Economic History

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Description: "Myanmar’s economic recovery slowed by high prices and shortages While economic conditions in Myanmar stabilized in the first half of 2023, businesses continue to face multiple challenges, household incomes remain weak, and food security has become an increasing concern, according to the World Bank’s semi-annual Myanmar Economic Monitor. Economic activity is slowly increasing in Myanmar, but from a low base, the report, A Fragile Recovery, says. GDP is projected to increase by 3% in the year to September 2023, a level still around 10% lower than in 2019. Severe supply and demand constraints continue to limit economic activity. Over the next one to two years, the economy is projected to expand slowly, but with the benefits of growth distributed unevenly across households, firms, and industries. Average annual inflation is projected to ease to 14% in the year ending September 2023, from 18.3% the previous year, and to drop further in 2024. Risks to the outlook include worsening conflict, more slumps in electricity generation, persistent inflationary pressure, and further deterioration in the business environment. The destruction caused by in May by Cyclone Mocha, which caused significant damage in states and regions where humanitarian needs were already substantial, was a reminder of Myanmar’s vulnerability to natural disasters. “While Myanmar is again making economic progress, the growth is unequal and the poorest are being hit hard by consecutive shocks,” said World Bank Country Director for Myanmar, Cambodia, and the Lao PDR, Mariam Sherman. “Worryingly, progress against malnutrition seems to have halted or reversed. More than half of households have been forced to sell assets, increase borrowing, or limit their spending, including on health and education. Such coping strategies will not only damage welfare in the short term, but also affect longer-term earning capacity.” The exchange rate has been stable for most of the last six months, inflation in food and fuel prices have eased, manufacturing output and orders have risen, and sales of local products have reportedly picked up. Passenger and freight transport volumes are rising, and although agricultural production has weakened, profitability is improving as farm gate prices rise and input costs ease, suggesting production may be higher in coming seasons. On the other hand, power outages, conflict, and logistics disruptions continue to constrain productivity, while investment indicators remain very weak. Moreover, with food prices high and ongoing weakness in the labor market, household incomes remain under substantial pressure. Impacts on employment and income have been particularly large in states and regions more affected by the ongoing conflict. The combination of weak employment, fewer hours worked, and increased incidence of casual or self-employed work has reduced the earning capacity of many families. Wages dropped by an average of 15% in real terms between 2017 and 2022 and almost half of Myanmar households reported that their incomes declined over the course of 2022. As a result, food security and nutrition appear to have worsened during the first half of 2023, with coping mechanisms becoming increasingly strained. According to a May 2023 World Bank survey, 48% of farming households worry about not having enough food, up from about 26% in May 2022. The survey also shows a notable drop in the consumption of nutritious foods such as milk, meat, fish, and eggs..."
Source/publisher: World Bank
2023-06-27
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-27
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Description: "The MAU tracks market prices in in Southeast Myanmar. Data are collected from three vendors per product per market in the last week of each month. The data include prices from Hpapun (Kamamaung market), Hsiseng (main), Kawkareik (main), Loikaw (Thiri Mingalar) and Taungoo (Nat Htet). Data will soon be available online at www.themimu.info/market-analysis-unit. KEY FINDINGS Prices increased notebly for a second straight month and they rose more widely than in March; Prices for rice and pulses rose 11% or more in several markets, although stable palm oil prices remained relatively close to April 2022 levels; Prices increased widely in Kawkareik and Loikaw makets in April, while prices were stable in Hpapun and mixed in Taungoo; Meat and fish prices rose by 12% in most markets, yet they largely tracked with changes at this time last year; Rice and some NFI prices may rise further in May if Cyclone Mocha impacts regional demand and supply networks; Stable prices in Hpapun are likely to rise in May, while Loikaw may be able to look forward to some price relief absent major market disruptions. Product-Level Price Changes Essential Foods – Essential food prices were stable or rising in April. Prices for rice and pulses rose 11% or more in several markets, although palm oil prices remained stable. The picture for essential foods differed slightly by township, with Loikaw in particular seeing higher prices. Vegetables – Vegetable prices were stable or rising in April, although onion prices fell sharply. Many vegetable prices rose 7% or more in April. The only vegetable prices which fell in April included onion and a few products in Hpapun. Kawkareik stood out for particularly large vegetable price increases. Hygiene Products – Prices for hygiene products fluctuated in April, rising and falling in different markets. Prices for hygiene products were stable or falling in Taungoo and Hpapun and rising in Kawkareik and Loikaw. Prices for hygiene products fell 7-11% in Hpapun, but some prices rose 40% or more in Kawkareik; price increases were due partly to stockouts of goods in smaller packaging. Meat and Fish – Most meat and fish prices rose sharply in April. Meat/fish prices increased 12% or more in most markets in April. Kawkareik and Taungoo saw the most-widespread meat/ fish price increases, while Hpapun stood out for unsually-stable meat/fish prices; dried fish and pork prices fell 6% in Hpapun. Other NFIs – NFI prices lurched upward in April, particularly in Kawkareik and Loikaw. Most NFI prices Kawkareik—which were stable last month—rose 9% or more in April, and they rose 3% or more in Loikaw. Stockouts of products in smaller packages caused some larger price swings in April (i.e., products were only available in larger sizes). Hpapun township was an outlier in April, with fairly-stable NFI prices..."
