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Description: "၁။ ယနေ့ကျရောက်သည့် (၁၀၃) နှစ်မြောက် အမျိုးသားအောင်ပွဲနေ့ အချိန်အခါသမယတွင် တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူလူထုအားလုံးနှင့်တကွ ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီရရှိရေး တိုက်ပွဲဝင်နေကြသော ရဲဘော်များအားလုံး ဘေးအန္တရာယ်အပေါင်း ကင်းဝေးကြပါစေကြောင်းနှင့် အားလုံးရည်မှန်းကြိုးပမ်း နေကြသည့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ နိုင်ငံသစ်အား အမြန်ဆုံး တည်ဆောက်သွားနိုင်ရေးအတွက် စိတ်ကူးသစ်၊ အကြံဉာဏ်သစ်၊ ခွန်အားသစ်များနှင့်အတူ ဆတက်ထမ်းပိုး ထမ်းဆောင်နိုင်ကြပါစေ ကြောင်း ဆုတောင်းမေတ္တာ ပို့သအပ်ပါသည်။ ၂၊၊ ကိုလိုနီနယ်ချဲ့လက်အောက်ခံဘဝ ၁၉၂၀ ခုနှစ်၊ ဒီဇင်ဘာလ ၅ ရက်( မြန်မာသက္ကရာဇ် ၁၂၈၂ ခုနှစ်၊ တန်ဆောင်မုန်းလပြည့်ကျော် ၁၀ ရက်နေ့)တွင် တက္ကသိုလ်ကျောင်းသားများက ဦးဆောင်၍ ရန်ကုန်တက္ကသိုလ် အက်ဥပဒေမူကြမ်းကို သပိတ်မှောက်ဆန္ဒပြခဲ့ကြပြီး ပထမဆုံး အကြိမ် အမျိုးသားလှုပ်ရှားမှုအဖြစ် ပေါ်ပေါက်လာခဲ့ခြင်းဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ယင်းလှုပ်ရှားမှုကြီးသည် တစ်နိုင်ငံလုံးသို့ တစ်ဟုန်ထိုးပျံ့နှံ့သွားခဲ့ကာ အမျိုးသားအထက်တန်းကျောင်းများ၊ အမျိုးသား ကောလိပ်များ ပေါ်ပေါက်လာခဲ့ပြီး နယ်ချဲ့တို့လက်အောက်မှ လွတ်မြောက်လိုသည့် မျိုးချစ်စိတ်များ ရှင်သန်နိုးကြားလာခဲ့ကြပါသည်။ ၃။ တိုင်းပြည်တာဝန်များကို ပခုံးပြောင်းထမ်းဆောင်မည့် လူငယ်လူရွယ် အမျိုးသားများ အနေဖြင့် မိမိတို့နိုင်ငံ၏ အတိတ်သမိုင်းအား သင်ခန်းစာယူ၍ အနာဂတ်သမိုင်း ပိုမိုကောင်းမွန်အောင် တည်ဆောက်ရန် အထူးလိုအပ်ပါသည်။ မိမိတို့နိုင်ငံ၏ အမျိုးသားနေ့သည် လွတ်လပ်ရေးလမ်းကို စတင်လမ်းဖောက် လျှောက်လှမ်းခဲ့သည့် နေ့ထူးနေ့မြတ်ဖြစ်သကဲ့သို့ မီးခဲပြာဖုံးနေသော ကျွန်စိတ် ကို သခင်စိတ်အဖြစ်သို့ အသွင်ပြောင်းနိုင်ခဲ့သည့် နေ့တစ်နေ့လည်းဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ကိုလိုနီနယ်ချဲ့တို့ လက်အောက်မှ လွတ်မြောက်ရေးအတွက် တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူများအားလုံး အသက်၊ သွေး၊ ချွေးတို့ဖြင့် ရင်းနှီးရယူခဲ့ရခြင်းဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ထိုကဲ့သို့ ပေးဆပ်မှုကြီးမားစွာ ရယူခဲ့ရသည့် လွတ်လပ်ရေးသည် အလုံးစုံ လွတ်လပ်သည့်နိုင်ငံအဖြစ်သို့ မရောက်ရှိခဲ့ပေ။ မိမိလူမျိုးအချင်းချင်း စိုးမိုးချယ်လှယ် ဖိနှိပ်ချုပ်ချယ်သော စစ်အာဏာရှင်များ၏လက်အောက်တွင် နှစ်ပေါင်း (၇၀) ကျော် ကြာ ခါးသီးစွာ ရင်ဆိုင်ခံစားခဲ့ကြရပါသည်။ ၄။ ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ (၁) ရက်နေ့တွင် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်က နိုင်ငံတော်၏ အချုပ်အခြာအာဏာကို ပြည်သူ့ဆန္ဒမဲဖြင့် ဒီမိုကရေစီနည်းကျ ရွေးကောက်တင်မြှောက်ထား သော နိုင်ငံတော်သမ္မတ ဦးဝင်းမြင့်နှင့် နိုင်ငံတော်၏အတိုင်ပင်ခံပုဂ္ဂိုလ် ဒေါ်အောင်ဆန်းစုကြည်တို့ ဦးဆောင်သည့် ပြည်သူ့အစိုးရထံမှ လက်နက်အားကိုးဖြင့် ဖိနှိပ်အုပ်ချုပ်နိုင်ရန် တစ်ဖန်ကြိုးပမ်းခဲ့သည်။ ၅။ ထိုကဲ့သို့ ဖိနှိပ်အုပ်ချုပ်နိုင်ရန် ကြိုးပမ်းခဲ့မှုကြောင့် တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူအားလုံးတို့ သည် နှစ်ပေါင်း (၇၀) ကျော်ကြာ အမြစ်တွယ်နေသည့် စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ကို အမြစ်ပြတ် တိုက်ထုတ်ရန် အနှစ်နှစ် အလလက ကိန်းအောင်းနေသော အမျိုးသားစိတ်ဓာတ်သည် ယနေ့နွေဦး တော်လှန်ရေးတွင် ပြန်လည်နိုးကြားလာခဲ့ပါသည်။ ယနေ့နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးတွင် တိုင်းရင်းသား ပြည်သူများအားလုံးသည် အမျိုးသားနေ့မှ ပေါက်ဖွားလာခဲ့သော အမျိုးသားစိတ်ဓာတ်ကို အခြေ တည်ကာ မိမိတိုင်းပြည်နှင့် လူမျိုးကို လုံခြုံအေးချမ်းသော နိုင်ငံတစ်ခုတွင် ကောင်းမွန်စွာနေထိုင် နိုင်ရေး၊ ပြည်ထောင်စုတိုင်းရင်းသား၊ လူမျိုးအားလုံး ဥမကွဲ၊ သိုက်မပျက် အတူတကွ နေထိုင်နိုင် ရေး၊ ကမ္ဘာ့အလယ်တွင် တင့်တယ်ဝင့်ထည်စွာ ရပ်တည်သွားနိုင်ရေးတို့အတွက် မွန်မြတ်သော စိတ်ဓာတ်များဖြင့် ကြိုးပမ်းဆောင်ရွက်နေကြသည့်အတွက် ဂုဏ်ယူဝမ်းမြောက်ရပါသည်။ ၆။ ယခုအချိန်ကာလသည် အာဏာလု အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်အား စစ်ရေး၊ နိုင်ငံရေးနည်းလမ်း အမျိုးမျိုးအား ကိုယ်စီထမ်းရွက်ကာ ညီညွတ်သော ဆန့်ကျင်တော်လှန်မှုများကြောင့် တော်လှန်ရေး ခရီးတစ်လျှောက် အားကောင်းသော အောင်မြင်မှုများကို ရယူပိုင်ဆိုင်ထားနိုင်သည့် အချိန်ဖြစ်ပါ သည်။ ထို့ပြင် တည်ဆောက်ထားပြီးသော ညီညွတ်ခြင်း၊ အပြန်အလှန်နားလည်ခြင်း၊ လေးစား တန်ဖိုးထားခြင်းများကို အခြေပြုလျက် မိမိတို့နိုင်ငံတွင် အာဏာရူးစစ်မိစ္ဆာများအား အချိန်တိုတို အတွင်း အမြစ်ပြတ်မောင်းထုတ်နိုင်ပြီး နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးကြီး၏ အောင်ပွဲကိုလည်း အချိန်တိုတို အတွင်း ရရှိနိုင်လိမ့်မည်ဟု အခိုင်အမာယုံကြည်ပါသည်။ ၇။ မိမိတို့ ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီအနေဖြင့် အချင်းချင်း အပြန် အလှန်လေးစားမှု၊ နားလည်ယုံကြည်မှုနှင့် စည်းလုံးညီညွတ်မှုတို့ကို ပိုမိုခိုင်မာအောင် တည်ဆောက် သွားပြီး ဘုံရည်မှန်းချက်ပန်းတိုင်ဖြစ်သည့် လွတ်လပ်၍ငြိမ်းချမ်းပြီး ဝါဒဖြူစင်သည့် ဖက်ဒရယ် ဒီမိုကရေစီနိုင်ငံသစ် တည်ဆောက်နိုင်ရေးအတွက် တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူများ၊ တော်လှန်ရေး အင်အားစုများအားလုံးနှင့်အတူ ဆက်လက်လက်တွဲ ဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ယနေ့ ကျရောက်သည့် (၁၀၃) နှစ်မြောက် အမျိုးသားအောင်ပွဲနေ့ အချိန်အခါသမယမှသည် နွေဦး တော်လှန်ရေးကြီး၏ အောင်ပွဲနေ့သို့ တွဲလက်ညီညီ အရှိန်မြှင့် ချီတက်ကြစေလိုကြောင်း လေးလေး နက်နက် တိုက်တွန်းလျက် ဤသဝဏ်လွှာအား ပေးပို့အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher: Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw
2023-12-07
Date of entry/update: 2023-12-07
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Format : pdf
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Description: " ယနေ့ မြန်မာသက္ကရာဇ် ၁၃၈၅ခုနှစ်၊ တန်ဆောင်မုန်းလပြည့်ကျော်(၁၀)ရက်နေ့၊ ခရစ်က္ကရာဇ် ၂၀၂၃ခုနှစ်၊ ဒီဇင်ဘာလ ၇ ရက်နေ့တွင် ကျရောက်သည့် ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်၏ (၁၀၃)နှစ်မြောက် အမျိုးသားနေ့အောင်ပွဲ အခါသမယတွင် ပြည်ထောင်စုဖွား တိုင်းရင်းသားညီနောင် အပေါင်း ကိုယ်စိတ်နှစ်ဖြာ ကျန်းမာချမ်းသာကြပါစေကြောင်း ဆုမွန်ကောင်းတောင်းအပ်ပါသည်။ ကိုလိုနီနယ်ချဲ့ခေတ်အတွင်း ကန့်သတ်ချုပ်ချယ်ချက်ပေါင်း များစွာပါဝင်သည့် ရန်ကုန်တက္ကသိုလ် အက်ဥပဒေ(၁၉၂၀) ပြဌာန်းခဲ့သည်ကို လက်မခံနိုင်သောကြောင့် ရန်ကုန်ကောလိပ် ကျောင်းသား/သူများ ဦးဆောင်ပြီး မြန်မာသက္ကရာဇ် ၁၂၈၂ခုနှစ်၊ တန်ဆောင်မုန်းလပြည့်ကျော်(၁၀) ရက် (၁၉၂၀ပြည့်နှစ်၊ ဒီဇင်ဘာလ ၅ရက်)နေ့တွင် ဆန့်ကျင်သပိတ်မှောက်ခဲ့ကြသည်။ ထိုလူထုသပိတ်ကြီးမှ အမျိုးသားပညာရေး ကို တောင်းဆိုဖော်ပြသည့် အမျိုးသားလှုပ်ရှားမှုကြီးတစ်ရပ် ဖြစ်ပေါ်လာခဲ့ပါသည်။ မတရားအုပ်ချုပ်သူ ကိုလိုနီနယ်ချဲ့အစိုးရကို ပထမဆုံး ထိထိရောက်ရောက် တော်လှန်ခဲ့သော ထိုနေ့ကို အမျိုးသားအောင်ပွဲနေ့ အဖြစ် သတ်မှတ်ခဲ့သည်မှာ ယနေ့ဆိုလျှင် (၁၀၃)နှစ်ပင် ပြည့်မြောက်ခဲ့ပြီ ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ယခုမျက်မှောက်ခေတ်ကာလတွင်လည်း အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်က ပြည်သူလူထုထံမှ အချုပ်အခြာအာဏာကို လက်နက်အားကိုးဖြင့် မတရားလုယူရန်ကြိုးစားပြီး၊ အဆိုပါ လုပ်ရပ်ကို ဆန့်ကျင်ဆန္ဒပြခဲ့ကြသည့် အပြစ်မဲ့ပြည်သူများအား အကြမ်းဖက် ဖိနှိပ်သတ်ဖြတ်မှုများကို ရက်စက်စွာ ကျုးလွန်ခဲ့ပါသည်။ ထိုသို့ မတရားအကြမ်းဖက်မှုများအား ခုခံကာကွယ်နိုင်ရေး၊ စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ် အပြီးသတ်ချုပ်ငြိမ်းရေးနှင့် တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူအားလုံး လိုလားတောင့်တခဲ့ကြသော ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ ပြည်ထောင်စု ပေါ်ပေါက်လာရေးအတွက် နိုင်ငံတဝန်းရှိ ကျောင်းသားလူငယ်များ အပါအဝင်၊ တော်လှန်ရေးအင်အားစုအသီးသီး စုပေါင်းကာ နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးအား ယနေ့အထိ တမျိုးသားလုံး တက်ကြွစွာ ပါဝင်ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေး အစိုးရအနေဖြင့်လည်း တဖက်တွင် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ် အပြီးသတ်ကျဆုံးရေးအတွက် နိုင်ငံရေး၊ စစ်ရေး၊ ဘဏ္ဍာရေးအစရှိသည့် ကဏ္ဍပေါင်းစုံ၊ စစ်မျက်နှာစာမျိုးစုံ ဖွင့်လှစ်ကာ ကြိုးပမ်းဆောင်ရွက်နေသကဲ့သို့၊ အခြားတဖက်တွင် အနာဂတ် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ ပြည်ထောင်စု၏ မျှော်ရည်ချက်များကို အမြန်ဆုံး ချမှတ်အကောင်အထည် ဖော်ဆောင်နိုင်ရန်အတွက် တိုင်းရင်းသားတော်လှန်ရေး အဖွဲ့အစည်းများအပါအဝင် တော်လှန်ရေးအင်အားစုအားလုံးနှင့် ချိတ်ဆက် ပူးပေါင်းကာ ပြည်သူ့နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေး အောင်ပွဲအတွက် ဆက်လက် ကြိုးပမ်းလုပ်ဆောင်လျက် ရှိပါသည်။ အတိတ်သမိုင်းတွင် မတရားဖိနှိပ်မှုအမျိုးမျိုးကို ဆန့်ကျင်တော်လှန်ခဲ့ကြသည့် လူထုတစ်ရပ်လုံး ပါဝင်လှုပ်ရှားမှုများကြောင့် နယ်ချဲ့ကိုလိုနီလက်အောက်မှ လွတ်မြောက်ခဲ့ရသော သမိုင်းအောင်ပွဲ သာဓကရှိခဲ့ပါသည်။ ထိုကဲ့သို့ပင် ယခုပြည်သူ့နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးတွင်လည်း တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူလူထု၏ လိုလားချက်၊ဘုံရည်မှန်းချက်ကို အခြေပြုပြီး၊ ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပဋိညာဉ် (FDC)တွင် ဖော်ပြထားသည့် လွတ်လပ်ခွင့်၊ တရားမျှတမှုနဲ့ တန်းတူညီမျှရေး စသည့် စံတန်ဖိုးများကို ကိုင်စွဲကာ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အာဏာရှင်ကို လက်တွဲညီညီ ပူးပေါင်းပါဝင်ပြီး ဆက်လက်တော်လှန်သွားမည်ဆိုပါက ခေတ်သစ် အမျိုးသားအောင်ပွဲနေ့ တရက်ကို ထပ်မံ ဖန်တီးနိုင်မည်ဖြစ်ဟု အလေးအနက် ယုံကြည်ပါကြောင်း သတင်းစကားပါးလျက်၊ ယနေ့ကျရောက်သည့် (၁၀၃)နှစ်မြောက် အမျိုးသား အောင်ပွဲနေ့အထိမ်းအမှတ်အတွက် ပြည်သူလူထုထံသို့ ဤသဝဏ်လွှာအား ပေးပို့အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher: National Unity Government of Myanmar
2023-12-07
Date of entry/update: 2023-12-07
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Format : pdf
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Description: "၁။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ကာကွယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန နှင့် မဟာမိတ်များ စစ်ဒေသအလိုက် တည်ဆောက်ထားသည့် Chain of command အောက်တွင် ပါဝင်လျက် Code of Conduct စစ်ဘက်ဆိုင်ရာ ကျင့်ဝတ်များနှင့်အညီ ဆောင်ရွက်မည်ဟူသော သဘောတူညီချက်ဖြင့် စစ်ကိုင်းတိုင်း၊ ယင်းမာပင်ခရိုင်၊ ပုလဲမြို့နယ်တွင် အခြေစိုက်သည့် မြန်မာ့တော်ဝင်နဂါးတပ်တော် (MRDA)၏ တပ်ဖွဲ့များကို ယင်းမာပင်ခရိုင် တပ်ရင်းအမှတ် (၃)၊ (၄)၊ (၅)၊ (၆) အဖြစ် ၂၀၂၂ ခုနှစ်၊ မတ်လ (၁၄) ရက်နေ့ရက်စွဲဖြင့် အသိအမှတ်ပြုကွပ်ကဲမှု ရယူခဲ့ပါသည်။ ၂။ ကွပ်ကဲမှုရယူပြီးနောက် အခြားပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်မတော် တပ်ရင်းများနည်းတူ တပ်ရင်း ထောက်ပံ့မှုများကို ၂၀၂၂ ခုနှစ် ၊ မေလ မှ​စတင်၍ ပြုလုပ်ခဲ့ရာ ယခုအချိန်အထိ စုစုပေါင်း ကျပ်သိန်း ၃၁၈,၀၀၀,၀၀၀ (မြန်မာကျပ်ငွေ သိန်းပေါင်း သုံးထောင် တစ်ရာ ရှစ်ဆယ်သိန်း တိတိ) (ခန့်မှန်းအမေရိကန် ဒေါ်လာ (၁၂၂,၉၇၆.၄၈)) ထောက်ပံ့ခဲ့ပြီးဖြစ်သည်။ ၃။ ပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်မတော် တပ်ရင်းများအဖြစ် အသိအမှတ်ပြု ကွပ်ကဲမှုမယူမီကာလကလည်း MRDA ၏ ထုတ်လုပ်ရေးလုပ်ငန်းများအတွက် စုစုပေါင်း ခန့်မှန်းအမေရိကန်ဒေါ်လာ (၂၄,၁၆၆.၆၇) ထောက်ပံ့ခဲ့ပြီး ပြည်သူ့တော်လှန်ရေးထောက်ပို့တပ် (PRF) အပါအဝင် ကာကွယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနမှတဆင့် ပြည်တွင်း၊ ပြည်ပ အလှူရှင်များ၏ လှူဒါန်းမှု စုစုပေါင်း ခန့်မှန်းအမေရိကန်ဒေါ်လာ (၂၈,၀၇၀) ကိုလည်း ဆက်သွယ်ပေးပို့ခဲ့သည်။ ၄။ ၂၀၂၂ ခုနှစ်၊ မတ်လ အတွင်း MRDA အနေဖြင့် ၎င်း၏ ရန်ပုံငွေဖြင့် လက်နက်ပစ္စည်းဝယ်ယူနိုင်ရန် အတွက် မဟာမိတ်များနှင့် ချိတ်ဆက်ဆောင်ရွက်ပေးခဲ့ရုံသာမက ကာကွယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနက ခန့်မှန်း အမေရိကန်ဒေါ်လာ (၉၀,၀၀၀) ကို အားဖြည့်ထောက်ပံ့ပေးခဲ့သည်။ ၅။ တော်လှန်ရေးကာလ အစောပိုင်းတွင် MRDA အတွက် မောင်းပြန် (၅) လက်နှင့် ဆက်စပ်ခဲယမ်းများကို ဝန်ကြီးဌာနအနေဖြင့် လည်းကောင်း၊ ဗုံးပစ်လောင်ချာ (၁၅) လက်နှင့် ဆက်စပ်ခဲယမ်းများကို အမှတ် (၁) စစ်ဒေသမှ တဆင့် လည်းကောင်း ထောက်ပံ့ပေးခဲ့သည်။ ထို့အတူ အသိအမှတ်ပြု ကွပ်ကဲမှုယူပြီး ဖြစ်သော တပ်ရင်း လေးရင်း အနက် ယင်းမာခရိုင်အမှတ် (၆) တပ်ရင်းကို မောင်းပြန် (၉၃) လက်နှင့် ဗုံးပစ်လောင်ချာ (၇) လက်တို့ကို တပ်ဆင်ပေးခဲ့သည်။ ၆။ ပြည်သူ့တော်လှန်ရေးမဟာမိတ်များအနေဖြင့် ခုခံတွန်းလှန်စစ် အောင်မြင်ရေးအတွက် တိကျခိုင်မာ၍ ရှင်းလင်းပြတ်သားသည့် ကွပ်ကဲမှုစနစ် တည်ဆောက်လျက်ရှိရာ ယင်းမာပင်ခရိုင်တပ်ရင်း (၃)၊ (၄)၊ (၅)၊ (၆) တို့သည် ပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်မတော် (PDF) တပ်ရင်းများအဖြစ် ဆက်လက်ခံယူလျက် Chain of Command နှင့် Code of Conduct (COC) နှစ်ရပ်ကို လေးစားလိုက်နာဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည်ဖြစ်သကဲ့သို့ ကာကွယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန နှင့် စစ်ဒေသကလည်း ဆက်လက်အသိအမှတ်ပြုထောက်ပံ့လျက် ကွပ်ကဲမှုရယူ ဆောင်ရွက် သွားမည် ဖြစ်ကြောင်း သတင်းထုတ်ပြန်အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
2023-09-14
Date of entry/update: 2023-09-16
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
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Description: "On 14 March 2022, the Myanmar Royal Dragon Army (MRDA), stationed in Yinmabin District of Pale Township in Sagaing Region, officially underwent a restructuring process. As part of this transformation, the MRDA's forces were reorganized into Yinmabin District battalions numbered (3), (4), (5) and (6). This reconfiguration was carried out with a commitment to honor the Chain of Command and the Code of Conduct jointly established by the Ministry of Defence of the National Unity Government and allied Ethnic Revolutionary Organizations. Similar to other People's Defence Force battalions operating under the same command structure, these Yinmabin battalions have received financial support totalling MMK 318,000,000 (EUSD 122,976.48) since May 2022 through to the present date. Prior to their integration into the command structure, the MRDA received roughly EUSD 24,166.67 in support specifically allocated for weapon production. Additionally, donations totalling around EUSD 28,070, including contributions from local sources and the diaspora (including the People's Revolutionary Supply Family), were channelled through the Ministry of Defence. In March 2022, the Ministry extended support to the MRDA by providing approximately EUSD 90,000 for the purpose of procuring weapons. The Ministry also collaborated with allied parties to facilitate the acquisition of these weapons. During the early phases of the revolution, the MRDA was initially supplied with five automatic rifles and ammunition through the Ministry, and 15 grenade launchers with ammunition via No. (1) Military Region. Among the four Yinmabin District battalions under the command, Yinmabin District battalion No. (6) was outfitted with an impressive arsenal, including 93 automatic rifles and seven grenade launchers. As the People's Revolutionary allies work diligently to establish a well-defined and resolute command structure aimed at securing victory in the defensive war, Yinmabin District battalions No. (3), (4), (5) and (6) are committed to maintaining their roles as People's Defence Force battalions. They will steadfastly adhere to the Chain of Command and the Code of Conduct. It is hereby declared that both the Ministry of Defence and No. (1) Military Region will provide all forms of support to these battalions, and that they will remain under their existing command structure..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
2023-09-14
Date of entry/update: 2023-09-14
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Description: "1. National Unity Government Acting President Duwa Lashi La recognizes the essential role of the revolutionary forces fighting to eradicate the military junta in Myanmar and is closely monitoring their situation and progress. 2. Accordingly, on 2 May 2023, the Acting President and Defense Minister U Yee Mon met with the leader of the Myanmar Royal Dragoon Army (MRDA) Bo Na Gar via Zoom. 3. The main objectives of the meeting were to encourage participation in the Chain of Command (COC) established by the Ministry of Defense and revolutionary allies according to military regions, to coordinate and cooperate with the administrative and defense mechanisms that the National Unity Government is building on the ground, and to accept and participate in the security sector reform programs to be implemented during the post-revolutionary period. 4. This was the full extent of the discussion. The Acting President and Union Minister U Yee Mon raised no further issues nor made any agreements..."
Source/publisher: President Office, National Unity Government
2023-09-12
Date of entry/update: 2023-09-12
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Description: "၁။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ယာယီသမ္မတ ဒူဝါလရှီးလသည် စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ် ပြုတ်ကျရေးအတွက် တိုက်ပွဲဝင်နေကြသည့် တော်လှန်ရေးအင်အားစုများ၏ အခန်းကဏ္ဍကို လေးနက်စွာ အသိအမှတ်ပြုပြီး ယင်းအဖွဲ့အစည်းအသီးသီး၏ အခြေအနေအရပ်ရပ်ကို မပြတ်စောင့်ကြည့် လေ့လာ ဆန်းစစ်လျက်ရှိသည်။ ၂။ စစ်အာဏာရှင်နှင့် အာဏာရှင်စနစ် အမြစ်ဖြတ်ရေးအတွက် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုကို တွန်းလှန် တိုက်ပွဲဝင်နေသည့် မြေပြင်တော်လှန်ရေး ခေါင်းဆောင်များကို အသိအမှတ်ပြုခြင်းနှင့် တော်လှန်ရေး အတွက် စုစည်းညီညွတ်မှုကို အခြေတည်လျက် ယာယီသမ္မတ ဒူဝါလရှီးလနှင့် ကာကွယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီး ဦးရည်မွန်တို့သည် ၂၀၂၃ခုနှစ်၊ မေလ (၂) ရက်နေ့တွင် မြန်မာ့တော်ဝင်နဂါးတပ်တော် (MRDA) ခေါင်းဆောင် ဗိုလ်နဂါးကို Zoom Meeting မှတဆင့် လက်ခံတွေ့ဆုံခဲ့ပါသည်။ ၃။ တွေ့ဆုံခြင်း၏ အဓိကရည်ရွယ်ချက်များမှာ ကာကွယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနနှင့် မဟာမိတ်များ စစ်ဒေသအလိုက် တည်ဆောက်ထားသည့် Chain of Command (COC) တွင် ပါဝင်ဆောင်ရွက်ကြရန်၊ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရက မြေပြင်တွင် တည်ဆောက်လျက်ရှိသော အုပ်ချုပ်ရေး၊ ကာကွယ်ရေး ဆိုင်ရာယန္တရားများနှင့် ညှိနှိုင်းပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်ရန်၊ တော်လှန်ရေးအလွန် ကာလတွင် အကောင်အထည် ဖော်ရမည့် လုံခြုံရေးကဏ္ဍ ပြုပြင်ပြောင်းလဲရေးဆိုင်ရာ အစီအစဉ်များတွင် လက်ခံပါဝင် ဆောင်ရွက်ရန် အဆိုပါကိစ္စရပ်များကို အလေးထားပြောဆိုခဲ့ကြသည်။ ၄။ နိုင်ငံတော်ယာယီသမ္မတ ဒူဝါလရှီးလနှင့် ပြည်ထောင်စုဝန်ကြီး ဦးရည်မွန်အနေဖြင့် အထက်ပါ ဆွေးနွေးချက်များမှလွဲ၍ အခြားမည်သည့် ဆွေးနွေးချက်၊ သဘောတူညီချက် တစုံတရာ လုံးဝ မရှိခဲ့ပါ။..."
Source/publisher: President Office, National Unity Government
2023-09-12
Date of entry/update: 2023-09-12
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Description: "Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from Aug 8 to 14, 2023 Military Junta Troops launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in Sagaing Region and Bago Region from August 8th to 14th. Military Junta troops arrested almost 50 civilians and used them as human shields in Tanintharyi Region. Juna’s troops arrested 2 civilians and burnt and killed them in Kale Township on August 12th. They also destroyed the part of the Seikphyu Road which connects Pathein- Monywa Road. Pyusawhtee militias that work under the Military Junta are threatening the civilians in various ways and collecting money in Sagaing Region and Tanintharyi Region. 8 civilians were killed by the Military Junta troop within a week. A child died and 2 were injured by the Human Right Violations of the Military Junta..."
Source/publisher: Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
2023-08-15
Date of entry/update: 2023-08-15
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Despite being on the backfoot as the country’s civil war intensifies, the military regime is showing no interest in a democratic transition that may be the country’s only hope. India must explore various options for a peaceful resolution to the crisis and provide humanitarian assistance to displaced people. Myanmar’s military regime has once again chosen to extend the state of emergency imposed two and a half years ago, marking the fourth extension since seizing power from the elected government in 2021. This latest decision prolongs the state of emergency for another six months, further delaying the promised elections that were supposed to occur under the military’s rule this month. The ostensible justification for the extension is the need for additional time to prepare for elections. The move, however, is not surprising since the military that effectively controls the National Defence and Security Council (NDSC) is facing considerable challenges in organising the polls owing to widespread opposition to their rule. Junta’s Grip Slipping Inside Myanmar, the situation has grown increasingly precarious, with multiple insurgencies and conflicts involving various ethnic armed groups becoming more prominent. The Rohingya crisis in Rakhine State remains unresolved, and clashes between the military and ethnic rebels have intensified in different regions, necessitating the imposition of martial law in almost 50 townships across Yangon, Mandalay, Sagaing, and Magwe regions, as well as Chin and Kayah states. The military’s continued use of force against these groups has exacerbated the situation, leading to a spiralling cycle of violence and displacement. According to various estimates, security forces have been responsible for the deaths of 3,868 people and the arrests of 24,137 individuals, with 19,687 still detained or sentenced. As of March 2023, the number of internally displaced people has reached 1,704,000, further intensifying the humanitarian crisis. The military’s continued use of force against these groups has exacerbated the situation, leading to a spiralling cycle of violence and displacement. In the face of mounting challenges, the junta’s grip on power appears to be slipping. Armed resistance groups have grown more assertive, resorting to guerrilla warfare tactics and strategic offensives even with financial constraints. The ongoing internal war severely threatens the nation, aggravating chaos and suffering. Democracy Not On Agenda Moreover, economic hardships, soaring inflation, and humanitarian crises have added to the people’s discontent and disillusionment with the military rule. Despite having a significant advantage in resources and weaponry, the army has struggled to quell resistance and maintain control. The military regime’s persistent postponement of the democratic transition reflects a lack of genuine commitment to democratic governance. It has shown little inclination to relinquish control and allow for a truly representative and inclusive political process, leading to growing scepticism among the domestic population, its immediate neighbours, and the international community about the junta’s intentions. The recent reduction of Aung San Suu Kyi’s prison term from a 33-year combined sentence to merely six years along with her relocation to a state-managed residence, is unlikely to alter these perceptions. How India Can Help For India, this situation poses a number of challenges. Myanmar’s ongoing crisis is significantly impacting India’s northeastern border regions. Over 54,100 Myanmar nationals have sought refuge in the Indian states of Arunachal Pradesh, Mizoram, Manipur, and Nagaland, straining resources and posing security challenges for India. The influx of displaced people and potential for cross-border insurgent activities demand India’s careful and proactive approach, especially as China remains keen to exploit the extant situation to its advantage. As a democratic nation with deep historical and political ties to Myanmar, India has followed a constructive approach while dealing with its Southeast Asian neighbour keeping its own strategic interests in mind. However, India must not hesitate to convey a firm message to the junta, expressing its concerns about escalating instability in Myanmar and exerting pressure on the military government to take more decisive actions toward achieving a peaceful resolution to the crisis. As a democratic nation with deep historical and political ties to Myanmar, India has followed a constructive approach while dealing with its Southeast Asian neighbour keeping its own strategic interests in mind. India’s approach should prioritise humanitarian assistance and support for displaced people as well as showcasing its commitment to regional stability. Providing aid and service to those affected by the crisis will alleviate suffering and demonstrate India’s solidarity with the people of Myanmar. Role At Talks Table Moreover, India should use its influence to open channels of dialogue with and between the junta and the opposition, including armed ethnic groups. The shifting of Aung San Suu Kyi to house arrest opens up new possibilities and could prove valuable to all parties involved in any such dialogue. Despite the waning influence she holds over the growing and increasingly militant resistance movement, Aung San Suu Kyi remains a prominent symbol in the nation. In addition to its bilateral efforts, New Delhi should collaborate closely with the ASEAN nations to assess whether their proposed peace plan requires reformulation or revisions. Working in coordination with regional partners can enhance the effectiveness of initiatives to bring stability and peace to Myanmar. India’s active involvement in regional forums will strengthen collective efforts to address the crisis and find viable solutions. With the ground situation in Myanmar evolving rapidly, India’s efforts hold immense significance in fostering regional peace and cooperation as well as preserving Indian interests in a country which is critical for India’s own internal security in the northeast..."
