonnes of jet fuel in February, according to government data. Monthly imports in 2019, before the COVID-19 pandemic, were about 14,500 tonnes. PetroChina International Singapore is the Singapore-based trading unit of PetroChina Co Ltd (601857.SS), ..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Reuters" (UK)
2021-05-20
Date of entry/update: 2021-05-22
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Sub-title: US could not unilaterally invoke 'R2P' to intervene in Myanmar's crisis but that doesn't mean the military option is off the table
Description: "Nearly 80 days and 800 deaths after the military coup of February 1, two divergent trendlines have emerged to define the future contours of Myanmar’s crisis: brutal reassertion of control by the military junta over a political and economic wasteland; or descent into civil war pitting the junta against a nascent coalition of forces fighting for federal democracy. Less noted and earlier in the crisis dismissed as quixotic, there is also however a third wild-card scenario involving action aimed at deflecting both of those two disastrous trajectories: foreign intervention to engage Myanmar’s generals in the only language they have ever understood or respected – military power. Impelled by the looming prospect of state collapse and humanitarian catastrophe as an inflexible Tatmadaw ratchets up its repression, the logic of external intervention in the form of US missile strikes against military targets is assuming a compelling momentum. As one well-placed Singapore-based analyst conceded: “We’re in such dire territory now that almost nothing is off-limits.” In the weeks following the putsch through February and into March many, including this writer, saw reassertion of control by the junta, known as the State Administration Council (SAC), as the most probable outcome. The argument was based on an assessment of four salient facets of the Tatmadaw as a military organization: its ample resources, institutional cohesion, proven ruthlessness and unblinking sense of mission. All of these characteristics had been amply demonstrated in earlier periods of popular protest. Where the assessment fell down was in underestimating the extraordinary courage and resilience of ordinary citizens. Led by a youthful vanguard armed with modern communications technology, hundreds of thousands who saw their future being torn away by the same military that between 1962 and 2011 had reduced their country to an economic basket case took to the streets in peaceful protest. This sustained outpouring of anger forced the military to move from relative restraint in the first weeks after the coup to a more characteristic resort to battlefield violence involving first targeted killings using rifles and finally open massacres with machine guns, grenades and rocket launchers..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
2021-04-21
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-21
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "As Burma strategically lies at the crossroads of the Indian subconti- nent, southwestern China, the Indian Ocean and the rest of continental Southeast Asia, both an emerging India and a rising China have found increasing interests in this regional node since the end of the 1980s. The changing of guards in Rangoon through a military coup d’état orchestrated by a younger generation of Tatmadaw (Burmese Army) officers in September 1988 indeed offered the two giants an opportu- nity to refocus their regional strategic ambitions on Burma. A new dimension of the Sino-Indian rivalry was thus highlighted and many academic researchers pointed out the rise of the strategic competition between Beijing and New Delhi through Burma throughout the 1990s. Almost two decades after the beginnings of the Chinese thrust into the Burmese strategic field and India’s gradual reaction to it, this article seeks to assess the state of the rivalry between the two giants in Burma. By focusing the analysis on the perceptions, interests and achievements of India and China’s approach to Burma on the ground in the past 20 years, it seeks to question the severity and intensity of this Sino-Indian “competition” in the Burmese field. It is argued here that despite having realized obvious breakthroughs in the region, India and China still face many difficulties in Burma, and are unable to openly use it as a mere playground for their bilateral “rivalry.” After a brief discussion of the academic literature that has dealt with the rise of the rivalry since the early 1990s, this paper will explore the most visible expressions of this Sino-Indian contest in Burma. The energy and military sectors, tensions in border areas and the quest for a strategic access to the Indian Ocean are the most crucial factors, but it will be postulated hereafter that each has its own limits. Given internal divisions, hesitations, misreadings or misperceptions in New Delhi and Beijing, as well as the nationalist stance of the Burmese military regime, this article will claim that the Sino-Indian competi- tion over Burma must not be overestimated. Indeed, the Burmese field itself offers considerable resistance to the further thrust of India and China in the region, limiting the phenomenon to a mere “quiet rivalry.” The Rise of a “Strategic Rivalry”: Perceptions and Interpretations of Indian and Chinese Policies toward Burma since the 1990s When a new Burmese junta (SLORC2 ) succeeded the autarchic military regime of General Ne Win in September 1988, Beijing and New Delhi adopted two different approaches to the developments in Burma. After a decade of tense relations in the 1960s, China had clearly redefined its Burma strategy according to its national and security interests, through a more friendly policy initiated by Deng Xiaoping’s visit to Rangoon in January 1978. A few years later, with a landmark academic article published in 1985 by the official Beijing Review, 3 China unveiled its economic and military ambitions in Burma and had only a few more years to wait before taking the opportunity to fully implement them. When the SLORC, ostracized by the international community after its harsh repression of the pro-democracy movement during the summer of 1988, indicated its willingness to establish a new partnership with Beijing, China swiftly filled the vacuum left by international donors and regional powers. Confirmed after the Tiananmen Square repression by the official visit to China by General Than Shwe (then the SLORC’s Vice-Chairman) in October 1989, the new Sino-Burmese partnership enabled China to gain a sound strategic foothold in Burma within just a few years..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: India Review via Routledge (London)
2008-01-01
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-18
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Amid the worsening domestic COVID-19 situation, Myanmar’s election in November 2020 brought a landslide victory for the National League for Democracy (NLD) under the leadership of Aung San Suu Kyi. Despite voting restrictions in parts of Rakhine and Shan states, the election was overall a step in the right direction, and the NLD increased its majority in the Pyithu Hluttaw (lower house) and Amyotha Hluttaw (upper house). The show of support at the ballot box for the NLD indicates the domestic popularity of Aung San Suu Kyi. Her defence of Myanmar’s handling of the Rohingya crisis at the International Court of Justice — and in many other international venues — was dubbed a betrayal of democracy and human rights by Western media, but it boosted her domestic aura as a defender of Myanmar. The priorities for the NLD government are no doubt domestic. The COVID-19 pandemic ransacked Myanmar’s economy and the domestic poverty rate skyrocketed. High on the government’s agenda is creating employment for millions of Myanmar workers who lost their jobs during the pandemic. The country still faces one of the worst humanitarian crises with the Rohingya issue which battered its international image and led to economic sanctions. Myanmar’s domestic peace process has also stalled and militarised conflicts in the north of the country have no end in sight. To deal with these issues, China is the most indispensable country for Aung San Suu Kyi and her government. As one of the manufacturers of COVID-19 vaccines and with a promise to contribute to the accessibility and affordability of vaccines in developing countries, Myanmar needs to work with China to vaccinate its population. Vaccine diplomacy was high on the agenda during a visit by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi to Myanmar in early January 2021, despite Naypyidaw making the first order of 30 million doses from India. As the largest trading partner and second largest FDI source for Myanmar, the continued economic growth and opening up of the Chinese market will also have positive reverberations. Although Myanmar society overall holds anti-Chinese sentiments, Aung San Suu Kyi’s government still sees the benefits of engaging in close economic cooperation with China. Initiatives such as the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor aim to further connect the two economies. With the recent signing of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), Myanmar is also set to benefit from further relaxing of trade restrictions among its major trading partners. The government is optimistic that participating in RCEP will help Myanmar gain access to a large market for its exports, and that there will also be opportunities for responsible, high-quality investment inflows. While Myanmar faces tremendous pressure from the West on the Rohingya issue, Myanmar’s Asian neighbours are hesitant to jump on the bandwagon. Only Malaysia and Indonesia — as the two Muslim-majority countries in ASEAN — have been more vocal. China is Myanmar’s strongest supporter on the Rohingya issue and is actively involved in facilitating negotiations between the governments of Myanmar and Bangladesh. The protection China offers to Myanmar at international institutions is crucial. A quid pro quo is evident between the two countries with Myanmar offering support for China at the United Nations on Xinjiang and Hong Kong. This cooperative relationship will likely continue as both face similar pressure from the West..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "East Asia Forum" (Australia)
2021-01-23
Date of entry/update: 2021-01-23
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Description: "China promised to continue to support Myanmar’s peace talks with ethnic minority groups and to boost its coronavirus aid on the first stop of the foreign minister’s six-day tour of Southeast Asia. During Monday’s meetings with President Win Myint and State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, Wang Yi also urged Myanmar to speed up construction work on the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor – a key element of the country’s Belt and Road Initiative. “China will support the new Myanmar government in revitalising the economy, improving people’s livelihoods and accelerating the industrialisation process. We hope that both sides will work together to effectively implement the agreement on building the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor and promote connectivity at the western, northern and eastern ends of the corridor,” Wang told the president, according to a report by state news agency Xinhua. China shares more than 2,100km (1,300 miles) of border with Myanmar’s north, an area that has long been troubled by the fighting between government and ethnic minority rebel groups, making China a crucial player in peace talks between the government armies and ethnic armed groups. Wang said Beijing would do whatever it could to support the peace negotiations, adding: “China supports Myanmar government’s commitment to national reconciliation in the country … and will continue to provide assistance within its capabilities, as well as upholding justice and safeguarding Myanmar’s legitimate rights and interests in the international arena.” In response, Win Myint told Wang that Myanmar was keen to cooperate with China on vaccine distribution and would continue to support Beijing’s positions on Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang, according to Xinhua..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "South China Morning Post" (Hong Kong)
2021-01-12
Date of entry/update: 2021-01-15
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Infrastructure is high on China’s agenda in Myanmar, but it is also making headway in other important sectors.
Description: "A year after Chinese President Xi Jinping’s first state visit to Myanmar, Foreign Minister Wang Yi is scheduled to arrive in the capital Naypyidaw today for a two-day official visit. The trip to Myanmar follows an African tour that has taken Wang to Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Botswana, Tanzania, and the Seychelles. The agenda of his Myanmar trip is yet to be confirmed, but the ongoing progress of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), along with COVID-19 diplomacy, is very likely to be high on the list. First signed between China and Myanmar in 2018, the CMEC envisions the construction of a network of railways, roads, ports, and new cities running overland from China’s Yunnan province to the sea. Although numerous memorandum of agreements related to CMEC and Xi’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) have been in place for years, progress has lagged considerably. Indeed, progress on the CMEC seems to have been slowed further by Beijing’s pandemic-induced belt-tightening and the unprofitable nature of many of the infrastructure projects that fell under its aegis. This had prompted Beijing to adopt an alternative model of engagement in Myanmar: one that is more economically feasible, and that leverages its strategic assets, innovation, and technology to expand its sphere of influence, rather than focusing on infrastructure alone. This is consistent with China’s recently announced Five-Year Plan (2021-2025), which signaled a significant shift in China’s economic and development strategy toward increased domestic consumption. This shift has been prompted by its trade tensions with the United States and the opportunities and challenges offered by a post-COVID-19-world. This re-calibration may impact Beijing’s ability to realize the CMEC as it is currently envisioned..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Diplomat" (Japan)
2021-01-11
Date of entry/update: 2021-01-12
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Description: "Steady Continued cooperation on regional integration between China and Myanmar gave a sharp contrast to India, which turned a blind eye toward such development trend and let go opportunties, a Chinese analyst said on Monday. The comments came after China and Myanmar signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on Sunday to conduct feasibility study of a 650-kilometer-long railway linking Mandalay, the country's second largest city in Myanmar's central region, with Kyaukphyu, the major town in Myanmar's Rakhine state. Zhao Gancheng, director of the Center for Asia-Pacific Studies at the Shanghai Institute for International Studies, told the Global Times that the signing of the MoU is an important step toward a very significant project under the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor and part of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative. When the concept of the corridor was first introduced in 2013, India was initially involved in the regional integration project, only to withdraw further into the process. The continued development of the Mandalay-Kyaukphyu railway shows that regional integration is moving forward even as India, which could play a major part in the program, has chosen not to participate, Zhao said..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Global Times" (China)
2021-01-11
Date of entry/update: 2021-01-12
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: India has recently stressed increasing ties with its neighbors, and stronger ties with Myanmar are key to that strategy
Description: "On June 1, 2018, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in his address to the Shangri-La Dialogue formally announced his country’s Indo-Pacific policy. He also said that India advocated an independent, free, and inclusive Indo-Pacific system in the region. At the same time, major steps were taken to strengthen relations with the US, Japan and Australia through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. It is important to note here that India had been avoiding connecting the Quad directly to the Indo-Pacific. The Indian government also tried to end the skepticism of the Southeast Asian countries by calling for the Indo-Pacific policy to keep New Delhi’s “Act East” policy and ASEAN countries at the center. However, Indian policymakers soon realized that if the Indo-Pacific regional system was to materialize, then faster and bigger steps would have to be taken. In November 2019, during the 14th East Asia Summit in Bangkok, Modi announced the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative. Recently, this was once again glimpsed when External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar visited Sri Lanka from January 5-7, where he insisted on promoting cooperation between India and its neighbors under the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative. There is no doubt that despite the difficulties and ups and downs, India’s cooperation with every country in South Asia, except Pakistan, has increased..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
2021-01-11
Date of entry/update: 2021-01-12
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi is scheduled to arrive in Myanmar on Monday on a critical two-day visit. It is intended to further strengthen Chinese influence in the country, in light of the changing international dynamics in the region, amid fears that China's sway is beginning to wane. Beijing is increasingly concerned with a plethora of issues, including recent Indian and Japanese initiatives with Myanmar, which Beijing fears may prove to be to their detriment, but also to take stock of the continued economic cooperation, strengthen its support for the peace process and to boost China's support for Myanmar's battle to control the Covid pandemic. Mr Wang's primary purpose on this visit is to show China's unswerving support for the country and its civilian leader, the State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi -- and to congratulate the National League for Democracy (NLD) on its landslide electoral victory. He will be the first international diplomat to visit Nay Pyi Taw in person since the elections last November. The visit seems to have been arranged at short notice -- and tagged onto Mr Wang's current trip to Africa. It is low-key and being handled discreetly, according to Myanmar government sources. Foreign diplomats believe this may reflect some discomfort on the part of Nay Pyi Taw at the visit, and what is seen as "vaccine diplomacy"..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Bangkok Post (Thailand)
2021-01-09
Date of entry/update: 2021-01-11
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: A long-running war and COVID-19 muddle development in Kyaukphyu, Myanmar.