Source/publisher: Myanmar Information Management Unit (Myanmar) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
2023-05-19
Date of entry/update: 2023-05-27
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Description: "The MAU monitors transport routes to track flows of commercial goods between towns. This rapid CTR presents pre-cyclone baseline data to support of aid delivery following Cyclone Mocha; the data do not reflect post-cyclone conditions. Data are based on MIMU shapefiles and KIIs with market actors. Reports available at www.themimu.info/market-analysis-unit Source and Volume of Goods Most supply of goods to Rakhine State arrives via three central/southern roads from Central Myanmar and by sea from Yangon. Supply to Rakhine State via road arrives through Ann (via Magway), Toungup (via Pyay) and Gwa (via Ayeyarwady Region). Within the state these feeder routes are linked by a single transportation artery running from Gwa in the south to Sittwe in the north. Supply volumes are largest north of Toungup, particularly along the road to Sittwe. Supply via sea from Yangon, while less frequent, delivers supply in large volumes. On Rakhine State's northern borders, supply from Chin State is rare (indeed, Paletwa is dependant upon northern Rakhine for supply), and imports from Bangladesh are limited, informal and poorly-mapped. In central and northern Rakhine State, waterways exist alongside roads as critical supply channels. Waterways duplicate and in some cases supercede road-based supply in the state's north. Waterways are particularly critical network links for locations like Pauktaw, Paletwa (Chin State), Myebon, and Mrauk-U, and they are important for connecting Kyaukphyu and Sittwe to Yangon by sea. Moreover waterways are critical for last-mile travel: some townships like Rathedaung have large areas with few roads, making waterways critical for reaching villages. Yet water-based supply routes in Rakhine State see less regular traffic than roads, with some major water routes seeing regular trade throughout the week but lessthan-daily. Route Quality and Seasonal Effect Major supply routes in Rakhine State have decent quality roads, yet most routes are very susceptible to poor weather. Road quality in Rakhine State is best in central/southern areas and along the major north-south cooridor, and it is worst in remote areas of the north. The conditions created by Cyclone Mocha—like seasonal monsoon conditions in general—can badly impact road and waterway transportation. Some key routes in the far north invariably worsen in heavy rain, and few throughout the state are consistantly reliable. Route conditions are often uncertain poor weather, including those critical for reaching towns like Buthidaung, Pauktaw, Paletwa, and Minbya..."
Source/publisher: Myanmar Information Management Unit (Myanmar) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
2023-05-16
Date of entry/update: 2023-05-16
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Description: "The MAU tracks market prices in in Southeast Myanmar. Data are collected from three vendors per product per market in the last week of each month. The data include prices from Hpapun (Kamamaung market), Kawkareik (main), Loikaw (Thiri Mingalar) and Taungoo (Nat Htet). Data will soon be available online at www.themimu.info/market-analysis-unit. KEY FINDINGS Prices were stable or rising in March, although most prices changed by less than 10%; Rice and palm oil prices were fairly stable in March, while prices for pulses fell slightly; Vegetable prices were fairly stable in March—more so than at this time last year, when prices fell—increasing their lead over March 2022 levels; Prices for hygiene products rose by 7% in some markets, in contrast to generally-lower prices in February; NFI prices were stable in March, leaving most products at least 20% higher than last year; Prices were stable in Loikaw and Kawkareik in March, while Hpapun and Taungoo saw a mix of higher, lower and stable prices. Product-Level Price Changes Essential Foods – Essential food prices were fairly stable in March. Prices for some essential foods shifted up or down in March, but the change was usually less than 5%. Palm oil prices increased sharply in Taungoo in March, reversing February's lower prices. Vegetables – Vegetable prices fluctuated in March, with most prices varying more by township than by product. Vegetable prices were stable in Loikaw and Kawkareik in March, but prices increased in Taungoo and they were mixed in Hpapun. Taungoo saw the most dramatic vegetable price shifts, with eggplant and garlic prices up sharply. Hygiene Products – Prices for hygiene products rose in Hpapun and Taungoo in March while holding stable elsewhere. Prices for toothpaste, detergent and sanitary pads rose by 7% or more in Hpapun and Taungoo, but all three were stable in Kawkareik and Loikaw. Price hikes for hygiene products were largest in Taungoo. Meat and Fish – Meat and fish prices were stable or falling in March. Prices for shrimp and fish paste were stable in March, while chicken prices fell by 5-11% in three of four markets monitored. The picture was more mixed for fresh fish, dried fish and pork, with prices rising or falling by 6% or more for each of these products. Other NFIs – NFI prices were stable or falling slightly in March. NFI prices were virtually unchanged in Kawkareik in March, and elsewhere they shifted by less than 10%. None of the NFIs monitored saw price cuts across all markets, but items like cooking pots and longyis saw price cuts in two of four markets. Price increases for NFIs were very rare in March..."
Source/publisher: Myanmar Information Management Unit (Myanmar) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
2023-04-28
Date of entry/update: 2023-05-13
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Description: "OVERVIEW: According to the observations of Myanmar’s Department of Hydrology and Meteorology (DMH) at 1200 HRS UTC+7, the deep depression (INVEST 91B) over North Andaman Sea and adjoining Southeast Bay of Bengal has moved Northwards and is crossing to Ayeyarwady Region near Haiggyikyun. The deep depression (INVEST 91B) is coded BROWN Stage (storm is currently crossing Myanmar coasts) as per DMH. INTENSITY: the deep depression (INVEST 91B) has estimated maximum sustained surface winds of 46-56 km/h (25-30 knots) (JTWC). FORECAST: In the next 24 hours, the deep depression (INVEST 91B) is forecast to likely move Northwards along the Deltaic area near Pathein and reach the Southern Rakhine Coast (DMH). According to JTWC, landfall in Myanmar is imminent, so the window of opportunity for development is closing. Global models generally agree that INVEST 91B will continue to track northward over Myanmar and dissipate. Potential for the development for a significant tropical cyclone is downgraded to MEDIUM. IMPACTS: Fairly widespread rain or thundershowers in Naypyitaw, Lower Sagaing, Mandalay, Magway, Bago, Yangon, Ayeyarwady, Taninthayi Regions and Shan, Chin, Rakhine, Kayah, Kayin, Mon States with regionally and isolated heavy falls in some Regions and States during morning of 23 March. Frequent squalls and rough seas off and along Myanmar coasts with waves reaching 2.74 – 3.96 m. Strong winds when crossing Ayeyarwady Region near Hainggyikyun, maximum wind speed of INVEST 91B may reach 72.4-80.5 km/h (45-50 mph) in Ayeyarwady Region and 56.3-64.4 km/h (35-40 mph) in Yangon Region. Storm surge 2.44 – 3.66 m high is possible in estuaries and tributaries at Pathein District, Labutta District, Myaungmya District, Maubin District, Phyarpon District, Ayeyarwady Region. According to the ASEAN Disaster Monitoring and Response System (DMRS), rainfall on 22 March with maximum intensity up to 100 mm/day occurred in Ayeyawardy Region and Yangon Region. ADVISORY: According to DMH, due to the deep depression (INVEST 91B), people should prepare for the impacts of rain or thundershowers with strong winds, lightning, possible flash floods especially in small streams and mountain streams, and landslides in the mountainous areas, as well as domestic flights, travellers, vessels and ships off and along the coasts of Myanmar. PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE: the Department of Disaster Management (DDM) of Myanmar continue to disseminated to those potentially affected relevant information regarding the dangers and potential impacts of the tropical cyclone which is developing in the Bay of Bengal. The AHA Centre will continue to monitor and issue necessary updates once more information from official sources becomes available..."