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Source/publisher: Observer Research Foundation
2023-08-09
Date of entry/update: 2023-08-09
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Insight Email No. 19 This Insight Email is published on August 9, 2023, as a translation of the original Burmese language version that ISP-Myanmar sent out to the ISP Gabyin members on August 4, 2023. This week’s ISP Insight Email No. 20 focuses on the State Administration Council’s (SAC) extension of its own term in office creating a complex Catch-22 situation with the SAC’s aspiration for fresh elections. Prison terms for President Win Myint and Aung San Suu Kyi were partially pardoned, yet the extent of the goodwill derived from this move remains minimal. This ISP Insight Email also discusses the development of the ‘ASEAN Minus’ strategy in dealing with the Myanmar junta. The bulletin also discusses the possible emerging trend of new military offensives expected after the extension of the junta’s term and also briefly introduces Andrew Ong’s new book on Wa, ‘Stalemate: Autonomy and Insurgency on the China-Myanmar Border.’ ∎ Key takeaways 1.Prolonged SAC’s rule The SAC held a National Defence and Security Council (NDSC) meeting on July 31 during which it extended its term in government by an additional six months citing the ‘unusual circumstances of the country’ as justification. The SAC‘s rationale behind this extension of the state of the emergency period was grounded in Section 42(b) and 425 of the constitution. Both sections pertain to the formal submission to extend the state of emergency, where Section 42(b) stipulates ‘reasons why (the Commander-in-Chief) has not yet been able to accomplish the duties assigned to him’ and where Section 425 stipulates the reasons why the ‘Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Services submits the extension.’ However ordinarily both the sections permit only two extensions of the prescribed duration of the state of emergency for a term of six months for each extension. The SAC has now extended its terms in government under the state of emergency for four times. The SAC selectively targeted the ‘conditional clause’ of ‘unusual circumstances of the country’ and has creatively interpreted it to suit its extension needs. The SAC also claims that the constitutional court has endorsed this interpretation. Even as the SAC extends its authority, it continues to uphold the promise of an eventual election. The SAC chairman in 2021 stated that the election process would be ready by August 2023. But this timeline has clearly not been met. In the present context, the chairman of the SAC has outlined two prerequisites for holding elections. The first condition involves conducting the election process outside conflict zones, while the second is that everyone in the nation has access to participate in the nationwide election. Both situations demand a ‘peaceful and stable situation with full law’ and ‘correct voters lists.’ Achieving correct voter lists though hinges on the successful completion of the national census, yet this process has again been delayed by incidents of physical violence and intimidation. The combination of the post-coup legitimacy crisis, a lack of widespread popular support, and the stated goal to hold fresh elections is seemingly a Catch-22 situation for the SAC. The SAC has also stated that the election will be held without delay, meanwhile it has also said ‘the election must not be rushed and should be prepared systematically.’ The SAC has still failed to state the exact date for fresh elections. Given this situation, the people of Myanmar can only realistically expect further extensions of SAC State of Emergency rule under the pretense of ‘unusual circumstances of the country.’ 2.Pardoned without freedom Speculation had been circulating that after the consecration of the Maravijaya Buddha stupa, the SAC might provide amnesty to political prisoners, even extending to the possibility of Aung San Suu Kyi’s full release or move to house arrest. There was also speculation on the formation of an interim government in order to conduct an election. This speculation intensified particularly in light of the unexpected meeting between Thailand’s Foreign Minister Don Pramudwinai and Aung San Suu Kyi. On August 1, the SAC granted partial clemency to President Win Myint and Aung San Suu Kyi. This gesture though only led to the reduction of their prison terms, falling short of ensuring their full release. For Aung San Suu Kyi, the SAC reduced her prison sentence by six years, leaving 27 years still remaining as she was originally sentenced to 33 years imprisonment. For Win Myint, the SAC reduced his 12-year sentence by four years. In contrast to the previous junta’s approach, the SAC’s leniency appears limited. In this recent amnesty, the SAC granted freedom to 7,749 prisoners, although only a handful political prisoners were included in this group. The recent developments surrounding Aung San Suu Kyi have sparked a wave of anticipation within Myanmar’s political landscape. Her significance remains undeniable, as she continues to command people’s trust. In a previous analysis on ISP OnPoint No. 16, ISP-Myanmar discussed a forecast scenario of greater freedoms being extended to Aung San Suu Kyi. These included the prospect of Aung San Suu Kyi engaging in more interactions with international delegates, a potential return to house arrest, or even her regaining freedom in the near future. The exact trajectory remains uncertain, but there is still a sense of hope. From August 7 to 11, the Union Supreme Court is set to hear appeals, a notable event that includes six appeals submitted by Aung San Suu Kyi. This legal proceeding holds significant interest and could yet have far-reaching implications. 3.The ‘ASEAN Minus’ approach The Five-Point Consensus was agreed upon among ASEAN countries in April 2021 in order to resolve the Myanmar conflict, but has so far encountered difficulties in implementation. Notably, U.N. special envoy to Myanmar, Mrs. Noeleen Heyzer recently finished her 18-month term, stepping down without achieving any discernible success. Acknowledging that ASEAN’s leadership and centrality are pivotal in shaping the region, Western nations have largely left resolution of the Myanmar crisis in ASEAN hands. Initial hopes were pinned on the potential of ‘ASEAN Plus’ efforts, leveraging the collaboration of regional entities including special envoys from China, Japan, and the United Nations. However, this approach has faced practical limitations and has not fully materialized. In response, certain ASEAN nations and China have leaned towards a strategy of ‘neighborhood diplomacy’ aimed at managing Myanmar’s challenges within the regional context. This new trend of ‘Asean Minus’ is thus clearly developing (See ISP Insight Email No. 17). On July 26, 2023, as reported in AP, in a meeting with the Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., Malaysia Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim suggested that ‘Southeast Asian countries should be given some latitude to engage informally with Myanmar on an individual basis to help resolve a deepening crisis there.’ He added ‘neighboring countries should be given “some flexibility, room and space” to engage with Myanmar on an informal basis.’ This approach concretely shows the position of ‘ASEAN Minus’ gaining traction, despite the fact that the regional group’s formal policy is still for ASEAN unity and that any Southeast Asian nation’s diplomatic efforts should support the centrality of ASEAN unity, be conducted in line with the Five-Point Consensus, and in coordination with the Chair of ASEAN. The momentum behind this ‘ASEAN Minus’ trend has been particularly noticeable following the independent visit of Thailand’s Foreign Minister Don Pramudwinai to Myanmar. While the ‘ASEAN Plus’ approach has the potential to harness the collective strength of the regional bloc, the concept of ‘ASEAN Minus’ could yield divergent outcomes. Under an ‘ASEAN Minus’ approach, individual countries could be motivated by their own interests and thus could potentially exhibit less cooperative power to pressure Myanmar towards reform. ‘ASEAN Minus’ could also result in a ‘negative peace’, merely a situation absent of fighting, but lacking any substantive peace, justice, or resolution of the Myanmar conflict (See ISP Insight Email No. 16). ∎ Trends to be watched Risk of intensifying military operations along with the extension of SAC’s term The military junta extended its rule for another six months on July 31, 2023. One of the reasons for the extension of its rule was ostensibly in order to hold a general election. Along this pretense, SAC chairman Min Aung Hlaing stated that it is necessary to accelerate peace and stability measures, and that rule of law processes must be completed in some areas of regions and states where terror attacks still occur. When the SAC put forward its justification for the previous extension on February 1, 2023, a similar sentiment was given and at least 40 townships subsequently had martial law imposed upon them. Following the July 31 extension, it can be assumed that more townships could now have stricter rules imposed upon them. As a result of the extension of SAC rule, ISP-Myanmar would also expect an increase in military offensives against opposition forces, orchestrated in different areas. International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) published a conflict updated in its Myanmar Conflict Map as ‘Junta tactics shift in Myanmar’s war-torn Dry Zone’ on July 5, 2023 where it argued that faced with the rise of newly formed armed organizations that the junta’s tactics have now shifted. The New York Times reiterated this point on July 31, 2023, in a special feature article ‘The Country That Bombs Its Own People’ working from IISS data. Analyses conducted by both the New York Times and IISS reveal a discernible trend in the tactics employed by the junta since the onset of 2023. The junta’s actions have exhibited an increasing selectivity in target identification, accompanied by an escalated level of violence during their raids and assaults. These attacks are mainly conducted by the Myanmar military and its proxy Pyu Saw Htee forces. From December 2022 to July 2023, IISS observed a decline in building burnings, however this decline has been inversely accompanied by a noticeable rise in atrocities targeting PDF armed forces. According to IISS, on 13 July SAC Chairman Min Aung Hlaing announced a plan to intensify efforts to quell armed resistance. The New York Times also reported that ‘altogether, 2023 has had a monthly average of 30 airstrikes, the highest for any year of the conflict so far, based on data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED). Based on data compiled by ISP-Myanmar in accordance with ISP-Myanmar’s system for documenting information in armed conflicts, a comprehensive overview of events in the conflict can be discerned. Specifically, the 40 townships under martial law in the period from February to June 2023 demonstrated a declining trend in armed clashes and the torching of houses and buildings. Notably though the number of air strikes has been rising significantly. It is worth noting though that the incidence of house burnings again increased after late June. As the SAC has now extended its rule for another six months, there could be more intense fighting and military operations. ∎ What ISP is reading? Ong, Andrew. (2023). Stalemate: Autonomy and Insurgency on the China-Myanmar Border. Cornell University Press. 276 pages. A book recently released on the Wa ethnicity and the United Wa State Army has attracted praise from many famous contemporary authors on Myanmar including Bertil Lintner. There are still few writings on Wa, as few researchers are working on the subject. The area of Wa State is situated on the China-Myanmar border and is semi-independently ruled through its own leadership with a force of 20,000 to 30,000 well-equipped soldiers. The Wa forces have agreed ceasefires with successive Myanmar governments for more than three decades, using this long-standing truce to pursue the economic and social development of the area. However in the past, many Wa ethnic leaders have been accused of engaging in the illicit drug trade. The author Andrew Ong’s approach to this study has some unique characteristics. Wa State is a difficult region to access for researchers and writers, but as Ong was a World Food Program (WFP) aid worker, he had a long working history in the Wa area and his anthropological approach is subsequently rather different from other authors and journalists. He studied the aspirations of ordinary Wa people, Wa leaders, and their political culture and external relations. He navigates the complexities of border politics, intersecting geopolitics and geo-economics, culminating in his book titled ‘Stalemate: Autonomy and Insurgency on the China-Myanmar Border.’ In the realm of contemporary books on Wa ethnic group and its political landscape, we can find two books, namely, Magnus Fiskesjö (2021)’s ‘Stories From an Ancient Land: Perspective on Wa History and Culture’ and Bertil Lintner (2021)’s ‘The Wa of Myanmar and China’s Quest for Global Dominance’. Additionally there are some short papers produced by the USIP and a few other institutions. “This book deliberately disappoints readers searching for details about the narcotics trade or weapons and even details about political factionalism or the who’s who of business conglomerates that investigative journalism tries to uncover,” Ong forewarns, as his approach is mixed with anthropological analysis. He presents readers with the perspective of the highlanders, showcasing how residents of the Wa State perceive the world. He also highlights the Wa’s distinctive governance concepts, which diverge from international norms. He also challenges readers to reconsider their understanding of order and stability. Given that the Wa ethnic force holds a prominent role as a leader of the Northern Alliance (FPNCC) and serves as a significant stakeholder in Myanmar’s peace process, Ong’s book offers valuable insights into understanding both the Wa people and their leadership.
Source/publisher: Institute for Strategy and Policy – Myanmar
2023-08-09
Date of entry/update: 2023-08-09
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Military Junta Troops arrested almost 60 civilians and used them as human shields from Tanintharyi Region and Sagaing Region from August 1st to 7th. Military Junta Troops launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in Pale Township, Sagaing Region on August 7th. Military Junta’s ships attacked with heavy and light artillery some villages which are located next to the Ayeyarwady River bank, between Katha Township, Sagaing Region, and Shweku Township, Kachin State. Military troops started targeting the youths and checked the civilians by going on the YBS buses in Yangon Region. The head of the prison that works under the Military Junta, beat, and tortured the political prisoners from Thayarwaddy Prison and Dike-U Prison, Bago Region, and held them in solitary confinement. A child died and a person was injured by the Military’s heavy and light artillery attacks within a week. Local Civilians from Sagaing Region, Magway Region, and Mandalay Region left their places and fled from the Military Junta raiding..."
Source/publisher: Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
2023-08-08
Date of entry/update: 2023-08-08
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Executive Summary To read the full report, download the PDF. Since the February 2021 coup, the Myanmar military has violently suppressed political opposition and used disproportionate violence against civilians. As the Myanmar military struggles to exert control over areas of resistance, persistent fires have been on the rise - likely as part of both the Myanmar military’s offensive against PDF groups, and their attempts to subjugate the civilian populations. This report by Myanmar Witness seeks to provide insight into this modus operandi of the Myanmar military by assessing data and specific case studies. This paper reviews what are alleged to be intentionally set fires in Myanmar, which has been a consistent feature of the conflict. Figure: Map showing all fire data collected and analysed by Myanmar Witness as of 31 January 2023. The use of fire has increased, resulting in the destruction of thousands of homes. As part of enduring monitoring of fire, Myanmar Witness observed a sharp increase in the number of fires being reported around Myanmar at the end of 2022 - with the largest change being an astounding 454% year-on-year increase in December. In every month observed between September 2022 and January 2023, Myanmar Witness collected more fire incidents than in the corresponding months in the previous year. Myanmar Witness has sought to understand this increase through investigation and analysis of fires in the months of September 2022 to December 2022. To understand this phenomena, Myanmar Witness has analysed large patterns of fires, turning these into case studies that demonstrate the potential systematic nature in which villages are being affected by fire. Myanmar Witness has found that these fires appear to happen in ‘clusters’, with repeated incidents in the same villages over time, as well as multiple simultaneous incidents in multiple villages in the same area. This is a pattern also observed in the wider fire dataset and in operations between September 2021 and January 2022, which can be read about in more detail in Myanmar Witness’ report, Civilian Harm. Myanmar Witness has collected 347 reports of fires during the period of September 2022 to January 2023. The team have then selected five case studies that are representative of trends observed across the wider set. In some of the selected case studies, fires seem to correlate with People Defence Force (PDF) activity and it is therefore a realistic possibility that they can be explained as retaliation for said activity by Myanmar’s Military. The case studies also demonstrate the way in which fire is used as a weapon, repeatedly destroying civilian infrastructure and objects indispensable to survival. Myanmar Witness identified a large cluster of fires across Sagaing at the end of November until mid-December 2022. These fires are linked to reports of Myanmar military soldiers and Pyu Saw Htee militia moving from village to village during this period, leaving a wake of charred destruction, and allegedly using human shields. Whilst the time and location of fires matches on the ground reports, Myanmar Witness has been unable to find conclusive imagery showing the presence of the Myanmar military and thus is unable to verify who is responsible. In addition to the widespread burning of villages, Myanmar Witness has identified claims and evidence of the destruction of food supplies including rice storage facilities, a sesame warehouse, livestock, and rice supplies. Myanmar Witness has been able to geolocate and verify several instances of food infrastructure being destroyed. Fires in January 2023 in 3 villages across Ye-U Township, Sagaing, resulted in the destruction of more than 100 houses, a historic Christian church and a number of other buildings. Some of these villages had suffered fires in the previous month, all allegedly perpetrated by the Myanmar military. Myanmar Witness has verified the locations and occurrence of fires at these sites, but is yet to find conclusive evidence of Myanmar military presence. Whilst there is a lack of conclusive evidence of the Myanmar military targeting civilians with fire, Myanmar Witness deems it highly likely that the fires identified in the below case studies were started by the Myanmar military. Myanmar Witness has identified and analysed considerable amounts of eyewitness testimony reported by local news media or by social media users which claimed the military or pro-military militias were responsible. The sequential and seemingly systematic use of fire in multiple villages, all in close proximity, and seemingly tied to PDF and resistance activity, adds weight to this conclusion. Additionally, Myanmar Witness has analysed footage showing military intent to burn villages in nearby areas, and has identified clear patterns of the use of fire by military units. It should also be noted that fires are markedly more common in areas subject to martial law and that have been subjected to SAC airstrikes in recent months. Since the Coup, Myanmar Witness has identified, investigated and verified footage relating to hundreds of fires in and around villages in Myanmar. As part of this data collection and monitoring, Myanmar Witness has produced several reports detailing some instances of these fires and the patterns they followed. These include: Civilian Harm: The impact of military operations in North-West Myanmar, Fire as a weapon in Sagaing and Burning Myanmar. Myanmar Witness also lays out these instances in the open-source Myanmar Witness Fire Map, making the data accessible for a wider audience to review..."
Source/publisher: Myanmar Witness
2023-08-08
Date of entry/update: 2023-08-08
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Myanmar’s junta finds itself in a conundrum. Two-and-a-half years after its coup, armed resistance to its rule has not diminished and is stronger than ever. What to do about this, from the junta’s perspective, is unclear. Its advantage in military hardware has not been decisive, its atrocity campaigns have not pacified, its diplomatic maneuverings have yielded little benefit, its ranks keep shrinking, and its financial viability gets thinner and thinner. Much of the foreign commentary about Myanmar focuses on the democratic resistance, with a good deal aimed at its weaknesses. But a big question is generally left unanswered: What is the military’s strategy to escape the hole it has dug for itself? On August 1, junta chief Min Aung Hlaing declared another state of emergency and mumbled about a future census and an election, this time in 2025. Why anybody would believe these pronouncements is baffling; they have been said over and over. Considering that, it’s worth assessing what the junta’s military status is and whether it has a viable strategy to regain the initiative, particularly on the battlefield. It is worth stating some of the stark military realities facing the junta this year. Repeated large-scale offensives in Karenni State have been thwarted. Resistance has expanded across larger parts of Bago, Tanintharyi and Magwe regions while resistance everywhere is deeper, more experienced, better armed, increasingly coordinated, and unwavering in its intent to destroy the junta. No ethnic armed organizations have signed new ceasefires with the junta and none of the NUG’s partners has disowned it. The junta’s meetings with the remnants of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement don’t even carry ceremonial benefit anymore. The Arakan Army doesn’t need to fight to secure more and more control over Rakhine. All it must do is strengthen its administration and legal systems, support cyclone relief, train new cadres of soldiers within the state, and let the junta kill itself elsewhere. So desperate is the junta, it sends scarce reserves from Rakhine to bolster weakening units elsewhere. RelatedPosts The Myanmar Regime’s Hollow Gestures Myanmar Junta Escalates War Crimes as Resistance Gains Ground in July What’s Next for Myanmar as State of Emergency Comes to an End? Presently, the junta cannot use highways to send supplies to large parts of the northern half of the country so it must resort to archaic flotillas easily targeted on the open spaces of rivers. It hasn’t sent significant convoys to Chin in over a year, and has stopped trying, so bad were its casualties. It has effectively lost its main arms supplier, Russia, and has not been able to bring any significant new weapons systems to the battlefield. Its new proxy militias, the Pyu Saw Hti, have never grown into significant combat forces while its old proxies, the Border Guard Forces (BGFs), only engage in hostilities to protect their commercial interests on their home turf. The junta’s troops are not massacred, but day after day they bleed casualties across the country through the steady onslaught of ambushes, roadside bombs, and drone attacks. Worryingly for the junta, it cannot recruit new troops on any meaningful scale while its officer cadet schools scrape the barrel, desperate for admissions. It cannot maintain steady operations at key border crossings in Muse and Myawaddy, while reaching India with commercial traffic is impossible. There are increasing attacks on major highways – generals are hit with roadside bombs just outside of Naypyitaw while resistance checkpoints are increasingly the norm in Bago, Mon and Karen states. Bridges are now systematically blown up by the resistance, such as across eastern Bago and northern Mon. The coordination and strategy demonstrated in these systematic sabotage campaigns by the Karen National Union and its PDF partners will only spread. And yes, internal cohesion is ever more problematic for the junta. It has doubts over its senior commanders, repeatedly arresting those from the northern and northwestern commands as well as the southern one in Tanintharyi. Lower-ranking field commanders have been repeatedly arrested in Karenni and Karen states for refusing orders to partake in offensive operations because they are pointless deathtraps. Overall, the junta’s units are more demoralized. Being surrounded by a population that wants you dead eventually takes a toll. Arguably the biggest military threats to the junta are consistent attrition and the subsequent erosion of the chain of command. Defections and desertions are not nearly as likely or devastating to a military as the loss of chain of command. The junta has too many small, disparate units. They won’t desert or defect en masse because that carries too many risks; they’ll just stop responding to orders and hunker down; wait for the storm to blow over until they can safely surrender. From a junta grunt’s perspective, they are now too dispersed as fighting forces, too atomized, and face too much resistance. No armored troop transport, limited and unreliable air support, little to non-existent medivac, no new weapons systems of note, limited to no communications with family, no rotations out, few if any reinforcements coming in… where does it all end for them? Min Aung Hlaing can neither claim nor offer greater stability: no normalization, no change in public support. He knows it. Extending the state of emergency is all the junta can do, which merely reinforces the overall veracity of the preceding descriptions. The challenge for the junta is what to do about it. It never countenanced the possibility of wide-scale, sustained rebellion across massive swaths of the Bamar heartland, much less that resistance in these places would have consistent support and direct collaboration from major ethnic armed groups, enabling mass armed revolt across most of the country. Myanmar’s sprawling geography and its own decreasing manpower are crippling challenges for the junta. Predictably, the junta’s forces will persist in what they do best, killing unarmed civilians and provoking massive population displacement through atrocity campaigns. The junta’s military strategy, if one wants to call it that, is to brutalize the population with endless atrocities hoping to break its defiance. At a much lower pace, it will conduct operations against armed resistance groups. Why this strategy would change the overall situation now is dubious given the junta’s challenges, but it will persist because that is all it knows. One shouldn’t downplay the humanitarian costs of atrocities and they do affect the armed resistance’s operations, but they are not decisive at a strategic level. Large parts of the country – think Karenni and Sagaing – have experienced systematic arson attacks and significant population displacement, but the resistance in all of them is stable if not increasing. The humanitarian crisis afflicting the Myanmar people is horrendous but their determination to win through stoic perseverance is unwavering so far. The coordination and cohesion of resistance forces is constantly questioned and maligned by analysts domestic and foreign, but considering the back-story of decades of mistrust and indoctrination, the core block of the resistance – the National Unity Government and the consultative councils, plus the KIA, KNU, CNF and KNPP – is remarkably stable if at times frustratingly opaque. Local PDFs may bicker but that doesn’t detract from their overall achievement – building their capacities to consistently degrade the junta’s combat units. When they emerge, junta forces numbering up to several hundred men are routinely engaged in mortal combat by PDFs. This stands in contrast to a year or two ago when the junta could burn villages by the dozen with 20 men and face little to no pushback. In the remarkably honest calculation of the junta, far too much of the country requires an active military presence, i.e., what a state of emergency recognizes as necessary. In late March of this year, Min Aung Hlaing admitted in a woeful speech that the junta cannot control 130 townships. One should assume this means the junta cannot effectively control a great deal more. If the junta’s units go outside their bases, they must fight. If the junta doesn’t actively defend an area, it will be lost. The junta may “control” towns, but more and more this just means the army barracks, police station, and GAD office, which it increasingly uses to shell villages so that its battered units don’t have to emerge even to burn villages. Considering this, what can be expected by the junta is greater emphasis on the theater of international diplomacy to obscure a worsening military position within the country. The supposed meeting by the Thai foreign minister with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, junta clemency for some of her convictions, and her movement to house arrest instead of a prison has the diplomatic and media corps abuzz. With Laos soon assuming the ASEAN chair, it can be expected that there will be more diplomatic engagement with the junta, which will attempt to use Aung San Suu Kyi as a prop to foster the false sense that it is moderating its approach. This theater of the absurd will garner endless commentary because it can be seen and written about. But it won’t change the substance of the matter, which is on the ground: a population of tens of millions that all viscerally want rid of this military. The revolution didn’t start because one party, much less one person, dictated it so. It started across the country when thousands of communities chose to take up arms. That is the reality of this time compared with 1962 and 1988, and it is inescapable. Myanmar’s war will be won or lost on the ground. Regardless, even in the realm of diplomacy, the junta still faces massive challenges. “Support” from regional neighbors is not significant despite the hype. Nobody is going to prop up the junta with hefty amounts of armaments, help it break sanctions at a large scale, or invest in it in any way that will fundamentally change the strategic trajectory of the conflict, which it is losing. International engagement with the junta is largely transactional and the junta has less and less to offer. Allowing junta officials to join ASEAN meetings is morally pathetic but changes nothing. All that Track 1.5 talks produce is to make their participants feel better about themselves. The junta increasingly demonstrates it has little to offer its neighbors. It cannot control BGF crime hubs. It cannot prevent refugee outflows, instead causing ever more of them. The drugs trade is growing exponentially. Its economic management is woeful to even junta supporters. The latest sanctions by the US mean the junta cannot operate effectively with foreign business partners, meaning investment and even ongoing engagement is massively encumbered and never more unattractive. ASEAN has had no breakthroughs. Nobody can even remember what the 5 points of the ASEAN Consensus even were. What the junta does next is unclear other than to manipulate the diplomatic stage and commit more atrocities. What the resistance does is much clearer – more of what it has been doing. The best thing going for the resistance is the public, which even after 2.5 years of war, still sees the junta as nothing but a loathsome ‘foreign’ occupying force. Public opinion is not shifting in the junta’s favor; too much innocent blood has been spilled. The biggest need is to send more and more humanitarian aid to displaced populations and bolster battered communities’ resilience. Maintaining public morale and support for the revolution and deepening cohesion of the core block of resistance are the other driving imperatives for the pro-democracy movement. Expanding the chain-of-command, bolstering local social services, and growing local administration are clear priorities already unfolding. Methodical relationships with the Myanmar diaspora are critical for financing. Engagement with unofficially supportive ethnic armed groups is important for bleeding the junta further. It is easy to find faults in the resistance, to nitpick it in a thousand ways and claim these flaws lead only to defeat. Myanmar’s revolution is what it is: a sprawling bottom-up revolt initially driven by the imperatives of local self-defense that grew into a national uprising based on shared aspirations for a better future built upon federal democracy. Yes, more coordination, more messaging, more clarity about its politics, more inclusion, more and better of everything would be wonderful. But the flaws don’t detract from the bigger picture. Look around the world and there is no clearer example of a mass movement fighting for a just cause. Moreover, despite whatever its critics proclaim, the raw fact remains that Myanmar’s pro-democracy resistance is not being defeated militarily and shows no sign of wavering despite all the horrors the junta has thrown at Myanmar’s people. The junta is losing. If things continue as they are, it will lose. The junta’s incessant brutality has lit a fire it does not know how to extinguish. That will not change. It created this raging inferno of resistance through the arrogance of staging another coup and the mass atrocities it committed afterwards. More atrocities will not shift the war in its favor. The democratic resistance is viable and ascendant because it is, and will remain, a popular national uprising of a people determined to rid themselves of juntas once and for all. If present trends continue, and it stands to reason they will, Myanmar’s current junta will not be defeated in a grand battle for Naypyitaw. By the end Naypyitaw will not even matter. The junta will simply bleed out in different parts of the country until it effectively collapses as a force and a new government is stood up. The post-conflict peace may be messy in places, at least to parts of the international community, but it will not be Syria. There is simply too much social goodwill and solidarity among the Myanmar people, the starting and end point of this revolution..."
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Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2023-08-08
Date of entry/update: 2023-08-08
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Description: "Junta airstrikes on civilian and resistance targets in Kayah State have risen sharply over the past six months, doubling the combined total in 2021 and 2022, according to the Progressive Karenni People Force (PKPF), which monitors regime atrocities in the state. THE PKPF’s report on Tuesday recorded a total of 572 airstrikes on civilian targets and battlegrounds in the resistance stronghold of Kayah State, as junta forces increasingly rely on aerial assaults amid heavy losses for their ground troops. However, the first half of 2023 saw twice as many regime airstrikes than in 2021 and 2022 combined. This period accounted for 68 percent of the total number of airstrikes conducted by the junta in the two and a half years since the coup. Meanwhile, at least 766 clashes have erupted between regime forces and allied resistance groups in Kayah State since the military takeover, the Karenni rights group said. The death toll among junta troops in Kayah is estimated at 2,230 – seven times larger than casualties suffered by resistance forces. Around 310 resistance fighters have been killed fighting the junta in Kayah State, according to the PKPF. Resistance groups had also destroyed 64 junta vehicles and seized a large quantity weapons and ammunition during the battles. Meanwhile, junta forces have killed around 516 civilians and detained 196 since the coup, the group reported on Tuesday. Junta shelling and bombing raids targeting civilians had also destroyed at least 1,639 houses and 39 religious buildings. On June 6, resistance forces established the Karenni State Interim Executive Council (IEC) as an interim government body, while junta administration only functions in the state capital of Loikaw, according to local sources. Meanwhile, fighting has escalated in Hpaswang and Mese townships after the regime sent heavy reinforcements to Kayah State last month. The United Nations estimates that at least 98,400 people were displaced in the state as of July 17. However, local aid groups on the ground report that more than 270,000 people have been displaced in Kayah State and neighbouring Pekon township of Southern Shan State. Aid groups said around 100,000 people are in urgent need of food supplies and healthcare assistance..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2023-08-02
Date of entry/update: 2023-08-02
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Rumor: Myanmar State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and President Win Myint have been released from prison by the junta. Fact: Suu Kyi and Win Myint remain behind bars along with their cabinet members and thousands of other political prisoners. Myanmar’s descent into chaos and turmoil continues. The recent partial pardon of Suu Kyi, which saw her total sentence reduced from 33 years to 27 years, is appalling but laughable. Suu Kyi’s former economic adviser Sean Turnell, who was also jailed in Myanmar before his release last year, said it was meaningless. Indeed, they are cowards! On Monday, amid rumors and speculation about the forming of a transitional government and the release of several politicians including Suu Kyi, the regime held a meeting of the National Defense and Security Council (NDSC) and extended the state of emergency. This is the fourth time the regime has done so, violating the charter. But it was joined by all NDSC members, including Vice President Henry Van Thio, who has served continuously as second vice-president under the National League for Democracy government and now the junta. It is just a divide and conquer scheme: Henry Van Thio is also under house arrest. The state of emergency was initially declared in February 2021, when the military ousted the democratically elected government of Suu Kyi. However, the country’s 2008 constitution drafted under the guidance of the military states that an emergency can be declared for an initial period of one year and can “normally” be extended for a maximum of two half-year terms at the discretion of the military-dominated NDSC. The extension means the regime will continue to rule illegally and unleash its terror campaign in Myanmar, where an unprecedented armed rebellion has been taking place since the coup. At the meeting, the junta chief called for increased military operations in Sagaing Region as well as Chin and Kayah states, saying “terrorist” attacks are the worst there. Last week, hundreds of military trucks entered Kayah State, where resistance forces have taken control of the territory. More slaughter and air raids are expected there. Min Aung Hlaing has admitted that the regime has no control over 130 townships, with martial law imposed in nearly 50 townships in Yangon, Mandalay, Sagaing and Magwe regions, as well as Chin and Kayah states. The regime has responded to the growing resistance movement with indiscriminate air strikes, raids and arbitrary killings across the country. As of last week, the junta had killed more than 3,850 people, including those engaged in anti-regime activities and civilians killed in indiscriminate attacks, according to independent watchdogs. World’s tallest Buddha … and most downtrodden people Around the same time that the regime made the announcement that it would reduce Suu Kyi and Win Myint’s sentences, its murderer-in-chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing offered up another carefully orchestrated news item to confuse the world and the media, holding a lavish ceremony in Naypyitaw to officially bless and open to the public the Maravijaya Buddha image, reportedly the world’s tallest. The gesture is absurd in light of the regime’s record. Since the coup, the Myanmar junta has caused the displacement of over 1.5 million people, scorched at least 70,000 homes, and killed more than 3,747 civilians. Dozens of detained activists and politicians have been executed, some hanged, as there is no rule of law in Myanmar. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the regime has committed “sexual violence, mass killings, extra-judicial executions, beheadings, dismemberments and mutilations” and created an appalling humanitarian crisis, plunging millions into dire poverty. Millions of people in Myanmar need humanitarian assistance due to the economic crisis sparked by the coup, which has only brought more poverty and distress to the population. But in July, addressing the Human Rights Council in Geneva, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Turk said the military was engaged in a “systematic denial” of humanitarian relief to the millions of civilians in need of help. There is a terrible irony in the regime leaders’ building the tallest Buddha image to show that they are the defenders of the faith in Buddhist-majority Myanmar; the country’s people feel they are the smallest, most defenseless and least protected people in this part of the world. Neighbors making friends with junta The question now is who can act as a broker between the regime and the opposition and apply any pressure? Other than China and Russia, the regime has few friends. In July, Thai Foreign Minister Don Pramudwinai met with Suu Kyi during a secret visit to Naypyitaw, becoming the first international dignitary to be granted permission by the regime to meet her. However, the meeting has caused controversy, as it took place shortly before the start of an Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) foreign ministerial meeting. He described his encounter with Myanmar’s former State Counselor as “a good meeting”, going on to say that, in regards to the current situation in Myanmar, “She encouraged dialogue.” There has been no direct communication from Suu Kyi. The regime’s spokesman said the two met freely for more than one hour. Critics pointed out that Don has no right to speak for Suu Kyi, and no one can verify his claim that she has called for dialogue. The opposition remains fragmented but still wants to bring down the regime, despite having limited resources. Anyone seeking to appease the regime, or harboring the delusion that they can be successful in taming the wolf, will be surprised to see this meaningless and ludicrous gesture from the criminals in Naypyitaw. Last week, Chinese special envoy Deng Xijun arrived in Naypyitaw and met with regime leader Min Aung Hlaing. China is said to be increasingly concerned with the growing instability in Myanmar and was reportedly unhappy with the previous extension of the state of emergency in February. Whenever Beijing sends high-level delegations to Myanmar it is believed that they consistently and repeatedly raise the issue of Suu Kyi and her well-being. Some China-Myanmar watchers have even speculated that China wants to see Min Aung Hlaing removed. If it is true, this largely echoes the opinion of the majority of Myanmar citizens. Who would want to endorse, defend and prop up a murderous regime leader and his cabinet in this region? Nevertheless, China also wants to expand its business activities and resume its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects in Myanmar. This conflict of interest means Beijing cannot be viewed as an honest broker. Time to act It is time for China, the US, the EU, certain Scandinavian countries previously involved in Myanmar’s political transition process, and Myanmar’s neighbors to do more the resolve the country’s deepening crisis. Ironically, the Southeast Asian nation’s location between rivals China and India has so far rendered it more of an international blind spot than a strategic hot spot such as Taiwan or Ukraine. But it is time to wake up: Myanmar’s growing instability is in danger of spreading to its neighbors China, India and Thailand—and beyond, throughout the region. The surge in refugees, insurgency, arms smuggling, organized crime, trafficking, money laundering, online scams, illegal drug production and illicit trade since the coup is in danger of contaminating the whole region. No one in the region can escape Myanmar’s crisis. It will only get worse if we fail to stop it. All players should demand the immediate release of Suu Kyi and other detained leaders of the ousted government, as well as elected MPs and all other political prisoners. They should never have been put in prison in the first place. Western governments should continue to impose targeted sanctions and arms embargoes on military enterprises, junta leaders’ families and associated crony businessmen. Across ASEAN, elected MPs, prominent politicians, institutions, and civil society groups should keep up the pressure on their governments to do more on the Myanmar crisis, and continue to pressure companies that are assisting the regime. If ASEAN and the international community want to see a restoration of stability and peace in Myanmar, it is time to increase—not reduce—the pressure on the regime and support the democratic opposition..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2023-08-02
Date of entry/update: 2023-08-02
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "The United States is deeply concerned by the Burma military regime’s extension of the state of emergency, which comes as the regime plunges the country deeper into violence and instability. Since overthrowing a democratically elected government two and a half years ago, the military regime has carried out hundreds of airstrikes, burned down tens of thousands of homes, and displaced more than 1.6 million people. The regime’s widespread brutality and disregard for the democratic aspirations of the people of Burma continue to prolong the crisis. The United States will continue to work with our partners and allies to apply political and economic tools to hold the regime accountable. We continue to call for it to end its violence and atrocities, release those unjustly detained, allow unhindered humanitarian access, seek justice for survivors, and engage with all stakeholders to pursue a peaceful, just, and democratic future for Burma..."
Source/publisher: U.S. Department of State
2023-07-31
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-31
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Sub-title: Military-controlled government seemingly needs more time to organise new vote as it tackles protests and armed resistance
Description: "Myanmar’s military-controlled government has extended the state of emergency it imposed when the army seized power from an elected government in 2021, forcing a further delay in elections it promised when it took over. MRTV television said the National Defense and Security Council met on Monday in the capital, Naypyidaw, and extended the state of emergency for another six months starting on Tuesday because time is needed to prepare for the elections. The NDSC is nominally a constitutional government body, but in practice is controlled by the military. The announcement amounted to an admission that the army does not exercise enough control to stage the polls and has failed to subdue widespread opposition to military rule, which includes increasingly challenging armed resistance as well as nonviolent protests and civil disobedience, despite the army having a huge advantage in manpower and weapons. The state of emergency was declared when troops arrested Aung San Suu Kyi and top officials from her government and members of her National League for Democracy party on 1 February 2021. The takeover reversed years of progress toward democracy after five decades of military rule in Myanmar. The military said it seized power because of fraud in the last general election held in November 2020, in which Suu Kyi’s party won a landslide victory while the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development party did poorly. Independent election observers said they did not find any major irregularities. The army takeover was met with widespread peaceful protests that security forces suppressed with lethal force, triggering armed resistance that UN experts have described as a civil war. As of Monday, 3,857 people have been killed by the security forces since the takeover, according to a tally kept by the independent Assistance Association for Political Prisoners. The army-enacted 2008 constitution allows the military to rule the country under a state of emergency for one year, with two possible six-month extensions if preparations are not yet completed for new polls, meaning that the time limit expired on 31 January this year. However, the NDSC allowed the military government to extend emergency rule for another six months in February, saying the country remained in an abnormal situation. The announcement on Monday is the fourth extension. The state of emergency allows the military to assume all government functions, giving the head of the ruling military council, Senior Gen Min Aung Hlaing, legislative, judicial and executive powers. Nay Phone Latt, a spokesperson for the National Unity Government, an underground group that calls itself the country’s legitimate government and serves as an opposition umbrella group, said the extension of emergency rule was expected because the military government hasn’t been able to annihilate the pro-democracy forces. “The junta extended the state of emergency because the generals have a lust for power and don’t want to lose it. As for the revolutionary groups, we will continue to try to speed up our current revolutionary activities,” Nay Phone Latt said in a message on Monday. Monday’s report did not specify when the polls might be held, saying only that they would occur after the goals of the state of emergency are accomplished..."