Description: "Kyi Kyi Hnin sits beneath a fan on a bright morning in her village along the coast of Kyaukphyu, a township in Myanmar’s Rakhine State on the edge of the Indian Ocean. “The government just signs laws, but they are committing violations,” she says. “The government should consider the communities’ desires and interests.” Kyi Kyi Hnin is a local community organizer and her speech is quick and resolute: She knows the challenges facing Kyaukphyu and spends her days working to support local residents. Kyaukphyu is home to a cluster of busy fishing towns and villages. But in the past few years, the township has been thrown into the center of geopolitics, armed conflict and, more recently, Myanmar’s struggle against COVID-19. For months, the country recorded relatively few cases of the virus, until a new outbreak began in August with Rakhine at the epicenter. After the state capital, Sittwe, Kyaukphyu has recorded the most cases of any township in Rakhine for much of the outbreak..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Diplomat" (Japan)
2020-12-03
Date of entry/update: 2021-01-05
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Description: "The Union government has unbundled a controversial Chinese-backed multibillion-dollar new city project across the Yangon River from Myanmar’s commercial hub and is finalizing the hiring of an international consultant to assist in the selection of a developer for the newly compartmentalized project. Known as the New Yangon City project, it is an element of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), which is a part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The CMEC will connect Yunnan province in China to Mandalay in central Myanmar, Yangon New City in the south and the Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone in the west. The Yangon regional government-backed New Yangon Development Company (NYDC) initially signed a US$1.5-billion (2.03-trillion-kyat) framework agreement in 2018 with Beijing-based China Communications Construction Company, Ltd. (CCCC) to draw up a proposal for the infrastructure project. The 20,000-acre (nearly 8,100-hectare) New Yangon City project is slated to include five resettlement areas, two bridges, an industrial estate, and commercial and residential areas as well as related infrastructure. The Yangon government’s 2019 guidebook listing the city’s projects—the Yangon Project Bank— estimates the New Yangon City project’s total cost at $8 billion. However, the project has been a source of controversy due to its flood-prone location as well as CCCC’s involvement. The Hong Kong-listed, Chinese state-owned company has been accused of engaging in corruption and bribery relating to development deals in at least 10 countries in Africa and Asia. Since its formation, the NYDC has said that while CCCC was the frontrunner for the project, the selection process to find the developer would follow the so-called “Swiss Challenge” model, in which other candidate firms would be invited to beat CCCC’s bid. However, the huge amount of the initial investment required has all but deterred other investors. On Wednesday, a senior official familiar with the project told The Irrawaddy that the $1.5-billion project has been unbundled by the Union government due to the sheer scale of the mega-investment required, making it possible for other companies to join the Swiss Challenge..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2020-07-29
Date of entry/update: 2020-07-30
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: How national security concerns sealed the varying fates of Chinese investment projects in Myanmar.
Description: "Almost nine years have passed since the Thein Sein administration unilaterally announced the suspension of construction work on the Myitsone dam in September 2011. The building of the controversial hydroelectric dam is a gargantuan Chinese investment project in Myanmar, with an estimated total cost of $3.6 billion, and with a planned reservoir area larger than the size of Singapore. The suspension followed increasingly severe public protests in Myanmar expressing opposition to the Myitsone dam project. Naypyidaw credited the suspension decision to the “people’s will, and many analysts have thus attributed the unexpected suspension to the victory of popular anti-China sentiments and anti-dam movements, following Myanmar’s domestic political transition. If the “people’s will” really brought the Myitsone dam project to a halt, might other Chinese overseas projects be at risk of a similar fate? The dam project was not the only Chinese mega-project undergoing construction in Myanmar at that time. Two other multi-billion-dollar projects, namely, the Letpadaung copper mine project and the Sino-Myanmar oil and gas pipelines project, also encountered severe public opposition and pressure when Myanmar started its partial transition from military dictatorship to quasi-civilian semi-democracy. Although the three projects have similarities in terms of their design, implementation, and the public backlash they faced, the setbacks they experienced varied greatly. Since the Myitsone dam project was unilaterally suspended by former President Thein Sein, the construction work remains shelved without any renegotiation. In contrast, the Letpadaung copper mine project experienced a two-year suspension, investigation, and renegotiation before it resumed, while the Sino-Myanmar oil and gas pipelines project was never suspended and has been operational since the completion of construction work in 2015. To understand why these projects encountered varying degrees of success, it is necessary to take into account the contexts of the three consecutive Myanmar governments within which these projects were operational: the military government before the political transition in March 2011, the quasi-civilian government of Thein Sein from March 2011 to March 2016, and the National League for Democracy (NLD)-led government since then. Doing so reveals that the “people’s will” was not the primary reason why Thein Sein unilaterally suspended the Myitsone dam project. Rather, national security concerns led Myanmar’s leaders to make different decisions on similar projects under different contexts. The plans for all three projects were finalized between 2009 and 2010, when Myanmar was still ruled by the military junta, known as the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). Myanmar had experienced Western sanctions and isolation during the era of military dictatorship. China not only was Myanmar’s largest trading partner and foreign investor, but also became its biggest regime supporter in the international community at this time. The maintenance of a good relationship with China was one of the main priorities for Myanmar’s leadership, to ensure regime survival and national security. Thus, Myanmar satisfied China’s demands in this period because the cost of rejecting China was intolerable..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Diplomat" (Japan)
2020-07-22
Date of entry/update: 2020-07-22
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Myanmar’s trade with foreign countries through border gates reached over 8.6 billion U.S. dollars as of July 10 in present fiscal year (FY) 2019-2020 which started in October, according to figures released by the Commerce Ministry on Monday. During the period, the country's export via border gates earned over 5.8 billion U.S. dollars while its import shared over 2.7 billion U.S. dollars. According to the ministry’s figures, this fiscal year’s border trade increased by over 281 million U.S. dollars, compared to the same period of last fiscal year 2018-2019 when it recorded over 8.3 billion U.S. dollars. Muse topped the list of border checkpoints with the most trade value of 3.8 billion U.S. dollars, followed by Heekhee with 1.6 billion U.S. dollars, the ministry’s figures said. The country conducts border trade with neighboring China through Muse, Lweje, Kanpikete, Chinashwehaw and kengtung with Thailand via Tachilek, Myawady, Kawthoung, Myeik, Hteekhee, Mawtuang and Maese gates, with Bangladesh via Sittwe and Maungtaw and with India through Tamu and Reed border gates, respectively. Myanmar mainly exports agricultural products, animal products, marine products, minerals, forest products, manufacturing goods and others while capital goods, intermediate goods and consumer goods are imported to the country..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Xinhua" (China)
2020-07-20
Date of entry/update: 2020-07-20
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "The “Association of South-East Asian Nations” or “ASEAN” was formed from the ASEAN Declaration in Bangkok on 8th August 1967 (as a successor to the Association of South-East Asia, “ASA” in 1961), and is just four years younger than the EEC (now the EU). ASEAN is now a grouping of ten geographically, culturally and politically diverse countries, although initially consisted only of those countries which avoided any socialist experimentation: Singapore/Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines and Indonesia. Most of the Mekong countries joined later: Vietnam, Cambodia, Myanmar and Laos. ASEAN has 651 million people and a land mass of 4.5 million sq kms (50% larger than India and one-half the size of China), and a nominal GDP of US$ 3 trillion (on a PPP basis 4x higher at $13 trillion) and US$ 4,600 nominal GDP per capita. By comparison, the EU has twenty-eight countries, 513 million people, and an almost identical land area of 4.48 million sq kms, but it has a nominal GDP that is 7X higher than ASEAN at US$ 19 trillion (or $23 trillion translating to just 2X on a PPP basis), and a US$ 37,300 nominal GDP per capita. The likelihood is that ASEAN will narrow the gap between its nominal and PPP GDP over the next few years, generating substantial gains for investors. What is common to all ASEAN countries is the agricultural economic base (except for Singapore & Brunei) and their consequently more manageable workforces, their Chinese (mostly Fujian) diaspora business culture, and their Japanese/Taiwanese/Korean led industrial investment. The Mekong countries share a common Buddhist heritage, but are a mixture quasi-democratic, and factional 1-Party States. The oldest cultures in ASEAN, the Mekong countries are the least developed, due to their proximity to China and its socialist sphere of influence from 1950-1980. That proximity is now a positive as China embarks on its “Belt & Road” initiative and its manufacturers rush to avoid rising labour costs and US/China trade friction, diversifying production to Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia and Myanmar. Currently the former closed countries, Vietnam, Cambodia, Myanmar and Laos, “continental ASEAN” or the old Indochina, are now leading ASEAN in growth from their lower economic bases, and after a temporary lapse in 2020, are all expected to be back to 6-7% growth rates in 2021..."
Source/publisher: "The Asia First Newsletter''
2020-07-10
Date of entry/update: 2020-07-10
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "In the meetings, President Xi focussed on three main projects under the Belt and Initiative and part of the CMEC (China-Myanmar Economic Corridor). These were the New Yangon Project, the Kyaukpyu Deep Sea Port with the SEZ (the latter only to sweeten the deal and keep the Myanmar side interested) and the China-Myanmar Border Cooperation Zone. China in the mean time had already completed an oil pipeline project from Kunming to Kyaukpyu and also a gas pipe line between the two ports. The Gas pipe line was started in 2013 and the Oil Pipe line started functioning fro April 2017. The projects were rushed through despite local objections. The Gas and Oil pipe lines together with the Kyaukpyu deep sea port are ostensibly meant to develop the south western hinterland of China, but the real reasons were strategic. The Port would help China avoid the vulnerable straits of Malacca. The ongoing spat with United States and the countries in the region looking for strategic alliances like India with Australia, the need for an alternate route for safety and security of supplies to the Chinese hinterland has become critical to China. While the Chinese side initially pushed for a large project with an investment of over 7 Billion Dollars, the Myanmar side in its negotiations reduced the project to 1.3 billion and also increased Myanmar’s stake in the project to 30 percent. Even this amount is too big a sum for Myanmar and there were always fears that Myanmar by borrowing from Chinese Banks may get into a debt trap as it happened to Sri Lanka vis a vis Hambantota. While the deep Sea Port will only help China and not Myanmar, the deal was sweetened with a parallel project of a special economic Zone for which the stakes for the two sides are yet to be finalised. At that point of time, Myanmar was not aware of the possible spread of the deadly Virus unleashed by China. With the rapid spread of the Virus in other countries and the possibility of its economy being very adversely affected, Myanmar launched an Economy Relief Plan on April 27, 2020. It was an effort to meet the exigencies that surfaced in Myanmar after the Covid-19 (Wuhan Virus) was officially (though delayed) declared by WHO. The Plan consisted of 7 objectives or Goals, 10 Strategies, 30 Action Plans, and 76 Actions. Without going into full details of all actions contemplated we shall restrict ourselves to the seven goals. These included..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Sri Lanka Guardian" (Sri Lankan)
2020-06-29
Date of entry/update: 2020-07-10
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "FOR the Southeast Asian state of Myanmar, the decision to expand ties with China despite Western pressure was a no-brainer. Significant economic ties have been expanded and the prospect for several large-scale infrastructure projects has been firmed up. Chinese president Xi Jinping’s recent visit to Myanmar could be considered a victory lap of sorts; the cementing of long-standing and ever-expanding ties between Myanmar and China and the final displacement of significant US and British influence in the former British colony. An op-ed on China’s CGTN website titled, ‘Xi’s New Year visit to Myanmar: A milestone in bilateral relations,’ would help frame the significance of president Xi’s visit while comparing and contrasting Myanmar’s ties with China and the US. The op-ed would note that president Xi’s trip to Myanmar was his first major trip abroad made during 2020. It is also the first major visit by a Chinese leader to Myanmar in nearly 20 years. Even US proxies can’t deny America’s decline THE op-ed also noted that Myanmar’s state counsellor, Aung San Suu Kyi, picked China for her first major visit abroad after her National League for Democracy party came to power in 2016. To understand the significance of this it is important to understand that Suu Kyi and her rise to power were primarily driven by support from Washington. She and her political party along with a large army of US government-funded fronts posing as nongovernmental organisations and US-funded media networks were selected and groomed for decades by Washington to seize power and serve as a vector for US special interests both in Myanmar itself and as a point of leverage versus Beijing. However, despite America’s expertise in political meddling, what it lacks is, as the op-ed calls it, any concrete economic pillars; something China does have on offer. No matter how much covert or overt financial and political support any client regime in Myanmar may receive from Washington it does not address the genuine need for real development within Myanmar itself. Without such development and the financial and economic incentives it brings with it, enemies and allies of the client regime alike will turn towards those who can offer such incentives..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "newagebd.net"
2020-07-02
Date of entry/update: 2020-07-10
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Myanmar has decided to expedite India-backed infrastructure projects and widen security ties with India as it seeks to balance China's expanding presence in the country in the backdrop of Beijing's active cross-border support for rebel groups and push for early completion of BRI projects. Myanmar’s all-powerful generals, who have controlled the country for decades, are upset with the Chinese strategy of arming rebel groups, including Islamic radicals. They are also upset with China's pressure on Myanmar to implement Belt-Road-Initiative (BRI) projects in spite of the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic, ET has learnt China is planning a China-Myanmar-Economic Corridor (CMEC), on the lines of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), to get access to the Bay of Bengal and the eastern part of the Indian Ocean Region. Several other BRI related projects threaten to push Myanmar to a debt trap. Speaking to journalists in Russia last month on the occasion of Victory Day parade, commander-in-chief of Myanmar armed forces Senior General Min Aung Hlaing called for international cooperation in the fight against terrorism, saying that terrorist groups exist because of “strong forces” Many analysts in Myanmar say Gen Hlaing’scomment was targeted at China, which the Myanmar military (or Tatmadaw) suspects is continuing to provide arms to rebel groups on the Myanmar-China border and to the ArakanArmy (AA), which is now operating in northern Rakhine state as well as the radical ArakanRohingya Salvation Army. The general's comments broadly reflects the sentiment among the top military leadership of the armed forces in Naypyitaw, ET has learnt.Interestingly the comments were made in Russia -- Myanmar's old defence partner..."