Source/publisher: ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance
2022-03-22
Date of entry/update: 2022-03-22
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Description: "Acknowledgements: To have completed such significant and thorough field research in Myanmar over the course of an unprecedented transition certainly would not have been possible without support and help from a great many people, and for that and many other things I am deeply grateful. First, to my family and friends, who supported me throughout this process. Thanks to Sean Turnell, my PhD supervisor, whose help and guidance throughout were essential. A number of people provided useful insights and feedback on various parts of this work at various stages, too many to name. Thanks also to Ian Holliday and Hong Kong University, whose annual conference on Myanmar was an immensely useful experience in 2011, and was always a source of useful feedback on my work. Lastly, thanks is also due to Macquarie University, whose support for both the PhD and the fieldwork made this thesis possible. In Myanmar, the list of people who I should acknowledge is long. First among those is Aung Tun, from Myanmar Egress, who helped me oversee the quantitative business survey in Myanmar and get permission to use the UMFCCI business list. The survey team, of five enumerators from Myanmar Egress, was also essential in helping to carry out the survey. Thanks go to the Union of Myanmar Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry, who allowed the research team to survey their members for this project. Thanks go to the over 200 businesses that were generous enough to give their time to talk to myself or one of the survey team – learning about businesses in Myanmar would not have been possible without this. Thanks also go to The Asia Foundation and Myanmar Development Resource Institute – Center for Economic and Social Development, who funded a separate work on subnational governance of businesses completed by this author, including a range of fieldwork visits. This fieldwork was the primary resource used in the February 2014 report, “Subnational Governments and Business in Myanmar.” This researcher appreciates the support of both The Asia Foundation and MDRI and their willingness to allow this research to be used in this PhD with the appropriate acknowledgement. Thanks are also due to Linn Maung Maung, from MDRI-CESD, who assisted greatly with that fieldwork and was the co-author on the aforementioned report. Needless to say there are many others who have influenced this work, through conversations and writings. Thanks, then, to all those whose names I have neglected but whose influence I have not..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Jared Bissinger - MA (International Relations, Australian National University)
2015-00-00
Date of entry/update: 2022-03-02
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Size: 6.3 MB (Original version), 5.9 MB (Reduce version) - 312 pages
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Description: "The introduction briefly describes the research topic, the context and rationale, as well as the aims and the significance of the research. The central research question of this thesis is: why are the anti-corruption measures initiated in 2013 unable to effectively address corruption in Myanmar? Since 2003, Myanmar is ranked at the bottom of the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) published annually by Transparency International (TI). It is perceived as one of the most corrupted countries in the world (ranked 147 among 168 countries surveyed in 2015) (TI 2016c). Nonetheless, the issue of endemic corruption in Myanmar has not received much academic scrutiny and 'not enough investigative work is being done to expose corruption in the country' (Phoe Thauk Kya 2014). After more than four decades of military rule, Myanmar made a crucial step towards democracy in 2012, when it held its first democratic elections since 1962. These elections were part of major political, economic and administrative reforms (Freedom House 2012). Myanmar is indeed embarking on an important transition, and it benefits from increasing foreign investment and development programs. In 2012, the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) lifted trade embargoes against the country. While this provides many opportunities for investment and growth, it also creates new and growing forms of corruption (Freedom House 2012)1 . Myanmar's private sector is underdeveloped and despite the reforms, the difficult investment climate remains a critical limiting factor for private sector development. Corruption is one of the most serious barriers to investment and commerce (World Bank 2014b), and 'the top concern for businesses, in Myanmar (Reuters, 6 May 2014). Little business can be accomplished without resorting to illegal payments (World Bank 2014b). Myanmar is a resource-rich country with agriculture and extractive industries, which provide the major portion of national income. Foreign direct investment grew from $329.6 million received in 2009/2010 to US$8.1 billion in 2014/2015 (Aung Hla Tun 2015). However, living standards have not improved for the majority of the population, and Myanmar remains one of the poorest countries in Asia with nearly one third of the population living in poverty (CIA 2016). Peter Pedersen and Clare Wee from the Asian Development Bank (ADB)'s Office of Anti-corruption and Integrity, argue that fighting corruption and fraud is crucial to achieving the goal of reducing poverty in the Asia-Pacific region. This is because corruption usually has a negative impact on development projects (ADB 2012), undermines sustainable development, and prevents the benefits of economic growth from being widely shared (ADB 2014). The landslide victory of Aung San Suu Kyi's political party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), at the November 2015 national legislative elections, can be regarded as a step towards an opening for the country. Nevertheless, establishing effective anti-corruption measures remains crucial for Myanmar's development process and to protect future investment. After the signature of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) in 2005 and its ratification in 2012 (UNODC 2013), Myanmar's government enacted a new Anti-Corruption Law (ACL) on 7 July 2013 and formed a new Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) on 25 February 2014 (Ei Ei Toe Lwin 2014). However, so far, in the most prevalent surveys related to corruption undertaken by International Organisations (IOs) and International Non-governmental Organisations (INGOs), Myanmar's score has not significantly improved (TI 2016c; World Economic Forum (WEF) 2015; World Bank 2015b)2 . Since its creation, the ACC has been criticised by Myanmar's journalists and political opposition, particularly for its lack of independence (Eleven Myanmar, 1 July 2015; Ei Ei Toe Lwin 2014; Naing Ko Ko 2014). The perceived effectiveness of an anti-corruption agency (ACA) is usually linked by academics to its ability to act independently (Schütte 2012, 23). Thus, the thesis examines the entrenched nature of corruption in Myanmar, its political culture and the limitations of the ACL and of the ACC. Aims and Significance of the Research The objective of the research is to explain why the new anti-corruption measures initiated