Source/publisher: "The Guardian" (UK)
2023-07-31
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-31
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Sub-title: Growing political instability in Myanmar and financial issues have stymied the progress of the Trilateral Highway project
Description: "On the sidelines of the recently concluded 12th Mekong Ganga Cooperation (MGC) meeting in Bangkok on 16 July, Indian External Affairs Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar met with his Myanmar counterpart U Than Swe to discuss regional connectivity initiatives, with particular emphasis on expediting the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway (IMT-TH) project. He emphasised the importance of peace and stability in border areas, expressed concerns about trafficking, reiterated India’s support for Myanmar’s democratic transition, proposed people-centric initiatives to address pressing challenges, and aimed to closely coordinate its policy with ASEAN regarding Myanmar. The IMT-TH presents a significant opportunity for enhanced connectivity and regional integration. It aims to connect India’s Northeast region with Thailand via Myanmar, facilitating trade and commerce, health, education, and tourism between the three nations while providing a more efficient and cost-effective transportation route. India has proposed extending the road network to include Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, further expanding its reach and potential impact. Bangladesh is also interested in joining the initiative for enhancing trade links and tourism. It aims to connect India’s Northeast region with Thailand via Myanmar, facilitating trade and commerce, health, education, and tourism between the three nations while providing a more efficient and cost-effective transportation route. Since its conception in 2002, the Trilateral Highway project has faced various delays and challenges, including political instability in Myanmar and financial issues. Nonetheless, recent years have seen progress, with several stretches of the highway being completed or nearing completion. The project aims to establish an essential strategic route, but earlier targets for its operationalisation have been delayed. Initially, the government sought to make the highway operational by 2015 and then extended the timeline till 2019. Now, the new deadline is set for 2027. It is, thus, crucial to closely assess the current situation on the ground to gauge the progress of this delayed project. The IMT-TH project follows a proposed plan that starts from Bangkok and passes through cities like Sukhothai and Mae Sot in Thailand, and Yangon, Mandalay, Kalewa, and Tamu in Myanmar before reaching India. In India, it is likely to pass through Moreh, Kohima, Guwahati, Srirampur, Siliguri, and Kolkata, spanning over 2,800 km. The longest stretch of the highway will be in India, while the most minor road section will be in Thailand. Thailand’s Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vijavat Isarabhakdi, stated in a recent interview that most of the project’s work in Thailand is over. The Indian counterpart also mentioned that around 70 percent of the work is complete. Upon being approached, Aung Naing Oo, Myanmar’s Trade Minister, revealed that most of the highway was constructed, spanning 1,512 km. The contractors will complete the remaining sections within three years. The longest stretch of the highway will be in India, while the most minor road section will be in Thailand. Persisting bottlenecks The IMT-TH project encompasses a vital road network in Myanmar, which, despite having witnessed notable development in recent times, still needs progress at numerous stretches. Several sections of the original IMT-TH alignments have been completed or upgraded, including the crucial bypass road connecting Myawaddy and Kawkareik in Thailand and the second friendship bridge linking Myawaddy and Mae Sot. Additionally, ongoing efforts involve the improvement and repair of roads between Kalewa (India) and Monywa (Myanmar), the construction of a new Bago bridge supported by Japan, and the development of an arterial road connecting Bago and Kyaikto in Myanmar, facilitated by the Asian Development Bank (ADB). However, urgent attention is required to replace 69 bridges along the Tamu-Kyigone-Kalewa road. Work on this stretch has been delayed since 2015 due to the termination of the contractor’s agreement. Recently, reports suggest that work on the first bridge between Moreh (in Manipur) and Tamu (in Myanmar) is expected to restart soon. However, a proper timeline is needed. Construction is underway on the difficult Yar Gyi road section, a significant part of the Trilateral Highway. This particular stretch is characterised by steep gradients and sharp curves, posing considerable challenges to the construction process. Currently, only about 25 percent of the road is complete. The Trade Minister of Myanmar has indicated that converting a 121.8-km portion of the road, specifically between Kalewa and Yar Gyi, into a four-lane motorway will require more time than anticipated. Consequently, the construction team may need to extend or postpone the initial deadline for completion. The Trade Minister of Myanmar has indicated that converting a 121.8-km portion of the road, specifically between Kalewa and Yar Gyi, into a four-lane motorway will require more time than anticipated. Additionally, significant security issues persist in Myanmar. The Chin State and Sagaing Region, where the majority of the work is ongoing, are engulfed in conflict between the Junta and the ethnic armed groups. If the conditions do not subside, the resumption of work by contractors seems improbable. Another aspect that needs immediate attention is formulating and implementing the IMT Trilateral Motor Vehicle Agreement (IMT-TMVA). While the Indian government conducted the IMT-TH Friendship Car Rally in 2016 to sensitise stakeholders to the potential benefits of a motor vehicles agreement (MVA) between the three countries, not much has occurred. There are several reasons for this; one of the biggest challenges to implementing the IMT-TMVA is the need for more infrastructure, particularly in Myanmar. The country has limited road networks and poor connectivity, which makes it difficult for vehicles to move smoothly between India, Myanmar, and Thailand. Bureaucratic hurdles continue to remain a significant bottleneck, where obtaining permits and clearances remains challenging due to differences in the rules and procedures of vehicle movement in each nation making the situation time-consuming and cumbersome. This will be particularly challenging for small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which may need more resources to navigate complex regulatory frameworks. Additionally, the security situation in Myanmar is also a significant concern for the implementation of the IMT-TMVA. The country has faced political instability and conflict in recent years, which has affected road transport safety. There have been reports of attacks on vehicles and disruption of transport routes, which can be a significant risk for businesses and travellers. This has led to concerns about the safety of drivers and passengers, which may impact the viability of any agreement. Adequate financing and resource allocation will play a vital role in overcoming these challenges and realising the full potential of this transformative regional initiative. Key factors for consideration Addressing infrastructure limitations, bureaucratic hurdles, and security concerns will ensure smooth cross-border transportation and maximise the benefits of the Trilateral Highway and the IMT-TMVA. Adequate financing and resource allocation will play a vital role in overcoming these challenges and realising the full potential of this transformative regional initiative. India’s commitment to supporting Myanmar’s democratic transition process and its emphasis on peace and stability are integral to the region’s progress and prosperity. Strengthening policy coordination with ASEAN regarding Myanmar will contribute to a more holistic approach to regional issues and ensure a stable environment for connectivity projects to thrive. Overall, the successful completion of the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway hopes to not only bolster economic growth but also pave the way for more robust regional integration, cultural exchange, and cooperation among the participating nations, ultimately contributing to peace, stability, and prosperity in the Mekong-Ganga region..."
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Source/publisher: Observer Research Foundation
2023-07-28
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-28
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Sub-title: Family members believe that transfers are an excuse to execute the prisoners without accountability.
Description: "At least 13 political prisoners in Myanmar have been killed by the junta while transferring from one detention facility to another, family members and rights organizations told Radio Free Asia. During the month of June alone, 37 political prisoners transferred from Daik-U prison, in the Bago region north of Yangon, went missing before reaching their destinations. At least eight of these have been killed, the Thailand-based Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, or AAPP, announced on July 19. Several family members have suggested that the junta is transferring the prisoners as a pretext to execute them away from surveillance, and they doubt the official explanations of how the prisoners died. In one such explanation seen by RFA’s Burmese Service, in a letter from prison authorities, a family was informed that the prisoner was shot while trying to escape after the prison transfer vehicle carrying him overturned in a road accident. In another case, prison authorities notified the family of 31-year-old Nay Aye that he had died in a strikingly similar way, one of Nay Aye’s friends told RFA. “The mail arrived after 3 p.m on the 14th. It was the notification letter from the Daik-U prison department signed by Kyaw Zay Ya,” Nay Aye’s friend said. “The letter said that he was shot dead while he and other prisoners were attempting to escape when the prison transfer vehicle transporting them from Daik-U to Tharyarwaddy Prison almost overturned on a road accident.” He said that the report was not believable and that he considered it to be a deliberate and premeditated murder. Nay Aye was arrested in Yangon on Nov. 24, 2021, sentenced to life imprisonment by the secret tribunal in Insein Prison under the Anti-Terrorism Act, and then sent to Daik-U Prison by the junta. While at Daik-U, he was praised by the prisoners for trying to open an in-prison clinic, get access to clean water and secure the right for political prisoners to read. Zin Win Htut, 27, is another prisoner who was killed in a transfer. He had been incarcerated since December 2021 and was serving a 15-year sentence for violating the Anti-Terrorism Act. His family was informed of his death on July 18, sources close to him told RFA. A member of the Myingyan University Student Union which Zin Win Htut once vice-chaired, said he believes it was an intentional murder. Anti-junta activities According to AAPP, the eight prisoners killed on transfers in June are Zin Win Htut alias Ta Yoke Gyi, Nay Aye alias Arkar Htet, Paing Myo, Yar Lay alias Zin Myint Tun, Pyae Phyo Hein alias Ko Pyae, Wai Yan Lwin alias Jar Gyi, Khant Lin Naing alias Ko Khant, Bo Bo Win alias Htan Taw Gyi, and Aung Myo Thu. According to a junta report issued on Dec. 12, 2021, all eight were arrested for their association with the Bago People’s Defense Force, or PDF, one of many grassroots militias formed by citizens after the Feb. 1, 2021 coup. In addition to those eight, Aung Soe Moe alias Mae Lone died in Daik-U Prison on July 16. Maung Dee, a former lawmaker who was ousted during the coup from Waw township in the Bago region, died on July 17 after being transferred to Bago Hospital due to ill health, AAPP reported. Earlier, in May, 19-year-old student activist Thant Zin Win and two other political prisoners whose names cannot be confirmed, were killed when 24 political prisoners from Daik-U Prison were taken out and interrogated again by the junta authorities, according to people close to the prison. These incidents summed up the total deaths of 13 political prisoners in Daik-U Prison alone. No bodies Whenever the families of the dead political prisoners ask to see the body, the prison authorities always refuse, a person close to one of the families told RFA. “They said that he died but we couldn’t see or know anything about the body,” the source said. “They issued notification letters to the families but we don't know what purpose they were issued for. We want to know the truth about what happened.” RFA reached out to Naing Win, the spokesman and the deputy director general of the prison department for comment, but his phone rang unanswered. An AAPP official told RFA that these killings are human rights violations. He said that AAPP urges the international community, including the United Nations, to investigate and take effective action as soon as possible. “It was evident that the junta shot and killed the inmates from Daik-U prison outside,” he said. “ It is a really horrible and brutal violation of human rights.”..."
Source/publisher: "Radio Free Asia" (USA)
2023-07-28
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-28
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Myanmar moves from military coup to a civil war that is now a revolution. The junta’s bungled effort to turn the clock back by seizing power in February 2021 has been a bloody fiasco. The regime ‘controls’ less than half of Myanmar: it’s ‘too unpopular to control the countryside, yet too powerful to yield the cities’. And much of that ‘control’ is contested. Unable to impose its will, the junta is mired in failure—in its operations, its understanding and its standing. Calling it a ‘junta’ may be too kind, suggesting military competence and political dominance. Perhaps ‘mafia regime’ is closer. Myanmar’s wicked tragedy has completed the military’s journey from revered institution to reviled enemy. The extent of the regime’s failure on so many fronts is one of the few firm facts amid the fog of Myanmar’s war. While it still has the strongest military force (equipment, firepower and control of the air), the junta is fighting ‘on an unprecedented number of fronts’. The International Institute for Strategic Studies reports that the conflict rages in seven theatres which can be grouped into three categories: borderland resistance strongholds (southeast Myanmar, Kachin State and northwest Myanmar) central contested areas (the Dry Zone and lower Myanmar) non-aligned areas (Shan and Rakhine states). The conflict has blown away the old coup script (roll tanks, imprison politicians, enjoy power). Instead, the coup grasped government but not the country, sparking a war that proclaims revolutionary change. The shift ‘from coup to revolution’ was the title and theme of the annual Myanmar Update, a two-day conference at the Australian National University: ‘The military’s violent crackdown on what was initially a peaceful popular uprising provoked a near-countrywide revolutionary movement, which has brought together an array of different political, ethnic, and religious groups fighting for the shared goal of ending military rule.’ Chairing the politics session, an eminence of Australia’s study of Myanmar, Andrew Selth, quoted one of literature’s greatest opening lines: ‘It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity, it was the season of Light, it was the season of Darkness, it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair …’ As Selth noted, Charles Dickens’s writing about the French revolution describes much about Myanmar’s revolution. My version of the big questions that confront Myanmar involves opposed scenarios: Will the revolt overthrow the military regime and remake the nation? Or will Myanmar fly apart, fragmenting along the fault lines of all those conflicts? The government-in-exile, the National Unity Government (NUG), offers a vision of federation, not fragmentation. The NUG’s foreign minister, Daw Zin Mar Aung, told the conference that the military can no longer win with its old divide-and-rule tactics: ‘This is no longer about the coup. It’s not about the military.’ She said the military was losing to the NUG’s vision of federalism, to move closer to the people and ‘undo the wrongs of the past’. The NUG’s representative to Australia, Tun Aug Shwe, told the conference that protests against the military in previous decades had aimed for dialogue and negotiation, release of political prisoners and parliamentary elections. Today, the revolution has two demands: ‘Eliminate the military leadership from Myanmar soil forever. Second, build the genuine federal democracy in Myanmar. Very focused. So previous revolution focused on the process level. But today people focus on the outcome, the end result.’ Myanmar’s military is smaller than commonly thought, according to an analysis by Ye Myo Hein, a global fellow at the Wilson Center. Dismissing estimates of a military headcount of 300,000 to 400,000, his alternative estimate of 150,000 personnel is ‘based on extensive interviews with military deserters and defectors, analysis of internal military directives and meeting notes, historical records of troop movements and sizes, and casualty counts from primary conflict data and military hospital records’. Ye Myo Hein concludes that of those 150,000 personnel, ‘roughly 70,000 are combat soldiers. At least 21,000 service members have been lost through casualties, desertion and defection since the coup. At this troop level, the Sit-Tat [military] is barely able to sustain itself as a fighting force, much less a government.’ Ye Mo Hein told the conference that the military can’t crush the resistance so it’s preparing for an ‘enduring and protracted war’ by seeking to tighten control over urban areas and strategic routes, launch frequent forays into resistance areas, and ‘divide and conquer’. He says that if neither side can achieve a ‘decisive victory’, Myanmar could shatter into a series of warring states: ‘If the regime remains in power, the conflict will drag and Myanmar could face a political black hole, potentially leading to balkanisation. While no signs of balkanisation are visible yet, the possibility cannot be ruled out if the conflict persists and political agreement remains elusive.’ The military has ceded ground and legitimacy. The regime has proved it can’t win. What’s yet to be established is if it can lose. Myanmar’s revolution has changed much. But it faces the opposed futures that Dickens identified in another era: ‘[W]e had everything before us, we had nothing before us, we were all going direct to Heaven, we were all going direct the other way.’..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Australian Strategic Policy Institute
2023-07-28
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-28
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "First came a bloody massacre. Then came digital snitches, arrests and prison — for those who mourned the deaths. On the morning of April 11, in a rural village in central Myanmar, a crowd gathered to celebrate the opening of a new administration building, built by the armed resistance to the military junta ruling the country. Suddenly, a military jet dropped two 500-pound bombs, one of them directly onto the villagers. When rescuers came to help the wounded, a combat helicopter sprayed the area with gunfire. In the evening, a military jet fighter conducted another airstrike. More than 175 civilians were killed, including more than 40 children, in the massacre at Pazi Gyi, the bloodiest day in the war between the military junta that seized power more than two years ago and the resistance. Word of the massacre spread rapidly on social media. On the same day, a young man, Willi Phyo, who lived in Mandalay and was a supporter of the resistance, changed his Facebook photo to black in sympathy for the victims. His protest was noticed by a channel on the social media platform Telegram. The channel is run by Han Nyein Oo, a pro-military social media figure, who acts as a spotter of dissent. It posted photos of Mr. Phyo, and pointed out to the authorities how to find him: “He lives on the ground floor of an apartment in front of elementary school, No. 17, 14th Street, 86th Street,” the Telegram channel reported. The Telegram channel also called out a television actress, Myat Thu Thu, who announced on Facebook that she would no longer live stream, out of grief for the villagers. Similarly, it called out a pop singer, May La Thanzin, who goes by “May Melody” and had posted a message of sorrow on a black background after the bombing. The next day, Ko Phyo was arrested. Then the actress and the pop singer were arrested. The pattern was repeated and again, all over the country, according to Radio Free Asia, which has compiled cases and provided details to The Post. The Telegram channel was a snitch line, tattling to the military junta about people who speak their minds online. The crackdown in Myanmar, or Burma, shows once again how authoritarian regimes are turning the digital revolution to their own ends. Once there was hope the internet would become a global force for freedom and openness. In some ways, it has. But it also has shown a dark underside as a tool of dictatorship. Follow Editorial Board's opinions Follow The Burmese generals seized power on Feb. 1, 2021, from a democratic government led by Nobel Peace Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi, whose party had won a resounding victory in parliamentary elections the previous November. After months of peaceful protests, democratic forces coalesced into armed resistance. The ragtag resistance has been fighting an intense war with the military ever since, shoulder to shoulder with ethnic militias also fighting the army. The junta has responded with unremitting force to put down protest and resistance, attacking civilians from the air, burning down villages and killing thousands of innocent people. Some 24,005 people have been arrested for opposition to the junta, and 19,618 are still detained. The military has turned Myanmar back into a dictatorship, cutting short a brief and incomplete flowering of democracy. In a previous editorial in this series, we detailed how young people around the world were imprisoned by authoritarian regimes for merely posting freely on social media. This editorial adds a grim case study from Myanmar, where a digital war is being fought on top of a shooting war. The young pop singer, Ms. Thanzin, on July 7 posted a new profile picture, a real photo, her first post since April, to the relief of her fans. “Missing you,” she wrote to her 7.5 million followers. Telegram is widely used around the world to avoid snooping by authoritarian regimes. The founder, Pavel Durov, a reclusive Russian entrepreneur, had first created Vkontakte, a hugely popular Russian social media platform that looked like Facebook. It was subsequently taken over by oligarchs close to the Kremlin when Mr. Durov resisted taking down pages of opposition leader Alexei Navalny. Mr. Durov and his brother Nikolai then created Telegram in 2013 to be a secure, ad-free messaging app, and its popularity soared. Mr. Durov fled Russia in 2014. He now lives in Dubai. In 2018, the Russian authorities demanded that Mr. Durov turn over encryption keys to Telegram, seeking information about Ukrainian users. He refused. Russia’s internet censor, Roskomnadzor, launched a two-year effort to block the platform online, but failed. Mr. Durov’s defiance enhanced the platform’s reputation as a haven against dictatorship. Telegram now has more than 800 million active users and is second in popularity only to WhatsApp in online messenger apps. Mr. Durov wrote in a blog post in 2021, “Telegram is the first app to stand up to and, if necessary, pick a fight with a government.” He added in April, “Telegram’s mission is to preserve privacy and freedom of speech around the world.” The company says Telegram “played a prominent role in pro-democracy movements around the world, including in Iran, Russia, Belarus, Myanmar and Hong Kong.” Telegram says communications between users are completely private, but channels — such as the one in Myanmar — are public. In these channels, Telegram says it will take down content that is deemed illegal, such as pornography or advocacy of violence and terrorism. However, it will not remove material that reflects free speech. Telegram declares on its website: “For example, if criticizing the government is illegal in some country, Telegram won’t be a part of such politically motivated censorship. This goes against our founders’ principles. While we do block terrorist (e.g. ISIS-related) bots and channels, we will not block anybody who peacefully expresses alternative opinions.” Mr. Durov posted about Telegram’s mission on his channel, “In the past, countries like China, Iran and Russia have banned Telegram due to our principled stance on the matter of human rights. Such events, while unfortunate, are still preferable to the betrayal of our users and the beliefs we were founded on.” In Myanmar, though, the snitch channel is using Telegram to suppress free speech — by alerting the authorities to criticism. We asked Telegram whether this is consistent with Mr. Durov’s lofty principles. They replied that Telegram would remove “doxing” content when notified by users. Telegram is a magnet for users — Mr. Durov says more than 2.5 million users sign up every day — because it combines private messaging to individuals and groups, including a popular “secret chats” function, with public channels that can reach huge numbers of users all at once. It is also fast. This makes it appealing not only to those fighting for democracy but also to authoritarian regimes and their allies. Russian officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin’s spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, use Telegram, the app they once tried to shut down. When the Russian invasion of Ukraine began, Telegram became the main channel for pro-Kremlin military bloggers to support the war. When the mercenary chieftain Yevgeniy Prigozhin began to complain in public about shortcomings of the Russian military, he broadcast his tirades in audio messages posted to Telegram and heard by millions. He also broadcast about his short-lived mutiny in June on the platform. Dictators constantly fear they will be overthrown. The digital age has brought them plenty of tools to cling to power. They can use online means to propagandize, to flood the zone of information, and they can pressure or change ownership of platforms to control the message. Dictators can also use force to coerce and block objectionable platforms or sites, or to erect barriers, such as China’s Great Firewall. They have the power to muster cyberwarriors to infiltrate the devices of their opponents, spy on them and to attack or destroy them. They can erect elaborate surveillance mechanisms to track people’s movements at the grocery store — or at a protest. They can reach beyond their own borders. But one of the most valuable tools an autocrat can have is the ability to zoom down to a granular level to locate individuals at odds with the regime. That is what the Myanmar Telegram channel is doing — picking out opponents one by one. Facebook has some 20 million users in Myanmar, a country of 53.8 million people. For many, Facebook is the whole internet, a source of news and information as well as social posting. The material gathered by Radio Free Asia shows that many of those who spoke out against the government did so on Facebook accounts. It is an enduring risk in dictatorships; those who are brave enough to speak out on social media also expose themselves — they put a target on their own back. The Telegram snitch line in Myanmar today has 54,500 subscribers. Informers are instructed where to send their report, and to “please make sure the address is accurate.” In war-torn Myanmar, details about arrests are sparse. But according to Radio Free Asia, in most high-profile cases, the charge leveled is based on Section 505-A of the penal code, alleging state defamation, sedition, incitement of public unrest and aiding “terrorism” by supporting pro-democracy groups, which were outlawed by the military junta as “terrorist organizations.” Some of the high-profile arrests are made public by the regime to instill fear in the population. After the massacre at Pazi Gyi, on April 19 a Burmese woman, Nilar Win, wrote in a Facebook post that she felt sorry for the victims of the massacre. The Han Nyein Oo Telegram channel soon posted screenshots of her lament — and asked the police for her arrest. She was arrested that day. The next day, Moe Htet, who owns a photography studio in Yangon, shared pictures of the airstrike victims online. She also changed her Facebook profile to black in mourning. The Han Hyein Oo Telegram channel urged the police to arrest her, providing screenshots of her post and providing her address. She was arrested. Also in Yangon, Cho Wint Mar Zaw spoke out in a Facebook post, expressing sympathy to families of the survivors of the massacre. The Telegram channel spotted her — and put her photo on the channel and asked authorities to detain her. She was arrested the next day, April 23. In May, the hunt snared a popular hip-hop singer, Byu Har, the son of a prominent musician, Naing Myanmar, who is best known for his pro-democracy anthem “Kabar Ma Kyay Bu,” written during a 1988 uprising against military rule. Based on the melody of “Dust in the Wind,” by American rock band Kansas, it was widely sung at anti-coup protests in recent years. According to Radio Free Asia, on May 23, Byu Har posted a video on Facebook, complaining about electricity shortages. Yangon has been stricken by power outages, lasting about five hours in the morning, and five hours in the afternoon or evening. “I want to tell the minister of electricity who is wearing that elegant uniform, and the employees under the ministry of electricity that you guys are all stupid fools,” the artist said in the video. Under the government of the deposed Aung San Suu Kyi, he added, “not only did we have enough electricity without any power outage, her government even lowered the rate of electricity bills.” He also lashed out at the junta leader, Gen. Min Aung Hlaing. “The guy who is governing the country is also a stupid incompetent fool himself,” he said. “You guys have no … skill at all. Even if a fool like me were to govern this country, I promise that we would have enough electricity with no power outages. … I am cursing at you because I don’t have the electricity. Got it? If you want to arrest me, just come.” The day after the video was posted, the Telegram channel urged the police to arrest the singer, calling him a “low class dog.” He was arrested the same day. Even mentioning the birthday of Aung San Suu Kyi is reason for being called out — and arrested. She is sentenced to 33 years after a trial on specious charges of corruption. On June 19, Kaung Khant Lwin, who lives in Yangon and works in a drugstore, posted a message on Facebook to celebrate Aung San Suu Kyi’s 78th birthday. He called her “our leader” and tucked a flower behind one ear, joining a “flower strike” that day to show solidarity with the jailed democracy icon. Flowers tucked into a bun have long been her signature look; on the protest day, many shops sold all their flowers. On Facebook, he included quotes from her famous 1990 “Freedom from Fear” speech, and he wrote his own testament: “Not being scared is not bravery. Doing the right thing despite being scared is bravery. I am also scared (as a human). But keeping in my mind that I have to do the right thing and then face it.” He was singled out the same day by the Telegram channel. It referred to him as a dog, and pointed to the address of the drugstore. About 130 people who participated in the “flower strike” were arrested that day, including Mr. Khant Lwin, and the Telegram channel cheered his detention. “A dog who supported the thieves by celebrating ‘The Dog Strike’ is now seized within an hour and had no time to run. [The police] were fast and reliable, we respect and salute.” Skip to end of carousel Also on the Editorial Board’s agenda arrow leftarrow right D.C. Council reverses itself on school resource officers. Good. Virginia makes a mistake by pulling out of an election fraud detection group. Vietnam sentences another democracy activist. Biden has a new border plan. The D.C. Council voted on Tuesday to stop pulling police officers out of schools, a big win for student safety. Parents and principals overwhelmingly support keeping school resource officers around because they help de-escalate violent situations. D.C. joins a growing number of jurisdictions, from Montgomery County, Md., to Denver, in reversing course after withdrawing officers from school grounds following George Floyd’s murder. Read our recent editorial on why D.C. needs SROs. Gov. Glenn Youngkin (R) just withdrew Virginia from a data-sharing consortium, ERIC, that made the commonwealth’s elections more secure, following Republicans in seven other states in falling prey to disinformation peddled by election deniers. Former GOP governor Robert F. McDonnell made Virginia a founding member of ERIC in 2012, and until recently conservatives touted the group as a tool to combat voter fraud. D.C. and Maryland plan to remain. Read our recent editorial on ERIC. In Vietnam, a one-party state, democracy activist Tran Van Bang was sentenced on Friday to eight years in prison and three years probation for writing 39 Facebook posts. The court claimed he had defamed the state in his writings, according to Radio Free Asia. In the past six years, at least 60 bloggers and activists have been sentenced to between 4 and 15 years in prison under the law, Human Rights Watch found. Read more of the Editorial Board’s coverage on autocracy and Vietnam. The Department of Homeland Security has provided details of a plan to prevent a migrant surge along the southern border. The administration would presumptively deny asylum to migrants who failed to seek it in a third country en route — unless they face “an extreme and imminent threat” of rape, kidnapping, torture or murder. Critics allege that this is akin to an illegal Trump-era policy. In fact, President Biden is acting lawfully in response to what was fast becoming an unmanageable flow at the border. Read our most recent editorial on the U.S. asylum system. 1/5 End of carousel Just before the birthday and protest, actress Poe Kyar Phyu Khin posted a video entitled “Daw Aung San Suu Kyi (Our True Leader)” to TikTok. She was arrested at her home in Yangon on the night of Aung San Suu Kyi’s birthday. Radio Free Asia reported that Telegram — Mr. Durov’s dream of defending free speech — has become a “form of military intelligence,” in the words of Yangon-based protest leader Nang Lin. “It may look like ordinary citizens are reporting people who oppose the military, but that’s not true,” he said. “It’s the work of their informers. It’s one of the junta’s intelligence mechanisms. In other words, it’s just one of many attempts designed to instill fear in the people.” In open societies, there are methods to counter the double-edged sword of social media. Disinformation and misinformation can be rebutted by rapidly leveraging openness and free expression. It is hard enough when the enemies of free expression use the right to free expression to spread their own misbegotten dictatorial message. But in Myanmar, once a nascent democracy now ruled by a ruthless military junta, the options are doubly hard. A lively independent digital news media is struggling and deserves support. Although Facebook has been criticized for allowing hate speech to be posted against the Muslim Rohingya minority in Myanmar, its continued presence also empowers people who want to resist the generals. The internet can be a force for democracy. The Telegram snitch channel is doing the junta’s work, and Telegram is complicit. Mr. Durov, a multibillionaire, has said that he stands for free expression and backs Telegram users against the state “no matter what.” It’s time for him to step up and defend these principles..."
Source/publisher: "The Washington Post"
2023-07-28
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-28
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "With the junta’s six-month state of emergency expiring on Monday, Myanmar people and observers have one question on their minds: what’s next? One possibility is that the regime will again violate the Constitution to extend the emergency for another six months from July 31. The junta has so far extended it three times, most recently in February. The Constitution permits only two six-month extensions. An alternative option would be for the junta to form an interim government with retired generals to maintain its rule under the guise of a civilian administration. Speculation about Myanmar’s post-July 31 political landscape is being fueled by the junta’s recent political moves, as it struggles to quell a two-year-old nationwide popular armed resistance. On July 9, the regime allowed Thai Foreign Minister Don Pramudwinai to meet the imprisoned Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, making him the first foreign visitor to gain access to her since the coup in February 2021. Two weeks on, it reportedly transferred the civilian leader from prison to house arrest this week. She then reportedly met with Ti Khun Myat, the Lower House Speaker under her National League for Democracy (NLD) government prior to the 2021 putsch. She is also likely to meet Deng Xijuan, China’s special envoy for Asian Affairs, who is visiting the country. The regime’s spokesperson told Voice of America Burmese on Friday that he had no idea about these developments – from Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s house arrest to the meetings. This coming Tuesday, the junta is likely to announce an amnesty for political prisoners to mark the consecration of its new giant sitting Buddha statue. Some sources said the amnesty announcement would incorporate Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s house arrest along with the transfer of other NLD government leaders like President U Win Myint and Mandalay Chief Minister Dr Zaw Myint Maung from prison to home confinement. Yet for all these developments and more in the pipeline, analysts expect no meaningful changes in Myanmar after July 31. They point out that the transfer of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi from prison to house arrest is another tactic used by the junta to ease international pressure against its rule. The previous military regime that ran Myanmar from 1988 until early 2011 also allowed visiting foreign envoys to see her whenever it faced mounting international pressure. Some observers say the extension of emergency rule remains a strong possibility, given junta boss Min Aung Hlaing recently hinted to his Cabinet that “much remains to be done to restore stability and rule of law across the union.” However, analysts do not dismiss the possibility of an interim government being formed with ex-generals. But they said the chances were thin given Min Aung Hlaing’s well-documented craving for absolute power, which could be thwarted by an interim administration. Formation of an interim government would occur only if the regime boss recognizes he cannot control the current deteriorating situation in the country. And if that happens, Myanmar would still be under a military-guided transition for years to come. In other words, military rule would be here to stay..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2023-07-28
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-28
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Description: "July 26 (Reuters) - Myanmar's military government may move ousted leader Aung San Suu Kyi from prison to house arrest in the capital, Naypyitaw, two media outlets reported on Wednesday. The 78-year-old Nobel laureate has been in detention since her arrest in early 2021 when the military overthrew her elected government in a coup and unleashed a bloody crackdown on opponents that has seen thousands jailed or killed. The Associated Press cited an unidentified security official as saying the move was an act of clemency to prisoners as part of a religious ceremony due next week. The BBC Burmese-language service cited a "source close to the prison" as saying she may have already been moved to a house usually used by government officials. Reuters could not independently verify the reports or Suu Kyi's whereabouts. A spokesman for Myanmar's ruling military was not immediately available for comment. Suu Kyi's lawyers and a spokesperson for the shadow National Unity Government, which opposes military rule, could not confirm the reports. "News of improvements in conditions is welcome, but does not change her status as a prisoner of conscience," said NUG spokesperson Kyaw Zaw. Suu Kyi is appealing sentences adding up to 33 years in detention after being convicted of offences ranging from incitement and election fraud to corruption, charges she denies. Many Western governments have condemned the junta's treatment of Suu Kyi and others, calling for their release. This month, Thai Foreign Minister Don Pramudwinai said he had recently met Suu Kyi, the first foreign official to be granted access to her since she was detained more than two years ago. The meeting came as Southeast Asian's regional grouping ASEAN struggled to agree on an approach on how to end the crisis in fellow member Myanmar. The daughter of Myanmar's independence hero was first put under house arrest in 1989 after huge protests against decades of military rule. In 1991, she won the Nobel Peace Prize for campaigning for democracy but was only fully released from house arrest in 2010. She swept a 2015 election, held as part of tentative military reforms that were brought to a halt by the 2021 coup..."