Source/publisher: "The Economic Times" (India)
2020-07-09
Date of entry/update: 2020-07-09
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Artisans in Sagyin have carved out a living from marble for generations but some fear the dust that cloaks the village.
Description: "The fine white dust that shrouds much of his northern Myanmar village also covers sculptor Chin Win as he leans over a half-finished Buddha statue. "We are blessed to carve Buddha," he said at his stone workshop surrounded by the seven white hills that give Sagyin village its name, which means "marble" in Burmese. For generations, artisans in this part of Buddhist-majority Myanmar have carved out a living from the marble, fashioning mostly colossal Buddha statues to be sold in the nearby city of Mandalay or exported to neighbouring China and Thailand. Many of the several thousand villagers here earn a modest living from the marble mines, hauling the slabs down the hill, carving them into statues, or exporting them overseas. Burmese marble, which ranges from pure white to bluish grey, is prized for its hardness and texture. A 45-tonne slab can sell for $40,000. In Sagyin, specks of the stone are used for everything from brushing teeth to washing clothes. "We grew up breathing the dust," said Chin Win, 35, who has been carving statues since he was 11 years old. "We use it as toothpaste, for soap powder, lipstick." The stone used to be chiselled by hand. Now, much of the work is done with machines. "I was born in this village and for generations, this is what we have done: the men work on marble carving and the women work in the marble mines or polish the marble statues," said 25-year-old Mya Lay, in a house fashioned from dry bamboo sheets, with a floor made of marble chippings..."
Source/publisher: "Al Jazeera" (Qatar)
2020-07-07
Date of entry/update: 2020-07-07
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Myanmar has indirectly called out China for arming 'terrorists' on its soil. WION's Palki Sharma tells you how Myanmar fears that this situation could endanger Indian development projects along the Myanmar-Mizoram border..."
Source/publisher: "WION"
2020-07-02
Date of entry/update: 2020-07-04
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Myanmar suspects that China was trying to use terror groups as a bargaining chip for smooth implementation of Belt and Road Initiative projects.
Description: "Myanmar, China’s closest ally in southeast Asia, has pointed fingers at Beijing for arming insurgent groups with sophisticated weapons and sought international cooperation to suppress rebel groups. In a recent interview to Russian state-run TV channel Zvezda, Myanmar’s Senior General Min Aung Hlaing said terrorist organisations active in Myanmar are backed by ‘strong forces’ and sought international cooperation to suppress rebel groups. The reference to ‘strong forces’ was widely seen to be a reference to Myanmar’s neighbour in the north, China. Myanmar military spokesperson Brigadier General Zaw Min Tun later elaborated on the comment made by the Commander-in-Chief of Myanmar’s armed forces. The spokesperson said the army chief was referring to Arakan Army (AA) and Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), terrorist organisations active in the Rakhine State in western Myanmar that borders China. A ‘foreign country’ is behind the Arakan Army (AA), he said, citing China-made weapons that terror group used in mine attacks on the military in 2019. It is unusual for the Myanmar leadership to point fingers at China. But this isn’t the first time that Naypyitaw had alluded to the Chinese connection. When the Myanmar military busted a huge cache of weapons including surface-to-air missiles - each costing between USD 70,000 and 90,000 - from the banned Ta’ang National Liberation Army in November 2019, the military had underlined the Chinese connection to the weapons. Most of the weapons seized by the force are “Chinese weapons,” military spokesperson Major General Tun Tun Nyi had declared..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Hindustan Times " (India)
2020-07-02
Date of entry/update: 2020-07-02
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: It’s important to distinguish between China and oversees ethnic Chinese when discussing three controversial projects in Kayin State, despite claims they are being implemented as part of the Belt and Road Initiative.
Description: "Since 2019, the narrative about private Chinese investment in Myanmar’s illicit economy, especially casinos and online gambling in Kayin State, has become increasingly rampant, holding China responsible for the audacity of private Chinese investors. However, a careful examination of the identity of the investors, their business background and registrations, as well as the management structure and funding sources of their operations, reveals a different reality: that these investments involve overseas ethnic Chinese through companies registered in Hong Kong with funding from outside China. Despite their efforts to paint their projects as part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, the investments are outside China’s jurisdiction and China should not be held accountable for their existence. Nevertheless, China should be wary of the damage that these projects pose to its national interests. It should distance itself from the projects and where possible take measures to oppose them. Since 2019, three allegedly private Chinese investment projects in Kayin State’s Myawaddy Township have captured the attention – and imagination – of many Myanmar observers. The first and the most sensational is the Yatai New City Project at Shwe Kokko. More recently, the Saixigang Industrial Zone Project and the Huanya International City Project have emerged. Despite their grandiose mission statements about tourism and industrial development, it is widely agreed that they are actually casino resorts and will host online gambling scam operations that primarily target Chinese users. These projects are the latest chapter of the broader spread of casinos and online gambling schemes throughout Southeast Asia, which came to Myanmar partially because of a government crackdown on such operations in Cambodia in 2019..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Frontier Myanmar" (Myanmar)
2020-06-25
Date of entry/update: 2020-06-26
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Topic: Belt & Road Initiative, Shweli River
Sub-title: The waters of the Shweli river in northeastern Myanmar have turned red, prompting concerns about pollution along a major corridor of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Residents and politicians blame Chinese factories upstream, raising questions about accountability for the impacts of cross-border development.
Topic: Belt & Road Initiative, Shweli River
Description: "Local reports say a river that forms part of the China-Myanmar border has turned red, prompting major concerns about pollution and accountability along a key trade route for China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) infrastructure and industry plan. The Shan Herald reported that the Shweli river, on the border between Myanmar’s Shan State and China’s Yunnan province, changed color around June 10. Local residents suspect the change is due to factories upstream in China dumping waste into the river. “We have never seen water color changes like this before. This is the first time I have ever seen the water red. I don’t know what China has done,” said local resident Sai Aye, who lives on the bank of the river in the border town of Muse. The Chinese portion of the Shweli river, known as the Ruili river in Chinese and Nam Mao in indigenous Shan, is lined with factories that process sugar, paper, fish for canning and meat. The Shweli is a tributary of the Irrawaddy river, the largest river in Myanmar and the source of irrigation for much of the country’s agriculture. “I think a factory in China dumped polluted water into the river. We have already sent an opposition letter to China’s external affairs department in Shweli [Ruili] city in Yunnan province,” Sai Kyaw Thein, a Shan State parliamentarian for Muse, told the Shan Herald. “We already sent a water sample from the Shweli river to a laboratory in Mandalay.” Though the cause of the red color hasn’t been found, the possible pollution raises major questions about environmental regulations and accountability around the BRI in Myanmar..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "ASEAN Today" (Singapore)
2020-06-25
Date of entry/update: 2020-06-25
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: The draft bill is a step in the right direction, but falls short on screening the export of fossil fuel technologies.
Description: "In May, China’s energy authority announced a public consultation for a draft energy law, setting the agenda for “green, low-carbon” production and a “safe and efficient” energy system. The draft law, which has been 13 years in the making, is an omnibus bill that seeks to unify China’s diverse laws governing coal, renewables and energy conservation. Five years after the signing of the Paris Agreement, references in the bill that position it as a “response to climate change” are welcome. Unfortunately, the proposed legislation also specifies the need for further exploration of fossil fuel energy sources such as coal, oil and natural gas. This matters because under the Paris Agreement, China committed to peak carbon dioxide emissions around 2030 or earlier if possible. China is the largest public financer of fossil fuels, providing US$20.2 billion a year for oil and gas and US$4.4 billion for coal, according to a recent report on G20 financing. China also ranks as the world’s largest producer and investor in clean energy and while coal still occupies the top spot in the country’s energy mix, its share is declining. However, the country’s effort to reduce emissions is being undermined by a relaxation of coal-power restrictions, which has led to approximately 10 gigawatts of new approvals at home and the financing of coal projects overseas..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Eco-Business" (Singapore)
2020-06-23
Date of entry/update: 2020-06-24
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: A Chinese company is applying to conduct feasibility studies for a high-speed railway between Mandalay-Kyaukphyu, said U Nyi Nyi Swe, general manager of Myanma Railways.
