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Description: Very valuable news site, specialising in the non-Burman groups....."The Burma News International was established in 2003 with four Burmese news organizations based in the western border of Burma, India and Bangladesh. It was later expanded, with other Burmese news organizations based in Thailand and the Thai-Burma border areas joining in. At present, it has ten independent Burma media/news organizations as members. They are: "Burma News International" (BNI - covers all ethnic groups)..."Chin World"...Independent Mon News Agency (IMNA)... "Kachin News Group" (KNG)..."Kaladan Press" (Arakan, Rohingya)..."Kantarawaddy Times" (Karenni)..."Khonumthung News" (Chin)..."KIC" (=Karen Information Committee, but this is usually in Burmese. "Karen News" is the English counterpart to "KIC")..."Mizzima News" (covers different ethnic groups)..."Narinjara News" (Arakan)..."Network Media Group" (NMG - covers all ethnic groups), "Phophtaw News Association" (covers all non-Burman groups)...Shan Herald Agency for News (S.H.A.N.)..... " The Burma News International aims to promote Burma related news and reports in South Asia and South East Asia. It is also serves as a bridge for mutual-understanding, sharing experiences, expertise and resources and cooperation among the Independent Burma Media Organizations."
Source/publisher: Burma News International (BNI)
Date of entry/update: 2009-12-22
Grouping: Websites/Multiple Documents
Language: English, Burmese
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Date of entry/update: 2003-06-03
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Description: * Bulletin [2001-2005] * Bulletin Board * Seminars * Publications * Back Issues Thai-Yunnan Newsletter The Bulletin was launched in 2001. The Thai-Yunnan Newsletter ceased publication in 1995. Current issues of the Bulletin plus archive of the 28 issues of the Newsletter from June 1988 to March 1995. They contain a fair amount of scholarly articles and correspondance on Burma.
Source/publisher: Department of Anthropology, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University
Date of entry/update: 2010-07-08
Grouping: Websites/Multiple Documents
Language: English
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Description: "Ethnic conflict has dominated the political landscape of Burma (Myanmar) since independence from Great Britain in 1948. In the process, countless lives have been lost, many communities dislocated from their homes, and a country that was deemed to have the brightest future of any of its Asian neighbors at independence has stagnated to become one of the world’s poorest. In such state failures, tragedy is interwoven with irony. Burma, indeed, is the land where the anthropologist Edmund Leach carried out his ground-breaking studies into patterns of cultural inter-change among peoples. In essence, Leach concluded that ethnic and political identities are neither innate nor inflexible, but develop on the basis of understandings and cultural exchanges between different societies. Since this time, ethnic field research in Burma has come to a virtual halt. The world of Asian studies thus owes a profound debt of gratitude to Prof. Josef Silverstein. Since the 1950s, his writings on ethnic questions have stood out as a persistent – and often lone – beacon of concerned but independent analysis. At the beginning of the 21st century, his works are as pertinent as when he first began. Not only has he crystallized complex issues in understandable form, but he has done this in a language that has become common currency in many international understandings of the country and its challenges. A particular issue in Burmese politics over the past 60 years has been the lack of common forums or platforms where different parties and nationalities might equally work together. As Prof. Silverstein has described, underpinning these failures is the ‘dilemma of national unity’.1 Important ethnic questions date back to the pre-colonial past. But, in general, the modern roots of many problems can be found in the political divisions of Burma, under a diarchic system, between ‘Ministerial Burma’ and the ethnic minority ‘Frontier Areas Administration’ during British rule. Inter-communal relations were then exacerbated by conflict during the Second World War, and the challenge of national unity has remained evident in all political eras since Burma’s independence in 1948..."
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Source/publisher: The Burma Studies Group, Association of Asian Studies Conference (Washington D.C.)
2002-04-05
Date of entry/update: 2021-07-27
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Camp Victoria, Myanmar (CNN)Full-throated they belt out songs of victory, their boots adding the drumbeat as ranks of new recruits jog in formation through their jungle training camp. There's no doubting the shining eyes of these young people united by an ideal -- freedom from the junta that's smothered democracy in Myanmar. Nor, perhaps, hiding from the dark tragedy that may await them. They pour into Camp Victoria, the headquarters of the long-standing ethnic army of the Chin National Front (CNF) in western Myanmar, close to India's border. They defy attempts by the camp's leadership to suspend training because of the Covid-19 pandemic. Many come from within the surrounding mountainous territory. But many others make the dangerous journey across a nation that's already riven with protests, army violence and oppression -- in search of military skills. On the cusp of adulthood, these volunteers say they demonstrated against the military coup that swept away their civilian government in February. And as the junta's response has grown increasingly bloody, so they have taken up arms. But any hope of singing songs of actual victory anytime soon are remote. Their leadership is warning of a long fight. "Now it's a kind of an urban guerrilla-type (conflict) but within months it will transform into a conventional civil war," Suikhar, vice chairman of the CNF, tells CNN. This bleak truth raises the prospect, indeed the probability, that Myanmar will descend into a protracted conflict where no victors emerge, and the country collapses. In a report on the emerging civil war in Myanmar published at the end of June, the International Crisis Group (ICG), a transnational think tank, accused the military of using a strategy that targeted civilians to undermine militia support. But the experts' prognosis for the civilian population was grim, too. "The coming period of national economic collapse, widespread poverty and deprivation will give them greater incentive to secure sources of revenue, either directly from locals or at their expense. These factors point to the likely emergence of new, sustained armed groups in these areas, following dynamics witnessed many times over the decades of insurgency in various parts of Myanmar," the report said. Suikhar insisted that his movement and the Chinland Defence Force, which are also being trained at Camp Victoria, were led by Myanmar's National Unity Government. This exiled administration that exists largely, for now, in name only, is a loose alliance of anti-junta forces and has no command or control authority over the armed groups inside Myanmar itself. And for the new graduates from the jungle training camp, there may be a bitter end to the romantic vision of a fight for freedom. Anxious to hear how outsiders saw the conflict unfolding, a young fighter, a former journalist and graduate from the University of ​Yangon explained that he was the commander of what started out as a 10-person group specially trained in urban guerrilla warfare. "At least, I did command 10 people. Now there are only seven. I lost three last week when they were carrying a homemade bomb to use against the junta. It blew up in their hands. They all died on the spot," he says. He's been ordered by his superiors in the Chinland Defence Force back to Camp Victoria for a break after this blooding. In a few days he was in a new black uniform and undergoing more specialist training. His eyes now shone with cold determination, not hope. Stalemate is not victory But the junta army is striking back ruthlessly, analysts say. "The Tatmadaw is using its long-established 'four cuts' counter-insurgency strategy in these areas, a cruel approach that deliberately targets civilians in an effort to deprive insurgents of food, funds, recruits and intelligence on troop movements (hence the four cuts). Attacks on populated areas are an integral part of this strategy, along with the looting of food stores and denial of relief supplies, in clear violation of international humanitarian law," the ICG alleges. The strategy is well enough known around Camp Victoria, where civilians are leaving outlying villages for small refugee encampments, or safety in Indian communities across the Tiau River. Most of the refugees are women, children and the old. They all left their villages for the same reasons. "I am really afraid of the Myanmar military because they're very nasty and they are ​a brutal military. Twenty years ago the military tortured my son in my own house. They hit him on the head. There was blood all over his head and that's why I am really afraid of them," said Tial Song, an elderly woman who was sitting under the orange plastic sheeting of a newly erected shelter. "How long will be you a refugee?" CNN asked Chanlal, Song's neighbor on this muddy hillside. "As long as the military rules over us," he replies. Beyond the outer defenses of Camp Victoria, the mountains of Chin State leap in near-vertical waves of thick jungle. Travel is on precipitous mountain passes along tiny mud tracks. Locals, many of them experienced hunters, have the edge over invading armies. They also have the mass intelligence network of their own communities, with fighters receiving live updates of enemy troops movements from village agents all over the state. But these advantages alone won't help the anti-junta forces survive. Stalemate is not victory. An unlikely jungle guerrilla Getting in, or out, of the Chin-controlled zone is a grueling test of endurance. It often involves entire days of back-breaking bouncing along the mud-slickened tracks on the back of small Chinese-made motorbikes. These little 125cc workhorses are the mules of the modern era, carrying fighters, ammunition and food to far-flung camps run by the Chinland Defence Force. One of these camps that CNN visited sits close to a jungle trail, with a small network of bunkers and dormitory tents for the volunteers. It may be their home and fighting base for many months to come. John Ling gave up his history studies at ​the University of ​Yangon to join the insurgency. Swapping the classroom for a hilltop camp​, he's the administrator, or quartermaster, for about 150 other volunteers. A slightly built man of 22, Ling's an unlikely jungle guerrilla. "Aren't you afraid of being killed?" CNN asks him. "No, because I stand for my country," he replies -- adding that his parents are not worried about him, but proud of the stand that he's taken. It may be noble -- but it's also open-ended. The armory is an A-framed tent of plastic sheeting and tree trunks. Its precious contents, dozens of shotguns designed for shooting birds, are lined up along each wall. On the floor, a log fire burns to keep the damp out, and rust off the guns. Suikhar, the Chin National Front vice chairman, is adamant that these fighters will soon be supplied with automatic firearms, such as AK-47s. "There are international smugglers. ... You can get weapons anywhere," he insists, but is opaque about how those weapons would be paid for. "People donate, raise the funds. So I don't think that money will be a problem." Many armed groups in Myanmar have relied for decades on smuggling, especially drugs like heroin and methamphetamines, to fund their insurgencies. And the longer they depend on local populations, the greater the chances are that civilians will be burdened by graft, protection rackets or simple taxation by rebel armies. The CNF says it believes it's one of 16 ethnic armies, and hopes for cooperation among them against a common enemy -- all in the name of "democracy and federalism." Young citizens have flocked to this ideal; it was the thwarting of a democratic future that drove so many young people into the forests with guns. But the future length of their war, indeed whether they win or lose, may depend less on the young people of the opposition than on the young soldiers and officers being sent to fight them from the national army. The quickest end to fighting rests in a "young officers' coup" against the brutality and corruption of the generals who returned to power in February. The Chin leadership knows this..."