in 2013 have been unable to successfully address the issue of corruption in Myanmar. In order to do so, the research first tries to determine the nature and extent of corruption in Myanmar. Then, the thesis considers the former anti-corruption measures established before 2013, and examines the political context and the motivations, which led the government to implement new anti-corruption measures. It focus on the period from when Myanmar start transitional reforms in 2010, until the introduction of the new anti-corruption measures in 2013. The thesis reviews the features of the ACL and of the ACC, determines their weaknesses and limitations and ascertains why corruption persists. The thesis, then identifies some potential strategies to make the ACC more effective by examining the challenges and the performance of ACAs in other countries such as Hong Kong, Singapore, Indonesia or Vietnam. Finally, the research analyses the alternatives for addressing the issue of corruption in Myanmar. Since the early 1990s, academic and policy interest in corruption in developing countries has greatly increased. Several international institutions such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the United Nations (UN), INGOs such as TI, and national governments, have proposed various strategies intended to reduce corruption in the Global South. Despite the prevalence of publications on corruption in Asia, there is a lack of research or academic literature on corruption in Myanmar. This is, despite the fact that it is one of the highest-ranking Asian countries in terms of official corruption. There is also little available evidence of the specific forms and patterns of corruption in the country. Consequently, although recent political and economic reforms initiated by Myanmar's government can be regarded as a first 2 From 2014 to 2016, Myanmar's score in the CPI ranged from 21 to 22 (scores ranging from 100 (highly clean) to 0 (highly corrupt)) (TI 2016c). In the 2014-2015 WEF's Global Competitiveness Index, Myanmar's rank in terms of 'Ethics and corruption' is 121 among 144 countries with a score of 2.6 (scores ranging from 1 (lowest) to 7 (best)) (WEF 2015). Between 2013 to 2014, Myanmar's rank in terms of 'controlling corruption' in the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators, increased slightly from 12.4 to 17.3 but remained very low (percentile rank among all countries ranges from 0 (lowest) to 100 (highest) rank) (World Bank 2015b). 2 step to democratisation, the country continues to face a major corruption issue, which threatens its development. As there is a dearth of research on corruption and anti-corruption initiatives in Myanmar, this thesis is important because it will provide a comprehensive assessment of the legal and institutional anti- corruption framework. It will focus specifically on the anti-corruption measures initiated by the government in 2013, which have not yet been analysed in publications, by any organisation or institution. Structure of the Thesis Chapter One defines the methodology and the sources of data used, as well as the major concepts relevant to the research question. Additionally, this chapter examines the existing literature on the research topic. Chapter Two determines the nature and extent of corruption in the country, and the political context in which new anti-corruption measures have been implemented. Chapter Two also evaluates the provisions of the ACL in light of the UNCAC. Chapter Three explores possible ways to make the ACC more effective by identifying reasons for the ACC’s poor performance. Furthermore, this chapter analyses whether an ACA is the most effective tool to address corruption in Myanmar, by comparing it with other ACAs established in the region. In concluding, the thesis reviews the contributions of the research undertaken and the implications of its findings, and proposes opportunities for future research..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: The University of Melbourne
2016-06-24
Date of entry/update: 2022-03-02
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Size: 396.27 KB (Original version) - 52 pages
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Description: "Since Myanmar gained its independence on 4 January 1948, it has passed through several highly distinct phases of development: decades of isolation, at fi rst self-imposed and later the result of sanctions, then the introduction of a market economy in the late 1980s, with various watershed moments in the country’s politics, ushering in a period of transition which has recently gathered pace. Th is has been accompanied by radical political and economic changes, mainly at the national level but also in the international context as the country has opened up to the outside world. In Myanmar itself, at the level of the Union Territory of Nay Pyi Taw, the 14 states and regions and the 330 townships, dramatic changes are taking place: the massive expansion of infrastructure, the intensive development of formerly peripheral areas of the country, much of which has been driven by resource extraction, and stronger links with neighbouring countries, all of which are focusing interest on the nature and pace of, and potential for, development in individual regions. In this setting, the purpose of this ‘Socio-Economic Atlas of Myanmar’ is to provide, for the fi rst time, a geographical overview and analysis of the country’s development progress and the spatial characteristics and disparities in its socio-economic transition using maps and texts. Th e idea for the Atlas evolved over the last 21 years, since February 1996, as a result of the increasingly intensive cooperation between the Departments of Geography at the University of Yangon, Myanmar, and the University of Cologne, Germany. Th e signing of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Universities on 23 August 2003 – highly unusual at the time – led to even more intensive cooperation in the fi elds of research and teaching. In 2011, the Centre of Excellence (CoE) for Urban and Regional Development was established as a partnership between the University of Yangon and the University of Cologne. Following various joint workshops between Germany and Myanmar, a partnership was also established with the then Department of Human Settlement and Housing Development (DHSHD), now the Department for Urban and Housing Development (DUHD) at the Ministry of Construction. Here too, many years of positive and increasingly intensive cooperation culminated in the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding on 13 June 2012 and the founding of the Myanmar German Research Centre for Urban and Regional Development (MGRC). Th e results of a joint research project – ‘Th e 81+ urban network system of Myanmar’ – were also incorporated into the Socio-Economic Atlas. Since 2011, an intensive partnership has also developed with the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH, which is a German federal enterprise and supports the German Government in international cooperation for sustainable development via technical advice and capacity building. GIZ operates in more than 130 countries and employs approximately 17,000 staff worldwide. On behalf of the Federal German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), GIZ resumed its activities in Myanmar in 2012 in the area of sustainable economic development. Th