Description: "The railway is part of a larger railway project connecting Muse to Mandalay. A memorandum of understanding for the railway was signed between the Myanmar government and China Railway Eryuan Engineering Group Co Ltd (CREEG) on October 22, 2018. “The Muse-Mandalay MoU includes applying for permission to conduct feasibility studies to build the railway from Mandalay to Kyaukphyu. The feasibility study takes two or three years,” U Nyi Nyi Swe said. The Chinese want to connect Kyaukphyu in Rakhine, where they will be developing an industrial zone and deepsea port, with Kunming in China via the Muse border town by building Kunming-Muse-Kyaukphyu express railroad. The route will also connect Mandalay with Yangon. U Ba Myint, managing director of Myanma Railways, said the project is expected to bring benefits in the form of increased border trade. He said the 431-km Muse-Mandalay high-speed railroad project, which will be built for trains to run at speeds of up to 160 km per hour, will cost around US$8.9 billion to build. The project is not expected to interfere with residents who live along the railway route, U Win Khant, permanent secretary of the Ministry of Transport and Communications, said during a recent press conference..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Myanmar Times" (Myanmar)
2020-06-22
Date of entry/update: 2020-06-24
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "The strategically vital Mekong subregion has been gaining salience in Beijing’s strategic calculations as China faces growing pushback from the US and other countries. The global pandemic appears to be consolidating a few trends in China’s ties with the Mekong nations. In this emerging scenario, it is likely that China will keep its focus on the Mekong subregion in the post-COVID-19 period. Cooperative partnerships with some countries have been further deepening, while China’s “mask diplomacy” has raised concern among citizens who want their governments to adopt a more cautious approach and there have been new factors that have been added to existing difficult relationships often viewed through the confrontational lens. Apart from China-ASEAN cooperation in engaging with the Mekong subregion, Beijing has been using the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC)–––a subregional cooperation mechanism jointly established by Cambodia, China, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam–––in engaging with the subregion in the fight against the global pandemic. In February, Chinese State Councillor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited Vientiane, Laos, to participate in the fifth LMC foreign ministers’ meeting where he called for “concerted efforts” to fight against the COVID-19 epidemic. The global pandemic provided Cambodia and China to further consolidate their cooperative partnership. During Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen’s visit to China in early February at a time when “anti-Chinese sentiments” were rising has been interpreted as demonstrating “solidarity” and China-Cambodia relations has described as “a model” for neighbourhood diplomacy..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Observer Research Foundation (ORF)" (India)
2020-06-20
Date of entry/update: 2020-06-24
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "When Myanmar announced its seven-point economic relief plan to mitigate the economic impact of COVID-19 in late April, one item immediately raised eyebrows among China analysts in the country. The initiative’s third main objective is stated as “Easing the Impacts on Laborers and Workers”, and one of the ways the government intends to achieve this is putting laid-off laborers and returning migrants to work on “Implementation of Labor-Intensive Community Infrastructure Projects” before the end of this year. At first glance, it seems a worthy goal, as it aims to benefit workers affected by the coronavirus pandemic. However, with several megaprojects in the planning stages as part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), experts are concerned that the COVID-19 Economic Relief Plan (CERP)’s emphasis on reviving the economy will see Myanmar push ahead with the implementation of BRI projects without properly assessing their risks in terms of conflict sensibility, potential for incurring unsustainable debt and commercial viability, among other criteria. Adding to their worries, shortly after the plan was unveiled, Chinese Ambassador to Myanmar Chen Hai and Myanmar’s Deputy Minister for Planning, Finance and Industry U Set Aung met to discuss how to move forward on the development of China’s ambitious projects in Myanmar in the context of the CERP. The New Yangon City; Kyaukphyu Deep-Sea Port and Industrial Zone; and China-Myanmar Cross-Border Economic Cooperation Zone projects—all of which were agreed during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Myanmar in January—were among those discussed at the meeting..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2020-06-11
Date of entry/update: 2020-06-20
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "New Delhi: Myanmar government’s discomfort with China is on the rise. After Myanmar’s auditor general in a startling announcement cautioned government officials about continued reliance on Chinese loans, the Myanmar government has formed a tribunal to investigate irregularities surrounding a controversial China-backed city development project near the Thai border in Karen State. The project has been criticised due to a lack of transparency, land confiscations, confusion over the scale of construction and the growing influx of Chinese money as well as suspected illicit activity and local concerns about the social impacts of casino businesses, according to a report in leading Myanmar English media The Irrawaddy. “The planned mega resort and city expansion project is controlled by the Karen State Border Guard Force, a Myanmar military-backed armed group led by Colonel Chit Thu and formerly known as the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA),” according to the media report..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Economic Times" (India)
2020-06-16
Date of entry/update: 2020-06-18
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Topic: casinos, China Federation of Overseas Chinese Entrepreneurs, Colonel Chit Thu, Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), Development, Karen Peace Support Network (KPSN), Karen State, Karen State Border Guard Force, Land Rights, Myanmar Yatai Company, Myanmar Yatai Shwe Kokko Special Economic Zone, Myawaddy, Shwe Kokko, U Tin Myint, Yatai International Holding Group (IHG)
Topic: casinos, China Federation of Overseas Chinese Entrepreneurs, Colonel Chit Thu, Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), Development, Karen Peace Support Network (KPSN), Karen State, Karen State Border Guard Force, Land Rights, Myanmar Yatai Company, Myanmar Yatai Shwe Kokko Special Economic Zone, Myawaddy, Shwe Kokko, U Tin Myint, Yatai International Holding Group (IHG)
Description: "The Myanmar government has formed a tribunal to investigate irregularities surrounding a controversial China-backed city development project near the Thai border in Karen State. The planned mega resort and city expansion project is controlled by the Karen State Border Guard Force, a Myanmar military-backed armed group led by Colonel Chit Thu and formerly known as the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA). The project is a collaboration between a Hong Kong-based company called Yatai International Holding Group (IHG) and Col. Chit Thu, officially dubbed the “Myanmar Yatai Shwe Kokko Special Economic Zone.” The project has sparked criticisms due to a lack of transparency, land confiscations, confusion over the scale of construction and the growing influx of Chinese money as well as suspected illicit activity and local concerns about the social impacts of casino businesses. At a press conference in Naypyitaw on Monday, Union government office Deputy Minister U Tin Myint said he has been selected as chair of an investigative tribunal for the Shwe Kokko project. U Tin Myint said that the team has yet to make a site visit due to COVID-19, but he has instructed officials from the Karen State government, the General Administration Department and the Settlement and Land Records Department to inspect conditions of the project on the ground..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2020-06-16
Date of entry/update: 2020-06-18
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Beijing also terms Huawei executive’s detention ‘serious political incident’ after release of Canadian spy agency report
Description: "China said Monday it has resumed work on bilateral projects with Myanmar as the two nations move past the novel coronavirus pandemic. “China and Myanmar have launched a fast lane to facilitate essential travel and resume work and production,” said Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman Lijian Zhao, addressing a news conference in Beijing. China had closed its borders with Myanmar in April amid the coronavirus pandemic. The closure was scheduled to last for two months until June 24. “Personnel at critical posts at oil and gas, electricity and infrastructure projects have already traveled both ways and resumed work,” Lijian said. The coronavirus was first detected in China’s Wuhan city last December, from where it spread to at least 188 countries and regions and has affected more than 7.96 million people worldwide. Over 3.8 million people have recovered so far, according to figures compiled by US-based Johns Hopkins University. The pandemic has so far claimed more than 434,000 lives. The US, Brazil, Russia and India are currently the worst-hit countries. Meanwhile, slamming the case against Chinese telecom giant Huawei’s chief financial officer as a “serious political incident,” Zhao urged Canada “to release Meng Wanzhou at once.” Referring to a two-page report by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), Lijian said: “It fully reveals the political intention of the US to deliberately oppress Chinese high-tech companies like Huawei, and Canada is acting as an accomplice.”..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Anadolu Agency" (Ankara)
2020-06-16
Date of entry/update: 2020-06-16
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Myanmar’s Ministry of Construction has unveiled four projects to be implemented under China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), including expressways, a bridge and a tunnel, which will form crucial links in trade routes with China. Speaking at a press conference on Monday in Myanmar’s capital Naypyitaw, Deputy Construction Minister U Kyaw Lin said the government had agreed with China to implement the four “early-harvest projects” as part of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), which is a key component of the BRI. The four projects were not among those announced when the two countries drew up their initial agreements on implementing BRI projects. During the 2nd BRI Forum in Beijing last year, which was attended by Myanmar State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, Myanmar and China signed a document referring to nine early-harvest infrastructure projects under the CMEC. However, the only details released by the government at that time concerned three economic cooperation zones in Kachin and Shan states and the Muse-Mandalay railway project. Myanmar signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with China establishing the CMEC in 2018. The 1,700-kilometer-long corridor will connect Kunming, the capital of China’s Yunnan province, with Myanmar’s major economic hubs, linking first to Mandalay in central Myanmar before branching east to Yangon and west to the Kyaukphyu SEZ in Rakhine State. The ministry said it plans to construct an expressway connecting Muse in Shan State with Mandalay via Tigyaing in eastern Sagaing Region. Muse, which sits across the border from Yunnan province, is the largest trade portal between the two nations. Mandalay is central Myanmar’s commercial center and the country’s second-largest city. The expressway is envisioned as another lifeline for China-Myanmar border trade. China earlier announced plans to implement the 431-km-long Muse-Mandalay Railway, which would connect with China’s rail network in Ruili, Yunnan province across the border from Muse. The railway is also expected to be a key part of the economic corridor..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2020-06-16
Date of entry/update: 2020-06-16
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "China and Myanmar have opened a "fast-track lane" for essential personnel exchanges, a foreign ministry spokesperson said here on Monday. Zhao Lijian said at a press briefing that a number of necessary personnel in oil and gas, power, and infrastructure projects will be exchanged between the countries in a two-way, return-to-work initiative known as a "fast-track lane". This is in line with the aim of building a China-Myanmar community with a shared future and conducive to promoting construction of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor and economic and social development of the two countries, he said. China and Myanmar share a common border of more than 2,200 kilometers. Zhao said that since the COVID-19 outbreak, the two sides have strictly implemented epidemic prevention and controls, and cooperated closely in fighting the epidemic. This followed the consensus reached by the leaders of the two countries in mapping out the characteristics of bilateral relations. "The two sides have established joint prevention and control mechanisms between border provinces and up until now, the two-way zero exchange of the epidemic has been maintained," Zhao said..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Xinhua" (China)
2020-06-15
Date of entry/update: 2020-06-15
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "The Myanmar government says it is receiving help from a Swiss company to scrutinize a China-backed study on Beijing’s ambitious railway project to connect Mandalay with Kunming, the capital of Yunnan Province in southwestern China. At a press conference in Naypyitaw on Wednesday, Myanma Railways Managing Director U Ba Myint said the Swiss company has already stepped in as a third party to review the feasibility study for the Muse-Mandalay Electric Railway, submitted by China Railway Eryuan Engineering Group (CREEG). The managing director did not disclose the name of the Swiss company, but said the company will cover all their own expenses for the review. The US$8.9 billion Muse-Mandalay Railway project is part of the backbone of the China Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), which is itself part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Beijing’s grand Asia-Pacific infrastructure plan. The Muse-Mandalay Railway is expected to be a key part of the economic corridor and connect with the Chinese rail network at the Chinese border town of Ruili in Yunnan Province. The railway an initial part of the strategic China-Myanmar High Speed Railway, which aims to connect Kyaukphyu in western Myanmar’s Rakhine State with Kunming via Muse, in Shan State. In 2011, Beijing and Naypyitaw first signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to build a railway from Ruili to Kyaukphyu via Muse. The entire rail line was to run 810 km. However, the government of then-president U Thein Sein suspended the project due to strong local objections and concerns about unfair terms, including interest rates and revenue sharing as well as security. The agreement expired in 2014..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2020-06-11
Date of entry/update: 2020-06-13
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Myanmar’s auditor general in a startling announcement has cautioned government officials about continued reliance on Chinese loans both pre-BRI and BRI loans that come with high rates of interest. Myanmar's current national debt stands at about $10 billion, of which $ 4 billion is owed to China, Auditor General Maw Than told a news conference in Naypyidaw on Monday. This can push Myanmar to debt trap like Sri Lanka and some African states. "The truth is the loans from China come at higher interest rates compared to loans from financial institutions like the World Bank or the IMF [International Monetary Fund]," he said. "So, I would like to remind the government ministries to be more restrained in using Chinese loans." The country has to repay as much as $500 million annually to China in both principal and interest. Analysts have pointed out that Myanmar’s involvement in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) meant that it continued to take new debts to finance its huge infrastructure projects..."
Source/publisher: "The Economic Times" (India)
2020-06-13
Date of entry/update: 2020-06-13
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Export through Lweje and Kampaiti borders to restart, having previously been confined to Muse border
Description: "Trade restrictions between Myanmar and China are gradually being lifted, with Global New Light of Myanmar reporting the Lweje and Kampaiti borders have been reopened for export, after they were temporarily closed to avoid the risk of spreading Covid-19. In the midst of the restrictions, the Muse border remained open for the export of watermelon, muskmelon, mango and plum, however it was inundated with growers wanting to gain access, which reportedly caused lengthy delays, reducing fruit quality and resulting in higher costs overall. China’s General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection, and Quarantine has provided clearance for the export of mangosteen, rambutan and lychee to commence, in addition to existing exports. Myanmar’s Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation has also sent information on tissue-culture bananas, limes, pineapples, avocados, and pomelos to China for trade access. Asiafruit is now available to read on your phone or tablet via our new app. Download it today via the App Store or Google Play and receive a two-week free trial along with access to previous editions..."
Source/publisher: "Fruitnet"
2020-06-01
Date of entry/update: 2020-06-01
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "When Myanmar’s military regime began opening up the country politically and economically in 2010, one motive was to alleviate the country’s overreliance on China. Ten years down the road, in the context of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the threat of new Western sanctions triggered by human rights violations against the Muslim Rohingya minority, China’s influence appears hardly diminished. When the quasi-civilian government under former president Thein Sein took over from the military junta in 2011, it launched a plethora of reforms to liberalise Myanmar’s economy and its political system. Driven partly by the desire of rapprochement with the West, the new administration introduced free elections, restored civic and political rights and released political prisoners. In response, Western nations started to re-engage with Myanmar — lifting sanctions, writing off debt and disbursing development aid again. On the economic front, signature reforms included the Foreign Investment Law of 2012, which facilitated the flow of foreign capital into Myanmar. The state’s monopoly in the telecom sector was ended and licenses issued to three foreign providers. In 2014, the Special Economic Zone (SEZ) Law was introduced to spearhead business environment improvements. The government also liberalised international trade by lifting state controls, easing licensing requirements and opening previously closed sectors to private sector trading. The economic reform momentum slowed down when a new government led by the former opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), took over in 2016. Under the leadership of State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, its initial focus was on peace, national reconciliation and cementing the democratic transition. In October 2016, the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine State pushed economic policy-making further to the back seat, disenchanting the business community..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "East Asia Forum" (Australia)
2020-05-27
Date of entry/update: 2020-05-28
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: With the economy taking a battering, Myanmar will have less room to negotiate over big infrastructure projects
Description: "The economic blow dealt by the coronavirus pandemic may put Myanmar in a weaker position as it negotiates with China over a series of large infrastructure projects, analysts have said. Myanmar plays a key role in China’s global Belt and Road project, a strategy to deepen trade and economic ties with over 60 countries by building railways, ports, bridges, roads and other infrastructure. Chinese President Xi Jinping spoke with President Win Myint by phone this week about pushing ahead with the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, which will link China’s landlocked Yunnan province to the Bay of Bengal via a deep sea port in Rakhine state. Some observers believe the call signals that China intends to exploit the coming economic slowdown to push ahead with projects on its own terms. “Myanmar was very cautious about dealing with these projects before,” said Khin Khin Kyaw Kyee, a China analyst at the Yangon-based Institute for Strategy and Policy. “But Covid-19 has compromised that and the projects are going to get momentum here because there aren’t a lot of options,” she added. Myanmar’s GDP is likely to drop by 2-3% as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic, with the poor set to be hardest hit, the World Bank warned..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Myanmar Now" (Myanmar)
2020-05-27
Date of entry/update: 2020-05-27
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Suu Kyi is now close to old adversary China while long-ruling military is skeptical of Beijing's intent ahead of pivotal polls
Description: "Elections are scheduled for November in Myanmar, and there is no indication so far that the polls will be postponed due to the Covid-19 crisis. Neither is there much doubt about the outcome. Most political observers believe that State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) will win again, though not in the same landslide fashion as in 2015 as recent by-elections show she and her party have lost significant support in ethnic areas. But the bigger electoral question is how her party’s delicate relationship with the autonomous military will play out and in that context how her government’s ties to its powerful northern neighbor China will be portrayed and potentially politicized on the campaign trail. An entirely new paradigm has emerged in Myanmar, one where Suu Kyi is now seen as a trusted ally of Beijing and the military as a nationalistic bulwark against China’s strong advances. That’s a significant reversal, one that could have implications for stability in the lead-up to polls. When Suu Kyi was under house arrest during military rule or active in non-parliamentary politics, China viewed the long-time pro-democracy icon with suspicion. That was at least in part because her late British husband, a Tibetologist, maintained ties with many Tibetans in exile..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
2020-05-25
Date of entry/update: 2020-05-26
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "The Myanmar and Chinese authorities say traders are incurring losses due to restrictions at border gates and that field visits will be used to attempt to resolve the issues. Myanmar Trade Department Director General (DG) Min Min said, “Their Yunnan Province Commerce Department DG met with our Consul General in Kunming. They said that they would investigate this case through field visits. And also our ambassador to China said that they agreed to resolve this case through negotiations as soon as possible by meeting with the government departments concerned.” Minister of Economy and Commerce Dr. Than Myint met Chinese ambassador Mr Chan Hia on May 21 through a video conference call to resolve the issue of great losses suffered by Myanmar traders due to traffic jams at border trade posts. Similarly Myanmar consul general in Kunming, China reportedly met Yunnan Province Economy and Commerce Department DG in an attempt to resolve this issue. Currently three border trade posts are open for trade operations on Sino-Myanmar border but the Chinese side does not allow Myanmar drivers to enter their country so that the Chinese drivers have to replace them in driving into their country which caused delays in trade activities and difficulties in goods flow into China..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Mizzima" (Myanmar)
2020-05-24
Date of entry/update: 2020-05-24
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Chinese President Xi Jinping expressed hope that Myanmar will speed up cooperation with China to implement its ambitious infrastructure projects in the country during a recent call with Myanmar President U Win Myint. In the phone conversation on Wednesday, Xi said that he is expecting the two sides will cooperate closely and speed up the implementation of projects under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) that were agreed to during his visit to Myanmar earlier this year. During Xi’s visit to Myanmar, both sides agreed to speed up the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) backbone projects including the Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in western Rakhine State, New Yangon City in Myanmar’s commercial capital and Cross-Border Economic Cooperation Zones in Shan and Kachin states. He branded all three projects as crucial pillars of the CMEC that are needed to deepen “result-oriented BRI cooperation” and move from “the conceptual stage to concrete planning and implementation” of building the CMEC. In January, the two sides inked a concession agreement and shareholders’ agreement for Kyaukphyu SEZ, a letter of intent on the development of Yangon City and a memorandum of understanding (MoU) to accelerate negotiations around the Ruili-Muse Cross-Border Economic Cooperation Zone. Among the backbone projects, the Kyaukphyu SEZ is crucial for China, as it is expected to boost development in China’s landlocked Yunnan Province and provide China with direct access to the Indian Ocean, allowing its oil imports to bypass the Strait of Malacca. The two sides signed an agreement on CMEC in 2018 and the corridor is part of the BRI, Xi Jinping’s signature foreign policy project. Unveiled in 2013, the international plan is also known as the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. The project aims to build a network of roads, railroads and shipping lanes linking at least 70 countries from China to Europe, passing through Central Asia, the Middle East and Russia and fostering trade and investment..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2020-05-22
Date of entry/update: 2020-05-22
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: At present, fears that China is using the pandemic to exert excessive pressure and push through BRI projects in Myanmar are exaggerated.