Source/publisher: "Reuters" (UK)
2023-07-26
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-26
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Description: "Police have been unable to perform their primary duty of law enforcement since the coup as they have been busy helping the Myanmar military impose a crackdown on dissidents. The resulting lawlessness has allowed criminal gangs and allied human traffickers to thrive in areas controlled by ethnic armed organizations on the Myanmar-China border. Human traffickers have expanded their network to major cities like Yangon and Mandalay, key border towns including Lashio and Tachilek, and even Sagaing and Magwe regions in central Myanmar, which is experiencing fierce fighting between junta and resistance forces. Here, they lure young people with the promise of high-paying jobs, before trafficking them to Wa State, an autonomous enclave in northeastern Myanmar controlled by the United Wa State Army (UWSA). RelatedPosts Myanmar Junta Detains Battalion Commander, Deputy for Refusing to Fight About 50 Myanmar Junta Troops Killed in Four Days of Resistance Attacks Cambodia’s Ruling Party Says on Course for ‘Landslide’ in One-Sided Poll At least 350 people were trafficked in Wa State from February 2021 to May 2023, according to data compiled by the UWSA, Thai authorities, news agencies in northern Shan State, and The Irrawaddy. Among those trafficked were young people from Yangon, Mandalay, Lashio, Kyaukme, Hsipaw, Sagaing and Magwe as well citizens from fellow ASEAN countries including the Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand, Laos and Indonesia, and from Russia. This figure only represents those who have been rescued or sought help. The actual number of trafficked Wa State, officially the Wa Self-Administered Division, is located in northern Shan State on the border with China. The UWSA is headquartered in Panghsan, and the self-administered division is made up of Mongmao, Monglin and Mongpauk districts and Panghsan and Namtit special townships – areas which the UWSA refers to as northern Wa State, covering around 1,500 square kilometers. Northern Wa State to the east of the Salween River is under the de facto control of the UWSA. Central government administration is limited to areas west of the Salween River. Northern Wa State comprises 24 townships. Panghsan, Monglin and Mongpauk are the busiest, hosting casinos, brothels, and hotels that sell narcotics including methamphetamine, ecstasy, ketamine and Happy Water. The USWA, which has a long history of trading narcotics and arms, claimed in 2005 that it had abandoned opium-poppy cultivation to focus on rubber, tea and orange trees, as well as mining rare earth elements and other minerals. However, the armed ethnic organization remains on the drugs and arms trafficking watchlists of neighboring Thailand and the US. But one key USWA-controlled business that the Wa army has avoided talking about is the hotel industry linked with casinos, gambling dens, brothels, and phone and internet scams. This sector is referred to as the “entertainment business” in Wa State. Investors in the UWSA’s entertainment business are mostly Chinese nationals. Brothels with Chinese names are controlled by criminal gangs and are hubs for human trafficking, slavery and forced prostitution. Brothels and online-scam businesses owned by Chinese nationals are guarded by armed men, according to a restaurant manager, an entertainment-business investor and other Wa State locals. Most operate undercover as massage parlors. The armed guards make sure trafficked victims don’t flee and do what they are told. These so-called businesses more accurately resemble organized crime groups. Female sex workers at brothels in Panghsan or Mongpauk earn 200 yuan (around 84,000 kyats at the current exchange rate) for 45 minutes, and between 1,000 and 2,500 yuan for the night, according to local agencies that help find recruits for brothels and online scammers. In some brothels, sex workers are reportedly forced to pay 50 percent of their earnings to their boss. But some are even less fortunate, sold by traffickers to Chinese businessmen for 15,000 to 20,000 yuan to become sex slaves. A virgin can earn a trafficker between 5,000 and 8,000 yuan per day. Hence, human traffickers target young girls as young as 14. “They [sex workers] should not be older than 25. Fifteen-year-olds are also okay. They are better since we can contract them for a long time. Virgins get better prices,” a brothel manager in Wa State told The Irrawaddy. Two of the registered 350 human trafficking victims were girls aged between 14 and 16. Women younger than 25 are preferred for prostitution, according to job adverts posted by brothels in Panghsan and Mongpauk. Applicants have to send three photos and a video of themselves to the brothels. Chinese bosses use middlemen in Shan State border towns, who provide transportation costs for successful applicants or send vehicles to pick them up, according to individuals engaged in the business. The prostitution industry in Wa State is not limited to sex with customers. Sex workers are also used as escorts for Chinese gamblers and nationals working in casinos, in internet scams and brothels, to perform in porn videos and via livestreams. Sex workers are also forced to use narcotics and stimulants so they can work for hours without sleep, according to accounts by victims, some of whom have filed complaints at Mongpauk police station. Meanwhile, men and women trafficked for phone and internet scams are confined in apartments and forced to work up to 19 hours per day, according to victims. Some were first sold into the scams but later forced into prostitution. Varying degrees of punishment are imposed on those who refuse to take orders. First-degree punishments include being confined to a room, gang-beaten, tased, and denied food and water, according to an ethnic Palaung woman who suffered torture before being released in 2022 after her family paid ransom money. Second and third-degree punishments include hanging from a tree or beam, searing the skin with hot objects, confinement in a doghouse, being stripped naked and beaten, imprisonment in a pitch-black room for several days, and chest-deep immersion in a water tank. An ethnic armed organization official posted to Panghsan for six years said: “This system is practiced on all [victims] regardless of their race or nationality. Whether they are Bamar or Chinese or Wa or Kachin or Palaung, they will be punished if they fail to pay back debts or lose at gambling and can’t repay the money. Men and women come to work here and if they want to go back before their contracts expire, or if they refuse to do the work as ordered, they are also beaten. Or they can be ransomed.” UWSA involvement in criminal activities The UWSA is known as the most powerful ethnic armed organization in Myanmar and envied by fellow EAOs for its de facto control over Wa State. But its other face is a vast business enterprise with ties to criminal gangs. Despite a constant flow of men and young women being trafficked into slavery, the entertainment industry in Wa State continues as usual. Its businesses are officially licensed and taxed by the UWSA-run government, which profits handsomely from the revenues. Meanwhile, UWSA chiefs benefit directly and indirectly from lucrative joint ventures with Chinese investors in the entertainment industry, according to sources in the industry. As in Wa State, human trafficking is rampant in neighboring China-Myanmar border towns controlled by the Kokang Border Guard Force and National Democratic Alliance Army. These casino towns are also notorious for prostitution and criminal gangs engaged in drug and arms trafficking. These businesses provide a large source of income for various EAOs and are thus unlikely to collapse anytime soon. International pressure rising The US State Department’s 2022 Trafficking in Persons Report for Myanmar states that “efforts to combat trafficking declined dramatically after the coup as the military regime shifted its focus away from other justice sector priorities and toward persecution of the pro-democracy opposition.” Myanmar was ranked on the bottom rung or Tier 3, for countries whose governments do not fully comply with the minimum standards and are not making significant efforts to do so. Minimum standards include laying out legislation that prohibits and punishes human trafficking as a crime; punishing these crimes in a way that is consistent and appropriate for the gravity of the evil involved in trafficking a person; punishment that appropriately deters future acts; and making “serious and sustained efforts” to eliminate all forms of trafficking by enforcement and prosecution, victim protection, trafficking prevention and more. Authorities and civil society organizations in Thailand, Indonesia, Vietnam, and the Philippines also report having to conduct tough negotiations with Myanmar authorities to rescue their trafficked citizens from Myanmar. Thai authorities said last month that around 140 Thai citizens had been trafficked into Shan State, and only 63 had been rescued. They waited two to three months after asking Myanmar authorities before the Thai victims were eventually rescued. Chinese ambassador to Myanmar Chen Hai held talks with deputy junta chief Soe Win in March and May in Naypyitaw, seeking cooperation to combat cross-border crimes and phone and internet scams. China’s top diplomat, Qin Gang, raised the same issue when he visited the China-Myanmar border and Naypyitaw to meet junta chief Min Aung Hlaing in the first week of May. Videos warning about Myanmar traffickers luring victims with promises of high-paying jobs have flooded Chinese social media. The videos highlight the plight of victims who are confined and tortured, and how they can also end up as victims of the organ trade. Following international pressure, the UWSA has taken steps to enforce the law against traffickers. In February, it issued an order barring judicial and law enforcement personnel from visiting casinos and entertainment venues except as part of their duties, and also barred them from drinking alcohol except on weekends. It also said it had handed over 100 victims of human trafficking to junta police on March 23 as part of regime efforts to rescue victims. The UWSA issued another order on June 6 warning of harsh action against entertainment venues caught selling narcotics including so-called party drugs such as ketamine, ecstasy and Happy Water. But the measures have seemingly failed to dent the operations of organized crime groups in Wa State. They continue to operate freely while human traffickers are still luring job seekers via social media. UWSA second generation The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) measures human security according to seven criteria: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political. A situation in which individuals cannot live with dignity or make a living also constitutes a lack of human security. According to the UNDP’s indicators, the operations of crime groups and traffickers in Wa State are a threat to both personal and community security. That threat on the Myanmar-China border is being monitored not just by Myanmar’s neighbors, but also the US and international human rights agencies. The Irrawaddy was unable to obtain comment from UWSA spokesman Nyi Rang about reported sex and cyber slavery and crime groups in Wa State. First-generation UWSA leaders such as Bao Youxiang and Wei Hsueh-kang have a murky past as drug traffickers. They earned their names as drug lords rather than as leaders of an ethnic armed organization fighting for freedom. The US even offered a reward of $ 200,000 for the arrest of UWSA vice chair Wei Hsueh-kang. But with the changing times, the UWSA has become increasingly involved in the politics of ethnic minorities in Myanmar. It now seeks official status of statehood for Wa State. The UWSA has also allied with other ethnic armies and supplied them with arms and financial assistance in a bid to enhance its image and expand its political influence. Through its allies, it has also provided help to resistance groups that emerged in the Spring Revolution against junta rule. The UWSA reshuffled its leadership in August last year, which saw Bao Ai Kham, son of long-time UWSA commander-in-chief Bao Youxiang, promoted to deputy general secretary of the United Wa State Party, the political wing of the UWSA. He is tipped to succeed his father as the next leader of Wa State. Zhao Ai Nap Lai, a son of Zhao Nyi-Lai, one of the founders of the UWSA, became the head of the politburo. Bao Youxiang’s nephew Bao Ai Chan was also promoted to deputy commander-in-chief of the UWSA. However, the second generation of UWSA leaders is likely to fall under the same shadow as the first generation if they fail to control criminal activity that threatens the social fabric of Wa State. Margaret Aung (a pseudonym) is a researcher at the Yangon-based Institute for Strategy and Policy-Myanmar..."
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Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2023-07-22
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-22
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "၁။ မြန်မာပြည်သူများအပေါ်၌ ဆိုးရွားသော အကြမ်းဖက်မှုများနှင့် လူ့အခွင့်အရေး ချိုးဖောက်မှုများ ကျူးလွန်လုပ်ဆောင်လျက်ရှိသည့်အပြင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ ဒီမိုကရေစီဖွံ့ဖြိုး တိုးတက်မှုများကို ဖျက်ဆီးခဲ့ပြီး တိုင်းပြည်အတွင်း တည်ငြိမ်အေးချမ်းရေးကို ထိပါးခြိမ်းခြောက် နေသည့် နိုင်ငံတော်စီမံအုပ်ချုပ်ရေးကောင်စီအမည်ခံ အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်တပ်၏ တရားမဝင် အဖွဲ့အစည်းမှ အဖွဲ့ဝင် (၂) ဦး၊ ယင်းတရားမဝင်အဖွဲ့အစည်း၏လက်အောက်ခံ လူဝင်မှုကြီးကြပ် ရေးနှင့် ပြည်သူ့အင်အားဝန်ကြီးဌာန၊ အလုပ်သမားဝန်ကြီးဌာန၊ ကျန်းမာရေးနှင့် အားကစား ဝန်ကြီးဌာနတို့မှ ပြည်ထောင်စုဝန်ကြီးများ၊ စစ်ထောက်ချုပ်နှင့် အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်ကောင်စီ၏ ထိန်းချုပ်မှုအောက်ရှိ အမှတ်(၂) သတ္တုတွင်းလုပ်ငန်းတို့အပေါ် ဥရောပသမဂ္ဂက ဒဏ်ခတ်အရေးယူ ပိတ်ဆို့မှုများ ချမှတ်ခဲ့ခြင်းအပေါ် ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီအနေဖြင့် ကျေးဇူးတင်စွာဖြင့် ကြိုဆိုပါသည်။ ၂။ ယခုကဲ့သို့ ဥရောပသမဂ္ဂ၏ (၇) ကြိမ်မြောက်သည့်တိုင် ချမှတ်ခဲ့သည့် ဒဏ်ခတ်အရေးယူ ပိတ်ဆို့မှုများသည် တရားမဝင်အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်တပ်၏ တိုးမြှင့်လုပ်ဆောင်လျက်ရှိသည့် အကြမ်းဖက် မှုနှင့် ရာဇဝတ်မှုများကို တားဆီးနိုင်ရေးအတွက် များစွာ ထိရောက်မှုရှိပါသည်။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၌ ဒီမိုကရေစီပြန်လည်ရရှိရေးနှင့် နိုင်ငံတဝှမ်းလုံး၌ ရေရှည်တည်တံ့သော ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးနှင့် ဖွံ့ဖြိုးရေး တို့တည်ရှိသော ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ နိုင်ငံတော်သစ် တည်ဆောက်နိုင်ရေး ကြိုးပမ်းနေကြသည့် မြန်မာပြည်သူတို့အတွက် များစွာခွန်အားဖြစ်စေခြင်းကြောင့် ထပ်တိုးပံ့ပိုးကူညီမှုများကိုလည်း ကျွန်ုပ်တို့ မျှော်လင့်ပါသည်။ ၃။ ဒေသတွင်းနှင့် နိုင်ငံတကာက ပြင်းထန်သော ဖိအားပေးမှုများ လုပ်ဆောင်နေစေကာမူ တရားမဝင်အာဏာသိမ်းယူထားသည့် စစ်ကောင်စီသည် နိုင်ငံတော်အား ဥပဒေမဲ့ ဆက်လက် ထိန်းချုပ်ထားနိုင်ရန် အကြမ်းဖက်မှုများ လုပ်ဆောင်နေခြင်း၊ လူ့အခွင့်အရေး ချိုးဖောက်မှုများကို စနစ်တကျတိုးမြှင့်လုပ်ဆောင်နေခြင်းတို့ကြောင့် ကုလသမဂ္ဂအပါအဝင် ကမ္ဘာ့နိုင်ငံများ၊ အဖွဲ့အစည်း များက ညီညွတ်သော တုံ့ပြန်အရေးယူမှုများကို ချမှတ်လုပ်ဆောင်ပေးရန်မှာ အရေးတကြီး လိုအပ်လျက်ရှိကြောင်း မြန်မာပြည်သူများကိုယ်စား ထပ်လောင်းအသိပေးလိုပါသည်။ ၄။ လက်ရှိဖြစ်ပေါ်နေသည့် အကြမ်းဖက်မှုများ အမြန်ဆုံး အဆုံးသတ်နိုင်ရေးနှင့် မြန်မာ ပြည်သူများမျှော်လင့်ကြိုးပမ်းနေသည့် ငြိမ်းချမ်းသာယာသော ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ နိုင်ငံတော်သစ် တည်ဆောက်သွားနိုင်ရေးအတွက် အရေးအကြီးဆုံးအရာမှာ တရားမဝင်သည့် စစ်အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးကို အမြန်ဆုံး အဆုံးသတ်နိုင်ရေးပင်ဖြစ်ပြီး ဒီမိုကရေစီအင်အားစုများအား ထိရောက်ပြီး လက်တွေ့ ကျသည့် ပံ့ပိုးကူညီပေးမှုများဖြင့်သာ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ ကာလရှည်ပြည်တွင်းစစ်နှင့် နိုင်ငံရေး မတည်ငြိမ်မှုအား အဆုံးသတ်နိုင်မည်ဖြစ်သည်ကို နိုင်ငံတကာအသိုက်အဝန်းအနေဖြင့် ကောင်းစွာ နားလည်သဘောပေါက်လိမ့်မည်ဟု မိမိတို့ အခိုင်အမာယုံကြည်ပါသည်။ ၅။ မိမိတို့ ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီသည် လက်ရှိပဋိပက္ခအား အမြန်ဆုံး အဆုံးသတ်ပြီး မြန်မာပြည်သူများအတွက် ငြိမ်းချမ်းသောအနာဂတ်ကို ဖန်တီးပေးနိုင် ရေးအတွက် ဒီမိုကရေစီအင်အားစုများနှင့် ခိုင်မာသော ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်မှုများဖြင့် ဆက်လက် လျှောက်လှမ်းသွားမည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်းကို ထပ်မံအသိပေးလိုပါသည်။ ယခု (၇) ကြိမ်မြောက် ဒဏ်ခတ် အရေးယူပိတ်ဆို့မှုများအပါအဝင် မြန်မာပြည်သူများနှင့်အတူ ရပ်တည်ပြီး မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၌ ဒီမိုကရေစီ ပြန်လည်ရရှိရေး၊ တရားမျှတမှုဖော်ဆောင်နိုင်ရေးနှင့် အားလုံးပါဝင်သော အနာဂတ် ဖက်ဒရယ် ဒီမိုကရေစီနိုင်ငံတော်သစ် တည်ဆောက်နိုင်ရေးအတွက် စဉ်ဆက်မပြတ်သော ပံ့ပိုးကူညီမှုများ အတွက် ဥရောပသမဂ္ဂနှင့် အဖွဲ့ဝင်နိုင်ငံများကို အထူးကျေးဇူးတင်ရှိပါသည်။ ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီ..."
Source/publisher: Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw
2023-07-21
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-21
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင် ဒီကနေ့ကျရောက်သော (၇၆) ကြိမ်မြောက် အာဇာနည်နေ့အထိမ်းအမှတ်ကို ကျင်းပနေကြပါသည်။ မြန်မာပြည်သူများ၏ လွတ်လပ်ရေး၊ ကိုယ့်ကံကြမ္မာကိုယ့်ဖန်တီးရေးနှင့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီအတွက် ရုန်းကန်ခဲ့သည့် (၇၆) နှစ်ကြာကိုလည်း ကိုယ်စားပြုနေသည်။ အာဇာနည်နေ့တွင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံနှင့် ဒေသတွင်းတစ်ခုလုံးအတွက် လွတ်လပ်ရေး၊ ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီနှင့် တရားမျှတရေးတို့ရရှိရန်အတွက် မိမိတို့အသက်ကို စွန့်လွှတ်အနစ်နာခံခဲ့သော သူရဲကောင်းများအားလုံးကို အလေးပြု ဂုဏ်ပြုအပ်ပါသည်။ လွန်ခဲ့သော (၇၆) နှစ် ဇူလိုင်လ ၁၉ ရက်နေ့၊ ၁၉၄၇ ခုနှစ်၊ နံနက် (၁၀) နာရီ (၃၇) မိနစ်တွင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ အမျိုးသားသူရဲကောင်းနှင့် လွတ်လပ်ရေးခေါင်းဆောင် ဗိုလ်ချုပ်အောင်ဆန်းနှင့်တကွ လွတ်လပ်ရေးခေါင်းဆောင်များ ရက်စက်ကြမ်းကြုတ်စွာ လုပ်ကြံသတ်ဖြတ်ခံခဲ့ရခြင်းက မြန်မာ့သမိုင်းကို ပြောင်းလဲစေခဲ့သည်။ ရလဒ်အနေဖြင့် မြန်မာပြည်သူများသည် သမိုင်းတလျှောက် ကြောက်စရာကောင်းတဲ့ အမှောင်နေ့ကို ခံစားခဲ့ကြရသည်။ လွတ်လပ်ရေးခေါင်းဆောင်များသာ ရက်ရက်စက်စက် လုပ်ကြံသတ်ဖြတ်ခြင်းမခံခဲ့ရလျှင် ယနေ့ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသည် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ၊ တန်းတူညီမျှရေးကတိကဝတ်နှင့် မူဝါဒများကို အပြည့်အဝအကောင်အထည်ဖော်ဆောင်ပြီး ကမ္ဘာ့အလယ်တွင် တိုးတက်ကောင်းမွန်နေလောက်ပြီဖြစ်သည်။ ဤကဲ့သို့ အမှောင်ကျသော နေ့ရက်များမတိုင်မီက မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသည် အာရှတွင် အလားအလာအရှိဆုံး နိုင်ငံတစ်နိုင်ငံဖြစ်ခဲ့ပြီး အာရှတိုက်၏ဆန်အိုးကြီးဟု လူသိများလောက်အောင် ဒေသတွင်း၌ ချမ်းသာကြွယ်ဝမှုရှိသောနိုင်ငံများအနက် တစ်ခုဖြစ်နေခဲ့သည်။ သို့သော် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင် လွတ်လပ်ရေးမတိုင်ခင်ကတည်းက အမြစ်တွယ်နေသည့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အာဏာရှင်စိတ်ဓာတ်ရှိသူများ​၏ လုပ်ရပ်ကြောင့် တိုးတက်မှုများအားလုံး အနှောင့်အယှက်ဖြစ်ခဲ့ရသည်။ လုပ်ကြံသတ်ဖြတ်မှုဖြင့် လွတ်လပ်ရေးခေါင်းဆောင်များကို ဆုံးရှုံးသွားရုံသာမက ပင်လုံမြို့တွင် လက်မှတ်ရေးထိုးခဲ့သည့် ပင်လုံစာချုပ်ပါ လွတ်လပ်ရေးသဘောတူညီချက်များနှင့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ သဘောတူညီချက်များလည်း ပြိုပျက်သွားခဲ့ရသည်။ (၇၆) နှစ်ကြာပြီးနောက် တူညီသော အကြမ်းဖက်အုပ်စု၏ အရင်းအမြစ်ဖြစ်သည့် စစ်တပ်က အခြေခံလူ့အခွင့်အရေးများကို လျစ်လျူရှုပြီး မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထုအပေါ် လူမျိုးတုံးသတ်ဖြတ်တိုက်ခိုက်ခြင်း၊ ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီစံတန်ဖိုးများနှင့် မူဝါဒများကို လျစ်လျူရှုခြင်းဖြင့် နည်းအမျိုးမျိုးသုံး၍ ဖိနှိပ်အကြမ်းဖက်နေကြဆဲဖြစ်သည်။ ခေတ်အဆက်ဆက် ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေး၊ လွတ်လပ်ရေးနှင့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီအတွက်ရပ်တည်ခဲ့ကြသော်လည်း အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုသည် မိမိတို့ပြည်သူလူထုအပေါ် ပြန်လည်စစ်ကြေညာဆဲဖြစ်သည်။ ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ ၁ ရက်နေ့တွင် မတရားအာဏာသိမ်းရန်ကြိုးပမ်းခဲ့သော အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုသည် လွတ်လပ်ပြီး တရားမျှတသည့် ၂၀၂၀ ဒီမိုကရေစီရွေးကောက်ပွဲရလဒ်ကို ဖျက်ဆီးပြီး မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထုထံမှ ဒီမိုကရေစီကို လုယူခဲ့သည်။ ငြိမ်းချမ်းစွာ ဆန္ဒဖော်ထုတ်ကြသည့် ပြည်သူလူထုများကိုလည်း စစ်မြေပြင်သုံးလက်နက်များဖြင့် အကြမ်းဖက်တိုက်ခိုက်ခဲ့ကြသည်။ (၇၆) နှစ်အတွင်း ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးနှင့် လွတ်လပ်ရေးကို ငြင်းပယ်ခံရခြင်း၊ စစ်အာဏာရှင်များ၏ လူမျိုးတုံးသတ်ဖြတ်ခံရခြင်းကို အဆုံးသတ်ရန်နှင့် အားလုံးပါဝင်သော ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်သစ်ကို တည်ထောင်ရန်အတွက် မြန်မာတစ်နိုင်ငံလုံးက စစ်အာဏာရှင်ကို တော်လှန်လာခဲ့ကြသည်မှာ (၂၇) လ တိုင်ခဲ့ပြီဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ပြီးခဲ့သော (၂၇) လအတွင်းတွင် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်သည် ကလေးပေါင်း ၈၀၀ အပါအဝင် အပြစ်မဲ့ပြည်သူ ၄,၀၀၀ နီးပါးကို သတ်ဖြတ်ခြင်း၊ နိုင်ငံတော်အတိုင်ပင်ခံပုဂ္ဂိုလ် ဒေါ်အောင်ဆန်းစုကြည်၊ သမ္မတကြီး ဦးဝင်းမြင့် စသည့် ခေါင်းဆောင်များသာမက ကလေး ၄၀၀ အပါအဝင် အပြစ်မဲ့ပြည်သူပေါင်း ၂၃,၀၀၀ ကျော်ကို မတရားဖမ်းဆီး အကျဉ်းချခြင်းများ ကျူးလွန်သည့်အပြင် လူနေအိမ်များ၊ စာသင်ကျောင်းများ၊ ဆေးရုံများနှင့် ဘာသာရေးအဆောက်အဦး ၇၀,၀၀၀ ကျော်ကိုလည်း မီးရှို့ဖျက်ဆီးခဲ့ကြသည်။ လွန်ခဲ့သော (၂၇) လအတွင်းတွင် မြန်မာပြည်သူ (၁၈) သန်းနီးပါး အသက်ကယ်ဆယ်ရေးအကူအညီများလိုအပ်ခြင်း၊ ပြည်သူ (၂) သန်းနီးပါး အိုးမဲ့အိမ်မဲ့ဖြစ်သွားရခြင်းနှင့် ပြည်သူ (၄၈) သန်းတို့ အလွန်အမင်း ဆင်းရဲသည့် ဒဏ်ကိုခံစားနေကြရသည်။ လွန်ခဲ့သော (၂၇) လသည် နာကျင်ခြင်းဝေဒနာ၊ ဆင်းရဲဒုက္ခအမျိုးမျိုး၊ သေဆုံးခြင်းနှင့် ပျက်စီးခြင်းများဖြင့် ပြည့်နှက်သောအချိန်ကာလဖြစ်သည်။ တချိန်ထဲမှာပင် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီက “ဖြတ် ၄ ဖြတ်” နည်းကို အသုံးပြုပြီး မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထုတရပ်လုံးအပေါ် ငတ်မွတ်ခေါင်းပါးခြင်းနှင့် ရောဂါများကို လက်နက်သဖွယ်အသုံးပြု အကြမ်းဖက်လျက်ရှိသည်။ မဖော်ပြနိုင်သော ရက်စက်ကြမ်းကြုတ်မှုများ၊ လူသားမျိုးနွယ်အပေါ် ကျူးလွန်သည့် ရာဇဝတ်မှုများ၊ စစ်ရာဇဝတ်မှုများနှင့် ရင်ဆိုင်နေရသော်လည်း လွတ်လပ်မှုနှင့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီကို မြတ်နိုးသော မြန်မာပြည်သူများရဲ့မျှော်လင့်ချက်ကို အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အာဏာရှင်များ​၏ စစ်လက်နက်များနှင့် တိုက်လေယာဉ်များက မဖျက်ဆီးနိုင်ပါ။ ဤအကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အာဏာရှင်များသည် မိမိတို့ပြည်သူလူထုကို ပြန်လည်တိုက်ခိုက်သတ်ဖြတ်သည့်အကြောင်းကို ရိုဟင်ဂျာလူမျိုးများကို လူမျိုးတုံးသတ်ဖြတ်ခဲ့ခြင်းဖြင့် သက်သေပြခဲ့ပြီးဖြစ်သည်။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီက “ဖြတ် ၄ ဖြတ်” ပေါ်လစီမှ တဆင့် အသက်ဆယ်ရေးအကူအညီများ လိုအပ်လျက်ရှိသော မြန်မာပြည်သူ (၁၈) သန်းအတွက် အကူအညီများကို ငြင်းပယ်ခြင်း၊ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံရှိ ကလေးသန်းပေါင်းများစွာ၏ ပညာရေးအခွင့်အလမ်းများကို တားဆီးပိတ်ပင်ခြင်းများကြောင့် နောင်လာမည် မျိုးဆက်သစ်များအတွက် ဆိုးကျိုးများစွာရှိသည်သာမက မြန်မာပြည်သူတရပ်လုံးအပေါ် လူမျိုးတုံးအကြမ်းဖက်ခြင်းကို ကျူးလွန်ခြင်းလည်းဖြစ်သည်။ ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေး၊ လွတ်လပ်မှုနှင့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီတို့၏ရန်သူ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အာဏာရှင်သည် မြန်မာပြည်သူ (၅၄) သန်းကို ဒုက္ခဆင်းရဲများနဲ့ သေကျေပျက်စီးစေရန် အလုပ်များနေစဉ် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ (NUG)၊ မြန်မာပြည်သူတရပ်လုံး၊ ဒီမိုကရေစီရေးအတွက် တိုက်ပွဲဝင်နေသော ရဲဘော်ရဲဘက်များနှင့် ဒီမိုကရေစီအရေးလှုပ်ရှားသူများသည် လွတ်လပ်ရေးနှင့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ စံတန်ဖိုးများနှင့် မူဝါဒများအတွက် ဆိုးရွားသော အခြေအနေများအကြား ဆက်လက်တိုက်ပွဲဝင်နေကြသည်။ လွန်ခဲ့သော (၇၆) နှစ်အတွက် နောက်ဆုံးတော်လှန်ရေးဖြစ်သည့် တစ်နိုင်ငံလုံးပါဝင်သည့် နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးသည် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ကို အမြစ်ပြတ်ချေမှုန်းသည်သာမက ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်သစ်ပန်းတိုင်ကို အပြည့်အဝ မရောက်မချင်း ကြိုးစားအားထုတ်ရန်အတွက် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီလမ်းပြမြေပုံဖြစ်သည့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပဋိညာဉ် (FDC) ကို ရေးဆွဲပြီးနောက် အသွင်ကူးပြောင်းရေး ဖွဲ့စည်းပုံအခြေခံဥပဒေ (Transitional Constitution) ကို ဆက်လက်ရေးသားလျက်ရှိသည်။ မြန်မာတစ်နိုင်ငံလုံးရှိ စစ်ကောင်စီကိုတော်လှန်နေကြသည့် မြန်မာပြည်သူများသည် အားလုံးပါဝင်သည့် လွတ်လပ်သော ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီနိုင်ငံတော်သစ်ကို ရေးဆွဲကြသည်သာမက ပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်ဖွဲ့များ (PDFs)၊ ဒေသကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်ဖွဲ့များနှင့် တိုင်းရင်းသား တော်လှန်ရေး အဖွဲ့အစည်းများ (EROs)များမှတဆင့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံထက်ဝက်ကျော်ကို စိုးမိုးထားပြီးဖြစ်သည်။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင် စစ်တပ်၏ လူမျိုးတုံးသတ်ဖြတ်ခြင်း အမှောင်ထုအဆုံးသတ်ပြီး လွတ်လပ်ခြင်းရောင်ခြည်အတွက် အာဇာနည်သူရဲကောင်းများက အသက်ပေးဆပ်နေကြခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။ အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာ သက်ဆိုင်ရာအဖွဲ့အစည်းများက အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီအပေါ် ထိရောက်သော အရေးယူဒဏ်ခတ်ခြင်းများပြုလုပ်ရန် တွန့်ဆုတ်နေပါက ဤကြောက်မက်ဖွယ်အမှောင်ထုကြီး အဓွန့်ရှည်ပြီး သန်းပေါင်းများစွာသော အပြစ်မဲ့ပြည်သူများ ဒုက္ခခံစားကြရပါလိမ့်မည်။ မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထုက ဤအရာကို မခံရပ်နိုင်တော့ပါ။ အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာအသိုင်းအဝိုင်းများအနေဖြင့် မြန်မာပြည်သူများ၏ ဒီမိုကရေစီဆန္ဒနှင့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီရည်မှန်းချက်များကိုလေးစားပြီး အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ (NUG)ကို မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ တရားဝင် ဒီမိုကရေစီကိုယ်စားလှယ်အဖြစ် အသိအမှတ်ပြုပေးပါ။ ထို့အပြင် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီသာမက သူတို့ကိုထောက်ခံသည့် တစ်ဦးချင်းဖြစ်စေ၊ အဖွဲ့လိုက်ဖြစ်စေ၊ ကုမ္ပဏီများ၊ နိုင်ငံများဖြစ်စေ အားလုံးကိုပါ ဆန့်ကျင်သည့် ထိရောက်သော ပစ်မှတ်ထား အရေးယူ ဒဏ်ခတ်ပိတ်ဆို့မှုများ ချက်ချင်းပြုလုပ်ပေးပါ။ ဤပိတ်ဆို့မှုများကို လူမှုစီးပွားရေးအရသာမက နိုင်ငံရေးနှင့် သံတမန်ရေးအရလည်း အကောင်အထည်ဖော်သင့်သည်။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ အာဇာနည်သူရဲကောင်းများသည် မြန်မာတစ်နိုင်ငံလုံး စစ်အာဏာရှင်ကို တော်လှန်သည့်အရေးတော်ပုံနှင့် အားလုံးပါဝင်သော ဖက်ဒရယ် ဒီမိုကရေစီအနာဂတ်အတွက် ခွန်အားပေးနေသည်။ ဒီကနေ့ အာဇာနည်နေ့တွင် လွတ်လပ်ရေးနှင့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီအတွက် မိမိတို့အသက်များကို ပဓာနမထားပဲ ဖိနှိပ်ခြင်းများနှင့် မတရားခြင်းများအကြား စွန့်လွှတ်ပေးဆပ်ခဲ့ကြသည့် မတုန်လှုပ်သော သတ္တိနှင့် ခိုင်မာသော ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်များအတွက် နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေး သူရဲကောင်းများအားလုံးကို ဦးညွှတ်အလေးပြုအပ်ပါသည်။ အာဇာနည်သူရဲကောင်းများက လွတ်လပ်မှု၊ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးနှင့် တရားမျှတမှုတို့၏ ကြီးမားသောတန်ဖိုးများကို သတိရစေသကဲ့သို့ သူတို့၏သတ္တိနှင့် စွန့်လွှတ်အနစ်နာခံမှုများကို ပြည်သူများ၏နှလုံးသားတွင် ထာဝစဉ်အောက်မေ့ ဂုဏ်ပြုနေမည်ဖြစ်သည်။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ အာဇာနည်နေ့တွင် ယူကရိန်းနိုင်ငံဟာလည်း မြန်မာပြည်သူများ၏အတွေးထဲတွင် ရှိနေပါသည်။ ယူကရိန်းနိုင်ငံအတွက်သာမက တစ်ကမ္ဘာလုံး၏ လွတ်လပ်သော မနက်ဖြန်များအတွက် ၎င်းတို့၏နေ့ရက်များကို စွန့်လွှတ်ပေးဆပ်ခဲ့ကြသည့် ယူကရိန်းသူရဲကောင်းများကိုလည်း အောက်မေ့ ဂုဏ်ပြု အလေးပြုအပ်ပါသည်။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံနှင့် ယူကရိန်းနိုင်ငံတို့မှ ရဲရင့်သောသူရဲကောင်းများသည် ဖိနှိပ်မှုမှ လွတ်မြောက်စေရန်နှင့် မိမိတို့လူမျိုးများကို လွတ်လပ်သောကမ္ဘာကြီးဆီသို့ ရောက်ရှိစေရန် အသက်များကို စတေးခဲ့ကြသည်။ မစဉ်းစားနိုင်လောက်သော နာကျင်မှုနှင့် ဆုံးရှုံးမှုများကို ခါးစည်းခံစားရသည့် အာဇာနည်သူရဲကောင်းများ၏ ကျန်ရစ်သူမိသားစုဝင်များနှင့် ထပ်တူထပ်မျှရပ်တည်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။ အာဇာနည်သူရဲကောင်းများ တိုက်ပွဲဝင်ခဲ့ကြသည့် လွတ်လပ်မှုနှင့် ဒီမိုကရေစီတို့အတွက် မယိမ်းယိုင်သော ကတိကဝတ်သည် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၊ ယူကရိန်းနှင့် ကမ္ဘာတစ်ဝန်းလုံးတို့၏ ခွန်အားနှင့် စိတ်ဓာတ်ကို သက်သေထူလျက်ရှိသည်။ လွတ်လပ်မှု၊ ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးနှင့် ချမ်းသာကြွယ်ဝတဲ့ ဒီမိုကရေစီကမ္ဘာကြီးအတွက် တိုက်ပွဲဝင်နေကြသော ရဲရင့်သော မြန်မာပြည်သူများနှင့် ယူကရိန်းပြည်သူများကို ထောက်ပံ့ပေးဖို့ ပြည်တွင်း၊ ဒေသန္တရနဲ့ အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာ သက်ဆိုင်ရာအဖွဲ့အစည်းများကို ထပ်မံတိုက်တွန်းလိုပါသည်။ အားလုံးအတွက် ပိုမိုတောက်ပသော မနက်ဖြန်နေ့ရက်များရောက်ရှိလာစေရန် တော်လှန်နေကြသည့် မြန်မာပြည်သူများအားလုံးကို အာဇာနည်သူရဲကောင်းများက အစဉ်အမြဲစောင့်ရှောက်ပါစေကြောင်း တောင်းဆုပြုအပ်ပါသည်။ လွတ်လပ်မှု၊ တရားမျှတမှု၊ တန်းတူညီမျှမှုနဲ့ စည်းလုံးညီညွတ်မှုတို့အပေါ် တည်ဆောက်ထားသည့် ပိုမိုကောင်းမွန်သည့် ကမ္ဘာကြီးကို တက်တက်ကြွကြွ ပါဝင်ဖော်ဆောင်ခြင်းအားဖြင့် သူတို့၏ ပေးဆပ်မှုများကို ဂုဏ်ပြုရန် တိုက်တွန်းအပ်ပါသည်။ နောက်လာမည့် (၇၇) ကြိမ်မြောက် အာဇာနည်နေ့ကို စစ်အာဏာရှင်လက်အောက်မှ လွတ်မြောက်ပြီး ငြိမ်ချမ်းမှု၊ လွတ်လပ်မှုများနဲ့ အာဇာနည်နေ့ကို ပြည်သူများ အောက်မေ့ဂုဏ်ပြုနိုင်ရန် မျှော်လင့်ပါသည်။ အရေးတော်ပုံအောင်ရမည်! မြန်မာနိုင်ငံကို ဘုရားသခင်ကောင်းချီးပေးပါစေ! လေးစားစွာဖြင့် ဒေါက်တာဆာဆာ ပြည်ထောင်စုဝန်ကြီး အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်ရေး ဝန်ကြီးဌာန အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of International Cooperation Myanmar
2023-07-19
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-20
