Peace processes, ceasefires and ceasefire talks (websites, documents, reports and studies)

OBL does not document all details of the ceasefires and peace negotiations as these are covered by several of the websites/multiple documents below.
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Websites/Multiple Documents

Description: News, Opinion/Analysis, Interview, Photo, Video
Source/publisher: Kachinland News
Date of entry/update: 2015-07-26
Grouping: Websites/Multiple Documents
Language: English, Kachin
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Description: "Ceasefires in Burma have been heavily utilised by the Burmese government as a policy to contain ethnic rebel groups and create tentative truces. The first ceasefire was arranged by the State Law and Order Restoration Council in 1989, specifically spearheaded by Khin Nyunt, then the chief of Military Intelligence, with the Kokang-led National Democratic Alliance Army, which had recently split from the Communist Party of Burma due to internal conflicts..."...Since 1989, the Burmese government has signed the following ceasefire agreements...":
Source/publisher: Wikipedia
Date of entry/update: 2015-06-01
Grouping: Websites/Multiple Documents
Language: English
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Description: Studies and other documents on Burma/Myanmar as well as on peace and conflict in other countries in SE Asia
Source/publisher: Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies (CPCS)
Date of entry/update: 2012-10-22
Grouping: Websites/Multiple Documents
Language: English
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Description: Articles on the peace process from late 2013
Source/publisher: Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB)
Date of entry/update: 2015-08-12
Grouping: Websites/Multiple Documents
Language: English
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Description: EBO?s vision for the future of the Union of Myanmar: The ?Pyidaungsu” (Union of Myanmar) is established as a federal democratic country after a well-negotiated and sustainable peace process. Just and fair negotiations have ended the 65-year old civil war and there is peaceful co-existence, where multi-ethnic communities thrive and participate actively in the political arena. The National Dialogue during the peace process has led to good governance and the establishment of a developed and prosperous nation. The international community supports the transition process and assists in the country?s development. Human rights are widely understood, fulfilled, promoted and respected. mission statement In support of the vision, EBO will: Encourage and strengthen the capacity of decision makers (the executive, army, parliament, civil service & political parties) to seek a more inclusive and democratic solution to peace through engagement processes with other stakeholders to develop policies and strengthen democratic practices. Facilitate ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) to consult amongst themselves; provide information, training and resources to develop policies and strategies for negotiations; and to implement their agreement with the government. The program will also build the capacity of EAOs to interact with the general public and political parties to strengthen collaboration and cooperation in support of a position to negotiate with the government. Strengthen the capacity of civil society organizations and (especially ethnic) media by facilitating access to information, training and funding to enable them, especially women and youth, to participate in the peace process and have a more active role in social and political processes. Provide the international community, foreign governments and INGOs with information on developments within Myanmar to help develop their policies to support democratization and to help coordinate their response and involvement in the peace process..."
Source/publisher: Euro-Burma Office (EBO)
Date of entry/update: 2015-04-25
Grouping: Websites/Multiple Documents
Language: English
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Description: "The Ethnic Peace Resources Project (EPRP) provides information and training to support ethnic communities in Myanmar working on the peace process. This website provides resources and training materials and is one part of the Ethnic Peace Resources Project. A website User Guide is provided to help you."
Source/publisher: Ethnic Peace Resources Project (EPRP) Ethnic peace resources project
Date of entry/update: 2013-09-19
Grouping: Websites/Multiple Documents
Language: English, Burmese/ မြန်မာဘာသာ
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Description: Legal pluralism covers situations where more than one legal culture is present. In Burma/Myanmar, for instance, there is the Anglo-Burmese statutory law, Burmese and non-Burmese customary law, legal codes drafted by various non-state actors as well as the gradual entry of international human rights standards...In our view, legal pluralism has an important place in the peace process. [This is a link to the Legal Pluralism sub-section in Law and Constitution]
Source/publisher: Online Burma/Myanmar Library
Date of entry/update: 2015-07-30
Grouping: Websites/Multiple Documents
Language: English
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Description: "Myanmar Peace Monitor is a project run by the Burma News International that works to support communication and understanding in the current efforts for peace and reconciliation in Myanmar. It aims to centralize information, track and make sense of the many events and stakeholders involved in the complex and multifaceted peace process..."
Source/publisher: Burma News International
Date of entry/update: 2013-05-15
Grouping: Websites/Multiple Documents
Language: English
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Description: The Myanmar Peace Support Initiative (MPSI) was formed in March 2012 at the request of the Government of Myanmar for international support to the peace process... MPSI works with and engages the Government, the Myanmar Army, non-state armed and political groups, civil society actors and communities, as well as international partners to provide concrete support to the ceasefire process and emerging peace process. From the outset, the intention has been for the MPSI to provide temporary support to the emergence and consolidation of peace in the absence of appropriate longer-term structures and while more sustainable traditional international responses are mobilised. Over the last year, the Government has formed the Myanmar Peace Centre (MPC), and donors have agreed to establish a secretariat to support the workings of the Peace Donor Support Group (PDSG). Efforts are being made to build the capacity of ethnic actors through the establishment of ethnic support structures. In line with its stated purpose of being a temporary structure, MPSI aspires to hand over many of its responsibilities and initiatives to permanent structures."....On 16 December, 2014, OBL noticed that one of the URLs was not working (temporary?). We have placed this link as an Alternate URL.
Source/publisher: Myanmar Peace Support Initiative (MPSI)
Date of entry/update: 2013-09-19
Grouping: Websites/Multiple Documents
Language: English
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Description: Link to a dedicated section on the Panglong Conference
Source/publisher: Online Burma/Myanmar Library
Date of entry/update: 2016-08-31
Grouping: Websites/Multiple Documents
Language: English
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Description: ''This page contains information on all aspects of peace building, including current needs and activities in Myanmar. The aim of this page is to provide actors across the sector with information that will enable greater coordination, transparency, and efficiency of operations in peace building. Information on this page includes situation updates and analysis, information on inter-agency coordination and activities under implementation, relevant thematic maps and publications, and also key technical guidelines and resources related to Peacebuilding...''
Source/publisher: Myanmar Information Management Unit (MIMU)
1970-01-01
Date of entry/update: 2019-02-07
Grouping: Websites/Multiple Documents
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Description: "The Peace Donor Support Group (PDSG) was first convened in June 2012 by the Government of Norway at the request of President U Thein Sein in order to provide a common platform for dialogue between the donor community and the Government of Myanmar, and to better coordinate the international community?s support to peace in general and the provision of aid in conflict-affected areas. The Government of Myanmar asked that the Group be initially composed of Norway, Australia, the United Kingdom, the European Union, the United Nations, and the World Bank. The US, Japan and Switzerland were invited to join the PDSG in May 2013. The efforts of the PDSG are premised on the belief that the current context represents an unprecedented opportunity to resolve ethnic conflicts, and that the international community can support the momentum for peace and help to build confidence in the peace-making process among key stake-holders. The engagement is also premised on the need for broad consultations with affected communities and civil society, and the acknowledgement of the importance of a political peace process. In addition to meeting the Union Government and NSAGs, the PDSG members also plan to continue to meet with civil society groups, and the wider donor community. These meetings provide an opportunity for the PDSG to demonstrate political support for the peace-making process, to get a better understanding of the needs and views of different stakeholders, enhance the co-ordination and coherence of peacebuilding support from donor partners, and for drawing on lessons from other, relevant international experiences. Some members of the Peace Donor Support Group, and other international donors, are also currently providing funding and technical support to Myanmar Peace Support Initiative."
Source/publisher: Peace Donor Support Group
Date of entry/update: 2013-09-19
Grouping: Websites/Multiple Documents
Language: English
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Description: "Founding: The Institute was founded in August 2013 in accordance with the resolution of representatives of ethnic organisations and civil society organizations (CSOs) in December 2012 in Chiangmai... Vision: A just, equitable, democratic and pluralistic Pyidaungsu... Mission: To provide impartial and independent spaces for building common understanding, resources and assistance to communities in building the Pyidaungsu... Values: 1) Grounded in relevant and factual information; 2) Directed and managed by participants in building the Pyidaungsu; 3) Focused to support needs identified by the participants..."
Source/publisher: Pyidaungsu Institute
Date of entry/update: 2016-09-12
Grouping: Websites/Multiple Documents
Language: English, Burmese (မြန်မာဘာသာ)
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Individual Documents

Sub-title: The Time for Reflection and New Solutions
Description: "15 October 2023 marks the eighth anniversary of the signing of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, which the State Administration Council and few remaining ethnic armed organisations in the accord are honouring in Nay Pyi Taw. Although the NCA process did involve a lot of theatre, the SAC’s true commemoration of the NCA occurred in the middle of the night earlier this week, when the military bombed the Kachin internally displaced persons’ camp of Munglai Hkyet, near the border with China. The attack killed at least 29 persons, including young children, with 56 more injured. Throughout the NCA negotiation and attempted implementation periods, fighting and human rights violations raged on, especially in the country’s north. The Myanmar military and government blocked humanitarian assistance then, as the SAC continues now. The international community responded at times with statements of concern and other assistance, but lacked coherent approaches to curtail the killing or ensure compliance with agreements. On this anniversary, the NCA’s vestigial institutions remain without public legitimacy, manipulated as part of the SAC’s strategy to divide, confuse, and manipulate national and international actors. The NCA’s basic principles remain valued by various actors, but would be more likely to be practised through new and different approaches and processes. Drawn from an analysis of the NCA published by TNI earlier this year, this summary highlights how the accord was never inclusive, effectively developed or truly implemented and is not fit for purpose in a political and conflict landscape greatly changed since the 2021 coup.* During the past three decades, the term ‘peace process’ has been commonly used in Myanmar to describe endeavours to end the country’s long-running political and ethnic conflicts. In reality, the Myanmar peace process has always been one of the most labyrinthine in the world. Dating back to 1989, a diversity of unilateral, bilateral and multilateral processes has been underway. In recent years, they were held together by the aspirations of a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) and 21st Century Panglong Conference. These two initiatives came to an abrupt halt with the military coup on 1 February 2021. To date, there has been no ‘peace process’ breakthrough that has led to national reconciliation and meaningful reform. The country remains far from the achievement of peace that reaches to all peoples, and Myanmar is currently in the midst of one of its most violent and conflict-divided periods of history since independence in 1948. The peace process – as reconfigured by government after 2011 – no longer exists. The present breakdown, however, should not be a time of resignation and despair. In the determination of young people and re-imagining of national politics since the coup, there are hopes that a new realism has entered the peace and reform vocabulary which will ultimately lead to effective solutions. For this to happen, it is vital that lessons are learned from the injustices and experiences of the past. Far from being new, the NCA was the latest in a long line of peace process failures, and it repeated many of the inequalities and inconsistencies that undermined peace efforts during previous cycles of government. Despite its high profile, the NCA never marked a moment of national breakthrough. Rather, conflict spread in several parts of the country from the time of its signing, pre-shadowing the state of ethno-political collapse which exists today. For these reasons, the NCA’s journey demands close examination. A Backdrop of Failure Many problems can be identified in the failure to build a nationwide process for peace. These were evident even before the 2021coup and renewed spread of civil war. Following the NCA’s 2015 signing, a catalogue of errors quickly built up. The treaty was initiated under the quasi-civilian administration of the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). But the difficulties continued after the National League for Democracy (NLD) came to government office in 2016. Problems and weaknesses in the NCA were not acknowledged; the peace process was not inclusive; the hand of the Myanmar military (Tatmadaw or Sit-Tat) was never far away; and initiatives to address the reform impasse too often ended in stagnation, political regression and increased conflict. Ultimately, over many years of meetings, the NCA did not bring the key stakeholders and conflict actors to the same table. Underpinning these failures, the complex nature of the NCA process led to procedural breakdowns and a build-up of disagreements over technical issues. Restructuring the peace process and addressing technical problems was undoubtedly necessary. But the challenges at the root of conflict and failure in negotiations have always been political. Technical fixes alone were never likely to bridge the political divides that exist on such scale. The outcome was the prioritisation of process over delivery, meaning that many commitments were never fulfilled. In part, these failures stemmed from very different perspectives among NCA signatories over the role of the agreement as a process towards ending armed conflict, protecting the human rights of war-affected communities and negotiating reform. For their part, ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) – both those party to the NCA and those outside the agreement – focused on the need for trust-building and substantive agreements first. In contrast, government and Tatmadaw leaders insisted on resuming formal meetings or signing agreements before addressing concerns about trust, substance and the implementation of ceasefires. Meanwhile, despite the promise of Panglong-21, NLD leaders focused on electoral politics rather than the peace process as the instrument for reform once in office. In consequence, fundamental differences in interests and needs were never addressed, and the parliamentary and peace processes were never brought on to the same track. These proved errors of historic proportions. The NCA never acted as a catalyst for building ethnic peace and national unity. Instead, dysfunction and instability grew at the heart of the peace negotiation process. National politics remained dominated by the ethnic Bamar (Burman) majority; the NLD and Defence Services were uneasy partners in government under the 2008 constitution; the Tatmadaw maintained a controlling role in many aspects of political, economic and security affairs (including selecting dialogue partners); ethnic armed movements were represented by a diverse array of ceasefire and non-ceasefire organisations; ethnic political parties and civil society organisations were never effectively included in the NCA or wider peace process; and the Tatmadaw continued to back a multitude of local militia groups and Border Guard Forces that play a key role in their efforts to manage conflict in the ethnic borderlands. Warning signings were persistently ignored. After the NCA was signed, frustration with the peace process tangibly grew in many ethnic states and regions. Continued fighting, land expropriation, the internal displacement of civilians, natural resource exploitation and the acceleration of business deals with outside investors all sustained an impression that the peace process was being used as a delaying device to constrain ethnic demands while the social, legal, political and economic landscape was reshaped to the government’s agenda and advantage. Too often, renewed conflicts in different parts of the country (including anti-Rohingya violence) were regarded by NCA donors and supporters as exceptions rather than evidence of urgent and systemic failings that need to be addressed. Rather than aiming towards peace, many political actors came to view the process as a continuation of war by other means. In consequence, the NCA never gained the momentum of countrywide support. Among many failings, the most outstanding was the continuing launch of military operations by the Defence Services. Even while the NCA and peace talks continued, further militarization and the build-up of Tatmadaw forces took place in both ceasefire and non-ceasefire territories of the country. While new ceasefires were agreed in areas that had seen decades of fighting, old ceasefires broke down in places where armed conflict had been mostly absent for 15 years. For communities living in these areas, the words ‘peace process’ sounded very hollow. Military security – not human security – appeared to be the main priority of the central authorities, raising serious questions about the intentions of both the government and Tatmadaw leaders. For all these reasons, contemporary judgments will be harsh. Despite many fine words, there were no fundamental changes in the conflict landscape before or after the NCA signing. Rather than charting a political roadmap for inclusive peace, the NCA process all too frequently appeared to be a vehicle for asserting and increasing Tatmadaw control. All the major challenges in conflict resolution remained, most of which exacerbated over time, and no political endgame ever came in view. Once the NCA had been signed, there was little momentum towards improving the functioning of ceasefires, deepening the reform basis of dialogue or making the process work. As these failures continued, key elements in the NCA architecture either fell by the way side or were never fully implemented. Major omissions and weaknesses included the inadequacies or lack of national-level dialogue meetings, interim arrangements, security sector reform and new processes for political negotiation and agreement. Warnings were constantly flagged up. But ameliorative steps were never sufficiently taken. Instead, from the beginning of 2020 both the NCA and national landscape were dominated by two new imperatives: Covid-19 and the November general election. Hopes that they might produce reflective shifts in the transitional landscape swiftly evaporated. The opportunity to use political and health responses as a means to promote cooperation and understanding between EAOs and government departments was missed by the NLD-led administration. Continued fighting, NCA neglect and the conduct of polling amidst a global pandemic only exacerbated ethno-political concerns. In reality, long before the 2021 coup it was clear that the NCA was malfunctioning as a process for national reform. The Lack of International Focus and Cohesion As these events unfolded, the actions of the international community also reflected different, and often divergent, aspects of Myanmar’s conflict impasse. A decade of international support for the peace process and political transition ultimately came to count for very little. Many decisions came out of self-interest rather than informed understanding of the diverse and complex challenges on the ground. A coherent peace programme never emerged, and there were many inconsistencies in the international response. There was no shortage of international actions. Egregious human rights violations became the subject of investigation by the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice. At the same time, political and business actors in China, India, Japan and various Western states were in rivalry for influence over the country’s political and economic direction. All affirmed support for the NCA and peace process as an essential step in political transition. But there was no consensus on policies or priorities to pursue. There was a failure to recognise Tatmadaw stratagems and the inherent weaknesses of the Myanmar state, opportunities were lost, and the manifest problems within the NCA were never addressed. Adding to the difficulties, while Western actors mainly focused their peace efforts on engagement with the Myanmar government and ethnic armed organisations based in the southeastern borderlands with Thailand, the prism of Chinese officials and businesses – always a key influence in the country – was mainly through the Myanmar government, Tatmadaw and EAOs based along its Yunnan border. Neither Western nor Chinese actors seemed willing and able to engage with all relevant groups. Rather, both apparently failed to understand that leaving out key groups in the peace process would be a major obstacle to achieving lasting solutions. Ultimately, these exclusions were never addressed. The SAC Coup: a New Cycle of Conflict and Division For the moment, the 1 February 2021 coup by the military State Administration Council (SAC) has consigned the NCA as a potential and inclusive model for political negotiation and peace-building to history. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and leaders of the NLD which won the 2020 general election are in prison, and peaceful protests have been brutally suppressed. To all intents and purposes, the tentative moves during the past decade towards a new system of federalism and democracy, brought about by negotiation and peace-building, have been brought to an end. By seizing power, Snr-Gen. Min Aung Hlaing may have thought it easy to return the political clock back to the Tatmadaw-controlled past. Instead, the country is faced with a scale of repression, violence and humanitarian emergency that echoes the worst times of civil war since independence in 1948. Protest and resistance against the regime has spread among the Bamar-majority population; ceasefires – including by three NCA signatories – have broken down in different parts of Chin, Karen, Kayah, Mon and Rakhine States; existing conflicts have escalated in Kachin and northern Shan States; and new armed struggles have developed in Magway, Sagaing, Tanintharyi and other regions as well as urban areas. The consequences have been profound. The NCA and broader peace process have been subsumed into a very different ethno-political landscape from the context in which they developed. The structures and divisions in conflict have significantly changed. Amidst a diversity of new movements and alignments, there are two rival governments claiming legitimacy in the country: the SAC and National Unity Government (NUG). In this new battleground, a host of resistance groups – generally known as People’s Defence Forces – have proliferated across the country, and their roles in any future process of political negotiation and peace-building are very uncertain. Reflecting the scale of violence, the nature of warfare has also changed. Anti-regime forces seek to launch urban attacks, while the SAC has increasingly relied on aerial attacks targeting civilian populations and created new Pyu Saw Hti and other local militia forces as it loses control on the ground. Many communities and civilians are caught in the crossfire, with it dangerous to publicly express political opinions or allegiances. SAC leaders, in the meantime, have been using the empty language of a new general election and the NCA as a theatre to try and divide opponents and deceive credulous outsiders. Since the coup, there has been no peace process or political roadmap of real prospect underway. If the NCA did not achieve breakthroughs under an NLD-led administration, it is improbable that this could happen under a regime headed by the Tatmadaw which, even before the coup, was the most disruptive actor in the implementation of the accord, consistently escalating violence and negating its own agreements. In the propaganda struggle, there have been intermittent meetings by the SAC with some of the remaining EAO NCA-signatories that have agreed to talks since the coup. But they are mostly among the smallest and weakest in the country. Such parties, several of which are breakaway or remnant factions, can never be regarded as representative of political opinion in the country at large while civil war continues and most of the leading voices for political change are excluded. The same lack of credibility awaits any future general election held by the military while major pro-democracy parties are repressed and during ongoing suppression of freedom of expression. Looking forward, discussions continue in political circles – framed around the vision of federal democracy – about how a successful peace roadmap might be achieved. Although a single unifying platform may be difficult to achieve, the significance of the challenging work on coordination, relationship-building and practical governance across ethnic and pro-democracy forces should not be underestimated. It is urgent that these efforts be strengthened if military rule and state failure are to come to an end. As experience warns, national peace processes in Myanmar over the past three decades have only led to assimilation into systems designed by the Tatmadaw. They are not platforms for negotiation, demilitarisation and reform. Indeed the further proliferation in local militia and paramilitaries under Tatmadaw authority since the coup pushes even further into the future the prospect of a peace process that answers the root causes of conflict by political dialogue and democratic reform. After sixty years in power, the Tatmadaw strategy of ‘managing’ rather than ‘resolving’ conflict still continues. The post-coup landscape also compounds the challenges of engagement for the international community. Currently, the SAC is one of the most criticised armed actors in the world. This is evidenced by repeated condemnation by the Office of the UN Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, Independent Investigate Mechanism for Myanmar and other international bodies. Since the coup, impoverishment, the loss of life and civilian displacement due to conflict have only increased. Currently, there are counts of over three million refugees and IDPs, more than 19,000 political prisoners still in jail, 4,150 civilians killed by the security forces, and estimates of over 20,000 people, including combatants, killed in the conflict zones. Clearly, eight years after its signing, the NCA is effectively null and void. Recommendations and Lessons for the Future Given the scale of crisis, it is vital that a united response is developed which supports national healing rather than exacerbates division. It is for Myanmar’s peoples to determine their political future. But, in support of this, human rights protections are essential, and the perpetrators of violations on all sides must be held accountable if lasting peace and justice are to be achieved. In any conflict resolution path, accountability must be at the heart of peace-building. This has been demonstrably missing until now. To date, however, there is little indication of lessons learned. Despite the depth of humanitarian emergency, there has been no indication of a cohesive strategy to address the challenges of national breakdown, whether by the United Nations, ASEAN or other governments and international institutions. The same imperatives are also essential in any international efforts to build a future peace process. While peace is required, a new process may well be considered inappropriate in the circumstances of coup d'état and repression. New realities should be explored, including those that reflect the role of youth and social dynamics driving elite-level political change, the momentum supporting federal democratic reform, and agreements among stakeholder parties that go beyond the agenda of the 21st Century Panglong Conference. After decades of conflict and military rule, it needs to be recognised that fundamental mistakes were made in support for the NCA in the hopes for rapid change after the accord was signed. Manifestly, a different and broad-based approach has long been overdue. Since the coup, however, different international representatives have already sought to initiate talks between select groupings, including between the SAC and preferred EAOs, as if this will be enough to build a peace process that is just and equitable for the country. It is critical that such errors are not repeated once again. Simply continuing the same ceasefire practices, tinkering with accord guidelines and mechanisms, or changing faces around the NCA or other peace talk tables will never be sufficient. Most importantly, talks that exclude current major stakeholders or that primarily serve to reduce national and international pressure on the SAC to accede to the public’s demands for meaningful political change will never be enough, and indeed may instead further postpone the time when nationwide peace could become achievable. In this respect, Myanmar is not unique. After the ending of the Cold War, aid became a Western response to conflict. But this, in itself, does not provide the platform for peace and reform. Rather, it may entrench division and an unrepresentative elite in power. Too often the word ‘transition’ has been invoked as a panacea during the last three decades without understanding the political context and causes of state failure. At best, peace processes in Myanmar have frozen conflicts without opening the way to political solutions. Sustainable peace requires political agreement and compromise. In contrast, approaches that only serve to strengthen the state and existing security apparatus will cause resistance among the wider population, feed community grievances and delay the opportunity for meaningful change. In Myanmar, a legacy of failure has built up during the past decade that overshadows the NCA and peace process in five key areas: military dominance, non-inclusion, lack of implementation, lack of accomplishment, and lack of political will. After decades of conflict, all sides must take responsibility for their actions. But standing at the centre of these obstacles has always been the Tatmadaw. All too often, international actors have fallen for the illusion of a ‘normative’ state, which can be reformed, without recognising that the Tatmadaw has continued to dominate central government for more than half a century, claiming ‘prerogative’ powers for itself and intruding into every aspect of national life.** In the aftermath of the 2021 coup, the evidence is clear. Under the 2008 constitution, the Defence Services already enjoyed sweeping powers. But Tatmadaw leaders operate well beyond these parameters, including arbitrary arrests, extrajudicial killings, land seizures, resource exploitation, paramilitary deployments, and political manipulation in favour of its own party, the USDP. As long as these practices continue, the NCA or any similar peace process can never be an instrument for national reconciliation and democratic reform. Transparency, inclusion, understanding, compromise and dialogue have always been essential steps in any meaningful process towards political transformation and lasting peace. On a cautionary note, precedent warns that the Tatmadaw leadership may continue to employ an ad hoc mixture of stratagems of political repression and ethnic ceasefires – bilateral, unilateral and NCA – as means to try and maintain central authority. In essence, the NCA, which had been used as a process to extend state control, is now being used to attempt to cling on to power – not as a gateway to political reform. As history has repeatedly shown, military-imposed systems will never achieve inclusive, just or sustainable solutions in the country. If the government does not represent the people, why should the people support it? Headed by a hermetic clique of ruling generals, the Tatmadaw leadership represents a Bamar-centric elite and a narrow nationalist view of the world. The question, then, remains for how much longer they can continue to find, persuade or coerce sufficient support to maintain such dominant position without long-needed reform. Myanmar today is a land in grave suffering and civil war. A decade after a new peace process began, the NCA did not lead to conflict resolution; it did not build the foundations for peace; and it did not lead to agreement for genuine political reforms to address the root causes of conflict and national instability. At the same time, the political landscape is far from static, and the polarisations in politics and society run deep. While military rule continues in Nay Pyi Taw, a diversity of ethnic armed movements remains in control of extensive territories, presenting very different visions for the future of the country. Adding to the complexity, there are a further cast of conflict actors in the wake of the new divisions created by the coup, claiming the right to be in the seat of government. These are presently symbolised by the SAC, NLD and NUG, while EAOs – in a number of alliances and positions – also demand that their voices are included if solutions are to be achieved. In any new peace process, these contested dynamics must be taken on board. A critical moment in post-colonial history has been reached. Hopes for better change still remain, and the struggle to shape Myanmar’s destiny is far from over. Shaken by the 2021 coup, there is a willingness among diverse parties to look at the challenges of conflict resolution anew, and there is a resolve that young people today will be the first generation to enjoy nationwide peace. The needs for reform are greater than simply regime change, requiring a federal democratic system of governance which, as the 1947 Panglong Agreement set out, is based upon the equality and union of all peoples. A political process towards peace, taking account of experiences in the past, can be a key element in such change. But to achieve this, the politics of exclusion must end and a fundamental change in political mind-set are essential. Political transformation, including sustainable and inclusive peace, are urgently required today. * Martin Smith and Jason Gelbort, The Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement in Myanmar: Promoting Ethnic Peace or Strengthening State Control? (Transnational Institute, Amsterdam, April 2023). ** In Ernst Fraenkel’s theory of the ‘dual state’ (developed in the 1930s), the ‘normative’ state co-exists with the ‘prerogative’ state whereby authoritarian parties or actors employ unlimited, arbitrary powers and violence unchecked by legal protections: see, Ernst Fraenkel, The Dual State: A Contribution to the Theory of Dictatorship (Oxford University Press, 2017)..."