Source/publisher: "CNN" (USA)
2021-07-08
Date of entry/update: 2021-07-09
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Sub-title: The role of transnational activism in promoting political reform
Description: "Introduction: On a remote stretch of the Salween River, between the proposed Dar Gwin and Wei Gyi hydropower dam sites and where it forms the border between Thailand and Myanmar (Burma), 1 sits the Ei Tu Hta camp for ethnic Karen internally displaced peoples (IDPs) in Karen National Union (KNU) controlled Myanmar. The family of Hsiplopo, the leader of this camp, live three hours walk away but he is unable to visit them because the tatmadaw, the Myanmar military with which the KNU has been engaged in the world's longest running civil war, have camps that are only two hours walk away. The camp is also built on steep hillsides, denuding the forest cover in the limited area available, and is unable to grow its own rice, relying instead on regular donations from the UN and other NGOs shipped upriver by longtail boat. 2 This type of human and environmental insecurity colours the daily existence of both the Karen people in this camp and many other ethnic minorities in Myanmar. Nevertheless, despite these conditions, Hsiplopo's commitment to a campaign against the proposed nearby dams is resolute: 'We don't want dams ... the military cannot build the dams because the KNU will not let them while the people do not want them.' 3 This stance reflects the opposition to the dams of many environmental activists and groups who inhabit the nebulous and dangerous borderlands regions of eastern Myanmar. It also represents a form of activated citizenship although the concept of citizenship for ethnic minorities in Myanmar is itself problematic as their relationship to the Myanmar state is often little more than one of oppression and conflict. Despite the civil conflict in these areas, and perhaps because of it, these activists often operate beyond the remit of the tatmadaw undertaking perilous work with the KNU to promote human and environmental security for ethnic minorities. As an activist from the Karen Environmental and Social Action Network (KESAN) explains: 'KESAN's programs are in the KNU area [in Myanmar] so we have a close relationship with the KNU leaders. ' 4 It can be difficult for environmental activists in the North, for whom this precarious existence is entirely foreign, to fully comprehend the existential struggle that dictates much environmental activism in the South, particularly under authoritarian regimes such as that of Myanmar, which has been dominated by the military since 1962. As a result, many Northern environment movements, and the American environment movement in particular, have been historically apolitical with the issues of 'human health, shelter, and food security' traditionally absent from their agendas (Doyle 2005, 26). This lack of political analysis on the issues of central importance to survival in the South and the movements they spawn is also reflected within many academic writings on environmental politics. Despite an increased focus on the environment in the last two decades, most approaches to environmental politics still examine predominantly ecological issues or regulatory regimes and focus particularly on the affluent states of the North (Howes 2005; Kutting 2000; Paehlke and Torgerson 2005). Although there has been increased attention on environmental movements in recent years, much of the material also focuses primarily on movements within the North (Carter 2007; Doherty 2002; Doyle 2000; Dryzek et al. 2003; Gottlieb 2005; Hutton and Connors 1999; Rootes 2007; Sandler and Pezzullo 2007; Shabecoff 1993). There has been some analysis of environn1ent movements in the South (Doherty 2006; Doherty and Doyle 2006; Doyle 2005; Duffy 2006; Dwivedi 1997, 2001 ), and various studies of transnational activism more generally ( della P01ta et al. 2006; Eschle and Maiguashca 2005; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Reitan 2007; Routledge et al. 2006; Rupert 2000), but only limited studies on how authoritarianism in the South specifically impacts on enviromnental activism (Doyle and Simpson 2006) or policy (Fredriksson and Wollscheid 2007). There are numerous studies that examine civil society under authoritarianism more broadly but these tend to focus on more traditional and formalised civil society organisations (Jamal 2007; Liverani 2008; Sater 2007). This chapter adds to this literature by delving more deeply into enviromnental politics under the military in Myanmar and examines the transnational campaigns against several proposed hydroelectric dams on the Salween River in eastern Myanmar. As transnational projects these dams are being undertaken by governments and transnational corporations (TNCs) but, as with most large energy projects in Myamnar, they are designed to export most of their electricity to either Thailand or China. Despite national elections in November 2010 that returned Myanmar to nominally civilian rule the 2008 constitution, on which the elections were based, provides for a continuing central role for the military in the country's governance (Holliday 2008). Although the election process was flawed, fraudulent and tightly controlled, with many generals from the former military regime, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), 5 merely stepping out of their uniforms to take up senior positions in the new government, there is little doubt that incremental change towards civilian rule is occurring and the potential for political discourse in Myamnar may well in1prove over time. While many exiled or human rights groups rightly point out that civil conflict and human rights abuses, particularly in the eastern border regions, continue,6 some analysts, such as the former International Labour Organization (ILO) Liaison Officer in Myanmar, Richard Horsey, are more optimistic about the 'new level of scrutiny' (Horsey 2011, 4) that has accompanied the new parliament. The current Liaison Officer, Steve Marshall, who is possibly more intimately involved with the new government than any other W estemer likewise argues that 'there is no doubt that the political landscape has changed' . 7 This top down political change has accompanied a less visible but nonetheless significant increase in domestic civil society activism in recent years and particularly since Cyclone Nargis in 2008 (Sabandar 2010; South 2004). The main beneficiaries of this opening have been humanitarian NGOs that have focused on emergency relief to natural disasters such as Nargis and Cyclone Giri in 2010, 8 but there has also been increased activity by environmental groups and NGOs. These groups, as with all those actors who wish to avoid sanction or imprisonment in Myanmar, engage in a certain amount of self-censorship to avoid overtly political critiques of the government but there is increasing space available for pursuing third sector environmental governance. This increased domestic activism has improved the prospects of collaboration between domestic and exiled groups with prominent domestic environmentalists running trainings on the border or in Thailand for exiled groups such as KESAN. 9 Regardless of recent changes, however, after five decades of authoritarian rule the local environmental movement remains embtyonic with significant limitations in experience and expertise. It has, therefore, been the transnational environment movement occupying Myanmar's borderlands that has provided the most fertile and important outlet for environmental activism and governance of large-scale hydropower projects in Myanmar. 10 This case study therefore suggests that, whereas hybrid regimes offer domestic spaces for political competition and therefore foster domestic civil society (Diamond 2002; Jayasuriya and Rodan 2007; Levitsky and Way 2002), traditional authoritarian regimes such as that which has afflicted Myanmar are more likely to create an activist diaspora, a dynamic transnational community of expatriates who engage in environmental activism in borderland regions or neighbouring countries. As this case study demonstrates, an activist diaspora tends to transcend ethnic divisions and therefore provides a multi-ethnic cohesion which is often absent from the broader exile community. As 'divide and conquer' has been one of the tatmadaw's main strategies in neutralising opposition by ethnic minorities, Myanmar's activist diaspora may contribute to more potent domestic social movements that promote democracy, human rights and environmental security in Myanmar..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Adam Simpson
2013-00-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-07-05
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Summary: Myanmar, also known as Burma, has suffered decades of repressive military rule, poverty due to years of isolationist economic policies, and civil war with ethnic minority groups. The transfer to civilian leadership in 2011 spurred hopes of democratic reforms. But the military maintained control over parts of the government, and security forces began a campaign of ethnic cleansing against the Rohingya. The military launched a coup in February 2021, announcing a yearlong state of emergency and arresting opposition figures, including de facto leader Aung San Suu Kyi, and civil society activists.....Introduction: Throughout its decades of independence, Myanmar has struggled with military rule, civil war, isolation from global affairs, and widespread poverty. In 2011, the military junta dissolved, giving way to a military-installed transitional government and ushering in what many believed would be a new era for the Southeast Asian nation. The country’s longtime opposition party—the National League for Democracy (NLD), led by Aung San Suu Kyi—won majorities in both chambers of parliament in 2015, and some foreign governments and companies that had previously shunned Myanmar began developing ties with it. But the military, known as the Tatmadaw, has continued to dominate many aspects of domestic affairs. Military and civilian leaders, including Suu Kyi, have also faced international condemnation for ongoing human rights abuses and brutal violence against Rohingya Muslims in the western state of Rakhine, which a UN report said were committed with “genocidal intent.” In February 2021, the military staged a coup and officially retook control, dashing hopes for democratic progress..."
Source/publisher: Council on Foreign Relations (New York)
2021-02-10
Date of entry/update: 2021-05-24
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Sub-title: Fighting in recent weeks has displaced some 45,000 civilians in Chin and Kachin states.
Description: "At least 10 military junta troops were killed and around 20 critically wounded in five clashes over the last two days in Myanmar’s Chin state, militia groups said Thursday, while tens of thousands of civilians have fled and are living in dire conditions as fighting has intensified in the region. Four of the engagements took place in Chin’s Hakha township, killing and injuring regime soldiers, a Hakha-based Chin-land Defense Force (CDF) spokesman told RFA’s Myanmar Service. The first occurred when CDF forces entered Lot Klone village on May 18 and were fired on by the junta troops, while the second took place the following morning, when a CDF unit ambushed soldiers on Matupi Road, killing seven, he said. “This morning [Thursday] we heard from sources close to the area that more than 10 troops were killed and more than 20 injured,” the spokesman said. Additionally, the CDF reported, a clash took place at a security checkpoint near Hakha University on May 18 and another near the intersection of Hakha Thar 6 and Hakha-Gangaw Roads the same day. On the evening of May 19, the military set fire to more than 30 motorbikes owned by Hakha CDF members, the group said, although no casualties were suffered. In Chin’s nearby Mindat township, the Mindat People’s Administration (MPA) militia said it engaged with regime troops on May 19 between mile markers 40 and 50 on Mindat-Matupi Road, killing three junta soldiers, including a sergeant. As of Thursday, the military had yet to confirm details of any of the clashes in Chin state, where soldiers are battling volunteer militias wielding mostly home-made weapons more than three months after it overthrew the country’s elected government in a Feb. 1 coup and reinstated junta rule. Za Op Ling, deputy executive director of the Chin Human Rights Organization (CHRO), told RFA that more than 35,000 civilians from Chin state have fled their homes since the attack on Lot Klone village—15,000 of whom have crossed Myanmar’s border into India’s Mizoram state. “Whenever there is a clash, the soldiers later search every house and make arrests,” he said. “Their main target is young people, so all the youths have fled to nearby villages. Some escaped to the Indian border. All this happened mostly in Mindat and at least 8,000 people have fled from the township alone.” Za Op Ling said that local authorities in Mizoram state have asked India’s central government to provide assistance to the refugees from Myanmar. A resident of Mindat confirmed that the township is nearly deserted after the military “opened fire with heavy artillery,” killing several residents. “In this kind of situation, it isn’t possible for people to live in the town. It’s not safe to stay at home at all,” she said. “People just fled to nearby forests or villages. The young people from our village have helped some of the refugees. Now there are only some elderly people left in the town, most of whom are trapped.” Around 3,000 people taking shelter in four villages in Mindat township are currently facing food shortages due to logistical difficulties and with water and power cut off, according to a local aid worker. A member of the Mindat CDF, which is helping the refugees, said the group plans to ask the United Nations refugee agency for help in distributing food and other necessities. A spokesman for the U.N. Secretary-General said in a statement on Tuesday that that the UN Office for Human Rights is investigating reports of arbitrary detentions, including the killing of six people in Mindat over the weekend. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights said at least 797 civilians, including dozens of children, have been killed by security forces since the latest military coup, while more than a thousand civilians have been injured. The fighting in Mindat over the weekend prompted Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) on Thursday to condemn the military’s blocking of humanitarian and medical aid and access to clean water. “The reports out of Mindat … expose the horrifying reality of ongoing violence against tens of thousands of civilians in Mindat by the Myanmar military,” the group said. “These actions further echo the unconscionable actions and severe breaches of international human rights law perpetrated by the Tatmadaw since the group seized power in a February 1 coup d’etat,” it said, using the Burmese name for the military. “Physicians for Human Rights is appalled by the Myanmar military’s unlawful implementation of martial law in Mindat, who has pushed civilians into Mindat’s surrounding jungles to escape detention, and the reported obstruction in access to clean drinking water.” The group noted that the fighting has left women and children in Mindat vulnerable to tactics of war it said the military regularly employs, including sexual and gender-based violence.....Kachin state refugees: In Kachin state, where junta troops have also been fighting the veteran ethnic Kachin Independence Army (KIA) since clashes broke out between the two sides on April 10, residents told RFA that the military has launched more than 30 airstrikes in the area over the past 40 days. The two sides have engaged in some 90 engagements in Kachin state’s Momauk township alone, prompting more than 10,000 people to flee from 20 villages. More than 3,000 have arrived in camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs), while the remainder are in hiding in forests near their homes, hoping to remain able to harvest their crops. A woman refugee from Momauk’s Sihak village told RFA her family had lost nearly everything in the fighting. “The three or four houses in front of ours were razed to the ground during the clashes,” she said. “The owners have nowhere to live and have fled.” A resident of Momauk’s Kone Law village said that clashes intensified just as farmers were preparing to harvest peanuts, and many crops were damaged. “We should have been harvesting then, but now, the harvest time has passed, and the ground has become very hard,” he said. “It’s very difficult to pull out the plants. We had to hire more people, but we still can’t get it done because the soil has hardened. There are a lot of people who dare not go to the fields because the soldiers are too close.” Civil society groups are attempting to provide food, shelter and medicine to Momauk, but refugees told RFA that the military is blocking them from doing so and confiscating the goods. Residents also complained that soldiers regularly plant landmines in area fields that kill essential cattle, but then demand compensation from farmers for “destroying their weapons.” A civil society worker who is assisting refugees in Momauk told RFA there are still not enough camps for those who have fled the fighting. “Even monasteries that used to take in refugees are full, so many people lack shelter because there is no place for them to live,” he said. “We are now trying to find ways to set up a new camp in a convenient location with the help of U.N. agencies, but it is difficult because of the rising number of refugees.” While the most intense fighting between the military and KIA has taken place in Momauk, clashes have also occurred in several other townships in Kachin state, including Laiza, Hpakant, Mohnyin, Mogaung, Tanaing, Bhamo, Putao, Mansi and Myitkyina.....Inter-ethnic conflicts: In addition to clashes with the military regime, Myanmar’s myriad ethnic armies have continued to fight amongst themselves in the pursuit of new territory, further exacerbating the country’s refugee crisis. Clashes between the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS) and the combined forces of the Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army-North (SSPP/SSA-N) and Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) broke out near Manli village in northern Shan state’s Namtu township in April. More than 2,000 residents of Namtu’s Panlong, Chaungsa and Manli villages, have since fled to the nearby town centers of Hsipaw and Namtu. Additionally, clashes between the SSPP/SSA-N and RCSS on May 19 prompted another 1,000 villagers to flee Hsipaw’s Wan Sein village, bring the total number of IDPs in the area to around 3,000. The SSPP/SSA-N and TNLA have called on the RCSS to withdraw their troops back to their home base in southern Shan state to ease fighting in the northern part of the region. Fighting between the RCSS and the TNLA intensified between 2015 and the end of 2017 in northern Shan state and in April 2018, the TNLA began joint operations with the SSPP/SSA-N in Namtu township. According to the SSPP/SSA-N, talks between the two Shan ethnic armies have yielded little progress..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "RFA" (USA)