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Description: "Today, Myanmar commemorates the 76th Anniversary of our Martyrs Day, the Day when Myanmar’s Independence agreement, known as Panglong Agreements, was taken away by brutally assassinating our National heroes, Myanmar’s great leaders of Independence from Britain. Today also marks 76 years of the brave people's unwavering struggle for freedom, self-determination, and federal democracy. We honour and pay tribute to the brave souls who sacrificed their lives in 1947 and during this ongoing Myanmar’s Nationwide Revolution to end genocidal military junta and establish inclusive federal democracy based on principles of self-determination, equality, human rights, and justice in Myanmar, the region, and the world. As we commemorate our great Martyrs who have come before us, we also salute and appreciate our great living Martyrs and Heroes who are holding the frontline of our freedom and federal democratic aspirations and democratic will of the brave people of Myanmar by risking their lives every day in the face of crimes against humanity, brutality, and cruelty of the genocidal military junta. 76 years ago, on July 19, 1947, Myanmar’s National Hero and Independence Leader, General Aung San, the father of Myanmar’s State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, along with Independence leaders, were brutally assassinated, changing Myanmar's history forever. As a result, the brave people of Myanmar have suffered from this terrible black day in our history. If our independence leaders were not assassinated in such a brutal way, Myanmar's promises and principles of federal democracy and equality would have been fully implemented, and Myanmar could have thrived under federal democracy, standing tall along with free and federal democratic Nations for the region and the world. Before this black day happened, Myanmar was already the most promising country in Asia and one of the most prosperous nations in the region, known as the food basket of Asia. However, acts of terrorism by a terrorist group, rooted right from Myanmar's pre-independent era, disrupted this progress. The assassination not only robbed us of our independence leaders but also shattered our freedom and federal democratic agreements and the Burma Independent's terms and conditions agreement signed in Panglong, known as the Panglong Agreement in our history. After 76 years, these same terrorism roots caused the emergence of the genocidal military institution known as the Tatmadaw, which oppressed its own people and denied basic human rights to the people of Myanmar through the destruction of federal democracy values and principles and genocidal attacks against its own people. Despite successive generations standing up for peace, freedom, and federal democracy, the brutal genocidal military declared wars against its own people. On February 1st, 2021, the same genocidal military mindset attempted to take away our freedom and democracy by destroying the results of the 2020 Myanmar election, which was nationally and internationally recognized as free, fair, and democratic. The people of Myanmar's peaceful protests were crushed with battlefield weapons. 27 months have passed since Myanmar's Nationwide Revolution began to end the 76 years of denial of peace, freedom, and the genocidal military dictatorships and to establish an inclusive federal democratic Union of Myanmar. In the last 27 months alone, the genocidal military has killed more than 4,000 civilians, including 800 children, unjustly arrested more than 23,000 civilians, including 400 children, Myanmar President U Win Myint and State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, and destroyed more than 70,000 homes, including schools, hospitals, and places of worship. During these 27 months, more than 18 million people of Myanmar have been pushed into a great need for life-saving aid, nearly 2 million people displaced to homelessness, and 48 million people pushed into extreme poverty. These 27 months have been filled with pain, suffering, deaths, and destruction. At the same time, the genocidal military junta has used starvation, hunger, and disease as weapons through their evil "four cuts" policies against the entire population of Myanmar. Despite facing unspeakable atrocities, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, the freedom and federal democracy-loving people of Myanmar's hope cannot be taken away or destroyed by the genocidal military's battlefield weapons or their fighter jets, which have committed genocide against their own people, as exemplified in the genocidal attacks against the Rohingya by the same genocidal military. The denial of life-saving aid to 18 million people under their evil "four cut" policies and the denial of basic education to dozens of millions of Myanmar's children, who are on the edge of lost generations, which will have effects for generations to come, are slow genocide against the entire population of Myanmar. While the genocidal military junta, the enemy of peace, freedom, and federal democracy, has been busy bringing death, destruction, and suffering to the 54 million people of Myanmar, the people of Myanmar, democratically represented by the National Unity Government of Myanmar (NUG), together with heroes, comrades, and pro-democratic freedom fighters, have been defending the values and principles of freedom and federal democracy in the face of this terrible terror and nightmare. This Nationwide Revolution, the last revolution for the past 76 years, will not only end the genocidal military dictatorship once and for all but will also clearly lay out Myanmar’s inclusive federal democratic roadmaps in our Federal Democratic Charter (FDC), which is now in the process of developing a transitional Constitution (TC) before we reach our destination of a fully-fledged federal democratic new Myanmar! The people of Myanmar Nationwide Revolution have not only written the destination of Myanmar’s future in freedom and an inclusive federal democratic union for all Myanmar but also control more than half of Myanmar’s territory through our heroes and freedom fighters from People’s Defence Forces (PDFs), Local Defences Forces (LDFs), and Ethnic Revolutionary Organizations (EROs). Our great martyrs have stated with their lives that enough is enough to the genocidal forces of darkness and have given their lives for the light of freedom. If the International Community hesitates to take decisive actions against these evil forces, the genocidal military, these reigns of terror will be prolonged, and millions more innocent people will suffer. Our people cannot bear this any longer. The International Community, as a responsible global Community, must support the Nationwide Revolutions for freedom and federal democracy, respect the democratic will of the people of Myanmar by officially recognising the National Unity Government of Myanmar (NUG), and reject the genocidal military junta by cutting off international finance, weapons, and legitimacy going into the brutal hands of the genocidal military junta and imposing strong, coordinated, and targeted sanctions against them and their supporters, be they countries, businesses, or individuals. Our martyrs continue to inspire us every day in this Nationwide Revolution against the genocidal military forces of evil and remain a guiding light in our collective journey towards an inclusive federal democratic future. On this Martyrs Day, we also remember our fallen heroes of the Spring Revolution, who, with their unwavering determination and bravery, stood up against injustice and oppression, sacrificing their lives for the cause of federal democracy and freedom. Their courage and sacrifice will forever be remembered and appreciated in our hearts as the sacrifices of our martyrs remind us of the immense value of freedom, human rights, and justice. Myanmar's Martyrs Day, Ukraine is also very much in our thoughts and prayers. We also remember, appreciate, and salute all the fallen heroes and martyrs of Ukraine who have given their today for the freedom of tomorrow, not only for Ukraine but for the whole world. The brave people of Myanmar and Ukraine have dedicated their God-given lives to the cause of liberation from oppression and to send their people to freedom and a free world. We stand in solidarity with the families and loved ones of the martyrs who have endured unimaginable pain and loss. Their unwavering commitment to freedom and democracy, for which their loved ones fought, is a testament to the strength and spirit of the people of Myanmar, Ukraine, and the whole world. We urge once again all stakeholders, domestic, regional, and international, to support the people of Myanmar and Ukraine in their aspirations for freedom, peace, and a prosperous democratic world. May the spirit of our martyrs continue to guide and inspire us as we strive for a brighter tomorrow to make this world a better place for all. Let us seize this moment to honour their sacrifice by actively engaging in the pursuit of a free and just world built on the principles and values of liberty, justice, equality, and solidarity. Together, let us forge a path forward towards the new world where the hopes for which our martyrs gave their lives are fully realised. May their sacrifice never be forgotten, and may their legacy inspire us to make this world a better place for all, one that our martyrs would be proud of, and where the world will fully enjoy peace and prosperity. May we celebrate the 77th Martyr Day without genocidal military junta’s brutality but with the joy of freedom, peace, and liberation of our people from the reign of terror and tyranny. Myanmar Nationwide Revolution will Prevail! May God Bless Myanmar! Sincerely, Dr. Sasa Union Minister Ministry of International Cooperation The National Unity Government Republic of the Union of Myanmar..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of International Cooperation Myanmar
2023-07-19
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-19
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "၁။ ၁၉၄၇ ခုနှစ်၊ ဇူလိုင်လ ၁၉ ရက်နေ့သည် မြန်မာ့သမိုင်းတွင် တိုင်းပြည်အတွက် ကြီးမား သော ဆုံးရှုံးမှုအဖြစ် ကြုံတွေ့ခဲ့ရသည့် မမေ့နိုင်စရာ ကြေကွဲဖွယ်နေ့ တစ်နေ့ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ မသမာ လူတစ်စုတို့၏ လုပ်ကြံမှုကြောင့် ဗိုလ်ချုပ်အောင်ဆန်းနှင့်တကွ နိုင်ငံ့ခေါင်းဆောင်ကြီးများ ကျဆုံး ခဲ့ကြရသည်မှာ ယနေ့တွင် (၇၆) နှစ် ပြည့်မြောက်ခဲ့ပြီ ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ကမ္ဘာတည်သရွေ့ မေ့ဖျောက် ၍ မရနိုင်သည့် နေ့တစ်နေ့လည်းဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ၂။ ၁၉၄၇ ခုနှစ်၊ ဇူလိုင်လ ၁၉ ရက် (စနေနေ့)၊ နံနက် ၁၀ နာရီ ၃၇ မိနစ်တွင် အတွင်းဝန်များ ရုံး၌ တိုင်းပြည်ကျွန်ဘဝက လွတ်မြောက်ရေးနှင့် စစ်ပြီးခေတ် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံပြန်လည်ထူထောင်ရေး အတွက် အစည်းအဝေးပြုလုပ်နေသော အမျိုးသားခေါင်းဆောင်ကြီး ဗိုလ်ချုပ်အောင်ဆန်း ဦးဆောင်သော ဖဆပလ ကြားဖြတ်အစိုးရ ဝန်ကြီးများကို မျိုးချစ်ခေါင်းဆောင် နန်းရင်းဝန်ဟောင်း ဂဠုန်ဦးစောနှင့် အပေါင်းအပါတို့က ရက်ရက်စက်စက် လုပ်ကြံသတ်ဖြတ်ခဲ့ကြပြီး မြန်မာပြည်၏ အနာဂတ်ကို ဖျက်ဆီးခဲ့ကြပါသည်။ အာဇာနည်ခေါင်းဆောင်ကြီးများ လုပ်ကြံခံရသောကြောင့် မိမိတို့တိုင်းပြည်အတွက် ထိခိုက်နစ်နာ ဆုံးရှုံးမှုများ အလွန်များပြားသည်ကို ယနေ့နိုင်ငံရေး အခြေ အနေများအား သုံးသပ်ကြည့်ပါက သိနိုင်မည်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ တစ်စုတစ်ဖွဲ့ကောင်းစားရေးအတွက် တိုင်းပြည်ကို အသုံးချကာ ကိုယ်ကျိုးအတွက် လုပ်ဆောင်ခဲ့ကြသောကြောင့် မိမိတို့တိုင်းပြည်သည် ယနေ့အချိန်အထိ နလန်မထူနိုင်ဘဲ အာဇာနည်သူရဲကောင်းများစွာလည်း ဆုံးရှုံးခဲ့ကြရပါသည်။ ၃။ ယနေ့နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးတွင်လည်း ဂဠုန်ဦးစောနှင့် အပေါင်းအပါများကဲ့သို့ အကြမ်းဖက် စိတ်ဓာတ်များဖြင့် အာဏာရှင်ပီသစွာ ပြုမှုလုပ်ဆောင်လျက်ရှိသည့် တရားမဝင် စစ်အုပ်စုသည်လည်း ပြည်သူလူထုထံမှ ဆင်းသက်လာသည့် နိုင်ငံတော်အာဏာကို လက်နက်အားကိုးဖြင့် အဓမ္မ သိမ်းယူ ခဲ့ပြီး ၎င်းတို့ကိုယ်ကျိုးစီးပွားအတွက် တိုင်းပြည်နှင့်လူမျိုးတို့၏ အသက်၊ အိုးအိမ်နှင့်စည်းစိမ်များစွာ ကို ချနင်းဖျက်ဆီးလျက် ရှိပါသည်။ လူမဆန်သော စစ်အာဏာရှင်တို့၏ အကြမ်းဖက် ဖိနှိပ်ချုပ်ချယ် မှုများကို တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူလူထုအားလုံးက ခေါင်းငုံ့မခံဘဲ တိုင်းပြည်နှင့်လူမျိုးအတွက် အသက် ကိုပင် ပဓာနမထားဘဲ အာဇာနည်ခေါင်းဆောင်(၉)ဦး စိတ်ဓာတ်အပြည့်ဖြင့် အာဏာရှင်စနစ် အပြီးသတ်ချုပ်ငြိမ်းရေးအတွက် တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူများအားလုံး တွဲလက်ညီညီ တိုက်ပွဲဝင်လျက် ရှိပါသည်။ ဇူလိုင် ၁၉ တွင် ကျဆုံးခဲ့သော ဗိုလ်ချုပ်အောင်ဆန်းနှင့်တကွ အာဇာနည်ခေါင်းဆောင် ကြီးများ၊ နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးတွင် ကျဆုံးခဲ့သောအာဇာနည်သူရဲကောင်းများနှင့် ခေတ်အဆက်ဆက် ဒီမိုကရေစီအရေး၊ မိမိတိုင်းပြည်နှင့် လူမျိုးလွတ်လပ်ရေးအတွက် တိုက်ပွဲဝင်ရင်း ကျဆုံးခဲ့ကြသော အာဇာနည်သူရဲကောင်းအပေါင်းတို့အား ဤသဝဏ်လွှာမှတစ်ဆင့် ဂုဏ်ပြု ဦးညွှတ်လိုက်ပါသည်။ ၄။ ဗိုလ်ချုပ်အောင်ဆန်းအပါအဝင် အာဇာနည်ခေါင်းဆောင်ကြီးများ၏ မပြီးပြတ်ခဲ့သော အာဏာရှင်စနစ် ပျက်သုဉ်းရေးလုပ်ငန်းစဉ်များကို မိမိတို့ တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူများ၊ တော်လှန်ရေး အင်အားစုများအားလုံးက တော်လှန်ရေးအသိ၊ တော်လှန်ရေးသတိဖြင့် စည်းလုံးညီညွတ်စွာ ဆက်လက် အကောင်အထည်ဖော်ဆောင်ရွက်ကြစေလိုကြောင်း အလေးအနက် တိုက်တွန်းနှိုးဆော် လိုပါသည်။ တိုင်းပြည်အတွက် အသက်ပေးလှူခဲ့ကြသည့် ဗိုလ်ချုပ်အောင်ဆန်းနှင့်တကွ အာဇာနည် အပေါင်းတို့၏ ကျေးဇူးကိုသိ၍ အမှန်တကယ် လေးစားမြတ်နိုးတန်ဖိုးထားကြသည်ဆိုလျှင် အာဇာနည်ကြီးများ၏ အသက်၊ သွေး၊ ချွေးတို့ဖြင့် ရယူပေးခဲ့သည့် လွတ်လပ်ရေးကို ရေရှည်တည်တံ့ အောင် မိမိတို့နိုင်ငံသားအားလုံးက ဦးလည်မသုန် ထိန်းသိမ်းကာကွယ် စောင့်ရှောက်သွားကြရမည် ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ၅။ အတိတ်သမိုင်းဖြစ်ရပ်များကို သင်ခန်းစာယူပြီး တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူများနှင့် တော်လှန်ရေး အင်အားစုများအားလုံးအနေဖြင့် အပြန်အလှန်နားလည်မှု၊ ယုံကြည်မှုနှင့် လေးစားမှုတို့ကို အခြေ တည်လျက် အာဇာနည်ကြီးများ ချမှတ်ခဲ့သည့် နိုင်ငံရေးလမ်းစဉ်များကို ကျင့်သုံးကာ မိမိတို့အားလုံး မျှော်လင့်တောင့်တနေသည့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီနိုင်ငံသစ်ဆီသို့ အမှန်တရားမှပေါက်ဖွားလာသော ခွန်အားများဖြင့် ရှေ့ဆက်ချီတက်ကြပါစို့လို့ တိုက်တွန်းရင်း ဤသဝဏ်လွှာအား ပေးပို့အပ်ပါသည်။ ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီ..."
Source/publisher: Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw
2023-07-19
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-19
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Key Event Details Location of Incident: 13 villages in Shwegu township (ရွှေကူ မြို့နယ်), Kachin state (ကချင် ပြည်နယ်) Man Wein (မံဝိန်း) village [24.137754, 96.738591] Si Thar (စီသာ) village [24.128808, 96.745465] Man Nar (မံနား) village [24.126390, 96.745613] Tone Kauk (တုံးကောက်) village [24.136419, 96.753562] Si Thaung (စီသောင်) village [24.107611,96.746033] Man Hkar (မံခါး) village [24.117149, 96.737877] Si Maw (စီမော်) village [24.136141, 96.719658] Hing Kawng (ဟိန်ကောင်) village [24.131099, 96.724823] Si Mu Gyi (စီမူကြီး) village [24.153250, 96.739304 Si Mu Lay (စီမူလေး) village [24.149589, 96.732140] Nam Lang (နန့်လန်) village [24.157110, 96.719063] Nawng Let Gyi (နောင်လက်ကြီး) village [24.162870, 96.723030] Moe Kint (မိုးကင့်) village [24.131803, 96.711720] Date/Time of Incident: 24 March 2023 - 11 April 2023 Alleged Perpetrator(s) and/or Involvement: Light Infantry Division (LID) 88 ​​Infantry Battalion (IB) 10, IB 77 under LID 88 Myanmar Air Force (MAF) Kachin Independence Army (KIA) Shwegu People’s Defense Force (PDF) Summary of Investigation: Shwegu township is an area of known resistance and site of clashes between the local Kachin Independence Army (KIA), Shwegu People’s Defense Force (PDF), and the military. Multiple incidents were reported by social media users and local media in Shwegu between the end of March and mid-April including airstrikes, destruction of a medical facility, and ground battles. Myanmar Witness has fully verified damage and destruction to structures in five villages through the geolocation of user-generated content (UGC). Myanmar Witness partially verified fires in several other villages in Shwegu township between 24 March 2023 and 11 April 2023. Myanmar Witness also investigated claims that these attacks have resulted in the death and displacement of civilians in the township but have been unable to verify these occurrences. Executive Summary On 24 March 2023, it was alleged that Myanmar military forces clashed with KIA and PDF joint forces in Shwegu township, Kachin state. As a result of these clashes, which continued from 25 March 2023 to 11 April 2023, multiple villages - 13 were identified by Myanmar Witness - suffered air and ground attacks from the Myanmar military resulting in fires and the destruction of housing. Some villages experienced multiple fires within this time period. Myanmar Witness verified, through geolocation and chronolocation of UGC and FIRMS data, fires in 13 villages in Shwegu township between 24 March and 11 April 2023. Media sources reported that 12 villages were affected during the clashes, but Myanmar Witness has also identified fires in Moe Kint village. This could indicate that 13 villages were affected. Additionally, Myanmar Witness geolocated an alleged airstrike in Si Thar village; a site that the Shwegu PDF claimed the military had attacked. Myanmar Witness has geolocated additional footage which purports to show a medical facility having suffered damage akin to an airstrike attack in Si Thar village, suggesting that civilian infrastructure has been affected by the clashes in Shwegu. Myanmar Witness has identified content that indicates the presence of Myanmar military troops during and/or before the fires in Shwegu and around the affected area. Their presence was determined by cross-referencing location information from pro-Security Administration Council (SAC) media channels and social media claims related to SAC personnel presence and operations in the area. Background and Context Shwegu has experienced clashes between the military, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), and local PDF since the military coup in February 2021. By June 2021, Myanmar Peace Monitor reported that roughly 6,000 civilians had fled from 42 locations in Mansi and Shwegu townships, Kachin state, due to clashes in the area. The Shwegu region borders three notably important conflict areas in Myanmar: Sagaing (part of the ‘dry zone’), Kachin, and Shan (Figure 1). Prior to the coup, Kachin was an area of prolonged internal conflict. Ethnic armed organisations have long sought autonomy over the state and control over its natural resources. Since the coup, the KIA has been one of the ethnic armed organisations actively supporting the development of armed resistance in the dry zone, such as Sagaing and Magway. In these areas, fighting between the PDF and the military is ongoing, with repeated claims that the military is targeting communities in areas of suspected PDF activity. Attacks impacting civilians have become more commonly reported and investigated by Myanmar Witness. For example, Myanmar Witness investigated an airstrike on a concert which reportedly killed over 80 people. Multiple media organisations have reported on the destruction in Shwegu between 24 March 2023 and 11 April 2023. Civilian houses in Nam Lang village were allegedly destroyed due to clashes between local defence forces and the military on 24 March 2023. On 25 March, BBC Burma reported that airstrikes had taken place in the villages of Nam Lang, Man Wein and Si Thaung. On 30 March 2023, Khit Thit Media reported that the SAC cut the internet and phone connections in Shwegu township. The military has historically used internet shutdowns to quell opposition, notably since taking power in February 2021 and — as Myanmar Witness has previously reported on — during the following months of anti-military protest. However, platforms such as Netblocks, OONI and IODA, which often report on communications blackouts, provide no indication that there was an internet shutdown, preventing Myanmar Witness from verifying these claims. Nevertheless, there is relatively little UGC associated with the fires in Shwegu, supporting the notion that some form of restriction on communication systems was in place. Since 30 March 2023 — when it is alleged that the military cut the internet connection — several villages were reportedly attacked by the military using airstrikes and arson, including: Man Wein, Si Thar, Tone Kauk, Si Thaung, Man Hkar, Si Maw, Nam Lang, and Nawng Let Gyi. The media generally report clashes in 12 villages in Shwegu, which resulted in fires. Myanmar Witness has partially verified fires in a further six villages using low-resolution satellite imagery analysis and FIRMS: Man Nar, Hing Kawng, Si Mu Gyi, Si Mu Lay, and Moe Kint. Myanmar Witness was able to verify: At least 13 villages suffered fire damage between 24 March and 11 April 2023. The destruction of the villages was verified through the use of Sentinel satellite imagery. The possible dates of fires were identified through FIRMS, which indicated that some villages may have been attacked multiple times. Four villages were badly affected by fire. The damage and destruction, as shown by UGC, was geolocated to: Si Thaung, Man Wein, Si Thar, and Nawng Let Gyi villages. Some structural damage was also verified in Man Nar village allegedly due to airstrikes. A building in Si Thar, allegedly a medical facility, was badly damaged during the timeframe investigated. The investigation walkthrough Myanmar Witness identified a cluster of fires in Shwegu township using the Myanmar Witness fire database, which were then verified using FIRMS and Sentinel. Following this, Myanmar Witness conducted an investigation to identify related UGC and reports via social media channels and official media sources, which led to further verification of the impact of the fires and destruction in five of the villages. Myanmar Witness cannot verify the exact number of houses destroyed due to the limited UGC and information. Multiple media sources claimed that the military were the single perpetrator responsible for the fires, setting them intentionally throughout the clashes with the KIA and PDF in the area. Myanmar Witness has been unable to verify these claims. Despite this, Myanmar Witness confirmed that fire incidents in Shwegu township were consistent with the locations where clashes between the military, KIA, and PDF were reported. The following section will provide information related to fires in the 13 villages. Fire incidents in five villages were classified as ‘fully verified’ as Myanmar Witness was able to identify and geolocate UGC associated with the fires and the destruction they caused (as per Myanmar Witness’ methodology). Incidents in the remaining villages were ‘partially verified’ using FIRMS and Sentinel data. Despite the verification of fire incidents and the resultant destruction, in all cases there is no evidence to conclusively say that the military was responsible. Lastly, the impact of the fires and clashes in the township was investigated, including the displacement and deaths of individuals. Myanmar Witness analysed satellite imagery from these locations and confirmed that the 13 villages had suffered from fire damage. Satellite imagery from 20 April 2023 (nine days after the clashes reportedly ended) demonstrates destruction in each village, some of which is considerable. Despite there being no related UGC of Si Maw, Hing Kawng, and Man Nar from 10 April 2023 to allow for the further verification of fires through geolocation, Myanmar Witness identified parts of these villages which appear to have active fires at the time when Sentinel satellite imagery was taken. This can be seen using Sentinel’s false colour filter on 10 April 2023 (Figure 7). Fires in five villages further verified using UGC Si Thaung Si Thaung village reportedly experienced fires more than once within the investigative timeframe. For example, the media reported the first fire on 25 March, however FIRMS didn't detect fire signatures that day. On the same day, a Shwegu Facebook page and the BBC posted images allegedly showing the aftermath of military attacks in Si Thaung, Si Mu Lay, and Man Wein. Myanmar Witness geolocated the images (Figure 8) to Si Thaung at 24.105928, 96.748044. Although there were claims of airstrikes in the area, the images posted by the Shwegu Facebook page are inconclusive. While some show destruction that is consistent with airstrike damage — houses have been completely destroyed with parts of the roofing and fencing broken — other images appear to show burnt flooring and material that could indicate fires where the houses were destroyed (Figure 9). Despite images of destruction to buildings, Myanmar Witness cannot fully verify the claims of an airstrike due to the lack of geolocatable features or verifiable evidence in these images, particularly of aircraft or munitions in the area. FIRMS detected heat signatures on 9 April; this is consistent with the destruction Myanmar Witness identified using Sentinel satellite imagery on 20 April. Sentinel imagery from 20 April 2023 shows ground changes, suggesting potential fire damage to Si Thaung. This indicates that the village could have been the site of clashes more than once between 24 March 2023 and 11 April 2023. Man Wein On 30 March 2023, Mandalay Free Press reported on an airstrike in Man Wein and claimed that almost the entire village was burned down after the airstrike. The military allegedly set fire to the village by hand. FIRMS registered a fire at around 0844 on 30 March 2023 in Man Wein. Myanmar Witness geolocated PDF drone footage that reveals that almost the whole of Man Wein was damaged by fire. Myanmar Witness geolocated this drone footage to around 24.137754, 96.738591. Using Google Earth’s measurement tool, Myanmar Witness estimates that a 60 m squared area of Man Wein was destroyed, as shown in the drone footage. This coincides with the Sentinel satellite imagery burn mark visible the day after the event on 31 March 2023 (Figure 10). Si Thar and Man Nar On 5 April 2023, the anti-military group Red Peacock media reported that Si Thar was hit by an airstrike, resulting in the destruction of the village’s hospital and fire damage to the adjoining village of Man Nar (Figure 11). FIRMS data shows multiple heat signatures in Si Thar and Man Nar villages on 5 Apr 2023, consistent with media claims that the military attacked these villages on these days. Both villages also appear to have suffered significant burn damage, evident through changes to ground coverage as identified using Sentinel imagery (dated 20 April 2023). Shwegu PDF posted footage on 6 April 2023, purporting to show the aftermath of the airstrike on the medical facility which Myanmar Witness geolocated to 24.128808, 96.745465 (Figure 12). Myanmar Witness also geolocated images of destruction to Man Nar village. Limited UGC showing the aircraft or munitions has made it difficult for Myanmar Witness to confirm the airstrike. Despite this, the damage to structures in Si Thar and Man Nar appears to be consistent with an air attack: buildings suffered structural damage (especially to roofing). Additionally, images posted online by Shwegu PDF indicate that there was fire damage and active fires. Nawng Let Gyi On 11 April 2023, Mizzima reported that the military set fire to Nam Lang and Nawng Let Gyi (for the second time). FIRMS also detected high heat signatures around Nam Lang on 11 April 2023. Myanmar Witness analysed Sentinel imagery (taken on 20 April 2023) and confirmed that both villages suffered significant ground changes which are consistent with burn damage. Myanmar Witness also identified and verified UGC from Nawng Let Gyi village, confirming the extent of the destruction (uploaded by a private account and the source has been redacted due to privacy concerns). Displacement and Victims Clashes causing displacement On 23 March 2023, The 74 Media reported that thousands of residents from the western side of Shwegu were seen fleeing Shwegu township at around 0800 local time, as the military was reportedly using heavy weapons in the area. Similarly, on 17 April 2023, Kachin News Group reported that around 10,000 people had fled Shwegu, with more than half of them living in surrounding jungles, where emergency medical aid and food were needed. Individuals supporting IDPs from Shwegu told the Kachin News Group that IDPs feared returning to villages in southeast Shwegu due to concerns about the military’s return. At the time of reporting, Myanmar Witness has not identified verifiable footage of IDP movement from the township. It’s likely that internet shutdowns and ongoing conflict could have hampered the documentation and reporting of these events. As such, these claims have not, as of yet, been verified. Deceased individuals PCT reported at least 17 known KIA/PDF soldiers were killed by the military during the clashes. On 19 April 2023, RFA also reported on casualties of the clashes, including that the bodies of ten individuals were found after the military convoy left Shwegu. The victims’ names and ages were shared online. The casualties reportedly aged between 22-60 years old. RFA also noted that these individuals had sustained injuries to their throats and gunshot wounds. MRTV uploaded images of three deceased individuals allegedly killed during the clashes; two of which were wearing military fatigues. The MRTV post alleged that these individuals were KIA/PDF personnel killed during clashes in the area. Myanmar Witness could not identify images of all of the deceased individuals. Graffiti Mandalay Free Press released Images online allegedly showing messages left on structures within Shwegu (although the specific village or location remains unknown). These messages contain profanities directed against the KIA and PDF (Figure 17). Myanmar Witness has reported on similar graffiti in other sites of conflict and have largely been considered an intimidation tactic. Munitions During the course of the investigation, Myanmar Witness analysed a video posted by local residents on Facebook on 12 April 2023, in which they claim that munitions from a military aircraft had been found in Si Thaung. Myanmar Witness cannot identify with certainty the type and model of the filmed ordnance nor the system that delivered it. At the same time, Myanmar Witness has identified some noteworthy details – reported below – which allow for an overall assessment that the ordnance filmed in the video was highly likely delivered by an aircraft. In the video, seven pieces of ordnance are visible. The seven pieces of ordnance appear to be identical apart from one, which has an additional tail kit with fins section still partly attached (Figure 19). Myanmar Witness believes that it is highly likely that the other six pieces of ordnance belong to the same model as the seventh but lack the additional tail kit, which may have been lost during flight or impact. The presence of add-on tail kits strongly suggests these rounds were re-purposed to be employed by aircraft. At the same time, the lack of suspension lugs on all of the bombs’ bodies indicates that these rounds could not have been attached to any aircraft pylons. The possibility that these rounds were fired by a rocket pod must be excluded, given the absence of a rocket motor and the fixed tail fins. For these reasons Myanmar Witness strongly believes that these seven rounds may in fact be sub-munitions, released mid-air by a larger, cargo-type bomb. An additional element which corroborates this thesis is the strong resemblance between the only surviving tail kit found in Shwegu township with other add-on tail kits allegedly found in the Kokang region of Shan State – following SAC airstrikes – and posted on Facebook on 28 December 2022 (shown below). On that occasion the add-on kits were found together with a large container-type bomb. Conclusion Myanmar Witness investigated a cluster of 13 fires in Shwegu township between 24 March 2023 and 11 April 2023. These fires coincided with claims online that the military was active in the area. All 13 fires were confirmed using FIRMS and sentinel satellite imagery, and five of the fires were further verified following the geolocation of UGC of the fire damage. As a result, Myanmar Witness is confident that multiple fires occurred in villages in Shwegu around the time clashes were taking place in the area. Myanmar Witness has also identified several allegations of airstrikes and claims related to munitions found in these attacks. It is claimed online that LID 88 and the Myanmar Air Force were responsible, causing destruction to medical facilities and close to places of worship. While this could not be verified, the munitions found were consistent with those used in other Myanmar Air Force attacks. This investigation has highlighted the destruction of civilian infrastructure and identified claims related to the mass displacement of individuals from the township as well as human casualties. Myanmar Witness will continue to monitor claims related to the human toll of fires. Abbreviations Ethnic Armed Organization/Ethnic Resistance Organisation - EAO/ERO Fire Information for Resource Management System - FIRMS Kachin Independence Army - KIA People’s Defense Forces - PDF Local Defense Forces - LDF Myanmar Air Force - MAF State Administration Council - SAC User Generated Content - UGC..."
Source/publisher: Myanmar Witness
2023-07-17
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-17
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: RFA interviews anti-junta fighter who faced torture before the daring escape.
Description: "In a daring escape from a prison in Myanmar last month, 10 inmates wrestled guns away from guards, got into a gunfight and sped away on stolen motorcycles, one of the former prisoners told Radio Free Asia. Junta authorities acknowledged the jailbreak at Taungoo Prison, in the Bago region in central Myanmar, saying police were searching for the escapees. But the de facto leader of the inmates, Baydar, who goes by one name, gave RFA Burmese a first-hand account of what happened, saying it all unfolded as the prisoners – some of whom were facing a death sentence – were being taken from their cells to a small courtroom within the prison walls go on trial. Secret trials inside prisons have become a common practice in Myanmar, where the military took control of the country in a February 2021 coup d’etat, overthrowing the civilian government. Baydar, a 30-year-old government telecommunications worker who had become a rebel fighter against the junta, had been captured in March and held in the prison since then, enduring frequent torture at the hands of guards seeking to extract information from him. To protest the military takeover, he had quit his job, traveled to Kayah state in eastern Myanmar and joined the anti-junta People’s Defense Force – made up of civilians who have taken up arms against the military – where he underwent combat training. “We realized that we could not protest peacefully because the soldiers are inhuman,” he told RFA. “From then on, we decided to take up arms to launch a revolution.” Baydar started fighting the Burmese army and even formed an anti-junta militia called the Underground Revolution Knights Force. Captured and tortured In March, he was arrested, along with seven other PDF fighters, imprisoned and tortured. “I was interrogated for five days in Yedashe police station,” he said, referring to a town in the Bago region. “If they weren’t satisfied with the answers, they beat me. I said ‘no’ because I didn’t do it, or they asked rubbish questions, but they beat me until I made an admission.” “You had to admit every charge whether you committed it or not because you were afraid of being beaten,” he said. In prison, Baydar constantly thought of ways to escape. Six of the people he was arrested with were also at the prison, and together they secretly brainstormed about ways to get out. Deposed President Win Myint, who was arrested in the coup, was also being held at Taungoo. Baydar and his inmate friends tried to come up with a way of bringing him out. But one rough plan they devised had to be abandoned when word got around the prison they were planning a jailbreak. “There was no one who could provide cover for us in the city,” Baydar said, referring to Taungoo. “We trusted no one to ask for help to give us cover.” One-time shot On May 18, Baydar and about 20 other prisoners were taken to a small building that acts as a courthouse. Normally, there is a heavy amount of security when trials are held, but on that day there were only two prison guards at the gate and seven other policemen nearby, he said. Baydar and others noticed that one police officer had a revolver, and a rifle was laying upon a bench. Several of the prisoners discreetly started talking among themselves. “We would get such an opportunity only once,” he said “We could not get it again.” Suddenly, one prisoner grabbed the officer’s revolver, and another inmate pinned down a second officer so they could get the rifle. “And then we wrestled with those guards,” he said. Gunfire erupted as police officers started firing at the prisoners, who fired back, wounding some of the officers. Baydar collected more guns from them. “The sergeant tried to get back his gun, so I had to shoot him in the chest,” he said. Since the small courtroom was already outside the prison wall, the ten prisoners were able to escape much more easily. Quickly locating some motorcycles nearby, they pleaded with the owners to let them ride away – and sped away from the prison. “We didn’t have time to explain to them about our organizations, so they might think we were rude,” he said. “And we were holding weapons. “But without using harsh words, we apologized by supplicating with palms togethers to promise that we would return the motorcycles at an appropriate time,” he said. They drove into the nearby jungle, where they have since re-joined PDF units. After the escape, there were reports that one prisoner was interrogated and tortured. Families and other sources close to the prisons have said that political inmates are now being treated more harshly. “When I was arrested, the military council made us feel intimidated. From there, I stood firmly on my belief and tried to make the impossible possible,” Baydar said. “What I would like to say is that our revolution won’t take that long if the people participate in big numbers.”..."