Source/publisher: Transnational Institute ( Amsterdam)
2023-10-15
Date of entry/update: 2023-10-15
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Three of Myanmar’s armed groups say they will not hold talks with the regime until violence against civilians ends. The Karen National Union (KNU), Chin National Front (CNF) and All Burma Students’ Democratic Front, which all signed the 2015 National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), said they will snub Sunday’s ceremony in Naypyitaw to mark eight years since the deal was agreed. The three organizations, who are fighting the regime alongside resistance groups, said the 2021 coup destroyed the basic principles and objectives of the NCA and nullified the military-drafted 2008 Constitution. A joint statement said the junta’s repeated attacks on civilians violated international humanitarian law. “This reinforces our position that the NCA is no longer valid and demonstrates that the military has abandoned peaceful means to resolve problems,” it said. In establishing a federal democratic union and sustainable peace, the three groups said they had laid out common objects and positions, including toppling the regime and ending military involvement in politics. They agreed to reform and reorganize the military fully under civilian control, draft a new constitution based on federalism and democracy and seek justice for the victims of the conflict. The revolutionary groups said talks would not be held without the regime ending violence against civilians and accepting the common objectives. “We demand a system change, not a change within the regime. Changing one military regime to another or even an authoritarian civilian regime is not acceptable,” said the armed groups. A new constitution and electoral system will create future governments based on a nation-unity model with a transitional authority agreed by all stakeholders, the statement said. It called on the public, the other NCA signatories and the international community to boycott the regime’s activities. Since the 2021 coup, the KNU has provided military training to several thousand anti-regime activists who have joined resistance groups. It is fighting with its allies in Karen and Mon states, Bago and Tanintharyi regions and the capital, Naypyitaw. The CNF’s armed allies are fighting the regime along with the Chinland Defense Forces in Chin State and neighboring Sagaing and Magwe regions..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2023-10-12
Date of entry/update: 2023-10-13
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Coup leader Min Aung Hlaing is planning to celebrate the eighth anniversary of the signing of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) in Naypyitaw on Sunday, even though some of the signatories have been fighting the Myanmar military since the 2021 coup, saying the accord is no longer valid. To his embarrassment, three signatories—the Karen National Union, Chin National Front and All Burma Students’ Democratic Front—said on Thursday that any attempt by the regime to base the peace process on the NCA would just “deepen the country’s crisis and prolong armed conflict” as the military takeover violated the peace agreement’s principles and aims. What is the NCA and who signed it? The NCA was signed on Oct. 15, 2015 between the Myanmar military, the nominally civilian government of President Thein Sein and eight ethnic armed organizations (EAOs). They are: Quitting the NCA Since the 2021 takeover, the KNU, CNF and ABSDF have denounced the coup and resumed fighting the military, saying the NCA was rendered void by the putsch. They have been joined in fighting the regime by non-signatories including the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP). All are not only fighting against the regime, but also arming and providing military training for anti-regime forces known as People’s Defense Forces. Who is still engaging with the regime’s peace talks? Faced with growing pressure and diplomatic isolation, Min Aung Hlaing invited EAOs, including non-signatories, to peace talks in April 2022 in an attempt to revive the NCA. The KNU, CNF and ABSDF rejected the invitation, saying the talks were not genuine efforts at seeking peace. The remaining signatories joined the talks. Three NCA non-signatories—the United Wa State Army (UWSA), National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA) and Shan State Progress Party (SSPP)—also joined the talks. Despite the KNU’s rejection of the NCA, former KNU chairman Saw Mutu Say Poe, who led the KNU when it signed the NCA in 2015, recently met with Min Aung Hlaing in Naypyitaw for what the regime described as peace talks. The KNU has distanced itself from the meeting and reaffirmed its commitment to Myanmar’s revolution. Observers said those EAOs that have agreed to participate in peace talks with the regime all have their own reasons for doing so. Most need to avoid conflict with the Myanmar military either to protect or promote their interests, while a few are small in size and poorly armed. RCSS leader Yawd Serk even said the PDFs would become armed robbers if not properly controlled by the NUG. Min Aung Hlaing has conferred honorary Wunna Kyawhtin titles on the leaders of the seven NCA signatories that are still engaging in peace talks with his regime. Some were conferred posthumously..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2023-10-13
Date of entry/update: 2023-10-13
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Description: "Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, the universally despised leader of the deeply unpopular 2021 military coup that ousted the re-elected National League for Democracy (NLD) government, is preparing to hold a grand ceremony for the 8th anniversary of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), which was signed on Oct. 15, 2015. The military leaders and endorsers of the 2021 coup, including Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, are a group of cunning, unprincipled and ruthless individuals, to belabour the obvious. They are not very bright, strategically speaking. They lack foresight. And they are anything but patriots. What kind of patriots would plunge their country into the abyss of nationwide violence, reignite the flames of civil war, condemn 30 percent of their fellow people to the worsening conditions of hunger or “food insecurity”, forcibly displace large segments of the population, including the majority Buddhists, order over 2,000 airstrikes in less than two-and-a-half-years against vulnerable civilians in clinics, hospitals, monasteries, resort to its colonial-style scorched earth operations, block the refugees’ access to emergency and humanitarian aid, burn down entire villages in the heartlands of the Bama majority, destroy nearly 80,000 homes across the country, and serially slaughter young men and women from all ethnic and faith backgrounds who staunchly resist the coup. I personally know well several of these coup plotters and endorsers, with blood on their hands, including the 3rd ranking coup leader General Mya Tun Oo (his former commander), and ex-Lt.-General Myint Swe who at the time of the coup was vice president in Aung San Suu Kyi’s administration, and Daw Yin Yin Oo (retired Foreign Service official and the military’s counter-intelligence agent) who serves as one of the two key female advisers in the coup regime. Daw Yin Yin Oo’s father the late Dr Maung Maung served as the legal adviser to the late military dictator General Ne Win until the latter’s death under house arrest. [The other woman who has the honour of being an advisor to the coup regime is Dr. Yin Yin Nwe, an ex-daughter-in-law of the late General Ne Win, who trained as a geologist at Cambridge University and worked as the head of UNICEF in China]. In the morning of the coup, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing instantly made Myint Swe “Acting President”, since the sitting President Win Myint refused to endorse the coup, while literally at gunpoint, as was required by the 2008 constitution. Twisting the military’s own constitutional requirement, Myint Swe play-acted the role of “President” and read out his presidential endorsement to Min Aung Hlaing’s coup. No such clause existed in the military’s 2008 Constitution that “the Commander-in-Chief shall instantly make the military’s handpicked Vice President “Acting President” in order to constitutionally endorse the coup in the event the real and sitting president refused to go along with the military’s seizure of power, even if a pistol is pointed to the latter’s head!” Joking and my personal assessment of men and women who made the coup aside, I offer my analysis of the coup and post-coup developments from an institutional perspective. Indeed, the Feb. 1, 2021 coup had inadvertently killed several birds with one stone, specifically the NCA and the 2008 Constitution birds. The constitution was the goose that laid the military’s golden eggs, whichever Senior General may serve as the Commander-in-Chief. This is precisely the most recent position – and analysis – of the Karen National Union: the coup had rendered null and void both the Constitution of 2008 and the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement of 2015. The Myanmar military under the Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing was a signatory, to the NCA, alongside the representatives of the parliament and the presidency, as well as eight other armed organizations, including the KNU and the Chin National Front (CNF). Its coup had abolished the parliament and the presidency, while imprisoning the sitting president and leaders of the legislature on trumped up charges, without due process, the KNU argues. According to the KNU reasoning, since the military as a key signer of the NCA had behaved in such a way that no other signatory has any moral or legal obligation to honour the otherwise legally binding treaty among the central state actors and the armed resistance organizations which signed the agreement, in good faith. The KNU is the country’s oldest pro-democracy and pro-federal union resistance organization founded in 1947 with 70-years of direct military and political experiences in dealing with the military in Myanmar. During the military-led reform period, the KNU leadership played an instrumental role in pushing for the peaceful political solution to bring an end to the country’s civil war of fluctuating intensities. First, a word about the 2008 constitution, which served as the basis of the NCA. To borrow the American lingo, it was the constitution of, for, and by the military. It was designed chiefly by the retired Senior General Than Shwe, who served as a young infantry officer under the command of my late great uncle the late Lt.-Colonel Ant Kywe over half a century ago. Than Shwe’s 2008 constitution was, for all intents and purposes, amendment proof and thus anti-democratic. That is to say, it was designed not to accommodate popular will or public opinion of the electorate as they “mature” or become more democratic and progressive. It contained no sunset clause for the military to allow itself to be phased out over a period of transitional electoral cycles, typical of all constitutions found in countries in a genuine democratic transition from the decades of military rule to a progressively democratic system (Indonesia, for instance). Furthermore, it also elevated the Ministry of Defence (or the Armed Forces) above any other institutions in society: the two other branches of the government, the legislature and judiciary, were to have no real control over the military, nor does the executive branch of which the military/Ministry of Defence was merely a component, theoretically. No political parties that enjoy a popular mandate from the people can influence the military’s policies or behaviour. It vested the power in the Commander-in-Chief to re-take power on any occasion which the number one soldier deems “a national emergency”. It gave the military, not just the Commander-in-Chief, the veneer of political legitimacy, and made lawful any future seizure of power even before such anti-democratic move took place. Alas, in a stroke of strategic genius, the military had killed both the NCA and its own constitution. When I was growing up during General Ne Win’s one party military dictatorship (1962-88), with the veneer of the “Burmese Way to Socialism”, the military propagandists had put in circulation that the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), the political wing of the military, was a good system, badly administered by “bad” party cadres, taking and executing dictates from the erratic number one, that is, Ne Win. Those 26 long years had passed, and General Ne Win and his deputies are now fertilizer. The post-BSPP era (1962-88) in Myanmar has seen two military-drafted constitutions (1974 and 2008) while the control of the state has been passed on from one crop of generals to another. The names of the ruling military cliques – usurpers really – have changed. But the military has remained as the most corrupt, incompetent, mafia-like, economy-wrecking actor, not to mention it being the spearhead of Rohingya genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes against Kachin, Rakhine, Karen, Shan, Chin, Mon, Muslims, Christians and defiant Buddhist Mons. Enter the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) with Senior General Saw Maung and General Khin Nyunt as Chairman and Secretary (1988-1992), the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) presided over by Senior General Than Shwe (1992-2010), the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) from 2010-15 and the National Security Council (controlled by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, and his deputies who headed the ministries of Defence, Home Affairs and Border Affairs) from 2015-2021, which constitutionally and effectively clipped the reformist wings of the NLD government of Aung San Suu Kyi, in a two-tiered system of power-sharing until it decided that the military could no longer tolerate the NLD’s directions and speed of the economic, legal and institutional reforms. To be sure, there are arguments that see some values and space for reform and federalism in the military’s 2008 constitution and some life in the NCA. They point out that the NCA and the constitution recognize the political nature of military conflicts in Myanmar – now in their 8th decade! And the constitution mandates the president – as opposed to the Commander-in-Chief – to seek peaceful solutions to these armed conflicts at the dialogue table. No one in their rational mind would argue against resolving political differences and ending violent conflicts and wars through negotiations, especially when the war is not going in your favour. In my recent visit to Neuengamme Concentration Camp Museum on the outskirts of Hamburg, Germany, I discovered that Heinrich Himmler, the dreaded head of the Nazi SS, of all the Nazis, was trying to incentivize the “neutral” Swedish government to reach out to Britain on its behalf for a ceasefire with the Allies: he freed 3,000 Norwegian and Danish inmates which the Swedish Red Cross came with white buses to fetch as the Nazi defeat was becoming apparent – to the SS leadership. Engulfed in the war at home with the society – and the popular resistance movements in virtually all regions throughout Myanmar, Min Aung Hlaing and the coup regime has shown no inclination for suing for peace, NCA or not. Finally, no analysis of prospect for peace and reconciliation will be complete without a cursory glance at the military’s historical record at such endeavours. Whoever is the Commander-in-Chief, Myanmar’s single largest military force – out of roughly two dozen such armed organizations which are mostly ethnically organized, and thus so-named as Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) – has an unenviable record of failures after failures in making peace and seeking “negotiated settlements” in resolving political disputes. The ceasefire and peace negotiations did not begin in 2013, the year considered the origin of the NCA which the coup regime is trying to resurrect. The first coup regime of General Ne Win – the Revolutionary Council government with its BSPP wing – had held “peace talks” with “insurgent groups”, then less than six, including the Karens, Shan, Mon and Burmese communists – in 1963, 1972, and 1980. They all collapsed, with no exception as the Burmese generals attempted to make peace and negotiate ceasefires on their own terms, without addressing the root causes – the denial of basic human rights, the refusal to accept ethnic group equality and the need for the military to strictly adhere to the national defence, as opposed to meddling in the messy business of democratic nation-building. Throughout the last half-century, Myanmar’s resistance organizations have consistently sought peaceful resolutions with or without external support. In his letter addressed to Richard von Weizsacker, then President of the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) dated Oct. 25, 1987 with the subject line “Regarding the Civil War in Burma”, M. Brang Seng, the late Chairman of the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) and an authorized spokesman for the National Democratic Front, the then largest alliance of the 10 ethnic resistance organizations, wrote: As you are well aware, Burma has been plagued by civil war for the past forty years. The civil war (has) intensified since General Ne Win seized power in 1962, and established a totalitarian, centralistic and one party system of government….We have repeatedly called upon General Ne Win’s regime to solve the nation’s problem politically at the conference table. But he has responded to us with his armed forces only in the battle field …. Therefore, we, of the National Democratic Front, wish to earnestly request to you, the President of the Federal Republic of Germany, to kindly help us find ways to peace negotiations between us and the Burma government. We have been and are willing still to end this forty year long drawn(-out) civil war to an end on the conference table.” Chairman M. Brang Seng was on a visit to West Germany at the time. Likewise, one of the leaders of the Shan resistance, the late Chao Tzang Yawnghwe, who commanded the 1st Military Region of the Shan State Army (1969-1972) and served as a peace negotiator in General Ne Win’s 1963 peace talks, expressed his fervent desire for ending the civil war in Myanmar. In his book “The Shan of Burma: Memoirs of a Shan Exile” (first published in 1987, by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore), Chao Tzang wrote: “a military victory will not bring about any kind of nationhood, or lasting peace and stability. Uprisings will end and rebel armies disappear if and only if Rangoon accepts objective realities and gets down to the real business of providing the peoples of Burma, both the Burmese and the non-Burmese, with the kind of leadership which the country badly needs in the spirit that was displayed before independence of gained.” He was referring to the spirit of democracy, ethnic equality and federated union of independent Myanmar. Alas, ceasefire, peace, and reconciliation are a far cry in the country where the single largest military force – Myanmar military that seizes power at the whim of the senior military clique of the day, abolish or subjugate all constitutive institutions of the state – including executive, judiciary, and legislature – locking up democratic leaders, summarily executes dissidents, slaughters its own citizens in mass killings, burns down entire villages wantonly, and perpetrates the gravest crimes under domestic and international law. After six decades in power, the Myanmar military has proven itself to be no partner in peace. Its conduct is guided by neither principles of fairness, justice, equality or basic rights nor abiding sense of patriotism. It takes two hands to make the sound of peace. Even Himmler’s Nazi SS desperately sought an honourable exit, despite its heinous crimes. Not so with the coup-making military of Myanmar..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Democratic Voice of Burma
2023-10-05
Date of entry/update: 2023-10-05
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Sub-title: Promoting Ethnic Peace or Strengthening State Control?
Description: "The ethnic ‘peace process’ in Myanmar is one of the most labyrinthine in the modern world. Dating back to 1989, a variety of bilateral, multilateral and unilateral initiatives have been underway. In recent years, they were linked by the aspirations of a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement and 21st Century Panglong Conference. None of these processes have led to inclusive political dialogue or sustainable peace, and both came to a halt with the military coup on 1 February 2021. Since this time, national breakdown has further ensued, and a new cycle of armed conflicts has begun, including in both rural and urban areas that have not seen fighting and displacement in many years. Myanmar today is among the most war-torn lands in both Asia and the world. Using the NCA as a spectrum, this new report by TNI seeks to analyse the most significant attempt to resolve ethnic conflict by negotiation since independence in 1948. Critical issues include the challenges in the negotiation of ceasefires; the failure to implement the NCA, including military violations; endeavours to overcome peace obstacles while the National League for Democracy was in government office; and analysis of how conflict parameters have changed in the fall-out from the 2021 coup. The NCA, though, did not occur in a vacuum. Over the years, a host of other challenges came to overshadow implementation and focus, undermining peace progress on the ground. Key issues include conflict regression in Kachin, Rakhine and Shan States, people’s militia and Border Guard Forces, economic opportunism and exploitation in the ethnic borderlands, and the divergent and ineffective responses by different international actors. Such factors are integral elements in Myanmar’s conflict landscape. Ultimately, there was no single reason why the NCA failed. The lack of inclusion, implementation, political will and political accomplishment are outstanding. Positioned at the heart of these failures is the Tatmadaw or Sit-Tat. After decades in government, the country’s military leaders sought to use the NCA as a mechanism for state control rather than a gateway to ethnic peace and reform. Myanmar was never at peace following the NCA’s 2015 inception. Myanmar is currently in its deepest state of civil war in several decades. Repression, political violence and humanitarian emergency are sweeping every state and region. All the peoples are suffering. It is thus vital that lessons are learned from the bitter experiences of peace failure in the past in order to build a better path to reform and reconciliation in the future. Any new process to address such challenges must be equitable, inclusive, just and sincere among all parties in order to contribute to this essential task..."
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Source/publisher: Transnational Institute ( Amsterdam)
2023-04-20
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-20
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Description: "EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: The current conflict in Myanmar began with the 2021 coup d’état. The conflict between the ruling junta and pro-democracry movement has accelerated environmental degradation and hurt Myanmar’s economic standing. Demographic stress has also worsened both from the junta’s lack of attention to urban infrastructure and its targeting of rural villages, increasing the number of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). The return to military rule has caused a worsening trend for most indicators used to determine the degree of conflict. This diagnostic uses the methodology created by the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy to establish possible short-term scenarios based on indicators of conflict determining trend lines and degree of risk. The military coup has destabilized the country which has resulted in a return to military rule causing a worsening conflict trend and making any peaceful settlement unlikely in the near future.....
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Source/publisher: Carleton University
2023-03-06
Date of entry/update: 2023-03-06
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Description: "According to the first sentence on Page 1 of the 2015 Defense White Paper, “The Republic of the Union of Myanmar” (was) first founded, not in 1948 as is universally accepted, but “by the Bagan dynasty over a thousand years ago.” Incredible as it may seem, the “proof” is in the statues of the three kings overlooking the parade ground in Naypyitaw. Any ordinary Bamar seeing them may feel proud of being a descendent of such warrior-kings, and that it’s his/her duty to preserve this land no matter what the consequences are. But we can also ask non Bamar visitors especially Shans, Mons and Arakanese, to Naypyitaw. What their feelings are on seeing these awesome figures. The likely answer may be if the Bamars go on revering kings that forcefully occupied our ancestral lands, their descendants have no right to call for our allegiance to them. On the other hand, the psychological effect on all of them may be different, if there were, say, statues of Aung San and non-Bamar leaders stood together and held the 1947 Panglong Agreement instead. Because to them, what the three kings, and later the British, had forged were not unions as claimed but empires. Then Aung San and leaders of the Frontier Areas, notably Chin Hills, Kachin Hills, and the Federated Shan States signed an agreement with the aim to establish a union. We should remember, said the late Shan politician Shwe Ohn, hadn’t it been for the Panglong Agreement, we could have been separate countries. However as far as the non-Bamars are concerned, the terms of the agreement, except for one, have not been fulfilled: Appointment of Frontier Areas representatives as central government ministers then called counselors which academics term “Shared-rule”. Accordingly, state chief ministers were also union ministers until 1962, but not afterward. Full autonomy (meaning with its own laws) which academics term as “self-rule”. But far from being able to have their own constitutions, states were not able to choose their own chief ministers without the consent of the prime minister even during the short lived democratic era. Establishing a Kachin State (With Chin Hills, it became a Special Division until 1974 when the status as a state was accorded) Human Rights and Democracy (Tun Myint of Taunggyi, another prominent Shan politician, in his Shan State’s Grievances presentation in 1957, reported bullying, tortures, rapes, Shan girls being sold in cities by TMD soldiers, and providing cash and arms to dissident movements to sow discord. In short, practicing the Divide and Rule policy. “If one compares this kind of behavior to the Japanese excesses, the TMD is clearly enjoying a comfortable lead,” he wrote. Financial autonomy (meaning the right to manage its own finances as in the British days plus “Bamar one kyat, Shan one kyat”) Taxes from extraction of minerals and wood were paid to the Shan States during the British era. It also received percentages of various taxes. One discovers that the financial relationship between Shan and Burma even during those days was not that between the DONOR and RECIPIENT, but in terms of LIABILITY to pay and to receive. It is unfortunate that after we have become free, we have to use the the word “Subsidy”, discrimination even in terms of terminology, said Tun Myint. Now about the application of the “Burmese One Kyat, Shan One Kyat” principle. According to the 1952-53 Fiscal Year Budget statistics, calculated by population figures from the 1941 census, one finds that while Mainland Burma got 1 kyat, and the Shan State got only 0.48 kyat. By the time, U Thein Sein became president in 2011, it became worse. Asia Foundation reported that the 14 states and regions received only 3.6% of the total expenditures. Thereby drawing a comment from a Canadian friend, “Why, Khuensai, you are only 3.6% federal.” Tun Myint concluded that Shan State bore all the characteristics of a colony: political and legal domination, economic dependence, and exploitation. The situation was such that there were calls for secession, a right provided by the 1947 constitution. As older, cooler headed leaders opted for political means to resolve the crisis, hot-headed and educated young ones decided to choose the armed struggle in 1958. 65 years have passed since then and the result? Neither the secessionists nor the Unionists are winning Especially the former, whose Mong tai Army, the strongest of all anti-military forces, as conceded even by the MIS, was defeated in 1995, after China decided an independent Shanland was against its interests. As for the Unionists, they have not fared better either. Panglong Agreement. However, the Bamar elites had refused to insert the Agreement, let alone discuss it, in the much-vaunted 2015 Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement. The Peace Process that followed it has also steadfastly steered clear of including it in their negotiations, avoiding it as though it were an infectious disease. After 7 years of negotiations, it has become quite clear nothing significant will be achieved as long as both sides are beating around the bush. And the non-Bamar states, as pointed out by the late Shan politician Tun Myint of Taunggyi in 1957, will continue to be Burmese colonies. Peace will still be an unattainable goal. It wasn’t like this when we were still under British colonial rule until 75 years ago. The situation was not perfect but we had peace and stability. In the Federated Shan States (as Shan State was known in those days) there were only 2 infantry battalions of the Burma Frontier Force. On the contrary, today we have a hundred times more battalions in the Shan State alone. And there is no peace. If this situation continues without any glimpse of hope for the people, some suggest perhaps we should ask the British to return and tell us what is going wrong in our country. Why other former colonies like US, India and Malaysia which had suffered under the same “Divide & Rule” British policies are getting ahead while we are still left behind. The question now is what’s next? Let’s see what fool’s idea I may have about this. As said earlier, we have fought for Independence but failed. We have also fought for a federal union, still to no avail. Today the situation is more complex. When I wrote “The Making of a Rebel”, there were only a few tens of thousands of rebels. But now we have hundreds of thousands. And more options: like elections, reactivation of Daw Suu’s role, diplomacy, supporting non-violent movements, building a golden bridge, as Chinese expert Sun Zi terms it, for the military to retreat across, more sanctions and embargoes, international involvement in peace talks, resetting the media’s role in reshaping society, etc. A mixture of carrots and sticks. To me, one thing is quite clear. Alone by itself, each of these carrots and sticks won’t work. However, if all or most of them can become parallel lanes of the same road leading in the same direction, there may be hope. This is not a new idea. The highly respected late Dr. Chao Tzang Yawnghwe, who was both a scholar and armed resistance leader, used to exhort us to apply the principle: Common Goal, Diverse Actions. Like Sun Zi had done earlier with his “qi” (Indirect Approach) and “zheng” (Direct Approach) principles, because one method alone is insufficient to win. But in order to put it into practice, a competent, dedicated and patient coordination, like Nick Fury did for the Avengers will be necessary. Without people like him, our heroes, however talented they are, would be a long way from winning. Before I end this article, here’s another fool’s food for thought. Right now, the Three Kings are the present military leaders’ Bible while the Panglong Agreement is the non-Burmans’ Ten Commandments. Until we have a common history text, we may still be living in the same country, but they are worlds apart. One encouraging fact is that we have not a few historians who follow in the steps of the late Dr. Than Tun, who championed writing history without bias. It will nevertheless take some time. The Oxford Sayadaw Dr. Khammai Dhammasami said it took even experts of the three Buddhist schools 7 years to come up with the Common Buddhist Text. This means for a common history text, we will need the same growth mindset (in contrast to the fixed mindset). And with the same growth mindset, and a common history text, we can live together happily ever after..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Shan Herald Agency for News" (Chiang Mai)
2023-02-22
Date of entry/update: 2023-02-22
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Executive Summary: The Myanmar Interim Arrangements Research Project (MIARP) was funded by the Joint Peace Fund (JPF)1 , and implemented between October 2017 and October 2018. Researchers spoke to more than 450 people in Shan, Karen/Kayin and Mon States, Tanintharyi Region, Naypyidaw, Yangon and Thailand, including confict-affected communities, representatives of Myanmar government and Army, leaders and members of Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs), civil society organisations (CSOs), political parties, diplomats and donors, and international aid workers and analysts. The term “Interim Arrangements” (ၾကားကာလအတြ߾္းေࠀာ߾္ရြက္ရ မည့္အ߿ီအ߿ဥ္မ်ား) is a contested concept, meaning different things to different stakeholders. The MIARP adopted the following working defnition of Interim Arrangements: “Service delivery and governance in confictaffected areas, including the relationship between EAOs and government systems, during the period between initial ceasefres and a comprehensive political settlement.” Interim Arrangement refers to EAOs’ governance functions, administrative authority and service delivery systems. The issue of which geographic areas are covered by Interim Arrangements is problematic. The Myanmar Army has pressed to restrict EAOs’ service delivery and governance functions to areas under armed groups’ exclusive control (which in most cases have not yet been demarcated); on the ground however, EAOs’ infuence and delivery of services and governance functions extend into areas where political and military authority is mixed, and contested with the government and Tatmadaw. In principle, the “interim” period extends until a comprehensive political settlement has been implemented, which given recent setbacks in the peace process may take many years to achieve. In the meantime, recognition of Interim Arrangements refects the government’s acknowledgement of key EAOs’ political legitimacy and administrative responsibilities - at least, for those groups which have signed the Nationwide Ceasefre Agreement (NCA). One of the key recommendations of this report is to support EAOs to exercise governance and administrative authority in a responsible and accountable manner. The only offcial text referring to Interim Arrangements is the October 2015 NCA. However, Interim Arrangements are relevant in areas where EAOs have not signed the NCA, and furthermore the NCA text fails to cover the full range of meanings associated with the term. Although Interim Arrangements are about more than the NCA, Chapter 6 (Article 25) of this agreement does recognize the roles of signatory EAOs in the felds of health, education, development, environmental conservation and natural resource management, preservation and promotion of ethnic cultures and languages, security and the rule of law, and illicit drug eradication. The NCA allows EAOs to receive international aid, in coordination with the government. However, with no agreed mechanism for addressing these goals through the peace process architecture, the NCA has had limited impacts on improving confict-affected communities’ access to equitable and effective governance and services. Furthermore, on the ground in southeast Myanmar, government offcials seem to regard EAOs primarily as service delivery actors, and/ or private companies, rather than legitimate governance and administrative actors. For many years, Myanmar’s larger EAOs have taken on governance and administration roles in their areas of control, often delivering a wide range of services in partnership with CSOs. In the southeast, groups like the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), Karen National Union (KNU) and New Mon State Party (NMSP) are de-facto governments in relatively small pockets of territory. They also have infuence and provide some services in wider areas of “mixed administration”, where EAO authority overlaps with that of the government and Myanmar Army. Between them for example, these three EAOs administer or support more than 2,000 schools, providing ethnic language teaching to vulnerable children who would otherwise often be denied an education. They also work with local partners to provide health services, access to justice and other public goods.2 Similar arrangements exist in other parts of the country, both in ceasefre areas where EAOs have not signed the NCA, and in areas of on-going armed confict. For example, across much of Kachin and northern Shan States, the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) and other EAOs provide elements of governance, and life-saving if under resourced services to Internally Displaced People (IDPs) and other highly vulnerable communities. There are three principal rationales for supporting Interim Arrangements: 1. Effective Interim Arrangements will provide the best outcomes for vulnerable and marginalised communities in confict-affected areas. Rather than reinventing the wheel, existing EAO and CSO service delivery systems should be supported on a case-by-case basis, recognising best practice (an “appreciative inquiry” approach). Meeting the government’s targets for school enrolment and universal health coverage for example, will depend on the work of EAOs and affliated civil society actors, who should be seen as partners in meeting critical needs and achieving development goals. Chapter 3 explores how these issues play out in relation to specifc sectors and issues. 2. Several of Myanmar’s EAOs (including NCA signatory and non-signatory groups) enjoy long-standing political legitimacy among the communities they seek to represent. Supporting EAO governance regimes will counter perceptions of the peace process as a vehicle for state penetration into previously autonomous areas, displacing existing EAO authorities and services, without consulting local stakeholders. In order to be confict-sensitive, aid should be delivered in ways that do not undermine systems associated with EAOs, to the beneft of the government (which is a party to the confict). Timely peace dividends can best be provided to vulnerable and marginalized communities by working with existing and trusted local service delivery systems. 3. Interim Arrangements could be a key element in building “federalism from below” in Myanmar, supporting effective local governance through equitable practices of self-determination. The administrative functions and services provided by key EAOs (and their civil society partners) should be regarded as the building blocks of federalism in Myanmar - a political solution to decades of armed confict which key stakeholders have endorsed. It will be very diffcult for confict-affected parts of Myanmar to move from the current mixture of service delivery systems and governance regimes towards a formalized (federal) system, without better coordination, and substantial political and technical negotiations. However, given the slow pace of the peace process since 2016, Interim Arrangements have been given relatively little attention. Given that the Political Dialogue element of the peace process appears stalled, it could be useful to identify a small number of political priorities, to help deliver on ethnic stakeholders’ key aims. These could be negotiated by EAOs (and political parties) in a „fast track“ manner, resulting in a Union Peace Accord that benefts both the government and ethnic stakeholders. Areas for possible progress include education and language policy (recognition of and funding for EAOs’ extensive school systems; “mother tongue” teaching in government schools); land issues (recognition of land title documents provided by EAOs; revision of unjust land laws; compensation and restitution for people who have had their land unfairly taken); equitable natural resource management; and addressing forced displacement – i.e. Interim Arrangements. This would not prevent ethnic stakeholders from continuing to campaign for federalism, including changes to the 2008 Constitution..."
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Source/publisher: Joint Peace Fund and Covenant Consult
2018-09-00
Date of entry/update: 2022-12-11
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Sub-title: Ruling junta’s talk of peace is desperate political necrophilia and ultimately just cover for more war
Description: "Myanmar is in conflict freefall, as the State Administration Council (SAC) junta regime fights a myriad of proliferating resistance groups on fronts across the country, many galvanized to arms by the military’s democracy-toppling February 2021 coup. Fighting in western regions such as Sagaing, Magwe and Chin State has surged in recent months, as scores of People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) ambush military columns and battle pro-SAC militias. The military, in turn, has pulverized civilian villages with air strikes, heavy artillery and army columns in expeditionary arson campaigns that have destroyed close to 20,000 houses, by some estimates. Internal displacement in the country, meanwhile, has surpassed one million. Despite the desperation of the humanitarian and human rights catastrophe, many analysts estimate that the military has been seriously degraded by armed resistance to the coup. That’s been led by PDFs and many established ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) such as the Karen National Union (KNU), some of which have forged alliances with or otherwise pledge loyalty to the National Unity Government (NUG), a parallel administration formed after the coup. So what does the SAC leadership do when faced with such unprecedented and geographically spread resistance? Logically, it calls for peace talks, the tried and true escape hatch for military repression in Myanmar. Myanmar’s Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) was signed by eight mostly small organizations in 2015 (another two signed in 2018), but despite incessant talks and secretive mediation, the agreement was moribund by October 2018. The military commander Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, the current dictator who staged the 2021 coup, announced a “Ceasefire for Eternal Peace” in December 2018, extending it every few months for years through the Covid-19 pandemic right up to the coup, even as fighting raged with EAOs in many parts of the country. The call for new peace talks in April this year conforms to a consistent pattern of perfidy over peace talks. Using a motley crew of desperate or insignificant NCA signatories is for the SAC desperate political necrophilia. The first round of “talks” in May was with Chairman Yawd Serk of the insurgent Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS) resulted in a number of agreements related to the “Union Accords”, which were negotiated for several years in a pre-coup process. The RCSS’s eagerness can be largely explained by its strategic missteps since late 2015. It used the cover of signing the 2015 NCA as a pretext to expand operations in northern Shan state, triggering a multi-sided conflict for control of territory and commodities between various EAOs, especially the ethnic Ta’ang armed group and the RCSS parent organization the Shan State Army (SSA) formed in 1964. This conflict displaced thousands of civilians, many for several times a year, disrupting livelihoods and trade and exacerbating intercommunal tensions amid aid restrictions by the military and previous government. The RCSS has decided to sit out the post-coup resistance and prioritize its own survival now that it has been restricted to territory closer to the Thailand border. The arrival of Saw Mra Razar Lin of the Arakan Liberation Party (ALP) at the junta’s peace talks was particularly surreal. The only senior woman leader of an EAO to attend peace talks for several years, she commands few troops, most of which are based on the Thailand-Myanmar border far away. The ALP and its armed wing are meaningless compared to the ethnic Rakhine Arakan Army (AA), which is estimated to field more than 8,000 troops. In heavy fighting between 2019 to the end of 2020, AA fought the Myanmar military to a standstill, inflicting hundreds if not thousands of casualties during a conflict that displaced some 200,000 civilians. An uneasy ceasefire has allowed space for the AA to expand its own judicial and taxation system on an estimated 60% of western Rakhine state, incorporating Rohingya Muslim representatives of the Arakan People’s Authority (APA). The AA suffered a blow on July 4 when an air strike killed six of its soldiers in a base in Kayin state close to the Thailand border, raising new questions about the durability of their uneasy post-coup ceasefire. Other groups that attended the talks included the Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army Peace Council, the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA), the New Mon State Party and the Pa-O Nationalities Liberation Organization (PNLO). These groups could potentially muster several hundred troops combined among them, but they have essentially been artificially inflated by Western donors to the peace process for several years. They are now ornamental bit-part actors in the SAC’s shoddy process. The largest EAO in Myanmar, the United Wa State Army (UWSA), controls its own autonomous region on the Chinese border with an estimated 30,000 troops and sophisticated weaponry, and didn’t really need to attend the peace talks. It dispatched a nominally senior official of no real significance in the hierarchy, and released a statement following the talks which basically stated that the Wa had their own autonomy and this was a Burman problem they wanted nothing to do with. Planned talks with the Shan State Progress Party, or SSA, have not been held as fighting continues between their forces and the SAC’s army in northern Shan State. In another indication of renewed bellicosity, well-known Myanmar model and actress Thin Zar Wint Kyaw has reportedly been arrested after wearing an SSA military uniform at a recent wedding ceremony close to the EAO’s headquarters at Wan Hai, after traveling to the area to endorse business initiatives. The SAC is making enemies of everyone, even as it supposedly cultivates peace. Further adorning the pretense of peace talks, the SAC has called for PDF members, or people involved in the civil disobedience movement (CDM), to defect from the “terrorist” NUG and return to the “legal fold”, a euphemism for the peace process of the 1990s which resulted in reduced conflict fighting but no conflict resolution. The SAC in recent days has even pledged to open “reception centers” for resistance actors to surrender along the borders, another indication of the junta’s underlying desperation. The subterfuge of peace talks extends to efforts at mediation by the Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), whose Special Envoy Prak Sokhonn visited Myanmar recently and was instructed to only meet with EAOs who had attended the SAC talks. This clearly violates the terms of the Five Point Consensus the SAC’s leader reached with ASEAN in April 2021: “constructive dialogue among all parties concerned shall commence to seek a peaceful solution in the interests of the people.” ASEAN is further compromised by the role of the ASEAN Humanitarian Center (AHA), which is conducting a needs assessment essentially as cover for the United Nations to operate in SAC-controlled areas and not areas of armed conflict where belligerents who are not part of the peace talks operate, and where civilian communities and aid workers are not represented and rely on cross border assistance not covered by the AHA or the UN. The NUG and main EAOs fighting the SAC issued a bitter statement condemning the role of ASEAN in humanitarian aid delivery in May, as the exercise was seen as clearly pro-SAC. Myanmar’s military leaders may lack sophistication but they possess the cunning to checkmate rule-bound international aid actors, consistent with the past decade during the previous peace process. A serious danger is that peace talks, alongside SAC announced plans for a nationwide election in 2023 with an entirely new electoral system that will likely ban the coup-ousted National League for Democracy’s participation, provide the bare minimum of a lifeline for the international community, especially the UN and international aid agencies, to justify their continued presence. It is perilous to promote fake peace while a conflict is raging elsewhere. The only accurate gauge of the SAC’s true intent is its behavior on the ground, seen in the thousands of civilian casualties, burning villages and interdiction of humanitarian assistance. In Myanmar, talk of peace is often cover for just more war..."