2021-05-20
Date of entry/update: 2021-05-23
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Description: "Michael Lidauer explores electoral politics in Myanmar: The Tatmadaw sought to legitimise the 1 February 2021 coup d’état – which occurred hours before the newly elected parliament was about to convene – with one key narrative: that the November 2020 elections were marred by widespread fraud.[1] To counter this argument, twelve civil society organisations released a statement four days prior to the coup, declaring that “the elections were credible and reflected the will of the majority voters” (PACE 2021). Indeed, no evidence has become available that any electoral materials were tampered with.....The electoral narrative of the coup: The Tatmadaw has commented on weaknesses in the electoral process at several times before and even more so after the elections, referring inter alia to the question of organising elections under the conditions of Covid-19 and inconsistencies in the voter lists. Before the electoral campaign period, in August 2020, the Commander-in-Chief discussed with a delegation of political parties their concerns (The Irrawaddy, 15 August 2020). Although accepting the election results immediately after election day, the military fielded numerous objections regarding the elections and rejected the results during the weeks leading to the coup, and recapitulate this in their public communications (cf. Tea Circle Oxford, 9 March 2021). It ultimately blamed the government, not only the election administration, for shortcomings.[2] Apart from the President, the State Counsellor and other governmental protagonists, the Union Election Commission (UEC) Chairman and members were arrested, and a new commission was appointed few days after the coup. In fact, the UEC became the single-most targeted institution with arrests and interrogations (AAPP 2021). Since then, the newly appointed UEC – headed by the same Chairman who was in charge of organising the 2010 elections – appears to build a body of evidence to substantiate the military’s claims of electoral fraud with publications about voter list data and ballots used in the 2020 elections in the Global New Light of Myanmar which yet await a closer analysis. Given the unfolding dramatic events of civilian resistance, heavy-handed responses by the security apparatus, and the struggle for international recognition of legitimate actors, this appears of a lesser significance in the current situation. However, the underlying electoral narrative is likely to become reinvigorated if the Tatmadaw keeps to the idea of organising fresh elections, as announced in the Five-Point Road Map of the State Administration Council, coupled with proposals to change the electoral system. This article seeks to look beyond claims of manipulation and provide more nuanced perspectives. While the elections have generated credible results, there were nevertheless a number of challenges related to long-standing weaknesses in the legal framework, political competition, and the dynamics generated by the Covid-19 pandemic, all of which are important to keep in mind for a more comprehensive understanding of the recent electoral process. What is more, the organisation of elections reveals frictions in civil-military relations among Burmese elites from which ethnic minorities suffer as a consequence. As Myanmar people on all fronts oppose a new military regime and as the armed forces exercise their powers against the population, this article aims to recollect some elements of the electoral process preceding the coup, in the hopes of contributing to an understanding of the ongoing situation and of gathering lessons learned for times when elections in Myanmar will again be under scrutiny. One such element is the cancellation of elections in parts of the country, a complex phenomenon that defies a simplistic explanation. Its analysis helps to understand majority-minority as well as civil-military relations even beyond the electoral process. Ahead of election day, on 8 November 2020, the polls were locally cancelled in many more locations than during previous elections, which resulted in disenfranchisement, political controversies, and diminished trust in the election administration (cf. ANFREL 2021: 45-51). However, while disenfranchisement was much debated, it was not a new phenomenon.....Varieties of disenfranchisement: In Myanmar, electoral disenfranchisement pertains to multiple processes of exclusion from the ballot, affecting people in various ways. These systemic deficiencies have been part of the electoral legal framework since long and were no novelty to the 2020 elections. Disenfranchisement extends inter alia to voters who are not at their place of residence at the time of the elections but elsewhere in the country or abroad. This may concern the diaspora, refugees, migrant workers, students or other travellers, although procedures exist for those who are temporarily registered at a new place and could therefore “transfer” their ballot. Persons who are forcibly displaced by conflict (namely internally displaced persons, or IDPs) often cannot take part in the polls, as authorities repeatedly failed to develop and implement a consistent and effective policy for IDP inclusion at the ballot box. Voting for IDPs was discussed ahead of the 2015 general elections, but was largely overlooked by national and international audiences, whose attention focused on the overall success of the election and its result, leading to a peaceful transition of power to a government led by the National League for Democracy. More debated – but not significantly tainting the perceptions of an overall well-run process at that time either – was the legal disenfranchisement of predominantly Muslim voters and candidates, preceding the mass exodus of the Rohingya to Bangladesh in 2017. The highly contentious Rakhine State politics during the last term ultimately altered how Myanmar was seen in the world. The recently published article “Boundary Making in Myanmar’s Electoral Process: Where elections do not take place” discusses both the processes of “legal denial” for Muslim voters and candidates as well as the lack of voting opportunities for IDPs during the 2015 elections. It is part of the forthcoming Modern Asian Studies Special Issue on “Border Governance: Reframing Political Transition in Myanmar and Beyond”, edited by Kirsten McConnachie, Elaine Lynn-Ee Ho and Helene Kyed. The article also discusses election cancellations, which occurred ahead of the general elections in 2010 and 2015, but did not stir much controversy at that time. Despite affecting approximately half a million voters in 2015 – the phenomenon of election cancellations remained little understood. However, without further specifications in the legal framework and without transparent criteria for cancelling or postponing the polls, election cancellations occurred again in 2020, but this time attracted much more attention and controversial debates.....Election cancellations in 2020: Myanmar’s legislation allows for localised election postponements due to risk of violence or natural disasters. While such decisions are usually informed by state institutions in the security sector and by election sub-commissions, the ultimate authority to cancel and postpone elections lies with the Union Election Commission.[3] The UEC is the constitutionally mandated body tasked with organising and overseeing elections. The UEC Chairperson and commissioners are appointed by the President. In addition to a permanent secretariat in Nay Pyi Taw, there are sub-commissions at state/region, district and township level. At the local level, the UEC relies strongly on personnel from other state institutions including from the General Administration Department (GAD) which until 2019 was under the authority of the military-led Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA) and only then became part of the Ministry of the Union Government under civilian administration (cf. Lidauer and Saphy 2014; Renshaw and Lidauer forthcoming). The cancellation or postponement of elections has different electoral consequences, depending on the size of the administrative unit concerned. Vacant seats in the legislature occur only where elections are cancelled for entire constituencies; in this case the need for by-elections arises. Conversely, the partial cancellation of elections in a number of wards or village tracts smaller than a constituency does not translate into vacant seats, but leads to the disenfranchisement of voters residing in the cancelled areas, as the election goes ahead regardless of their participation (Lidauer 2021). Vacant seats in the hluttaws at national level proportionally increase the voting powers of military representatives for whom 25 per cent of the seats are reserved.[4] On 16 October, the UEC announced the cancellation of elections in a number of electoral constituencies where “free and fair elections cannot be held” (UEC Announcement 192/2020). While this timing and reasoning followed the pattern of similar announcements in 2015, the scale of these cancellations was unprecedented. Elections were cancelled for nine entire townships in Rakhine State and six entire townships in Shan State, as well as for 581 additional wards and village tracts in these States together with Kachin, Kayin and Mon States and Bago Region.[5] The cancellations resulted in 15 vacant seats in the Pyithu Hluttaw (nine in Rakhine, six in Shan), seven vacant seats in the Amyotha Hluttaw (all Rakhine), as well as 32 vacant seats in states’ legislatures (20 in Rakhine, 12 in Shan). Based on data shared by the UEC, over 1.2 to 1.3 million voters did not have the opportunity to vote as a result of the cancellations, and 189 candidates (who had already started campaigning) lost the possibility to contest these elections.....Reasons and reactions: These decisions caused strong reactions among political parties and civil society organisations, with allegations of gerrymandering in Rakhine State. Several parties questioned the UEC’s impartiality in this process, demanded more transparency and consultations, called for ethnic voting rights to be protected, and for the decisions to be reconsidered. On 27 October, eleven days after the first announcement, the UEC made further cancellations public, notably for Paletwa township in Chin State[6] – raising the overall number of constituencies without elections to 54 – and revoked some of the earlier decisions. These additional announcements did not help to improve perceptions and trust in the UEC, but hardened the belief that its decisions would favour the incumbent. The UEC decisions were criticised both for cancelling elections in some areas and for going ahead in others. In various areas, elections were in fact cancelled for different reasons, although on the same legal basis. The cancellation of four entire townships that form part of the Wa Self-administered Zone, and its ally in Mongla township – resulting in five vacant Pyithu Hluttaw seats and ten vacant State Hluttaw seats respectively – had been expected, as elections did also not take place there in 2010 and 2015. These are areas without any Myanmar governmental administration to prepare for elections, where a voter list had not been established, and no candidates had been enlisted. The cancelled areas in Kachin State, Karen State and Eastern Bago Region (including one village tract of Mon State) followed a similar logic, as all these areas pertained to ceasefire areas under full or mixed control of ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) and have changed little since 2015, but did not result in vacant seats in any hluttaw. In Kachin State, elections were cancelled in fewer village tracts than in 2015 in a number of townships. In Kayin State, unlike in 2015, no elections were cancelled in Hlaingbwe township, and the cancelled areas were significantly reduced in Kyainseikgyi township. This was reportedly a result of negotiations between candidates and the election administration. Partial election cancellations also occurred across Shan State. In southern Shan State, elections were cancelled entirely for Mongkaing township, where several EAOs are present. In northern Shan State, partial cancellations coincided with locations where armed conflict or tensions between the Tatmadaw, EAOs, and local militia had occurred. Kyaukme and Tangyan townships stood out with new cancelled areas while others were similar to 2015. In eastern Shan State, the cancelled areas corresponded to territories where the government has historically a weak presence. In Rakhine State, where election cancellations were new, they were all argued for on the basis of security threats resulting from ongoing armed conflict between the Tatmadaw and the Arakan Army (AA). This included entire townships that ethnic parties and candidates considered safe, such as Pauktaw and Ponnagyun, and partial cancellations in other townships where only voters in small urban areas remained eligible to elect their respective representatives, such as in Taungup, Kyauk Phyu and Ann townships.