e GIZ Private Sector Development Project (PSD) in Myanmar aims to strengthen capacities for sustainable private sector development with the focus on improved framework conditions for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in Myanmar. All parts of this atlas, from the single maps to the texts, have been created and written with the utmost diligence and care. However, the maps in particular are based on information and statistical data which sometimes may contain errors and uncertainties. Th ey refl ect and visualise the current state of knowledge. Any errors and shortcomings in data other than that provided to us by other institutions remain our own. In order to contribute to the further improvement of knowledge about the country and the current socio-economic transformation processes, we encourage the readers of the Atlas to notify and discuss with us any errors which may come to their attention. Th is atlas could not have been produced without the trustful and fruitful collaboration and constant support of countless dedicated individuals in numerous institutions in Myanmar and Germany. Th e authors are indebted to their many colleagues, department heads, offi cials, staff members and other individuals who, with great kindness and patience, provided information, data and advice, shared knowledge, experience and passion, and listened and encouraged over many years and in many areas of Myanmar. First and foremost, we would like to express our profound thanks to the Ministry of Construction, particularly the Department of Urban and Housing Development, and the University of Yangon under the Ministry of Education for their trust, confi dence and invaluable support over many years in which the Atlas gained shape. At the Ministry of Construction, H. E. the Minister of Construction, U Win Khaing, H. E. the former Minister of Construction, U Kyaw Lwin, Permanent Secretary U Kyaw Linn, Director General U Min Htein, former Deputy Director General U Win Myint and former Director U Win Zaw provided invaluable support for which we are sincerely grateful. Several staff members of the Ministry of Construction are co-authors of the Atlas, others contributed indirectly. In the Ministry of Education, we are deeply grateful to H. E. the Minister of Education, Professor Dr Myo Th ein Gyi, H. E. the former Minister of Education, Professor Dr Khin San Yee, H. E. Chairman of the National Education Policy Commission Professor Dr Myo Myint, H. E. and the former Vice Minister of Science and Technology, Professor Dr Ba Shwe. We would like to thank the Rector of the University of Yangon, Professor Dr Pho Kaung, his predecessors Professor Dr Aung Th u, Professor Dr Tin Tun and Professor Dr Soe Yin, and Pro-Rectors Professor Dr Kyaw Naing and Professor Dr Omar Kyaw for their excellent personal support and strong encouragement. Several heads of the Department of Geography at the University of Yangon have done much to strengthen the growing collaboration since 1996. Th e members of the Centre of Excellence (CoE) for Urban and Regional Development at the University of Yangon, established in 2011 as research institution and think tank, were very supportive in respect to the generation of regional knowledge. Several members of various universities in Myanmar under the Ministry of Education are co-authors of this atlas, others contributed indirectly. We are sincerely grateful to the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH for the excellent collaboration and their generous fi nancial support for parts of the cartographic work and the publication of this atlas. Our thanks are also due to Irina Scheff mann, Cho Myat Nwe Tun and Dominik Weidert for the trustful cooperation and creative exchange over recent years. We also thank GIZ’s institutional partners, the Directorate of Investment and Company Administration (DICA), especially Director General U Aung Naing Oo, Deputy Director General U San Myint, Director Dr Marlar Myo Nyunt, Assistant Director Daw Aye Aye and Deputy Staff Offi cer Daw Yin Yin Mar. We are most grateful to numerous ministries and departments which contributed valuable information and data for the generation of the maps, namely the former Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation, Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Communications and Information Technology, Ministry of Cooperatives, Ministry of Electric Power, Ministry of Energy, Ministry of Environmental Conservation and Forestry, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Home Aff airs, Ministry of Hotels and Tourism, Ministry of Immigration and Population, Ministry of Industry, Ministry of Information, Ministry of Labour, Employment and Social Security, Ministry of Livestock, Fisheries and Rural Development, Ministry of Mines, Ministry of National Planning and Economic Development, Ministry of Rail Transportation, Ministry of Science and Technology, Ministry of Social Welfare and Ministry of Transport. Our sincere thanks also go to the Nay Pyi Taw City Development Committee, Yangon City Development Committee and Mandalay City Development Committee, the Myanmar Computer Federation and Myanmar Garment Manufacturers Association (MGMA). Th e German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) supported a two-year Visiting Professorship (2012-2014) and several short-term stays at the University of Yangon. Th e German Research Foundation generously supported the research project ‘Th e urban system of Myanmar in the transformation process’ (KR 1764/19-1) and provided a substitute professorship grant (2012-2014; KR 1764/23-1). Sincere thanks go to the Rectorate, the Faculty of Science and the Institute of Geography of the University of Cologne for their support. Sincere thanks are due to all our co-authors and contributors to the atlas, namely YCDC Secretary Daw Hlaing Maw Oo, Pro-Rector Professor Dr Aung Kyaw, Pro-Rector (retir.) Professor Dr Win Maung, Deputy Director General Professor Dr Nay Win Oo, Deputy Director General U Myint Naing, Director Dr Th an Th an Th we, Professor Dr Htun Ko, Professor Dr Khin Khin Han, Professor Dr Nilar Aung, Associate Professor Dr Khin Khin Soe, Associate Professor Dr Saw Yu May, Associate Professor Dr Zin Nwe Myint and Dr Zin Mar Th an, for their commitment to the book’s joint endeavour, namely to provide an up-to-date overview of a rapidly evolving development process. We owe special thanks to Stefanie Naumann for the excellent layout and Christopher Hay, Ulli Huber, Dr Edel Sheridan-Quantz and Katharine Th omas for the thorough translation and English correction. Finally, we would like to thank our families and friends in Myanmar and Germany for sharing their love and passion and for strengthening the bridge between our cultures. Th is book is dedicated to our teacher, friend and sister Sayama Gyi Professor Dr Mi Mi Kyi, without whom none of this would have been possible..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Franz Steiner Verlag
2017-04-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-10-24
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Size: 27.31 MB (190 Pages) - Original version
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Sub-title: Senior General Min Aung Hlaing has attracted ridicule for airing grand development plans at a time when the economy is in crisis, but even the regime’s more rational economic goals are unlikely to be achievable.