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Source/publisher: "Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
2022-07-07
Date of entry/update: 2022-07-07
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Description: "The Irrawaddy’s editor-in-chief Aung Zaw recently spoke to Bertil Lintner, a veteran journalist and author of several books on Myanmar, on the peace process in the country. Here are excerpts. Aung Zaw: Since the coup, there are endless tragic stories in Burma, or Myanmar. And the coup has faced very strong resistance in the country; the regime still tries to consolidate their power within the country but still, they are failing. And even a year after the military staged the coup, the regime keeps facing strong resistance; people take up the form of armed-resistance known as PDF [People’s Defense Force] and we now have a government in exile. Recently, the regime leader [Senior General] Min Aung Hlaing invited ethnic armed organizations to attend the peace talks in Naypyitaw. So, there are EAOs, ethnic armed organizations, who have decided to go there and who are not going there—they are still divided. It seems to me that many major ethnic armed groups are not going there. So, but at the same time on the ground, we see a lot of fighting taking place in Chin State, Kayah State, Karen State; and a lot of clashes in Shan and Arakan [Rakhine] states. So what is your thought? I want to pick your brain. What is your thought on this—Min Aung Hlaing’s invitation and then the ongoing, very fragile peace process in the country? Bertil Lintner: Well, basically so far, for him, it’s for a military government’s attempt to get a legitimacy that they want to invite these armed groups for talks to discuss peace and this sort of thing. But I think we’ll have to look at the so-called “peace process” and how it began and how it’s developed. Ah, I will also argue that the whole timetable—the way the talks are being conducted—is wrong. Normally, in any kind of peace process, the government will announce its desires, the armed groups will respond, ‘OK, we are not going to fight’; you meet, you talk, you reach a political consensus about the future of the country; and you sign an agreement. That’s a normal procedure anywhere in the world. But here, the whole idea was everyone has to come and sign it—the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement [NCA]—first, before they could have a real talk. It’s like, you know, putting the cart before the horse. And of course it’s never going to work. And if you look at the groups that checked and signed the so-called NCA—we have altogether 10 by now, isn’t it? So how many of those actually have any armies? I mean, if you take, for instance, the Pa-O [the Pa-O National Liberation Army]; there was no army before they signed the NCA, but suddenly, it’s known; for them to become more credible, they created an army. The same with the Arakan Liberation Party or the Arakan Liberation Army that’s based on the Thai border with the Karen. […] And they are not having any armed activity for years, for decades, really. And suddenly, they have become a signatory, and therefore a player. The Chin National Front was also non-existent until the so-called peace process began. You have the ABSDF [All Burma Students’ Democratic Front], which gave up the armed struggle a long time ago. You have two small Karen breakaway factions which are insignificant. And they have the Lahu, basically an NGO, based in Thailand and they don’t have any army either. So, that leaves I would say two-and-a-half armies among the so-called signatories. It’s the Shan State Army of the Restoration Council of Shan State, and they do have an army; and then it’s the Karen National Liberation Army or the Karen National Union; and then the new Mon State Party and its army; which is so-so, they lost most of their strength but still they have a small force. All the major groups in the country, like the Wa, like Kokang, like Kachin, like the Shan State Army, or the SSPP—the Shan State Progress Party; they haven’t signed this agreement. I would say that […] 80 percent of all the armed non-state actors, if I may use that term, in the country belong to groups that never signed the NCA. So, the whole thing was a joke from the very beginning. KAZ: Why they did not sign the ceasefire [the NCA]? Those groups, the TNLA, KIA, Wa? The Wa signed an informal agreement in 1989. BL: They wanted to see some political progress first. I mean what they want is basically a federal union. Or even in some cases, a confederate mixture of states or union of states. And before they reach that, why should they sign anything? It’s like surrender, really. And it is the way, the groups that did not sign the agreement, the way they think. And if you look at two of the major armies today which are the most active, [they] are the Arakan Army and the TNLA in the Palaung area. They’re new armies. But still they’ve grown from nothing, really, to several thousand today during this so-called peace process. KAZ: It is estimated that the EAOs, the troops, the strengths, they have total numbers of about 80,000 fighters all over the country. And they have controlled roughly 30 percent, more than 30 percent of the country’s national territory. They have more political influence than in the past, since the coup. A lot of Burman people look up to them and there are a lot of expectations over which EAO, which ethnic groups are coming to join the fight against the military regime. But the peace process; the so-called peace process seems to create more problems than solutions. Why is that? BL: Well, there’s a split between those who signed the agreement and those who didn’t. Even if most of the groups who signed it are small and insignificant, they are still groups that are recognized as signatories of the NCA. They get access—this is in the past—the got access to a special office in Yangon. They got lots of money from the international community to continue so-called talks about nothing really, so it gave them some kind of prestige and legitimacy. And then of course they split with the groups who said, “Wait a minute, what they’re doing here is they are not talking about the future of the country; not talking about the Constitution, about what kind of country Myanmar or Burma should be in the future.” And this created a split. KAZ: Now after the coup, there’s more talk on, not just of a federal union, but about a confederation. AA [Arakan Army] leader Tun Myat Naing told us in 2019, he said, “We prefer a confederation of states, like Wa State, which has a larger share of power in line with the Constitution.” He said, “Confederation is better than federalism.” And then he said, “We think confederation is more appropriate to the history of Rakhine State and the hopes of Arakanese people.” What do you think? BL: Well, if you first look at the question of splits, one of the main signatories, one of the groups that actually had an army, the Karen, they have split after the coup. Because there’s certain parts, brigades of the Karen National Liberation Army that are actively fighting the Tatmadaw [Myanmar’s military], or whatever you want to call it, and there are others that are not, and they have some kind of peace agreement or ceasefire agreement with the central authorities. So it’s even caused splits within the organizations. And many of the Burman dissident groups, dissidents who have fled […] after the coup, have sought shelter in areas controlled by the Karen rebels, who supposedly are a signatory to the so-called NCA. So it has created a lot of problems and it hasn’t solved a single one. But then the question is, this is very interesting question but, I cannot really comment before I know exactly what is meant by confederation. How should the powers be divided? But these are exactly the kind of issues that should be discussed, and that should be talked about during the peace process. KAZ: Yeah. Tun Myat Naing said, in the same context, in the same interview in 2019, “We [would] have authority to make decisions on our own. But there will be a common defense system, there would be cooperation on market regulations and foreign affairs. To have control over our own destiny, self-determination, is an inspiration of every ethnic group. We can try.” BL: Well again, this comes back to question of power sharing, which would be the responsibility of the central government—because after all, they would need a central government—and then the confederate states. But then another problem arises naturally. If you look at the various states, the current states of the Union of Myanmar or Burma, there’s actually no state that has only one ethnic group. Chin State is probably the most cohesive in that sense, that there are very few outsiders, but then again, the Chin speak 20-30 different languages. They don’t even understand each other and sometimes they have to use Burmese to talk to each other sometimes, right? And Arakan State has a very large Muslim minority, Rohingya in the north and Kaman Muslims elsewhere in the state, and the hill tribes in the Arakan Yoma, right? In Shan State maybe 50-60 percent are Shan, hard to say, but you have large communities, other communities, ethnic communities there: Wa, Palaung, Pa-O, and Kachin; and would they want to be part of Shan State? Wouldn’t they like their own states? If you look at Kachin State, are the Kachin even the majority there? I doubt it. I would think that there are more Shan, Shanni, and Burman, actually living in Kachin State than Kachins. Then you have the question of the Rawang and the Lisu, they don’t really feel like they are Kachin so, so they would have a separate, kind-of, status or identity. Even in Karen State, Kayah State you have a mixture of various nationalities. So how do you solve that problem? But this are exactly, precisely the kind of issues any kind of peace talks should be focusing on: power sharing between the center and the states; and how to solve the minority problems within the minority areas; and what kind of solution should be found to that problem. KAZ: When we say ‘peace talks’, my question back to you is, peace talks with whom? Because this current military regime lacks legitimacy. They have no public mandate or public support inside and outside the country. The military is the sole problem and cause of division in the ethnically diverse country. It’s the military that’s the source of the division in our country. BL: Yeah, that’s the main problem. If you look at what the military has said since the beginning of the so-called peace process, it’s that they have the duty to uphold and defend the Constitution. In other words, they don’t want to change the Constitution. They don’t want to change the status of the various states or the various nationalities within the boundaries of the country. And this of course is a problem if you want to talk peace. It is a non-starter basically, and I think the whole peace process, so-called peace process, was a non-starter from the very beginning. KAZ: I want to ask you, since the coup, there were arguments that some powerful EAOs have an advantage in terms of promoting their political agenda and their inspirations for either the federal [Union] or confederation. They also get more support from the Burmese people. BL: If you go back to what the situation was like a year ago, in 2021, the case was very similar after the 1988 uprising. The ethnic armed organizations were very slow to react. And I talked to people from the various ethnic groups after the military intervention a year ago here. They said, it is a fight between the Burmans, it doesn’t concern us. What did the Burmans do when we were under attack up in Kachin state, for instance? But then that kind of attitude disappeared quite quickly when they realized that they do have something in common with all these urban dissidents and the people resisting the new military government […] It seems to me that the KIO, the KIA is cooperating with several of the PDFs even outside Kachin State—that’s in Mandalay and Sagaing, and so on; they even send troops there to fight. […] It was nothing like that in 1988. And in the Karen area, parts of the Karen area, there’s a lot of different groups from the cities and the towns – which are not based there. And they cooperate with the Karen rebels..."
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Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2022-05-30
Date of entry/update: 2022-05-30
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Description: "Of the 10 ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) that have agreed to attend talks with junta chief Min Aung Hlaing in Naypyitaw, seven have current or former leaders who received the Wunna Kyawhtin title from the coup leader last month. Four of the recipients are still alive and the other three were honored posthumously. Along with some other ethnic leaders, they were awarded the Wunna Kyawhtin title on April 17, which is New Year’s Day on Myanmar’s traditional lunar calendar. All seven of the groups whose leaders were honored are signatories to the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA). The recipients were Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army-Peace Council leader Major-General Htein Maung (aka Saw Htay Maung); Khun Okkar of the Pa-O National Liberation Organization (PNLO); U Khaing Soe Naing Aung of the Arakan Liberation Party (ALP); Yawd Serk of the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS); Myaing Gyi Ngu Sayadaw U Thuzana of the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA); Nai Htaw Mon of the New Mon State Party (NMSP); and Kyar Khun Sar of the Lahu Democratic Union (LDU). On April 22, five days after awarding the titles, Min Aung Hlaing called for face-to-face talks with EAO leaders, saying he sought to end the armed conflicts in Myanmar. Coming after a year of clashes with newly formed anti-regime resistance forces that have been fighting alongside ethnic armed groups to topple his regime, Min Aung Hlaing’s offer of peace is, many believe, a pretext to persuade the armed groups to distance themselves from the resistance forces. The peace talks plan has become a laughing stock as none of the groups that have said yes to the junta’s proposed peace talks is currently engaged in active fighting with the regime. EAOs and other groups that are engaged in active fighting with the regime, such as the Karen National Union and Kachin Independence Army, have officially rejected the regime’s invitation, saying the proposed talks lack inclusivity. The regime has not invited Myanmar’s shadow National Unity Government (NUG) or its armed wing, the People’s Defense Force (PDF), which has been fighting the regime. Many people in Myanmar see the NUG as their legitimate government and the PDF as their army. The majority of the EAOs that are planning to attend the talks are recipients of awards given by Min Aung Hlaing; this has invited suspicions that the regime chief awarded the titles with the specific intention of persuading the EAO leaders to attend the peace talks. A local political analyst on ethnic affairs shared that view. “You could say that the title is a sort of incentive from Min Aung Hlaing [to persuade some ethnic leaders to join the talks],” he said. The Wunna Kyawhtin title, which recognizes outstanding contributions to the country, was awarded to a total of 25 individuals on April 17; some 20 of the recipients are current or late ethnic leaders. Saw Mutu Say Poe, the leader of the KNU, an NCA signatory, was among those awarded the Wunna Kyawhtin title on April 17. However, the oldest armed organization in Myanmar on Monday rejected the junta’s invitation to attend the talks, saying they will not be all-inclusive. Two other NCA signatories, the Chin National Front and the All Burma Students’ Democratic Front, have also rejected the talks because of the junta’s limitation on participants. The Brotherhood Alliance, a tripartite military coalition of the Arakan Army, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, said they would take a wait-and-see approach to the peace talks. NCA non-signatories the United Wa State Army and the National Democratic Alliance Army, both of which have de facto control over their territories, as well as the Shan State Progress Party, will attend the talks in Naypyitaw. Many believe the move by the regime—which is fighting a war on various fronts against multiple EAOs and PDFs—to confer titles on ethnic leaders and invite them to peace talks is intended to undermine the unity among armed revolutionary organizations..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2022-05-11
Date of entry/update: 2022-05-11
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Description: "Myanmar’s long history of civil war can be categorized as periods of alternating clashes and peace talks. It is often said that politics is war without bloodshed, while war is politics with bloodshed. Often, the warring sides will call for honesty for the sake of peace, before they question each other’s honesty. In Myanmar, peace talks are a tricky business. Though both sides will struggle for a result that is favorable to them, normally the results are determined by the more powerful side. Peace talks with ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) were previously held under the civilian Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL) government and the military-led Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) government. Those talks achieved nothing because self-determination and self-rule for ethnic people was always rejected and the existence of EAOs was never recognized, even as both the AFPFL and BSPP governments wanted EAOs to disarm and surrender. So the peace talks held between 1948 and 1988 were not successful. In the post-1988 period, peace talks became even trickier because of drastic changes in the political landscape of the country. Myanmar was going through a political crisis following the 1988 pro-democracy uprising, and its economy was also plagued by mismanagement under the BSPP rule. At the same time, the Communist Party of Burma, the major player in Myanmar’s civil war, split into several armed groups. They had financial constraints and lacked ammunition. And both the troops and local people were exhausted after many years of war. Seeing those factors, the then military regime changed its policy toward EAOs. The regime, which had always called for disarmament, made peace with EAOs by recognizing ethnic parties and armed organizations and designating their controlled areas as special regions. The process started in 1989 and by 1995 all the EAOs, except the Karen National Union (KNU) and Mong Tai Army (MTA), had agreed ceasefires with the Myanmar military. For 20 years from 1989 to 2009, the military constantly engaged in measures designed to weaken the EAOs. They included offering business concessions to the EAOs and instigating religious disputes. The then junta was able to do this because there were no fighting outside the borderlands, as the main opposition party – the National League for Democracy (NLD) – favored peaceful struggle over armed struggle. However, the military continued to attack the KNU and the MTA with superior numbers. Finally, the MTA was forced to surrender and the KNU, once the most powerful group among the EAOs, had become weaker. This is what the military did over the two decades of ceasefire and peace. In 2009, the regime went a step further and forced the EAOs that had signed ceasefires to transform themselves into Border Guard Forces (BGF) or people’s militias and brought them under the army’s control. Apparently, the regime thought that it could now easily control the EAOs. But the regime broke its promise to settle ethnic issues through political dialogue. In 2005, it forced the Palaung State Liberation Organization and Shanni Nationalities Army to disarm. EAOs that were either weakened or had attached greater importance to business interests over armed struggle were swayed by the military regime. The New Democratic Army – Kachin led by Zahkung Ting Ying in Kachin State, a Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) splinter group led by Bai Suocheng, the Karenni Nationalities People’s Liberation Front led by Tun Kyaw, and the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army and some splinter groups from the KNU all became BGFs. Other armed organizations, such as the Kachin Defence Army, brigades 3 and 7 of the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP), the Pa-O National Organization (PNO), the Kayan New Land Party and some Karenni National Progressive Party and KNU splinter groups, became people’s militias. Both BGFs and people’s militias were under the command of the Myanmar military. Of them, only the Kokang splinter group led by Bai Suocheng and the PNO led by Aung Kham Hti were granted self-rule in their territories under the army-drafted 2008 Constitution. The Shan State Nationalities People’s Liberation Organization ceased to exist. This is the advantage the military was able to achieve in 20 years of peace. In those years, the military became aware that EAOs only care about their regions and territories in the borderlands, and do not bother to challenge the central government. The regime was well aware that it could focus its energy on addressing the threat of the NLD by appeasing the EAOs. While some EAOs collapsed or were weakened during the years of ceasefire, others grasped the opportunity to strengthen themselves. The United Wa State Army (UWSA), the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA), and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) were able to expand both their treasuries and arsenals of weapons during those years. Later, the KNU was able to re-unify its Karen forces. The SSPP, the MNDAA and the Restoration Council of Shan State were also able to restore their strength. The Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) and the New Mon State Party (NMSP) have weakened a lot compared to 1995, when their ceasefires came into effect. But they still have a strong presence in Myanmar politics due to their long history. Meanwhile, powerful new EAOs like the Arakan Army (AA) and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) emerged because of their dissatisfaction with the regime’s handling of ethnic issues. After 20 years of ceasefire, the EAOs became aware that they needed to rebuild strength, or otherwise risk collapse, and that the military was trying to break them up by any means. They realized that the military will compromise with EAOs when inland Myanmar is in crisis, but will always try to contain the EAOs otherwise. In ten years of peace talks from 2011 to 2021, the EAOs saw that the Myanmar military has a greater say than elected governments. Moreover, the military restricted certain EAOs from participating in peace talks, and treated smaller EAOs with arrogance. Myanmar’s military did not recognize ethnic people’s demand for self-determination and self-rule, but insisted that EAOs must join the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process under the 2008 Constitution and join the political dialogue under the 2015 Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement process. The regime did not accept an all-inclusive peace process, saying instead that the peace process is “not a Taung Pyone Pwe [a popular spirit festival in Mandalay] in which everyone can participate freely.” Last month, junta chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing offered face-to-face peace talks with leaders of EAOs. Since last year’s coup, the generals have repeatedly tried in vain to hold talks with EAOs. This has prompted Min Aung Hlaing to make the proposal himself. Everyone can see that Min Aung Hlaing is trying to keep the EAOs out of the fighting as his army is facing a military crisis nationwide and is desperate to find a way out. The regime is likely to allow EAOs to have greater territorial control and to lift its restrictions on their armaments at the planned meeting. It will be interesting to see to what extent Min Aun Hlaing will compromise. In fact, EAOs like the UWSA and the NDAA already control their territories, and all they need is legitimacy. Moreover, EAOs like the KIA, the AA, the TNLA, the MNDAA, the SSPP, the KNPP, the KNU, the NMSP and the Chin National Front that have political ambitions to control their entire states might not accept a regime offer that will only allow them to continue to control their existing territory. It is impossible to separate the EAOs from the People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) – the armed wing of the National Unity Government (NUG) – now. In Kachin, Chin, Karen and Kayah states, PDFs are fighting alongside the EAOs. In Sagaing and Magwe regions, PDFs work closely with EAOs. The most important point is that the EAOs have little trust in the junta chief’s offer of peace talks due to their previous experiences with the military. Again, the PDFs are a great boost for EAOs which have fought Myanmar’s military for many years. So the majority of EAOs will continue to support the PDFs. Many groups have refused to attend the talks saying all stakeholders, such as the NUG and PDFs, should be allowed to join them. But some small EAOs without strong principles may accept the offer of peace for their own interests while the military is making compromises. However, strong and principled EAOs are likely to shun the peace talks. The regime is now saying EAOs don’t commit terrorist acts like the PDFs do. But for many years, they described the EAOs as insurgents and terrorist groups. But despite labelling the AA as a terrorist group, the military held talks with the AA in 2020. It previously refused to hold talks with the TNLA and MNDAA, which are allied with the AA in the Northern Alliance, but is now prepared to include them in peace talks. Throughout Myanmar’s history, we have witnessed the military’s negative attitude towards peace. If the regime is really serious about achieving peace in the country, it must first unconditionally release all those it has unfairly detained. To discuss a ceasefire and peace, the regime needs to talk with not only EAOs but also the PDFs and all the other resistance groups waging a defensive war, as well as the NUG and its legislative body. Clashes with PDFs and other revolutionary groups engaged in Myanmar’s Spring Revolution account for 70 per cent of fighting so far in 2022, while clashes with EAOs account for 30 per cent. Without talking to the PDFs, it is impossible to achieve peace in Myanmar. No peace talks will succeed when key players are excluded. The intention of the junta chief’s peace offer is to keep the EAOs at bay so that he has time and energy to crush the PDFs. It is just a political ploy. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the international community have called for dialogue among all parties to solve the Myanmar crisis. But the junta is trying to deceive them by offering peace talks only to the EAOs..."
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Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2022-05-10
Date of entry/update: 2022-05-10
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Sub-title: They say the shadow government and its paramilitary group must be present for negotiations.
Description: "Myanmar’s four most powerful ethnic armed groups have rejected an olive branch from the junta, saying there can be no peace talks until the military regime allows the country’s shadow government and the paramilitary group that fights on its behalf to take a seat at the table. On April 22, junta chief, Snr. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, called for negotiations that he promised to personally attend and gave the ethnic armies until Monday to accept the offer. But the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO), the Karen National Union (KNU), the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) and the Chin National Front (CNF) all rejected the invitation. They said that by not offering all stakeholders the chance to participate, the junta showed it is unwilling to meet halfway. “We recognize that political issues need to be addressed through a political dialogue,” KIA information officer, Col. Naw Bu, told RFA’s Myanmar Service, when asked about the decision not to register for the talks. “We are not attending the meeting this time because it’s clear to us that we will not be able to reach a point at which we can discuss real political issues.” The four ethnic armies are Myanmar’s largest, most experienced and best equipped, and together have accounted for some of the strongest resistance to military rule. KNU spokesman Padoh Saw Tawney said that in addition to refusing to allow the shadow National Unity Government (NUG) and the prodemocracy People’s Defense Force (PDF) paramilitary group to attend talks, the junta had failed to honor commitments it had made to his and other ethnic armies, such as reducing its troop presence in their territories in the country’s remote border regions. “If the talks are not held in an inclusive environment, the consequences will be indescribable for the country,” he said. The junta has rejected requests from ethnic leaders and the international community to let the NUG and PDF participate in the talks. Min Aung Hlaing has repeatedly said that the junta will not talk with “terrorists,” and vowed to continue to crack down on the groups. Padoh Saw Tawney said that if the military has good intentions, it should “leave politics” so that the rest of Myanmar’s stakeholders can form a federal democracy and begin the process of rebuilding the country. “We cannot go without these preconditions,” he said. Other ethnic leaders, such as KNPP First Secretary Khu Daniel, told RFA that peace talks without the NUG and PDF would be “meaningless,” and suggested that the junta peace offer was part of a bid to create a schism within the armed opposition. “The NUG formed political alliances with our ethnic groups,” he said. “The junta intends to separate them from these groups. But without them, there will be no solution to this problem.” Khu Daniel acknowledged that some ethnic armies had agreed to join in negotiations but noted that they have smaller forces and hadn’t made much headway in fighting against the military. “Our groups, which are really fighting, are not attending. So, nothing will come out of it,” he said. Armies that accepted In addition to the KIA, KNU, KNPP, and CNF, the other ethnic armies to reject the invitation were the All Burma Students Democratic Front and the Lahu Democratic Union — two of the 10 groups that have signed a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) with the government since 2015. The United Wa State Party, the Shan State Progressive Party, and the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA) have said they will attend the peace talks. So have the Arakan State Liberation Party, the Shan State Rehabilitation Council, the Karen National Peace Council, the Democratic Karen Army, the New Mon State Party, and the Pa-O National Liberation Organization — all of which are members of the Peace Process Steering Team (PPST) of NCA signatories. The 10 groups that signed the NCA have suggested that the deal remains in place, despite an already flailing peace process that was all but destroyed by the unpopular junta’s Feb. 1, 2021, coup. Previously, all 10 said they would not pursue talks with the military, which they view as having stolen power from the country’s democratically elected government. PPST spokesman, Col. Saw Kyaw Nyunt, said his group decided to accept the junta invitation with the hope that it would lead to broader negotiations. “It’s a start with the aim of finding a way to have inclusive talks,” he said. “We’ll try to determine how to create such an inclusive political environment, even though we have not yet held a political dialogue to build a federal democratic union.” The three northern alliances — the Kokang National Democratic Alliance, the Ta'ang National Liberation Army and the Arakan Army — have said they are still negotiating among themselves over Min Aung Hlaing’s offer. Speaking to RFA at the end of last week, junta deputy information minister, Maj. Gen. Zaw Min Tun, told RFA that “most” of the ethnic armed groups had accepted the invitation. On Monday, he said that “a total of nine groups” had confirmed they would attend talks — NCA signatories Democratic Karen Army, Karen National Peace Council, Pa-O National Liberation Organization, New Mon State Party, Arakan State Liberation Party, and Shan State Rehabilitation Council; and non-signatories United Wa State Party, Shan State Progressive Party, and National Democratic Alliance Army. “Some groups have issued statements saying they will not attend, and we are waiting for others to make their decision,” he said. Zaw Min Tun said the junta is committed to pushing the peace process forward, adding that it is willing to “openly discuss the establishment of a union based on democracy and federalism.” ‘Effort to buy time’ Naing Htoo Aung, permanent secretary of the NUG’s Defense Ministry, said that 15 months after seizing power, the junta has led Myanmar to ruin, and its rule is in jeopardy. “The junta is not doing well militarily, politically, or economically ... so, I think they are making a fake peace invitation as an effort to buy time,” he said. “Unity among the revolutionary forces right now is unprecedented. That’s why [the military] hopes to create misunderstanding between them.” Political analyst Sai Kyi Zin Soe called the peace talks a “failure” because the four strongest armed groups declined the junta’s invitation to attend. “The main reason they did not take the offer was not that because they don’t want to hold talks. What they want is a dialogue that leads to real peace,” he said. “They are not attending because they don’t believe it is an invitation with a genuine desire for peace. The trust has been shattered.” The military has made 12 invitations to the country’s armed ethnic groups since the February 2021 coup, but the April offering marked the first time Min Aung Hlaing said he would attend..."
Source/publisher: "RFA" (USA)
2022-05-09
Date of entry/update: 2022-05-09
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Time for an Evaluation of Donor-Led Peace Efforts? As recently as 2020 one of the most prominent logos on Yangon billboards, vehicles, and signs was the woven fibers of the Joint Peace Fund (JPF). The JPF arrived in Yangon in 2016, loudly proclaiming that it had pledges from nine western donors who would fund US$100 million in peacebuilding activities between 2016 and 2021. The JPF would support the National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) of 2015, a Norwegian-sponsored agreement between the quasi-civilian government of U Thein Sein and a dozen or so Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs). Hundreds of millions of dollars also flowed into Myanmar in the name of peace from Western embassies, United Nations (UN) agencies, the World Bank, church groups, and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs). All parties were convinced that they could contribute to the country’s road to peace by bringing the peacebuilding skills of the outside world to Myanmar. International experts in peacebuilding, public health, gender, democracy, displaced peoples, education and a host of other subjects arrived. The Myanmar Police Force was even funded by the European Union to train in crowd control techniques in 2013 and 2016, all part of a scheme to assist them to become “a modern police agency that adheres to international standards, respects human rights and maintains gender awareness.” Conferences were held in Yangon hotels, workshops in villages, and leaders jetted off to see ‘best practice’ peace efforts in places like Northern Ireland, Colombia, Sri Lanka, and Mindanao in the Philippines. And then of course it all disappeared on February 1, 2021, when the Myanmar military staged their coup. What went wrong? No answers seem forthcoming. Monitoring, Evaluation and the Coup of February 1, 2021 Hundreds of millions of dollars were spent on peace and democracy efforts in Myanmar between 2016 and 2021. Myanmar’s service sector briefly flourished and rents in Yangon skyrocketed, particularly in neighborhoods favored by expatriates where houses owned by military families were snapped up. But that was OK because each dollar spent was rooted in “evidence based policy”, which meant a particular “benchmarked performance objective” pre-determined by the donor was aligned with success, however defined. So the JPF and the donor systems hummed along, always seeming to meet those benchmarked performance indicators. The Rohingya crisis of 2017 came and went, ceasefires in Shan and Kachin States collapsed, and fighting resumed in Karen and Karenni States. The Arakan Army emerged, too. Monitoring and Evaluation officers carefully noted “roadblocks” on the “road to peace”. Ambassadors lectured Myanmar people that this was the “last chance” for peace. But it didn’t work. The crash occurred on the day of the coup, when the elected leadership of the government was arrested and the military occupied Myanmar’s cities. Peaceful demonstrators were shot, military operations against ethnic peoples in the borderlands resumed, and resistance groups began to organize. All the efforts of the 2016-2021 peacebuilding seemed for naught. As for the evaluators, they seemed to have suddenly disappeared. For example, instead of acknowledging failure and announcing a new study in the interests of transparency, JPF’s website was scoured of all reports and effectively went blank. Or perhaps it went underground, as rumors have emerged that the JPF is now negotiating with the military government. It seems that the peacebuilding of 2016-2021 was in vain or perhaps even counter-productive. This means, though, that it is time to ask the critical question of what went wrong. All that data- driven policy-building can be resuscitated, and the tools used to evaluate the NGOs can now be used to evaluate the overall peace process. Monitoring and Evaluation in donor-speak meant western accounting standards benchmarking every kyat and dollar. The recipients were held accountable to the stakeholders, of whom the donors were most important. This is why endless reams of the monitoring and evaluation reports were submitted to Western embassies, JPF, World Bank, and others. Receipts for tea were carefully collated with a performance objective, budget line and benchmark. Monitoring and Evaluation Officer became a new profession in Myanmar, judging by the number of job ads advertising for this particular skill. It seems callous to ask, but isn’t the coup and the seeming collapse of the aid sector a great opportunity for a final monitoring and evaluation report? What are the lessons learned? Why did the road to peace fall off a cliff? Where did the hundreds of millions of dollars spent on peace go? Frankly were JPF still around, it seems like a perfect question for them to conduct an inquiry into. Measuring The Technology of Peace One problem is that the JPF and other donors reduce peace to being a technical problem. In the imported version of ‘Peaceland’, conflict, economics, and politics were reduced to metrics which are easily monitored and evaluated with numbers. Thus, violent incident reports seemed quick and precise and economic development was robustly measured in tenths of a percent growth. Election transparency was presumably measurable in the liters of purple gentian violet used to stain the fingers of voters. The problem perhaps is that peace is not just a technical problem. Peace is complicated, because there are many forms of it and it is more than an absence of violent incidents. Indeed in peace studies, an absence of violent incidents is sometimes called “negative peace”. Myanmar people remember well “negative peace’” from the decades of military rule when fear of government violence was constant, even when there were no violent incidents to count. For negative peace to become “positive peace,” there needs to be reconciliation and the birth of a new sense of shared destiny. Peace studies scholars use mystical terms such as soul of place, cultures of peace, social cohesion, and positive peace. The point is that peace is rooted ultimately in the morality and traditions of the local society, not dollars spent, incidents counted, or even gross national product. A Wonky Question for the Evaluators: What is Your Real Deliverable? The monitoring and evaluation profession is about measuring progress toward a goal. Peace was the goal for the NCA but that came to mean only that violent fighting between the military and EAOs should stop, even if the reign of fear continues. Monitoring and evaluation reports, though, only asked if the shooting stopped, not if steps toward what peace studies scholars call “positive peace” were taken. The incentive presented by Western embassies and NGOs was that if you could answer ‘Yes’ that violence rates had decreased, you could get the next contract. Somehow the world of monitoring and evaluation missed the fact that assigning a cup of tea from a workshop to the correct budget category was not the point. “Positive peace” is the point, but this is unfortunately not really a deliverable that can be monitored and evaluated by simply counting violent incidents. February 1, 2021 presents a classic monitoring and evaluation opportunity for the ‘lessons learned’ crowd. Perhaps what needs to happen is that the donors from the UN, Norway, UK and USA need to admit that the coup was a failure of their own policies, not just of the Myanmar people. Sadly, this is not yet happening. In Thailand, where I work, USAID, Washington’s aid agency, in particular has arrived with monitoring and evaluation specialists promising dollars for programs addressing Myanmar issues. The catch is that the extensive American accountability requirements mean that the same policies and same NGOs that engineered the failure of 2016-2021 are being funded again. More importantly, the pesky goal that is “positive peace” is still missing. So NGOs spring up, monitoring and evaluation specialists are hired and villas rented in Chiangmai and Bangkok. After that is done, some money will make its way across the border to Myanmar and the rather small number of NGOs with the wherewithal and office staff to continue satisfying the technocracy of the peace industry. What Would a Real Evaluation Look Like? What would a real evaluation of the NCA and JPF look like? First, it might start with not just the failures in the 2015 ceasefire, but the dozens of other Myanmar ceasefires which have taken place since the 1950s. And then before that there is the poisonous legacy of British colonialism well remembered by Myanmar’s peoples. Myanmar has historians who could help with evaluating why ceasefires have been ineffective for the last 100 years or so. For example, little thought is put into why the 1950s ceasefires following the 1949 Battle of Insein failed. Nor is much written about the 1990s ceasefires with the Mon, Kachin, Wa, and others. In those failed ceasefires might be found the reason why the 2015 NCA also failed. And finally why did the Rohingya repatriations endorsed by the UN in 1978, 1992, 2012 and 2017 also fail? If you are a foreigner scratching your head about the Battle of Insein, or other ceasefires, you are not alone. After all, what monitoring and evaluation officer created a career based on bragging about the ceasefire that did not work, even if it was one of the most important events in twentieth century Myanmar history? But I would guess that the unsuccessful endings of the Burmese Civil War of 1949-1950 tell us more about peace in Myanmar than the peace industry’s successes in Colombia, Sri Lanka, etc. What such studies should not start with are lectures about USAID monitoring and evaluation requirements, or critiques from Western embassies about “Myanmar’s failure”. New ideas and thoughts from outside ‘Peaceland’ need to be sought. There are excellent books in English by Johan Galtung, Severine Autessere, John Paul Lederach, Thich Nhat Hanh, Elise Boulding, and others about the nature of peace and peacebuilding which are rarely noted in the reams of reports. Myanmar scholars like U Pho Hlaing’s writings about the nature of Burmese democracy, Aung San Suu Kyi’s writings about democracy and fear, Saw Aung Hla’s writings about the Karen and Maung Maung Gyi’s thoughts regarding Burmese authoritarianism, were almost universally ignored in Yangon consultancy reports, even though they are available in English. More of course must be available in Burmese, Karen, and the other languages of Myanmar..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2022-04-20
Date of entry/update: 2022-04-20
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Today is the 6th Anniversary of signing the Nationwide Ceasefi re Agreement. With the aspiration to achieve sustainable peace, the Karen National Union signed the Nationwide Ceasefi re Agreement and committed to solve the over 70 years long political problems peacefully through political dialogue, which was not resolved by the successive governments. In the NCA implementation we, the KNU. along with the implementation partners have firmly and tirelessly overcome many challenges. W e achieved the gradual progressive trend of establishing a federal democratic country beyond 2020 through the Three Steps and Three Phases Approach in the Union Accord. It is with great regret that we see the military coup on 1 February 2021 has breached all NCA's principles and stopped the NCA implementation, so that the military returns to dictatorship with the use of coercive force for solving what are political problems. As a result of the military coup, all citizens and ethnic people arc suffering from many socioeconomic related problems resulting from the various forms of oppression, and the country faces collapse. The KNU stands on the principle of " solving political problems by political means" . However, according to our experience in the implementation of the NCA. to achieve this it totally depends on the stakeholder's honesty and commitment to comply with the agreements. Therefore, to save the country from chaos, the KNU requests to all relevant stakeholders the following: 1. To release unconditionally those detainees including political leaders detained following the coup. 2. To withdraw police and military troops back to their stations/bases throughout the country and to declare and practically implement a nationwide ceasefire. 3. Focus immediately on implementation of humanitarian activities freely with the help of international support, remove restriction on all mcdical treatments including Covid-19 vaccination, protection, and treatment. 4. Release firm orders for the provision of civilian protection to be followed by the police and military forces, and broad international monitoring process through international observers. 5. Accept UN-supported international mediation for the ending of the military rule, and negotiation for transfer of power to an inclusive and participative unity government with representation from all key stakeholders who are committed to federalism and solving the over 70 years long internal political conflict, rooted problems and causes. 6. Tatmadaw to declare officially its commitment to a federal democra tic state, and its withdrawal from politics. The KNU firmly believes that with the country of Burma’s diversity of ethnicity and religions, its history of chauvinism and dictatorship, the problems of Burma can only be solved, and a peaceful society can only be achieved, by building a federal state and applying democratic practices..."