[7] Widely held assumptions that all these cancellations would result in electoral outcomes favouring the NLD proved incorrect; in fact, ethnic parties secured the majority of elected seats in the Rakhine State Hluttaw despite the cancellations. The partial election cancellations in Paletwa township in Chin State, affecting a total of five electoral constituencies,[8] were also contentious.....High-level public disputes over the election cancellations: The UEC’s decision-making process regarding the election cancellations became a public point of controversy at a high political level, involving the Office of the President and the Tatmadaw, and resulting in mutual accusations of shortcomings between the military and civilian leadership. The UEC stated that several governmental offices, including MoHA and the Ministry of Defence, were consulted to arrive at the decisions where elections should be postponed. The Tatmadaw, while maintaining that the UEC is the only authority to decide whether to hold elections or not, outlined that the UEC’s announcements did not reflect the military’s advice (Eleven, 20 October 2020). In fact, this issue – touching upon civilian administrative authority but also upon questions of security, the Tatmadaw’s domain – was not the first point in time that saw military discontent with the electoral process, but brought tensions between the civilian government and the armed forces in particular to the fore. These discussions exacerbated ethnic parties’ frustrations about the exclusion of their voters from the elections.....Impact on Rakhine State: In the immediate aftermath of the elections, the AA and Tatmadaw became unlikely allies in demanding that the cancelled polls should take place before the formation of the new hluttaws. In mid-December, this demand was supported by the President, and the Rakhine State sub-commission reportedly started preparations for by-elections (Radio Free Asia, 15 December 2020). For the AA, this was an opportunity to broaden their bargaining powers and increase their legitimacy. On the side of the Tatmadaw, the push for elections in Rakhine State was also interpreted as part of larger efforts to discredit the overall electoral process (The Irrawaddy, 20 January 2021). It was nevertheless unlikely that these elections would have taken place in the immediate aftermath, since, following amendments to the electoral laws in 2016 and 2019, by-elections for vacant seats cannot take place one year after and one year before general elections. In that context, by-elections seemed unlikely to happen before April-May 2022. In the interim, the postponement of elections in Rakhine State appeared to generate an unexpected opportunity for a truce between the Tatmadaw and the AA (ICG, 23 December 2020); fighting ceased and tens of thousands were reportedly able to return home. In mid-January, the Rakhine State Hluttaw passed a proposal to urge the government to remove the “terrorist” designation of the AA. This designation, in place since March 2020, had been seen as an impediment to ceasefire negotiations. With an unusual expression of solidarity, Rakhine and Rohingya communities issued a joint declaration of mutual respect that emphasized not only elections for those areas where they were cancelled, but also for the Rohingya (Rohingya Today, 18 January 2021).....Reflecting on the elections in the light of the coup: All interpretations about reasons for the cancellations and effects of vacant seats as well as speculations about early by-elections and any opportunities that may have come from this situation were overtaken by the coup d’état of 1 February. Portraying itself as the guardian of electoral democracy, the military leadership deployed a narrative of electoral fraud to justify its takeover. The public controversies around the election cancellations were one element in a longer process of discrediting the 2020 elections. The issue of election cancellations demonstrates that the 2020 electoral process has seen a number of challenges, inter alia related to decision making process in the state administration. Although the final decision about election cancellations remains with the UEC, sub-national offices charged with informing these decisions were reporting within different hierarchies in the context of electoral security, turning decisions on localised election cancellations into an area of civil-military co-ownership and co-dependency. The process of election cancellations in 2020 illustrates the problematic nature of this co-ownership, which did not occur as such in 2015 when the leadership of the election management body had more direct communication channels with the security apparatus. As a consequence, the situation resulted in opportunities to criticize the UEC, despite the fact that similar cancellations had occurred in previous elections albeit at different scale. The cancellations shed light on loopholes in the system – here, the lack of clear procedures for postponing the polls – that were present both in the 2015 and the 2020 elections, and show how weaknesses in the regulatory framework for elections amplified the opposition between the civilian and military parts of the State ahead of the coup d’état, with detrimental effects on ethnic minorities. Now is not the time to strive for electoral reforms, but debates about elections and suffrage rights in Myanmar are essential and will eventually return. At that time, the transparency and process of any necessary election cancellations should be enhanced with clear communications and consistent criteria for such decisions, alongside other issues pertaining to electoral integrity, accountability and inclusion that will be important to address..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Tea Circle" (Myanmar)
2021-05-19
Date of entry/update: 2021-05-19
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Description: "Dear: I am sorry to disturb you again so soon after my last correspondence, but another major crisis has emerged that requires urgent attention. In the last few days, attacks by the military junta in Myanmar have seriously escalated with indiscriminate shelling and bombing of 50,000 civilians in the town of Mindat in Chin State. The town is under siege by 1000 troops and is being bombed by helicopter gunships and heavy artillery, including tanks. I attach an urgent statement from Dr. Sasa, spokesperson of the National Unity Government. A few days ago, 20 young men were arrested by the military in the town. Their screams of torture, heard by residents, led to protests that, as elsewhere throughout Myanmar, have been violently suppressed. The military personnel in the first convoy that approached the town, after talking with courageous local inhabitants, abandoned their vehicles and their weapons, presumably because they did not wish to participate in the killing of the civilian population. However, the military subsequently heavily reinforced their presence and are now bombarding the town. The military are arresting anyone who tries to help wounded civilians and those they have arrested, including medical personnel, are being used as human shields by the military. In the last 48 hours, 5 civilians have been killed and 14 injured. Meanwhile, homes are being destroyed by tanks and helicopter gunships. Mindat is an important town for the Chin people and a gateway to Chin State. It is a centre for Chin culture and its Buddhist and Christian population. This could be one reason why it has been targeted by the military junta, which habitually targets ethnic communities. (Such attacks are also being carried out against the Kachin, Karen and Rohingya people). It is likely that the Junta wish to 'make an example' of Mindat, to spread fear across Chin State and the rest of Myanmar. I have visited Mindat and have received gracious, generous hospitality from the people and the community leaders there. They are a peace-loving people who do not deserve to be victims of such violence and have few resources to defend themselves. It is poignant that they destroyed rather than kept the weapons abandoned by the soldiers in the first convoy. I have visited Mindat and have received gracious, generous hospitality from the people and the community leaders there. They are a peace-loving people who do not deserve to be victims of such violence and have few resources to defend themselves. It is poignant that they destroyed rather than kept the weapons abandoned by the soldiers in the first convoy. Since the military coup on 1 February, nearly 800 civilians (including 52 children) have been killed and 5000 civilians detained by the military junta. Today, the elected Minister of International Cooperation and International Spokesperson for the newly-formed National Unity Government (NUG), Dr. Sasa, said: “The international community must support the courageous people of Myanmar to end this reign of terror once and for all. The military forces must be stopped. If delays in the recognition of NUG as the legitimate government of Myanmar continue, the risks of a full blown of civil war are very high.” I call upon the British government and the UN Security Council: • To call upon the junta to end the siege of Mindat. • To immediately sanction the military regime in Myanmar with the suspension of all military trade deals; dealings with stateowned companies; and trade in oil and gas. • To recognise the democratically elected National Unity Government; • and to urge all other nations to do likewise. Yours sincerely, Caroline - The Baroness Cox House of Lords London SW1A0PW..."
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Source/publisher: House of Lords via Ministry of International Cooperation Myanmar
2021-05-15
Date of entry/update: 2021-05-16
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "ကြေညာချက် အမှတ် ( ၁၇/၂၀၂၁ ) ၁၃၈၂ ခုနှစ်၊ တပေါင်းလပြည့်ကျော် ၃ ရက် မတ်လ (၃၀)ရက်၊ ၂၀၂၁ခုနှစ်။ ================ ၁။ တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူလူထု၏ အသက်အိုးအိမ်စည်းစိမ်များကို အကြမ်းဖက်တိုက်ခိုက်လျက်ရှိသည့် အာဏာ သိမ်းစစ်ကောင်စီ နှင့် ၎င်းတို့၏ လက်ပါးစေ လက်နက်ကိုင်အကြမ်းဖက်သောင်းကျန်းသူများ၏ ရက်စက်မှုများ ကြောင့် နိုင်ငံတစ်ဝှမ်း၌ ပြည်သူအများ နေ့စဉ်နှင့်အမျှ အတိဒုက္ခရောက်နေကြရသည်။ ၂။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ ရက်စက်ကြမ်းကြုတ်မှုများကို ရှုတ်ချပြီး ပြည်သူများနှင့်အတူ တိုက်ပွဲဝင် လျက်ရှိ သည့် တိုင်းရင်းသားလက်နက်ကိုင်တော်လှန်ရေးအဖွဲ့အစည်းများ၏ ခိုင်မာသော ရပ်တည်ချက်များ၊ ကူညီပံ့ပိုး မှုများကို မြင်တွေ့ ကြားသိ နေရပါသည်။ ၃။ ညီနောင်မဟာမိတ် (၃) ဖွဲ့ ဖြစ်သော ကိုးကန့် (MNTJP/MNDAA)၊ တအောင်း (PSLF/TNLA) နှင့် ရခိုင် (ULA/AA) တို့က ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ် မတ်လ (၃၀) ရက်စွဲဖြင့် ထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာသည့် မြန်မာ့တပ်မတော်မှ စစ်အာဏာသိမ်းပြီးနောက် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအတွင်း လက်ရှိဖြစ်ပျက်နေသော ပြည်တွင်း ပဋိပက္ခများနှင့် ပတ်သက်၍ သဘောထားထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာချက်ကို ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီက ကြိုဆိုပါကြောင်းနှင့် မြန်မာ့နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေး အောင်မြင်ရေးနှင့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စု တည်ထောင်ရေးတို့အတွက် အတူလက်တွဲ ကြိုးပမ်းဆောင်ရွက်သွားရန် ဖိတ်ခေါ်ပါကြောင်း ထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာအပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher: Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH)
2021-03-30
Date of entry/update: 2021-05-14
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "On Feb. 1, 2021, the Myanmar military – the Tatmadaw – shattered the all too brief effort to transition to democracy in Myanmar. Over the past two and a half months, the Tatmadaw has continued its illegitimate effort to undermine the democratic elections from last year and prevent the elected government from taking power. In the face of mass popular opposition and international condemnation, the military has only escalated its use of violence against its own population – systematically stripping away rights and violently attacking protestors and dissidents, reportedly killing over 700 civilians as of Apr. 20, 2021, and detaining more than 3,000. Despite the continued threats and extreme violence, the people of Myanmar have stood their ground and refused to be silenced. On Apr. 16, opponents of the coup from across the political spectrum announced the formation of a National Unity Government (NUG) to resist the military. Just as importantly, the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), a grassroots movement aimed at disrupting state functions and crippling the economy in order to undermine the military’s attempt to rule, has been hugely successful in galvanizing collective action since early February. In addition to the tens of thousands of CDM participants walking out of their private and public sector positions, protests across the country have seen massive youth engagement on a scale not seen in a generation. The organizing power has been impressive. Social media platforms like Facebook, Twitter, and TikTok have been used to spread awareness and coordinate protests, strikes, and other forms of peaceful resistance. The military has taken notice of the CDM’s power, issuing threats against young people protesting and shooting indiscriminately at protestors of all ages, including children. Parallel movements have arisen in areas like neighboring Thailand, with Thai youth protesting their own authoritarian government in solidarity with activists from Myanmar. Today we launch a Just Security series that will take a deep dive into the situation in Myanmar. The series will provide insights that put the coup and civilian response into historical and modern context, deepen unexplored angles on the current crises, and survey possibilities and ways forward over the next six months to a year. This series also aims to elevate policy discussions on a number of issues, ranging from peace and accountability to religion and democracy, asking: What is happening now and why? Within the series, contributions from authors from Myanmar and others working closely on the situation will explore topics such as youth leadership in the CDM and protests, domestic and international solidarity, environmental concerns, the dissolution of rule of law in Myanmar, and what the coup means for ongoing international accountability efforts. Below, we offer an overview of the major themes of the series, along with a timeline of the struggle for democracy in Myanmar. The current uprising against military rule must be understood in the context of these decades-long struggles for peace, democracy, accountability, and justice..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Just Security (New York)
2021-04-26
Date of entry/update: 2021-05-10
Grouping: Individual Documents
Category: Anti-coup protesters, Spring Revolution, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Freedom of opinion and expression: - the situation in Burma/Myanmar - reports, analyses, recommendations, Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association, violations of, Right to Life: reports of violations in Burma, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar, Human Rights Defenders, Racial or ethnic discrimination in Burma: reports of violations against several groups, Discrimination against the Rohingya, International Criminal Court, Several Groups, Rohingya (cultural, political etc.), International Court of Justice (ICJ) - General, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, National Unity Government (NUG), Various groups, Political History, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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Sub-title: Unclaimed attacks on military airbases signal a possible spread of civil war from remote frontier areas to urban centers
Description: "No group has yet claimed responsibility for several, almost simultaneous attacks on military targets in central Myanmar, including air bases recently used to target ethnic armed groups in the nation’s frontier areas. Security analysts, however, believe the shadowy attacks are likely the work of an alliance between ethnic rebels and urban-based pro-democracy dissidents, with the former providing the explosives and the latter knowledge of local conditions in the Myanmar heartland. If that assessment is accurate and the hits were not isolated incidents, it could mean that Myanmar’s long-running, low-intensity civil wars are spreading from ethnic minority areas in the nation’s periphery to major cities and towns. Three months after top generals seized power from a popularly elected government and despite the fact that military and police have gunned down over 750 and arrested well over 4,000 protesters, people are still bravely taking to the streets to vent their anger with the coup. The ongoing popular resistance underscores what is by now widely seen as perhaps the most unsuccessful coup in modern Asian history. That could yet spell ill for coup leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, who has stuck stubbornly to his guns amid rising international condemnation that is deeply isolating the country. There are certain indications provided confidentially to Asia Times by military insiders that veterans of previous ruling juntas, namely the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) and State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), are growing wary of Min Aung Hlaing’s perceived as ineffective and polarizing actions and tactics. Recent developments, including the attacks on military airbases, have opened a Pandora’s box of possibilities and scenarios that were largely unforeseen when the tanks rolled into the main city of Yangon three months ago and scores of elected MPs and other politicians were arrested and detained in the capital Naypyitaw. Those include a wider civil war in the nation’s central region heartland, including near the generals’ bunker-like capital at Naypyidaw. On April 29, unidentified militants fired rockets at air force bases in Magwe and Meiktila in central Myanmar. Another explosion detonated at a Myanmar Army weapons storage facility near Bago city, about 70 kilometers north of Yangon. Those attacks came after intense fighting between the Myanmar military, known as Tatmadaw, and ethnic rebels from the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) on the border with Thailand. The shadowy unclaimed