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Source/publisher: "Radio Free Asia" (USA)
2023-07-04
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-04
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "The horrendous account of a businessman who says he escaped from “cyber slavery” in Myanmar made headlines in the Chinese mainland last week. The man, using the pseudonym Li Wei, told the Metropolitan Channel of Henan TV in April that he was lured by a client to the Southeast Asian nation late last year when he tried to chase a payment he was owed. His story is becoming a familiar one. Like many other victims, the man says he was trafficked by a criminal syndicate and forced to engage in so-called pig butchering scams. More Chinese victims plucked from cross-border cyberscams in Myanmar This common form of cyber fraud sees scammers, many of them trafficked, seeking to win the trust of victims by developing romantic or business connections – “fattening the pigs” before they are “butchered” by swindling money from them. Li told the broadcaster that some of the cyber slaves had even been put in what their captors called a water prison. He said they were locked in rooms filled with water up to their mouths, with sharp nails on the floor that made it hard to stand. Such accounts have been appearing more frequently in Chinese state media recently as the government seeks to warn the public about these scams. In what the media called “a very big case”, a court in Chengdu, Sichuan province convicted 34 people late last month over their involvement in a scam ring based in Myanmar. But the case only involved fraudulent proceeds of several million yuan – meaning the syndicate was just one of the many small operators in the crime hubs that have sprung up along the Moei River in Myanmar. Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang in May called on the Myanmar government to work harder to stop the scams, but it is unclear whether this type of pressure is having any effect. One of the most infamous of the scam hubs is Shwe Kokko in the restive Kayin state. Originally a casino city co-developed by Yatai International Holdings – owned by Chinese-born businessman She Zhijiang – and the Kayin State Border Guard Force (BGF), it became a centre for online scams during the Covid-19 pandemic. Shwe Kokko is also the headquarters for the BGF, which is made up of former insurgency troops from Kayin who were integrated into Myanmar’s military, the Tatmadaw, during a ceasefire in 2010. In 2020, the Myanmar government – then a power-sharing arrangement between the civilian government and the military – launched an investigation and halted the controversial project, called Yatai New City. But local NGOs and media pointed out that the military coup that came the following year reversed the project’s fortunes, as the military government needed the BGF to fight rival armed groups. The Tatmadaw has neither the capacity nor the incentive to stop the BGF from restarting this project and turning it into a hub for cybercrime. The BGF is a loose group of former ethnic militias. Two small battalions reportedly defected from the military government recently, further undermining the Tatmadaw’s incentives to upset the remaining BGF forces on its side. She has been a long-time fugitive from China and was arrested in Thailand last year for running a cross-border gambling business. He is waiting to be extradited to China, and according to Myanmar media reports the BGF has filled the void left by She. Chinese, Malaysians among 2,700 victims rescued in Philippines cyber scam raid 30 Jun 2023 These schemes are a concern across the region, with Association of Southeast Asian Nations members vowing to work together to combat them. There have been reports of rescues, crackdowns and trials in recent months – it is progress, but they are just the tip of the iceberg. Getting to the root of the problem will be difficult and complicated, but there is an opportunity now for cooperation between Beijing and Asean members, since they face a common enemy. Stopping these criminal syndicates and their protectors can only be done with regional cooperation, and with strong political will..."
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Source/publisher: "South China Morning Post"
2023-07-04
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-04
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Description: "The world’s largest marble Buddha, now under construction in Myanmar’s military capital of Naypyidaw, will reportedly be able to withstand 193 kilometer-per-hour winds and earthquakes measuring as high as 8.8 on the Richter scale. The gargantuan 25-meter Buddha, weighing over 5,000 tons and etched from over 20,000 tons of marble, is nearly complete after three-plus years of building, according to state media reports. And State Administration Council (SAC) junta leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing is clearly excited judging by reports of his June 29 visit to the construction site. The project has employed over 150 laborers, including from the Myanmar Engineering Society and Military Engineering Corps, and will be built entirely “without foreign experts,” Min Aung Hlaing proudly proclaimed during his site visit. The image, carved in the Maravijaya style, is a very common Buddha pose “with 32 great characteristics and 80 small characteristics of the Lord Buddha”, according to state media reports. In a report covering the first section of the image’s installation in October 2021, just as multiple conflicts were raging in Myanmar following the February coup that year that installed the SAC, the purpose of the statue was touted as peaceful. “(T)he Buddha image is being built with the aim of showing the flourishing of the Theravada Buddhism in Myanmar to the world, ensuring the peace and tranquility of the country, contributing to development of the region through the visits of local and foreign travelers and improving the State development.” Min Aung Hlaing had taken a close interest in the gigantic statue’s construction even before his disastrous and bloody coup. He has reportedly visited frequently at important stages of the statue’s assembly. In May, for instance, he witnessed the “Unnalon Holy Hair installation.” At the auspicious time and date of 2:43 am on February 13, the fourth section of the image was conveyed and installed. The military ruler has seemingly staked his karmic fortunes on the statue’s successful completion. Gigantic Buddha statues are not new to Myanmar or Theravada Buddhist countries across Southeast Asia. Some of the biggest Buddhas in Myanmar are at the Maha Bodhi Tahtaung in Monywa, home to a 116-meter standing Buddha reportedly opened in 2008, the third tallest Buddha statue in the world, and a 90-meter-long reclining Buddha replete with 31 floors inside. (The tallest Buddha statue in the world is the Statue of Unity in India, towering at 182 meters.) There are also gigantic reclining Buddhas in the Mon State capitol of Mawlamyaing, in Bago city and the famous Chaukhtatgyi in Bahan township in Yangon – all of which underscore Myanmar’s long tradition of religious construction and support of the Buddhist clergy, or sangha. The Maravijaya Buddha will overshadow the previous largest marble Buddha, the Lawka Chantha Abhaya Labha Muni, or Kyauk Taw Gyi Pagoda, on the outskirts of Yangon, carved in 2013 to 11.3 meters from 700 tons of marble winnowed down to 400 tons upon completion. The statue was so heavy it required specially-built barges and railways to transport. While gigantic religious statues in Myanmar are commonplace, so too is the pursuit of celestial absolution for mass crimes by military rulers. Min Aung Hlaing is merely the latest dictator to support religious construction projects in karmic hope that building giant Buddhas will give them positive reincarnation rather than rebirth in the “hungry ghost realm” where they belong to be endlessly tormented by their many victims. There are growing reports of SAC leaders engaging in not just the building of gigantic religious structures but also flourishes of yedaya, or Myanmar black magic, also common practiced by generations of superstitious generals. In the mid-1990s, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), the current junta regime’s obvious inspiration, toured a Buddha Tooth Relic borrowed from China around Myanmar. That abusive regime built lavish temples, reportedly with forced prison labor, to display the artifact in a bid to boost their spiritual fortunes and appease the Buddhist priesthood. The sangha and military haven’t always seen eye to eye. There have been sometimes supportive, almost symbiotic, relations, especially with conservative or ultranationalist monks in the official Buddhist synod, the State Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee. At other times, including in 1990 and 2007, the two power centers have been antagonistically opposed as activist monks staged public marches to agitate against declining living standards and the then-military regimes’ disastrous socio-economic policies. The relationship between the military-controlled central state and Buddhist clergy was also tested during General Thein Sein’s 2011-16 administration by the rise of the Buddhist monk-led Patriotic Association of Myanmar, or Ma Ba Tha, which contributed to a rise in anti-Muslim persecution and at times open violence. The most notorious pro-military monk is Sitagu Hsayadaw, who was widely revered in the country until his support for the Ma Ba Tha caused certain unease. But as Myanmar Now’s editor Swe Win wrote early in 2023, Sitagu expressed support for the coup soon after it was staged and continues to sidle up to Min Aung Hlaing, to the opprobrium of many in Myanmar. In recent weeks, the influential Ottama Thara from the Thabarwa Monastery in Thanlyin township, close to the commercial capital of Yangon, reportedly urged senior National League for Democracy (NLD) officials to compel Aung San Suu Kyi to retire from politics and seek to promote peace in the country. Many monks formerly connected to Ma Ba Tha are now reported to support SAC-raised death squads such as the Thwe Thouq (blood drinkers) and brutal militias such as the Phyu Saw Thee in the deeply religious but horrifically violent conflict areas of Sagaing and Magwe. State media routinely claims many monks have been targeted for assassination by the anti-coup resistance despite their supposed innocence but likely due to their perceived support for the SAC. At the same time, many monks are known to be involved in the clandestine support for resistance activities while also conducting their traditional roles in health, education and humanitarianism. The lavish funeral arrangements for the former chairperson of the State Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee, Bhamo Hsayadaw, who died at age 94 on May 25, were another indication of the regime’s karmic compulsions, even if the respected monk dissolved the Ma Ba Tha in 2017 and reportedly called on the military not to stage a coup in January 2021. Min Aung Hlaing, Vice Senior General Soe Win and other senior SAC officials were pallbearers at the June 6 funeral in another apparent attempt to stockpile good deeds to outweigh their widespread war crimes. As if to deepen the macabre aspects of these religious performances, the silicon sculpture of Bhamo Hsayadaw will have state-of-the-art artificial teeth to represent his unique smile, the work of famed sculptor Aung Kyaw Tun. But as Myanmar endures a grinding multi-sided war, extreme military violence, natural disasters and a devastated economy, Min Aung Hlaing’s gigantic Buddha statue in Naypyidaw will not be smiling down kindly upon him or his junta. Indeed, in March, the Maravijaya image seemingly cried as stripes appeared around the marble statue’s eyes, stains that prompted officials to unceremoniously cover its face. It was hardly a propitious sign for a superstitious dictator seeking spiritual absolution for his many well-documented karmic crimes..."
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Source/publisher: "Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
2023-07-03
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-03
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Observers say such sales abet junta war crimes and suppliers should be held accountable.
Description: "Companies in India are supplying weapons to Myanmar’s junta while Prime Minister Narendra Modi expresses concern about the political crisis in Myanmar on the international stage, observers said Monday, highlighting the two-faced nature of the strategy. Indian arms manufacturer Bharat Electronics Limited, or BEL, transferred military equipment worth more than US$5.1 million to Myanmar’s army or known Myanmar arms brokers Alliance Engineering Consultancy and Mega Hill General Trading over a period of six months from November 2022 to April 2023, the rights group Justice for Myanmar reported in June. The military equipment included metallic sonar domes; transducers and gaskets for the domes to be used on frigates, warships or submarines; directing gear systems; technical documents; various items for radio transmission or radar equipment; and manpack radios for battlefield communication. Justice for Myanmar called the shipments “part of a pattern of Indian support for the Myanmar military and its domestic arms industry” and called on India’s allies to use their leverage to “pressure India to stop the supply of arms and dual use goods and technology” to the regime, including during Modi’s state visits to the U.S. and France this year. The weapons sales come even as Modi and U.S. President Joe Biden issued a joint statement following their meeting at the White House on June 22 expressing concern about the worsening rights situation in Myanmar and calling for the release of the country’s political prisoners. Than Soe Naing, a political analyst, pointed out the hypocrisy of India selling weapons to the junta with one hand while saying it is concerned with the situation in Myanmar on the other. He noted that India has stayed neutral amid the ongoing conflict in Myanmar and neglected or even arrested refugees who have fled fighting across its border. “But on the international arena, when making a statement as a democratic country, it uses the terms ‘democracy and human rights,’” he told RFA. “It doesn’t make any sense. It is a government that is indirectly supporting the crimes committed by the Myanmar military by willfully ignoring them.” Justice for Myanmar’s report came on the heels of one released in May by U.N. Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar Tom Andrews, who said the junta had imported at least US$1 billion in arms and raw materials to manufacture weapons between the Feb. 1, 2021, military coup d’etat and December 2022. Rights groups say the junta is using such weapons against the people of Myanmar, including to attack the armed resistance and civilians who oppose its rule. While Russia, China and Singapore were the major sources by far, the U.N. report found that Indian entities, including state-owned entities, had transferred US$51 million in arms and related materials to the junta over the same period. That followed Russia’s US$406 million, China’s US$267 million, and Singapore’s US$254 million. Selling weapons for war crimes Ko Mike, a spokesman for the Blood Money Campaign, a collective of Myanmar activists campaigning to stop revenues reaching the junta, said that Indian companies selling weapons to Myanmar are abetting war crimes. “They are supporting killings by a terrorist group [the junta] that is committing the worst crimes in the world,” he said. “Sometime in the future, it will be necessary to do something internationally about accountability [for such entities].” Ye Tun, a political analyst, said that Modi appears to believe the junta is responsible for maintaining stability in Myanmar. “So if you [maintain stability] by using weapons, India will sell weapons to Myanmar’s military [to support such alleged efforts].” Prior to the sales detailed in Justice for Myanmar’s latest report, the group noted that Indian state-owned arms producer Yantra India Limited shipped multiple 122mm howitzer barrels to the junta in October 2022 in an apparent breach of international law. The Indian government has so far ignored calls by civil society organizations and the people of Myanmar, including the shadow National Unity Government, or NUG, and failed to comply with U.N. resolutions and its responsibilities under international law, said Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadana Maung. Radio Free Asia attempted to contact the Indian Embassy in Myanmar by email for comment but received no response. Calls to junta Deputy Information Minister Major Gen. Zaw Min Tun, seeking comment on the claims, went unanswered Monday. Regional stability at risk Thein Tun Oo, the executive director of the Thayninga Institute for Strategic Studies, which is made up of former military officers, called it “normal” for India to assist its neighbor. “India can stand on its own two feet and cooperate with anyone it wants to,” he said. “India has taken Myanmar as a partner ... [because] Myanmar is the best country for India to cooperate with on the security of the Indian Ocean. So, it is normal for India to cooperate with Myanmar.” But NUG spokesman Kyaw Zaw said that as the world’s largest democracy, India is expected to embrace democratic values and not prop up regimes that oppress their own people. “We hope that India will try to understand the will of the people of Myanmar and help them to fulfill that will,” he said. If India instead continues to support the junta, he said, there will be no resolution to the conflict in Myanmar and the stability of the region will be at risk..."
Source/publisher: "Radio Free Asia" (USA)
2023-07-03
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-03
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "၁။ အကြမ်းဖက် (စကစ) စစ်အုပ်စုကို ပြန်လည်တိုက်ခိုက်နေပြီဖြစ်ကြောင်း ကရင်နီပြည် လူမျိုးပေါင်းစုံ ပြည်သူ့လွတ်မြောက်ရေးတပ်ဦး (ကလလတ) ၏ ဇူလိုင် ၁ ရက်နေ့ရက်စွဲဖြင့် သဘောထားကြေညာချက်ကို အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊​ ကာကွယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန အနေဖြင့် ဂုဏ်ယူဝမ်းမြောက်စွာဖြင့် လှိုက်လှဲစွာ ကြိုဆိုပါသည်။ ၂။ ကလလတ ဗဟိုကော်မတီ၏ သမိုင်းစာမျက်နှာသစ် ဖွင့်လှစ်လိုက်သည့် ယခု ကြေညာချက်သည် လွယ်ကူစွာ ဆုံးဖြတ်ပြီး ထွက်ပေါ်လာသော ကြေညာချက်တခု မဟုတ်ကြောင်း မိမိတို့ အထူး သတိပြုမိသည်နှင့် တပြိုင်တည်းတွင် နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေး အမြန်ဆုံး အောင်မြင်ရန် အရေးပါသည့် ဖြစ်ထွန်းတိုးတက်မှုတခုကို သမိုင်း၏တောင်းဆိုချက် အရ ဖော်ဆောင်ခြင်း ဖြစ်သည်ဟုလည်း လေးနက်စွာ ခံယူပါသည်။ ၃။ ကရင်နီပြည်(ကယားပြည်နယ်) အတွင်း သံလွင်အရှေ့ဘက်ခြမ်းရှိ စစ်ရေးအချက်အခြာ နေရာများကို ကလလတနှင့် ပူးပေါင်းမဟာမိတ်အဖွဲ့များ အောင်မြင်စွာ တိုက်ခိုက် သိမ်းပိုက်နိုင်ခဲ့သည့်အပေါ်လည်း မိမိတို့အနေဖြင့် အထူးပင် ဂုဏ်ယူပါသည်။ ၄။ ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီ (CRPH)၊ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ (NUG) တို့နှင့် နီးနီးကပ်ကပ် လက်တွဲပြီး တော်လှန်ရေးလုပ်ငန်းများကို ပူးတွဲလုပ်ဆောင် သွားရန် အဆင်သင့်ဖြစ်နေကြောင်း ကလလတ၏ ကြေညာချက်ပါ သဘောထားကြောင့် မိမိတို့ အထူးပင် အားတက်ရပါသည်။ ၅။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ကာကွယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနအနေဖြင့်လည်း စစ်အာဏာရှင် စနစ်အမြစ်ဖြတ် ချေမှုန်းရေးအတွက် ကလလတ အပါအဝင် မဟာမိတ်အဖွဲ့အစည်းများ အားလုံးနှင့် ဆက်လက်၍ အခိုင်အမာ လက်တွဲဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည် ဖြစ်ကြောင်း တည်ကြည် လေးနက်စွာ သန္နိဌာန်ပြုပါသည်။ ၆။ စစ်အာဏာရှင်ကို အမြစ်ဖြတ်ချေမှုန်းနိုင်ရန် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံရှိ လူမျိုးစု လက်နက်ကိုင် အဖွဲ့ အစည်းများအားလုံး ပူးပေါင်းပါဝင်ကြပါရန်လည်း အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ကာကွယ်ရေး ဝန်ကြီးဌာနက တိုက်တွန်းပန်ကြားပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Myanmar - NUG
2023-07-01
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-01
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Description: "According to numerous postings on social media, a united front consisting of ethnic resistance armies and Burman resistance groups known as People’s Defense Forces, or PDFs, is waging a successful war against the army of the junta, which seized power in Naypyitaw on Feb. 1, 2021. Some foreign analysts have even claimed that the alliance is made up of 100,000 ethnic fighters and as many as 65,000 men and women are under the command of the PDFs, and that they together control most of the country. If those grossly exaggerated figures and outlandish claims were taken at face value, the days of the so-called State Administration Council (SAC) would be numbered and Myanmar could soon become the democratic, federal union that the resistance is said to be fighting for. It may be correct to say that the SAC-appointed government in Naypyitaw is the most incompetent the country has had since independence in 1948. The civil war has also spread from the ethnic-minority inhabited areas in the frontier areas to the Myanmar heartland, and the SAC has been unable to exercise control over some previously peaceful parts of the country. But the bitter truth is that Myanmar has a long and troubled history of failed attempts to forge pan-ethnic resistance fronts—and the main, divisive issue has always been Burman-ethnic minority relations. And it should be remembered that there are also conflicts between the various ethnic minorities. There is long-standing animosity between the Kachin and the Shan in Kachin State, and Shan, Kachin and Palaung have overlapping claims to territory in northern Shan State. The Wa, now in eastern Shan State, want their own state, which the Shan may not agree to. Rakhine State is torn apart by conflicts between Buddhists and Muslims, and Karen and Mon rebels have been fighting over territory adjacent to the Thai border. Myanmar may not have as many as 135 “national races”, a figure that has more to do with numerology (1+3+5=9, the military’s lucky number) than reality, but the country is nevertheless the home of a multitude of ethnic groups, and successive post-independence governments—as well as forces that for decades have resisted central authority—have all failed to create the shared sense of nationhood and belonging that everyone has been talking about since the Panglong Agreement was signed in 1947. The very first resistance front was set up in 1949, so only a year after independence. It was called the People’s Democratic Front and comprised the Communist Party of Burma (CPB), the Communist Party (Red Flag), the People’s Comrade Party (PCP), the Revolutionary Burma Army (RBA), and the Arakan People’s Liberation Party (APLP). Despite the fact that all of them were leftist and had similar ideologies, it failed to achieve anything noteworthy on the battlefield. The PCP, an offshoot of Aung San’s erstwhile militia, the People’s Volunteer Organization, surrendered in 1958 and so did the APLP, which was set up in 1945 and led by U Sen Da, an Arakanese monk and nationalist leader. What remained of the RBA, pro-communist defectors from the Burma Army, merged with the CPB. In 1956, four ethnic resistance armies, the Karen National Union (KNU), the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP), the Mon People’s Front and a Pa-O group led by U Hla Pe forged an alliance called the Democratic Nationalities United Front, but it ceased to exist when the Mon and the Pa-O surrendered in 1958. A broader, pro-communist alliance called the National Democratic United Front was set up in 1959 and had six members: the CPB, the Karen National United Party (KNUP; a leftist Karen faction), the KNPP, the Chin National Vanguard Party, the New Mon State Party (NMSP), and a Pa-O faction. It was dissolved in 1975 over disagreements with the CPB, for which class was more important than nationality. Splits occurred within the ethnic groups as well, as some were still more sympathetic to the CPB and others were not. In the early 1960s, some of the ethnic resistance armies tried to unite their respective forces under the banner of the Nationalities Liberation Alliance. It consisted of the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), the KNPP, the Kawthoolei Revolutionary Council (KRC), and Noom Suk Harn, a Shan group. Largely dysfunctional, it was dissolved when KRC chairman Saw Hunter Thwame surrendered in 1963. Two years later, the KNU, the KNPP, the Kayan New Land Party (KNLP; a Padaung group), the Zomi National Front (ZNF; a Chin group) and the War Council of the Shan State Army (SSA) set up the United Nationalities Front, which was dissolved after only a year of existence. An alliance called the Nationalities United Front was set up in 1967 comprising the KNUP, the KNPP, the KNLP, the NMSP, the ZNF and the Shan State Nationalities Liberation Organization (later known as the Shan State Nationalities People’s Liberation Organization, the SSNPLO, a leftist Pa-O group.) The NMSP left the Nationalities United Front in 1969, considering the alliance too leftist. The front was eventually dissolved in 1973. In that year, the more moderate Revolutionary Nationalities Alliance was formed consisting of four members: the KNU, the KNPP, the KNLP and the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP), the political wing of the SSA. The KNU, now led by the legendary General Bo Mya, was instrumental in bringing several groups together in the base area the Karen rebels controlled on the Thai border. As a result of his efforts, the Revolutionary Nationalities Alliance was succeeded in 1975 by the Federal National Democratic Front, which a year later changed its name to the National Democratic Front (NDF). Over the years, the NDF became the only alliance that had regular meetings, usually at the KNU’s Manerplaw headquarters on the Thai border. It also managed to maintain at least a semblance of unity among the ethnic resistance armies. But it also experienced splits, as well as disputes within its various member organizations, mainly over the question of whether they should or should not cooperate with the CPB. The communists demanded that other groups should made declarations accepting the leadership of the CPB, a predominantly Burman-led organization. That in turn led to splits within ethnic groups such as the SSA/SSPP and even the KNU went through a sometimes bloody power struggle between leftists and rightists. The original members of the NDF were the KNU, the KNPP, the SSPP, the Arakan Liberation Party (ALP), the Lahu National United Party (LNUP), the United Pa-O Liberation Organization (UPNO), and the Palaung State Liberation Organization (PSLO). The UNPO resigned in 1977 and was replaced in 1980 by the Pa-O National Organization (PNO). The NMSP joined in 1982 and the KIO in 1983; the Wa National Organization (WNO) in 1983; the Lahu National Organization (LNO) in 1987 (replacing the LNUP, which had resigned from the front in 1984); the National United Front of Arakan replaced the ALP in 1988; and the Chin National Front (CNF) joined in 1989. The KNLP resigned in 1977 but rejoined in 1991. The PNO, the PSLP and the SSPP were expelled from the NDF in 1991 because they had entered into peace agreements with the government. In the early 1990s, the NMSP, the KNPP, the KNLP and the KIO also made peace with the government while the Wa on the Thai border merged with the much more numerous Wa forces of the former CPB, which had collapsed following a mutiny among the mainly hilltribe rank-and-file of its army in April 1989. In late 1989, the combined force became the United Wa State Party and Army (UWSP/UWSA). Following the collapse of the communist insurrection, a handful of ethnic groups that had been allied with the CPB formed the All Nationalities People’s Democratic Front: the SSNPLO, the KNLP and the Karenni State Nationalities People’s Liberation Force. A smaller Burman group called the Democratic Patriotic Army (DPA), which the CPB had set up after the 1988 pro-democracy uprising, also joined the front. But by 1994, the DPA was gone from the scene and the other groups entered into ceasefire agreements with the government. The ceasefire agreements of the early 1990s led to the demise of the NDF as well, and it was not until 2011 that an attempt was made to form a new alliance of ethnic resistance armies. It became known as the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC) and, initially, brought together 11 groups, the most powerful being the KIA, the KNU and the SSA/SSPP, and it even had a unified, armed wing called the Federal Union Army (FUA). But, before long, six of the groups made their own, separate peace agreements with the government. Like all peace agreements before those, they were based on the same principle: the ceasefire groups were allowed to retain their respective armies—and to engage in any kind of business. Fundamental political issues were never on the table, and it was, in effect, nothing more than a divide-and-rule policy from the side of the military. The FUA never became a properly organized armed force, and by 2017 the UNFC had ceased to exist. In 2016, representatives of the KIA, the Arakan Army (AA), the Kokang-based Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) set up the Northern Alliance, which actually proved to be quite successful on the battlefields of Kachin State and northern Shan State. The AA, whose home base was in Rakhine State in western Myanmar, was included because it had been trained by the KIA and fought alongside the MNDAA in the Kokang region. That front was enlarged in 2017 as seven groups formed an alliance called the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee (FPNCC): the KIA, the TNLA, the MNDAA, the AA—and the SSA/SSPP, the UWSA and the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA; based in Mong La in eastern Shan State, the NDAA was one of four local armies that emerged from the CPB after it collapsed in 1989). The FPNCC was set up at the UWSA’s Pangkham (Panghsang) headquarters, and it has appealed to China to help find a solution to Myanmar’s civil wars. Parallel to the FPNCC, the TNLA, the MNDAA and the AA—and, off-and-on, the KIA—fight under the banner of the Brotherhood Alliance, sometimes referred to as the Northern Brotherhood Alliance. But the peace agreements of the 1990s and the so-called “Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement”, which the Myanmar military initiated in 2015, have made it impossible for the ethnic armed organizations to establish any united front that could take part in meaningful peace talks. Massive foreign aid to dubious “peace projects” during the period 2011-2021 has also divided the groups, rather than help them unite behind common political demands. But long before the peace agreements of the early 1990s, which led to the demise of the NDF, and more recent events, splits had also occurred between the ethnic groups and what should have been their Burman allies. In 1969, a number of prominent Burman politicians formed what was called the Parliamentary Democracy Party (PDP), whose aim was to resist General Ne Win’s military dictatorship. Led by former and ousted prime minister U Nu, it included several of the legendary Thirty Comrades who had gone to Japan with Aung San during World War II and later went back to drive out the British. The PDP’s Patriotic Liberation Army (PLA) was led by one of them, Bo Let Ya. They set up bases on the Thai border where they in 1970 signed a pact with the KNU and the NMSP called the National United Front. The SSA was invited to join as well, but declined when U Nu made no firm commitment to federalism. The movement began to dwindle when U Nu left Bangkok for India in 1973, and those who remained became the People’s Patriotic Party (PPP), led by Bo Let Ya. But they soon fell out with the KNU, also over issues related to federalism, and Bo Let Ya was killed by the Karen in 1978. Nearly all remaining members of the PPP surrendered during a general amnesty in 1980. After the 1988 pro-democracy uprising, about a dozen Burman and ethnic groups set up the Democratic Alliance of Burma (DAB), but it became defunct when the KIA began to negotiate a separate peace deal with the government in 1993, which was finalized in 1994. Members of the National League for Democracy, who had been elected in 1990 but prevented from taking up their posts, also fled to the Thai border area, where they formed the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB) and an expanded front called the National Council of the Union of Burma (NCUB) with KNU leader Bo Mya as the official president. But the Burmans and the ethnic groups never agreed on any political issues and the DAB, the NGCUB and the NCUB soon faded into oblivion. Those who have had the patience to read this far must find the clutter of acronyms of major, middle-sized and small and insignificant groups, shifting alliances, splits and surrenders truly bewildering, and it all seems like an absolute mess only very few outsiders would even want to try to make sense of. But it reflects the complexities of Myanmar’s ethnic resistance and its complex relationships with Burman groups, whether leftist or rightist. Even so, it has not prevented foreign peacemakers from coming up with easy solutions based on suggestions of “dialogs” and talks about “reconciliation”. In this regard, the Swiss and the Norwegians have been especially destructive, dealing only with people they know and pouring vast amounts of money into what they call “the peace process”, which isn’t and never was a genuine effort to solve Myanmar’s decades-long civil wars. Nor do we need those more recent, extravagant accounts of the situation on the battlefield today, but sober assessment of the strength and policies of the various groups, realizing that there is no nationwide entity comprising Burman outfits as well as ethnic armed organizations. Three of the main ethnic armies, the UWSA, the NDAA and the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), have substantial investments in commercial enterprises in SAC-controlled areas and are not even involved in any fighting with the Myanmar army. Instead, the RCSS has fought fierce battles with the TNLA and the SSA/SSPP. And the PDFs are local forces that are not under any effective, common command. This is a war that neither side can win. The anti-SAC forces are not well-equipped enough to defeat the much more heavily armed Myanmar army, which, in turn, is stretched out on too many fronts to be able to crush the resistance. Besides, the Myanmar army has tried to do precisely that for more than 70 years, and not succeeded. What has been lacking is a genuine analysis of what has caused the never-ending civil wars, and how the ethnic issue that is at the heart of the problem should be addressed. But that can be done only by the peoples of Myanmar themselves and, if outsiders want to play a role, they should refrain from giving bad advice based on poor insights into the history of Myanmar’s civil wars, failed alliances and misguided peace efforts as well as insufficient understandings of the intricacies of the country’s ethnic politics. Westerners especially must rid themselves of their “White-Messiah Complex” and start listening to people who matter instead of patronizing them. Only then can we, to paraphrase what Winston Churchill said during World War II, see not the end and not even the beginning of the end—but, perhaps, the end of the beginning of a process that could lead to peace..."
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Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2023-06-29
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-29
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Sub-title: It is imperative that the NUG successfully integrate the defecting Karenni forces and accommodate their leadership.