Source/publisher: Karen National Union
2021-10-15
Date of entry/update: 2021-10-15
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "1.Today marks the Sixth Anniversary of the signing the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) by the leaders of Ethnic Revolutionary Armed Organizations, government, tamadaw and Hluttaw on 15th October of 2015, in the presence of foreign diplomats which included the UN, EU, China, Japan and Thailand in order to establish a Union based on the principles of democracy and federalism that guarantees democracy, national equality and selfdetermination. 2. PPST upholds the essence of NCA which embodies resolving political crisis through political means, fostering a meaningful political dialogue with all the stakeholders, and protection and security of the people's lives and property. 3. During the past six years, four sessions of the Union Peace Conference - 21st Century Panglong had been convened according to the Seven-step culminating in the signing of three parts of the Union Accord. However, we were still unable to lay down concrete principles to establish a Federal Democratic Union as desired. Implementation of ceasefire matters and interim arrangements made no headway. Another disappointment was the inability to convince remaining ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) to sign the NCA which included the principle of all-inclusiveness. 4. On the bright side, we have stimulated the widespread awareness and substantial understanding of federalism among the public and public participation in the peace process. We have faced numerous obstacles and challenges in fostering a new political culture that seeks resolution for the long standing political crisis through political means. We believe that those lessons learnt will become instrumental in resolving the nation's current political crisis. 5.The entire peace process including implementation of NCA has stalled due to the coup on February 1, 2021. In order to overcome the political crisis, the PPST has adopted the following political goals based on the NCA essence that embodies resolving political conflict through political means, fostering meaningful political dialogue with all the stakeholders, and protection of civilians: 1) To release immediately and unconditionally all the state leaders and other detainees arrested after the coup, and seek to resolve the political differences as soon as possible. 2) The future political dialogue for a political solution is to include all stakeholders and to take place with the assistance of the international community. 3) To find solutions for the earliest transfer of power to the civilian leadership within the democratic framework through a collective approach. 4) To implement institutional reforms to enable the Union of Myanmar to stand with dignity among the International Community. 5) To establish a security system that protects the people in pursuant of peace, stability and prosperity of the nation. 6) To implement programs that advance the protection of the lives and property of the people, and resettlement and rehabilitation for their losses. 7) To build a Federal Democratic Union which ensures stability, peace and prosperity. 6. We welcome the efforts of the international community including the ASEAN to resolve the Myanmar political crisis. We will also collaborate with all political forces to work towards the solution. 7. PPST is seeking humanitarian assistance for the people displaced by the conflict, as well as Covid-19 related support and programs for people in the NCA-S EAO based area. 8. On this special occasion of the 6th Anniversary of the Signing of the NCA, we solemnly call for immediate and unconditional release of all detained political prisoners and urge all the stakeholders to find peaceful means to resolve the current political crisis..."
Source/publisher: NCA-S EAO
2021-10-15
Date of entry/update: 2021-10-15
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Description: "The decision by Myanmar’s National Unity Government (NUG) to declare a “defensive people’s war” against the military junta that usurped power in Naypyitaw on Feb. 1 has not been met with much sympathy from the international community. The British ambassador designate to Myanmar, Pete Vowles, tweeted on Sept. 7 that his country “supports peaceful efforts to restore democracy in Myanmar. We strongly condemn the coup’s coup and brutality, we call on all parties to engage in dialogue.” Two days later, The Irrawaddy quoted the US Embassy in Yangon as stating that they encourage “all sides to be peaceful and to avoid an escalation of violence.” Chris Sidoti, a member of the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar, an independent group of international experts, told Reuters on Sept. 8 that “Violence is the cause of the suffering of the people of Myanmar, it is not the solution…We empathize with the NUG, but we fear for what will happen as a result of this decision.” ASEAN has proposed a four-month ceasefire to enable the delivery of humanitarian aid and is also encouraging a dialogue between the junta, the State Administration Council (SAC), and its opponents. The Australian government, which before the coup had a bilateral Defense Cooperation Program with the Tatmadaw (Myanmar’s military), has repeatedly urged the SAC to engage in a dialogue and somehow believes that ASEAN can play a constructive role in solving the crisis in Myanmar. No one in his or her right mind would be against a dialogue leading to a peaceful solution to Myanmar’s escalating civil wars between the Tatmadaw and the ethnic armed organizations and now also a host of new resistance armies which are active not in border areas but in the country’s heartland. But it is recklessly naïve to believe that the Tatmadaw, with or without foreign encouragement, would be even remotely interested in engaging in such a dialogue. Exchanging views and reaching compromises have never been on the generals’ agenda. They have always believed in military might and demanded surrender from their opponents. But if a peaceful solution to Myanmar’s many conflicts is not possible, what’s the alternative? Does the NUG and its armed wing, the loosely organized People’s Defense Force (PDF), and its ethnic allies have any chance of defeating the mighty Tatmadaw? As all the readers of The Irrawaddy are aware, I’ve been writing about Myanmar’s civil war for more than four decades. During that time, I have also on numerous occasions seen the Tatmadaw in action and also been in the middle of two major battles in the frontier areas. The first was in the Naga Hills in December 1985 when the Tatmadaw launched an early morning attack on the headquarters of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland in northwestern Sagaing Region (then Division). It is quite possible that my presence there was a major reason why the Tatmadaw decided to move troops across those remote and rugged hills and attack. The battle was fierce because troops from the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) were there, and that made a difference from fighting the poorly armed Naga. But, in the end, the Tatmadaw captured the camp. I and other survivors had to flee and hide in the jungle for days before it was possible to move to more secure locations. The second time was at the battle of Hsi-Hsinwan in northern Shan State in November 1986. I was in a trench together with commanders of the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) when their “people’s army” attacked a Tatmadaw position on the top of the mountain. Hundreds of CPB soldiers had been mobilized for the fight, which began at dawn. I have never seen such an arsenal anywhere in Myanmar’s war-torn areas. The CPB’s troops were equipped with 120mm mortars, 75mm recoilless rifles, grenade launchers, machine-guns and automatic rifles. The Tatmadaw camp was blown to pieces and casualties were severe, but the few surviving troops refused to surrender. I did, though, meet a wounded soldier who had been captured by the CPB. I had witnessed the fight from the CPB’s side, but, as I wrote about the encounter in my book Land of Jade: “I was disappointed at not being able to interview him. I would at least have liked to tell him that I had been impressed by the fighting spirit of his unit.” In those days, the Tatmadaw was also an extremely brutal force committing numerous and often unspeakable atrocities on the civilian population in the frontier areas. I had learned that from many interviews with villagers and other victims of Tatmadaw cruelty. At the same time, it was actually quite poorly armed — but, despite all that, a battle-hardened and largely effective light infantry force. Soldiers were constantly on the move and there were fights against the CPB, the Karen on the Thai border, the Kachin in the far north and other pockets of resistance in ethnic minority areas. All that changed after the 1988 pro-democracy uprising. The main fear within the Tatmadaw leadership was that disgruntled soldiers might join the pro-democracy activists and that, in turn, would be the beginning of the end of military-dominated rule in Myanmar. Consequently, in order to prevent a crack in the ranks, everything was done to keep at least the officer corps satisfied. Beginning in 1989, the Tatmadaw spent more than a billion dollars on procuring new, more sophisticated military equipment. It came primarily from China but also from Singapore, Pakistan and Israel. Most of it, however, was materiel that Myanmar did not actually need, such as missile systems that would be of little use in counter-insurgency operations, huge tanks, armored vehicles, naval patrol boats and various kinds of radar equipment. It was simply toys for the boys and the troops also got new, smart uniforms. Before long, Myanmar’s own defense industries began producing new infantry rifles to replace the old, heavy G-3 which was based on German designs. Equally important was a decision to scrap the previous, unpopular system of constant rotations of regional commanders, which had been done in order to make sure that no such officer built up his own power base in a certain part of the country. And then came a series of ceasefire agreements between the Tatmadaw and a number of ethnic rebel armies. The Wa, the Kachin, Khun Sa’s drug army, the Mon and Pa-O and others made peace with the Tatmadaw. Those agreements, initiated by intelligence chief Gen. Khin Nyunt, were struck in order to prevent a link-up between the urban dissidents and the ethnic rebels, which could have proven disastrous for the junta that took over power on Sept. 18, 1988. It worked. Only a few pro-democracy activists remained with the Karen National Union, the only sizable ethnic army that refused to enter into a truce with the Tatmadaw. But, to be on the safe side, the size of the Tatmadaw was increased dramatically. The three services — the army, the air force and the navy — amounted to no more than 195,000 men before 1988. Nearly all of them belonged to the army; the air force as well as the navy were very small and, many would argue, almost insignificant. According to the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies and other international think-tanks, the army has now 507,000 men, the air force 23,000 and the navy 19,000, so altogether 549,000 in total. Those think-tanks may have grossly overestimated the strength of the Tatmadaw because most units are undermanned and many troops may exist only in official reports from the field. Be that as it may, it is undeniable that the strength of the Tatmadaw in terms of manpower and equipment is way above that of the 1980s. But, because of the old ceasefire agreements, which lasted for nearly two decades, that also means that a generation of troops have very limited fighting experience. They are, as a source said, better at parades showing off their new uniforms and guns than at combat. And then, the embrace of the market economy that followed the 1988 uprising gave the officers ample opportunities to earn vast amounts of money. As one Myanmar source wrote on social media: “the army officers are only interested in taking bribes and making business deals with the cronies, they don’t want to fight battles anymore, they joined the army to get rich quickly.” Or, as a retired Tatmadaw officer once told me: “luxury when I was in the army consisted of a badminton set and a bottle of army rum, and I was a colonel. Now even captains and lieutenants have more than one car, several sets of golf clubs, and at least two mistresses. And they don’t have to fight.” That changed again when, in June 2011, the ceasefire with the KIA broke down. For the first time in more than a decade, major battles raged in an ethnic minority area. I was at the KIA headquarters in Laiza in December 2012 and I was astonished to observe the poor performance of the Tatmadaw. In the beginning, they sent in the infantry, which was poorly trained and had zero fighting experience. Casualties were extremely heavy as the advancing Tatmadaw troops were mowed down by KIA guerrillas. It became so bad that the Tatmadaw had to withdraw its infantry and rely instead on its Russian-supplied helicopter gunships, attack aircraft and heavy artillery fired from bases far from the KIA’s positions. According to credible reports from Yangon at the time, some officers paid bribes to avoid being sent to Kachin State to fight. This was not the Tatmadaw I saw in the 1980s. Then came another fierce war in Rakhine State as a new rebel force, the Arakan Army (AA), rose up in arms. Tatmadaw dead and wounded numbered in the thousands, including some senior officers. And, again, the infantry’s poor performance prompted the Tatmadaw to resort to air power, firing indiscriminately into villages where they thought the AA would be present — but to no avail. Today, the AA and its civilian wing run a de facto parallel government in Rakhine State. The AA is closely allied with the Ta’ang National Liberation Army, a Palaung force, and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, which is made up of fighters from Kokang, an area in northeastern Shan State dominated by ethnic Chinese. Judging from independent reports, those three armies, called the Brotherhood Alliance, have fought what appear to be numerous successful battles with the Tatmadaw. According to a November 2020 paper published by the United States Institute of Peace, “Myanmar has not experienced this intensity of fighting in decades.” Nor has it suffered such heavy casualties. The big question now is: What’s next? Today, the Burmese-dominated Tatmadaw is sent out to gun down people not only from the ethnic minorities but also their own kin in parts of the country where there has been no insurgency since the years immediately after independence in 1948. That, and the casualties they are evidently suffering even there, must have a devastating effect on the morale of the troops. For the first time in decades, there are now speculations about possible rifts within the Tatmadaw. If NUG sources are to be believed, more than 2,000 security personnel, most of them policemen but also soldiers, have defected to the pro-democracy movement. None of those reports can be independently verified, but it is clear that something that has never happened before is brewing within the Tatmadaw. It remains to be seen whether the NUG’s “defensive people’s war” will accelerate that process — or have the opposite effect, namely to make the Tatmadaw close ranks even more firmly than before. A main problem is that many officers and even private soldiers must be acutely aware of what they have done when it comes to corrupt practices and atrocities they have committed. They may fear that a change could mean that they would be held accountable for all that — and the brutality that the Tatmadaw now has unleashed in towns and villages all over the country is almost unprecedented. What began as carnival-style protests immediately after the coup became something entirely different when the police and the Tatmadaw began killing peaceful protesters. Such brutality breeds resistance, and that is what we are seeing in Myanmar today. In any case and whatever the future will be, forget about “dialogues” and futile attempts at urging the two sides to refrain from violence..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2021-09-13
Date of entry/update: 2021-09-13
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Myanmar’s friends need to deny the junta legitimacy and work with the National Unity Government
Description: "On Tuesday, the president of Myanmar’s democratic National Unity Government (NUG) proclaimed D-Day, the launch of a “people’s defensive war” against the military government, to overthrow it and end the oppression. Predictably, that caused a stir in the international community. One Western embassy reacted by asking its nationals to leave the country as soon as possible, while another ambassador issued a statement calling on all parties to work on restoring democracy peacefully. D-Day was not, as some surmised, a call to arms to sweep away the Tatmadaw in a large, bloody offensive. Rather, it was a demonstration of will and the acknowledgement of a reality. Myanmar is in the midst of an uprising against what its people consider a murderous occupying force. The call was taken up by the NUG’s allied ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), the Kachin Independence Army, the Karen National Liberation Army, the Karenni Progressive Party, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, and the Ta-ang National Liberation Army, as well as the People’s Defense Forces (PDFs), an NUG-allied but disparate host of dozens of militias operating mostly in Myanmar’s Bamar-dominated center. Fighting increased on that day, but not significantly, compared with the days and weeks before. In its call, the NUG proclaimed a state of emergency, provided advice to civilians on how to protect themselves, and issued strict rules of engagement to its allied forces, to ensure the uprising complies with the Geneva Conventions. It called on Tatmadaw soldiers and police officers to defect and offered them protection. Some analysts lamented the call, fearing further doom for Myanmar. Others have pointed to the reality that the military is facing a credible strategic challenge. I am of a somewhat more optimistic predilection. EAOs are holding their territory, PDFs are proliferating and will continue to do so. Once the rainy season stops, one well-informed analyst told me, they may pop up in locations that have so far been peaceful. Tatmadaw defections are up. Guerrilla action has reached its gilded capital. All of this could in time overwhelm the Tatmadaw, sap the will of their rank and file to continue the fight, and may lead to them being unable to maintain their posture. No matter what they believe, everybody observing Myanmar agrees: The fighting will not stop right now, and there is currently no window for a negotiated solution. We need to remember: The uprising against the military is wildly popular, the military remains utterly despised, and the collapse of the economy was a calculated strategy in the early days of the coup to force out the military junta peacefully. Everybody agrees that the humanitarian fallout needs to be addressed, and the NUG is certainly willing to do so. The effort by ASEAN’s envoy to declare a humanitarian ceasefire, though, was doomed all along – it suited the Tatmadaw, who would love nothing more than having a ceasefire with EAOs to turn around and stamp out the PDFs. Had the envoy bothered to speak to the NUG, it would have told him that. Another thing is unchanged: Myanmar still has a legitimate, elected government that has built the most inclusive multi-ethic coalition in the history of the country, and remains the only actor that might have enough about them to keep the country together – if it wins. It has developed a democratic interim constitutional arrangement and principles for a federal democratic future. It has opened a pathway to Rohingya citizenship. D-Day has confirmed that there is political will and strategic purpose about this government and its allies. The overwhelmingly positive reactions around the country, from EAOs to student unions, have again demonstrated the support the NUG has. The NUG has made progress in establishing working relationships with a number of foreign governments. Still, few of these deal with the NUG as they would with an established government. In that respect the decision of the United Nations’ Credentials Committee next week on whether to accept the credentials of the NUG-loyal UN ambassador remains key. The international community needs to support this claim to strengthen the hand of the NUG, open it up to aid and support from the UN and beyond. Myanmar’s friends need to hold the line, deny the junta legitimacy and work with the NUG. The stronger the NUG and its alliance, the more quickly this uprising will be over. Building channels for mediation and low-level cooperation is no wasted effort even now. On the question of delivering humanitarian aid and of countering Covid-19, there may be potential for dialogue and limited cooperation at the grassroots level, between the junta and NUG-aligned EAO authorities, with the blessing perhaps of the NUG. That is all there can realistically be hoped for right now. At the end of it all, there will be a negotiated outcome, but only when the situation is ripe for a solution. For now, interests remain diametrically opposed: Nothing short of the complete overthrow of the regime and the fundamental remaking of the military is acceptable to the people of Myanmar. Without one side all but collapsing, that situation will not change. Representatives of the diplomatic community and international organizations have a responsibility to communicate the situation as it is clearly to their capitals, and not to muddy the waters by going through the motions: expressing concern, and calling for a peaceful return to democracy. That return is not in the cards right now. That fact needs to be understood by the decision-makers in the capitals, but also that it does not preclude constructive international engagement in Myanmar..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
2021-09-09
Date of entry/update: 2021-09-10
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Current Position of PPST members
Description: "Some troops of the KNU, Myanmar’s oldest ethnic armed group, restarted fighting with the Myanmar military prior to the coup, but this intensified after February 1. The KNU has offered sanctuary and military training to anti-coup activists and overrun army bases in their areas of operation to demonstrate its solidarity with the anti-coup movement. The CNF has also actively collaborated with locally-formed People’s Defense Forces to resist the military’s brutal assault on the pro-democracy protests in Chin state. That has provoked a brutal reaction from the junta, which has ferociously retaliated with airstrikes. The internal political dynamics inside the signatory bloc are profoundly complex. The RCSS/SSA-S, one of the largest groups among the NCA signatories, has been reluctant to stand decisively with one side – whether the junta or the anti-coup movement – although its leader, Yawd Serk, has vocally protested the coup and supported the anti-coup movement since February 1. Myanmar analyst David Scott Mathieson pointed out that “it is more likely that Yawd Serk is prevaricating, waiting to see which side will prevail so he can cut a deal with them”. In the six months since the military takeover, the RCSS/SSA-S has focused more on fighting other ethnic groups, such as the TNLA and SSPP/SSA-N, than with the junta as it seeks greater control of territory and resources. Meanwhile, other groups in the Peace Process Steering Team (PPST), the coordinating body of the NCA signatories, are tentatively working with the regime or have remained silent on the coup. The Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), the Karen National Liberation Army/Peace Council (KNLA/PC) and the New Mon State Party (NMSP) met with the junta’s council in April, while the Arakan Liberation Party together with KNLA/PC attended the Armed Forces Day parade on March 27. Recently, Naing Hong Sa, the chairman of the NMSP changed the tone to call for unity between the ethnic armed groups and the Bamar people fighting the military dictatorship but it is not clear yet what the NMPS’s attitude will be going forward. The All Burma Student’s Democratic Front, Pa-O National Liberation Army and Lahu Democratic Union have remained quiet on the coup. As a bloc, the PPST officially declared the temporary cessation of the NCA implementation and peace negotiations with the junta on July 7. Moreover, Yawd Serk stepped down as the head of the PPST. In its latest statement issued on 5th August, however, the PPST did not even mention the phrase federal democratic union despite typically – albeit feebly – having recited that mantra in all its past statements. The KNU and some smaller groups may still believe in the federal vision. Padoh Saw Taw Nee, the KNU’s foreign affairs head, told the author that “the KNU leadership still firmly believes in federalism as they know historically and empirically that it is the best way for the country”. But he admitted that even some Karen people are suspicious as to whether federalism will be the best option for them. Some ethnic armed groups, especially smaller ones, in the signatory bloc have been struggling for their survival instead of thinking about the political future of the country, and some have become disillusioned with the concept of federalism in the current tumultuous period. This point is obviously reflected in the response of the ethnic armed organizations (EAO’s) to the federal democracy charter drafted by the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw formed by the deposed parliamentary members of the NLD. The federal democracy charter released on March 31 received muted and reserved approval from the EAO’s. PPST spokesperson Colonel Khun Oakkar said “NCA signatory EAO’s welcome the federal democracy charter, but need time to examine the finer details” immediately after its release. So far, there have been no official endorsement from those EAO’s. AA chief Maj. Gen. Tun Myat Naing was more open in his response to the federal promises made by the Bamar politicians, saying that “the NLD government after 1988 promised federalism and they pledged this to the ethnic people but, after they came to power, they didn’t keep their promise”. Myanmar and Federal Discourse The failure of the NLD to keep that promise is one of the key reasons for the suspicions of the ethnic minorities about the federal goal, and one of the main obstacles to forging an inter-ethnic alliance in the current anti-coup struggle. The word ‘federalism’ has been politically taboo in Myanmar since the 1962 coup, with the then coup leader General Ne Win justifying the military takeover by citing the risk of Myanmar disintegrating or fragmenting territorially due to the federal proposals of the ethnic minorities. Under military rule, the use of the word ‘federalism’ could lead to a lengthy term of imprisonment. The word was only revived as a dominant political discourse following the political opening up of 2011, especially in peace negotiations with the EAO’s. The Myanmar military, which has long been inimical to the concept of federalism, eventually agreed to establish a federal system in the country but the military’s interpretation of federalism is within the framework of the 2008 constitution. In the first 21st century Panglong conference held in August-September 2016, the military tried to assert that the 2008 constitution was written with federal characteristics, and took a firm stand on its position to uphold the military-drafted constitution. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the leader of the NLD, reiterated federalism as a political solution to Myanmar’s longstanding ethnic conflicts after her party’s entry into parliament in 2012. However, the NLD’s position on federalism is very general and vague and its leaders have rarely articulated any detailed policy on this controversial political concept. U Tun Myint (Taung Gyi), a veteran politician who attended the 1948 Panglong Conference, once wrote a letter criticizing Daw Aung San Suu Kyi for her failure to articulate the NLD’s policy on federalism. When he asked her during a meeting in 1989 “whether the new union that your party’s statement talks about building up in the future is federal or unitary”, she retorted, “We just referred to the Union. Federal or unitary systems are theory and they are different from practice. Now, I could not say exactly what type of Union it will be. It will be negotiated in the national conference and I will accept what everyone else agrees to”. U Tun Myint suggested that the NLD, as a leading party of Myanmar, should have a detailed policy on how the future union will be formed instead of accepting and following agreements of others. [U Tun Myint (Taung Gyi), “A piece of brick and a grain of sand of a Shan politician”, pp. 533-542] The NLD’s lack of a detailed policy on federalism was echoed by other analysts two decades later. In its 2015 manifesto, the NLD stated its goals as “the establishment of a federal democratic union based on the principles of freedom, equal rights and self-determination … through solidarity with all ethnic groups”. In two speeches during a campaign tour for the 2015 election to the Pa-O autonomous zone in Shan State, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi reportedly referred to a “federal Union” no fewer than 31 times. But after the NLD came to power, it failed to take the necessary steps to advance the federal future. The NLD government in 2015 surprised many by appointing its representatives and party members as the chief ministers of all the states and regions, even where the NLD had won a minority of state seats, without consultation with its once-allied ethnic parties. Ethnic political leaders have been critical of the NLD’s policy of going it alone, saying it does not augur well for the move towards a federal Union. That was exacerbated by the deteriorating relations between the NLD and the ethnic minorities due to the NLD’s missteps to impose its political hegemony through Burmanization and centralization projects. The NLD tried to impose its political hegemony in ethnic regions by erecting statues of General Aung San, father of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and a key political symbol of the NLD, in Kayah State and other states with sizeable ethnic minority populations. The plan to erect the statue sparked opposition and protests in Kayah and the NLD’s local officials made the situation worse by violently cracking down on the demonstrations. There were also protests in Mon State when the NLD decided to change the name of a bridge in Mawlamyine to the General Aung San Bridge. During the NLD’s reign in power, its intentional silence about, and sometimes tacit endorsement, of the military’s brutal offensives in ethnic regions also triggered resentment among the ethnic minorities toward the NLD’s promises of federalism. It is fair to say that the AA and the Rakhine people have become disillusioned with the idea of federalism since the NLD’s time in power. On the other hand, the diverse ethnic political forces have not delivered much thought to the precise institutional arrangement of any federalist state. Most of the EAOs prefer a more decentralized federal union, in which the ethnic states have a high degree of autonomy and self-determination consistent with the 1947 Panglong agreement. However, as the veteran analyst Bertil Lintner once wrote, they need to answer the questions of “What kind of federal union would they (EAO’s) want? How should power be divided between the states and the central government? What exactly is the ‘federal army’ some of the groups have talked about?” In the political and academic spheres, different federal systems such as the territorial, ethnic, symmetric, asymmetric, dual, cooperative and creative have been proposed and discussed, but so far no consensus has been reached. The multi-ethnic inhabitants of the states and the recent initiatives by certain groups such as AA in favor of confederation have complicated the issue even more, and now the coup has further aggravated the situation. Ultimately, the military’s coup has put the country on a path towards becoming a failed state running the risk of disintegration and territorial fragmentation. Without political solidarity among the diverse political and ethnic groups or a shared political vision, the anti-coup movement is highly unlikely to overcome the current political crisis of the country. Federalism has been much anticipated as a shared political vision to forge political solidarity between the pro-democracy and federal proponents. However, at this crucial moment, the attraction of federalism has been woefully diminishing even among its former champions and there are obviously growing tendencies toward confederation and separate states. The coup has definitely put Myanmar into a political black hole, but the future of the country looks even bleaker, particularly due to the lack of consensus among the anti-junta political stakeholders on the vision they are striving for and on the future country they are trying to build up. Myanmar will continue to head only in a dire direction if the shared vision on the future of the country is not revamped and re-envisioned soon. Ye Myo Hein is the executive director of the Tagaung Institute of Political Studies and a fellow with the Asia Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2021-09-02
Date of entry/update: 2021-09-03
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "1. On February 1, 2021, the Tatmadaw (Burman military) issued Order Number (1/2021), the promulgation of seizure by it. We, the KNU Concerned Group, strongly protest and denounce Tatmadaw's seizure of power, because according to the promulgation letter, it was the seizure of the political power from the NLD, the winning party of the general election held on November 8, 2020. 2. Though the NLD Party did not accept the 2008 Constitution, the NLD had contested in elections with a positive outlook starting from 2012. It won a landslide victory in 2015 general election and though it made the effort to amend the Constitution within the parliament, there was no success. On the other hand, the Ethnic Armed Revolutionary Organizations (EARO) tried to amend the Constitution on the basis of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), without success. Accordingly, it is entirely evident that the 2008 Constitution cannot be amended either in the parliament or on the basis of the NCA. 3. Similarly, the KNU Concerned Group do not absolutely accept the administrative services set up by Tatmadaw, after the seizure of power. In the Karen revolutionary areas, we will perform, maintain and defend our administration, in accordance with the administrative system laid down by the KNU and on the basis of self-determination. 4. For that reason, we earnestly urge: ^ The Karen armed organizations, the DKBA, KNU/KNLA PC, BGF etc., to join up with the KNLA as the Kawthoolei Army, to defend together the Karen people, together with the entire people made up of all the ethnic nationalities; ^ The entire people to unanimously oppose the seizure of power by the Tatmadaw; ^ The international community not to recognize the military government set up by the Tatmadaw. KNU Concerned Group..."
Source/publisher: KNU Concerned Group
2021-02-03
Date of entry/update: 2021-09-02
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Description: "Over the past decade, Myanmar has undergone a rapid period of political reform as it has transitioned away from a military junta towards a civilian and democratically elected government. This period has witnessed a series of land governance reforms, being pulled into various directions by Myanmar’s pluralistic society and land use and tenure practices, resulting in overlapping and conflicting policies and legal frameworks in land governance. Struggles over control and access to land and territory are one of the most pressing political issues facing the new National League for Democracy (NLD) government, which won a historical victory in the 2015 general elections under the leadership of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. Maintaining its broad base support and legitimacy largely hinges on the government’s ability to tackle pressing land governance issues, while dealing with various democratic, ethnic, and developmental crises that plague the country (Callahan 2003; Ferguson 2014; Grundy-Warr and Yin 2002; Willis 2013). The military and its cronies have engaged in a long history of land grabbing that has sparked protests and civil strife (Aung 2015; Gee 2005; Jones 2014a; Woods 2011). Ongoing discussion on peace processes between ethnic armed organizations and the central government and military are in large part concerned with territorial boundaries of ethnic states and authority within them (Einzenberger 2016; Hong 2017; Kramer 2015). Insecure peasant access to and unclear ownership over land, due to the central government’s lack of recognition of customary land tenure systems, has hampered prospects of rural economic development throughout the country (Boutry et al. 2017; Huard 2016). This paper looks at how farmers and state actors shape and reshape legal pluralism within the context of dual authority, where both the Myanmar central government and the Karen National Union1 (KNU), the latter being the leading political organization representing the Karen’s struggle for political self-determination, are responsible for land management in their respective, albeit overlapping, territories. It illustrates the ongoing power struggle centered on the central government’s and the KNU’s interests and strategies to increase the land area under their respective administration, and how this corresponds with customary tenure systems and farmers’ views on land tenure security and strategies to ensure their land rights. Two village case studies in Karen State are used to illustrate how farmers shape their strategies to secure their land rights while navigating through the blurred boundaries of competing legal systems and spaces, embedded in the context of dual authority. The paper looks at state spatiality as complex processes and practices of socio-spatial regulation across scales shaping and reshaping state-society relations. Placing dual authority as one of the building blocks for state transformation, it illustrates how political authority produces rights, and vice versa (Lund and Rahman 2018), within the context of legal and institutional pluralism. It shows how these processes and practices are rooted in the production of political space, centering on farmers’ strategies to strengthen their land rights, and how these are entangled in the central government-farmers-KNU power relations. In particular, it looks at: (1) the conflicting legal frameworks pertaining to land governance in the country; (2) how these legal frameworks are negotiated and appropriated at the village level through various means and institutional set up, including how they interact with customary land rights; and (3) how it reflects back on and influences farmers’ land tenure security. Building on legal pluralism research (von Benda-Beckmann, von Benda-Beckmann, and Spiertz 1996; Moore 1986; Van der Linden 1989), we argue that while inconsistent policies and legal frameworks leave the door wide open for land expropriation, as powerful actors shop for suitable and applicable laws to serve their interests, it also serves as an entry point for less powerful actors to increase their room to maneuver and reclaim their rights. Here, rather than portraying inconsistent, conflicting legal frameworks as merely a sign of a weak legal system in Myanmar’s land governance, we position it as an entry point for farmers and local communities to fight for their land rights. Building on Mann’s definition of states as merely [consisting of] ‘some degree of authoritative rule making and some organized political force’ (Brenner et al. 2003, 125), we view states as both sets of institutions and an expression of social power relations. As stated by Jones (2014b, 146): ‘States are seen as being produced, transformed and constrained by conflicts between social forces, … as they struggle for power and control over resources’. 2 Building on Brenner et al.’s (2003, 11) definition of states as ‘dynamically evolving spatial entities that continually mold and reshape the geographies of the very social relations they aspire to regulate, control and/or restructure’, we view state transformation processes as the creation of new political space and institutional emergence shaped by ongoing power struggles and contestation between and within political actors across scales. Or, as stated by Lefebvre (2003, 99): ‘State space hinders the transformation that would lead to the production of a differential space’. Here, state transformation is not limited to formal state actors, but also includes other actors and institutions with statutory capacity. Or, as stated by Lund and Rachman (2016, 1201): ‘The mutual constitution of rights and authority takes place in many institutional settings … Government institutions are not the only source of state effects’. The paper contributes to the wider literature on legal pluralism and state transformation processes in two ways. First, it brings to light the blurred boundary between the different forms of (legal) ordering (e.g. state law, customary law, religious law), and thus between legal systems and spaces. It argues that while legal scholars tend to view legal pluralism as the conception of different, yet interlinked legal systems and spaces, they are in fact more than just a compilation of different legal orders. On the contrary, it illustrates the messy realities where boundaries between the different forms of ordering are at best blurred, as actors and institutions transcend the different legal systems and spaces in pursuit of their interests, reconfiguring the boundaries of those spaces in the process. Second, it presents the concept of dual authority as a theoretical underpinning to unpack the politics of legal pluralism, centering on the question of ‘who makes the law’. Current discourse on legal pluralism has highlighted the importance of power analysis surrounding the politics of inclusion and exclusion in the overall shaping of law-society relations (Boelens, Bustamante, and de Vos 2007). However, it lacks a theoretical concept to unpack the political power shaping and reshaping the plurality of legal practices (Barzilai 2008). Legal pluralism entails that different institutions can assume jurisdiction, depending on how they view and cope with the conflict situation emerging from overlapping policies and legal frameworks. As stated by von Benda-Beckmann (1981, 145): ‘While actors in a dispute shop for various institutions of dispute settlement, institutions also shop for dispute. Depending on which aspect of the dispute is emphasized, a different institution can assume jurisdiction’. The case studies examined in this paper show how jurisdiction itself is blurred by plural legal systems and state spaces of dual authority that interpenetrate one another. As such, political authority and rights that emanate from different power domains are in a constant state of flux. Rights can emerge and submerge, depending on what legal system is referred to as well as what authority and legitimacy actors attribute it in a particular place and time. It highlights the centrality of political space and institutional emergence in state transformation processes through the illustration of how ‘state space is represented and imagined both in geopolitical struggles and in everyday life’ (Brenner et al. 2003, 7). Additionally, it raises the question as to what ‘state law’ and ‘non-state law’ is and where the boundaries lie in the context of multiple political spaces and institutions competing for authority (Sikor and Lund 2009), as manifested in the context of dual authority (Huard 2016). Taking two neighboring villages in mixed government-KNU controlled areas in Karen state as a case study, the paper shows the localized dynamics that shape the creation of new political spaces, manifested in states actors’ strategies to increase political authority and farmers’ strategies to strengthen their land rights, and how the two are intertwined within the established, yet ever changing geography of state regulation..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: The Journal of Peasant Studies
2019-10-31
Date of entry/update: 2021-08-07
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Ethnic conflict has dominated the political landscape of Burma (Myanmar) since independence from Great Britain in 1948. In the process, countless lives have been lost, many communities dislocated from their homes, and a country that was deemed to have the brightest future of any of its Asian neighbors at independence has stagnated to become one of the world’s poorest. In such state failures, tragedy is interwoven with irony. Burma, indeed, is the land where the anthropologist Edmund Leach carried out his ground-breaking studies into patterns of cultural inter-change among peoples. In essence, Leach concluded that ethnic and political identities are neither innate nor inflexible, but develop on the basis of understandings and cultural exchanges between different societies. Since this time, ethnic field research in Burma has come to a virtual halt. The world of Asian studies thus owes a profound debt of gratitude to Prof. Josef Silverstein. Since the 1950s, his writings on ethnic questions have stood out as a persistent – and often lone – beacon of concerned but independent analysis. At the beginning of the 21st century, his works are as pertinent as when he first began. Not only has he crystallized complex issues in understandable form, but he has done this in a language that has become common currency in many international understandings of the country and its challenges. A particular issue in Burmese politics over the past 60 years has been the lack of common forums or platforms where different parties and nationalities might equally work together. As Prof. Silverstein has described, underpinning these failures is the ‘dilemma of national unity’.1 Important ethnic questions date back to the pre-colonial past. But, in general, the modern roots of many problems can be found in the political divisions of Burma, under a diarchic system, between ‘Ministerial Burma’ and the ethnic minority ‘Frontier Areas Administration’ during British rule. Inter-communal relations were then exacerbated by conflict during the Second World War, and the challenge of national unity has remained evident in all political eras since Burma’s independence in 1948..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: The Burma Studies Group, Association of Asian Studies Conference (Washington D.C.)