Description: "With the COVID-19 pandemic past its peak in China, attention has turned to the Chinese government’s deployment of “COVID diplomacy.” This term frames how China’s government is sending medical supplies and personnel across the world — including to Myanmar — to build goodwill and show global leadership in fighting the pandemic. Some Southeast Asian observers say it is an overt propaganda campaign, with others going further and warning of the region’s acceptance of Chinese government soft power. For Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) partners, some view China’s government are using such soft power to push through projects that may not be in the recipient’s best interests. In Myanmar, some saw Chinese Ambassador Chen Hai’s May 6 meeting with Deputy Minister for Planning, Finance and Industry U Set Aung regarding the implementation of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) project — which falls under the BRI — as an attempt to push such projects through. The discussions took place soon after Myanmar released its COVID-19 Economic Relief Plan (CERP), which was published on April 27. The CERP details the country’s short- and medium-term plan to deal with the economic impact of the pandemic and includes stipulations to expedite the solicitation of strategic infrastructure projects, as well as approve and disclose large investments by reputable international firms that are experiencing delays. For the time being in Myanmar, however, fears that China’s government is using the pandemic to exert excessive pressure and push through BRI projects are exaggerated. The suspicion surrounding Chen Hai’s meeting is questionable given that discussions were on projects for which MoUs had been signed during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Myanmar in January this year, the first such visit by a Chinese leader in 19 years. Indeed, the acceleration of the BRI in Myanmar was already underway before the global ramifications of the COVID-19 outbreak were known. Ahead of his arrival in Myanmar in January, Xi called for the “deepening of results-oriented Belt and Road cooperation and [to move projects] from a conceptual stage to concrete planning and implementation in building the CMEC.” During Xi’s visit, the Kyaukphyu SEZ and deep-sea port, Myanmar-China border economic zones, and New Yangon City developments were described as the “three pillars” of the CMEC. These were the three projects reportedly discussed during Chen Hai’s May 6 meeting. Certainly, the Chinese government will be hoping to improve its image to ease BRI project implementation. Projects may be accelerated to mitigate the expected economic downturn in Myanmar. Yet, there has been no major shift in BRI project implementation because of the pandemic. Given the scale of BRI projects and importance to Myanmar’s economy, it would have been astonishing if such a meeting had not taken place soon after the CERP was released..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Diplomat" (Japan)
2020-05-20
Date of entry/update: 2020-05-21
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Description: "Although no new deals were struck during People’s Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping’s trip to Myanmar on January 17 and 18, the visit was significant for several reasons. The visit was the first by a PRC president to Myanmar in 19 years, and the first by Xi to this country in his role as president. The visit was widely touted as marking the 70th anniversary of the establishment of relations between the PRC and Myanmar. However, Xi’s first trip abroad this year was aimed at expediting implementation of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), a key component of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (CGTN, January 17). During the visit, the two governments signed 33 agreements, memorandums of understanding, protocols and letters of exchange relating to railways, industrial and power projects, and trade. Several of these agreements firm up Myanmar’s commitment to the CMEC’s three central components: the Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone (SEZ), which includes a deep-sea port, an industrial park and other projects; the China-Myanmar Border Economic Cooperation Zone; and an urban development plan for Yangon (The Irrawaddy, January 18). However, just weeks after Xi’s visit saw the two sides take steps to expedite CMEC projects, Beijing’s plans have run into new problems. CMEC projects are running late, and in an op-ed piece published on the eve of his Myanmar visit, Xi stressed the need for CMEC projects to be moved from “the conceptual stage to concrete planning and implementation” (New Light of Myanmar, January 16). The coronavirus pandemic has emerged as the latest challenge in the long list of obstacles that have slowed CMEC projects over the years. According to Khriezo Yhome, a New Delhi-based analyst of developments in Myanmar, it “may be too early to assess the impact of the coronavirus crisis on CMEC projects,” given that the pandemic is still only at an “initial phase” in Myanmar; however, there is “no doubt” that it “will slow down the implementation of CMEC projects in the short-term..."
Source/publisher: "The Jamestown Foundation" (United States)
2020-04-13
Date of entry/update: 2020-05-11
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "China and Myanmar inked dozens of deals on Saturday to speed up infrastructure projects in the Southeast Asian nation, as Beijing seeks to cement its hold over a neighbor increasingly isolated by the West. But no major new projects were agreed during the two-day visit by President Xi Jinping, the first of any Chinese leader in 19 years. Analysts said Myanmar was generally cautious of investments by Beijing and was also being careful ahead of elections later this year. Still, Xi and Myanmar leader Aung San Suu Kyi signed 33 agreements shoring up key projects that are part of the flagship Belt and Road Initiative, China’s vision of new trade routes described as a “21st century silk road”. They agreed to hasten implementation of the China Myanmar Economic Corridor, a giant infrastructure scheme worth billions of dollars, with agreements on railways linking southwestern China to the Indian Ocean, a deep sea-port in conflict-riven Rakhine state, a special economic zone on the border, and a new city project in the commercial capital of Yangon. They did not address a controversial $3.6 billion Beijing-backed mega dam, where work has been stalled since 2011, reflecting the contentiousness of Chinese investment in Myanmar, where many are uncomfortable with the sway Beijing has over its smaller neighbor..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Reuters" (UK)
2020-01-18
Date of entry/update: 2020-04-29
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: “...China in Burma,” both discursively and materially, is a complicated dynamic affair. The diplomatic, political and economic relations between the two countries have been continually refitted as the two countries have gone through their own separate and shared events. In particular, Burma’s postindependence ethnic armed movements, underground communist insurgency, and the Burmese military’s counterinsurgency strategies against them along China’s shared border continue to provide historical weight to Burma’s regional and national-scale political economies. Since the mid-1960s ethnic strongmen have dominated the political and economic sphere in northern Burma, in this case mostly with the illegal drugs economy, which was, and still is, woven into cross-border business networks with Yunnan Province and beyond...."
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2016-01-00
Date of entry/update: 2020-04-04
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Sub-title: A global research agency believed increasing pressure from the west on Myanmar’s alleged rights violations would push the country’s political and economic allegiance towards China, even if Myanmar seeks diversification of trade relations.
Description: "Fitch Solutions, a unit of the UK Fitch Group, said China looks likely to be the dominant foreign influence over the coming years with its already entrenched interests over Myanmar coupled with the possibility of news sanctions from the West due to human rights abuses. “The government’s inaction and repeated equivocation of the alleged abuses risks Myanmar becoming even more isolated on the international stage and also sanctions being expanded to include civilians and the economy,” said Fitch Solutions in its latest Outlook for Myanmar report released last week. The atrocities committed against the northern Rakhine Muslims has once again caught the international attention recently as the International Court of Justice in January imposed emergency “provisional measures” on Myanmar, ordering the country to preserve evidence of crimes and report to the court on measures taken to prevent genocide. The case derived from the military crackdown that resulted in more than 740,000 northern Rakhine Muslims fleeing to Bangladesh. The EU Commission’s decision in early February to partially withdraw Cambodia’s trade preference under the Everything But Arms (EBA) trade preferences initiative renewed worries about the EU removing Myanmar’s privileged status..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Myanmar Times" (Myanmar)
2020-03-06
Date of entry/update: 2020-03-06
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Chinese President Xi Jinping likes to travel big. His visit to Myanmar in January — the first for a Chinese leader in almost two decades — was no exception, capped off with no less than 33 bilateral agreements. However, the number alone overstates things. Some of the "agreements" merely saw Xi's entourage hand over feasibility studies for proposed projects. Many are not new. The number does, however, underscore the ever-tighter orbit Myanmar has been tracing around its giant neighbor since a detente with the West hit reverse over a massacre of the country's Muslim Rohingya minority in 2017. Crucially, a few of the deals advance China's plans to turn Myanmar into a secure new route to the Indian Ocean, valuable to Beijing for strategic and economic reasons. Whether China's coming spending splurge spells boom or bust for threadbare Myanmar — and peace or more war for its restive fringes — remains a worry. A pair of Chinese-built oil and gas pipelines already bisect Myanmar, from Kyaukphyu on the country's Bay of Bengal coastline to its border with China's landlocked Yunnan province. As part of Xi's signature Belt and Road Initiative, the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor would add a rail link to the route, an industrial park along their shared border and — most critically, and controversially — a deep sea port at Kyaukphyu to anchor it all..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "VOA" (Washington, D.C)
2020-03-04
Date of entry/update: 2020-03-05
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Most of deals meant to speed ambitious Chinese plan to connect Asia with Africa, Europe via land and maritime networks
Description: "Myanmar and China on Saturday signed scores of deals, most of them set to spur China’s landmark Belt and Road Initiative, an ambitious project to connect Asia with Africa and Europe via land and maritime networks to boost trade and stimulate economic growth. On his first visit to China’s Southeast Asian neighbor, President Xi Jinping met Myanmar President Win Myint, State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi, and military chief Senior Gen Min Aung Hlaing. Xi and Suu Kyi witnessed the signing of 33 agreements, protocols, and memoranda of understanding of infrastructure projects. The pacts include a concessional agreement for a deep sea port project in Myanmar’s western Rakhine state, giving Beijing strategic access to the Indian Ocean and cutting its reliance on maritime trade on the narrow and congested Strait of Malacca between Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore. China also handed Myanmar a feasibility study for a high-speed railroad line connecting Kumin, China to the Rakhine port. The agreements also include developing a special economic zone along the two countries’ shared border and a new city next to Yangon, Myanmar’s biggest city. Most of the deals are to strengthen the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, a plan to connect China's Yunnan Province with Myanmar's second-largest city Mandalay, leading to Yangon and Kyaukpyu in Myanmar’s Rakhine State. It is widely seen as a strategic economic corridor under the Belt and Road Initiative..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Anadolu Agency" (Ankara)
2020-01-18
Date of entry/update: 2020-03-03
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Xi’s recent voyage to Myanmar spotlighted the broader question about whether some key regional states are getting more cautious in responding to Beijing’s initiative.