attacks on airbases also coincided with intensified battles with the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) in the country’s far north, where many pro-democracy activists have sought refuge after bloody crackdowns in urban areas. The Tatmadaw’s attacks have been marked by airstrikes on rebel targets which have included civilian villages. That’s caused the recent displacement of more than 25,000 villagers in Kayin state and at least 5,000 in Kachin state. That adds to the tens of thousands who fled their homes amid earlier fighting in the areas. Long-time observers of Myanmar’s politics have privately drawn parallels between current events and what happened after an even bloodier coup in 1988, when thousands of dissidents also took to the hills and jungles after the Tatmadaw crushed another nationwide, pro-democracy uprising. But, they note, there are fundamental differences between the events of 1988 and current developments. In 1988, young urban dissidents formed the All Burma Students’ Democratic Front (ABSDF), donned uniforms and fought alongside ethnic rebels in the frontier areas. At that time, it was much easier to acquire weapons from grey Thai arms markets and dissident groups had ready sanctuaries — and even offices — in neighboring Thailand. However, improved relations between the Thai and Myanmar militaries coupled with severe entry restrictions into Thailand caused by the Covid-19 pandemic have at least so far kept the dissidents on the Myanmar side of the border. The old ABSDF exists now only in name as most of its cadres have either surrendered or been resettled in third countries. The ABSDF’s ultimately failed uprising could explain why the new ethnic-urban alliance has taken on a different and potentially more explosive form. Indeed, recent developments seem to signal the beginning of hitherto unseen urban warfare, which the Tatmadaw is ill-equipped to handle. Apart from the obvious alliances between informal groups of pro-democracy activists and ethnic rebels, local resistance forces have already emerged in Sagaing Region and Chin state. Reports indicate similar forces are coalescing in Mon state and Mandalay Region. Social media posts show those local partisans are equipped with hunting rifles and homemade explosives but have nonetheless been able to inflict significant casualties on the police and military, including in Kalay in Sagaing Region. In nearby Chin state, a new force called the Chinland Defense Force reportedly killed 15 junta troops in their area. Shadowy bomb and Molotov cocktail attacks have been reported against police stations in Yangon, Mandalay and Monywa. At the same time, the Tatmadaw must contend with battle-hardened ethnic armies. In the country’s far north, there have been over 50 clashes since Kachin rebels overran and captured a Tatmadaw outpost on the strategic Alawbum mountain near the Chinese border on March 25. Airstrikes have failed to dislodge the KIA, which has carried out subsequent attacks near the Hpakant jade mines in western Kachin state and north of Sumprabum in the state’s north. In Kayin State, the Free Burma Rangers nongovernmental organization reports daily fights between the Tatmadaw and KNLA, despite the fact the two sides entered a ceasefire agreement in October 2015. That agreement, which included the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS) and eight smaller, rather insignificant groups, was termed a “Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement” (NCA), although it was neither nationwide nor led to even a semblance of peace in frontier areas. Although the KNLA and the KIA have sided openly with Myanmar’s until now peaceful Civil Disobedience Movement, other ethnic groups have been less supportive. In a March 27 interview with Reuters, RCSS chairman Yawd Serk said his group would not stand by idly if the junta’s forces continue to kill protesters but his vow hasn’t been followed up with any clear action. On the contrary, the RCSS has been fighting a rival Shan group, the Shan State Army of the Shan State Progress Party and its ethnic Palaung allies in the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) for control of areas in northern Shan state. Myanmar’s most powerful ethnic army, the 20,000-30,000 strong United Wa State Army (UWSA), has remained conspicuously silent since the coup. Not all Wa agree with the stance: Ten Wa civil society organizations signed on March 25 a written, urgent plea to the UWSA and its political wing the United Wa State Party to say something. That hasn’t happened though, probably because the UWSA is so closely allied with China’s security services, which do not want to get involved with Myanmar’s anti-coup movement. Protesters have targeted Beijing’s perceived support of the regime at the United Nations. Several Chinese factories were torched in Yangon in one spasm of violence. The 7,000-strong Arakan Army (AA) in Rakhine state, one of Myanmar’s most powerful rebel armies, which has killed hundreds of Tatmadaw soldiers in recent fighting, has taken a more surprising stance. It entered into ceasefire talks with the Tatmadaw in November last year and was taken off its list of “terrorist” organizations soon after the February 1 coup. Its leader, Twan Mrat Naing, said on April 16 at the UWSA’s Panghsang headquarters that the ousted National League for Democracy government claimed that it would create a federal union with equal rights for all nationalities but failed to deliver on the promise. With that view, it’s doubtful the AA will join any grand alliance between urban dissidents and ethnic armies. Even without a unified ethnic resistance, there is still a chance that the Tatmadaw’s old guard could move to break the stalemate by pressuring or even trying to overthrow Min Aung Hlaing and his top deputies before the situation deteriorates further. The SLORC and SPDC were likewise brutal outfits and no friends of democracy, but former junta chief and commander-in-chief Senior General Than Shwe did initiate liberal reforms that led to a more open society and vastly improved relations with the West and wider world before stepping aside in 2010. Than Shwe is now in his late 80s and political analysts in Myanmar believe that the current chaos is hardly the kind of legacy he would want to leave behind. Whether the aging general has the wherewithal, influence or inclination to try to rein in Min Aung Hlaing is unknown, but the anarchy unleashed by his coup is clearly not in the military establishment’s short or long-term interests..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
2021-05-01
Date of entry/update: 2021-05-02
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "The pro democracy unity government in Myanmar which includes members of Aung San #Su​ Kyi's party, says it will not enter talks until the junta releases all political prisoners. Souteast Asias regional bloc has been holding talks with the leaders of the miltiary who seized power on February 1st. Since then massive protests have been held against the coup, hundreds of civilians have been killed and many more arrested. Wai Hnin Pwint Thon campaigns officer at #Burma​ Campaign UK, and the daughter of a man currently serving a 65-year jail sentence in Myanmar for his part in the 2007 protests gave us her talke on the current situation. She says negotiations will have to happen but that talking with the #Myanmar​ military is futile..."
Source/publisher: "France24" ( Paris)
2021-04-28
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-29
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Topic: Myanmar, ethnic conflict, civil war, ceasefires, landgrabbing
Topic: Myanmar, ethnic conflict, civil war, ceasefires, landgrabbing
Description: "ABSTRACT: A reform process initiated in 2011 in Myanmar brought hope to end decades of civil war and ethnic conflict. But new ceasefires have not moved into real political dialogue, the ‘peace process’ has stalled, and fighting continues in parts of the country. Economic reforms have favoured foreign investment and local elites, and have had detrimental impacts on communities in ethnic borderlands. The new ceasefires facilitated this, and coupled with economic reforms brought loss of land and related natural resources, and strengthened the central government and the military’s political and economic control over ethnic borderlands. This article argues that this is a continuation of the ‘neither war nor peace’ policy of a previous round of ceasefires in the 1990s, but by different means. In the past this focused on coercion and military pressure, but now these military tactics have been complemented with the use of the new legal framework.....Introduction: Myanmar has suffered from ethnic conflict and civil war since independence in 1948, and the national armed forces (known as the Tatmadaw) have played a dominant role in national politics since it staged a coup d’etat in 1962. In 2011, a reform process started that brought hope at home and abroad that finally a political solution could be found at the negotiation table to more than sixty years of armed conflict. Almost a decade later, newly agreed ceasefires have not moved into real political dialogue, the so-called ‘peace process’ has all but stalled, and fighting continues in many parts of the country, causing new displacement of the civilian population. Meanwhile, economic reforms initiated in the same period favouring foreign investment and local elites have had detrimental impacts on rural communities in ethnic borderlands.1 The new ceasefires have played a large role in facilitating these negative consequences. Rather than bringing peace and inclusive development that respects and promotes social justice and local customs, the ceasefires and economic reforms have brought loss of land and related natural resources and the destruction of local cultures. Legal reforms have further paved the way for these negative developments. This article analyses why the new ceasefires have not transformed into a lasting political settlement, by comparing them with previous ceasefire attempts and by placing them into the larger conflict dynamics in Myanmar. It will explain the impact of these failed ceasefires on the right to land for rural communities in the ethnic borderlands. It will show how the ceasefires and the economic reforms strengthened the central government and Tatmadaw’s military, political and economic control over ethnic borderlands. It is argued that what is being experienced currently is a continuation of the ‘neither war nor peace’ policy of the first round of ceasefires in the 1990s (Kramer 2009a), but by different means. While in the previous round of ceasefires this involved mostly coercion and military pressure, in the present times these military tactics have been complemented with the use of the country’s new legal framework..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: The Journal of Peasant Studies via Routledge (London)
2020-12-09
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-27
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Violations of religious freedom are increasing and persecution takes place in more than 25 countries, with China and Myanmar among those that have the worst records, according to a report by a Vatican-backed charity. The Religious Freedom in the World Report, covering 2019-2020 and issued on Tuesday, said that in some countries, such as Niger, Turkey and Pakistan, prejudices against religious minorities led local residents to blame them for the COVID-19 pandemic and denial of access to medical aid. The 800-page report was prepared by Aid to the Church in Need International (ACN), a worldwide Catholic charity that studies violations of freedoms of all religions. The latest report put 26 countries in a "red" category denoting the existence of persecution, compared to 21 countries at the time of the last report two years ago. It put 36 countries in the "orange" category denoting discrimination, compared to 17 two years ago. The report describes discrimination as when laws or rules apply to a particular group and not to all, and persecution as when there is an active programme to subjugate people based on religion. "There has been a significant increase in the severity of religiously-motivated persecution and oppression," the report said. It was particularly scathing about China and Myanmar. "The apparatus of repression constructed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in recent years is ... fine-tuned, pervasive, and technologically sophisticated," the report said. The most egregious violations were against Muslim Uighurs in Xinjiang "where the atrocities have reached such a scale that a growing number of experts describe them as genocide", it said..... HARASSMENT AND ARREST": In February, the administration of U.S. President Joe Biden endorsed a last-minute determination by the Trump administration that China has committed genocide in Xinjiang and has said the United States must be prepared to impose costs on China. China says the complexes it set up in Xinjiang provide vocational training to help stamp out Islamist extremism and separatism. The Chinese foreign ministry has called allegations of forced labour and human rights violations "groundless rumour and slander". The ACN report said Catholic hierarchy in China "continue to suffer harassment and arrest" despite a landmark deal signed in 2018 between Bejing and the Vatican on the appointment of bishops on the mainland. Reuters reported last year that two nuns who work at the Vatican mission in Hong Kong were arrested when they went home to the mainland for a visit. China was increasing the use of facial recognition on worshippers of various religions, it said. In Myanmar, the report said Rohingya Muslims "have been the victims of the most egregious violations of human rights in recent memory". Last year, the International Court of Justice ordered Myanmar to take urgent measures to protect Rohingya from genocide. The government has denied accusations of genocide. The ACN report said the military coup on Feb. 1 was "likely to make things worse for all religious minorities" in Myanmar, where about 8% of the population is Christian. Africa would be "the next battleground against Islamic militants," the report said. Militant groups were causing havoc in countries including Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria, northern Cameroon, Chad, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia and Mozambique, it said..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Reuters" (UK)
2021-04-21
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-21
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Myanmar faces a number of significant stabilisation challenges including frequent natural disasters, environmental challenges and organised crime, in addition to the challenges associated with a nascent democratisation process. This report, however, focuses exclusively on violent conflict and displacement. Myanmar has been afflicted by armed conflict since independence. During the 1960s-1980s, a number of armed groups were able to establish ‘effectively independent micro-states’ (EC, 2016, p. 3). These had their own ‘rudimentary’ governments, service provision, and foreign policies (EC, 2016, p. 3). This situation persists in some parts of Myanmar (EC, 2016, p. 3). The communities currently most at risk of, and affected by, conflict and violence are those living in the Kokang Self-Administered Zone and in other parts of northern Shan State. Other affected communities include those living in Kachin, Rakhine, Chin and Kayin States. The community most affected by the threat of forced displacement is the Rohingya, a Muslim ethnic group, in Rakhine State. The nature of conflict in these areas ranges from occasional to frequent clashes between armed groups and government forces. In addition to armed conflict, Rakhine State suffers from tensions between the Muslim and Buddhist communities. There were more than 700,000 internally displaced people (IDPs) in Myanmar in 2016 (McConnachie, 2016, p. 4). Moreover, more than 128,000 refugees from Myanmar were living in Thailand in 2014 (UNICEF, 2014, p. 3). According to UNICEF, displacement can constitute a driver of conflict, depending on whether it is forced or not, and on the extent to which host communities are prepared for IDPs. Women and children are reportedly disproportionately affected by migration and displacement, and make up the majority of those who are IDPs and refugees (ibid). The literature identifies a number of sources of resilience in Myanmar, which include:  Institutionalisation of peace-making: Both the previous and current governments declared their commitment to ending conflict in Myanmar. A number of peace initiatives and inter-faith dialogues have taken place in order to mitigate tensions and conflict in the country.  Economy: Myanmar’s economy has considerable potential. A number of economic reforms have been undertaken and economic growth is strong, although it has been slowing recently.  Strengthened civil society: The previous government’s decision to allow issue-driven CSOs to operate in Myanmar has led to a proliferation of such organisations.  Education: The previous government undertook steps to reform the education system in Myanmar in a bid to end discrimination against ethnic minorities.  Release of political prisoners: A significant number of political prisoners have been released since the new National League for Democracy (NLD) led government came to power.  Increased press freedom: Extensive media reform has resulted in a proliferation of ‘alternative’ information and has rendered the government subject to increased scrutiny. The literature identifies a number of policy options for mitigating tensions in Myanmar. International actors could potentially provide support and assistance in a number of areas. These include technical support for the conclusion, implementation and monitoring of ceasefire agreements, and support for an inclusive national political dialogue. They also include various forms of assistance for recovery and development, as well as support for educational reform. There is a sizeable body of literature on Myanmar’s stabilisation challenges. This consists of a mixture of peer-reviewed journal articles, policy briefs, and reports by NGOs and international organisations. While gender is not addressed in all of the papers reviewed for the purposes of this report, a number of papers do look at gender, specifically in the context of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), and in the context of peace-making and peacebuilding..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Governance and Social Development Resource Centre