2002-04-05
Date of entry/update: 2021-07-27
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "June 29th 2020 marks 25 years since the New Mon State Party (NMSP) agreed a ceasefire with the then State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) military government in Burma (as the country was officially called until 1989). The essays collected here reflect on the experiences of Mon communities and the NMSP, before and after the ceasefire. The NMSP and the (ex-Communist Party of Burma) United Wa State Army are among the few “ceasefire groups” of the 1990s which still have ceasefires. Other ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) were either forced in 2010 to become Myanmar Army-controlled Border Guard Forces (BGFs: e.g. most units of the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army) or Peoples Militias (pyithusit: e.g. the Pa-O National Organisation), or ceasefires broke down amid recrimination and return to largescale state violence against ethnic nationality communities (e.g. the Kachin Independence Organisation, whose 1994 ceasefire broke down after 17 years, in 2011). In contrast, other groups like the Karen National Union (KNU) continued the armed struggle for self-determination through the 1990s and 2000s, before agreeing a ceasefire with the U Thein Sein government in 2012. The NMSP ceasefire effectively broke down in 2010 under military government pressure to become a BGF. However, despite considerable tensions at the time, fighting did not break out again. The NMSP resisted pressure to transform into a BGF, and eventually confirmed a new bilateral ceasefire with the government in February 2012. Both the KNU (in 2015) and NMSP (in 2018) signed the multilateral Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA). Unfortunately, the NCA has largely failed. The hoped-for “Political Dialogue” has stalled, with the Myanmar government and armed forces (Tatmadaw) unwilling to allow necessary sub-national (ethnic community) consultations, or to accept EAO demands for meaningful federalism. Security elements of the NCA (the Joint Monitoring Committee) have been largely dysfunctional and/or dominated by the Tatmadaw. While key EAOs (including the NMSP) continue to deliver governance administration and services (e.g. health and education) in their areas of control and authority, the peace process has yet to provide a credible vehicle for delivering “Interim Arrangements”, despite these being mandated by the NCA (Chapter 6, Article 25). The four essays collected here discuss different aspects of the NMSP’s long struggle for Mon self-determination in the context of the 1995 ceasefire. Martin Smith and Ashley South are writers and analysts, who have studied Mon history and society since before the ceasefire. Martin offers a historical-cultural and political account of the Mon armed struggle, which frames the essays to follow. Ashley presents an assessment of the NMSP’s achievements and challenges since the ceasefire. Nai Kasauh Mon and Nai Banya Hongsar are civil society activists and authors. Nai Kasauh Mon provides a critical analysis of the ceasefire years, highlighting both successes and failures. And Nai Banya Hongsar discusses the challenges that the NMSP and Mon movement continue to face in a country still entrapped within a cycle of conflict and ceasefire..."
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Source/publisher: Covenant Institute via Myanmar Information Management Unit
2020-06-29
Date of entry/update: 2021-07-27
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "It has been four months since the Myanmar military seized power from the elected National League for Democracy (NLD) and arrested most of the NLD leaders including State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi. The reason originally given was irregularities in the voting process and lack of redress by the Union Election Commission, which was controlled by the NLD, although such reasoning, especially amidst new accusation of corruption amongst other things remains suspect. Soon after the coup, the military formed a body, the State Administration Council (SAC), under the control of the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces Min Aung Hlaing. Not unsurprisingly the return to military rule was met with widespread protests in the country and condemnation from the international community while Myanmar security forces took to the streets to brutally suppress the protestors, known as the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM). Security forces used not only riot control techniques but live-fire resulting in the deaths at the time of writing over 860 civilians had been killed, including children, and more than 4,840 civilians convicted or arrested. 1 Protests have taken place throughout the country including areas under the control of Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs). The EAOs, before the coup, had been involved in an NLD led and ostensibly military supported, peace process – the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement. While the peace process had been flawed and at one point stalled for two years it was expected that 2021 could see some progress made in addressing many of the problems that had occurred. The EAOs largely came out in favour of the protestors and the Peace Process Steering Team (PPST) an alliance of the 10 NCA-signatories2 immediately issued the following statement 1). We condemn the Myanmar military’s way of addressing the current political crisis by carrying out a coup d’état. 2).We demand the immediate and unconditional release of all leaders who are detained and arrested. 3).We urge the resolution of political problems by peaceful means and negotiation, rather than by force of arms. 4.) We stand firm on the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) and act accordingly regarding the peace process. 5.) We call for the unconditional declaration of a nationwide ceasefire. 6.) We will collaborate with the public in seeking solutions, as we are aware of the difficulties faced by the people by the coup as well as the global pandemic (COVID-19). 7.) We call on the support of the international community including the UN in resolving the current crisis.3 That said, however, at least one ethnic political party the Arakan National Party (ANP), the biggest Arakanese political party in Arakan State, released a statement signalling that it would cooperate with Myanmar’s military. In its statement, the ANP said it will work together with the Tatmadaw to resolve specific Arakanese crises including the removal of the terrorist label for the United League of Arakan/Arakan Army, which the SAC later did. On March 11, the PPST, which had already suspended all political dialogue with the military on February 20, held a meeting to discuss strategies to stop the Myanmar military’s ongoing violent crackdown on anti-coup protesters and also future dialogue with the Committee Representing the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), a shadow NLD government.4 According to reporting there had been concerns among some EAOs that it could be dangerous for the PPST to prioritize coordination with the CRPH. One leader was quoted as saying, We were a dialogue partner of the military. We were a dialogue partner of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. Now we cannot stand the people’s suffering. The main discussion is how to calm the situation down. We are thinking of the plight of the citizens,5 Despite several concerns, the Karen National Union, the Restoration Council of Shan State and the Chin National Front still held separate talks with the CRPH. In addition, the Karen National Union’s Chairman Mutu Say Po wrote a letter on 22 March 2021, after Min Aung Hlaing had sent a letter requesting a meeting. The reply from Mutu Say Po stated, The KNU finds it completely unacceptable that police and Tatmadaw personnel, whose responsibilities are to protect and defend its own people, have killed, attacked, and threatened peaceful protesters. Such events have damaged our country's reputation and caused great pain and suffering of our people. These included a number of requirements the military had to meet before further discussions could take place these were, 1. Withdraw all riot squads and Tatmadaw troops which have been deployed against protesters and withdrawal of all Tatmadaw troops which have been deployed in ceasefire areas and send them back to their outposts and bases; Declare and implement a nationwide ceasefire. 2. Release and remove charges against those detained since Tatmadaw took over power on the 1" February 2021. 3. Fully allow access for medical assistance and healthcare to support the people's protest movement. 4. Issue orders to police and Tatmadaw troops to comply with all NCA provisions — and urgently release the following provisions regarding proper treatment of civilians: A. Stop acts violating a person's dignity, violence, extrajudicial detention, kidnapping, torture, inhumane treatment, imprisonment, killing or causing the disappearance of individuals B. Stop forcibly taking money, property, food, labour or services from civilians; in addition, halt unlawful and arbitrary arrest, entrapment, forced confession, lawsuits and prosecution against civilians; C. Stop denying individuals' right to healthcare and restriction of public health resources; and halt blocking the legal transportation of medicines for public use; D. Stop the destruction or actions that would lead to the destruction of schools, hospitals, clinics, religious buildings and their premises and the use of such places as military bases or outposts; E. Immediately stop any form of sexual attack on women, including sexual molestation, sexual assault or violence, rape and sex slavery; End all killing or maiming, forced conscription, rape or other forms of sexual assault or violence, or abduction of children. 5. Abolish laws issued by Tatmadaw since Feb 1" that violate human rights. 6. Agree to address the root causes of internal conflict of over 70 years through negotiations. 7. Agree to accept international mediation to support negotiations to end the current military administration and transfer power to a National Unity Government. 8. The Tatmadaw should publicly declare its commitment to democracy and federalism and withdraw from active engagement in politics..."
Source/publisher: Euro Burma Office
2021-06-17
Date of entry/update: 2021-06-19
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Format : pdf
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Description: "NCA အတိုင်း လိုက်နာသွားမည်ဟု KNLA စစ်ဦးစီးချုပ် ထုတ်ပြန် ဇွန်လ ၉ ရက်၊ ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်။ ကေအိုင်စီ ကေအဲန်ယူ-ကရင်အမျိုးသားအစည်းအရုံး လက်မှတ်ရေးထိုးထားသည့် တစ်နိုင်ငံလုံးပစ်ခတ်တိုက်ခိုက်မှု ရပ်စဲရေး သဘောတူ စာချုပ် (NCA) အတိုင်း တိကျစွာလိုက်နာကျင့်သုံးသွားမည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်း ကရင်အမျိုးသား လွတ်မြောက်ရေး တပ်မတော်-KNLA စစ်ဦးစီးချုပ် ဗိုလ်ချုပ်ကြီး စောဂျော်နီက ယနေ့ ရက်စွဲဖြင့် ၎င်း၏ သဘောထား ထုတ်ပြန်ခဲ့သည်။ ကရင်အမျိုးသားလွတ်မြောက်ရေးတပ်မတော် -KNLA အနေဖြင့် KNU၏ နိုင်ငံရေး ဦးဆောင်မှုလမ်းညွှန် မှုကို ခံယူလျက် ဒီမိုကရေစီအရေး၊ တန်းတူရေး နှင့် ကရင်အမျိုးသားအရေးကို အစဉ်ဆောင်ရွက်လာခဲ့ရာ မေလ ၁၀ ရက်နေ့က ထုတ်ပြန်ခဲ့သော KNU ဥက္ကဌ ဗိုလ်ချုပ်ကြီးစောမူတူးစေဖိုး၏ သဘောထားအတိုင်းလိုက်နာ ခံယူသွား မည်ဟုလည်း ဖော်ပြထားသည်။ ထို့အပြင် ကရင်အမျိုးသား လွတ်မြောက်ရေး တပ်မတော်(KNLA) တပ်ဖွဲ့ဝင်များအားလုံး အနေဖြင့်လည်း စစ်စည်းကမ်းများနှင့်အညီ တိကျစွာ လိုက်နာကြရန်လည်း ၎င်း၏ သဘောထားတွင် တိုက်တွန်းထားသည်။ ပြီးခဲ့သည့် မေလ ၁၀ ရက်နေ့က KNU ဥက္ကဌ ဗိုလ်ချုပ်ကြီး စောမူတူးစေးဖိုးက သက်ဆိုင်ရာ အစုအဖွဲ့ များ အနေဖြင့် အပစ်ရပ် စာချုပ်(NCA) မူဘောင်များအတိုင်း တိကျစွာ လိုက်နာကျင့်သုံးပြီး ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေး ကို ထိန်းသိမ်းကြရန် တိုက်တွန်းထားသည့် သဘောထားထုတ်ပြန်ချက်တစ်စောင် ထုတ်ပြန်ခဲ့သေးသည်။..."
Source/publisher: Karen Information Center -KIC via The Irrawaddy - Burmese Edition
2021
Date of entry/update: 2021-06-10
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Format : pdf
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Sub-title: Just as during the decades-long civil war and recent elections, Myanmar’s ethnic minorities will be pivotal in the post-coup status quo
Description: "The diverse ethnic minorities in Myanmar have a long and often troubled history with the Burmese military that seized power in Myanmar on February 1, 2021, spanning across the bloody civil war, as well as the country’s democratic reforms in the past decade. Ethnic relations and the delicate, changing balances of power between the Bamar majority, the Tatmadaw, the civilian government officials, and amongst themselves have long dictated the reality and prospects of Myanmar’s politics, peace, and prosperity. In this policy paper, Michael Martin, a long-time Myanmar expert, traces the history of ethnic minorities in the 2008 constitution, the three ensuing parliamentary elections, and now the fluid and contentious political environment after the February 1 coup. Martin outlines three potential outcomes for the future of Myanmar, either federal democracy, fragmentation, or military power consolidation—all of whose outcomes intrinsically depend on the complex political and security dynamics of the ethnic minorities dispersed across the country.....About this Series: This paper is part of Stimson’s Civil-Military Relations in Myanmar series, which seeks to analyze the complex relationship between the civilian and military sides of the Burmese government and the implications for the country’s future peace and development. Since the founding of the country, the Burmese military, or Tatmadaw, has held a unique and privileged status across institutions of power. And despite movement toward democracy in the past decade, the relationship between the civilian and military sides remains deeply unsettled. This contest for power and the political, security, and constitutional crises it creates have had far-reaching effects on Myanmar’s political processes, its ongoing civil war, the Rohingya crisis, and regional peace and stability—a reality most recently and poignantly seen in the 2021 coup d’état staged by the Tatmadaw against the civilian government. The series brings together the expertise of leading experts on Myanmar, Southeast Asia, democratization, and policy to uncover the complex dynamics between the two sides. The series provides key insights and recommendations for disentangling the contentious relationship and charting a path forward for relevant stakeholders in Myanmar. More than three months have passed since Senior General Min Aung Hlaing and the Tatmadaw staged their palace coup in Myanmar (Burma), setting up a new military junta entitled the State Administrative Council (SAC). The actions of the nation’s ethnic minorities1 and their associated ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) will be critical if Min Aung Hlaing and the SAC are to be defeated, either by political or military means. The failure to secure the support of the ethnic minorities and their EAOs could either doom the people of Myanmar to many more years of oppressive military rule or lead to the fragmentation of the nation into several smaller sovereign states. To properly appreciate the importance of Myanmar’s ethnic minorities and their EAOs to the nation’s future requires an examination of the country’s political developments since 2010, Min Aung Hlaing’s decision to depose the civilian side of the hybrid civilian-military Union Government, and the role of the ethnic minorities and their EAOs in determining Myanmar’s future. However, in order to understand why the ethnic minorities and the EAOs are so critical to Myanmar’s future, it is necessary to first examine the Tatmadaw’s original plan for the political transition of Myanmar into a “flourishing and disciplined democracy.”2.....The Tatmadaw’s Plan for Myanmar’s Political Transition: On August 30, 2003, Prime Minister General Khin Nyunt announced that Myanmar’s military junta, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), would undertake a “seven-point roadmap for democracy.” 3 The roadmap called for the reconvening of a constitutional convention that was suspended in 1996, the drafting of a new constitution for the nation, the adoption of the constitution in a national referendum, the holding of nationwide parliamentary elections, and the transfer of power from the SPDC to the new government.4..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: The Stimson Center
2021-06-03
Date of entry/update: 2021-06-07
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Format : pdf
Size: 251.04 KB (18 pages)
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Sub-title: Fostering the untapped potential of Myanmar’s youth
Description: "In January 2017, State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi gathered 18 young people from across Myanmar for a Peace Talk in Nay Pyi Taw. These youth, representing a range of ethnic identities, shared their fears, hopes, and insights on how to transform conflict into peace, and how to build trust between, and within, communities. While the Peace Talk was considered by some to be symbolic rather than substantive, the meeting brought the issue of youth inclusion to the fore and reaffirmed previous statements delivered by State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi calling for greater engagement of youth in peace.8 Throughout Myanmar’s history young men and women have been active at the community level in activities ranging from youth-led social affairs groups (Tha-yay Nar-yay ah thin) to supporting social and community projects such as free funeral and wedding services, cultural activities, blood donations, among many others. In the more formal peacebuilding sphere, youth have supported and sustained peacebuilding processes but have rarely featured in formal, influential public decision- making roles. In the lead up to the partial signing of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) in October 2015, young men and women were the backbone of Government and Ethnic Armed Organisation (EAO) coordination structures, but were never selected as formal negotiators. Furthermore, key documents guiding formal peacebuilding efforts in Myanmar — such as the NCA and the Framework for Political Dialogue — do not contain provisions related to youth inclusion. These documents also do not consider youth as a cross-cutting issue across thematic discussions. In other words, speeches and statements articulating the importance of youth inclusion have yet to be matched by inclusion strategies and structures that secure the meaningful engagement of young people in the future of their country. While low levels of youth inclusion in public decision-making persist, there is an opportunity to capitalise on nascent youth policy commitments and harness the contributions of youth leaders, innovators, facilitators, and policy-advocates to increase the likelihood of reaching sustainable peace in the country. Global evidence shows that broadening public participation – including to young people – in peace increases the prospects for it lasting.9 Empowering young peacebuilders has also been shown to create active citizens for peace, to reduce violence and to increase peaceful cohabitation.10 With the passing of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2250 on Youth, Peace and Security (YPS) in 2015, there is also potential for Myanmar to lead globally and set good practice for sustainably increasing the involvement of young people at all levels of decision-making, policy-making and peacebuilding. Myanmar youth are contributing formally and informally to a host of peacebuilding initiatives; leveraging these contributions, often innovative and catalytic in their approaches, can support the multiple transitions the country is undergoing. Bringing the role of young people to the forefront of Myanmar’s transition also builds on Myanmar’s history where students and youth movements have influenced the trajectory of the country. This Discussion Paper provides a starting point for understanding the status of youth inclusion in peacebuilding in Myanmar. In Section 1, this Discussion Paper assesses the involvement of youth and inclusion of youth perspectives in peace at both national and sub-national levels since 2011. Section 2 analyses the challenges young women and men face to their substantive involvement in peacebuilding. Section 3 draws upon national and international good practice, articulating a strategic framework for action to overcome obstacles discussed in Section 2. (For a detailed overview of the methodology used to inform this Paper, see Annex 2.) opportunities and challenges to young men. Other identity factors often supersede age-related identity. Thus, when discussing youth in Myanmar, it is critical to understand other elements of identity that intersect with age, such as: gender, ethnicity, religion, class, disability, Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Intersex, and Questioning (LGBTIQ), migration, nationality, drug use, among others..."
Source/publisher: Paung Sie Facility, UKaid, SWEDEN, Australian Aid
2017-01-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-05-12
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Format : pdf
Size: 1.86 MB (72 pages)
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Description: "It is saddening to see that it had resorted to armed conflict during a time of political change and that the Karen National Union (KNU) will be looking to seek solutions through dialogue, said the ethnic armed group's chief General Saw Mu Tu Say Poe on May 10, April 2021 via a statement. The statement and the signature of the KNU chief has been confirmed by other top level officers of the KNU. "Yes. It is his opinion for the peace of the union," said a top-brass member of the KNU. The statement urges the rest that are involved to follow the policies as indicated in the National Ceasefire Act (NCA). It also says that the KNU is a group that had, for years, working toward through taking up arms to achieve equality and betterment for the Karen people and that through political dialogues aimed at regional development and peace that it was able to sign on to the NCA. KNU, together with other ethnic armed groups, signed the NCA on October 15, 2015. There have been multiple battles between the Tatmadaw (military) and the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), specifically the KNLA's Division 5. The KNLA is an armed organisation under the KNU and battles against the military had sent many locals in those areas to flee into Thailand..."
Source/publisher: "Eleven Media Group" (Myanmar)
2021-05-10
Date of entry/update: 2021-05-10
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Format : pdf
Size: 65.24 KB
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Topic: Myanmar, ethnic conflict, civil war, ceasefires, landgrabbing
Topic: Myanmar, ethnic conflict, civil war, ceasefires, landgrabbing
Description: "ABSTRACT: A reform process initiated in 2011 in Myanmar brought hope to end decades of civil war and ethnic conflict. But new ceasefires have not moved into real political dialogue, the ‘peace process’ has stalled, and fighting continues in parts of the country. Economic reforms have favoured foreign investment and local elites, and have had detrimental impacts on communities in ethnic borderlands. The new ceasefires facilitated this, and coupled with economic reforms brought loss of land and related natural resources, and strengthened the central government and the military’s political and economic control over ethnic borderlands. This article argues that this is a continuation of the ‘neither war nor peace’ policy of a previous round of ceasefires in the 1990s, but by different means. In the past this focused on coercion and military pressure, but now these military tactics have been complemented with the use of the new legal framework.....Introduction: Myanmar has suffered from ethnic conflict and civil war since independence in 1948, and the national armed forces (known as the Tatmadaw) have played a dominant role in national politics since it staged a coup d’etat in 1962. In 2011, a reform process started that brought hope at home and abroad that finally a political solution could be found at the negotiation table to more than sixty years of armed conflict. Almost a decade later, newly agreed ceasefires have not moved into real political dialogue, the so-called ‘peace process’ has all but stalled, and fighting continues in many parts of the country, causing new displacement of the civilian population. Meanwhile, economic reforms initiated in the same period favouring foreign investment and local elites have had detrimental impacts on rural communities in ethnic borderlands.1 The new ceasefires have played a large role in facilitating these negative consequences. Rather than bringing peace and inclusive development that respects and promotes social justice and local customs, the ceasefires and economic reforms have brought loss of land and related natural resources and the destruction of local cultures. Legal reforms have further paved the way for these negative developments. This article analyses why the new ceasefires have not transformed into a lasting political settlement, by comparing them with previous ceasefire attempts and by placing them into the larger conflict dynamics in Myanmar. It will explain the impact of these failed ceasefires on the right to land for rural communities in the ethnic borderlands. It will show how the ceasefires and the economic reforms strengthened the central government and Tatmadaw’s military, political and economic control over ethnic borderlands. It is argued that what is being experienced currently is a continuation of the ‘neither war nor peace’ policy of the first round of ceasefires in the 1990s (Kramer 2009a), but by different means. While in the previous round of ceasefires this involved mostly coercion and military pressure, in the present times these military tactics have been complemented with the use of the country’s new legal framework..."
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Source/publisher: The Journal of Peasant Studies via Routledge (London)
2020-12-09
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-27
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Format : pdf
Size: 1.68 MB
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Description: "Myanmar faces a number of significant stabilisation challenges including frequent natural disasters, environmental challenges and organised crime, in addition to the challenges associated with a nascent democratisation process. This report, however, focuses exclusively on violent conflict and displacement. Myanmar has been afflicted by armed conflict since independence. During the 1960s-1980s, a number of armed groups were able to establish ‘effectively independent micro-states’ (EC, 2016, p. 3). These had their own ‘rudimentary’ governments, service provision, and foreign policies (EC, 2016, p. 3). This situation persists in some parts of Myanmar (EC, 2016, p. 3). The communities currently most at risk of, and affected by, conflict and violence are those living in the Kokang Self-Administered Zone and in other parts of northern Shan State. Other affected communities include those living in Kachin, Rakhine, Chin and Kayin States. The community most affected by the threat of forced displacement is the Rohingya, a Muslim ethnic group, in Rakhine State. The nature of conflict in these areas ranges from occasional to frequent clashes between armed groups and government forces. In addition to armed conflict, Rakhine State suffers from tensions between the Muslim and Buddhist communities. There were more than 700,000 internally displaced people (IDPs) in Myanmar in 2016 (McConnachie, 2016, p. 4). Moreover, more than 128,000 refugees from Myanmar were living in Thailand in 2014 (UNICEF, 2014, p. 3). According to UNICEF, displacement can constitute a driver of conflict, depending on whether it is forced or not, and on the extent to which host communities are prepared for IDPs. Women and children are reportedly disproportionately affected by migration and displacement, and make up the majority of those who are IDPs and refugees (ibid). The literature identifies a number of sources of resilience in Myanmar, which include:  Institutionalisation of peace-making: Both the previous and current governments declared their commitment to ending conflict in Myanmar. A number of peace initiatives and inter-faith dialogues have taken place in order to mitigate tensions and conflict in the country.  Economy: Myanmar’s economy has considerable potential. A number of economic reforms have been undertaken and economic growth is strong, although it has been slowing recently.  Strengthened civil society: The previous government’s decision to allow issue-driven CSOs to operate in Myanmar has led to a proliferation of such organisations.  Education: The previous government undertook steps to reform the education system in Myanmar in a bid to end discrimination against ethnic minorities.  Release of political prisoners: A significant number of political prisoners have been released since the new National League for Democracy (NLD) led government came to power.  Increased press freedom: Extensive media reform has resulted in a proliferation of ‘alternative’ information and has rendered the government subject to increased scrutiny. The literature identifies a number of policy options for mitigating tensions in Myanmar. International actors could potentially provide support and assistance in a number of areas. These include technical support for the conclusion, implementation and monitoring of ceasefire agreements, and support for an inclusive national political dialogue. They also include various forms of assistance for recovery and development, as well as support for educational reform. There is a sizeable body of literature on Myanmar’s stabilisation challenges. This consists of a mixture of peer-reviewed journal articles, policy briefs, and reports by NGOs and international organisations. While gender is not addressed in all of the papers reviewed for the purposes of this report, a number of papers do look at gender, specifically in the context of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), and in the context of peace-making and peacebuilding..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Governance and Social Development Resource Centre
2017-05-02
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-21
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Format : pdf
Size: 334.77 KB
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Sub-title: An EBO commentary on the ICG’s ‘Rebooting Myanmar’s Stalled Peace Process’
Description: "The following paper has been written in response to the International Crisis Group’s latest Report No.308/Asia of 19 June 2020, ‘Rebooting Myanmar’s Stalled Peace Process’ and is designed to further complement and put forward some of our conclusions to facilitate further discourse. ICG’s Executive Summary The Panglong-21 peace conference would be largely symbolic and do little to address the fundamental obstacles on Myanmar’s road toward sustainable peace… the primary objectives for both sides are modest. The NLD sees the Panglong-21 meeting mostly as a way to boost its political campaign, while ethnic armed groups want to ensure that the peace process continues after the vote, regardless of who comes to power. The ICG fails to understand that ensuring the peace process continues after the elections is not symbolic and it is not a modest objective. It would be a very significant achievement. The Tatmadaw has never believed in negotiations and still does not. In 2011, for the first time in over sixty-four years, Thein Sein, decided to try to find a political solution to the civil war. If the talks do not continue after the elections, it means a return to war. The Commander-in-Chief has in the recent past stated that the peace talks must end by 2020 and that the ethnic forces must be either disbanded or demobilized. Aung San Suu Kyi has also said that she wants the peace talks to end by 2020. If both of them can be made to agree to continue the peace talks beyond 2020, it would be a major achievement indeed. The election period, however, will also be an opportunity to reflect on how to take the peace process forward… The current government, the military and ethnic armed groups should use this period to review their own strategy and goals, ramp up informal dialogue and examine crucial issues that have so far been put aside, such as the growth of the illicit economy and the mounting might of military-aligned militias… This downtime constitutes a unique opportunity for all parties to reflect on how to restart the process with a more constructive approach in 2021. The downtime may apply to the government and the Tatmadaw. ICG has mistakenly assumed that the ethnic armed organizations (like the government) have been idle during the two-year period when the peace talks were deadlocked (2018 and 2019). The ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) have been very busy reviewing their strategy and goals, having intense internal dialogue and examining crucial issues in order to see how they can be addressed in a way that will be acceptable to all stakeholders. They do not want to go back to war and are committed to trying to find political solutions. They have not had, and will not be having, any downtime. The problem lies with the government and the Tatmadaw..."
Source/publisher: Euro Burma Office
2020-06-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-12
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Sub-title: The need for a combined Ethnic approach in the 2020 election
Description: "Many expected the 2016 election which saw Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy gain power to be a major step forward, not only towards democracy but also ethnic equality. Such hopes now seem somewhat misguided in retrospect, with many ethnic political parties feeling abandoned by the NLD and especially Aung San Suu Kyi, therefore the 2020 election will allow ethnic representatives to redress the balance at the ballot box. The NLD had been able to win the majority of seats in ethnic states based largely on the iconography of its leader and the perception that she would rule justly. While the ethnic political parties had been able to secure seats in Rakhine and Shan states, their power was largely curtailed by the NLD appointing non-ethnic State Ministers, or those with NLD loyalties. The winning ethnic political party representatives were forced to accept NLD appointments and the NLD largely ignored ethnic political parties in the governing process. During by-elections in 2018, the NLD retained its overall parliamentary majority but lost several seats previously held in minority-dominant areas. According to NLD spokesman Myo Nyunt, We lost five out of six seats in ethnic areas. Ethnic people are not satisfied with our performance on the peace process . . . This result is a lesson for us. We will come up with a strategy for each constituency for the coming election.1 While the NLD appears to be insistent on tying its electoral future, and its ability to retain ethnic votes, to the peace process, it is unlikely to see progress made on the issue before the election date. The NLD turning its back on ethnic political parties (EPPs) has not gone down well with ethnic leaders and as the election draws nearer, they need to rally their constituents around ethnic aspirations. Also, what needs to be taken into account, is the fact that it is not necessarily in the military’s best interests to have the NLD in power for another four years as the NLD continues to try to chip away at the military-drafted constitution. Already, pro-military demonstrations have taken place in Yangon seeking to prevent constitutional amendments that would weaken the military’s 25% grip on power in the legislature.2 It would, therefore, be better for the military, and the Union Solidarity Development Party (USDP) the most likely challenger to the NLD, to delay the peace process until after November regardless of current constraints due to the COVID-19 pandemic. While some ethnic political parties have seemingly learnt from the mistakes in the last election and have organised along state lines, joining together to create united fronts, large scale communication strategies need to be implemented putting forward the benefits of ensuring a much larger voice for ethnic representation in the governance of the country..."
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2020-04-00
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Description: "The current tripartite (government/Tatmadaw, EAOs, and political parties) Framework for Political Dialogue in the peace process was based on an assumption of ethnic unity, not to mention, a unified stance between the government and Tatmadaw, and amongst the political parties. However, this unity remains more of an ideal in all three cases, rather than an actuality. It was widely expected that the EAOs would at least have similar aspirations on what the future federal union would look like. But past years have shown that this assumption was inaccurate. The more substantive and detailed the negotiations have become, the more divided and fragmented the EAOs have turned out to be. This fragmentation could not only be seen between the different EAOs (horizontal fragmentation) but also potentially within the EAOs (vertical fragmentation). At the horizontal level, different factions have emerged indicating the groups’ different interests and the different realities each group is trying to cope with. Particularly, the division is clear between the Ethnic Armed Organisation – Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement Signatory groups (EAO NCA-S) and the EAO NCA Non-Signatory groups (EAO NCA-NS), currently consisting of the Northern Alliance, and the Karenni National Progress Party (KNPP). Horizontal Fragmentation – NCA Non-Signatories: Within the Northern Alliance (NA) 1, federalism is not a key issue. The United Wa State Army (UWSA) and the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA – Mong La) have never articulated a desire for federalism. In fact, the two organizations, the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP), and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (originally formed in 1989, forcibly disbanded by the Tatmadaw and its proxy in 2009, and re-emerged in 2014), which is a member of the NA’s splinter Three Brotherhood Alliance, are offshoots of the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) which collapsed in 1989. The UWSA and NDAA managed to not only continue operating but to also secure their territories through a ceasefire (‘gentlemen’s agreement’) brokered by intelligence chief Khin Nyunt. Rather than a federal Union, the UWSA would likely be more comfortable with a one-country, twosystems arrangement – a reverse of the China-Hong Kong situation where a Communist country tolerates a democratic enclave, i.e., a democratic country tolerating a Communist enclave. Chinese officials have informally suggested that unless and until the Myanmar economy catches up with that of Wa State, they do not see how Wa State could integrate into the Myanmar system. In the case of Hong Kong, China’s economy has caught up with that of Hong Kong, and the process of trying to integrate the democratic enclave into the main system has begun. Given their background, the NDAA and the MNDAA might have similar aspirations albeit with less chance of succeeding. The situation of the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP), however, may be more complicated. Its ideology may be more aligned with its three ex-CPB colleagues, but it cannot afford to be seen as not supporting the cause of Shan nationalism. If it did, it would lose popular support to its competitor, the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), which in its opinion is using its legal status in the peace process (and NCA) with the government to encroach on both its territory and legitimacy. The Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) which like the UWSA enjoyed from 1995, 17 years of a pretty autonomous existence until 2011, might like a similar arrangement but not being Communist, it does not enjoy the same kind of patronage from China as the USWA does. And with the Kachin State being a signatory of the original 1947 Panglong Agreement, the KIO has thrown in its lot with the groups demanding ‘genuine’ federalism. However, what constitutes ‘genuine’ federalism is a point of contention. Not being an NCA signatory, it is also hampered in trying to ensure that its version of ‘genuine’ federalism is reflected in the 21st Century Panglong peace talks. Unlike its ‘big brothers’ in the NA, the Arakan Army (formed in 2009) and a member of the NAsplinter, the Three Brotherhood Alliance, is demanding confederate status for Rakhine State,2 The position on federalism of the remaining NA member, the Ta-ang National Liberation Army (current iteration formed in 2009 with military activities starting 2011), is unclear. It definitely wants equality and autonomy for the Ta-ang people, but how that can be achieved within a federal system and within Shan State where the Ta-ang people live, has not yet been articulated or made public. It is also continuing to clash with both the Tatmadaw and the RCSS. The last NCA Non-Signatory, the Karenni National Progress Party (KNPP), has also like the KIO, thrown in its lot with the groups demanding ‘genuine’ federalism. However, in terms of its true aspiration, the KNPP harks back to 1875 when the British recognized the sovereignty of the Karenni States. Recognizing the difficulty of claiming independence, ‘genuine’ federalism is seen as the next best-case scenario, however, it would likely opt for confederation like the AA if that option were open. But not being an NCA signatory, like the KIO, it is also hampered in trying to ensure that its version of ‘genuine’ federalism or confederation is reflected in the 21st Century Panglong peace talks..."