Description: "The slowing of Myanmar military defections to the National Unity Government (NUG) since 2022 challenges the opposition theory of victory based on hollowing out the junta army as an effective fighting force, spread too thinly across too many fronts. The Myanmar military’s most important victory to date may not have been on the battlefield, but in the barracks, having staved off mass defections. Cracks have recently emerged, however, as the Karenni National People’s Liberation Front (KNPLF) announced that its two battalions had defected to the NUG. The border guard forces on the country’s eastern frontier with Thailand had been integrated into the Myanmar military for more than a decade. Though small with only a few hundred men, it is the first Border Guard Force (BGF) to defect en masse. And while it is one of dozens of BGFs, which are in no way a monolithic force, the reasons for their defection may be shared more widely across the multi-ethnic country of 55 million people. The Border Guard Forces Border Guard Forces emerged as the Myanmar military reached ceasefires with various ethnic resistance organizations that had been fighting the central government for decades. This accelerated during the National Ceasefire Agreement process, during which 10 ethnic armies signed a pact with the military in 2015. The military sought to divide the different ethnic armies and buy off individual commanders with promises of local autonomy, control over lucrative cross-border trade and more control over special economic zones. The most notorious example of these zones is the gambling hub of Shwe Kokko in eastern Kayin state. In 1994, a group broke away from the Karen National Union/Liberation Army (KNLA), establishing themselves as the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army. In 2009-2010, they became the Kayin State Border Guard Force, under the leadership of Colonel Saw Chit Thu, and formally integrated into Myanmar's military. Under the agreement, Saw Chit Thu was allowed to develop the area. Enter a Chinese national, with Cambodian citizenship, She Zhijiang, whose Yatai International Holdings pledged to invest $15 billion in Shwe Kokko, starting in 2017. Yatai New City is nothing but a hub of gambling, human and drug trafficking, and on-line scam centers. An ex-BGF colonel, Saw Min Min Oo, is one of directors of Myanmar Yatai, the local partner. Another key player is Chit Lin Myaing Co., ostensibly the corporate holding company of Saw Chit Thu’s Border Guard Force. In December 2020, the military raided Shwe Kokko, but when the government tried to oust Saw Chit Thu in January 2021 some 7,000 border guards threatened to resign in protest, forcing a government rethink. The government quickly reappointed him and Saw Chit Thu became an important military ally following their seizure of power on Feb. 1, 2021. Since then, Shwe Kokko has grown, with rents paid to the State Administrative Council (SAC), as the junta formally calls itself. Thailand arrested She Zhijiang in August 2022 at China’s request and will soon extradite him, but business continues. Under pressure from China, Thai authorities briefly turned off the power to Shwe Kokko and other SEZs in June 2023. Border Guard Forces have done much of the front-line duty against the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), the cost of doing business with the junta. In April 2023, there was intense fighting near Shwe Kokko, which caused a large refugee exodus into Thailand. Though the junta’s border guards suffered heavy casualties, they were supported by the Myanmar Air Force, which eventually pushed the KNLA back; the KNLA and allied People's Defence Force militias suffered their own heavy losses. Since the coup, casinos and scam centers, funded by Chinese transnational criminal enterprises, have proliferated along the border, under the protection of Naypyidaw-backed BGFs. They are an important financial lifeline for the economically beleaguered junta, whose sources of revenue have dwindled due to their economic mismanagement. The Karenni patchwork Like elsewhere in Myanmar’s border regions, the political tapestries are complex and there are a multiplicity of actors in Kayah state. The Karenni National Progressive Party immediately joined with the NUG following the February 2021 coup and has actively fought against junta forces. They have worked with the Karen Nationalities Defense Force that was established following the coup as an umbrella for local people’s defense forces in Kayah State and southern Shan State. The KNPLF was one of the 2015 National Ceasefire Agreement parties, formally integrated into the military as the Karenni Border Guards Force. Despite being on the junta’s side, the KNPLF has been attacked by the Myanmar military. On 24 December 2021, over 100 members of the 66th Light Infantry Division massacred and incinerated the bodies of some 40 civilians, including two aid workers from Save the Children, in Hpruso. When the KNPLF tried to intervene and secure the release of detained civilians, the military killed four of their members. In early 2023, the KNPLF refused to attend a ceasefire meeting in the capital Naypyitaw. Unlike other BGFs, the KNPLF control no special economic zone. As such their defection is not a financial loss for the junta. With fewer financial incentives than the border guards in Shwe Kokko and other areas, the KNPLF has been less willing to fight on behalf of the junta or be used as cannon fodder. Fighting in the Karenni region has subsided in relative terms, according to the think tanks IISS and ACLED. And there may be a reason for the decline in violence: The various Karenni forces have routed the military in recent engagements. In reply, the military has increased air attacks; some 108 in Kayah state in April, alone. There’s been at least at least two since the defection, with more expected. And yet, it is a loss and one more piece of the border that the junta no longer controls, between the Karen region and Shan State, adjacent to Thailand’s Mae Hong Son and close to Naypyitaw. While numerically small, the KNPLF immediately joined in military operations against the junta, which had tried to seize their headquarters in Mese township. Several military outposts near Mese fell over this past weekend, and there are reports that Light Infantry Battalion 430 surrendered, with up to 100 troops. If so, it would be the largest surrender to date. Finally, on June 12, a group of ethnic armies and opposition militias established the Karenni State Interim Executive Council, the first revolutionary state government established. The KNPLF’s defection helps to maintain political solidarity. Contagion unlikely Every Border Guard Force is their own organization, with their own political and economic motivations to maintain their alliance with the junta. The BGFs who control the special economic zones in Shwe Kokko, KK Park, and Kokang still have a financial incentive to stay loyal to the junta. Many fear the more puritanical ethnic armies, which are vehemently against the gambling and human trafficking that goes on within the economic zones and might not countenance being under the NUG umbrella. And given the fighting that has transpired between some BGFs and ethnic armies, the latter may not be too willing to embrace their formal rivals. Spread thin, the junta needs the border guards now more than ever, which gives them additional leverage over Naypyitaw. A contagion is unlikely, but the first BGF to defect represents a crack. As the junta fails to provide other BGFs with materiel or air support, while milking them for funds and using them as fodder, some groups may take note. To that end, it’s imperative that the NUG handle this well, integrating the defecting Karenni forces and accommodating their leadership. After all, the theory of victory is based on the man-by-man, unit-by-unit hollowing out the junta’s forces..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "RFA" (USA)
2023-06-27
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-27
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "၁။ ယနေ့သည် ကရင်နီအမျိုးသားတရပ်လုံး တန်ဖိုးထားဂုဏ်ယူရသည့် နေ့ထူးနေ့မြတ် တစ်ရက်ဖြစ်သည်။ ယနေ့ကျရောက်သော (၁၄၈) နှစ်မြောက် ကရင်နီအမျိုးသားနေ့ကို ကရင်နီ ပြည်သူတရပ်လုံးနှင့်အတူ ဝမ်းမြောက်ဂုဏ်ယူစွာ ကြိုဆိုပါကြောင်းနှင့် ယနေ့ကြုံကြိုက် နေရသော အခက်အခဲ အတားအဆီးများအားလုံးကို အောင်မြင်စွာ ဖြတ်ကျော်နိုင်ပါစေကြောင်း ဦးစွာဆုမွန်ကောင်း တောင်းအပ်ပါသည်။ ၂။ ခရစ်နှစ် ၁၈၇၅ ခုနှစ်၊ ဇွန်လ (၂၁) ရက်နေ့တွင် ကရင်နီပြည်၏ သီးခြားတည်ရှိမှုကို အသိအမှတ်ပြုကြောင်း ဗမာဘုရင်ကိုယ်စားလှယ် ကင်းဝန်မင်းကြီး ဦးကောင်းနှင့် ဗြိတိသျှ ဘုရင်ခံချုပ် ကိုယ်စားလှယ် ဆာဒေါ့ကလပ်ဖော့ဆက်တို့က လက်မှတ်ရေးထိုး အတည်ပြု ခဲ့ကြသည်။ ၃။ ထို့နေ့ကို ကရင်နီအမျိုးသားနေ့ဟု သတ်မှတ်ကာ နှစ်စဉ်အမျိုးသားနေ့ အခမ်းအနား များကို ကျင်းပခဲ့ပြီး ကိုယ်ပိုင်စာပေ၊ ယဉ်ကျေးမှုနှင့် ဓလေ့ထုံးတမ်းစဉ်လာများကိုထိန်းသိမ်း စောင့်ရှောက်လာခဲ့သည်မှာ ယနေ့တွင် (၁၄၈) နှစ်တိုင်တိုင် ပြည့်မြောက်ခဲ့ပြီး ဖြစ်သည်။ ၄။ ကရင်နီပြည်သူများသည် ကိုယ်ပိုင်အုပ်ချုပ်ခွင့်၊ ကိုယ်ပိုင်ပြဌာန်းခွင့်၊ တန်းတူရေးနှင့် တရားမျှတမှုရရှိရေးအတွက် အာဏာရှင်အဆက်ဆက်ကို အစဉ်တစိုက်တွန်းလှန်ခဲ့ကြသည်နှင့် အားလျော်စွာ သမိုင်းအစဉ်အလာအားဖြင့် ကြီးမားလှသည်။ ၅။ ယနေ့ ဆင်နွှဲလျက်ရှိသော ပြည်သူ့နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးတွင် ကရင်နီအမျိုးသား ခေါင်းဆောင်ကြီးများ၊ မဟာမိတ် ကရင်နီအမျိုးသား တော်လှန်ရေးအဖွဲ့အစည်းများနှင့် ကရင်နီ ပြည်သူများ၏ ကြီးမားလှသော ကြိုးပမ်းအားထုတ်မှု၊ အရင်းအနှီးများနှင့် အသက်၊ အိုးအိမ်၊ စည်းစိမ် ပေးဆပ်စွန့်လွှတ်မှုများကို အစဉ် အောက်မေ့ဦးညွှတ် ဂုဏ်ပြုရမည်ဖြစ်သည်။ ၆။ ကရင်နီအမျိုးသားတော်လှန်ရေး ခေါင်းဆောင်များ၊ တော်လှန်ရေးအဖွဲ့အစည်းများ၏ ဦးဆောင်မှုနှင့်အတူ ကရင်နီပြည်၏ စစ်ရေး၊နိုင်ငံရေး ဖြစ်ပေါ်တိုးတက်မှုများကို အသိအမှတ်ပြု ဂုဏ်ယူဝမ်းမြောက်ကြောင်းကိုလည်း ဖော်ပြအပ်ပါသည်။ ၇။ နိုင်ငံရေး၊ စစ်ရေး၊ စိတ်ဓာတ်ရေးရာ စစ်မျက်နှာစာ အဘက်ဘက်တွင် မြန်ဆန်စွာ အင်အားပြုန်းတီး ချိနဲ့လာလျက်ရှိသော အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်အား အမြစ်ပြတ်ချေမှုန်းနိုင်ရန် ယခင်ထက်ပိုမို စုစည်းညီညွတ်စွာြဖင့် ကြိုးစားအားထုတ် ရုန်းကန်တိုက်ပွဲဝင်သွားကြရန်နှင့် ကိုယ်ပိုင်ပြဌာန်းခွင့်၊ ကိုယ်ပိုင်အုပ်ချုပ်ခွင့်၊ တန်းတူရေးနှင့် တရားမျှတမှုတို့ ပြည့်ဝထုံမွှမ်းသော ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စုသစ်ကို အားလုံးအတူတကွ လက်တွဲထူထောင်ကြပါစို့ဟု တိုက်တွန်းလျက် ယနေ့ ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ်၊ ဇွန်လ (၂၃) ရက်နေ့တွင် ကျရောက်သော (၁၄၈) နှစ်မြောက် ကရင်နီအမျိုးသားနေ့သို့ ဤသဝဏ်လွှာအား ဂုဏ်ယူစွာဖြင့် ပေးပို့အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
2023-06-21
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-21
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: How America and China Are Reshaping the Burmese Civil War
Description: "ver since the Burmese military seized power in a coup in early 2021, the country has been caught in a deadly tailspin. What began as peaceful mass protest against the junta flared into armed resistance, with much of the country descending into renewed civil war. The conflict has since turned into a protracted insurgency, with newer pro-democracy forces fighting alongside ethnic armed groups that have battled central authorities for decades. Amid growing signs of a strategic stalemate, both the junta and the resistance appear determined to fight on. Neighboring states have tried to mediate, but a negotiated peace is not in sight. For much of the last two years, the Burmese crisis received minimal attention from the United States and China, despite unfolding at a time of intensifying great-power tensions. Washington and its partners have voiced support for Myanmar’s pro-democracy faction, yet geopolitical considerations have limited their willingness to take forceful action against the junta. Although Beijing favors the military dictatorship in some respects, it initially opted to wait and see, too. But this great-power restraint is now breaking down. Misperceiving several developments as indications that the antiregime forces are American proxies, Beijing is moving with increasing determination to shore up the junta. The result is what one might call Cold War–ization: the civil war is attracting outside meddling by great-power rivals, each fearing that inaction would benefit the other side. Stay informed. In-depth analysis delivered weekly. This puts other countries in the region, particularly those in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, in a bind. One of ASEAN’s core tenets has been that it should not be forced to choose between the United States and China. Instead, the group values maintaining good relations with both great powers. But as Myanmar’s civil war takes on aspects of a Cold War proxy conflict—a situation brought on in part by the unwillingness of governments in the region to unite against the junta early on—the country’s neighbors may soon face that exact choice: not just between a junta and a pro-democracy resistance but between China and the United States. For Washington and its allies, meanwhile, the entrenchment of a military junta beholden to China would portend diminished influence and greater instability throughout Southeast Asia. A RENEWED CIVIL WAR The February 2021 coup set Myanmar on a path to conflict and devastation. The putschists enjoyed scarce support among the population, which rallied behind deposed leader Aung San Suu Kyi. Hundreds of thousands took to the streets in peaceful protest. Members of the ousted government banded together with several other political and ethnic groups to proclaim a civilian National Unity Government to restore democracy. The military’s answer was to unleash relentless and often indiscriminate violence on its opponents. By the spring of 2021, Myanmar was careening toward a renewed civil war, with opponents of the military dictatorship taking up arms and vowing to fight back rather than retreat. The resistance found allies among the country’s almost two dozen ethnic armed groups—organizations located along Myanmar’s periphery, some with close economic and political ties to neighboring China, that have fought for increased autonomy or outright independence ever since Myanmar’s founding in 1948. Although facing a ruthless and better-equipped adversary, the pro-democracy and ethnic armed groups quickly gained a foothold in many rural areas, especially along the country’s borders with India, China, and Thailand. As early as mid-2021, the junta’s leader, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, conceded that his forces did not control the entire country. They have since held their ground in the countryside but have struggled to take cities and towns, in part because they are outgunned by the regime’s heavy artillery and at the mercy of its air force. As of late spring 2023, the two parties appear to have reached a strategic stalemate. DOUBLE GAMES The United States’ approach to post-coup Myanmar has consisted of a cautious and pragmatic balancing act between values and interests. Washington opposes the junta, yet it is also wary of alienating its allies and partners in the region, some of whom have maintained engagement with the Burmese military since the coup. High-level U.S. officials have met with Burmese opposition resistance leaders, and the U.S. government has issued targeted sanctions against high-ranking military officials. But the sanctions have left untouched the junta’s most prized asset: Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise, a military-owned firm that generates some $1.5 billion in annual revenues and offers the regime much-needed access to foreign currency. Washington has also refrained from imposing secondary sanctions on those who do business with the junta, such as Thai energy companies and Singaporean financial firms. This restraint on the part of the United States is likely meant to placate other countries in the region, particularly Thailand, whose government—itself brought to power in a coup in 2014—remains supportive of the Burmese junta and maintains close economic ties to the regime. Important U.S. allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific, such as Australia, India, and Japan, have voiced their “concern” about the Burmese crisis but fear that excessive pressure would open the regime to greater Chinese influence. As a result, they have maintained or, in the case of India, expanded their economic and diplomatic ties to the junta and are unlikely to provide support to the Burmese resistance. Not unlike the United States, China has viewed the chaos in Myanmar with ambivalence. Beijing enjoyed good relations with Aung San Suu Kyi’s government before its overthrow. From the Chinese perspective, the outbreak of a civil war next door—China and Myanmar share a 1,300-mile border—was bad news for regional stability and for China’s multibillion-dollar investments in Myanmar under the Belt and Road Initiative. China was and remains one of the Burmese military’s leading arms suppliers, but it has never quite trusted the military’s leadership, which it views as too unpredictable. Beijing also supports some of Myanmar’s ethnic armed groups, including by acquiescing to an underground cross-border arms trade. For this and other reasons, leaders in Beijing opted to hedge their bets in the aftermath of the coup. Although they never denounced the junta or explicitly called for a return to civilian rule, they opened a backchannel to the National Unity Government and pressured the regime not to dissolve Aung San Suu Kyi’s party, the National League for Democracy. When fighting between the junta and an ethnic armed group led to the accidental shelling of a Chinese border town, Beijing reportedly warned the junta that another such incident would draw “the necessary response.” Chinese leaders also kept the ruling generals at arm’s length. When Wang Yi, then the Chinese foreign minister, visited Myanmar in the summer of 2022, he declined to meet with Min Aung Hlaing, the junta’s leader, a move that was seen at the time as a major diplomatic snub. CHINA GOES ON THE OFFENSIVE The complex array of American and Chinese interests at play in Myanmar allowed the country to mostly avoid the gravity well of U.S.-Chinese competition, at least for a while. The warring parties on the ground may view their fight as part of a global struggle between democracy and autocracy, a fact most evident in the resistance’s vocal support for Ukraine and the junta’s Russian sympathies. But the same has not been true of Washington and Beijing, for whom the civil war has been an exercise in balancing and hedging, not in proxy warfare. In September 2021, the United States and China even collaborated to block the junta from taking over Myanmar’s seat at the United Nations. Things have taken a turn for the worse over the past year, however, as Beijing has abandoned its initial caution and embraced the junta. Driving this shift is China’s perception that the United States has itself changed course and that Washington now fully supports—and is solidifying its influence over—the pro-democracy resistance. Two developments in particular have triggered Beijing: new U.S. legislation on Myanmar and last year’s decision by the National Unity Government to open an office in Washington. In truth, neither step signals a meaningful shift in U.S. policy. The law in question, the 2023 BURMA Act, reiterates Washington’s goal of reversing the coup and calls for the provision of nonlethal military aid (mostly communications equipment) to antiregime forces. Yet the law mandates neither lethal military support nor sanctions on the junta’s oil and gas business, and even the disbursement of nonlethal aid has lagged. U.S. efforts on behalf of Myanmar’s rebels are negligible—practically nonexistent—in comparison with the support the United States is providing to Ukraine, for instance, in its war against Russia. As for the National Unity Government’s new office in the U.S. capital, its goal is to coordinate and amplify the resistance’s advocacy, but whether it succeeds in this task is another question. These caveats notwithstanding, Beijing’s reaction has been to throw its weight more forcefully behind the junta, ending two years of relative disengagement. In May, Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang met with Min Aung Hlaing, declaring that China would help Myanmar “achieve reconciliation under the constitutional and legal framework”—diplomatic code for supporting the military regime. Earlier this year, the junta banned Aung San Suu Kyi’s party, which it would likely not have done without feeling that it had Beijing’s assent. According to insiders, Chinese interlocutors have also urged the pro-democracy resistance not to grow too close with the West. Beijing’s new special envoy to Myanmar, Deng Xijun, has gone on the offensive, too. In recent months, Deng has held a flurry of meetings with junta leaders and representatives of several ethnic armed groups and is reportedly pushing for cease-fires between these parties. That outcome would benefit the regime and hobble the resistance: a truce with Chinese-aligned ethnic armed groups would drive a wedge between them and their pro-democracy allies, whose fighters rely on the ethnic armed groups for training, manpower, and equipment (a large portion of which is of Chinese origin or is built using Chinese-made parts. The regime, on the other hand, would be fighting on fewer fronts at once and could redeploy its soldiers to the most important hot spots. The result would be an emboldened junta, confident of its chances for survival and willing to fight on. GET OFF THE FENCE China’s newfound interest and engagement in Myanmar brings to mind Cold War–era conflicts in Southeast Asia, such as wars in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. Then as now, rival domestic factions curried favor with and sought support from rivaling superpowers—which were often receptive to these efforts, driven by a fear that the other side would otherwise gain a leg up. Myanmar today is no exception. Competition between China and its rivals—above all, the United States and India—is reshaping domestic politics in many countries in the Indo-Pacific as local actors feel compelled to pick sides. The Maldives and Sri Lanka have for years been caught in a geopolitical push and pull between India and China. The question of Chinese influence, and of embracing or rejecting China’s growing regional ambitions, has become a political lightning rod elsewhere in South Asia, parts of Southeast Asia, and Oceania. But the stakes are particularly high in an armed conflict such as Myanmar’s, where China’s growing involvement risks prolonged suffering and additional great-power tensions. Given the state of U.S.-Chinese relations and the ideological dimension of Myanmar’s civil war, it was perhaps inevitable that the warring parties would become entangled in broader geopolitical rivalries. But substantial culpability lies with regional actors who have long since abdicated responsibility and thereby ceded the playing field to Beijing. ASEAN has performed especially poorly. Owing to the bloc’s focus on consensus building and noninterference, it has proven incapable of exerting any serious pressure on the junta. Its flagship diplomatic initiative in the conflict, an unworkable 2021 agreement known as the Five-Point Consensus, quickly lost steam because it lacked enforcement mechanisms. Meek attempts at backdoor diplomacy by the Indonesian government, which currently chairs ASEAN, have failed to make progress, too. Meanwhile, several autocratic ASEAN member states appear eager to rehabilitate the junta within the organization, including Thailand and Laos, which is set to assume the role of chair for 2024. Instead of endless dithering and talk of engaging “all stakeholders,” ASEAN members and other countries in the region should face the facts. First, the Burmese military is the structural and proximate cause for the violence that has repeatedly engulfed Myanmar for three-quarters of a century. Second, the military is incapable of achieving battlefield victory, as evidenced by its failure to consolidate control over rural areas, defeat the ethnic armed groups, and suppress popular resistance despite its overwhelmingly superior firepower. Its removal from power is the only realistic option for achieving long-term peace in the country. The diplomatic efforts of ASEAN and other states should reflect that reality. ASEAN could learn from the African Union, which in 2019 suspended Sudan for its military’s failure to hand over power to civilians. Washington should try to coordinate its Myanmar policy with Beijing. Finally, ASEAN will risk obsolescence if it sticks to seeking cooperation and striving to accommodate both great powers. This approach is already proving ineffective in the South China Sea in the face of aggressive Chinese territorial expansion. In Myanmar, ASEAN needs to make some hard choices and get off the fence. China’s diplomatic efforts to shore up the junta, if successful, will only drag out the conflict and consolidate a regime beholden to China’s revisionist geopolitical goals. That outcome, in turn, would likely portend greater pressure on other states in the region to align with either Washington or Beijing—an outcome that no one within ASEAN wants. The United States, for its part, should understand that it can no longer dismiss Myanmar as strategically unimportant. Given the country’s location at the meeting point of South Asia and Southeast Asia, a stable Myanmar is essential for stability in the region at large. As a first step, the United States should turn more attention to Myanmar, as it pledged to do in the BURMA Act, and persuade its allies and partners to align their policies. Yet the U.S. government should not view the civil war as a zero-sum competition with China, whose geographic proximity to and major interests in Myanmar make it a necessary part of any settlement. On the contrary, Washington should try to coordinate its Myanmar policy with Beijing, if only to build the necessary guardrails to preclude escalation. U.S. officials should make their case by appealing to the pragmatism of Chinese leaders: The United States and China’s shared interest in regional stability means the junta must go. And since the junta will consider a peaceful negotiated settlement only if it sees no path to military victory, U.S. assistance to the resistance forces under the BURMA Act is not a threat to China but is instead in line with Beijing’s own goals. Moreover, Beijing should be well aware that the junta’s complete lack of popular support makes it a risky long-term partner. For Southeast Asian states, keeping Cold War dynamics from fracturing the region should be a paramount concern, one that takes precedence over increasingly unworkable norms around noninterference and consensus. Recent moves by Thailand to rehabilitate the junta are the exact wrong approach, giving the regime a false sense that it can hold on to power. Instead, ASEAN’s interest in regional stability points to one solution only: removing Myanmar’s main destabilizing agent, the junta, from power..."
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Source/publisher: Foreign Affairs
2023-06-19
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-19
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "January 4 was the 75th anniversary of Myanmar’s independence. Although the military regime went out of its way to hold lavish celebrations, the response among much of the population — at home and abroad — was significantly more muted. That is not surprising, given widespread popular resistance to the 1 February 2021 military coup and criticism of the regime’s brutal actions since then. The persistence and strength of this revolutionary sentiment compels a closer look at the ways in which Burma’s independence in 1948 was both partial and exclusionary. Today, there is a deep sense among many people that the current revolution needs to be not only political but also social and cultural, challenging the categories and political norms that have harmed marginalised groups and constrained democratic possibilities. Are there ways to use this anniversary to learn from the past without feeling obligated by it, to support the efforts that open up wider possibilities for Myanmar’s future and reject those that would reinforce the political exclusions of its past? We offer four areas where this revolutionary-minded lens compels more thorough re-thinking of key aspects of Myanmar’s political dynamics. First is a reconsideration of the fundamental presumption of ‘Independence’ — the nation-state model; the second is a critical assessment of what Independence in 1948 actually constituted and what perspectives were left out; third is a return to the Left-leaning economic critiques of Independence and the effects of their comparative absence today; and finally, fourth, we look at တိုင်းရင်းသား (taingyintha), one of the key categories of belonging in contemporary Myanmar, to show how its persistence suppresses alternate notions of community and perpetuates élite-driven identity politics. Questioning the Nation-State Norm Immediately following the 1 February coup, the initial public discourse was about a ‘return to democratic government’. But as the revolution gained momentum and needed more broad-based support, its political aspirations had to expand to include more groups. At the same time, its scope also expanded, incorporating not just a more robust sense of federalism but addressing broader systemic inequalities as well as more radical proposals (like the complete abolition of the armed forces). But ground realities present a more sobering and complicated picture: both the United Wa State Army (UWSA) and Arakan Army (AA) are asserting their territorial control and pushing for a level of political autonomy that resembles an independent state. Some major ethnic armed organisations such as the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and Karen National Union (KNU) are providing space and support for multi-ethnic youth fighting against the military, while smaller ethnic organisations — as well as some leaders within these larger groups — have remained close to the regime, preferring to maintain the status quo through the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement. These dynamics point to a scenario of ‘fragmented sovereignty’ with local ethnic military leaders deciding the fate of a significant percentage of the population who call Myanmar home. Meanwhile, the international community appears unwilling to robustly support the revolutionaries, with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) predictably constrained by its Five-point Consensus. Reflecting on Myanmar’s independence under these circumstances requires a willingness to think outside of the Westphalian nation-state box, and the presumption that international borders are sacrosanct. Even today, as tens of millions of Myanmar people resist the military coup, there are reasonable and persistent differences in their visions of what they are fighting for. Even those who have recently opened up to robust conversations on federalism might balk at fully independent Wa or Arakan States, as fear-mongering framings of ‘Balkanisation’ have been a part of Burmese political discourse since before military rule. It is also the case that a post-Westphalian or post-Myanmar discussion might feel like it dismisses the sacrifices made by so many for Independence, and the investments that many people have in their Myanmar identity. But the persistent distrust between leaders of various groups, and between leaders and the populations they claim to represent, shows that the situation demands a new imagination of what independent Myanmar could look like. Independence for Whom? Instead of imagining Burma’s declaration of independence in 1948 as a simplistic rejection of British colonial rule and the restoration of indigenous rule, we can look back even further, to critically assess the centralising, assimilationist project of previous Burman kings: Bodawpaya violently annexed Arakan in 1784, strengthening a dismissive discourse about Rakhine cultural and religious practice and provoking a lasting hostility of Rakhine people toward Burman rule; looking even earlier, Alaungpaya’s conquest of the Irrawaddy Delta in the 1750s set off an ethnic Burman migration to the area that effectively made Mons and other groups a minority by the 19th century. Burma’s independence addressed none of these historical dynamics of assimilation, appropriation and exclusion. From the perspective of some occupied populations, it merely presented an opportunity for a majority group to take control of a territory that had already been forcefully brought together by successive colonising powers (first, the Konbaung kings, then the British), perpetuating the fiction of it being a coherent political entity. In fact, 1948 is only considered a meaningful or complete moment of independence from a particular set of standpoints. Non-Burman responses ranged from hesitant and conditional acceptance (as laid out in some of the clauses of the Panglong Agreement of 1947) to justified fear that they were simply trading a relatively benevolent colonial master for a more hostile Burman one. There is an important parallel here with the present moment. While labels like the ‘Spring Revolution’ can be a useful shorthand for what has been happening in Myanmar for the last two years, presenting a unified sense of the resistance movements foregrounds an overly-simplistic narrative. Instead of presuming that solidarity automatically emerges through a shared enemy, more effective descriptions of the current struggle see solidarity as something that is achieved gradually and provisionally, through the hard work of groups on the ground, seeking to build alliances across differences of identity, but also of interest. This likely requires a much stronger economic critique. The Need for Economic Revolution At the time of Independence, Left-leaning critics argued that full political liberation from colonial rule was impossible unless it was accompanied by a socialist economic revolution that could resist the neo-colonial domination of a global capitalist system, where influential actors often sought to actively undermine aspiring socialist states. Today, not only are the dynamics of economic dependence amplified in ways that constrain new actors, new states would be heavily dependent on resource extraction and probably driven by the existing economic interests of entrenched élites. In this context, it is likely that newly-created political entities would end up being heavily militarised and autocratic, not necessarily a better solution than the present. The road to independence in the 1940s featured disjunctures between groups that seemingly pitted ethnic interests against class interests. For example, although the saophas (traditional hereditary leaders in the Shan States) represented Shans at Panglong, their positions and influence were being increasingly challenged by other groups, including the youth of the Shan State Freedom League (SSFL). Although a Leftist ally of the Burman-led Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL) that was pushing for independence, the SSFL was denied a role at Panglong. Rather than see this as a clash between ethnic and economic interests, we might instead take a critical view that sees both class and ethnic identities as potentially meaningful for people, but also exploitable by élites with their own interests, a lesson that remains crucially important for alliance-building in today’s movement. Frustratingly, virtually none of the current revolutionary leadership — among Ethnic Revolutionary Organisations (EROs) or the National Unity Government (NUG) — are explicitly talking about the need for an economic revolution to complement a political one. Instead, they are primarily focused either on ethnic rights and federalism or on opposition to the military government. But across the country, at the grassroots, people are much more conscious of the ways in which their oppression emerges from political factors and predatory neo-liberal capitalism. This is consistent with the critique put forward by social movements that were becoming more prominent before the coup, focused on land rights, workers and farmers rights, and opposition to mega-projects and destructive Special Economic Zones (SEZs). Continued economic collapse after the coup has simply reinforced this sentiment, but it is not emphasised sufficiently in public discourse around the revolution partly because it poses a threat to many established actors and their economic interests and partly because élites continue to dominate that discourse. Challenging Élite Discourses Without the coup, it’s possible that Myanmar’s political discourse might have continued in a generally reformist manner, under successive National League for Democracy (NLD) governments. When Daw Aung San Suu Kyi labelled the post-1988 movement ‘Burma’s second struggle for independence’, it had only the modest goal of ending military rule. But the 2021 coup has made a revolutionary approach not just more thinkable and more imperative; it feels almost inevitable. Ten years of a quasi-democratic experiment gave people a sense of the benefits of freedom but the coup radicalised many, turning them away from gradualist, reform-minded alternatives to try to break free from the constraints of established categories and norms in politics and society. Abolition of these categories is a complicated task. To take one example, တိုင်းရင်းသား (taingyintha; lit., ‘natives of the country’) is a term that denotes a kind of belonging and connection to the territory, but it has been used by successive military governments to distinguish officially recognised ethnic groups from those designated as ‘foreign’. In this way, it has provided some protection for those fortunate enough to be included, even as it has excluded others and helped justify widespread complicity in the face of the Rohingya genocide. But the spectre haunting taingyintha is the history of Burmanisation: it offers belonging only on the terms of a dominant Burman and Buddhist national identity and can likely never offer a genuinely inclusive ground for solidarity. Fortunately, potential alternatives have arisen from the struggle itself. In the early days of the revolution, with the spontaneity of an almost leaderless, bottom-up revolt against the coup, it was mostly Gen-Z youth across the country who expressed their unequivocal rejection of the dictatorship. In doing so, they also called for addressing other social hierarchies, starting with gendered hierarchies in the ထဘီ (htamein; sarong-like wraparound garment worn by women) movement and for mass apologies for atrocities done to the Rohingya people. The movement went on to call, for the first time, for solidarity with ethnic Chinese, Muslims, and people of all classes and identities in society. The masses acknowledged this fight and named it ‘လူမျိုးဘာသာမခွဲခြား မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသား’ (lumyo-batha-ma-khwe-cha-myanmar-naigantha; lit., ‘Myanmar citizens without any differentiation based on race or religion’). But as the revolution grows more protracted, the real politics of the struggle on the ground have an impact on the political subjectivities of all the resistance forces. Progressive and transgressive discourses like these get pushed down by a romanticising of the taingyintha ideal, which does not change the terms of belonging but simply rebrands EAOs as Ethnic Revolutionary Organisations (EROs). It is imperative that the ongoing struggles and sacrifices of these communities be recognised, but it is equally imperative to do so without reinforcing the constraining, dominant ideas that have supported previous Burman-led military regimes. * At the 75th anniversary of independence, the way the dominant discourses were re-asserted by élites is telling: the regime is using the old playbook with its narrative to save the country and save Buddhism. The corresponding discourse from some revolutionary actors is also to harden ethnic difference, portraying the NUG-led resistance as simply a Burman vs Burman civil conflict and entrenching claims based on more rigid ethnic identities. In fact, these two discourses are two sides of the same coin, as they are essentialising identity categories following the state-driven logic of taingyintha. Myanmar’s moment of partial independence in 1948 displayed a similar parallel in its dominant discourses and the ones that sought to portray political belonging in ways that captured a more complex range of salient identities and dynamics. Grassroots and youth groups in the current revolution offer an opportunity to reclaim the spirit of independence not only as liberation from oppressive rule but also from norms that have constrained the ability of people in Myanmar to imagine a more just and inclusive political community. * The views expressed here are those of the author and not of the ‘South Asia at LSE’ blog, the LSE South Asia Centre or the London School of Economics and Political Science. Please click here for our Comments Policy. This blogpost may not be reposted by anyone without prior written consent of LSE South Asia Centre; please e-mail [email protected] for permission. Banner image © Saw Wunna, Yangon, 13 May 2021, Unsplash. The ‘Myanmar @ 75’ logo is copyrighted by the LSE South Asia Centre, and may not be used by anyone for any purpose. It shows the national flower of Myanmar, Padauk (Pterocarpus macrocarpus), framed in a design adapted from Burmese ikat textile weaves. The logo has been designed by Oroon Das..."
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Source/publisher: London School of Economics and Political Science
2023-06-19
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-19
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Description: "The military press release on the 2nd anniversary of the establishment of the Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF) said that the administrative mechanism of the military council in Karenni State (Kayah) is now only in Loikaw. Founded on 31 May, 2021, the KNDF has formed 22 battalions and six military strategies. Our BNI-Myanmar Peace Monitor’s weekly news review for this week highlights the 2nd anniversary of the establishment of the KNDF and military and political shifts in Karenni (Kayah) State.....၂ နှစ်ပြည့် KNDF ၏ ကရင်နီဒေသဆိုင်ရာ သတင်းစကား ကရင်နီပြည် (ကယား) အတွင်း အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်ကောင်စီ၏ အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးယန္တရားသည် လွိုင်ကော်မြို့ တစ်မြို့တည်းတွင်သာ ရှိတော့သည်ဟု ကရင်နီအမျိုးသားများကာကွယ်ရေးတပ် (KNDF) ဖွဲ့စည်းထူထောင်ခြင်း ၂ နှစ်ပြည့် စစ်ရေးသတင်းထုတ်ပြန်ချက်က ဆိုပါသည်။ ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ် မေလ ၃၁ ရက်တွင် ဖွဲ့စည်းခဲ့သည့် KNDF သည် ယခုအခါ စစ်ဗျူဟာ (၆) ဗျူဟာဖြင့် တပ်ရင်းပေါင်း ၂၂ ရင်းကို အခိုင်အမာ ဖွဲ့စည်းထားနိုင်ပြီဟုလည်း ဆိုပါသည်။ ယခုတစ်ပတ် BNI-Myanmar Peace Monitor ၏ အပတ်စဉ်သတင်းသုံးသပ်ချက်တွင် KNDF တည်ထောင်ခြင်း ၂ နှစ်ပြည့်နှင့်အတူ ကရင်နီပြည် (ကယား) ဒေသတွင်း စစ်ရေး၊ နိုင်ငံရေးအရွေ့များကို လေ့လာတင်ပြထားပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher: Myanmar Peace Monitor
2023-06-09
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-09
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Description: "1. NUG Acting President transfers authority to establish & manage Interim Central Bank to the MOPFI.....2. NUG wishes Sagaing Forum to con-solidate and coordinate revolutionary forces.....3. Ministry of Defence announces Yangon Regional Military Battalion 5101 established.....4. Defence Ministry calls for application of health professionals to serve as military medical staff.....5. Over 400 battles occurred in No. 1 Military Region in April.....6. Cyclone Mocha has exacerbated the suffering of 2 million IDPs and triggered floods & landslides that affected an estimated 1.6 civilians.....7. Education Ministry urges all to keep boycotting the SAC’s education institutes.....8. Basic Education Completion Certificate be released in February, 2024.....9. Home Affairs and Immigration Minister U Lwin Ko Latt meets with PDF members at the Bago military front.....10. NUG’s acting president Duwa Lashi La visits and supports people affected by Cyclone Mocha.....11. People’s Defence Forces battalions in Sagaing armed by the Ministry of Defense.....12. PDF, Special Operation Force and the allies raided Kyar Inn Seik Gyi police Station and offices.....13. Minister Daw Zin Mar Aung, Ministry of Foreign Affair met with the special envoy of the Secretary-General.....14. NUG announces nearly 240 million kyat allocated for people affected by Cyclone Mocha..."
Source/publisher: National Unity Government of Myanmar
2023-06-05
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-06
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Description: "National Unity Government Weekly Press Update (17/2023)..."