Description: "One of the storylines that ran throughout Chinese President Xi Jinping’s first visit to Myanmar in his current capacity was the inroads Beijing was hoping to make with respect to its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). While the focus itself was not surprising, it nonetheless raised a broader question at play in the wider region: are key states getting more cautious in how they engage the BRI? Since China’s BRI first took off, there has been a near endless focus on the mix of opportunities and challenges it presents for various countries as well as how other major powers are responding to it But as I’ve argued before, a key part of that conversation, beyond what China wants or what the United States thinks and does, is how key regional states themselves are responding to the BRI. Getting a sense of regional reactions is challenging given the diversify of responses we have seen, the evolution of the BRI itself, which remains quite amorphous in some senses amid the periodic reports we see, and the relative availability of alternatives offered by other countries such as Japan. Indeed, regional engagement with the BRI is best seen not as a linear process, but a more dynamic one in response to changes in these variables and more..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Diplomat" (Japan)
2020-01-22
Date of entry/update: 2020-03-03
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: The Belt and Road Initiative, hailed for promoting development, is coming under fire as debt burdens grow, reflecting a growing wariness of Beijing’s posturing as a global leader-in-waiting on an international stage that seeks to promote debate rather than censor it
Description: "A good way to measure China’s appeal for the rest of the world is to gauge the success of its Belt and Road Initiative. As of last September, Beijing had signed more than 190 cooperation documents with more than 160 countries and international organisations in support of the trade initiative to link economies into a China-centred trading network. Its cumulative investment has exceeded US$100 billion, with construction projects valued at a staggering US$720 billion. Yet the initiative had begun slowing by 2018. This was due, in part, to a decline in Chinese funds available for investment. Chinese state banks had become more cautious about lending as the trade war with the United States commenced. Chinese state-owned enterprises were still moving car and steel capacity overseas, and building highways and cement plants in developing economies, but on a much smaller scale compared to their 2016 investment peak. Some countries (such as Myanmar, Sierra Leone and Tanzania) had become hesitant about continuing to borrowing large sums for fear of a debt trap..."
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Source/publisher: "South China Morning Post" (Hong Kong)
2020-02-05
Date of entry/update: 2020-03-03
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Indian and foreign media may have missed it but the US-India joint statement will most certainly be scrutinised closely by Beijing for anti-China content.
Description: "Both the Indian and foreign media coverage of US President Donald Trump’s India visit went on and on about his mention of Delhi riots and Pakistan – but almost entirely overlooked the reference to the Blue Dot Network, which has given rise to growing unease in Beijing. The mellifluous language of the joint statement centres on a ‘Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership’ tick boxing the expected military, space, and energy cooperation, as well as concern about the high debt situation in developing countries and the need for “responsible, transparent and sustainable financing practises”. That’s diplomatic language to refer to the dire situation faced by countries like Sri Lanka and the Maldives due to heavy debts to China.The next few lines refer to the Blue Dot Network as a “a multi-stakeholder initiative that will bring governments, the private sector, and civil society together to promote high-quality trusted standards for global infrastructure development”. That might seem rather tame, but here’s the carrot. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) expects that infrastructure development needs in the Indo-Pacific alone could be worth about $1.7 trillion per year through 2030. That’s what the Chinese are after. And now it seems, everyone else wants a slice of the pie, and the influence that goes with it..."
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Source/publisher: "The Print" (India)
2020-02-28
Date of entry/update: 2020-03-03
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "More than 1,000 Burmese workers in China have contacted the Myanmar embassy for help returning home, an official at the Myanmar embassy in Beijing told Myanmar Now. Factory closures in response to the coronavirus outbreak have left large numbers of Myanmar migrants out of work, with some sleeping rough besides highways and in bushes, according to one charity. The Moe Ma Kha Foundation, which is helping the stranded Myanmar migrants, has urged the embassy to prioritise over 200 factory workers who are sleeping rough in forests in Shandong and Guangdong provinces. They include pregnant women and children, and the workers there are running low on food because they have so little money, the foundation said. But the embassy said no one would be prioritised, and that the order of returns would be based on addresses and other credentials..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Myanmar Now" (Myanmar)
2020-02-27
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-28
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Myanmar is exported over 45,000 tons of rice and broken rice in second week of February and it is less than 3,000 tons in compared with last week export, according to Ministry of Commerce. It exported US$1.071 million worth of about 3,900 tons of rice and US$0.298 million worth of about 1,250 tons of broken rice from border trade centers along Myanmar-China border from February 8 to 14. Myanmar exported 2,700 tons of rice and 1,200 tons of broken rice from Muse 105-mile border trade center, about 620 tons of rice and 0.05 ton of broken rice from Chinshwehaw border trade center and about 520 tons of rice and 50 tons of broken rice from Lweje border trade center in that period. It exported US$8.231 million worth of over 25,000 tons of rice and US$0.401 million worth of over 15,000 tons of broken rice from maritime trade in that period. Myanmar exported about 15,000 tons of rice and over 1,000 tons of broken rice to Asia, 5,800 tons of rice and about 4,800 tons of broken rice to Africa and about 4,900 tons of rice and about 10,000 tons of broken rice to EU in that period..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Eleven Media Group (Myanmar)
2020-02-27
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-28
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "More than 130 Myanmar citizens working at a brick making site in China’s province of Yunnan have returned home as they fear the coronavirus, according to a statement released by anti-human trafficking police on February 24. Those Myanmar workers are 50 men and 88 women including those from Myakaing village, Kyauktan Township, Yangon Region. As the workers no longer wanted to work in China for fear of the coronavirus, they contacted the consul general’s office for help. Then, the office contacted the Yunnan Province government for further action. The authorities then sent the Myanmar workers to Chinshwehaw, a border checkpoint between Myanmar and China. The statement said that arrangements were made to send them home after they had received medical checkups at Hopan People’s Hospital..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Eleven Media Group (Myanmar)
2020-02-25
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-25
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: A Chinese-owned bag factory in Yangon abruptly announced its shutdown on Monday due to a lack of raw materials caused by the COVID-19 epidemic in China.
Description: "The Lucky Sky Bags factory in Mya Sein Yaung industrial zone in Hlaing Tharyar township gave no notice to its workers, some of whom were on strike, before shutting down on Monday. U Myo Zaw Htay, one of the leaders of the strike, called for the factory’s licence to be revoked and its 20 Chinese employees deported. "They got a seven-year tax exemption for investing in Mya Sein Yaung industrial zone,” he said, “but it operated for just 11 months.” The factory, which has 642 workers, makes leather bags for export to Europe. The workers went on strike from January 31 to February 11 to protest against unfair labour practices, which made it difficult for the factory to meet export deadlines and resulted in a decline in orders, according to the workers. After reaching an agreement with the factory on February 11 the workers returned to work. But 10 days later, the labour union's secretary was fired for no reason, so the workers protested and the factory shut down, U Myo Zaw Htay said. The factory management vowed to pay the workers compensation. Lucky Sky Bags was the third Chinese-owned company to shut down in the past three weeks due to the COVID-19 outbreak that has infected over 79,000 people globally..."
Source/publisher: "Myanmar Times" (Myanmar)
2020-02-24
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-25
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Bilateral border trade between Myanmar and China declined by US$209 million from Jan. 23 to Feb. 18 compared to the same period last year due to the spread of coronavirus, according to U Khin Maung Lwin, assistant permanent secretary for the Ministry of Commerce. The value of border trade through the Muse, Chinshwehaw, Lweje and Kanpiketi border trade zones totaled over $270 million—a decline from $479 million in the same period last year. “It was mainly because of the COVID-19 outbreak and Chinese New Year holidays. The holidays started on January 23 and normally end in early February,” U Khin Maung Lwin told The Irrawaddy. Before the coronavirus outbreak, the value of daily trade through the border trade zones was between $10 million and $14 million. Since the outbreak, it has dropped to between $1 and $2 million per day, according to the Ministry of Commerce. “Border trade has recovered slightly since trade resumed after February 13, but travel restrictions are still in force and watermelons are therefore not selling,” said U Khin Maung Lwin. “Around 40 trucks of honeydew melon have been exported to China as some Chinese supermarkets have bought them online. Also, only limited volumes of marine products are being exported as airlines have not yet resumed flights in the area.”..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2020-02-25
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-25
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: " Myanmar's Yangon Region Investment Committee (YRIC) recently approved 16 foreign investment businesses for the region, according to the Directorate of Investment and Company Administration (DICA) late Saturday. A total of 28.507 million U.S. dollars of foreign investments from China, Seychelles and Estonia as well as 3 billion Kyats (2 million U.S. dollars) from one local enterprise engaged the region's manufacturing sector and other services, creating over 8,900 job opportunities for local citizens. Yangon region absorbs 60 percent of country's investment from both home and abroad, followed by Mandalay region with 30 percent and the rest flows into other regions and states. Myanmar attracted over 20.8 billion U.S. dollars' foreign investments as of Jan 31, the first four months of the current fiscal year 2019-2020, according to the DICA's figures. The new Myanmar Companies Law which started to enforce on Aug. 1, 2018 allows foreign investors to take up 35 percent in local companies. Under the new companies law, investment with capital not exceeding 5 million U.S. dollars can be permitted by regional and states authorities of the DICA..."
Source/publisher: "Xinhua" (China)
2020-02-23
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-24
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Description: "Exports of watermelon and marine products on Myanmar-China border have declined by 209 million US dollars due to the spreading of coronoavirus (COVID-19), said Union Commerce Minister Dr. Than Myint, on 22 February. “Till 14 February of 2018-2019 fiscal year, the total trade value reached 14.595 billion US dollars, up 2.147 billion US dollars compared with the same period this year. The export value increased by 1.053 billion US dollars. The border trade sees a decline due to the Chinese New Year holidays and the spreading of coronavirus,” he said. “During the holidays from 23 January to 18 February, Myanmar-China border trade declined by 209 million US dollars—exports of 152 million US dollars and imports of 57 million US dollars, compared with the same period last year. It has an impact on water melon, sweet melon, perishable goods and marine products,” Dr. Than Myint continued. As a measure to solve this problem, Yangon Region Government helps merchants to get the places for the sale of water melon and sweet melon in Yangon market, in cooperation with Yangon City Development Committee..."
Source/publisher: Eleven Media Group (Myanmar)
2020-02-23
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-24
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: The Myanmar Garment Manufacturers Association (MGMA) says it fears that half the garment factories in the country may have to shut down temporarily as soon as March, due to a shortage of raw materials from China.
Description: "The association announced this during a press conference at the Union of Myanmar Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industries (UMFCCI) headquarters in Yangon last Friday. According to the association, garment manufacturers in the country may be forced to take such action due to a shortage of raw materials from China. Some 90 percent of the raw materials such as fabrics, textiles, and zips used by garment factories in Myanmar come from China, and supplies have been curtailed due to the coronavirus outbreak in China. Much of China had been shut down for the week-long Lunar New Year holiday at the end of January, but the government extended it into early February as part of efforts to curb the spread of the outbreak. Even though the extended holiday is now over, factories in China only just started up operations last week. However, with many workers quarantined and travel restrictions in place, production is only restarting slowly. Garment factories in Myanmar are already feeling the heat and have been coping since the start of the outbreak by reducing their operations and work hours, said Some factories have already started feeling the heat with reduction in operations and running hours, MGMA members said..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Myanmar Times" (Myanmar)
2020-02-24
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-24
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: China looks to Irrawaddy River as alternative trade route as high-speed rail plan stalls on security concerns
Description: "Ethnic wars, security concerns and official foot-dragging have all conspired to stall China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) plan to build a high-speed railroad from its southwest down through Myanmar’s volatile northern regions to the Indian Ocean. But Beijing has an emerging alternate plan: Develop a safer trade route via Myanmar’s Irrawaddy River – a 2,200-kilometer waterway which flows north to south through the length of a nation known for its lack of modern roads and rail links. The China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), a BRI-driven plan to link China and Myanmar via trains, roads and ports, aims to give Beijing an alternative route for fuel and other shipments through the congested Malacca Strait and the contested South China Sea, both potential conflict areas with the United States. That has made Myanmar a crucial cog in Chinese President Xi Jinping’s signature BRI, a US$1-trillion global infrastructure-building scheme that aims ultimately to put China at the center of a new global trade and security order..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
2020-02-22
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-23
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Description: "Louise was living from hand to mouth while helping her aunt sell noodle soup in the Laos capital of Vientiane, which sits on a curve of the Mekong River. Their lives were mostly untouched by the increasing Chinese investment in their country that in recent years has built billion-dollar dams, bridges and railways. Louise* was in her early 20s and had few professional prospects when she was approached by a woman who told her there were great opportunities in China, the country’s northern neighbour seen as a land of technological breakthroughs and booming cities. The woman said her relatives had been successful in China and she offered to take Louise there, too. Louise did not know then that this was her first step to being trapped in an abusive marriage with a Chinese man who felt he owned her. “I wanted to support my parents … I am poor and I was very curious to see China. I thought it would bring me a better life,” Louise recalls. Soon she was in a van with nine other Laotian women, travelling from Vientiane to the border with Thailand, and from there to Bangkok’s Suvarnabhumi Airport, where they boarded a flight to Guangzhou in southern China. Louise is among thousands of young girls and women, mostly from Asian countries, who have been trafficked into marriages with Chinese men. She has since been rescued, but many others have not been so lucky...'
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Source/publisher: "South China Morning Post" (Hong Kong)
2020-02-15
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-22
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Description: "When President Xi Jinping made his first state visit this year to Myanmar and signed new infrastructure contracts, there was no indication of the obstacle about to trip up China’s plan for railways, ports and highways around the world: the coronavirus. Travel restrictions to prevent the spread of the disease, which has now killed more than 1,800 people, have idled much of the world’s second-largest economy and choked key elements of Xi’s signature Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Chinese workers cannot get to overseas projects, and factories are cut off from the Chinese imports they need to keep running, according to more than a dozen company executives and officials. “Many factories in China remain closed; those that are open cannot reach full capacity,” said Boyang Xue, a China analyst at Ducker Frontier. “Since many BRI projects tend to source equipment and machinery from manufacturers based in China, the disruptions in industrial production and supply chain will cause further delays.” One giant project, China Railway International Group’s $6 billion high-speed railway in Indonesia, is on a war footing..."