Source/publisher: Euro Burma Office
2020-08-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-12
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Sub-title: The continued use of Militias in Shan State
Description: "On March 26, the Tatmadaw abolished one of its local proxy armies, the Khawngkha militia, amid accusations that some of its leaders were involved in the illegal drugs trade, or had failed to inform the authorities about drug trafficking in the area.1 Since the 1950s, various Myanmar Governments have officially created and sanctioned the operations of militia forces in the county’s ethnic states. These groups have been used primarily as a military force to fight against ceasefire and non-ceasefire ethnic groups, to control the lives of ethnic populations, and to further secure the country’s border areas. These militias quickly became notorious for taxing the local population, drug trafficking, illegal gambling, and a wide variety of human rights abuses. They have been allowed to do this with the express permission of local military commanders who have themselves allegedly earned money from the variety of illegal activities that the groups operate. Article 340 of the 2008 constitution states that: With the approval of the National Defence and Security Council, the Defence Services has the authority to administer the participation of the entire people in the Security and Defence of the Union. The strategy of the people’s militia shall be carried out under the leadership of the Defence Services. The Kawngkha Militia had previously been the 4th Brigade of the Kachin Independence Army and was based out of its headquarters at Kawngkha, eight miles east of Kutkai, and was responsible for a largely Kachin area north of Lashio town. It opened a number of refineries in the area and was responsible for the transhipment of heroin north to the border of Manipur State. In addition to its narcotics involvement, it also derived some of its income by operating a number of gambling dens.2 In 1991 it signed a ceasefire with government forces before becoming a People’s Militia Force (PMF) in 2010. The Myanmar Army had attempted, unsuccessfully, to get the KDA to surrender all of its weapons in May 2010 after Yaw Chang Fa, the KDA treasury official and Bang Hpik village military officer was involved in a shootout with Police and Special Branch. Yaw Chang Fa and his troops had opened fire on the officials on the road between Mung Hawm and Bang Hpik villages when they illegally arrested villagers from Bang Hpik and took them to Mung Hawm police station. Six were shot dead, seven fatally injured and three were detained. Consequently, more than 300 Myanmar soldiers from Infantry Battalion No. 45, No. 241 and No. 242 from Kutkai Township surrounded the KDA’s Kawngkha HQ. and asked for Yaw Chang Fa to be handed over. Yaw Chang Fa and a number of KDA troops fled..."
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Source/publisher: Euro Burma Office
2020-06-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-12
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Sub-title: The Peace Process Steering Team’s role in the peace process
Description: "On October 15, 2015, the government led by the then president U Thein Sein and eight ethnic armed groups signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement. The original signatories were the PNLO, the Karen National Union (KNU), the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), the Chin National Front (CNF), All Burma Students Democratic Front (ABSDF), Arakan Liberation Party (ALP), the Karen Nation Union Peace Council (KNUPC) and the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA). The original eight groups would be later joined, in February 2018, by the New Mon State Party (NMSP) and the Lahu Democratic Union (LDU). To ensure a common negotiating position the original eight groups formed the Peace Process Steering Team on 26 March 2016 under the leadership of General Mutu Say Poe of the KNU and General Yawd Serk of the RCSS as deputy leader. The team stated, Purpose: 1. to provide leadership (guidance and supervision) when meeting with non-signatory groups and the new government. 2. provide direction when making urgent decisions. 3. direct projects for the JMC (Joint Monitoring Committee) and the UPDJC (Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee) Guidelines: 1. Convening of NCA signatory EAOs, together with observers and technical advisors, totalling 79 persons; 2. Reassess NCA implementation; 3. Welcome the new government for its peace commitment and the EAOs readiness to cooperate: 4. The necessity for all EAOs to participate and be represented in the forthcoming 2nd Union Peace Conference; 5. Believe in the need for all EAOs’ enthusiastic participation until an agreement to form a federal union is achieved through political negotiations; 6. The formation of EAO Peace Process Steering Team (EAO PPST); and 7. Pledge to adhere to the NCA and cooperate with the new regime and the Tatmadaw (Military) to implement the agreement.1 Two days later on March 28 2016, at the 2nd EAO-8 summit, the Delegation for EAO Unity (DEU) led by Khaing Soe Naing Aung with members including Padoh Kwe Htoo Win, Than Khe, Saw Kyaw Nyunt, Lian Sakhong, Dr Sui Khar and Mi Su Pwint. The purpose of the DEU was ostensibly to focus on further discussions with non-signatories EAOs and meetings with the then United Nationalities Federal Council’s Delegation for Political Negotiation (DPN) about how both can work together under an NLD government.2 Numerous meetings have taken place between the PPST and the Myanmar Peace Centre (MPC) prior to the election, and the NLD’s successor peace broker the National Reconciliation and Peace Centre (NRPC). The PPST has actively involved itself in the various Union Peace Conferences that have taken place under the auspices of the NLD government. The first UPC saw 73 proposals made but resulted in no agreements. The second saw agreement on 37 points, and the third UPC on 14 points. The agreement or Union Accord currently covers political, economy, social, land and environment categories, however, a major sticking point has been with the composition of a single armed force and the ethnic states non-cessation. However general dissatisfaction with the peace process and perceived disagreements within the organisation itself led to the KNU suspending its participation in the NCA process,3 . . . in order to create meaningful participation of the organization in the peace process and to seek enough time for the creation of the unified participation of the whole organization.4 In response to what was perceived to be a lack of movement on the peace process, General Mutu resigned his position in the PPST in March 2019. He was replaced by KNU Secretary-General Ta Doh Moo. General Mutu was quoted as saying the peace process had deviated from the goal of creating a federal democratic union that includes ethnic equality and rights of autonomy.5 He also noted that The ethnic armed organizations that comprise the PSST have common goals for reaching a federal system, but their views on what kind of federal system they want differ from those of the ethnic armies implementing the terms of the NCA. 6 The PPST also formed a working group to discuss with government officials three agenda items outlined in a letter to Aung San Suu Kyi and Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. These issues related to earlier assurances by Min Aung Hlaing to secure peace by 2020 and by Aung San Suu Kyi that three Union Peace Conference sessions would be held in 2019; a review and renegotiation of all NCA mechanisms to ensure they are fair for all parties; and the formation of a consensus among differing opinions on the degree of federalism.7 In May 2019, the PPST held its fourth conference, which included the participation of the KNU and formed two working groups with one group responsible for addressing the deadlock and federal issues while another group would work on the structure of all-inclusive participation.8 At the same meeting, EAO leaders discussed the possibility of transforming the Peace Process Steering Team (PPST) into the Peace Process Consultative Meeting (PPCM), but there were disagreements on how or if this should take place.9..."
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Source/publisher: Euro Burma Office
2020-01-00
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Description: "Despite a ceasefire that began on 10 May and the COVID-19 pandemic, low-intensity conflict continued throughout 2020. The Union Peace Conference 21st Century Panglong (UPC) was held from 17-19 August 2020, and while there remains far to go, the general outcome of the meeting was treated favourably by several ethnic leaders and it is hoped there will be a stronger basis for future talks in 2021. That said, however, intermittent clashes continued in some ethnic states throughout the year and there is little to suggest that such clashes in some states will stop as peace negotiations continue in 2021. Skirmishes occurred in Karen State largely in areas controlled by the Karen National Liberation Army Brigade-5 area (Mutraw District). Clashes have largely been linked to the Myanmar military’s construction of a road linking Kyaukkyi in Bago Region and into Papun. The reconstruction of the old road originally began in early 2018. The construction was halted temporarily but has since resumed. The KNU has claimed that the reconstruction of the road would allow further Myanmar military (Tatmadaw) expansion into KNU controlled areas, while the Myanmar military has said that existing roads need to be upgraded or they will deteriorate.1 In large part, the reason for such continued clashes is the interpretation by both sides of clauses in the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement. On December 1, 2020, the KNLA’s 5th Brigade issued a statement expressing its impatience with the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement. According to Brigadier General Tamala Taw the 5th Brigade G1, Even though we have signed the NCA, there has been no implementation, particularly, of the NCA Chapter 3 and Article 25 of Chapter 6. None of these issues – ceasefire areas, deployment of troops, the common definition of some terms used in the NCA, and the avoidance of using the public spaces mentioned in the NCA as military outposts or encampments – these have never been discussed. The lack of discussion of the interim period in the NCA Article 25 of Chapter 6 has led to a decline in trust. In the bilateral meeting of KNU and the Myanmar government in 2012, there was a KNLA proposal for the relocation of military bases from civilian areas and troop routes to be moved. We have been waiting for this to happen for more than eight years now, but so far no action has been taken, so it leaves us in a state of despair. This has been seen as giving the military a huge advantage in the ground – trust has now been further eroded.2..."
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Source/publisher: Euro Burma Office
2021-01-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-12
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Sub-title: Moving forward after the election
Description: "After the Myanmar peace process had been deadlocked from the end of 2018 until the beginning of 2020 the Government of Aung San Suu Kyi along with the military and a number of armed ethnic organisations (EAOs) were able to hold another Union Peace Conference 21st Century Panglong (UPC) from 17-19 August 2020. State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi had made resolving peace with the many armed ethnic groups in the country a priority after coming to power in 2015. And both the State Counsellor and Commanderin-Chief of the armed forces, Snr. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing had voiced an opinion that talks must restart prior to the 2020 general election. Several criticisms have been made about the results of the UPC which saw representatives from all 10 Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement-signatory EAOs participate. Invitations had also been offered to non-signatory EAOs from Kachin (KIA), Wa (UWSA), Kokang (MNDAA), Mong La (NDAA), and Shan (SSPP) in the northeast, but all declined due to the exclusion of the Arakan Army (AA) which the government has designated a terrorist organisation. Regardless, the talks continued with the adoption of a further 20 principles for the Union Accords (UA), and an agreement among the parties to continue formal peace talks with the incoming government in 2021. While some believe there were no substantive results from the UPC, 1 the fact is that the UPC meeting has led to the reinvigoration of a stalled peace process and allowed further time for EAOs to reconsider their position in moving forward. At least one participant, Sai Leng from the Restoration Council Shan State Army, pointed out that, It is meaningful to agree on how to build a federal union beyond 2020. We also agreed on some guiding principles of building the federal union, such as power-sharing between Union and States,2 Similarly, the State Counsellor said the peace process was now back on track and the principles signed were “more sincere and have more substance.”3 Lieutenant General Yar Pyae, the military delegate and chairman of the Joint Monitoring Committee on the nationwide ceasefire, Now we can draw a conclusion that countless negotiations have reduced the mistrust that has been deep-rooted on both sides . . . [stakeholders] should not leave the negotiation table, whatever the reason.4 According to one EAO advisor, one of the more important points was that, Part 3.3 (a) Power, resource, tax and finance will be divided between the Union and regions/states in line with the federal system (official translation). But he also noted, [But] Some observers have pointed out that it was only a repetition of UA#1 (political sector) 4 (d). But according to the negotiators, the difference is the emphasis shown here, which was not in UA#1. Therefore, they [ethnic leaders] say, the key to a federal union is now open. Accordingly, it can be regarded as a second breakthrough after the NCA.5 Another negotiator in the talks had suggested that the talks were ‘more disappointing’ but expressed the desire to move forward regardless.6..."
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Source/publisher: Euro Burma Office
2020-11-00
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Sub-title: Challenging Christianity in Wa Special Region
Description: "On 13 September 2018, Myanmar’s largest non-state armed actor, the United Wa State Army (UWSA), issued a statement saying it was curtailing the practising of Christianity. The statement said that all churches built after 1992 would be destroyed as they had been built illegally and that only churches built between 1989 and 1992 were legal. It also noted that authorities would also check on the number of Christian schoolteachers and students in the region.1 In addition, it also said authorities would monitor the activities of organizations that support churches in the region and Evangelical Christians would not be allowed to proselytize at schools.2 Only ethnic Wa would be allowed to train as religious leaders, and they would be under the authority of the UWSA central government. Myanmar media quoted Kachin Baptist Convention (KBC) chairman Rev. Samson as saying that that action had been prompted by the work of ‘extremist missionaries’ and, You can’t call them typical Christians. They are just people who want to attack established churches. They are against what we Christians believe.3 According to another media report, the UWSA detained 92 Lahu Christian leaders and 42 Wa students in Shan State, and the students were forced to serve as soldiers.4 There is an estimated 221,000 Lahu living in Myanmar - 80% of whom are Christians with 43% believed to be Evangelical.5 In a statement dated Sept. 25, Lahu Baptist Convention (LBC) said that 52 churches had been closed and stripped of all Christian symbols. Three other churches were demolished, and religious schools shut down, the LBC is based in Kengtung, eastern Shan. In addition, to closing down LBC churches the UWSA have also closed those operated by the Kachin Baptist Convention and the Wa Baptist Convention. On 5 October, 100 ethnic Wa Christians the UWSA had detained were freed, but the group continued to hold more than 100 ethnic Lahu Christians..."
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Source/publisher: Euro Burma Office
2019-01-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-11
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Sub-title: The UWSA and Statehood
Description: "Once again, the leader of the United Wa State Party/United Wa State Army (UWSP/UWSA) Bao Youxiang has reiterated his call for state recognition of the Wa self-administered zone this time at the organisation’s 30th anniversary. During his speech in the Wa capital of Panghsang, on northern Shan State’s border with China, the chairman apparently told the assembled that Wa state is an inalienable part of the Union of Myanmar, and solemnly promised not to split from it or seek independence.1 In his speech, he was reported as saying, What we need is ethnic equality, ethnic dignity, ethnic autonomy, and we ask the government to give the Wa an autonomous ethnic state; then we will fight for our lives . . . Until our political demands are realized, we will hold high the banner of peace and democracy on one hand, and armed self-defence on the other, and maintain the status quo. 2 The success of the UWSA and its ability to maintain an all but in name autonomous state in Myanmar is largely due to its support from China. The UWSA is especially supported by members of the PLA and Yunnan Province administration. 3 Many Chinese advisers, including Chinese intelligence officers and former PLA personnel, are close to the Wa leadership, and the UWSA often echoes official Chinese talking points. China’s links with the Wa are also strengthened by language, investment, communications, and transport, all of which are linked to Yunnan. 4 While other armed ethnic groups up until the 1990s had also been able to maintain semiautonomous enclaves, the Karen especially, bordering Thailand, this ended when the Thai Government warmed to successive Myanmar military governments. As a result, pressure was put on such groups to acquiesce to the then government, the NMSP ceasefire being an obvious case. The UWSA had not previously maintained ethnic aspirations but was borne out of the collapse of the Communist Party of Burma and is largely a political construct underscored by ethnicity. Khin Nyunt after signing a ceasefire with the group used it to fight against the Mong Tai Army (MTA) and in doing so it was able to take over large swathes of Shan territory north and south of Kengtung which they still control today and see as part of a future Wa State. After signing the 1989 ceasefire agreement, the UWSA used money from the narcotics trade and invested in a number of casinos, hotels, and other entertainment enterprises. One of the five largest banks in Myanmar, Mayflower Bank, prior to its suspension by the Myanmar Government, had been linked to the UWSA and was subsequently accused of money laundering by the U.S. which has designated the UWSA as significant narcotics traffickers under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act. In addition, the UWSA also set up a number of other businesses including the Hongpang Group, founded in 1998, and involved in import/export, general trading, production of textiles, wires and cables, electric appliances and agricultural goods. It is also engaged in livestock breeding, gem mining and highway construction. In addition to its more legitimate concerns, the UWSA has also been implicated in the arms trade supplying not only other Myanmar based ethnic armed groups but also Naga and in the past Maoist rebels. Currently, the group has used proxies such as Ho Chin Ting to invest in enterprises such as Yangon Airways and a chain of hotels in Myanmar, among them the luxurious Thanlwin Hotel in Yangon.5 In reality, the Wa region is a prefecture of China in all but name, despite this, the government has asked the UWSA to sign the NCA, but as head of the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee (FPNCC) alliance which also includes the United League of Arakan/Arakan Army (ULA/AA), Kachin Independence Organization/ Kachin Independence Army (KIO/KIA), Myanmar National Truth and Justice Party/Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNTJP/MNDAA), Palaung State Liberation Front /Ta’ang National Liberation Army (PSLF/TNLA), Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army (SSPP/SSA), Peace and Solidarity Committee/Shan State East National Democratic Alliance Association (PSC/NDAA), many of whom continue to fight with government forces, it has rejected calls to do so unless major changes are made to the agreement.6 While many commentators have generally recognised former CPB organisations on a par with those ethnic armed groups that emerged since 1948, the objectives and most importantly the constructs that define them are not similar. While many in the FPNCC believe that the UWSA shares the same over-arching objective in ethnic unity for all – it remains unclear as to whether the UWSA see this as a genuine objective or merely a convenient identifier to achieve its own aims. For the UWSA, the overall veneer of ethnic equality is a useful tool towards establishing its own statehood and assuaging doubts about its somewhat controversial past deeds not to mention those alleged in the present. While Bao Youxiang may call for ‘ethnic equality, ethnic dignity, ethnic autonomy’ which is a particularly noble aspiration, it could be argued when conflict occurred in 2009 against the MNDAA it did little to support their brothers in arms with whom they had an alliance.7 Rather, the UWSA moved to secure its own flank and did little else to change the course of the conflict.8..."
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Source/publisher: Euro Burma Office
2019-06-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-11
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Sub-title: Territorial Concerns in Karen and Mon States
Description: "The death, on 17 October, of a Mon National Liberation Army (MNLA) soldier in a clash with troops from the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) furthers highlights territorial concerns that need to be addressed within the peace process and also at a local level. According to reports, the KNLA attacked two MNLA bases in response to what Saw Edward, a spokesman for the KNLA at the Three Pagodas Pass, because,. . . the MNLA destroyed a Karen flag three days ago after his armed group [KNLA] put it up on the dividing line between Karen and Mon territory at Thee Ba Dot. 1Major Nai Aye Mann from the MNLA said the KNLA had put its flag in front of an MNLA base, so it was destroyed, but also asked why the KNLA also attacked another base at Ma Yang Chong if the dispute was just about the flag. The KNLA is the armed wing of the Karen National Union and the MNLA is the armed wing of the New Mon State Party. Both have signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement with the government and have had previous disputes in the past. It had been hoped that with both groups now signatories to the NCA such disputes could easily be negated, but such a belief belies the fact that the situation on the ground still remains tense. Somewhat bizarrely, it has been suggested that the KNLA action was undertaken in response to what has been described in the media as the arrest of seven DKBA-splinter group members.2 According to one report, the KNLA was unhappy that the MNLA arrested seven members of the group and seized 11 firearms in an attack on a base, which they said was inside Mon territory, although such a proposition is unlikely to be the case.3 The Mon State government had addressed the DKBA-splinter issue and asked that all members of the group, believed to have around thirty troops, be arrested as ‘insurgents’ according to a statement signed by Colonel Nay Htut Oo, the border and security and affairs minister in Mon State, The group’s intention is to profit politically from creating instability and disrupting the peace process,4 That said, a number of smaller armed ethnic militias, many of which are under Myanmar military control, each with their own vested interests, continue to operate in ethnic areas controlled by NCA-signatory groups further complicating the peace process. But perhaps, more worryingly, regardless of the reasoning for the recent clash, the fact remains that territorial claims, the most likely cause, have yet to be addressed. In an attempt to prevent further conflict, officers from the MNLA and KNLA met at the Three Pagodas Pass on the Thai border and verbally agreed to stop fighting. Major Nai Aye Mann from the MNLA said low-level officers on the ground could not resolve the territorial dispute and future meetings between the groups’ leaders would be needed to end the issue..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Euro Burma Office
2019-11-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-11
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Sub-title: The Role of the KNPP in the Union Peace Process
Description: "Despite the fact that thus far ten groups have signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement1 the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) still maintains a number of reservations in relation to the signing of the agreement. While a number of other groups, primarily situated in Shan State and along the border with China have also held out,2 the fact that the KNPP, one of the remaining members of the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC) has not yet signed is somewhat surprising.3 Given its geographical location between Karen State and Shan State, it had been expected given the signing of the NCA by KNPP allies and UNFC members the New Mon State Party (NMSP) and Lahu Democratic Union (LDU) that the KNPP would also sign. However, the KNPP is still concerned about signing the agreement and attending the Union Peace Conferences that the government initiated to further the peace process. Although a number of doubts remained, the KNPP met with the Government’s Peace Commission for two days on April 26-27, 2018 in Loikaw and agreed on the implementation of bilateral terms through regular discussions at the state level.4 According to a joint statement issued after the meeting, The Karenni National Progressive PartyKNPP has committed to sign the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement-NCA and has agreed to follow the following points in the short term before signing the NCA. (a) Issues concerning holding negotiations at the state level for Local Monitoring Team & JMC issue, movement of troops of both sides and communications to hold regular negotiations between Kayah State Government and the KNPP as agreed by both sides (b) To reassign liaison officers at the state level and Union level to carry it out through the agreed communication channels agreed by both sides at the state level and Union level (c) Progress was achieved in the military sector, and both sides are to proceed with the work as agreed. 3. As the above points were agreed at the Peace Talks, the Karenni National Progressive Party-KNPP hereby announced that it had agreed at the talks to keep on its efforts for signing the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement-NCA.5 The KNPPs Gen Bee Htoo said that while the two sides have not yet been able to reach an understanding on signing the NCA, “It is important to keep peace in Karenni State.”6 One of the main issues of concern for the KNPP was the killing of three of its soldiers and one civilian who was allegedly murdered by Tatmadaw troops at the regional operation command based in Loikaw in December 2017. Although, the Tatmadaw has said it is conducting an inquiry into the incident no further progress has been made. The incident has further weakened trust in relation to the Myanmar military and its presence in Karenni State. Shwe Myo Thant, Secretary of KNPP Central Committee, was quoted as saying The KNPP maintained the bilateral agreement with the government since 2012 but we need to watch the condition of the relationship between us and Tatmadaw,7 To further negotiations, a meeting between the Peace Commission had been planned in May but the Commission cancelled the meeting after the KNPP had asked for further clarification in relation to the subjects to be discussed.8..."
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Source/publisher: Euro Burma Office
2018-11-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-11
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Description: "Since 9 June 2011, Kachin State has seen open conflict between the Kachin Independence Army and the Tatmadaw (Myanmar military). The Kachin Independence Organisation had signed a ceasefire agreement with the regime in 1994 and since then had lived in relative peace until the ceasefire was broken by the Tatmadaw in June 2011. The increased territorial infractions by the Tatmadaw combined with economic exploitation by China in Kachin territory, especially the construction of the Myitsone Hydropower Dam, left the Kachin Independence Organisation with very little alternative but to return to armed resistance to prevent further abuses of its people and their territory’s natural resources. Despite this, however, the political situation since the beginning of hostilities has changed significantly. Although a number of groups agreed to a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement in October 2015, with the continuing conflict in Kachin State, the KIO has sought a number of different methodologies to realise their political aims and secure its people’s legacy. Strategy One – The UNFC Alliance The origins of the UNFC began in May 2010 when three 1990s ceasefire groups, the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO), the New Mon State Party (NMSP), the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP) and three non-ceasefire groups, the Karen National Union (KNU), the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) and the Chin National Front (CNF), formally announced the creation of the Committee for the Emergence of a Federal Union (CEFU). The Committee’s purpose was to consolidate a political front at a time when the ceasefire groups faced perceived imminent attacks by the Tatmadaw. However, in November 2010 shortly after the Myanmar elections, the political grouping was transformed into a military united front. At a conference held from the 12-16 February 2011, CEFU declared its dissolution and the formation of the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC). The UNFC, which was at that time comprised of 12 ethnic organisations1 , stated that: The goal of the UNFC is to establish the future Federal Union (of Myanmar) and the Federal Union Army is formed for giving protection to the people of the country. Shortly after, wide-scale conflict occurred throughout areas controlled by the SSPP and a number of their bases were lost to the Tatmadaw. Then, in June 2011, the KIO ceasefire broke down, resulting in the current conflict in Kachin State. The formation of the UNFC had occurred at a time of increasing uncertainty in relation to how the new Myanmar Government would settle the 1990s ceasefire groups issue. It could be argued that the Tatmadaw’s insistence that the ceasefire groups become Border Guard Forces precipitated the fighting, or that the creation of a military alliance consisting of both ceasefire and non-ceasefire groups precipitated the fighting..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Euro Burma Office
2018-09-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-11
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Sub-title: Ethnic Political Parties and the 2020 elections
Description: "As Myanmar moves towards the 2020 election, ethnic political parties now, more than ever, need to work together and find common ground if they ever want to influence the future politics of the country and ensure ethnic equality. Minority ethnic groups make up a third of the country's 51.5 million people.1 Currently, ethnic politics can be defined as consisting of five main actors: merged ethnic political parties, the NCA non-signatory armed ethnic groups, NCA signatory groups, the Nationalities Brotherhood Forum (NBF), and the United Nationalities Alliance (UNA). All of these groups have divergent interests and it is these interests that may weaken ethnic policymaking in the future. While all groups profess a singular goal – ethnic equality and a genuine federal union, it is how they work together, if they can, that will ultimately decide the future of ethnic representation in the country after the 2020 election. One of the main ethnic alliance is the United Nationalities Alliance which was formed after the 1990 election and was considered one of the most influential and experienced political alliances operating in the country.2 The UNA encompassed a varied spectrum of ethnic political parties, dominated by the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD), which had contested and won seats in the 1990 general election. Originally, in the UNA there were 12 different political parties. Today, there are 15 parties:..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Euro Burma Office
2021-09-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-11
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Description: "The Karen National Union (KNU), alongside the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), were instrumental in encouraging a number of Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) to sign Myanmar’s Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement on 15 October 2015. It was the actions of these two groups and the positions they have held within the armed ethnic resistance movement that allowed for the peace process, no matter how flawed it may be, to move forward. That said, however, despite their support for the process and the current government’s efforts, through the Union Peace Conference, to secure a more permanent peace, both groups have found themselves attacked by the Myanmar military, the Tatmadaw. While such skirmishes were expected initially due to little official demarcation of territory and a lack of conflict solving mechanisms,1 one and a half years later it would appear the Myanmar military is selectively applying the NCA in areas where it operates. Most recently the Tatmadaw has attempted to exert its influence further into the KNU controlled 5th Brigade area of Mutraw (Papun) resulting in human rights abuses, displacement and the unlawful killing of a local environmental activist. The main reason given for the incursion was the reconstruction of an all-weather road, the Bu Hsa Kee Road, connecting the Myanmar military camps at Ler Mu Plaw and Kay Pu. The original road had been built during the Tatmadaw's offensives in 2006 and 2007, Tatmadaw soldiers had the north-south road built to connect their camps, and many small security outposts were built at intervals along the side of the road. According to Free Burma Rangers, roads built by the Myanmar Army served three purposes in the projection and expansion of Myanmar army power and control in Karen State, namely, 1. To resupply and connect camps 2. To more rapidly launch offensives and patrols and 3. To compartmentalise and isolate ethnic communities to better be able to control them within a network of roads and camps..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Euro Burma Office
2018-04-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-11
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Description: "The recent change of leadership within the National Socialist Council of Nagaland – Khaplang (NSCN-K) further draws attention to the future of the group and that of the role it plays not only in Myanmar’s peace process but also the country’s ethnic landscape. 1 On 17 August, the group removed Lt-Gen Khango Konyak, who is a western Naga and an Indian national, from his role as chairman following a three-day meeting from 15-17 August at its HQ in Taga. Konyak, 70, is a Naga of Indian origin and a China-trained rebel, he had taken over as chairman of the NSCN-K after Khaplang died in June 2017 after a prolonged illness.2 He was replaced by Yung Aung, the deputy minister of the NSCN-K defence department, as interim chairman and also the head of the Government of the People’s Republic of Nagaland (GPRN) which holds sway over the Naga inhabited region in Myanmar’s northern Sagaing Division. Yung Aung, 45, is the nephew of the group’s founder SS Khaplang and is a Hemi Naga from Myanmar. The move has been seen by many as an attempt by the Myanmar Naga to expel their Indian brethren. How this will change the situation in regards to the peace processes in India and Myanmar remains unclear. According to reports, Yung Aung has deep links with China and maintains close ties with the United Liberation Front of Asom-Independent (ULFA-I) ‘commander-inchief’ Paresh Baruah and the Manipuri militant leadership.3 According to an NSCN-K statement, Konyak had been impeached because He was found guilty of absolute control of powers and functions without collective leadership, nondistribution of powers and functions exposing a one-man government policy, incompatible traits…4 However, an NSCN-K official based in India said, “For quite some time, Konyak was unable to assume an active role in the organisation and discharge his duties due to his sickness.’ Also, He had been away from Taga for a long time which widened the gulf that existed between him and other top leaders,” 5 In addition, there appear to be some issues in relation to tribal affiliations. A number of senior leaders were unhappy at his appointment. Many of them belong to the Pangmi tribe, a conglomerate of several tribes inhabiting a large area from the border in Arunachal Pradesh to the hills bordering Hukawng Valley in Myanmar. 6..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Euro Burma Office
2018-10-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-11
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Description: "The date for the next Union Peace Conference (UPC) is scheduled for May, but their remains some doubts in regards to the likely achievements to be made. At the beginning of the year, two Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) members showed they were displeased with the process. The Karen National Union (KNU) called for its postponement while the Restoration Council of Shan State suggested it would not attend due to constant obstruction by the Myanmar military of state-level dialogue. Although two more groups, the New Mon State Party (NMSP) and Lahu Democratic Union (LDU) signed the agreement on 13 February a number of other groups are still not prepared to move forward. While such delays and indecision have been indicative of the entire peace process, what needs to be considered, however, is who is likely to gain by yet further delays in the process. There is little doubt that the process has significant flaws, the problems that have plagued it since it was taken over by the NLD-led Government are many. While it is essential that ethnic armed organisation try to ensure they get the best deal possible it must also be noted that the only stakeholder likely to gain through postponement of the process is the Myanmar military, the Tatmadaw, which will see its position strengthened for every delay made..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Euro Burma Office
2018-04-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-11
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Sub-title: The future of the NSCN-K
Description: "In what appeared to be a coordinated effort between the Myanmar and Indian militaries, operations against Indian insurgents on the Indian side of the border and the Naga Socialist Council of Nagaland – Khaplang (NSCN-K) in Sagaing, Myanmar, have largely been successful in diminishing the threat the NSCN-K posed to both governments Hostilities between the Tatmadaw and the NSCN-K heightened after 400 soldiers from six battalions led by the Hkamti district tactical commander under the Tatmadaw’s North-West Command took control of the NSCN-K’s headquarters in Taga area of Nanyun township on January 29, 2019. A month later ‘Operation Sunshine-1’ from February 22 to 26, occurred with the Indian Army acting against suspected Arakanese Army (AA) camps inside Indian territory, with fleeing Arakan troops arrested by the Myanmar Army on their side. The move was largely seen as a tit-for-tat action to encourage Myanmar to increase operations against anti-India rebels. The latest operation known as ‘Operation Sunshine-2’, took place between May 16 and June 8, and included two battalions of the Indian Army — along with Special Forces, Assam Rifles and infantry Ghataks (commandos) — on the Indian side of the border, while clearance action was taken by four brigades of the Myanmar Army resulting in around 70-80 insurgents being detained. 1 Although, the NSCN-K is based in Myanmar’s Sagaing division its primary dispute is with the Indian Government as it wants to create a united independent Nagaland based on a federal system2 that is to include parts of Manipur, Assam, and Arunachal Pradesh in India and parts of Sagaing Division. 3 That said, however, the group's presence, its support for Indian rebel groups, and its refusal to take part in the Myanmar Peace Process remain a contentious issue within the Myanmar government..."
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Source/publisher: Euro Burma Office
2019-07-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-11
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Description: "There had been much hope regarding an end to ethnic conflict in Myanmar with the then Thein Sein’s government’s attempts to bring long-term armed ethnic organisations around the table. The international community including the United States and Europe were quick to remove sanctions and offer support to the government, even more so when the National League for Democracy was elected. However, with the length of time so far taken and differences over what individual actors want, the possibility of an actual ceasefire in conflict affected areas and an eventual political solution seem far away. While eight armed ethnic organisations signed a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement on 15 October 2015, many others remain reluctant to do so as competing interests and objectives vie with the overall demand for equality in a federal union. Many observers see the conflict, and the peace process, through a singular black and white prism. This view sees the Military/Government pitted against armed ethnic organisations the latter all wanting the same outcome. However, this is not the case, the number of actors involved and their motivations is what currently drives the conflict, and the solution to it, in the country. Before 2010, armed ethnic resistance was seen as a unitary issue. Armed ethnic groups were united in the common aim of overthrowing a military regime that was seen to have invaded ethnic states and trampled on the rights of ethnic peoples in favour of the predominant Burman, or Bamar, majority. While some groups had come to an accommodation with the military government, it was primarily the New Mon State Party (NMSP) and the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) that had decided to break with perceived ethnic unity and try and find an alternative to conflict. Putting trust in the then military Government and what was called the National Convention these two groups believed that their voices would be heard only to find this would not be the case. As a consequence, and as the Myanmar military gradually eroded ethnic territory given to those groups, fighting once more broke out in Kachin State in 2011. It is therefore understandable that some, the Kachin especially, are wary of further negotiation with the government. It was believed that with the arrival of the NLD-led Government that more progress would be made towards securing peace and achieving genuine federalism. Two Union peace conferences have been held, and while some view the recent concessions about 37 agreed on points as positive, many ethnic leaders believe that the current peace process is being badly mis-managed and that the process under Thein Sein yielded better results..."
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Source/publisher: Euro Burma Office
2017-10-15
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-11
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Sub-title: Refocussing Rakhine Nationalism
Description: "Many observers have characterised the recent events in Rakhine State in which the Arakan Army attacked Myanmar Police Posts as a further extension of ongoing ethnic armed conflicts in Myanmar. However, the underlying objectives of the Arakan Army do not correlate with the objectives of most other armed ethnic organisations that have been fighting for equality over the last sixty years. Rather, the Arakan Army’s creation and its later political position does not just seek equality and federalism but rather an autonomous Rakhine State.1 This is in itself should also be seen in the context of connections between Rakhine nationalism and the possible involvement of the Arakan Army/United League of Arakan (AA/ULA) in furthering that nationalist agenda. As AA/ULA Commander-in-Chief Major General Twan Mrat Naing notes, We prefer [a confederation of states] like Wa State, which has a larger share of power in line with the Constitution, adding that, . . . a confederation is “better” than federalism. . . And we think it [a confederation] is more appropriate to the history of Rakhine State and the hopes of the Arakanese people,2 He also continued, In a confederation, we have the authority to make decisions on our own. But there would be a common defence system. And there would be cooperation on market regulation and foreign affairs. To have control over our own destiny—selfdetermination—is the aspiration of every ethnic group. We can try,3 It remains unlikely the AA will ever see it objectives realised, seventy years of ethnic conflict suggests that the Myanmar Army, is unlikely to allow it to achieve any form of confederation. Instead the conflict is likely to continue and put further burden on an already over burdened populace. An issue the AA is acutely aware of the AA’s deputy chief, Brigadier General Dr. Nyo Twan Aung in a video message told ordinary Arakanese that if the current fighting in northern Rakhine State continues to worsen, it could spread to other places in the state. 4 In the same address he gave advice to residents in relation to an authorisation by the Rakhine State government giving permission to state police and military to carry out household checks in seven townships of northern Rakhine State, in an attempt to find..."