2017-05-02
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-21
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "On 8 November 2020, Myanmar had its third general election since 2010. The electorate overwhelmingly voted for the National League for Democracy (NLD). On 1 February 2021, the Tatmadaw staged a coup, alleging that the NLD had taken power by fraudulent means. President U Win Myint and State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, along with most senior NLD leaders, were immediately arrested. The remaining senior NLD leaders urged people to protest, before being arrested themselves. The people have risen to the occasion, and have sacrificed much to challenge the coup. The fate of the revolution lies in the hands of political entities and ethnic armed organizations, who must support the people before it is too late......People’s Response to the Military Coup: Under the banner of the “Spring Revolution”, Myanmar’s anti-military coup movement has generated an unprecedented level of national unity – overcoming ethnic, religious, and class boundaries. Since early February, protesters have drummed pots and pans every day at 8pm in response to the coup. They have come out to streets, turning major roads into seas of people, remaining peaceful despite the violence they endure at the hands of the military. Civil servants and private sector workers have established a national civil disobedience movement (CDM) in an unmatched attempt to cripple the military’s administrative mechanism. In response to brutal crackdowns from security forces, demonstrations are now smaller to aid escape. The protesters have also used road blockages to hinder the advancement of security forces. However, security forces have now forcefully cleared blockades at most protest sites. In some places, security forces have reportedly forced local residents (especially men) to clear them. Protesters have also started social punishment campaigns against military families and their associates, and have called for a boycott of products produced by military’s companies. These tactics have already had significant effects. For instance, many restaurants and bars no longer sell Myanmar Beer. There are also reports of people boycotting MyTel, a mobile operator jointly owned by the Tatmadaw and the Vietnamese military. One could argue that the public has done their part to the best of their capacities and it would be unrealistic to expect more from them. The best they could possibly do would be to continue the social punishment campaign against military leaders, their families and associates, as well as to sustain their boycott of products and services provided by the military’s companies. Therefore, at this point, the outcome of the Myanmar Spring Revolution largely depends on the capacity of institutional leaders to consolidate various opposition forces. The elected members of the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (Union Parliament), mostly from the NLD, are attempting to provide the institutional leadership by forming the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH). Thus, the outcome of the Myanmar Spring Revolution depends on the political decisions and leadership of the CRPH.....The Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH): The elected NLD members believe that their victory in the 2020 general election provides a mandate to form the CRPH, which was established so that they could perform the necessary activities and duties of an elected government. These include appointing and forming a government and making laws.....Political Visions of the CRPH: On 5 March 2021, the CRPH announced its political vision, declaring their commitment to the following: to end military dictatorship; to ensure the unconditional release of all unlawful detainees including President U Win Myint and State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi; to achieve full-fledged democracy; and to rescind the 2008 Constitution and write a new Constitution based on the federal system. The CRPH also states that it will steadfastly work hand-in-hand with all ethnic nationalities and strive for the full realization of this vision. To pave the way for broader participation in the Spring Revolution, the CRPH removed all the ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) from the ‘unlawful organization list’ while designating the Tatmadaw as a ‘terrorist organization.’ It seems that most of the ethnic minorities welcome the political visions of the CRPH. However, many ethnic minorities also feel that the CRPH’s vision statement is only the first step. The CRPH must further show a concrete roadmap for including diverse voices within their vision. For example, the former joint secretary of the Karen National Union (KNU), Padoh Mahn Mahn, states that the political visions of the CRPH are only the beginning and that the CRPH must provide a workable plan for establishing a genuine federal union and a federal army. Likewise, the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy also points out that CRPH must declare the abolishment of the 2008 Constitution if ethnic minorities are to come onboard. At that point, the status of the 2008 Constitution was unclear because its abolishment was only positioned as a ‘political vision.’ However, on 31 March 2021, the CRPH has declared abolishment of the 2008 Constitution and announced Federal Democracy Charter. The Charter provides further details on how the CRPH might seek to translate its visions into reality, for instance by declaring the duties of an interim National Unity Government (NUG). The list of individuals appointed to the NUG was released on 16 April 2021.....Progress of the political talks between the CRPH and the EAOs: The stated political visions of CRPH appear to have won the hearts and minds of some ethnic minority political parties and armed organizations. Since its formation, the CRPH has reportedly been negotiating with EAOs on the terms of creating a federal union. Among those involved in the talks are the Karen National Union, the Restoration Council for Shan State, and the Kachin Independence Army, as well as other groups that have signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement. By March 2021, the political talks are about 80% complete, according to Zin Mar Aung, the Acting Foreign Minister of the CRPH. These political talks contributed to the aforementioned Federal Democracy Charter and the appointment of the NUG. According to the Charter, the interim NUG is formed with these roles: President, State Counsellor, Vice President 1, Vice President 2, ministers and deputy ministers. The NUG appointed by the CRPH shows that President U Win Myint and State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi remain in their posts despite being in detention. The NUG is perhaps the most diverse government in terms of ethnicities the country has ever had. As an aside, it is interesting to ask why the CRPH decided to keep Daw Aung San Suu Kyi as State Counsellor instead of appointing her as the President. Some might beg an answer for the rationale of keeping the post of “State Counsellor”. The post was created to circumvent the 2008 Constitution, which bars people married to foreigners from becoming the president. One wonders why the CRPH has decided to retain the “State Counsellor” post even after declaring the abolishment of the 2008 Constitution.....Doubts over the CRPH: Ethnic minorities have two major concerns over the capacity of the CRPH to uphold the agreements and understandings that the CRPH has reached with them. The first concern relates to ethnic minorities’ perception that Bama political leaders and the majority of Bama ethnic people do not have a strong political will for federalism. This is because a delegation of power to State governments (i.e., ethnic minorities) would mean less power to the Union (Central) Government (i.e., Bama). In other words, federalism is not the top priority of the NLD and (most) Bama ethnic people. Federalism has never been the top priority of the NLD[1] and the Tatmadaw. In the last Union Peace Conference in August 2020, they (Bama leaders) did not even agree over the terminology of “State Law” (insisted on by Bama leaders) and “State Constitution” (insisted on by NCA-signatories). Subsequently no agreement has been reached on how write a constitution or a mother law governing the ethnic states. This time, the CRPH announced its political visions and the Federal Democracy Charter while some members of the NLD’s 21-member Central Executive Committee were still in detention. Thus, the concern is whether the CRPH will be able to convince freed NLD leaders to support and honor the agreement (i.e., political roadmap) reached with the ethnic minorities. Another concern is whether the CRPH can convince the Bama public that federalism is the best way to address the long-standing civil war. From the start of public protests, the priorities of Bama ethnic group and non-Bama ethnic groups have been quite different. For example, the key demands of Bama protesters, who rally behind the NLD flag, have been: (1) the release of mother Suu (State Counsellor), President Win Myint and all other detainees; (2) respect the 2020 election result; (3) restoration of democracy and eradication of military dictatorship. On the other hand, the key demands of ethnic minorities and (some groups of) Generation Z have been: (1) the eradication of the military dictatorship; (2) abolishment of the 2008 Constitution; (3) establishment of genuine federal democratic union; and (4) release of all detainees including the President and State Counsellor. It took the CRPH a whole month to announce its ‘political visions’ statement above. It is understandable that the CRPH has hesitated to make the political decisions in the absence of all members of the NLD’s 21-member Central Executive Committee. The decision-makers of the CRPH must have worried about whether freed NLD leaders would support any political understanding or agreement reached between the CRPH and the EAOs. This author has learned that the ethnic minorities who chose to cooperate with the CRPH have the same concern. Padoh Mahn Mahn of KNU states that if the NLD or CRPH were to betray the ethnic minorities when they regain power, that would be the end of the ethnic minorities’ aspirations to remain in the union. This would force the minorities to choose a different political path. In his interview with Voice of Myanmar, KPICT spokesperson Nsang Gum San also echoes that for the Kachin, this could be seen as the final attempt to establish a federal union, which ethnic minorities have demanded for many decades. However, Arakan National Party (ANP) and Mon Unity Party (MUP)—two opposition political parties seeking to represent the respective ethnic groups—have decided to join the military regime’s State Administrative Council (SAC). This is clearly not helpful for the anti-coup movement as the military could argue that not all ethnic minorities are against the military’s takeover......Defeating the Coup Requires Faster Decision Making: The CRPH’s announcement on 31 March 2021 – which declared the abolishment of the 2008 Constitution and announced the Federal Democracy Charter – was certainly a huge milestone for achieving federalism in Myanmar. Ethnic minorities had been urging the CRPH to show a clear and concrete roadmap. In his interview with Irrawaddy, CRPH spokesperson said that the Charter was consulted and agreed on by at least four political organizations, although he could not name them for security reasons. It remains to be seen if the Charter is able to rally all major ethnic armed organizations. However, since the Charter is only a general roadmap, there might be issues that require mutually understanding clarification or definition. Both sides – that is, the CRPH and EAO leaders – have to work out such issues and cooperate quickly to resolve them. Time is of the essence. Without full cooperation from at least the major EAOs, the Spring Revolution will seem unwinnable to the public and international community. Needless to say, it is of the utmost importance that people do not lose faith in the revolution. Currently, the international community is on the side of the CRPH as they condemn the coup d’état and violent crackdowns on the unarmed and peaceful protesters. No government — not even China and ASEAN members — has publicly recognized the military junta. However, this could change if the international community begins to think that Myanmar Spring Revolution is unlikely to succeed. Therefore, having a concrete agreement between the CRPH and EAOs is key..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Tea Circle" (Myanmar)
2021-04-21
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-21
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Format : pdf
Size: 322.62 KB
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Topic: Burma/Myanmar – ethnic conflict – Bamar – Kachin – Rohingya
Topic: Burma/Myanmar – ethnic conflict – Bamar – Kachin – Rohingya
Description: "For four years since March 2011, when an entrenched military junta ceded power to a notionally civilian government headed by President Thein Sein (formerly prime minister in the outgoing junta), Myanmar has sought to make a transition to democracy. 1 One clear comparative lesson from the literature on transitions is that respect for ethnic and religious minorities is essential for the creation of a stable, consolidated democracy. Several components feed into this: protection of both individual and group rights, policies promoting inclusiveness and non-discrimination, and more generally a sense among minority groups that a level political playing field means that they too could one day have the chance to attain majority status. As part of the wider transition, the Myanmar government is sponsoring both a peace process with ethnic armed groups and, more broadly, an agenda of national reconciliation. Alongside peace talks, this has generated several disparate initiatives designed to bring people together across ethnic and religious fault lines. Nevertheless, at a time when low-grade civil conflict continues to plague both Kachin State and northern Shan State, and when sectarian violence remains potent across much of the society, long-standing divisions continue to have real social 1 In 1989, the military junta decreed a series of name changes for the country and many places within it. Burma became Myanmar, Rangoon became Yangon, Karen State became Kayin State, and so on. This article uses the old geographic terminology when focusing on the period before 1989, and the new terminology when focusing on the period after 1989. This usage is not intended to convey a political message..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: The University of Hong Kong
2015-03-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-15
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: The need for a combined Ethnic approach in the 2020 election