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Source/publisher: "Reuters" (UK)
2020-02-18
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-21
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Sub-title: A state-owned Chinese firm has expressed interest to invest in the planned Dawei Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in Tanintharyi Region, U Myint San, vice chair of Dawei SEZ Management Committee, told The Myanmar Times.
Description: "The Myanmar government has yet to respond to the Chinese, given that talks to develop the SEZ with Italian-Thai Development Company Ltd (ITD) as well as the Thai and Japanese governments are at advanced stages. However, analysts aren’t ruling out the possibility. “Dawei SEZ has taken a long time to take shape and isn’t going as planned. As we don’t have the funds to implement it, if the current investors cannot develop the project effectively, then Chinese companies are our only options,” said U Zaw Win Pe, a local analyst and former economic adviser to parliament. “We’ll complete negotiations with the ITD first. If we cannot agree to the terms of the project, we can cancel the contract when it expires. I think the Chinese have the capacity to develop this project, but we’ll have to wait and see if ITD would be able to do it within the specified period,” U Zaw Win Pe added. The Chinese are expected to reap strategic benefits if they win Dawei SEZ. “China is already developing the Kyauk Phyu SEZ in Rakhine State. China is building a bullet train route from Kunming, China to Bangkok in Thailand. If they can connect that route to Dawei SEZ, it will be a great achievement for China. If China wins [Dawei SEZ], they will connect this route,” U Myint San said..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Myanmar Times" (Myanmar)
2020-02-20
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-20
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Sub-title: Farm labourers and crab catchers are among the thousands of Myanmar facing hard times because of the economic impact of the coronavirus outbreak.
Description: "THE IMPACT on Myanmar of the coronavirus outbreak that began in neighbouring China late last year has hit border trade and tourism hard, and there were reports last week that the garment sector was also being affected by supply-chain disruptions. As of February 17, Myanmar was monitoring eight people for symptoms of the Coronavirus disease 2019, or COVID-19, the Ministry of Health and Sport said. Earlier suspected cases of this novel type of coronavirus, including some in which patients were held in quarantine, have been confirmed as negative. COVID-19, which is a relative of the SARS and MERS coronaviruses, currently lacks a specific medical treatment and a vaccine is still being developed. China’s decision to close four border crossings at the start of the Chinese Lunar New Year to help contain the spread of the disease has sparked a sharp downturn in trade, with the agriculture, aquaculture and seafood sectors the worst affected. The number of Chinese tourists has also slumped, partly because visa rules have been tightened while the outbreak remains uncontrolled and also because of airlines cancelling services..."
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Source/publisher: "Frontier Myanmar" (Myanmar)
2020-02-19
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-20
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Description: "The planned multi-billion dollar Kyaukphyu Deep Seaport project will be developed with the contribution of 70 per cent by the China International Trust and Investment Corporation Consortium (CITIC) and 30 per cent by Myanmar, said Deputy Commerce Minister U Aung Htoo on Feb 16. According to the notification issued by Myanmar Economic Zones Central Committee dated 29 February, 2015, the project has a total area of 4289.32 acres—607.88 acres for the deep seaport project, 2446.07 acres for the industrial zone project and 1235.37 acres for the advanced housing project. A framework agreement was signed by Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone Management Committee and the CITIC Consortium from China in Nay Pyi Taw on 8 November, 2018. The agreements pertaining to Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone Project and Deep Sea Port Project were signed. On 18 January, 2020, both sides exchanged the MoUs. Both projects will be developed by the CITIC Consortium and Myanmar-Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone Holdings Groups of Company composed of 42 local private companies from Myanmar..."
Source/publisher: "The Star Online" (Selangor)
2020-02-17
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-17
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Description: "At the second Belt and Road forum in April last year, Xi Jinping stated that the infrastructure projects under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) would be financially and environmentally sustainable and deliver high quality infrastructure. The re-calibration of the initiative sought to dam the surge of criticism that had been miring the Chinese flagship foreign policy initiative the past two years. Myanmar was among the countries that had become wary over the infamous debt trap narrative, unflattering reports of poor standards in infrastructure and opaque and wasteful procurement practices disproportionately favoring Chinese companies. Back on track? Nonetheless, on 18 January 2020, BRI projects in Myanmar appeared to be back on track as Xi Jinping, on his first visit to Myanmar, and Aung San Suu Kyi announced their countries renewed commitment to cooperate. Myanmar’s eagerness for re-engagement with China, however, is driven largely by its international isolation due to the reported atrocities against Rohingyas. But has China also heeded to the criticism about BRI? It would appear that China’s new tune on BRI is not only a response to criticism but also about increased competition to its connectivity project. Competition Japan remains the largest infrastructure developer in Asia and in September 2019 announced a partnership to develop connectivity in Asia with the European Union (EU). This committed the partners to pursuing projects in a transparent and sustainable manner – a clear contrast to the BRI. Likewise, the EU’s connectivity strategy for Asia from September 2018 and it’s follow up a year later placed full emphasis on sustainability, good governance and transparency. The United States, South Korea, and a number of other OECD countries have also started infrastructure initiatives that seek similarly to differentiate from the BRI..."
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Source/publisher: "Eurasia Review"
2020-02-16
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-17
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Description: "As China goes all out to contain the novel coronavirus epidemic and some countries had evacuated their citizens, suspended flights and exaggerated the crisis, a launch ceremony for the China-Myanmar 2020 joint scientific survey of Myanmar's waters was held on Thursday, at Myanmar's Thilawa port in Yangon. This is the first major bilateral cooperation project launched by the two sides since President Xi Jinping's successful visit to Myanmar in January. It is a true reflection of the solid progress of the China-Myanmar community with a shared future. During Xi's visit to Myanmar, the two countries agreed to jointly build a China-Myanmar community with a shared future, which received a positive response from all walks of life in Myanmar. Today, the epidemic fight has solidified the friendship between China and Myanmar. After the novel coronavirus epidemic broke out in Wuhan, Central China's Hubei Province, YTV, one of the television channels in Myanmar, produced a seven-minute video to cheer for and support Wuhan and China, which touched the hearts of millions of the Chinese people. During China's fight against the epidemic, the world has seen this scenario: Chinese builders worked day and night at "Chinese speed" to set up, in just over 10 days, two large-scale high-level specialist hospitals which were designated to treating novel coronavirus patients in critical conditions. The world knows it was a feat only China could accomplish. The Chinese government has mobilized tens of thousands of medical workers to respond to the emergency. They headed into the eye of the storm without regard for their personal safety, validating the spirit of unity and mutual assistance of the Chinese nation during times of crisis. The quarantine of Wuhan, the epicenter of the epidemic which has a population of more than 10 million, has been accomplished with the understanding cooperation of the city's people. While the city has been locked down, its order has been maintained and basic supplies largely ensured..."
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Source/publisher: "Global Times" (China)
2020-02-16
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-17
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Sub-title: A Chinese-owned garment factory in Hlaing Tharyar township in Yangon Region has temporarily shut down and laid off hundreds of workers due to the COVID-19 outbreak.
Description: "The Hunter Myanmar Garment Factory shut down on Saturday, allegedly due to financial difficulties caused by cancelled orders and lack of raw materials. Ma Thandar Win, leader of the labour union at the plant, said the Chinese owner told Yangon Chief Minister U Phyo Min Thein she could not access money because the banks are closed due to the virus outbreak. “U Phyo Min Thein said he did not know when the epidemic will end and the banks will reopen,” she said. “It is cold there and is the flu season. When spring comes in April, the problems might end, but there is no guarantee.” Ma Thandar Win said the union and management will meet on Monday at the Labour Department office in Hlaing Tharyar to discuss compensation for the nearly 1000 workers. The workers want a guarantee that they will be reinstated when the factory reopens. “The factory is just 13 months old and has had problems,” she said. Under the law, workers must be employed for at least six months before they are entitled to 15 days’ compensation. Many workers are not eligible yet.” She said some workers only need a few days before they reach one year of employment, which would qualify them for one-month’s compensation. “They could lose around K130,000,” she added..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Myanmar Times" (Myanmar)
2020-02-17
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-17
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Sub-title: China’s coronavirus epidemic is hitting Myanmar’s important manufacturing and tourism industries as well as disrupting border trade, but in the longer term the crisis could encourage more supply chain factories to relocate from its giant neighbour.
Description: "The outbreak of the novel coronavirus in the central Chinese city of Wuhan came at the worst possible time for Myanmar’s tourism industry, with the peak season lasting from October to March. The epidemic has been declared a global emergency by the World Health Organization and is having an economic impact well beyond China where economic growth is forecast by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) to fall to 5.4 percent from 5.9pc in 2020. Fitch Solutions Macro Research this month lowered its forecast for Myanmar’s real GDP growth for the financial year 2019-20 to 6.3pc from 6.5pc, down from an actual 6.8pc in 2018-19. It expects the slowdown in tourism activity to account for most of the impact as Chinese nationals accounted for nearly a third of over two million foreign tourists last year. But the impact of the virus outbreak goes beyond a drop in Chinese travellers. Crude oil prices have lost around US$10 per barrel since mid-January on coronavirus-related fears. China is the biggest oil importer and if economic activity slows further then analysts say benchmark oil prices could dip by another US$3-5 per barrel. Oil and gas exports account for roughly half of Myanmar’s total export revenues and a drop in price will affect the government’s efforts to attract foreign investment in the upcoming bidding round. The energy ministry is expected to release 15 offshore and 18 onshore blocks to international bidders later this year. The EIU’s global trade lead Nick Marro expects much of the economic shock to hit China in the first quarter, which he says will have consequences for ASEAN over that same period..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Myanmar Times" (Myanmar)
2020-02-14
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-15
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Description: "Crew members work on the Chinese research vessel Xiangyanghong 06 at Thilawa port in Yangon, Myanmar, Feb. 13, 2019. Chinese research vessel Xiangyanghong 06 arrived at Myanmar's Thilawa port in Yangon on Thursday to conduct a joint research in Myanmar's waters..."
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Source/publisher: "Xinhua" (China)
2020-02-13
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-14
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Description: "This article argues that the origins and theoretical underpinnings of Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative can actually be traced back to the mid1980s, that is, almost three decades before the ofcial media unveiled the Maritime Silk Road Initiative (MSRI). It examines the changing role of Myanmar in China’s grand strategy in general and in MSRI in particular by undertaking an investigation of trade and investment relations. This analysis of the geo-economic and geo-strategic implications of MSRI is undertaken in order to ofer a prognosis of benefts and costs for Myanmar. Both the extent and the limits of MSRI are illustrated in Myanmar. It ends with a discussion of possible roadblocks, detours, cracks and fault lines along the Maritime Silk Road.....Myanmar/Burma is the second-largest country in Southeast Asia and is located at the juncture of Southeast and South Asia. Given its resources, natural endowments and strategic location bordering China and India, Myanmar fnds itself at the center of political wrangling between major powers. While India’s culture and religion have infuenced the Burmese way of life over the centuries, China has traditionally exerted geopolitical and strategic pressure on Myanmar. As Tin Maung Maung Than notes: ‘Geopolitical ramifcations for modern Burma have been overwhelmingly determined by bilateral relations with China’, which date back to the early Pyu kingdoms of the ninth century AD.1 Myanmar sufers from centrifugal tendencies. Since independence in 1948, successive governments have battled around the country’s periphery with ethnic separatist movements and communist insurgencies, some of which received direct support from Beijing. Post-independence, Myanmar has ‘accommodated China as its “senior” in a paukphaw (kinsmen) relationship’, and avoided taking actions inimical to China’s interests..."
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Source/publisher: "Journal of Contemporary China"
2017-12-27
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-10
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Description: "The “New Silk Road”, also known as the “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR) initiative or Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), is a development strategy proposed by China, which aims to foster the economic cooperation and connectivity mostly between Eurasian countries. 1 The initiative is named after the “Silk Road”, an ancient route of 6,437 kilometer in length, that dates back to the Western Han Dynasty (206 BC – 220 AD) and used to connect regions of East Asia with the Middle East and Europe, prospering numerous Eurasian civilizations for centuries.2 Therefore, with the implementation of the “New Silk Road” strategy, China aims to revive the 2.000-year-old network by investing on some serious infrastructure projects throughout the whole route, that largely resembles the legendary “Silk Road”. The promotion of regional economic development, the economic benefits for the countries involved and the tightening of the cultural ties of the participants, are the main goals of the OBOR initiative, in other words, OBOR is based on a win-win development strategy for the countries that are located throughout the path of the “New Silk Road”.3 The first signs of OBOR were brought to the surface during the Olympics of 2008. However, China’s ambitious plan was first stated on 2013, by the Chinese President Xi Jinping, the 5th president of China. The OBOR project consist of two different “routes”, one land route and a maritime one, that both begin and end in China’s territory. The first route (Silk Road Economic Belt) begins from Xi’an in Central China and leads to Northern Europe up to Rotterdam (busiest port in Europe), coming all the way from Central Asia, the Middle East, Eastern Europe and Russia and the center of Europe. On the other hand, the maritime route (the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road) connects the Mediterranean Sea with the South China Sea, in a long route that comes through the Suez Canal, the Indian Ocean, the Malacca strait, etc. It is estimated that approximately 65-70 countries and a total of 4,4 billion people (as much as the 60% of global population) will benefit from the participation in the OBOR project that will require at least 30-35 years to be completed..."