Source/publisher: Euro Burma Office
2019-04-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-11
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Description: "China promised to continue to support Myanmar’s peace talks with ethnic minority groups and to boost its coronavirus aid on the first stop of the foreign minister’s six-day tour of Southeast Asia. During Monday’s meetings with President Win Myint and State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, Wang Yi also urged Myanmar to speed up construction work on the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor – a key element of the country’s Belt and Road Initiative. “China will support the new Myanmar government in revitalising the economy, improving people’s livelihoods and accelerating the industrialisation process. We hope that both sides will work together to effectively implement the agreement on building the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor and promote connectivity at the western, northern and eastern ends of the corridor,” Wang told the president, according to a report by state news agency Xinhua. China shares more than 2,100km (1,300 miles) of border with Myanmar’s north, an area that has long been troubled by the fighting between government and ethnic minority rebel groups, making China a crucial player in peace talks between the government armies and ethnic armed groups. Wang said Beijing would do whatever it could to support the peace negotiations, adding: “China supports Myanmar government’s commitment to national reconciliation in the country … and will continue to provide assistance within its capabilities, as well as upholding justice and safeguarding Myanmar’s legitimate rights and interests in the international arena.” In response, Win Myint told Wang that Myanmar was keen to cooperate with China on vaccine distribution and would continue to support Beijing’s positions on Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang, according to Xinhua..."
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Source/publisher: "South China Morning Post" (Hong Kong)
2021-01-12
Date of entry/update: 2021-01-15
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Sub-title: The polls approaching in Myanmar are an opportunity for the government and ethnic armed groups to re-examine their positions in the country’s peace process. All parties should use the election-related hiatus to ask why talks have not succeeded and how to make them more productive.
Description: "A flurry of negotiations among Myanmar’s government, its military and ethnic armed groups belies deeper problems in the country’s moribund peace process. The government and armed groups that have signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) are eager to hold a Panglong-21 peace conference before electoral dy­namics take precedence later this year. As a result, two prominent armed groups that had suspended their participation have formally re-entered the peace process. Although these are positive developments, even if it takes place the conference would be largely symbolic and do little to address the fundamental obstacles on Myanmar’s road toward sustainable peace. By putting formal negotiations on hold for at least six months, the election and subsequent transition period constitute a unique opportunity for a rethink. All parties involved should use this window to examine blockages that have hindered genuine progress so far, multiply informal meetings to rebuild trust and examine ways of reinvigorating the peace process from 2021. and the overwhelming Burman dominance in political institutions. The discontent is most evident in Rakhine State, where the political marginalisation of the Rakhine ethnic minority under the NLD has boosted support for the Arakan Army insurgency. Armed conflict and insecurity are likely to result in the cancellation of voting in some constituencies in minority areas, particularly in Rakhine State, which will only deepen local minorities’ alienation. The election period, however, will also be an opportunity to reflect on how to take the peace process forward. The formal negotiations will likely be put on hold for six to twelve months, until after the next cabinet is sworn in (scheduled for late March 2021). The current government, the military and ethnic armed groups should use this period to review their own strategy and goals, ramp up informal dialogue and examine crucial issues that have so far been put aside, such as the growth of the illicit economy and the mounting might of military-aligned militias. Even if the COVID19 pandemic delays the Panglong-21 conference, there will still be a significant period during which formal peace negotiations will not take place. This downtime constitutes a unique opportunity for all parties to reflect on how to restart the process with a more constructive approach in 2021. If the NLD forms the next government, as appears likely, it should use its second term in office to reinvigorate its leadership of the peace process. Overcoming the deadlock in negotiations toward a political settlement requires a fundamental shift in approach. As a first step, Naypyitaw should overhaul institutions like the National Reconciliation and Peace Centre, to rely less on former government bureaucrats and instead draw in new negotiators and advisers from a range of backgrounds, such as business, academia and civil society. The key to substantive progress, however, lies in renewed political commitment from Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD to the peace process, a stronger sense of empathy with the grievances of ethnic minorities, and a clear vision for where the peace process is going..."
Source/publisher: International Crisis Group (Belgium) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
2020-06-19
Date of entry/update: 2020-06-19
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Sub-title: The peace process has made little progress since the National League for Democracy took office and stakeholders will need to embrace a new approach if the guns of war are to be silenced under the next government.
Description: "The Union Election Commission’s announcement that the general election will be held in November means that the two months of campaigning will begin in September and end two days before voting takes place. The election campaign period has implications for the peace process. Political parties, including the ruling National League for Democracy, will be focusing on their campaigns and will have little time to devote to complex negotiations involving the government, Tatmadaw and ethnic armed groups. The election will be followed by the installation of new governments and peace process will not be able to resume until April next year at the earliest. This is why the NLD government is pushing to hold another 21st Century Panglong Union Peace Conference before the election campaign period begins – the last opportunity to do so before its term ends. Government spokesperson U Zaw Htay predicted at a regular news conference on May 30 that part three of the Union Accord would be signed at the next peace conference if it is held in the coming weeks. Zaw Htay said the accord consists of three parts. The first part includes topics not included in the original agreement that could be the subject of further negotiations. The second is the phases to be implemented after the 2020 election, and the third involves agreeing on the fundamental principles of a federal Union. The reason for addressing post-election matters is to provide some assurance that the peace process will continue regardless of the election outcome. Although the NLD is widely expected to win enough seats to nominate the president and form the next government, the accord will provide a greater certainty to all parties. The post-election aspect of the accord is also a sort of a roadmap for the peace process, and represents a commitment from the NLD if it does win another term in office..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Frontier Myanmar" (Myanmar)
2020-06-18
Date of entry/update: 2020-06-18
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Description: "In the early weeks of 2020, the signs pointed to progress in Myanmar’s convoluted effort to finally end 70 years of ethnic strife in its border areas. On Jan. 8, representatives from the government and the 10 ethnic armies that are party to a 2015 cease-fire deal convened in the capital, Naypyidaw, where they reached an eight-point agreement on the next steps to continue implementing that cease-fire. They also vowed to meet for a fourth national peace conference by the end of April, to build on three earlier summits held between 2016 and 2018. That fourth summit would have signaled the timely revitalization of Myanmar’s troubled peace process, which Aung San Suu Kyi, the country’s de facto leader, has dubbed the “21st Century Panglong,” after the agreement that her father, independence hero Aung San, signed with representatives of several ethnic groups in 1947. Making progress in the peace talks after several recent setbacks would have provided a boost to Aung San Suu Kyi and her party, the National League for Democracy, as they prepare for a general election later this year. But plans for the peace conference now threaten to be derailed by the coronavirus pandemic. Myanmar confirmed its first cases of COVID-19 on March 23, prompting the government and ethnic armed groups to postpone all meetings and push the summit back to July. Government spokesman Zaw Htay told reporters on May 30 that the government still plans to hold the summit next month, albeit with strict social distancing measures in place and a reduced number of delegates. Myanmar currently has some 230 official cases of COVID-19. July may represent the last chance to restart talks this year, with elections looming. The government has effectively ruled out holding the summit during the election campaign, set to run for 90 days between August and October..."
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Source/publisher: "World Politics Review (WPR)"
2020-06-08
Date of entry/update: 2020-06-09
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Description: "The Myanmar military has rejected a proposal by three ethnic armies to begin cease-fire talks in a bid to kick-start the country’s stalled peace process, instead vowing further retaliation for armed offensives and ambushes, a military spokesman said Tuesday. The Brotherhood Alliance of ethnic armies — the Arakan Army (AA), the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) — extended the invitation to begin peace talks in a statement issued Monday. De facto leader Aung San Suu Kyi’s four-year-old government has long sought to end Myanmar’s multiple ethnic wars with historic peace talks. But those talks have sputtered, while only 10 of the country’s 20-some ethnic armies have signed a 2015 nationwide cease-fire pact that is seen as the foundation of peace talks. The Brotherhood Alliance trio, which has not signed the agreement, also announced Monday that it was extending a current unilateral cease-fire from June 1 to Aug. 31, and issued an appeal for both sides to protect civilians, end the civil war, and assist with coronavirus prevention activities. The announcement came three days after the AA launched a retaliatory attack on a border guard outpost in Rakhine state, killing four policemen and capturing six others. The AA also seized three family members of the officers, but later released them. The AA ambushed the outpost to strike back at government soldiers for an attack on the AA in Paletwa township of abutting Chin state, which the AA also claims as its territory. In March, the Myanmar government declared the AA, a predominantly Buddhist force that seeks greater autonomy for ethnic Rakhine people in the state, an illegal association and terrorist group — raising the stakes in a conflict that begin with AA attacks on government border posts in late 2018 and early 2019..."
Source/publisher: "Radio Free Asia (RFA)" (USA)
2020-06-02
Date of entry/update: 2020-06-03
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Description: "This report is the culmination of a year-long research project into the activities of civil society in and around the ongoing Myanmar peace process. This includes the negotiations taking place in the Union Peace Conference (UPC, also known as the 21st Century Panglong Conference (UPC/21st CPC) the Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee (UPDJC), and the Joint Implementation Coordination Meeting (JICM). It also includes civil society peacebuilding outside of the peace negotiations and parallel structures. The research project aimed to identify: • the drivers of conflict in Myanmar, • the civil society actors involved in peacebuilding in Myanmar, • the types of peacebuilding activities performed by these CSOs, and to classify these activities into types, • the contributions of these activities to official and unofficial peacebuilding, • as well as any factors enabling and constraining civil society peacebuilding. The research was funded by the Joint Peace Fund Myanmar, and was conducted in partnership between the Enlightened Myanmar Research Foundation (EMReF) and the Inclusive Peace and Transition Initiative (IPTI). The research team conducted interviews with 160 individuals from 123 organizations, including from civil society (including CSO networks and local and international CSOs), donors, members of parliament, as well as representatives of EAOs, members of the Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee (UPDJC), members of political parties, and government representatives. The CSO sample was built by asking CSOs to nominate other CSOs working on peacebuilding, hence the sample is shaped by these individuals’ understanding of peacebuilding in Myanmar. The research was guided by the Civil Society and Peacebuilding (CS&PB) framework, developed by Paffenholz and colleagues. In the context of Myanmar, the term peace process is generally used to refer to a sequence of high-level peace negotiations and associated consultations and other supporting institutions. This process began in 2011, under the government of U Thein Sein, and led to the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) in 2015. The structure and sequence of the current negotiations were set out in the NCA and the Framework for Political Dialogue (also negotiated and signed in 2015). These negotiations are projected to lead to a permanent ceasefire, disarmament and demobilization of non-state armed groups, government and constitutional reforms. Since 2015, the main forum for these negotiations has been the UPC (21st CPC). The UPDJC acts as the secretariat for the UPC and has responsibility for important aspects of the process such as pre-negotiations and consensus building on issues to be brought before the UPC. This means that many issues are essentially decided by the UPDJC, with the UPC frequently acting to confirm decisions taken in the UPDJC (although this is not the sum total of its role).. The Joint Implementation Coordination Meeting (JICM), is the “consensus committee” for the UPDJC. It takes responsibility for issues that cannot be resolved in the UPDJC. Together,these three institutions make up track 1: the official or mainstream peace process. While this research framework places the mainstream peace process as the“center” of peacebuilding activity,this is more in the interest of conceptual clarity. Peacebuilding away from the negotiation table can be equally important..."
Source/publisher: JPF via "Reliefweb" (New York)
2020-06-01
Date of entry/update: 2020-06-02
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Sub-title: The many unilateral ceasefires seem meaningless — they have not stopped or even lessened the fighting so far.
Description: "In Myanmar, unilateral ceasefires have been interchangeably announced by the Myanmar military (Tatmadaw) and a group of ethnic armed groups – known as the Northern Alliance – composed of the Arakan Army (AA), Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA). The first unilateral ceasefire was announced by Tatmadaw on December 21, 2018. The Northern Alliance followed by announcing their first truce on September 9, 2019, after the Tatmadaw extended the truce for a third time. Both sides have announced unilateral ceasefires five times so far (See the table below). The unilateral ceasefires of both parties look to cover plenty of days as they announced them at different times. However, the simultaneous ceasefires, covering both sides, are limited in duration. The total length of simultaneous ceasefires – in September 2019 and May 2020 – is only 33 days. (See the illustration below). But even during the unilateral ceasefire periods, the Tatmadaw and Northern Alliance could not managed to lessen or stop the fighting. Instead, tit-for-tat fighting raged on in Shan, Chin, and Rakhine states. Enjoying this article? Click here to subscribe for full access. Just $5 a month. Although the country is grappling with the global coronavirus pandemic, the fighting between the Tatmadaw and AA in Chin and Rakhine states continues and has produced thousands of displaced persons. In addition to the AA, the Tatmadaw has clashed with the Karen National Union (KNU) that signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) in October 2015..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Diplomat" (Japan)
2020-05-29
Date of entry/update: 2020-05-30
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Suu Kyi is now close to old adversary China while long-ruling military is skeptical of Beijing's intent ahead of pivotal polls
Description: "Elections are scheduled for November in Myanmar, and there is no indication so far that the polls will be postponed due to the Covid-19 crisis. Neither is there much doubt about the outcome. Most political observers believe that State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) will win again, though not in the same landslide fashion as in 2015 as recent by-elections show she and her party have lost significant support in ethnic areas. But the bigger electoral question is how her party’s delicate relationship with the autonomous military will play out and in that context how her government’s ties to its powerful northern neighbor China will be portrayed and potentially politicized on the campaign trail. An entirely new paradigm has emerged in Myanmar, one where Suu Kyi is now seen as a trusted ally of Beijing and the military as a nationalistic bulwark against China’s strong advances. That’s a significant reversal, one that could have implications for stability in the lead-up to polls. When Suu Kyi was under house arrest during military rule or active in non-parliamentary politics, China viewed the long-time pro-democracy icon with suspicion. That was at least in part because her late British husband, a Tibetologist, maintained ties with many Tibetans in exile..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
2020-05-25
Date of entry/update: 2020-05-26
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: A trio of ethnic armed groups have escalated their fight with the military in Myanmar’s Shan State. This alliance has long been outside the country’s peace process. With China’s help, the government should pursue bilateral ceasefires – and longer-term rapprochement – with the three organisations.
Description: "What’s new? On 15 August, an alliance of ethnic armed groups staged coordinated attacks against strategic targets in northern Myanmar. The offensive left up to fifteen people dead, and clashes reportedly continue in the northern part of Shan State, creating concerns for civilians’ safety. Why did it happen? The three ethnic armed groups behind the attacks have been largely excluded from the peace process for the past five years. In recent months, the government has proposed bilateral ceasefires to the groups but has set unrealistic demands and accompanied the offers with military pressure. Why does it matter? The attacks mark a serious escalation in Shan State’s conflict. They represent a rejection of bilateral ceasefire terms that the Myanmar government has proposed to the armed groups. While the Myanmar military has not yet responded with significant force, the brunt of mounting violence will inevitably fall on civilians. What should be done? Both the Myanmar military and the armed groups should exercise restraint, allow humanitarian agencies to safely provide assistance and pursue ceasefire talks. The military and government should review their earlier ceasefire proposal, while China should continue to use its influence in Myanmar to encourage an end to the fighting...Overview On 15 August, a trio of ethnic armed groups calling themselves the Brotherhood Alliance staged coordinated attacks on targets in Myanmar’s Mandalay Region and Shan State, killing up to fifteen people, mostly soldiers and police officers. Clashes have recurred daily across northern Shan State since then, resulting in combatant deaths on both sides as well as civilian fatalities. The alliance – comprising the Arakan Army (AA), Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) – said it mounted the attacks in response to military aggression in both Rakhine and northern Shan States. The three groups had been negotiating bilateral ceasefires with the government that would have brought them into the broader peace process for the first time. However, unrealistic demands from Naypyitaw have undermined those negotiations, and the attacks represent a rejection of the government’s proposed terms. The government and military should moderate those terms, notably by abandoning their insistence that the groups give up territory they have acquired over the past five years. The attacks on 15 August hit a Myanmar military training academy, a bridge and police outpost on an important highway, a military battalion and a narcotics control checkpoint. Myanmar’s military has alleged that they were payback for a recent raid on a drug production lab in northern Shan State. It says the key target was a narcotics control unit situated on the main highway running from Mandalay, Myanmar’s second largest city, to the border with China..."
Source/publisher: "International Crisis Group (ICG)" (Belgium)
2019-09-24
Date of entry/update: 2020-05-21
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "...This paper gives an overview of politics and development in Myanmar. It places recent political changes in their historical context, focusing in particular on minority conflicts as well as the national context. The role that international aid agencies can play is explored, offering recommendations for policy and practice. There is a risk that pressure to build good relations with the government and to spend pledged funds will lead donors to overlook significant ongoing problems in conflict-affected border areas and elsewhere in Myanmar. Yet the right kind of foreign aid, implemented in the right way, can play a potentially useful role in supporting peace, justice and development. Donors need to learn from experience elsewhere, recognising that many challenges will arise over the coming years despite recent reforms. By building a careful understanding of Myanmar's political economy at the local and national levels, and incrementally establishing programmes, they will be able to build domestic capacity in support of sustainable peace and poverty reduction. Continued engagement can generate opportunities for astutely promoting international standards including human rights..."
2013-00-00
Date of entry/update: 2020-05-16
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Format : PDF
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Description: "The Myanmar military has denied a Karen National Union (KNU) claim they have been building up their troop deployment in Hpapun district of Kayin State. A statement dated May 15 issued by the KNU claims the Tatmadaw (government forces) are building up their forces in the area controlled by 2nd, 5th and 7th Brigades of its military wing Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA). In this statement, the KNU claims that in exploitation of the current ceasefire between them, the Tatmadaw is building up their forces especially in Mu Kyaw district (Hpapun district) controlled by 5th Brigade of the KNU and adjoining areas controlled by 2nd and 7th Brigades. It also says that the building up of forces up to twice normal strength and building new outposts in these areas undermine the confidence building which is crucial for strengthening the ceasefire. KNU General Secretary Pado Saw Tado Mu said, “There are two parts. The first part is building outposts. In this part, there are new more outposts including the BGF (Border Guard Force). And another part is personnel deployed at these outposts. We found that more personnel were sent and deployed at these outposts. And then they deployed more heavy weapons such as howitzers that were never deployed in these areas. This is not a good trend for us. It is the significant things which can be pointed out.” Tatmadaw True New Information Team Secretary Brig. Gen. Zaw Min Tun said that they did not send and deploy any more troops and any more new heavy weapons in these areas but their military columns which were performing their security duty were attacked by sniper fire from KNU troops. “Firstly, I’d like to say, they claimed they opened COVID-19 checkpoints and then they shot at our military columns with sniper fire in Hpapun. Secondly, we absolutely did not do anything in sending and deploying more troops and new heavy weapons in the areas controlled by their 2nd, 5th and 7th Brigades as they are claiming. We have already had Joint Monitoring Committee - State-level (JMC-S). I would like to say it will be more helpful for both sides and ongoing peace process if we can resolve this issue through dialogue. There is absolutely no military buildup as they claim.” Although the Tatmadaw said disputes between two sides could be resolved through JMC-S mechanism, ethnic armed groups said that this JMC mechanism was not practical and workable and called for it to be rectified. KNU General Secretary Pado Saw Tar Doe Mu said that peace process was currently stalled because of COVID-19 pandemic and dialogue between them had difficulties so that they were trying to explore means to resolve this incident..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Mizzima" (Myanmar)
2020-05-16
Date of entry/update: 2020-05-16
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Welcome to Dateline Irrawaddy! This week, the panel will participate in discussions from home via videoconferencing like we did on last week’s program. We’ll discuss the prospects for peace in Myanmar amid the COVID-19 pandemic and whether mutual understanding can be built between ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) themselves and between EAOs and the Tatmadaw [the Myanmar military]. Member of the Central Executive Committee of the Karen National Union (KNU) Padoh Mahn Nyein Maung has joined me from his home in Su Taung Pyae Village of [Ayeyarwady Region’s] Pantanaw Township. I’m The Irrawaddy Burmese editor Ye Ni.The President’s Office issued a statement on Tuesday, forming a coordinating committee to work with EAOs to contain the spread of COVID-19 in ethnic areas. Clashes between the Tatmadaw and EAOs have decreased in most of the conflict zones except in Rakhine State. There has been no fighting in the Palaung area [in Shan State, also known as the Ta’ang people] where fierce clashes took place recently and the fight against COVID-19 is taking priority. The government has adopted a “no one left behind” policy to fight COVID-19 everywhere in its territory, aiming to tackle the pandemic together with the EAOs. My understanding is that the government has formed the coordinating committee to implement that policy. There are previous examples that show an understanding could be built during crisis and peace could be achieved after the crisis is over. In a recent example, the legacy of the tsunami brought peace between the Indonesian military and rebels in Aceh in 2004. Do you expect the cooperation in the fight against COVID-19 will boost the prospects for peace in Myanmar?..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2020-05-02
Date of entry/update: 2020-05-04
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Myanmar Cardinal Charles Bo is backing a call by the United Nations chief and Pope Francis for a global ceasefire, including in Myanmar.
Description: "As the entire world is currently engaged in a war against a deadly invisible enemy that is taking lives across the globe in tens of thousands, Myanmar’s military has been ramping up its offensive against the country’s armed ethnic militias. This is why the country’s cardinal is raising his voice again, lending support to the call by the United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres and Pope Francis, for a global ceasefire, in favour of humanity’s more urgent war against the Covid-19 virus. With conflict Myanmar is vulnerable “The pandemic’s consequences are catastrophic for public health and for social and economic life. This is no time to escalate the conflict,” urges Cardinal Charles Bo of Yangon, in a statement released on Wednesday. “I am convinced that continued military operations, precisely when the whole nation is suffering a crisis, will have catastrophic consequences for our nation,” warns the cardinal, who is also President of the Federation of Asian Bishops’ Conferences (FABC)..."
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Source/publisher: "Vatican News"
2020-04-24
Date of entry/update: 2020-04-27
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "...THE Tatmadaw True News Team held a press conference at the Defence Services Museum in Nay Pyi Taw yesterday. Chairperson of the team Maj-Gen Soe Naing Oo, Vice Chairperson Maj-Gen Tun Tun Nyi, Secretary Brig-Gen Zaw Min Tun and officers from the Office of the Commander-in-Chief (Army) clarified confiscations of arms and ammunitions from 28 February to 16 March near Lwal Kham village in Kutkai Township, about K 315 billion worth of narcotic drugs and related items, peace-making efforts in 2020, and thwarting AA groups in their attempts to control a military post in Rakhine over 40 days..."
Source/publisher: The Global New Light of Myanmar, 2020
2020-03-23
Date of entry/update: 2020-04-25
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Format : PDF
Size: 336.08 KB
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Description: "Scholars at the University of Oslo (Norway) and Universitas Gadjah Mada (Indonesia) have since 2012 conducted collaborative research on “Power, Welfare and Democracy (PWD)”, based on previous studies with research organisations in civil society, and funded by the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Jakarta. The PWD project has examined the character and challenges of democratisation in Indonesia, and how it relates to power relations and social welfare in society. The project has included a baseline survey on the development of democracy; a thematic study on politics of citizenship; a thematic study on welfare regimes; a thematic study on local regimes; and comparative anthropological studies of UN-REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation). As this research project comes to an end in 2017, a two-days conference will be held at the University of Oslo to summarise major findings and to discuss the implications for domestic and international policy making..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: University of Oslo (Norway)
2018-08-00
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-29
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
Size: 700.88 KB (164 pages)
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Description: "Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army (RCSS/SSA) spokesman Col. Sai Om Kay said that they had been fighting with the Tatmadaw (Myanmar Army) on Loi Tuan Mountain, Mong Kong Township, southern Shan State on February 27 in the morning and the fighting between them was still raging until today. The fighting started with artillery fire on February 27 at about 8 a.m. and the fighting is reportedly still raging fiercely until the afternoon of February 28. “The fighting was almost all day yesterday and now Tatmadaw is still firing intermittent fire of heavy weapons,” spokesman Col. Sai Om Kay said, referring to Thursday. The RCSS/SSA said that four battalions with approximate strength of 400 personnel had an engagement with RCSS troops in Loi Tuan pass in Mong Kong Township, southern Shan State and it was started by firing heavy weapons and the fighting was fierce. Shan State legislative Assembly legislator from Mong Kong constituency (1) Sai Pan said that they heard the firing of heavy weapons and they had to watch and monitor the fighting between these two armies. “They fought yesterday and today. We could hear weapons firing until this afternoon. We cannot get accurate information on this battle as they fought in the jungle but nearby villages said that they heard heavy weapons fire,” he said. Political analyst Than Soe Naing said that the fighting between them appeared because of lack of trust building between them and having suspicion against each other though they had territory demarcation between them..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Mizzima" (Myanmar)
2020-02-29
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-29
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Myanmar’s history has been intertwined with the issues of postcolonial state building since it gained independence from British colonialism in January 1948. The policies and administration pursued by the British proved instrumental in deterioration of contact and cooperation between the diverse ethnic peoples of Myanmar while ethnic conflict was fostered. 1 The historical struggles of ethnic minorities for recognition and representation are vital to understanding the current transition to democracy and struggles for legitimacy in Myanmar. Undoubtedly, the initial phase of independent Myanmar, following the assassination of General Aung San on the eve of independence, was characterized by unstable but occasionally democratic governments punctuated by interventions by the Myanmar military. The last significant bid for democracy ended, however, following a military coup by General Ne Win on 2 March 1962. 2 The new military ruler led the country, first under his Revolutionary Council and then under his Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), into a 26-year era of isolation following his ‘Burmese way to socialism’, an admixture of Buddhist, Marxist and nationalist principles that ethnic minorities in the country interpreted as ‘Burmanization’, which saw Myanmar decline “from a country once regarded as amongst the most fertile and mineral rich in Asia to one of the world’s 10 poorest nations.”3..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Southeast Asia Research Centre (Hong Kong)
2012-12-01
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-27
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
Size: 692.19 KB (27 pages)
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Sub-title: Arakan Army's highly mobile and lethal tactics have made a mockery of government's peace process
Description: "As Myanmar’s government sues for peace, its autonomous military, the Tatmadaw, faces a new type of insurgency it seems increasingly ill-prepared to counter and combat. Myanmar’s “new” insurgents are highly mobile and, unlike the country’s older generation rebel groups, maintain few fixed positions, using instead hit-and-run attacks that have rendered the Tatmadaw’s traditional frontal assaults increasingly ineffective. The situation is in many ways similar to the one the United States faced in the Vietnam War: an invisible enemy which strikes from the shadows, making counterattacks more likely to hit civilians than enemy combatants. That’s all conspiring to undermine the Tatmadaw’s leverage and clout against ethnic armed groups that rely on local population support to sustain their insurgent fights. Previously, Myanmar’s myriad rebel groups aimed to control large swathes of territory protected by fixed and often well-armed installations. The Karen National Union (KNU), long firmly entrenched on the Thai border, maintained several bases along the Moei river and a well-fortified headquarters with permanent buildings housing its civilian administration and military command units..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
2020-02-24
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-24
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Military enterprises, ostensibly set up to feed and supply soldiers,were some of the earliest and largest Burmese commercialconglomerates, established in the 1950s. Union Myanmar EconomicHoldings Limited (UMEHL) and Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC) are two profit-seeking military enterprises established by the military after the dissolution of the Burma Socialist Programme Party in 1988, which remain central players in Myanmar’s post-2011 economy.• Military conglomerates are a major source of off-budget revenuefor the military and a main employer of retired soldiers. Yet few veterans receive more than a small piece of the profits from UMEHL. The vast bulk of formal dividends instead disproportionately benefit higher ranking officers and institutions within the Tatmadaw. Military capitalism entrenches the autonomy of the Tatmadawfrom civilian oversight. Despite this, obligatory or semi-coerced contributions from active-duty soldiers are a source of cash fow for UMEHL, effectively constituting a transfer from the government budget to the military’s off-budget entities. The most significant source of livelihoods support for most veterans is the service pension dispersed by the Ministry of Finance and Planning (MoPF).• Despite delivering suboptimal welfare outcomes for most soldiers and veterans while eroding the legitimacy of ceasefires, successive governments since 1988, including Aung San Suu Kyi’s NationalLeague for Democracy (NLD) administration, have entrenched military capitalism by encouraging commercial activities of armed groups that enter into ceasefire agreements..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Yusof Ishak Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS)
2019-02-00
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-23
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
Size: 1.55 MB (49 pages)
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Description: "A northern Shan rebel armed group, the Shan State Progressive Party (SSPP), says they may sign the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) this year if necessary to work with the Myanmar government towards political reform. SSPP leaders held a meeting from Feb. 4-18 at their headquarters in Wang Hai, northern Shan State, to discuss the possibility of signing the NCA and finding compromises with the Myanmar government. “If we need to sign [the NCA] for our group, we will do it. But first we want to discuss it with our members of our alliance,” said SSPP Colonel Sai Su. The NCA was first signed in October 2015. Col. Sai Su also said that if the government and the Myanmar military, or Tatmadaw, are wise, they will choose to compromise with the ethnic armed group coalition known as the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee (FPNCC) and all of its members will sign the NCA. The FPNCC includes the SSPP, the United Wa State Army (UWSA), Mong La’s National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA), the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), Kokang’s Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and the Arakan Army (AA). According to the SSPP, the FPNCC does not have a common stand on signing the NCA and the groups need more time to discuss it. Col. Sai Su said that if the SSPP signs the NCA, they will explain the decision to ethnic Shan people. The SSPP was a member of the now-defunct United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC), which worked to draft the NCA, but resigned from the group in 2017. The SSPP then joined the FPNCC, which continues to negotiate with the Myanmar government regarding the NCA..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand) via reliefweb (New York)
2020-02-20
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-21
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Masculinities, gender and social conflict in Myanmar
Description: "The Union of Myanmar is a complex country context marked by ethnic, religious and linguistic diversity. It has been affected by decades of an authoritarian, isolationist regime and numerous interconnected conflicts, ranging from national-level ethnic political and armed conflicts and a pro-democracy struggle, to broader social-level land conflicts. It has also seen conflicts at the household level, such as domestic violence. In Myanmar, as in other countries, these numerous forms of violence affect men, women, boys, girls and those with diverse gender identities in different ways. There is increasing awareness that gender is important in understanding conflict and working towards peace and social cohesion. A growing number of development programmes are dedicated to addressing this. In practice, such programmes have largely focused on women’s participation in political and peacebuilding processes. This focus on increasing women’s meaningful participation in arenas and activities formerly dominated by men is an important aspect of peacebuilding. However, there is another ‘side’ to the gender inequality dilemma, which is less well understood – one that deals with the experiences of men and boys. Social expectations around masculinity are often overlooked (or oversimplified). Masculinities, that is, the social expectations of men to act or behave in certain ways because they are men, can be drivers of conflict or violence. However, limiting work on this to ‘men-engage’-type approaches focusing mainly on mobilising men to prevent sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) can mean overlooking how social expectations of masculinities can also lead to increased vulnerability for men and boys, which is often not recognised or addressed by peacebuilding programming. Understanding masculinities is important, because these masculinity norms – these social expectations – can be mobilised to manipulate the taking of violent actions. For instance, society may invoke the expectations on men to be protectors of their community from perceived external threats, including land confiscations for development projects. Where this means confronting more powerful actors such as state agencies, frustration and pressures can turn into violent action..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Paung Sie Facility, International Alert (London), Phan Tee Eain
2018-12-00
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-17
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
Size: 928.79 KB (52 pages)
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Description: "This report is the culmination of a year-long research project into the activities of civil society in and around the ongoing Myanmar peace process. This includes the negotiations taking place in the Union Peace Conference (UPC, also known as the 21st Century Panglong Conference (UPC/21st CPC) the Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee (UPDJC), and the Joint Implementation Coordination Meeting (JICM). It also includes civil society peacebuilding outside of the peace negotiations and parallel structures. The research project aimed to identify: • the drivers of confict in Myanmar, • the civil society actors involved in peacebuilding in Myanmar, • the types of peacebuilding activities performed by these CSOs, and to classify these activities into types, • the contributions of these activities to ofcial and unofcial peacebuilding, • as well as any factors enabling and constraining civil society peacebuilding. The research was funded by the Joint Peace Fund Myanmar, and was conducted in partnership between the Enlightened Myanmar Research Foundation (EMReF) and the Inclusive Peace and Transition Initiative (IPTI).3 The research team conducted interviews with 160 individuals from 123 organizations, including from civil society (including CSO networks and local and international CSOs), donors, members of parliament, as well as representatives of EAOs, members of the Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee (UPDJC), members of political parties, and government representatives.4 The CSO sample was built by asking CSOs to nominate other CSOs working on peacebuilding, hence the sample is shaped by these individuals’ understanding of peacebuilding in Myanmar. The research was guided by the Civil Society and Peacebuilding (CS&PB) framework, developed by Pafenholz and colleagues.5 In the context of Myanmar, the term peace process is generally used to refer to a sequence of high-level peace negotiations and associated consultations and other supporting institutions. This process began in 2011, under the government of U Thein Sein, and led to the Nationwide Ceasefre Agreement (NCA) in 2015. The structure and sequence of the current negotiations were set out in the NCA and the Framework for Political Dialogue (also negotiated and signed in 2015). These negotiations are projected to lead to a permanent ceasefre, disarmament and demobilization of non-state armed groups, government and constitutional reforms. Since 2015, the main forum for these negotiations has been the UPC (21st CPC). The UPDJC acts as the secretariat for the UPC and has responsibility for important aspects of the process such as pre-negotiations and consensus building on issues to be brought before the UPC. This means that many issues are essentially decided by the UPDJC, with the UPC frequently acting to confrm decisions taken in the UPDJC (although this is not the sum total of its role)..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Enlightened Myanmar Research Foundation (EMReF) (Yangon) and Inclusive Peace & Transition Initiative
2019-01-21
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-17
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
Size: 3.31 MB (101 pages)
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Sub-title: Avenues for reform and decentralization and steps towards a federal system.