Description: "Many expected the 2016 election which saw Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy gain power to be a major step forward, not only towards democracy but also ethnic equality. Such hopes now seem somewhat misguided in retrospect, with many ethnic political parties feeling abandoned by the NLD and especially Aung San Suu Kyi, therefore the 2020 election will allow ethnic representatives to redress the balance at the ballot box. The NLD had been able to win the majority of seats in ethnic states based largely on the iconography of its leader and the perception that she would rule justly. While the ethnic political parties had been able to secure seats in Rakhine and Shan states, their power was largely curtailed by the NLD appointing non-ethnic State Ministers, or those with NLD loyalties. The winning ethnic political party representatives were forced to accept NLD appointments and the NLD largely ignored ethnic political parties in the governing process. During by-elections in 2018, the NLD retained its overall parliamentary majority but lost several seats previously held in minority-dominant areas. According to NLD spokesman Myo Nyunt, We lost five out of six seats in ethnic areas. Ethnic people are not satisfied with our performance on the peace process . . . This result is a lesson for us. We will come up with a strategy for each constituency for the coming election.1 While the NLD appears to be insistent on tying its electoral future, and its ability to retain ethnic votes, to the peace process, it is unlikely to see progress made on the issue before the election date. The NLD turning its back on ethnic political parties (EPPs) has not gone down well with ethnic leaders and as the election draws nearer, they need to rally their constituents around ethnic aspirations. Also, what needs to be taken into account, is the fact that it is not necessarily in the military’s best interests to have the NLD in power for another four years as the NLD continues to try to chip away at the military-drafted constitution. Already, pro-military demonstrations have taken place in Yangon seeking to prevent constitutional amendments that would weaken the military’s 25% grip on power in the legislature.2 It would, therefore, be better for the military, and the Union Solidarity Development Party (USDP) the most likely challenger to the NLD, to delay the peace process until after November regardless of current constraints due to the COVID-19 pandemic. While some ethnic political parties have seemingly learnt from the mistakes in the last election and have organised along state lines, joining together to create united fronts, large scale communication strategies need to be implemented putting forward the benefits of ensuring a much larger voice for ethnic representation in the governance of the country..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Euro Burma Office
2020-04-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-12
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Size: 112.12 KB
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Description: "The current tripartite (government/Tatmadaw, EAOs, and political parties) Framework for Political Dialogue in the peace process was based on an assumption of ethnic unity, not to mention, a unified stance between the government and Tatmadaw, and amongst the political parties. However, this unity remains more of an ideal in all three cases, rather than an actuality. It was widely expected that the EAOs would at least have similar aspirations on what the future federal union would look like. But past years have shown that this assumption was inaccurate. The more substantive and detailed the negotiations have become, the more divided and fragmented the EAOs have turned out to be. This fragmentation could not only be seen between the different EAOs (horizontal fragmentation) but also potentially within the EAOs (vertical fragmentation). At the horizontal level, different factions have emerged indicating the groups’ different interests and the different realities each group is trying to cope with. Particularly, the division is clear between the Ethnic Armed Organisation – Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement Signatory groups (EAO NCA-S) and the EAO NCA Non-Signatory groups (EAO NCA-NS), currently consisting of the Northern Alliance, and the Karenni National Progress Party (KNPP). Horizontal Fragmentation – NCA Non-Signatories: Within the Northern Alliance (NA) 1, federalism is not a key issue. The United Wa State Army (UWSA) and the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA – Mong La) have never articulated a desire for federalism. In fact, the two organizations, the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP), and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (originally formed in 1989, forcibly disbanded by the Tatmadaw and its proxy in 2009, and re-emerged in 2014), which is a member of the NA’s splinter Three Brotherhood Alliance, are offshoots of the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) which collapsed in 1989. The UWSA and NDAA managed to not only continue operating but to also secure their territories through a ceasefire (‘gentlemen’s agreement’) brokered by intelligence chief Khin Nyunt. Rather than a federal Union, the UWSA would likely be more comfortable with a one-country, twosystems arrangement – a reverse of the China-Hong Kong situation where a Communist country tolerates a democratic enclave, i.e., a democratic country tolerating a Communist enclave. Chinese officials have informally suggested that unless and until the Myanmar economy catches up with that of Wa State, they do not see how Wa State could integrate into the Myanmar system. In the case of Hong Kong, China’s economy has caught up with that of Hong Kong, and the process of trying to integrate the democratic enclave into the main system has begun. Given their background, the NDAA and the MNDAA might have similar aspirations albeit with less chance of succeeding. The situation of the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP), however, may be more complicated. Its ideology may be more aligned with its three ex-CPB colleagues, but it cannot afford to be seen as not supporting the cause of Shan nationalism. If it did, it would lose popular support to its competitor, the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), which in its opinion is using its legal status in the peace process (and NCA) with the government to encroach on both its territory and legitimacy. The Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) which like the UWSA enjoyed from 1995, 17 years of a pretty autonomous existence until 2011, might like a similar arrangement but not being Communist, it does not enjoy the same kind of patronage from China as the USWA does. And with the Kachin State being a signatory of the original 1947 Panglong Agreement, the KIO has thrown in its lot with the groups demanding ‘genuine’ federalism. However, what constitutes ‘genuine’ federalism is a point of contention. Not being an NCA signatory, it is also hampered in trying to ensure that its version of ‘genuine’ federalism is reflected in the 21st Century Panglong peace talks. Unlike its ‘big brothers’ in the NA, the Arakan Army (formed in 2009) and a member of the NAsplinter, the Three Brotherhood Alliance, is demanding confederate status for Rakhine State,2 The position on federalism of the remaining NA member, the Ta-ang National Liberation Army (current iteration formed in 2009 with military activities starting 2011), is unclear. It definitely wants equality and autonomy for the Ta-ang people, but how that can be achieved within a federal system and within Shan State where the Ta-ang people live, has not yet been articulated or made public. It is also continuing to clash with both the Tatmadaw and the RCSS. The last NCA Non-Signatory, the Karenni National Progress Party (KNPP), has also like the KIO, thrown in its lot with the groups demanding ‘genuine’ federalism. However, in terms of its true aspiration, the KNPP harks back to 1875 when the British recognized the sovereignty of the Karenni States. Recognizing the difficulty of claiming independence, ‘genuine’ federalism is seen as the next best-case scenario, however, it would likely opt for confederation like the AA if that option were open. But not being an NCA signatory, like the KIO, it is also hampered in trying to ensure that its version of ‘genuine’ federalism or confederation is reflected in the 21st Century Panglong peace talks..."
Source/publisher: Euro Burma Office
2020-08-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-12
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: The continued use of Militias in Shan State
Description: "On March 26, the Tatmadaw abolished one of its local proxy armies, the Khawngkha militia, amid accusations that some of its leaders were involved in the illegal drugs trade, or had failed to inform the authorities about drug trafficking in the area.1 Since the 1950s, various Myanmar Governments have officially created and sanctioned the operations of militia forces in the county’s ethnic states. These groups have been used primarily as a military force to fight against ceasefire and non-ceasefire ethnic groups, to control the lives of ethnic populations, and to further secure the country’s border areas. These militias quickly became notorious for taxing the local population, drug trafficking, illegal gambling, and a wide variety of human rights abuses. They have been allowed to do this with the express permission of local military commanders who have themselves allegedly earned money from the variety of illegal activities that the groups operate. Article 340 of the 2008 constitution states that: With the approval of the National Defence and Security Council, the Defence Services has the authority to administer the participation of the entire people in the Security and Defence of the Union. The strategy of the people’s militia shall be carried out under the leadership of the Defence Services. The Kawngkha Militia had previously been the 4th Brigade of the Kachin Independence Army and was based out of its headquarters at Kawngkha, eight miles east of Kutkai, and was responsible for a largely Kachin area north of Lashio town. It opened a number of refineries in the area and was responsible for the transhipment of heroin north to the border of Manipur State. In addition to its narcotics involvement, it also derived some of its income by operating a number of gambling dens.2 In 1991 it signed a ceasefire with government forces before becoming a People’s Militia Force (PMF) in 2010. The Myanmar Army had attempted, unsuccessfully, to get the KDA to surrender all of its weapons in May 2010 after Yaw Chang Fa, the KDA treasury official and Bang Hpik village military officer was involved in a shootout with Police and Special Branch. Yaw Chang Fa and his troops had opened fire on the officials on the road between Mung Hawm and Bang Hpik villages when they illegally arrested villagers from Bang Hpik and took them to Mung Hawm police station. Six were shot dead, seven fatally injured and three were detained. Consequently, more than 300 Myanmar soldiers from Infantry Battalion No. 45, No. 241 and No. 242 from Kutkai Township surrounded the KDA’s Kawngkha HQ. and asked for Yaw Chang Fa to be handed over. Yaw Chang Fa and a number of KDA troops fled..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Euro Burma Office
2020-06-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-12
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Moving forward after the election
Description: "After the Myanmar peace process had been deadlocked from the end of 2018 until the beginning of 2020 the Government of Aung San Suu Kyi along with the military and a number of armed ethnic organisations (EAOs) were able to hold another Union Peace Conference 21st Century Panglong (UPC) from 17-19 August 2020. State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi had made resolving peace with the many armed ethnic groups in the country a priority after coming to power in 2015. And both the State Counsellor and Commanderin-Chief of the armed forces, Snr. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing had voiced an opinion that talks must restart prior to the 2020 general election. Several criticisms have been made about the results of the UPC which saw representatives from all 10 Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement-signatory EAOs participate. Invitations had also been offered to non-signatory EAOs from Kachin (KIA), Wa (UWSA), Kokang (MNDAA), Mong La (NDAA), and Shan (SSPP) in the northeast, but all declined due to the exclusion of the Arakan Army (AA) which the government has designated a terrorist organisation. Regardless, the talks continued with the adoption of a further 20 principles for the Union Accords (UA), and an agreement among the parties to continue formal peace talks with the incoming government in 2021. While some believe there were no substantive results from the UPC, 1 the fact is that the UPC meeting has led to the reinvigoration of a stalled peace process and allowed further time for EAOs to reconsider their position in moving forward. At least one participant, Sai Leng from the Restoration Council Shan State Army, pointed out that, It is meaningful to agree on how to build a federal union beyond 2020. We also agreed on some guiding principles of building the federal union, such as power-sharing between Union and States,2 Similarly, the State Counsellor said the peace process was now back on track and the principles signed were “more sincere and have more substance.”3 Lieutenant General Yar Pyae, the military delegate and chairman of the Joint Monitoring Committee on the nationwide ceasefire, Now we can draw a conclusion that countless negotiations have reduced the mistrust that has been deep-rooted on both sides . . . [stakeholders] should not leave the negotiation table, whatever the reason.4 According to one EAO advisor, one of the more important points was that, Part 3.3 (a) Power, resource, tax and finance will be divided between the Union and regions/states in line with the federal system (official translation). But he also noted, [But] Some observers have pointed out that it was only a repetition of UA#1 (political sector) 4 (d). But according to the negotiators, the difference is the emphasis shown here, which was not in UA#1. Therefore, they [ethnic leaders] say, the key to a federal union is now open. Accordingly, it can be regarded as a second breakthrough after the NCA.5 Another negotiator in the talks had suggested that the talks were ‘more disappointing’ but expressed the desire to move forward regardless.6..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Euro Burma Office
2020-11-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-12
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: BURMA