Description: "Coup leader and Tatmadaw Commander-in-Chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing has become the laughing-stock of Myanmar social media over his grand plans for the country. The most outrageous example of his folly is the grandiose expansion of the capital, Nay Pyi Taw, that he proposed in August. His vision of a city of 20 million people with a subway system and electric buses for transport prompted The Irrawaddy to publish an editorial titled “Myanmar junta boss Min Aung Hlaing’s delusions of grandeur”. At meetings of the Central Committee on Prevention, Control and Treatment of COVID-19, Min Aung Hlaing has also waxed lyrical about using traditional medicine to produce vaccines for use against the coronavirus. The domestically produced vaccines would save on the cost of imports, he said. He has also given reassurances that despite rising inflation there will be no food shortages in Myanmar because it is mainly an agricultural country. At a meeting of the National Planning Commission in Nay Pyi Taw on September 22, Min Aung Hlaing discussed using electric vehicles and trains to reduce reliance on fuel imports. He also said that Myanmar could become a middle-ranking member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations within five years, and one of the top ASEAN countries in a decade. Nothing could be further from the truth. Min Aung Hlaing is like the head of a poor household whose small wooden house is going up in flames but instead of trying to put out the fire he is shouting loudly about building a grand mansion. His comments reflect a lack of both basic knowledge of macroeconomics and the necessary skills for managing the economic turmoil he has unleashed on the country by overthrowing the elected government. The World Bank has forecast a contraction in GDP of 18 percent in the 2020-21 fiscal year, amid a crisis in the banking sector and the rapid depreciation of the kyat against the US dollar. In recent days, the kyat has sunk to a record low of around K2,500 to the dollar, almost half what it was trading at on January 31. The crash has prompted many money changers to close their doors, only adding to the sense of turmoil and chaos. The economic crisis will be devastating for the people of Myanmar. The United Nations Development Programme has forecast that the poverty rate could double by early 2022 and nearly half of the population will be below the poverty line. That prediction was made back in April, and the situation has only become more dire since then. But we need to look past Min Aung Hlaing’s delusions to winnow the truth from falsehoods and understand why the senior general and his junta, which calls itself the State Administration Council, are articulating certain economic policies. We need to ask whether the policies can be successful, what impact they will have on the lives of the country’s people, and what trajectory the economy is likely to follow in months and years ahead. An economic agenda, and its challenges The SAC’s economic policies can be summarised as promoting the agricultural sector for self-sufficiency, import substitution and industrialisation through protectionism. The junta’s draft Myanmar Economic Recovery Plan seeks to flatten a recession curve by focusing on the domestic economy and domestic consumption as a counter to supply chain disruptions. The plan also sets three objectives: promoting agricultural-based industrialisation, creating a stable market economy to attract direct foreign investment, and supporting domestic industries and businesses to create jobs. Regarding the first goal, Min Aung Hlaing has repeatedly spoken of the need to export milled rice rather than paddy, and the draft MERP targets cultivation of value-added vegetables in greenhouses in the medium term. For the second objective, MERP emphasises relaxing rules and regulations, setting up one stop service offices to speed up processing of applications, and streamlined procedures for importing capital goods. To support domestic businesses, MERP says only essential goods should be imported, while non-essential goods should be produced domestically where possible. Promoting self-sufficiency and import-substitution, and relying on domestic consumption are understandable policy responses to targeted sanctions, the suspension of international aid, dwindling revenues and declining foreign currency reserves. These policies are the regime’s strategy for the long game. The generals are probably aware that economic recovery in the short to medium term is impossible given the scale of economic downturn and absence of international assistance. They will resist international pressure to make concessions and will instead isolate themselves, if necessary, regardless of the costs incurred on the society. In this context, these policies will be needed to help them hang on to power. But the SAC will be unable to achieve these objectives unless it addresses more immediate challenges to the economy. In particular, the banking crisis has planted the seeds of destruction in the real economy and the value of the kyat. Some have predicted that the economic downturn could become more severe after the fiscal year ends on September 30. The kyat’s precipitous decline over the past week only hints at how bad the situation could get. As an example of why the country’s financial crisis will make it impossible for the junta to realise its economic plans, consider the regime’s decision to give priority to the agriculture sector, particularly small-scale farming. The output from monsoon season crops is predicted to decline significantly this year due to a sharp fall in fertiliser use by farmers. This occurred partly because of a global rise in fertiliser prices but mainly because of the disruption that the coup inflicted on the economy. A survey of agricultural input retailers conducted by the International Food Policy Research Institute in March found a range of factors had contributed to lower fertiliser use, including truck drivers going on strike, the disruption to banking services because of internet cuts and the Civil Disobedience Movement, the depreciation of the kyat (which made imports more expensive), and the decision of the SAC-controlled Central Bank to set limits on cash withdrawals from bank accounts. In a working paper published in April, IFPRI predicted that fertiliser sales would be half that of a normal year. It said this would have an outsized impact on the rice harvest, particularly in the Ayeyarwady delta, which produces about half of the monsoon crop and usually accounts for half of the country’s annual fertiliser imports. In a normal year, Myanmar imports about US$500 of inorganic fertiliser. The assessment was based only on fertiliser sales and did not include other factors such as the cost of seeds and farm machinery. Reduced spending on farm inputs will not only have implications for the macroeconomy, it will also have a huge impact on poverty, IFPRI said, because about 80pc of the country’s poor are linked to the agricultural sector, IFPRI said. The impact of this is not yet being felt. Data published recently by the junta’s commerce ministry showed that agricultural products accounted for 34pc of all exports between October 2020 and September this year – an increase of 25pc on 2019-20. Total trade between October 2020 and September 3 this year was $27.15 billion, a near-20 percent drop