Description: "Ever since the Panglong Agreement was signed on February 12, 1947, only two weeks after the Aung San - Attlee Agreement on Burma’s Independence of January 27, 1947, the issues of federalism, minority rights and self-determination have been central to Myanmar politics, confict and military-civilian relations. Accordingly, relations between the center and the periphery are at the core of the constitutions of 1947 and 1974, as well as the 2008 Constitution. Yet, by any standards, the Myanmar state has been unitary, and indeed centralized to an extreme degree, since independence in 1948, leading to 70 years of confict. To a large degree, the confict explains the other defning trait of the Myanmar state: for most of the last seven decades, it has been dominated by the military. Relations between the military and state institutions have been shaped by the relationship between the central government and Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs). The issues of democracy, federalism and the role of the military cannot be separated, and together they form the basis for modern Myanmar politics. In this context, it is not surprising that organizations representing the interests of ethnic nationalities spent the last two decades of military rule, after the emergence of the democracy movement of 1988 and the NLD’s victory in the 1990 elections, calling for a “tripartite dialogue” among the NLD, the military and themselves. It is no coincidence that these were also the decades when the military was drafting the 2008 Constitution. The current peace process was initiated by President U Thein Sein in 2011, the year Myanmar embarked on its transition to democracy. Although democracy and the pursuit of peace are undoubtedly two of Myanmar’s most pressing issues, the fact that two distinct processes – which will be referred to in this paper as the political process and the peace process – developed from there raises a number of issues..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung Ltd (Yangon)
2018-01-04
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-17
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
Size: 368.39 KB (82 pages)
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Description: "Civil Society: Civil Society is defined broadly as the space between the family and the state, but does not include political parties, professional unions and associations, private businesses, and Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs). For the purpose of this Discussion Paper, research was directed predominantly, but not entirely, to non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil society organisations (CSOs) at Union and sub-national level and their emerging networks. Research also included ethnic literature and culture associations. It is important to note that many people “wear several hats” in Myanmar, meaning that the affiliations of individuals are not always limited to one organisation. The roles of as key stakeholders often change roles over time. Due to their importance in Myanmar, faith-based networks are also included in civil society. Civil society is not synonymous with communities. It is inherently heterogeneous; its diversity relates to a range of different ethnic, linguistic, religious, gender, and class identities among which ethnicity stands out as a particularly prominent marker of identity in Myanmar. Social cohesion: A cohesive society is one that works towards the wellbeing of all, creates a sense of belonging, promotes trust, and offers everyone the opportunity to prosper and advance peacefully. Peacebuilding: Peacebuilding is defined as initiatives that foster and support sustainable structures and processes that strengthen the prospects for peaceful coexistence and decrease the likelihood of the outbreak, reoccurrence, or continuation of violent conflict.1 Within this Paper, civil society engagement in peacebuilding refers to civil society-led initiatives that seek mitigate inter- or intra- ethnic, faith, and communal tensions and promote social cohesion. Peace process: For the purposes of this research, the ‘peace process’ is defined as the national tri-lateral negotiations related to the ethnic armed conflict. Peace process architecture relates to government-led initiatives since 2011, spanning bi-lateral ceasefires, the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), the Union Peace Conferences (UPCs), Joint Monitoring Committees (JMCs), and the national dialogue process. For the purpose of this Paper, participation in the peace process has been categorised into direct participation (contribution to decision-making and supporting roles within peace architecture), and indirect contributions, which are equally critical, that lie outside of the peace process and political structures. Gender: The socially constructed roles, behaviours, activities, and attributes that determine our understanding of masculinity and femininity. The question of gender difference and the construction of masculine and feminine is not universal, but culturally specific and strongly influenced by other factors such as ethnicity, religion, race, and class.2 Youth: Myanmar’s National Youth Policy defines young people as between the ages of 15-35. The United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2250 considers young people to fall between 18-29 years..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Paung Sie Facility
2018-10-18
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-15
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
Size: 8.24 MB (90 pages)
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Description: "Myanmar’s de facto leader Aung San Suu Kyi said Wednesday that the country’s unresolved political problems are the root cause of failure to end hostilities between the government military and ethnic armed groups as Myanmar continues to strive for permanent peace. “The governments of the successive periods have tried their best to put an end to the armed conflicts and restore peace to our motherland, but have not yet achieved the goals of peace,” she said in her capacity as chairperson of the Central Committee for the Development of Border Areas and National Races at the 73rd Union Day ceremony in Panglong, also known as Pinlon, in Myanmar’s southern Shan state. As state counselor, Aung San Suu Kyi has made ending Myanmar’s armed conflicts and forging peace the cornerstone of her administration, but the peace process has been stymied by ongoing fighting between Myanmar forces and rebel armies in outlying ethnic regions and by the Rohingya crisis in Rakhine state. Her civilian-led government has held three sessions of the 21st-Century Panglong Conference attended by delegates from the government, military, and ethnic armed organizations..."
Source/publisher: "RFA" (USA)
2020-02-12
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-14
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language:
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Sub-title: Exiled Activists in Myanmar's Political Reforms
Description: "Myanmar’s tumultuous post-colonial history has been characterized by decades of direct and indirect military rule and corresponding political mobilizations that have ranged from armed ethnic and ideological insurgencies to mass protests, student movements, and non-violent pro-democracy uprisings. The nationalization and mismanagement of the economy, the militarization of the state, political surveillance and oppression, and the closure of universities are all factors that have triggered the flight from Burma of millions of Burmese. Several main waves of exit can be distinguished, following major political events—(1) the 1962 military coup; (2) the installation of direct rule by the Burma Socialist Programme Party in 1974 and the U Thant funeral crisis; (3) the 1988 mass uprisings; and (4) the 2007 “Saffron Revolution” protests, respectively. The largest o the extreme sensitivity surrounding this subject, in the past very few organizations inside Myanmar were able to operate openly on human rights issues. Exile organizations based in Thailand and India are widening the scope of their existing capacity-building initiatives for the documentation of local human rights issues and improving the knowledge and skills of those who defend human rights, while also expanding their (underground and above-ground) networks across the country..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Kerstin Duell
2014-11-02
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-10
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf pdf
Size: 213.52 KB (15 pages)
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Topic: civil society, democratisation, civil–military relations, ethnic confict, aid, Myanmar, transition, development, civil war, peace‐building.
Topic: civil society, democratisation, civil–military relations, ethnic confict, aid, Myanmar, transition, development, civil war, peace‐building.
Description: "The political landscape of Myanmar has changed signifcantly since former dictator Than Shwe paved the way for a series of wide‐ranging reforms in 2011. A nominally civilian government was sworn in and political prisoners were freed. Most visibly, long‐term opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi has ascended to power after her long‐banned opposition party – the National League of Democracy (NLD) – won the historic elections of 2015 by a wide margin. The country’s vibrant civil society also benefted from the lifting of restrictive laws on media and public mobilisation. Despite these remarkable transformations, Myanmar’s transition has seemingly slowed down and the space for progressive social and political action has contracted once again. Particularly worrying is the situation in the country’s borderlands, where long‐running sectarian conficts have escalated since 2011. In order to understand the challenges that persisting authoritarianism, state violence, and civil war pose to civil society in Myanmar, this article situates contemporary social and political action within a historical analysis of political transition. It asks about: (a) the nature of political transition in Myanmar, (b) the challenges that the trajectory of political transition poses for civil society actors, and (c) the implications for international development and peace‐building initiatives. This article argues that Myanmar’s political transition should not be understood as a process of democratisation that is driven by pro‐democratic forces and which might eventually lead to liberal democracy. Viewing the country’s transition through the lens of democratisation is not only misleading but deeply problematic. Political reforms were planned and executed by the country’s military: the Tatmadaw. The emergent hybrid civil–military order safeguards authoritarian rule and military dominance. This top‐down nature of political transition poses signifcant challenges for civil society. In combination with fragility and confict, liberalising the public sphere has not only benefted progressive social and political action but has also enabled the growth of uncivil society,3 whose pursuit of exclusionary identity politics fuels sectarian violence..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: IDS Bulletin
2019-09-00
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-09
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
Size: 222.04 KB (22 pages)
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Topic: anniversary, Ceasefire, chairman General Mutu Say Poe, Karen National Liberation Army, Karen National Union, Karen Revolution Day, KNLA, KNU, Military, nationwide ceasefire agreement, NCA, Peace Process, Peace talks, Political Dialogue, resistance, Tatmadaw, vice chairman Padoh Saw Kwe Htoo Win
Topic: anniversary, Ceasefire, chairman General Mutu Say Poe, Karen National Liberation Army, Karen National Union, Karen Revolution Day, KNLA, KNU, Military, nationwide ceasefire agreement, NCA, Peace Process, Peace talks, Political Dialogue, resistance, Tatmadaw, vice chairman Padoh Saw Kwe Htoo Win
Description: "The Karen revolutionary struggle is not over, as the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) and the political dialogue it calls for have yet to be implemented, Karen National Union chairman General Mutu Say Poe said in an address to his fellow Karen to commemorate the annual Karen Revolution Day. Friday marked the 71st anniversary of the beginning of the ethnic Karen revolutionary movement in 1949 following the central government’s denunciation of the group as an unlawful organization after months of protests demanding equality for the Karen people. “Currently, we are still in the mode of revolutionary resistance,” the chairman said in his address on Friday, citing a lack of progress in the peace process. The Karen resistance movement has long demanded basic rights, equality and self-determination. The KNU is the most senior of Myanmar’s various ethnic armed groups, having resisted central government control for seven decades. Padoh Saw Kwe Htoo Win, the vice chairman of the KNU, said the group had waged a 63-year campaign of armed resistance because previous governments had ignored its call to resolve the Karen people’s political demands peacefully, through political dialogue. He said the previous governments and junta had only agreed to discuss a ceasefire, not to hold political dialogue..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2020-01-31
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-01
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Topic: Karen National Liberation Army, Karen National Union, KNU, Military, mine explosion, peace negotiations, Peace Process, Peace talks, road reconstruction, Tatmadaw
Topic: Karen National Liberation Army, Karen National Union, KNU, Military, mine explosion, peace negotiations, Peace Process, Peace talks, road reconstruction, Tatmadaw
Description: "The Myanmar military has accused the Karen National Union of using an anti-vehicle mine to kill a battalion commander in a targeted attack in Karen State’s Papun Township on Monday, an allegation the KNU denied. The commander was serving as part of a unit providing security for a road-building project that the KNU opposes. Lieutenant Colonel Aung Kyaw Soe, commander of Light Infantry Battalion No. 708, died when the anti-vehicle mine exploded at 3 p.m. on Jan. 27 near Nat Taung Village in Papun, said Brigadier General Zaw Min Tun, a spokesman for the Myanmar military (or Tatmadaw). The following day, military vehicles transporting goods to security forces and engineers constructing roads in the area were hit by anti-vehicle mine blasts near Muthae Village in Kyauk Kyi Township, Bago Region. The military said the attack damaged a vehicle and its shipment of rice. Brig-Gen. Zaw Min Tun told The Irrawaddy on Thursday, “The mine that killed the commander on Monday was planted in the middle of the road and was detonated in a targeted attack.” “[The KNU] should refrain from such actions. If not, we will have to act for security reasons,” he said..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2020-01-30
Date of entry/update: 2020-01-31
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Myanmar’s military continued to carry out serious human rights violations in 2019, while the government made no progress addressing the pervasive impunity of soldiers who committed abuses, London-based Amnesty International said Thursday in a new report on repression in Asia. The military’s violations included war crimes in Kachin, Rakhine, and Shan states where government forces have been engaged in armed conflict with ethnic armed groups, the rights organization said. Civilians, state lawmakers, and local officials have reported soldiers detaining and sometimes torturing villagers suspected of aiding the enemy or of being rebel fighters themselves in the conflict zones, especially in northern Rakhine state. “The military committed serious violations against civilians, including unlawful attacks, arbitrary arrests, torture and other illtreatment, enforced disappearances, extrajudicial executions, and forced labor” in Rakhine state, where government forces have fought the rebel Arakan Army (AA) in heightened hostilities over the past year, the report said. “Many of them constituted war crimes,” it said..."
Source/publisher: "RFA" (USA)
2020-01-30
Date of entry/update: 2020-01-31
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: The guns of civil conflict fell silent during the visit by Chinese leader Xi Jinping – a pause in fighting that not even State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi can achieve.
Description: "WEEKS before the visit by President Xi Jinping, local media outlets were focusing on the relationship between China and Myanmar. I especially enjoyed two cartoons drawn by Myanmar cartoonists before Xi arrived. One showed a fat Chinese man dressed in red talking to three men sitting on the floor. “When we visit, we don’t want to hear any noises,” he’s saying. The three men, who are wearing uniforms and have rifles beside them, reply, “Yes”. The other cartoon is in two blocks, one above the other. The top one shows rats running in circles and antagonising each other. The bottom image shows the rats all smiles with arms around each other’s shoulders as a big red cat clad in the flag of the People’s Republic of China enters the room with a stern expression. Support more independent journalism like this. Sign up to be a Frontier member. The cartoons were caustic comments on the recent quiescence of ethnic armed groups. In the days ahead of Xi’s arrival, the guns of war were indeed silent..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Frontier Myanmar" (Myanmar)
2020-01-26
Date of entry/update: 2020-01-30
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Chinese leader Xi Jinping has vowed to “solve” persistent gunrunning to Myanmar insurgents
Description: "When Chinese President Xi Jinping met Myanmar’s military commander-in-chief Senior General Ming Aung Hlaing in Naypyidaw earlier this month, it was not clear which of the two raised the issue first. But side-stepping the 800 pound gorilla in the room — new Chinese weaponry fueling Myanmar’s civil wars — was never going to be an option. Over the past year, those Chinese weapons have cost the Myanmar military, or Tatmadaw, hundreds of lives. And as the fighting season gathers pace in western Rakhine state, the likelihood of another high death toll in 2020 will cast a long shadow in army circles over the triumphant hailing of a “new era” in Sino-Myanmar amity and cooperation that attended Xi’s historic state visit. Almost certainly not by coincidence, the day before the January 18 meeting – the sixth meeting between Xi and Min Aung Hlaing — the Tatmadaw’s public relations wing ensured that the “discovery” of a rebel cache of Chinese munitions made on January 15 in Hsenwi township in northern Shan state received wide media publicity..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
2020-01-28
Date of entry/update: 2020-01-29
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Topic: ALP, Arakan Liberation Party, Chiang Mai, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, EAOs, ethnic armed organizations, Military, nationwide ceasefire agreement, NCA, Peace Process, Peace Process Steering Team, PPST, RCSS, Restoration Council of Shan State, Tatmadaw
Topic: ALP, Arakan Liberation Party, Chiang Mai, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, EAOs, ethnic armed organizations, Military, nationwide ceasefire agreement, NCA, Peace Process, Peace Process Steering Team, PPST, RCSS, Restoration Council of Shan State, Tatmadaw
Description: "Organizing a national-level political dialogue before the next peace conference will be one of the key issues to discuss during next week’s meeting between the government and the ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) that signed the nationwide ceasefire agreement (NCA). The national dialogue began in 2017 but not all the signatories were able to convene. These included the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS) because of objections from the Tatmadaw (military) about the location and the Arakan Liberation Party (ALP) in Rakhine State, citing security concerns. The RCSS and ALP were missing from the dialogue in 2017 and 2018 and their input was therefore missing from the process to establish a federation. With the formal peace process stalled, the national political dialogue has been abandoned for nearly two years. Sai Ngern, the head of the EAOs’ negotiation team on the political dialogue framework and a secretary of the RCSS, said every NCA signatory “must be able to organize the national-level political dialogue under a new framework”. “We tentatively plan it to be able to hold talks in late March. It will be on the agenda of the talks with the government on Jan. 28-29,” he told reporters after the 10 NCA signatories’ Peace Process Steering Team (PPST) meeting in Chiang Mai on Saturday..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2020-01-20
Date of entry/update: 2020-01-22
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "A week after formal peace negotiations resumed, General Yawd Serk, who represents Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) signatories, urged all sides to work collectively to move the peace process forward. The NCA signatories’ Peace Process Steering Team, currently led by Gen. Yawd Serk of the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), meets from Friday in Chiang Mai to discuss future tasks in the peace process ahead of the implementation of the eight points agreed at the Joint-Ceasefire Implementation Coordination Meeting (JICM). The meeting, a gateway to the formal peace talks, was held on Jan. 8 in Naypyitaw, joining peace negotiators from the ethnic armed organizations that signed the NCA and the government. Gen. Yawd Serk said: “In laying down future tasks, we have to do so in agreement” with the time set by the JICM for the convening of the fourth 21st-century Panglong peace conference, which is scheduled for no later than April. He said reaching “the goal of building a federal Union” depended on the groups’ constant engagement in the peace process and keeping “the affairs of the Union in the forefront, rather than the affairs of one group”..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2020-01-17
Date of entry/update: 2020-01-20
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "“As ever, it is civilians who bear the brunt of the accompanying abuses that the Myanmar military soldiers inflict on the local populations. Furthermore, they do so with impunity. Documented for decades, yet without any real change, the Myanmar military which commit rape and sexual violence, extrajudicial killings, torture, forced labor and many other forms of violations against local ethnic populations, escapes justice.” A new decade has begun in Myanmar[1], yet the same problems that have blighted the country since independence, ethnic inequality, Burmanization, and military attacks in ethnic areas remain. Renewed fighting in Karen State, continuing fighting in Shan and Arakan States, and the struggle for ethnic nationalities to assert their identity have all been present in the first two weeks of this year. Yet the powers in Naypyidaw remain stuck on the same track, pushing a broken peace process and blaming ethnic groups for continued failures. At the Joint Implementation Coordination Meeting (JICM) held in Naypyidaw on 8 January, 2020, which was attended by leaders of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) signatory ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), the government, and the Myanmar military, State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi put blame on the EAOs for the failure of the peace process. In her opening remarks, she stated, “Concerning the case of having more armed conflicts, we would like to remind you of the fact that taking advantage by means of stronger armed forces or playing with the fancy of finding other new solutions will never bring solutions to the problems of our country.” The meeting, unsurprisingly, ended without substantive progress..."
Source/publisher: Progressive Voice (Thailand)
2020-01-12
Date of entry/update: 2020-01-19
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "The United Wa State Party (UWSP) says that they expect the solution for resolving fighting between government troops and northern Myanmar based ethnic armed forces will be found during Chinese President Xi’s visit to Myanmar. The statement issued by UWSP/UWSA (United Wa State Army) welcomes President Xi’s visit to Myanmar and added that peace in northern Myanmar was concerned with Sino-Myanmar relations and development among people (with China). The statement suggests that China plays a crucial role in restoring peace in Myanmar especially a ceasefire with ethnic armed groups in the Northern Alliance..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Mizzima" (Myanmar)
2020-01-16
Date of entry/update: 2020-01-16
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Amid relentless protests against the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) across the northeast, leaders and cadres of the banned insurgent group National Democratic Front of Bodoland-Saoraigwra (NDFB-S) came back to India from Myanmar as part of the ongoing talks with the Government of India. A top leader of the rebel outfit told News18, “All the 50 members of the NDFB-S left Myanmar early on Saturday. The Indian Army escorted the leaders and cadres from the International border to an undisclosed Army base.” “The outfit’s chief, B Saoraigwra, and his family members along with his security personnel crossed the international border at Tamu (in Manipur), while NDFB-S’ (self-styled) general secretary B Ferrenga, council members and other cadres entered India through the Longwa international border (in Nagaland),” he added. Though the Director General of Assam Police, Bhaskarjyoti Mahanta, refused to comment on the development, a senior intelligence officer said, “All this is being directly monitored by Ministry of Home Affairs. We have not been informed officially yet. The top leadership of the group will be taken to Delhi as part of peace talks.”..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "News 18" (UK)
2020-01-11
Date of entry/update: 2020-01-12
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "While Myanmar’s state counselor and de facto leader Aung San Suu Kyi focused her energies last month on personally defending her country’s appalling human-rights record in The Hague, bewildering ever more erstwhile supporters for papering over atrocities, “Rape as a Weapon of War and the Women Who Are Resisting: A Special Report” recently released by the Free Burma Rangers (FBR) reflects a more accurate portrayal of the true nature of the ethnic conflict embroiling the long-troubled country. “Sexual violence has become a hallmark of the prolonged civil conflict and an indisputable tactic of the Burma Army against ethnic women,” the report states. “After several failed domestic and international agreements, the Burma Army continues to rape with impunity, but women across the ethnic states are tired of living in fear.” Working with local ethnic pro-democracy groups, FBR trains, supplies, and later coordinates with teams providing humanitarian relief. After training, these teams provide essential emergency medical services, basic necessities and human-rights documentation in their home regions..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
2020-01-03
Date of entry/update: 2020-01-11
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "The Myanmar army attacked a Kachin Independence Army (KIA) training base in northern Shan State’s Hseni Township on Wednesday, according to local sources. The KIA reported that the Myanmar army attacked a KIA Brigade 10 training base and KIA forces fought back. “We heard that they came to attack our base. KIA forces were fighting in self-defense,” KIA spokesperson Colonel Naw Bu told The Irrawaddy on Friday. “We do not know details yet about whether the Myanmar army has withdrawn their troops from our area or whether our training base has withdrawn troops from the area, as it is very difficult to get in contact with them,” he said. Col. Naw Bu is based at the KIA headquarters in Laiza, Kachin State. The colonel added that in the last three months, the Myanmar military has deployed troops in the territory of KIA Brigade 10 and has been searching for the KIA army base. Kachin News Group reported that the Myanmar army fired four large artillery shells at the KIA training base, as well as lighter weapons..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2020-01-10
Date of entry/update: 2020-01-11
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "The opinion piece of January 1, 2020 The Global New Light of Myanmar wrote that “Our new year resolution should be “total peace” in 2020” is an appropriate and welcome aspiration and everything should be done to realize this noble intention. While it is correct that the people should be involved in achieving the desired peace, harmony and reconciliation that would come with it, ground work has to be laid out so that the public could participate in a matured manner. This means that the people should be appropriately informed, given freedom of expression and freedom of choice in a variety of issues confronting the country. In other words, the powers that be must not mislead and politically exploit the mass for its political gains. The case in point is the NLD regime’s mobilization of the mass on the eve of ICJ lawsuit just very recently, where the regime and its media outlets told the people that they were also been sued. Actually it is only the government or political decision-making apparatus that the lawsuit is directed at and in no way the people..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Shan Herald Agency for News" (Myanmar)
2020-01-03
Date of entry/update: 2020-01-10
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "As the restarting of nationwide ceasefire agreement (NCA)-based peace process gears to restart after more than a year of standstill, it is important to note that the government intention is to link the projected achievement of peace along the line with its Myanmar Sustainable Development Plan (MSDP) launched to cover the time span from 2018 to 2030. The ambitious government plan launched in August 2018, now over a year old, is a 66-page document, which incorporates existing and draft plans and policies, sets out 3 pillars, 5 goals, 28 strategies and 251 action plans. The three pillars are “Peace and Stability; Prosperity and Partnership; and People and Planet”. Under Peace and Stability, there are two goals. One is “Peace, National Reconciliation, Security and Good Governance” and the other, “Economic Stability and Strengthened Macro Economic Management”. Under Prosperity and Partnership, “Job Creation and Private Sector Led Growth” is the goal. Finally, under People and Planet, there are two goals. One is “Human Resources and Social Development for a 21st Century Society” and the other, “Natural Resources and the Environment for Posterity of the Nation”..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Shan Herald Agency for News" (Myanmar)
2020-01-09
Date of entry/update: 2020-01-10
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi called on all signatories of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) to take responsibility and accountability in implementing the pact, saying its principles apply equally to all stakeholders. She made the comments on Wednesday at the resumption of the long-awaited Joint Implementation Coordination Meeting (JICM) in Naypyitaw, at which she was joined by military representatives led by deputy army chief Vice Senior General Soe Win, and ethnic representatives led by Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS) chairman General Yawd Serk. The JICM is considered a gateway to resuming the formal peace process, which has been stalled for more than a year since two NCA signatories suspended their participation. The Karen National Union decided to temporarily suspend its participation in formal peace negotiations in October 2018 and the RCSS withdrew from the Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC) on the NCA the following month..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2020-01-08
Date of entry/update: 2020-01-09
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Myanmar’s political transition from military authoritarianism to an evolving parliamentary system has gained worldwide attention and praise. Local and international scepticism regarding the flawed national elections of November 2010 gave way to outright optimism once the by-elections of April 2012 brought representatives from the opposition party National League for Democracy into the bi-cameral national as well as two federal parliaments. In particular, Nobel Laureate Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s metamorphosis from long-term political prisoner into national parliamentarian was seen as key evidence of the government’s sincerity in its reform agenda. Since then, the country has embarked on a journey towards fundamental change, encountering severe challenges, setbacks, and renewed criticism but also encouraging developments. This Panorama edition analyses the focal areas of institution-building, principal actors and long-term processes that will hopefully lead toward a democratic, federal state. While development cooperation practitioners and experts in political transitions toil to draw up plans, programmes and budgets, Myanmar’s government and parliaments face an impatient population demanding an end to underdevelopment, poverty, corruption, armed conflict and oppression of dissent, so that there can be focus on daily bread-and-butter issues..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Panorama Insights into Asian and European Affairs" via "Academia.edu" (USA)
2013-00-00
Date of entry/update: 2020-01-09
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
Size: 2.15 MB (146 pages)
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Description: "Myanmar has planned to hold the fourth meeting of the 21st Century Panglong Peace Conference within the first four months of this year. A total of eight agreements including holding the peace conference were reached at the 8th Joint Implementation Coordination Meeting (JICM) on the nationwide ceasefire agreement held in Nay Pyi Taw on Wednesday, U Zaw Htay, the director general of the State Counsellor Office, told media after the meeting. The 21st Century Panglong Peace Conference was held in August 2016, May 2017 and July 2018, respectively. A total of 51 federal-related basic principles have been adopted into a union accord so far after the third conference. At the meeting, State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi, in her capacity as the chairperson of the National Reconciliation and Peace Center (NRPC), called for continued efforts for the emergence of complete federal-related basic principles on creating future union as the 51 ones previously adopted are not enough for the goal..."
Source/publisher: "Xinhua" (China)
2020-01-09
Date of entry/update: 2020-01-09
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Violence flared a year ago when the Arakan Army attacked Myanmar police, forcing thousands from their homes.
Description: "A year ago, four police stations in the conflict-ridden western Rakhine State of Myanmar came under attack from the Arakan Army (AA) leaving an estimated 13 officers dead and nine injured. The response was swift. Myanmar's military (also known as the Tatmadaw) promised to "crush the terrorists", marking the beginning of the latest bloody chapter in the country's never-ending conflicts, waged primarily between the Tatmadaw and various ethnic rebel groups. Rakhine has become notorious as the location of the military's brutal campaign against the mostly Muslim Rohingya, which led to the exodus of 740,000 people and accusations of genocide. What the military called "clearance operations" were partially justified by claims that the Muslims posed a threat to Rakhine Buddhists and their way of life, but the AA, founded in 2009 is an ethnic Rakhine, religiously Buddhist armed group..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Al Jazeera" (Qatar)
2020-01-07
Date of entry/update: 2020-01-07
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Although Africa is among the regions contributing the least to global warming, the continent is one of the hardest hit by the impact of climate change on agriculture, health and water. Convening in New York at the Dec. 11-13 Religions for Peace summit, African leaders called on the organization and its members to do more to help address the crisis. Spiritual leaders and delegates from across the globe discussed joint action on climate conservation at a Dec. 11 session on "Partnership for Environmental Stewardship and Climate Protection." A delegate from Senegal told panelist Charles McNeill of the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) that Africans are "the least responsible and the least informed" when it comes to combating climate change, due to larger issues like "putting food on the table." He called for greater involvement of religious leaders in persuading more people to do their bit to counter climate change. McNeill, UNEP's senior adviser on forests and climate, pointed to the work being done in the Democratic Republic of Congo, where people are taking steps to protect the Congo Rainforest — the second largest after the Amazon in Brazil. "I really appreciate the comment that the African people are, in spite of the fact that they're hurting the most… they are engaging and turning it around," said McNeill. Since 70% of the population in Congo depends on the forest for day-to-day resources, a delegate from Kenya said there's an urgent need to find sustainable alternatives to fuel, so that there's less cutting of trees. With the alarming deforestation in the Amazon, environmental and religious groups also fear large-scale deforestation in Congo..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The National Catholic Reporter" (USA)
2019-12-19
Date of entry/update: 2020-01-06
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "A unilateral cease-fire extended into the New Year by the “Three Brotherhood Alliance” of ethnic armies battling Myanmar’s armed forces appeared to make little difference as residents across the conflict zone in Rakhine state reported fighting this week. Local lawmakers and villagers said Thursday that the armed conflicts have continued despite the cease-fire announcement by the Arakan Army (AA) and its allies the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA). They had announced Wednesday that they were extending a temporary unilateral cease-fire against Myanmar forces until Feb. 29 to allow more time to implement negotiations with the Myanmar military — the second extension since September. The three ethnic armies, which along with the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) form the Northern Alliance, have been meeting with government peace negotiators to discuss bilateral truces, but have made little headway. The parties have agreed to meet again in January. The AA said armed conflicts are continuing because the military has used excessive force to intrude into its territory..."
Source/publisher: "Radio Free Asia (RFA)" (USA)
2020-01-02
Date of entry/update: 2020-01-06
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "KPSN Welcomes UN FFM Report – Calls for Sanctions on Military Companies The Karen Peace Support Network (KPSN), welcomes the report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on Myanmar, on the Myanmar military’s economic interests, published on 5th August 2019. The Fact Finding Mission was established to look into who is responsible for violations of international law in Rakhine, Shan and Kachin States, and to make recommendations to ensure justice and accountability. It found that the Myanmar military has committed war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Karen Environmental and Social Action Network (KESAN)
2019-08-08
Date of entry/update: 2020-01-06
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Visiting Chinese State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with Myanmar's Commander-in-Chief of Defense Services Min Aung Hlaing here on Sunday, with both sides agreeing to strengthen economic cooperation and speed up peace process in northern Myanmar. Lauding the Myanmar army as an important force in preserving the country's peace and stability as well as the friendship between China and Myanmar, Wang said the exchanges between the armed forces of the two countries represent an important part of "Paukphaw" (fraternal) friendship. China is willing to take the 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations next year as an opportunity to jointly push forward the construction of the Belt and Road Initiative and the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, build a community of shared future with the Myanmar government and army, so as to push bilateral relations into a new era, he noted. Wang said the peace and reconciliation process in northern Myanmar is significant to the country's social and economic development, hoping that Myanmar continues to stick to political dialogue and firmly carry on peace talks. China will as always maintain close contact with Myanmar and play a constructive role in promoting the peace talks, Wang said. He called on all relevant parties to continue to show restraint, maintain the ceasefire and sign a ceasefire agreement at an early date. The two sides should also strengthen cooperation in the control and management of border areas to ensure peace and stability at China-Myanmar border areas, he added..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Xinhua" (China)
2019-12-08
Date of entry/update: 2019-12-09
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "A visitor to Myanmar can easily spend two weeks seeing the main tourist destinations and depart with the impression of having been in a peaceful nation. Within its borders, however, rages the world’s longest continuing civil war. It began at independence in 1948 and no end is in sight. This is the conundrum of Myanmar today: the coexistence of peace and war. The first national election in 20 years was held in 2010, at the end of five decades of repressive military rule. This election produced a government led by former General Thein Sein that unexpectedly moved quickly to adopt far-reaching political and economic reforms. The longtime leader of the democratic opposition and world-famous icon of democracy Aung San Suu Kyi was released from house arrest shortly after that election. In 2012, she won a seat in the parliament in a by-election. In the 2015 election, her party — the National League for Democracy (NLD) — won in a landslide against the military-supported party..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Brookings Institution (blog)"
2019-12-06
Date of entry/update: 2019-12-07
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Topic: CHINA, MYANMAR, INSURGENCY, UNITED WA STATE ARMY, ARAKAN ARMY, TNLA, MANPADS, FN-6
Sub-title: Ethnic rebels unexplained acquisition of Chinese-made FN-6 portable missiles is a political and military game-changer
Topic: CHINA, MYANMAR, INSURGENCY, UNITED WA STATE ARMY, ARAKAN ARMY, TNLA, MANPADS, FN-6
Description: "Myanmar’s seizure last week of a large cache of mostly Chinese weapons from a rebel camp sparked a brief and predictable flurry of nationalist outrage, underscoring as it did the shadowy role of neighboring China in fueling the nation’s many long-running ethnic conflicts. But the real significance of the November 22 incident had less to do with the seized weaponry’s quantity or provenance and much more with unambiguous confirmation that insurgents in active hostilities with government forces, or Tatmadaw, are now fielding man-portable air defense systems, or MANPADS, weapons that militarily and politically constitute potential game-changers. Amidst the stack of over 150 assault rifles, machine-guns, grenade launchers and nearly 80 sacks of explosives seized in a village in northeastern Shan state’s Namhsan township troops also retrieved in an apparent first a single MANPADS launcher identified as a Chinese-manufactured FN-6. Abandoning the cache after an apparently brief clash with state forces were rebels of the ethnic Palaung Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), which operates across northern Shan state and dominates the tea-growing hill country of Namhsan..."
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Source/publisher: "Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
2019-11-28
Date of entry/update: 2019-11-29
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