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Source/publisher: KEDISA via Academia.edu (USA)
2017-00-00
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-10
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Description: "This article explores the function of a transnational road in China-Myanmar relations from a perspective that reflects on Myanmar’s experience. It makes two key points. Firstly, Myanmar’s dependent relationship with China is illuminated if one applies a New Economic Geography perspective to economic processes. Secondly, these processes did not lead to a permanent dependency structure through which China assumed the dominant position; the structure is changeable, subject to action by Myanmar. The latter point indicates that China’s influence is greatly contested by the smaller country, and that the interaction of economic and political factors impact on the Myanmar-China relationship, particularly at local sites. This article focuses on economic activities at the city level, in order to assess advantages and disadvantages of the relationship. The cities that were chosen as the units of analysis are Ruili and Mandalay. As the cities are situated on the main road connecting Myanmar to China, the relationship is quite intense. This article explores the key characteristics of this economic relation via the road, focusing on the connectivity of Mandalay and Ruili. This article will focus on the processes of industrial relocation in Ruili and Mandalay to assess benefits Myanmar gains from the bilateral relationship. Using a New Economic Geography approach associated with the work of Krugman1 , a core-periphery pattern was applied as the theoretical framework to explain industrial relocation and agglomeration. Consequently, the analysis focuses on spatial relations and factors that form the relational structure. In addition, this article also highlights the political and economic transitions in Myanmar since 2010 that led to change in the relational structure. It also draws on fieldwork, which is used to illustrate how connectivity has impacted Mandalay and northern Myanmar..."
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Source/publisher: Chulalongkorn University (Bangkok)
2018-02-18
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-10
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Description: "The rhetoric of “standing up” to China, showing Pakistan “its place,” and protecting “every inch” of national territory are powerful, and intertwined, drivers of modern India’s foreign policy.2 The 2017 Sino–Indian military standoff in Doklam at the Bhutan tri-junction reified some of these narratives as the crisis re-focused attention on (a) the risk of active conflict between the two powers over an unsettled border dispute and (b) India’s management of relations with smaller neighbors in light of strategic rivalry with China.3 Indeed, China’s expanding economic footprint in South Asia as part of the Belt-and-Roads Initiative (BRI) has increased stress on India to compete with Beijing for maintaining strategic influence over its smaller neighbors.4 Throughout the Doklam crisis, which occurred in the backdrop of India’s refusal to join the BRI, New Delhi sought to secure its “special relationship” with Bhutan and not lose territory to China.5 What went largely unnoticed was New Delhi’s troop build-up at the tri-junction with Myanmar.6 Given the situation in Doklam, this was a logical military precaution from an Indian standpoint. The difference remains that unlike Bhutan, India does not have special relations with Myanmar. If anything, Myanmar is heavily dependent on China, and India has failed to become a credible counterbalance, despite reinvigorating its “Act East” policy, which emphasizes economic connectivity to Southeast Asia via Myanmar.7 Regardless of these contextual differences, it is conventional wisdom that strategic rivalry with China drives India’s “Act East” policy, and territorial sensitivities inform its tactical response to crises such as Doklam. Especially vis-à-vis Myanmar, existing literature emphasizes competition with China as decisive in shaping India’s foreign policy.8 Though the role of domestic and bureaucratic politics is appreciated, these drivers are not considered critical..."
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Source/publisher: Asian Security
2018-12-05
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-10
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Description: "Myanmar is caught between a rock and a hard place. As the government seeks to pick up the pace of development, electrical power is needed and hydropower is touted as an “environmentally-friendly” solution in order to switch on the lights. But there are a number of problems with how this process is being handled and the negative effects that big dams typically could have on the country’s rivers and water supply. DAM BUILDERS VS DAM BUSTERS Dam builders face dam busters when it comes to the pros and cons of dams as a way to harness the power of Mother Nature. Hydropower and dams are touted by people in the industry as an answer to power and also a way to control rivers that tend to flood. Yet the standoff over the Chinese-run $3.6 billion Myitsone Dam project in Kachin State alerts us to the public opposition to the building of dams – and in this particular case, the questions over who was going to get most of the power, given the original plan to send most of the electricity to China, while Myanmar is thirsty for electricity. Interestingly, the Myitsone Dam was not mentioned publicly during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s recent state visit to Myanmar. A raft of close to three dozen development projects mostly linked to Xi’s Belt and Road Initiative were signed. But the Myitsone Dam was noticeable by its absence from the list, despite Xi being the main Chinese official, in his role as Vice President, to push for the signing of the deal back in 2009..."
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Source/publisher: "Mizzima" (Myanmar)
2020-02-08
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-08
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Sub-title: Government looking to drum up trade with Singapore and Laos as exports to China dry up
Description: "Myanmar is losing the equivalent of $16 million a day in border trade with China because of the coronavirus outbreak, a senior official from the commerce ministry has said. Exports to China dropped by $160m between January 27 and February 5 at border trade areas in Shan and Kachin states, commerce secretary Khin Maung Lwin told Myanmar Now. Trade has dried up because buyers inside China are unable to reach the border due to travel restrictions aimed at curbing the virus, said Dr Thet Lwin Oo, Director of the Myanmar International Trade Center. Meanwhile Myanmar traders are having their Chinese visas denied, said Sein Win Hlaing, chairman of the Myanmar Rice Producers Association. Trade at the border is worth over $500 million a month, government figures show. Between October and January, China imported $1.4 billion worth of goods from Myanmar and exported $680 million worth. Khin Maung Lwin said that as there were now no buyers on the Chinese side, the ministry is looking for new export markets..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Myanmar Now" (Myanmar)
2020-02-08
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-08
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Topic: Myanmar , Crab , Exports , China , Virus
Topic: Myanmar , Crab , Exports , China , Virus
Description: "Thousands of workers from crab wholesale centres from the Labutta township are now out of their jobs after China suspended its crab imports from Myanmar due to the spread of novel coronavirus in China. The suspension of crab exports to China has huge impacts on workers and the crab industry in the township. Crab is one of the major exports of Labutta Township, and it may have an impact on those involved in the whole industry. The price of crab declined to around Ks5,000 (RM14) per kilo from around Ks15,000 (RM43)per kilo after China stopped importing crabs from Myanmar. U Win Naing, Chair of the Labutta Crab Entrepreneurs Association said: “Due to the closure of border gates, we cannot ship crabs to China. We mainly export crabs to China. There are 130 crab wholesale centres in Labutta.” Labutta township exports more than ten tonnes of crabs to China every day. Most people in the rural areas rely only on crab fishing. - Eleven Media Group/Asia News Network..."
Source/publisher: "The Star Online" (Selangor)
2020-02-08
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-08
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Sub-title: Lethal coronavirus outbreak highlights unforeseen risk of greater connectivity with China
Description: "In mid-January, Chinese President Xi Jinping made a historic visit to Myanmar with a pocket full of promises. Xi vowed to build and finance big new infrastructure projects to connect the two neighbors in unprecedented trade-promoting ways in a so-called China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, which if realized as envisioned would serve as a poster child for his wider Belt and Road Initiative in Southeast Asia. Fast forward three weeks to the coronavirus outbreak, which has killed at least 25 and infected over 24,000 in China, has spread contagion panic worldwide – and has suddenly put those grand Myanmar plans into certain doubt, as Beijing looks inward to contain the epidemic and Naypyidaw weighs new downsides of greater bilateral connectivity. Like other nations Myanmar has suspended visas on arrival for Chinese tourists, while the national hotels and tourism ministry has asked travel agencies to stop providing services to all Chinese nationals. Those measures could deal a hard blow to Myanmar’s nascent but crucial tourism industry. Chinese nationals accounted for over 17% of Myanmar’s documented 4.36 million visitors in 2019, a figure that is sure to fall drastically with the new visa ban..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
2020-02-05
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-07
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Sub-title: The coronavirus outbreak in China has caused trade between Myanmar and its neighbor to slow to a trickle, trade officials say.
Description: "The clearest example of this is the plunge in the volume of watermelons from Myanmar that are crossing the border to the east. “About 600 truckloads of Myanmar’s watermelons used to cross the border a day in the Muse border trade area in Shan State. Since the outbreak earlier this year, the number of loads has plunged to about 30, a reduction of 95 percent,” said U Naing Win, chair of the Myanmar Melon Producers and Exporters Association. China is one of Myanmar’s largest trade partners, with goods flowing between both countries across land routes and by sea. The Chinese government’s restrictions on travel between provinces in the country that are part of efforts to curb the spread of the virus is causing severe problems at border trade areas, U Naing Win added. “As long as this health emergency continues, losses will continue. It is important to combat this disease so markets can return to normal as soon as possible. If not, the damage will be huge. A continued reduction in business volume of 95pc is just unsustainable,” he said. “The slowing of watermelon sales, one of main export commodities in the Muse area, started on January 13. In the past, there was more demand during Chinese New Year period and a truckload of watermelons was worth from K8 million to K13 million, but prices have now dropped by between 50pc to 70pc ” said U Sai Khin Maung, vice chair of the Muse Fruit Commodity Brokers House. Traders in Muse say that the Chinese government’s travel restrictions are impeding the flow of goods. This is being compounded by new restrictions on oversea trade routes as well, said Ministry of Commerce Assistant Secretary U Khin Maung Lwin. “Import and export licence applications for oversea trade with China were stopped this week, so trade seems to be slowing to a crawl,” U Khin Maung Lwin said..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Myanmar Times" (Myanmar)
2020-02-07
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-07
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Description: "Migrant workers returning to Myanmar from China’s Yunnan province because of coronavirus fears are walking away from their jobs without receiving the pay owed to them, as their Chinese employers try to discourage them from leaving, sources say. Nearly 1,000 have crossed the border at Myanmar’s Chinshwehaw town since Jan. 28, with around 350 crossing each day at Laukkaing, both in Myanmar’s Kokang Self-Administered Zone, sources say, adding that most had been employed in chili and eggplant plantations in remote areas of Yunnan. Some are leaving without receiving their salary or money they have saved, because their bosses do not want them to leave, a resident of Yesagyo, a town in Myanmar’s Magway Division near the border, told RFA’s Myanmar Service in an interview. Others are meanwhile unable to leave, Ma San New Htay said. “The bosses do not give them their full wages, or control their passports, IDs, or other documents. That’s why some workers cannot return home, even though they want to leave,” she said. Also speaking to RFA, one returned worker said that many are now leaving China despite employers’ attempts to hold them back..."
Source/publisher: "RFA" (USA)
2020-02-05
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-07
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Sub-title: Beijing is toning down its rhetoric for the grand plan and rethinking its massive international infrastructure programme, Raffaello Pantucci writes...Signs of a more modest approach from Xi Jinping’s trip to Myanmar when there was little official mention of an economic corridor involving the two countries.
Description: "Absent from almost all of the official coverage around Chinese President Xi Jinping’s recent visit to Myanmar was any mention of the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM-EC). A belt and road route before the Belt and Road Initiative existed, the corridor was a concept first mooted in the late 1990s but has largely gone nowhere. The bigger question this poses is whether this is a harbinger of China shedding its grander overambitious belt and road visions over the next decade for a more focused and logical set of bilateral engagements. Certainly there has been a toning down of rhetoric around the belt and road, an infrastructure vision to link economies into a China-centred trading network. While it remains a hot topic in Beijing and a sure-fire way for leaders of other countries to be seen to be aligning themselves with China, its scattered record of success has meant there has been rethinking about how this grand concept will continue to fit into Beijing’s foreign policy repertoire. It continues to be a convenient tag for Chinese diplomats to use given its broad and positive conceptual basis but, it is not clear that China wants to continue to talk in the expansive corridor terms that it used to..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "South China Morning Post" (Hong Kong)
2020-02-03
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-05
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Continued mistrust of China – including from the Tatmadaw – ensured that there was little significant progress during President Xi Jinping’s recent visit to Myanmar.
Description: "On January 17, Xi Jinping became the first Chinese president to travel to Myanmar in 19 years when he paid a two-day state visit. Although Xi visited Myanmar in 2009, it was the first time he had travelled here as president. The importance of the visit was heightened by the fact that the two countries are marking the 70th anniversary of diplomatic relations this year – newly independent Burma was the first non-communist country to recognise the People’s Republic of China. During his visit Xi met top Myanmar officials including President U Win Myint, State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and Commander-in-Chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, and attended signing ceremonies for a number of agreements and memoranda of understanding. But did China gain what it expected from the visit? And what does it mean for China-Myanmar relations?
Source/publisher: "Frontier Myanmar" (Myanmar)
2020-02-05
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-05
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Sub-title: It doesn’t have many friendly nations to help it balance ties with Beijing
Description: "Chinese President Xi Jinping’s state visit to Myanmar last week is a vivid indicator of the region’s changing geopolitics, reflecting adversely on the West and its allies. Its real significance transcends the 33 agreements signed, although it is an impressive number in itself for a short sojourn of a day and a half. President Xi took his own time in coming to the southern neighbour which had to be content with largely one-way VVIP traffic, as Myanmar’s top leaders travelled to Beijing with noticeable regularity. As the Vice-President, he had visited Myanmar in 2009. The last visit by a Chinese President took place in 2001. The 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations was judged to be the ideal occasion to launch a major renewal and strengthen the process of the bilateral relationship. U. Nu, the first prime minister of Burma (Myanmar’s previous name), famously depicted his country’s position in the region as “hemmed in like a tender gourd amongst the cacti.” Then, it chose the policy of independence and non-alignment. Does the red-carpet treatment extended to the President of China show that today’s Myanmar, jointly led by Aung San Suu Kyi and the military, has taken sides?..."
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Source/publisher: "The Hindu" (India)
2020-01-23
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-04
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