on the $33.55 billion in the same period last year, state media reported recently. Agricultural products have thus helped to prop up Myanmar’s trade figures this year, but this is because of increased agricultural production before the coup. Decreased fertiliser use this year means agricultural outputs are likely to fall dramatically in the near future, hitting both exporters and importers hard next year. Political problem, political solution During eight months of SAC rule, all of the country’s economic indicators have become flashing red lights. The junta leader’s import-substitution and industrialisation policies are relevant for the medium to long-term but they cannot address the immediate and worsening economic crisis. The financial crisis is the result of a lack of trust and confidence in the economy, particularly private banks. The reason for this is the Tatmadaw’s seizure of power, and restoring confidence would almost certainly require a return to the status quo ante – a political settlement that enables the National League for Democracy to return to office. Another possible solution is a massive injection of international funds – a bailout, essentially – but the Tatmadaw’s power grab and the human rights abuses it has inflicted over the past eight months mean there is little appetite to provide monetary assistance through the SAC. Only the restoration of democracy and a legitimate government will unlock the international assistance Myanmar needs to alleviate the crisis. With such a solution unlikely to materialise, the future for Myanmar’s economic is bleak. In the coming months we can expect to see increased poverty inflicting greater suffering on the people, while the state-controlled news media continues to fawn over more of Min Aung Hlaing’s delusions of grandeur. Khine Win is a public policy analyst focusing on economic governance in Myanmar..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Frontier Myanmar" (Myanmar)
2021-09-30
Date of entry/update: 2021-09-30
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Almost eight months after the military coup, Myanmar’s currency depreciated to a record low this week, prompting fears of worsening social and economic instability in the country, which has been devastated by the takeover. On Tuesday, the US dollar exchange rate rose to a record high of around 2,500 to 2,700 kyats per dollar. Prior to the Feb. 1 coup, the exchange rate was between 1,300- 1,400 kyats per USD. The rates on Wednesday are the same as yesterday, according to sources from different money exchanges and the black market. The value of gold on the domestic market reached a record high of more than 2.25 million kyats per tical on Tuesday, up sharply from a little over 2 million kyats the previous day. Gold shops had to close on that day and the market reopened only on Wednesday afternoon with prices at 2.2 million kyat per tical. The tical is a traditional Burmese measurement of gold weight equal to16.33 grams (just over half an ounce). The gold price before the coup was 1.32 million kyats per tical. People are only looking to buy US dollars in the currency market, with almost no one willing to resell, pushing the value of the greenback up sharply against the local currency, according to market sources. “Dollar sales are almost nonexistent and demand [for US currency] is rising as more people want to buy than previously,” said a businessman who spoke on condition of anonymity. Under the junta, the Central Bank of Myanmar has been selling reserve dollars to some companies importing key commodities such as petrol, cooking oil and pharmaceuticals through local private banks on a quota basis. However, the businessman said, there is a large demand for dollars in the market. Since the coup, the central bank has sold more than 190 million US dollars to the market in an attempt to stabilize the exchange rate. Of that amount, some $60 million was sold in September alone. However, unwilling to accept the drop in the Myanmar currency’s value, the junta set the official exchange rate at around 1,755 kyats per USD on Wednesday. Economists told The Irrawaddy that the economic slowdown, the banking crisis and political instability in the aftermath of the coup have led to volatility in the US dollar/kyat exchange rate, adding that the banking crisis had escalated into a currency crisis. A business analyst in Rangoon said, “It is mainly based on political instability. As the political situation becomes more volatile, some rich people will buy gold and dollars. The Central Bank also tries to monitor [the situation]. But as the bank does not have a lot of dollars, it can’t control things.” He said the current economic problems in the Southeast Asian country could not be resolved through economic policies alone, but only through political change. The rise of the US dollar/kyat exchange rate has seen petroleum prices increase steadily to more than 1,400 kyats per liter. At the end of January, fuel prices ranged between 660-770 kyat per liter. As a consequence, transportation costs have risen, as well as domestic commodity prices and the prices of some imported goods. On Wednesday, some companies abruptly halted their sales of imports due to the serious drop in the kyat’s value. An economist said: “People have lost faith in the kyat and are reluctant to deposit in banks. So they purchase the commodity they trust. People are trying to save dollars rather than spending.” He said that due to a decline in exports, the cessation of foreign investment and the absence of international aid, the junta’s income from foreign currency had dried up, limiting its ability to control the US dollar/kyat exchange rate. “They can’t solve this crisis. It is clear that they cannot do it. The whole economy is collapsing because of them,” he said..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2021-09-29
Date of entry/update: 2021-09-30
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Description: "Fuel prices in Myanmar have more than doubled since the junta’s February 1 coup, as the cost of crude oil has jumped in international markets and the kyat has weakened significantly against the US dollar amid post-coup political turmoil. Before the coup, the price of a liter of octane or diesel fuel was around 700 kyats. Now, it has soared to over 1,500 kyats. “Crude oil prices have hit a record high this year in the international market. Not only our country, but other countries are also experiencing price hikes. But in Myanmar it is coupled with the weakening kyat,” a manager of a Yangon fuel importer told The Irrawaddy. On Tuesday, oil prices hit their highest level in three years, climbing above US$80 a barrel in the global market amid tight supply and surging demand. This week, the US dollar exchange rate reached a record high in Myanmar of around 2,500 to 2,700 kyats per US dollar. Prior to the coup, the exchange rate was between 1,300 and 1,400 kyats per US dollar. The Central Bank of Myanmar has been selling US dollars to oil importers through private banks, but the amounts are not sufficient for all the oil importers who are now finding it hard to purchase US dollars in the open market. “It is mainly because of the exchange rate. And it is difficult to buy US dollars. Previously, you could buy US$1 million easily, but now you can only buy smaller amounts from several currency dealers,” the manager of a Mandalay-based oil importer told The Irrawaddy. Despite the increase in global crude prices, fuel prices in Myanmar are unlikely to have more than doubled if the kyat had not depreciated steeply, added the manager. On Monday, coup leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing urged regime ministers to find ways to reduce the use of imported fuel and to aim for the manufacture and operation of electric buses and vehicles..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2021-09-30