Description: "... Table of contents: Introduction, the initial stages, preliminary discussion with the local government, the general village register, areas not dealt with synchronously, a three fold classification, treatment of the Shan States and the Chin hills, non-synchronous arrangements for the districts of Burma, preparatory erasures, code of census procedure, definitions, circle lists, training census officers, experimental enumeration, forms and stationery, the preliminary enumeration, testing the preliminary record, census holidays, the final enumeration, preparation of the provisional totals, the work of abstraction, the work of abstraction, cost of operation, Chapter (1) the distribution of the population, selection of natural divisions, district densities, provincial density, urban and rural population, imperial table no.1, of little value for purposes of comparison of urban population, numerical distinction between towns and villages, average number of inhabitants per village and of residents per house, overcrowding in Rangoon, average number of residents per house in the scheduled area, registered buildings, no return of boat population, Chapter (2) The movement of the population, factors regulating the movement of the population, the natural factors, unreliability of birth and death statistics, the social factor, increases and decreases b districts, variations in urban population, lower Burma, variations in urban population, Upper Burma, extent of foreign immigration in the various districts, movement from rural to urban areas, persons born in Burma but censused in India, Chapter (3) The religion of the people, Buddhism, Burmese Buddhism, Burmese Buddhist Sects, Power of the priesthood in Burma, Latent Animism, Animism, Animism and ancestor worship, Nat worship in Burma, Animism and head hunting, spirit worship of the Karens, Muhammadanism, Hinduism, Christianity, Christian Denominations, Anglicans, Roman Catholics, Baptists, Other denominations, Sikhism, Judaism, Zoroastrianism, Jainism, Chapter (4) Age, Sex and Civil condition, age returns to be first considered, the ages returned, want of accuracy in age returns, unadjusted age return, the mean age of the population, proportionate increase or decrease in age periods since 1891, proportion of the two sexs, district proportion, Lower Burma, district proportion, Upper Burma, civil condition, marriage in Burma, percentage of married, to total population, civil condition by sex and age periods, distribution my age for indigenous races, Chapter (5) Education, improved system of education classification, contrast of figures with figures of previous censuses, alteration of age periods, treatment of those only able to sign their names, actual increase in literacy obscured by increase of census area Education by Age periods, district proportion of literacy, female education, education by religion, literacy by religion, literacy by race, literacy by languages know, no comparison of census with departmental figure, Chapter (6) The languages of the province, tones in the languages of the provinces, pitch and stress tones, origin of tones, the morphological order, grouping of provincial languages, the Burmese language, Arakanese, Travoyan, Yaw, Chaungtha, Yabein, Intha, Taungyo, Kadu, Szi, Lashi and Maru, Hpon, Maingth, the Lisaw sub-group, the Chingpaw language group, the Chin language group, Kuki Chin sub-groups, Northern Chin Languages, central Chin languages, Old Kuki languages, Southern Chin Languages, Southern Chin forms in Lower Burma, the Siamese Chinese sub-family, the Tai language group, Southern Tai sub-group, Norther Tai sub-group, Northern Burmese Shan, Southern Burmese Shan, Chinese Shan, connection of Shan with Chinese, the Karen languages, Southern Karen sub-group, Northern Karen sub-group, the Non annam sub-family, group of the Mon Annam sub-family, North Cambodian group, Dunnu or Danaw, Synopsis of Indo-Chinese languages, Selon, other....Chapter (7) Infirmities, definition of infirmities, high upper Burma figures in 1891, general decrease in infirmities in 1901, insanity, insanity by age periods, deaf mutism, deaf mutism by age periods, Blindness, Blindness by age periods, leprosy, leprosy by age periods, Chapter (8) Caste, Triee and race, caste in Burma, Difficulty of recording caste in the province, Misleading answers and errors in transliteration, No real castes in Burma, Indian castes, paraiyan, Mal, Kapu or Reddi, Palli, other castes, Susalman Tribes, methods of studying the people,Methods of studying the people, Application of the scientific methods The Burmans Dr. Macnamara's theory Burmese characteristics The Arakanese, Tavoyans, &c. TheTalaings,The Chingpaw or Kachins, Connected tribes, The Maingtha, TheShans, The Karens, Bghai and cognate tribes The Chins The Northern Chins The Central and Southern Chins The Taungthus, Taungyos and Danaws, The Palaungs , The Was, TheKadus, The Taws, The Tamans, The Lisaws The Lahus, The Akhas, The Hka Muks , The Yin, The Hpons, The Panthays, The Chinese The Sellings, The Manipuris, Europeans, Exogamy and Endogamy, Tctemism , Chapter (9) Occupation, Subsidiary occupations Subsidiary Occupations of those whose main occupation was agricultural. Difficulties experienced in compilations ... Classification of Occupations... Contents of Imperial Table XV Comparison with 1891 totals ... Class A.—Government ... Class B.—Pasture and Agriculture Landholders, Tenants, &c. ... Growers of special products ... Partially Agriculturists Class C.—Personal Services ... Class D.—Preparation and Supply of Material substances Order VIII.—Lighting, Firing and Forage Order IX.—Buildings Order X.—Vehicles and Vessels Order XI.—Supplementary Requirements Order XII.—Textile Fabrics and Dress... Order XIII.—Metals and Precious Stones Order XIV.—Glass, Earthen and Stoneware Order XV.—Wood, canes and leaves ... Order XVI.—Drugs, gums and dyes Order XVII.—Leather Class E.—Commerce, Transport and Storage Order XVIII.—Commerce ... Order XIX.—Transport and Storage ... ... ... ,, Class F. —Professions ... ... „. Learned professions Midwives ... ... ... ... ,„ Artistic professions ... ... ... .,, , Tattooers Class G.—Unskilled Labour not Agricultural ... ... - Class H.—Means of subsistence independent of occupation Subsidiary Tables Nos. IXA. and IXB..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Kham Koo Website
1902-00-00
Date of entry/update: 2020-01-12
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : PDF
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Description: "...Book contents: Chapter (1) Introduction, Burma a distinct type- previous isolation - influence of Buddhism - current misconceptions about Burma - sketch of history, Chapter (2) Childhood, Infancy - early influences - children's games - school teaching - Togwin, Chapter (3) Adolescence, Universal monastic novitiates - Buddhist institution - The Yanan Theinthamot - Kyaung, Ecclesiastical architecture - Decadence - Zedi - ancient religious orders - Brahmans - Payadyun - Religious worship - principle of Buddhism - return to secular life Chapter (4) Manhood and occupation, agriculture - home industry - Manners and customs - settlements - climate, Chapter (5) Trade and professions, Oil - pressing - palm and cane sugar growing - fruit and vegetable gardening - fishery - the chase - pottery - brick and tiles - plaster - work - stone - cutting - cordage - silk weaving - umbrellas - lacquer - work - foot - gear - metallurgy - implements - ornaments - coins - alchemy - alchemy - forest and timber - carpentry - carving - painting and design - inscriptions and writing - literature - medicine - dealers - transport - boats and carts - travel, Chapter (6) Shan - Karen - Chin - Chimpaw - Chinese - Native of India - European, Chapter (7) political, chronic wars - brigandage - village system - native administration - British administration - royalty - history, Chapter (8) pageants and frolics, the drama - music - games - festivals - Nat worship - pilgrimages - the great shrines, Chapter (9) Age and mortality - funeral observances - tombs..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Kham Koo Website
1901-00-00
Date of entry/update: 2020-01-12
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : PDF
Size: 20.6 MB
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Description: "... Book contents: Chapter (1) Rangoon, Chapter (2) Amenities of Rangoon, Chapter (3) Across the Yomas to Taungdwingyi, Chapter (4) Life in a Burmese Market town, Chapter (5) Jungle life at Kokogon, Chapter (6) Through the forest to Pyinmana, Chapter (7) One thousand mile up the Irrawaddy, Chapter (8) One thousand mile up the Irrasaddy II, Chapter (9) Two Capitals, Chapter (10) Some other towns, Chapter (11) A month on the Lashio Line, Chapter (12) Camping in the Northern Shan State, Chapter (13) The Burman..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Kham Koo Website
1905-00-00
Date of entry/update: 2020-01-12
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : PDF
Size: 16.32 MB
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Description: "...Book Contents: Part (1) The country and climate, Fauna, Flora, Geology and Minerals, The races of Burma, The Chingpaw or Kachin Group, The Kuki-Chin Group, The Siamese-Chinese Sub-Family, The Mon-Hkmer Sub-Family, Part (2) Government, administration, education, history, Part (3) Industries, the forests of Burma, Mines, agriculture, trade, transport, currency, weights and measures, Part (4) Archaeology-Architecture-Art-Music, Art.-Sculpture, Wood Carving, Lacquer, Silver and Gold work, Drawing, Painting, Embroidery, Bumese Music and Musical Instruments. Part (5) Religion, Buddhism, Part (6) Language and Literature, The history of Tagaung Tanyap, Part (7) Hints to visitors or new residents..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Kham Koo Website
1911-00-00
Date of entry/update: 2020-01-11
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : PDF
Size: 18.35 MB
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Sub-title: Members of Northern Alliance bloc of armed groups say they have evidence for prosecuting military for war crimes, genocide
Description: "A coalition of ethnic rebel groups has welcomed efforts by the international community to punish Myanmar’s military through legal processes for alleged genocide against ethnic minority groups including Rohingya Muslims in the country’s west. Three members of the Northern Alliance bloc of armed groups -- the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), Arakan Army and Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army -- issued a joint statement on Thursday welcoming three lawsuits against Myanmar at the International Criminal Court (ICC), the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and an Argentine court for rights violations in ethnic areas. The groups said that during the past 70 years of the ongoing civil conflict, Myanmar’s military has committed genocide, extrajudicial arrests, inhuman torture, massacres, abductions and use of gang rape as instruments of war. They added that they stand ready to cooperate and collect evidence of war crimes by the military in northeastern Shan state and western Rakhine state between 2009 and 2019 and are in full support of the international organizations that have taken up the matter with the ICC and ICJ..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Asia-Pacific"
2019-11-29
Date of entry/update: 2019-11-29
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Thant Myint-U has titled his reflective and illuminating new book “The Hidden History of Burma,” even though he gently suggests that the country’s past wasn’t so much obscured as it was hiding in plain sight. For decades, especially after a ruthless crackdown on pro-democracy protestors in 1988, Burma had drawn international ire for the brutal rule of its military junta, which for a time went by the grotesque-sounding acronym SLORC (State Law and Order Restoration Council). Against the depredations of the dictatorship stood the charismatic Aung San Suu Kyi: a tireless civilian advocate for democracy who spoke consistently of hope, enduring years of detention and house arrest with a serene smile and a flower in her hair. Her public image weighed heavily in the international community’s imagination, which was decidedly more familiar with the morality play of “The Lady Versus the Generals” than with the longer history of Burma. That history proved to be stubborn and consequential — its effects only aggravated by how much its convolutions were simplified or ignored. “In the early 2010s,” Thant Myint-U writes, “Burma was the toast of the world.” (The junta had changed the country’s name in English to “Myanmar” in 1989; a prefatory note explains why this was an “ethno-nationalist” move — the equivalent of Germany demanding that English speakers refer to it as “Deutschland.”) The generals seemed to be ceding power, the country seemed to be ending its long isolation, tourism seemed to be on the rise; a number of rebel groups signed cease-fires, and in 2015 the National League for Democracy, led by Aung San Suu Kyi, won enough seats in the country’s first free elections in a generation to form a government..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The New York Times" (USA)
2019-11-19
Date of entry/update: 2019-11-20
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "The euphoria knew no bounds. When it was announced that a text had been drafted for a proposed ceasefire agreement between the Myanmar government and some of the country’s many ethnic resistance armies, The Center for Humanitarian Dialog, a Swiss-based peace and reconciliation outfit that runs several Myanmarrelated projects, hailed it as “the most comprehensive ceasefire agreement in Myanmar’s history” which “will set the stage for resolving the longest-running conflict in Southeast Asia.” Vijay Nambiar, special advisor on Myanmar to the Secretary General of the United Nations, also called the drafting of the proposal “historic” and UNICEF even suggested that it “could be a dawn of a new time of progress for the most disadvantaged children in Myanmar.” That was on March 31, 2015. Four years on, it is evident that Myanmar’s so-called peace process has been a complete failure. Even as the foreign peacemakers were congratulating themselves in the capital Naypyidaw and in Yangon, the reality on the ground remained depressingly unchanged. Airstrikes and other attacks were continuing against Kachin and Palaung rebel forces in the north and northeast of the country. When what was termed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) was nevertheless signed on Oct. 15, 2015, it was announced that “eight groups” were behind it. But five of the signatories had no noteworthy armed forces, and one, the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army, had been a government-allied militia since it broke away from the main group, the Karen National Union (KNU), in 1994..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Global Asia" (South Korea)
2019-03-27
Date of entry/update: 2019-11-01
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Size: 395.65 KB (4 pages)
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Description: "...everyone who has seen anything of Burma, and paid any attention to its history, knows that it is essentially not the country of the Burmese. The Burmese proper are probably a very small minority in it, though the peoples of other races, Talines, Shans, and some others, have in certain places become so Burmanized that it is difficult to distinguish them from the Burmese..."
Creator/author: Rev. Dr. J. N. Cushing
Source/publisher: Rangoon Gazette and Weekly Budget via SOAS Bulletin of Burma Research, Vol. 1, No. 2, Autumn 2003
1888-10-26
Date of entry/update: 2010-12-14
Grouping: Individual Documents
Category: Several Groups
Language: English
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Description: Abstract: "Based on secondary resources and long term anthropological field research, this paper explores some of the ?external? factors involved in the pro-democracy and ethnic struggles for self-determination currently being experienced in Burma. The analysis draws in cultural, economic and political aspects to demonstrate that a number of macro- and micro-level external or external-origin influences are at play, at a number of different ?inside?, ?outside? and marginal sites. The paper argues in particular that ?cultural? factors such as computer-mediated communication and contacts with outsiders when living in exile, serve as means by which real, virtual and imaginary connections are drawn between these different sites and the actors who inhabit them. In the context of Burma, this paper thus presents a glimpse into this complexity of origin and substance of external influences, of interactions between the external and the internal, and of the multidirectional pathways along which they operate. After an introductory overview, it does so by first reviewing some pertinent macro-political and macro-economic external factors, including international views and strategic interests. The paper then focuses on micro-level social and cultural issues, examining aspects of new media as utilised by the Burmese exile community and international activists. External influences on exiled communities living in the margins on the Thai-Burma border (characterised by the paper as neither ?inside? nor ?outside? proper), including Christianity and foreign non-governmental organisations, are then explored. The paper concludes that inside views, reactions and experiences of outside influences are presently just as important in determining outcomes as are the outside influences themselves."
Creator/author: Sandra Dudley
Source/publisher: Queen Elizabeth House
2003-02-00
Date of entry/update: 2010-07-08
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: English
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Description: "...Burma is a country rich in ethnic diversity. Yet although the SPDC attempts to promote this diversity, and the existence of its 135 "national races" (SPDC term for the country?s ethnic minority groups), the rights of ethnic minority people remain in violation...n areas where cease-fire agreements have been reached, human rights abuses continue to take place. In fact, in these "national reconciliation" areas human rights abuses have increased rather than abated. There has been no move on the part of the SPDC to engage in political discussions with opposition groups to reinforce the military cease-fire agreements. Under the terms of the cease-fire, some ethnic groups have been allowed to keep their arms and soldiers, however, SPDC had vastly increased the number of its soldiers in those areas... The continuing armed conflicts in the Karen, Karenni, Shan and Chin States have been accompanied by massive human rights violations..."
Source/publisher: Human Rights Documentation Unit, NCGUB
2001-10-00
Date of entry/update: 2003-06-03
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: English
Format : htm htm
Size: 92.2 KB 6.04 KB
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