Date of entry/update: 2021-09-30
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "If you need cash in Myanmar, you have to get up early. Queues start forming outside banks at 4 a.m., where the first 15 or 30 customers are given a plastic token that will allow them to enter the bank when it opens at 9:30 a.m. and withdraw cash, according to more than a dozen people who spoke to Reuters. If you do not get a token, you either have to queue for hours for the few functioning cash dispensing machines outside or go to black-market brokers who charge big commissions. The cash crisis is one of the most pressing problems for the people of Myanmar after the Feb. 1 military coup. The central bank, now run by a junta appointee, has not returned some of the reserves it holds for private banks, without giving any reason, leaving the banks short of cash. The banks themselves have been closed or open only intermittently as many staff have gone on strike to protest against the coup. Meanwhile, internet outages make online transactions difficult and international transfers have largely stopped working. That presents problems for Burmese people and small businesses as they try to navigate an economy rapidly crumbling under the country’s new leaders and the collapse of tourism, one of Myanmar’s fastest-growing sectors. The Burmese kyat has dropped some 20% in value since the coup. “It’s now very difficult to operate a business,” said Hnin Hnin, an entrepreneur in her mid-20s who supplies shampoo and bedsheets to high-end hotels. “Traders don’t accept bank transfers now. They want cash. So we need to find the cash.” As a result, Hnin Hnin, who agreed to be identified only by a part of her name to discuss sensitive matters, has been one of the thousands of people queuing daily in front of the few functioning cash machines in major cities. Some people band together in groups of five, she said, so one person can take out money for the whole group. She has also been forced to figure out ways to pay her suppliers overseas, by making an agreement to swap money with a partner holding cash in an account in Thailand. Under the agreement, the partner gives Hnin Hnin access to her Thai baht account, so she can pay suppliers in Thailand, and Hnin Hnin pays her back with physical kyat notes in Myanmar. The central bank and the junta did not respond to requests for comment. Reuters put questions to Myanmar’s four largest private banks, including Kanbawza Bank and CB Bank. They also declined to respond. It is now almost impossible to get hold of U.S. dollars or other overseas currency at regular exchange centres in Yangon, a dozen people told Reuters. Black-market traders will take online transfers in exchange for physical notes in various currencies, they said, but add a commission of up to 10%. Myanmar's private banks were in trouble long before this year’s coup, at least partly because of their habit of lending money to well-connected customers who rarely bothered to pay them back, at least four bankers, including then-deputy central bank governor, told Reuters in 2017. The coup and the protests against it now mean there is no functional banking system, according to Richard Horsey, an independent political analyst specializing in Myanmar. “You have a three-pronged hit to the banking system,” said Horsey. “The pre-existing problems with the banks, which will be all the more difficult to resolve now; you have the economic impact of the coup which has produced a virtual hard stop to the economy without any kind of ability by the regime to manage that or inject stimulus; and then you have the banking sector strike itself.” People want to withdraw cash now to buy food and other essentials, said Horsey, and also because they fear the banking system will collapse. POVERTY RATE COULD DOUBLE The cash crisis is the most immediate sign of much deeper economic problems facing Myanmar, some experts said. Financial research firm Fitch Solutions said in April it expected Myanmar's gross domestic product to shrink 20% in 2021. The United Nations Development Programme said last month that Myanmar faces economic collapse due to the combined effect of the new coronavirus and the coup, which in its worst-case analysis could put nearly half the country’s 54 million people into poverty, compared to about a quarter in 2017. “If the situation on the ground persists, the poverty rate could double by the beginning of 2022,” said UNDP in its report. "By then, the shock from the crisis will have resulted in significant losses of wages and income, particularly from small businesses, and a drop in access to food, basic services and social protection." Millions are expected to go hungry in the coming months, the United Nations’ World Food Programme said in an analysis published in April. Some workers have trickled back to resume their jobs at banks in the past few weeks, but financial analysts see no immediate alleviation of the cash shortage. In Yangon, the country’s commercial capital, an egg and cooking oil trader who identified herself as Khin told Reuters the flow of eggs, oil and other agricultural commodities had slowed substantially and was no longer sufficient, forcing her to raise prices by 25%. While groceries are available in markets and in shops, some country analysts said they worry that farmers will not have access to seeds or credit to buy them before the monsoon planting season around June. “Farming in rural areas has already slowed down and the impact will be huge in the next season," said Khin. "Beans suppliers and chicken farm owners aren't sure if they can start another cycle." The commercial chain has been grinding to a halt, a major rice trader who works with hundreds of Myanmar farmers told Reuters. That trader said he lacks the cash to buy rice from farmers, which means in turn the farmers do not have money to buy equipment or pay workers to produce the rice. Many of the private banks’ loans were collateralised against real estate in Yangon, where property prices have collapsed since the coup, according to Myanmar economy analysts. Private banks in Myanmar are required to deposit a certain percentage of their customers’ money with the country’s central bank, as a way of protecting savings. Two bankers told Reuters their banks had deposited more than is required, but were denied permission by the central bank to withdraw any surplus, leaving them short of cash to dispense to customers. A banker at a major Myanmar bank said the closure of branches in the first two months after the coup prevented a run on the banking system with a rush to withdraw savings. “It was a good thing that the branches haven’t been open,” said the executive. “If the branches were open, we wouldn’t have enough cash to pay out..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Reuters" (UK)
2021-05-14
Date of entry/update: 2021-05-15
Grouping: Individual Documents
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