Source/publisher: National Unity Government of Myanmar
2023-06-05
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-06
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Description: "Key Event Details Location of Incident: Nam Neint village (နန်းနိမ့်), Pinlaung Township (ပင်လောင်း), Shan State (ရှမ်း) [19.900822, 96.836592]. Date/Time of Incident: 11 March 2023 Alleged Perpetrator(s) and Involvement: Myanmar Military Pa-O National Army (military-allied forces) Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF) People’s Defence Forces (PDF) Summary of Investigation: Pinlaung township has experienced a number of reported clashes taking place between the military, military-allied forces, and local defence forces in the area. Eleven days before the incident at Nam Neint village, reports of an airstrike four kilometres away in Tawng Me Thin (တောင်မဲသင်း) village were verified by Myanmar Witness. Myanmar Witness geolocated user-generated content (UGC) showing Nam Neint village on fire and identified FIRMS data that suggests this fire took place on 11 March 2023. This fire was seen burning between 0715 local time and 1045 local time. Images of deceased individuals were geolocated by Myanmar Witness to Nam Neint village. The images indicate that the individuals had died very recently, and fires were captured still burning. Although the capture date of the various pieces of UGC in this investigation cannot be verified, Myanmar Witness determined that the incident almost certainly took place on 11 March 2023, likely between 0715 and 0847 local time. While the perpetrators cannot be conclusively identified, there is information to suggest that the Myanmar military were present in the area at the time. Warning: This report contains graphic imagery. Summary On 27 February 2023 in Pinlaung Township, Southern Shan State, The Karenni National Defense Force (KNDF) and the People's Defense Forces (PDF) attacked a Pa-O National Organization (PNO) checkpoint near the village of Tawng Me Thin village. At least 10 Myanmar military and PNO personnel were reportedly killed in this incident. The PNO is a military-aligned organisation, with an armed wing: the Pa-O National Army (PNA). They have known ties to the Union and Solidary Development Party (USDP). Due to the fighting in the region, many villagers from Tawng Me Thin and the surrounding villages were reportedly forced to flee to other villages in Pinlaung (ပင်လောင်း) and Naungtayar sub-Township (နောင်တရားမြို့နယ်ခွဲ). On 28 February 2023, reports on social media claimed that Tawng Me Thin village was hit by an airstrike. Myanmar Witness identified footage showing a Myanmar Air Force (MAF) K-8 aircraft flying over Tawng Me Thin village. In the footage, the village appears to have been attacked with the aircraft; however, Myanmar Witness could not verify the date this incident took place. On 11 March 2023, the Myanmar military allegedly raided Nam Neint village, burning homes and killing more than 20 residents - including at least three monks. Civilians allegedly hid inside the monastery compound while the military burned down homes. Myanmar Witness has verified several images showing at least 22 separate deceased individuals in the monastery compound, as well as evidence of burnt homes. The images of bodies are time stamped to 11 March 2023, but could not be independently chronolocated. However, NASA’s Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) confirms the presence of fire in Nam Neint village on 11 March 2023. Using Suncalc, Myanmar Witness analysed some of the identified UGC and broadly chronolocated its origin to be between 0715 and 0847 local time. Location Pinlaung township in southern Shan State is located within the Pa-O Self-Administered Zone, which is jointly controlled by PNO and the Myanmar military (Figure 1). The township is at the junction of Naypyidaw (နေပြည်တော်), Taunggyi (တောင်ကြီး), and Loikaw (လွိုင်ကော်). Between 24 February to 1 March 2023, clashes were reported between Myanmar military forces, their allies the PNA, and joint KNDF and PDF forces. A skirmish on 27 February 2023 reportedly left nine individuals from the Myanmar military and PNA joint forces dead. According to a citizen from Pinlaung township, this occurred when joint defence forces (KNDF and PDF) attacked a Myanmar military and PNA joint checkpoint on the road between Long Pyin (လုံးပျဉ်) and Tawng Me Thin village. An airstrike in Tawng me Thin village on 28 February (analysed within this report) led to the displacement of up to 6000 people from neighbouring villages. This was followed by ground attacks in Nam Neint village which left up to 22 people dead. The Tawng me Thin village Airstrike - 28 February On 28 February 2023, Tawng Me Thin village was allegedly attacked with an airstrike. Myanmar Witness was able to geolocate footage showing a MAF aircraft carrying out an airstrike in Tawng Me Thin village (Figure 3). In the footage, at the 0.06 second mark, a fighter jet identified by Myanmar Witness as a K-8, passes over the village and drops ordinance at around 19.888637, 96.872788. This immediately causes a flash and smoke to rise from the affected area (Figure 4)..."
Source/publisher: Myanmar Witness
2023-06-05
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-05
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Description: "1. Prime Minister urges enhanced efforts to maintain effective communication in areas under NUG’s control.....2. Military junta obstructs humanitarian aid delivery.....3. NUG Ministry of Defence reports 700 injuries and 600 fatalities among military troops in March.....4. Maung Swan Htet, a medical student, recognized as a hero of the Spring Revolution.....5. NUG condemns violence against health services by the military council.....6. Assistance provided to households affected by Cyclone “Mokha”..."
Source/publisher: National Unity Government of Myanmar
2023-05-29
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-03
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Format : pdf
Size: 2.2 MB
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Description: "Sagaing has been the strongest resistance stronghold during the Spring Revolution in Myanmar. The region hosts the largest number of People’s Defense Forces-Local Defense Forces (PDFs LDFs) leading an armed revolution against the Myanmar’s military regime. The civil war has also produced the largest number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Sagaing. At the same time, the region has seen the worst destruction at the hands of Myanmar army troops, coupled with all forms of brutality. On the one hand, there have always been disputes between PDFs-LDFs, all of whom have the common goal of eliminating the military dictatorship. Nevertheless, Sagaing’s defensive war against the military regime continues unabated. This is also the region where unarmed, nonviolent strikes still occur on the ground. On the last two days of May, the “Sagaing Forum” was convened and the military and administrative affairs of the region were discussed. Our Burma News International (BNI) – Myanmar Peace Monitor (MPM) Weekly News Review examines the new military and political landscapes at the Sagaing Forum based on relevant news and data.....စစ်ကိုင်းဖိုရမ်နှင့် စစ်ရေး၊ နိုင်ငံရေး အခင်းအကျင်းအသစ်များကို မျှော်ကြည့်ခြင်း စစ်ကိုင်းသည် အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်ကောင်စီတပ်များအား ခုခံတော်လှန်စစ် အပြင်းထန်ဆုံးဒေသ ဖြစ်သည်။ အာ ဏာသိမ်းစစ်ကောင်စီတပ်အား ခုခံတော်လှန်စစ်ဆင်နွှဲနေကြသော မြို့ပြဒေသအလိုက် ပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေး တပ်ဖွဲ့(PDF-LDF) အများဆုံးဒေသ ဖြစ်သည်။ စစ်၏ ဘေးထွက်ဆိုးကျိုးအဖြစ် နေရပ်စွန့်ခွာထွက်ပြေးတိမ်း ရှောင်နေကြရသည့် စစ်ဘေးရှောင်ပြည်သူအရေအတွက်တွင်လည်း နိုင်ငံတဝှမ်းလုံးအတွင်း စစ်ကိုင်တိုင်းသည် အများဆုံး ဖြစ်သည်။ အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်ကောင်စီတပ်များ၏ မီးရှို့ဖျက်ဆီးမှုစာရင်းတွင်လည်း စစ်ကိုင်းသည် ထိပ်ဆုံးတွင် ရပ်တည်နေသည်။ အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်အုပ်စု၏ ဖိနှိပ်မှု၊ ရက်စက်ကြမ်းကြုတ်မှုပုံသဏ္ဍာန်မျိုးစုံကို စစ်ကိုင်းတွင် တွေ့ရသည်။ အခြားတဖက်တွင်လည်း စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ် အမြစ်ပြုတ်ချေမှုန်းရေးဆိုသည့် ဦးတည်ချက်တူညီစွာ ပေါက်ဖွား လာကြသည့် PDF-LDF များအချင်းအချင်းအကြား အငြင်းပွားမှုများကို မကြာခနဆိုသလို တွေ့ရတတ်သည်။ သို့ သော် စစ်ကိုင်းသည် အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်အုပ်စုအား ခုခံတော်လှန်စစ်ဆင်နွှဲရာတွင်တော့ အရှိန်အဟုန်မြင့်တက်နေ ဆဲဖြစ်သည်။ လက်နက်မဲ့အကြမ်းမဖက်နည်းဖြင့် ငြိမ်းချမ်းစွာဆန္ဒဖော်ထုတ်လျက်ရှိသည့် မြေပြင်သပိတ်စစ် ကြောင်းများကိုလည်း စစ်ကိုင်းတိုင်းအတွင်း တွေ့မြင်နေရဆဲဖြစ်သည်။ ၂၀၂၃ခုနှစ် မေလ၏ နောက်ဆုံးနှစ်ရက် တွင်တော့ စစ်ကိုင်းတိုင်းအတွက် “စစ်ကိုင်းဖိုရမ်”ကို ကျင်းပကာ တွေ့ဆုံဆွေးနွေးဖြစ်ခဲ့ကြသည်ဟု ဆိုပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher: Myanmar Peace Monitor
2023-06-03
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-03
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Description: "National Unity Government Weekly Press Update (21/2023) ..."
Source/publisher: National Unity Government of Myanmar
2023-06-03
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-03
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Executive Summary: Following the attempted coup on 1 February 2021, thousands of Karenni people participated in the peaceful mass protest movement against military rule that spread across the country. After the regime’s brutal crackdown and killings of peaceful protestors, young people in Karenni State set up barricades and roadblocks and took up arms to defend themselves. Some joined the Karenni Nationalities Defense Forces, while others joined local Peoples Defense Forces groups. Since May 2021 the junta has attempted to exert control over Karenni State through rapid militarization. Military reinforcements are routinely deployed across townships in Karenni State and neighboring areas. At the same time, the Burmese military has ruthlessly employed its counter-insurgency strategy known as the “four cuts.” This deliberately targets civilians, viewing them as the support base for armed resistance groups, and aims to cut off access to four essentials: food, funds, intelligence, and recruits. As part of its collective punishment strategy, the Burmese military has occupied villages across Karenni State, razing civilian infrastructure, setting up temporary outposts, and planting landmines around villages. When soldiers from the Burmese military retreat from a village, they typically burn down civilian homes. The first part of this report documents serious violations of international human rights and international humanitarian law. These include both indiscriminate and targeted attacks on Karenni civilian populations, murder and mass killings, widespread destruction of civilian property, forced displacement on a massive scale, arbitrary arrest and detention, torture and cruel treatment, sexual violence, and using Karenni civilians as forced labor and human shields. It also describes the humanitarian crisis facing at least 180,000 Karenni internally displaced people (IDPs). More than 40 percent of the estimated total Karenni population has been forcibly displaced, the vast majority of them women and children. The five townships of Loikaw, Hpruso, Shadaw, Deemaw Soe and Pekhon have been almost entirely abandoned. Already traumatized by the violations they have experienced, IDPs live in constant fear of renewed attacks by junta forces. Many IDPs have been displaced multiple times. Junta forces continue their assaults on Karenni towns, villages, and IDP sites unabated. In many cases, IDPs’ homes have been destroyed and they have nowhere to return to. The uncertainties they face about the future are paralyzing as they struggle to maintain hope. The second part of this report contextualizes its findings with legal analysis. In summary, it is reasonable to conclude that members of the Burmese military have committed the war crimes of attacking civilians, attacking protected objects, pillaging, murder, torture, cruel treatment and displacing civilians in Karenni State. The conduct of the Burmese military likely also constitutes the crimes against humanity of imprisonment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, murder, torture, enslavement, other inhumane acts, and forced displacement when considered in the context of a widespread or systematic ‘attack’ against the civilian population in Burma, committed with the requisite knowledge of the attack. The Burmese military can commit these atrocity crimes with impunity because the international community does not hold them accountable, even though it has a legal and moral obligation to do so. A series of important steps must be taken to ensure that individual perpetrators from the Burmese military are held accountable. This includes referral of the situation in Burma to the International Criminal Court, which provides a pathway to justice and reparations for the thousands of victims. Without justice and accountability, there can be no lasting peace for Karenni communities. This report also urges the international community to take action beyond mere ‘statement diplomacy’ to protect the thousands of civilians who live with the daily threat of being murdered by the military regime. This should include imposing a coordinated global arms embargo on the Burmese military and sanctioning aviation fuel supply in a bid to end deadly airstrikes on civilian populations..."
Source/publisher: Karenni Human Rights Group, Kayan Women’s Organization, Karenni National Women’s Organization, Kayah State Peace Monitoring Network
2023-06-03
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-03
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Size: 29.53 MB 1.25 MB 31.76 MB
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Description: "Sagaing Region has seen some of the strongest and most widespread resistance to the Myanmar military’s February 2021 attempted coup. In the face of the ongoing crisis in Sagaing, where villagers have been subjected to fear, violence and destruction of their villages at the hands of the military junta, a beacon of hope has emerged in the form of the Sagaing Forum as a regional political platform. This new political initiative can in the medium term address the pressing challenges faced by the region’s communities, while aiming to build up local and subnational governance structures to build trust and support cohesion within Sagaing’s pro-democracy movement. The question here lies in whether the Forum can strengthen local and subnational networks to increase collaboration within Sagaing Region, which could help bring the resistance to the next level. Plight of villagers and political challenges For more than two years, the people of Sagaing have endured unimaginable hardships. The military junta’s “four-cuts” strategy, aimed at isolating and weakening resistance movements, has been deployed ruthlessly, leaving villagers trapped in a cycle of violence and oppression. The scorched-earth policy and arbitrary arrests have resulted in the destruction of thousands of villages, leaving communities devastated and displaced. As of Feb. 28, 2023, junta troops and affiliated groups have burned down 60,459 homes across the country, according to Data for Myanmar. In Sagaing alone more than 50,000 houses have been destroyed. The major challenges faced by local actors and the National Unity Government (NUG) in countering military offensives are substantial, despite the individual strength of civil society and local People’s Defense Forces (PDFs). The absence of involvement by civil society groups in regional policies, and district and township-level appointments, which are directly made by key ministries such as the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Home Affairs within the NUG, has resulted in a lack of ownership. This lack of ownership not only creates a lack of coordination, but also makes it increasingly difficult to counter the military’s offensives. Moreover, in vast territorial regions like Sagaing, there is still a lack of a regional political body that can provide guidance to local PDFs and enable regional administrators to implement responsive and inclusive governance practices and policies. The birth of the Sagaing Forum After more than six months of dedicated deliberation, local community groups have come together in a series of bi-weekly Zoom and in-person meetings, totaling almost 20 gatherings. Their purpose has been to navigate through the political storms and remain resolute in their pursuit of establishing a political platform that fosters common ground and shared goals. These deliberations have involved representatives from over 25 out of the 37 townships, making it a comprehensive and inclusive process. Some township administrators directly appointed by the NUG have also attended the Forum. Interestingly, the name “Sagaing Forum” itself was coined by the participating groups. The Forum’s leadership comprises a diverse range of individuals, including Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) teachers, campaigners, and local PDFs, who demonstrate a remarkable level of resilience, perseverance, and adeptness in navigating the complexities and obstacles that arise during discussions and message management. As an observer, I have had the privilege of occasionally attending these meetings, including the groups’ informal discussions with the NUG and Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), exploring the group’s aspirations and envisioning their future path. They have had meaningful discussions, though the NUG and CRPH were not well informed enough in advance. It is worth noting that although invited, the Committee Representing Sagaing Hluttaw (CRSH), as a regional people’s elected body, was unable to participate due to their ongoing activities related to “important matters” surrounding politics, administration, defense, and humanitarian aid with the NUG, and they kindly requested an excuse. Though some NLD Sagaing representatives elected in the 2020 election attended individually, I wondered if the Forum (held May 30-31 for the first time) representing local stakeholders from more than 28 townships was not “important” enough for the CRSH to spend time with? Bottom-up approach Amid the current chaotic circumstances, the emergence of the Sagaing Forum brings a ray of hope. It represents a fresh and bottom-up approach to addressing the challenges faced by the region. Instead of relying on conventional methods, the Forum aims to foster collaboration, dialogue, and inclusive decision-making processes. Its ultimate objective is to establish a federal unit, advocating the NUG, CRPH and CRSH to be inclusive and responsive, steering away from divisive approaches. The Forum’s efforts are essential in creating a positive path forward for Sagaing, offering a glimpse of optimism amidst the prevailing challenges. Among political approaches, the Sagaing Forum could stand out as a zero-to-one innovation in a Buddhist Bamar-dominated region. It signifies a departure from the conventional top-down models and embraces a bottom-up perspective, emphasizing the voices and needs of the local communities. By doing so, the Forum recognizes the importance of empowering those directly affected by the crisis and involving them in shaping their own future. In the face of immense challenges and suffering endured by the people of Sagaing, the Sagaing Forum emerges as a beacon of hope, offering a pathway towards a brighter future. Its bottom-up approach, centered on inclusivity, local empowerment, and collaborative decision-making, signifies a profound shift in political engagement. By prioritizing the immediate needs of affected communities and striving for sustainable solutions, the Sagaing Forum lays the groundwork for a more reconciled and resilient Sagaing Region. As we reflect on the transformative power of changing political dynamics, let us ponder the following questions: How can other regions draw inspiration from the Sagaing Forum? What lessons can we learn about the potential for inclusive approaches to shape a better future for the people of Myanmar? Additionally, we must consider whether the Sagaing Forum can propel the Spring Revolution to new heights, bringing about significant progress and positive change. Zaw Tuseng, a former pro-democracy activist, is founder and president of the Myanmar Policy Institute (MPI). The MPI was formed recently to mobilize Myanmar researchers to formulate policies and institutionalize the policymaking process for Myanmar. He holds an Executive Master of Public Administration degree from Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2023-06-02
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-02
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "1. NUG launched 1 million USD fund for the Cyclone Mocha affected communities, calling for humanitarian support from the international community.....2. SAC controlled police station taken over in Salin Township, Magway region.....3. NUG remarks ASEAN Chairs should progress commitments made by ASEAN Leaders.....4. SAC’s controlled mobility contributed to hundred of Rohyingya deaths in Cyclone Mocha, NUG Minister remarks.....5. Nealy 7 billion MMK of humanitarian aid distributed in 2 years..."
Source/publisher: National Unity Government of Myanmar
2023-05-22
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-02
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
Size: 2.28 MB
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Description: "National Unity Government Weekly Press Update (20/2023)..."
Source/publisher: National Unity Government of Myanmar
2023-05-22
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-02
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
Size: 1.92 MB
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Sub-title: ဆေးဝန်ထမ်းတပ်ဖွဲ့၊ ကျန်းမာရေးဝန်ထမ်းများ ခေါ်ယူခြင်း
Description: "၁။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ကာကွယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန၊ ပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေး တပ်မတော်သည် ပြည်သူ့ရဲဘော်များ၊ စစ်ဘေးရှောင်ပြည်သူများနှင့် ပြည်သူများကို ကျန်းမာရေး စောင့်ရှောက်မှုများ အင်တိုက်အားတိုက် ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိသောကြောင့် ကျန်းမာရေးဝန်ထမ်း အင်အား တိုးမြှင့်ရန် လိုအပ်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။ သို့ဖြစ်ပါ၍ နိုင်ငံတစ်ဝှမ်းရှိ ကျန်းမာရေးဝန်ထမ်းများ အနေဖြင့် မိမိတို့သင်ယူတတ်မြောက်ထားသော ပညာရပ်များအလိုက် ပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေး တပ်မတော်၏ ကျန်းမာရေးစောင့်ရှောက်မှုလုပ်ငန်းများတွင် ဆေးဘက်ဆိုင်ရာ စစ်မှုထမ်း ဆောင်ရန်အတွက် လျှောက်ထားနိုင်ပါသည်။ ၂။ လျှောက်ထားနိုင်သည့် ပုဂ္ဂိုလ်များ- (က) အထူးကုဆရာဝန်များ/ အထူးကုဘွဲ့လွန်သင်တန်းသားများ (သွားနှင့်ခံတွင်း အထူးကု ဆရာဝန်များအပါအဝင်) ( ခ) ဆရာဝန်များ (သွားနှင့်ခံတွင်း ဆရာဝန်များအပါအဝင်) ( ဂ) သူနာပြုများ (ဃ) ဆေးနှင့် ဆေးနှီးနွှယ်ဆိုင်ရာ ဒီပလိုမာ၊ ဘွဲ့ရရှိသူများ ( င) တိုင်းရင်းဆေးပညာရှင်များ ( စ) အခြေခံကျန်းမာရေးဝန်ထမ်းများ ၃။ လျှောက်ထားသူသည် - (က) ကျန်းမာရေးကောင်းမွန်သူဖြစ်ရမည်။ ( ခ) နိုင်ငံ့ဝန်ထမ်းဖြစ်ခဲ့ပါက CDM ပြုလုပ်ထားသူ (သို့မဟုတ်) အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေး အစိုးရ၏ လျှို့ဝှက်တာဝန်ပေးချက်အရ စစ်ကောင်စီထံတွင် တာဝန်ထမ်းဆောင်နေ သူများ ဖြစ်ရမည်။ ( ဂ) နိုင်ငံ့ဝန်ထမ်းမဟုတ်ပါက အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီနှင့် ပတ်သက်မှုမရှိသူ ဖြစ်ရမည်။ (ဃ) အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ကာကွယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန၏ ဆေးရုံ/ ဆေးခန်း/ တပ်ရင်း/ တပ်ဖွဲ့/ စစ်ကြောင်းများတွင်သော်လည်းကောင်း၊ တာဝန်ချထားမည့် နေရာ ဒေသများသို့သော်လည်းကောင်း၊ သွားရောက်၍ တာဝန်ထမ်းဆောင်နိုင်သူ ဖြစ်ရမည်။ ၄။ လျှောက်ထားသူ၏ ပညာအရည်အချင်း၊ အတွေ့အကြုံ၊ စွမ်းဆောင်နိုင်မှုနှင့် တော်လှန်ရေး ၏ လိုအပ်မှုတို့အပေါ်တွင်မူတည်၍ သင့်လျော်သောတာဝန်များ ခန့်အပ်သွားမည်။ ၅။ တာဝန်ချထားမည့် နေရာဒေသများတွင် တာဝန်ထမ်းဆောင်မည့် ကျန်းမာရေးဝန်ထမ်း များ၏ လုံခြုံရေးနှင့် စားဝတ်နေရေးတို့အတွက် ဝန်ကြီးဌာနနှင့် သက်ဆိုင်ရာမြေပြင် တပ်ရင်း/ တပ်ဖွဲ့များက တာဝန်ယူဆောင်ရွက်ပေးမည်ဖြစ်သည်။ ၆။ လျှောက်ထားလိုသူများအနေဖြင့် စာပိုဒ် ၂ တွင် ပါရှိသည့် ရာထူးနေရာများအလိုက် ထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာသည့်နေ့ရက်မှစ၍ (၃၀.၆.၂၀၂၃)ရက်နေ့ အထိ နေ့စဉ်ပိတ်ရက်မရှိ နံနက် (၁၀:၀၀) နာရီမှ ည (၈:၀၀) နာရီ အထိ Telegram Username - @MedicalServicePDF နှင့် Email- [email protected] သို့ ဆက်သွယ်ပြီး လျှောက်လွှာပုံစံများ ထုတ်ယူ၍ ပေးပို့လျှောက်ထားနိုင်ပါသည်။ (မှတ်ချက်။ လက်ရှိတာဝန်ထမ်းဆောင်နေသော ကျန်းမာရေးဝန်ထမ်းများ အပါအဝင် တော်လှန်ရေးကာလ ပြည်သူ့ရဲဘော် နှင့် ပြည်သူ့ကျန်းမာရေးစောင့်ရှောက်မှု လုပ်ငန်းများတွင် ရဲရင့်မြင့်မြတ်စွာ ပါဝင်ဆောင်ရွက်သူအားလုံးကို သမိုင်းမှတ်တမ်း တစ်ခုအဖြစ် လေးစားစွာ မှတ်တမ်းတင် ထားရှိမည်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။) ကာကွယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
2023-05-31
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-01
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
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Description: "ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပဋိညာဉ် အစိတ်အပိုင်း(၂)၊ ကြားကာလဖွဲ့စည်းပုံအခြေခံဥပဒေဆိုင်ရာ အစီအမံ၊ အခန်း (၄)၊ ပုဒ်မ (၂၅)၊ ပုဒ်မခွဲ (ခ)နှင့်(ဂ) အရ ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်၊ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရသည် ဥပဒေကဲ့သို့ အာဏာတည်သောအမိန့်ကို အောက်ပါအတိုင်း ထုတ်ပြန်လိုက်သည်။ ၁။ ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ (၁) ရက်နေ့တွင် နိုင်ငံတော်အာဏာအား အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်မှ အဓမ္မလုယူပြီးနောက် အဖက်ဖက်မှပျက်စီးယိုယွင်းမှုများအနက် ဘဏ်လုပ်ငန်းကဏ္ဍလည်း တခုအပါအဝင် ဖြစ်သည်။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်၏ဗဟိုဘဏ်က ထိန်းချုပ်ထားသော ဘဏ်များသည် ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ် ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလမှ စတင်၍ ဘဏ်တခုအနေဖြင့် စောင့်ထိန်းရမည့် အပ်ငွေအပ်နှံသူ ပြည်သူများ၏ အကျိုးစီးပွားကို မကြည့်ရှုဘဲ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်အလိုကျ ဆောင်ရွက်ခဲ့ကြသည့် အတွက် ပြည်သူများအနေဖြင့် နစ်နာဆုံးရှုံးမှုများစွာ ခံစားနေကြရသည်။ ၂။ ထို့အပြင် အများပြည်သူပိုင် နိုင်ငံခြားအရန်ငွေ (Foreign Exchange Reserve) များကိုလည်း ပြည်သူများအားအကြမ်းဖက်သတ်ဖြတ်ရာ၌ အသုံးပြုသည့် လေယာဉ်ဆီအပါအဝင် လက်နက်နှင့် လက်နက်ထုတ်လုပ်ရေးပစ္စည်းများ ဝယ်ယူရာတွင် သုံးစွဲလျှက်ရှိသည်။ ၃။ သို့ပါ၍ ပြည်သူများ၏ နစ်နာဆုံးရှုံးမှုများကို အချိန်မီကုစားနိုင်ရန်၊ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ ဘဏ်လုပ်ငန်းကဏ္ဍကို ထိရောက်စွာ ထိန်းကျောင်းတည့်မတ်နိုင်ရန်နှင့် အများပြည်သူပိုင် နိုင်ငံခြားအရန်ငွေအား အကြမ်းဖက်လုပ်ရပ်များတွင် အသုံးပြုနေခြင်းကို တားဆီးကာကွယ်နိုင်ရန် အတွက် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ပြည်ထောင်စုအစိုးရအဖွဲ့သည် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ စီမံကိန်း၊ ဘဏ္ဍာရေးနှင့် ရင်းနှီးမြှုပ်နှံမှုဝန်ကြီးဌာနအား အောက်ပါတာဝန်များ ဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်ရန် အလို့ငှာ ကြားကာလဗဟိုဘဏ် (Interim Central Bank) အဖြစ် အာဏာအပ်နှင်းလိုက်သည်- (က) နိုင်ငံတကာနှင့် ဒေသတွင်း ဗဟိုဘဏ်များနည်းတူ ဗဟိုဘဏ်တရပ်အနေဖြင့် ဆောင်ရွက်ရမည့် လုပ်ငန်းတာဝန်များကို အကောင်အထည်ဖော်ရန်၊ (ခ) ဘဏ်နှင့် ငွေရေးကြေးရေးအဖွဲ့အစည်း လိုင်စင်လျှောက်ထားလာသည့် အဖွဲ့အစည်း၊ ကုမ္ပဏီများအား စိစစ်၍ လုပ်ငန်းလိုင်စင်ထုတ်ပေးရန်၊ (ဂ) အထက်အပိုဒ် (က) နှင့် (ခ) ပါ တာဝန်များကိုဆောင်ရွက်ရာတွင် လိုအပ်သော အမိန့်၊ စည်းမျဉ်း၊ စည်းကမ်း၊ ကြေညာချက်တို့ကို အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအဖွဲ့၏ ခွင့်ပြုချက်ဖြင့် ထုတ်ပြန် ဆောင်ရွက်သွားရန်၊ ၄။ (က) ကြားကာလဗဟိုဘဏ်ကို ဒါရိုက်တာအဖွဲ့ ဖွဲ့စည်း၍ စီမံခန့်ခွဲရမည်။ (ခ) ဒါရိုက်တာအဖွဲ့၏ ဥက္ကဋ္ဌသည် ကြားကာလ ဗဟိုဘဏ်ဥက္ကဋ္ဌဖြစ်ပြီး အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ စီမံကိန်း၊ ဘဏ္ဍာရေးနှင့် ရင်းနှီးမြှုပ်နှံမှုဝန်ကြီးဌာန၊ ပြည်ထောင်စုဝန်ကြီးအား ကြားကာလဗဟိုဘဏ်ဥက္ကဋ္ဌအဖြစ် ယင်း၏လက်ရှိတာဝန်များ အပြင် ပူးတွဲတာဝန်ထမ်းဆောင်ရန် တာဝန်အပ်နှင်းလိုက်သည်။ ၅။ ဥပဒေကဲ့သို့ အာဏာတည်သော ဤအမိန့်သည် ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ်၊ ဇွန်လ ၁ ရက်နေ့မှစ၍ စတင်အာဏာတည်ရမည်။..."
Source/publisher: National Unity Government of Myanmar
2023-06-01
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-01
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Executive Summary Since September 2022, Myanmar Witness has been monitoring events in Kyainseikgyi township, which has been the site of clashes between the KNLA and Myanmar military. This report investigates claims that the Myanmar Air Force (MAF) carried out several airstrikes in the township between October 2022 and January 2023. On 6 October 2022, at around 0300 hours, a military fighter jet allegedly bombed Mae Kasa village (မက္ကသာရွာ), about 10 kilometres east of the Phayar Taung military post which had been captured by the KNLA a few weeks earlier. Myanmar Witness has identified and geolocated imagery which shows significant damage to a building in the Dhamma Rakkhita Monastery grounds (ဓမ္မရက္ခိတဘုန်းကြီးကျောင်း). Additionally, satellite imagery was used to verify a date window within which damage to the roof occurred. The monastery grounds had provided a site of refuge for internally displaced people (IDP). During November and December 2022, and January 2023, KIC News reported that the MAF carried out four air strikes on the Thabyu mining pits, about 22 kilometres north of Mae Kasa village, killing at least three civilians. Myanmar Witness has identified and geolocated images of the destruction of structures in the area, specifically related to the 16 November airstrike and the 25 January airstrikes. On 16 November 2022, General Zaw Min Tun, the head of the State Administrative Council's (SAC) press team, confirmed that a MAF offensive to ‘maintain the security of the region’ took place in the township. This confirms that the MAF was operating aircraft in the area and provides added weight to allegations of other airstrikes between October 2022 and January 2023. Myanmar Witness has provided in-depth reporting on the nationwide use of airstrikes by the MAF in the Eyes on the Sky report, and will continue to monitor and investigate further incidents. Background and Context According to online news sources including Myanmar Now and Khit Thit Media, on 28 September, following clashes between the KNLA and Myanmar military, a joint force of the KNLA and the PDF attacked and captured the Phayar Taung military post (ဘုရားတောင်စခန်းကုန်း) situated on the road connecting Kyainseikgyi town (ကြာအင်းဆိပ်ကြီးမြို့) and Phayar Thone Su town (ဘုရားသုံးဆူမြို့). More than 10 SAC troops (exact number differs between 11 and 13) were reportedly killed, including the deputy battalion commander of the Myanmar military, and their weapons were seized. The Karen National Union (KNU) reported that the Myanmar Air Force (MAF) bombed the Dhamma Rakkhita Monastery in Mae Kasa village at around 0300 hours on 6 October 2022, severely damaging a building. The monastery was previously used by local charities, for Shinbyu ceremonies, and religious festivals. It was also used to house internally displaced people (IDP) from Mae Kasa and surrounding villages. The individuals who had been taking refuge in the Dhamma Rakkhita Monastery have been forced to relocate to Phayar Thone Su town and nearby places due to the frequent sighting of fighter jets, according to Khit Thit Media. The township remained a site of tension over the next few months. Between November 2022 and January 2023, three people were killed, eight were injured, and buildings were damaged during MAF airstrikes on the mining blocks of Thabyu Mine (သပြုသတ္တုမိုင်း), about 21 kilometres north of Mae Kasa village (မက္ကသာရွာ), according to reports by Khit Thit Media. There were also reports of ground clashes on the morning of 4 January 2023, when the KNLA and PDF joint forces attacked Light Infantry Battalion (LIB) 32 and LIB-283, based in Kyainseikgyi township, and set a number of buildings on fire, according to Mizzima News..."
Source/publisher: Myanmar Witness
2023-05-31
Date of entry/update: 2023-05-31
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Human Rights Foundation of Monland (HURFOM) In the wake of Cyclone Mocha, civilians in Burma braced for the worst as the powerful storm threatened lives and caused widespread destruction. While local emergency response teams worked to put preventative measures and safety protocols in place, the military junta continued to bombard civilians with air and ground attacks. Their immense suffering, even in the wake of a natural disaster, did not deter the regime from their attacks. The cyclone has affected the whole region, and yet days into the first week of May, the military junta deployed a series of targeted airstrikes on civilians in Southeastern Burma. A joint statement with the Karen Human Rights Group and the Karen Peace Support Network condemned attacks on 10 May by soldiers from Light Infantry Battalion (LIB) #599 under Military Operations Command (MOC) #13, together with other junta-backed infantry divisions and battalions. The attacks killed nearly 20 people, including several children. Between 7 and 14 May 2023, the Human Rights Foundation of Monland (HURFOM) reported that the military was responsible for carrying out three airstrikes which bombed six villages in Ye Township, Mon State, on May 7, 8, and May 14 in western Dawei. These attacks led 1200 to 1500 residents to flee their homes as displacement continued to be fueled by the relentless raids and assaults by the regime. During this period, in Kyaukgyi Township (KNU areas), more than fifty civilian homes were also destroyed by the junta, including a religious building and a school. Residents have also continued to face abuse and threats by junta-supported administrators. Since the regime reformed its gun laws and made it more accessible to purchase and use weapons, many Administrators in Mudon Township bought guns from the black market. “ “They threaten villagers with their guns,” said a villager. The junta-backed Ministry of the Interior issued the order to revive the 1977 law allowing ‘loyal’ civilians to bear arms on January 31, 2023, a day before the second anniversary of the attempted coup. Since then, Mon State administrators have obtained guns. To access and own a weapon, any individual must make an application and need final approval from the Ministry of Home Affairs. Still, Administrators in Mudon Township have been able to get them quickly. Now, junta-backed defence groups such as pro-junta militias and administrators can ‘legally’ take up arms issued to them by the junta, and the military overlooks their misconduct. This could lead to many other problems related to the misuse of these weapons, and we are worrying about the life and properties of the people. On the other hand, it also means that if ordered, these armed people must cooperate in junta operations against the resistance, according to Mudon villagers. Guns obtained from the black market are illegal, but Administrators are pro-military, and critics of the policy note that the military simply overlooks their misconduct. Extortion and bribery persist as the junta targets key routes to illicit funds from ordinary people. The military increased the operation of thirty-seven checkpoints along the Tanintharyi Highway and has been committing illegal taxation and extortion against travellers and vehicle drivers, according to local sources and travellers using this 180-mile-long motor highway. HURFOM fieldworkers were able to speak with various locals and reliable sources. All believed that these were the results of the permission of the central junta administration to their security troops to utilize policies due to inadequate support from the State/Region levels to their security forces: “It is as if they can earn their daily incomes at the bottom level. This means more extortions, illegal levying of taxes, arbitrary arrests, and demanding ransom. As you know, we could only earn a maximum of 12.000 MMK a day, but we are forced to pay various illegal taxes, sometimes extorted money or properties, and unjust taxation. So, imagine how much cash we left in our hands to feed my family? A 50-year-old mini truck driver from Ye, Mon State, stated. “Even the daily road users, such as local farmers, rubber plantation workers, and even local inhabitants, are suffering,” a 30-year-old Tavoyan rubber plantation farmer from a village in Yebyu Township told reporters, adding, “We have to encounter thieves and criminals in our daily life while crossing their checkpoints and security gates. From Mahlawe Taung tollgate, Yebyu Township, Tanintharyi Region, to Myeik Township, Southern Region, travelers and vehicle drivers estimated that various junta forces had operated more than 37 checkpoints and tollgates along the 180 miles long highway. “Before the coup, there were only seven tollgates for road tax. After the coup, the regime occupied all these tollgates for security reasons and added another thirty tollgates and checkpoints along the road to the Southern Region,” a truck driver who has to use this highway daily said. “The military will justify their checkpoints for ‘security’ reasons. However, behind the scenes, the daily income from here is not even used to support their military families. Significant top-down corruption exists here,” a former Civil Servant from Myeik Township expressed his view on May 1. In addition, the junta’s arrest and detainment of innocent people is ongoing. Those who stand firm in their beliefs and pro-democracy opinions are being targeted. Three people were arrested the first week of May, including a young man arrested on May 4. These young people were abducted for their views shared on social media, including their condemnation of the extrajudicial killings committed by the junta. “The latest arrest case occurred in the early morning of May 4, 2023,” a neighbour told HURFOM. A group of plainclothes police and military intelligence officers surrounded the house of Ko Paing Thu, a young resident of Phet-Kalate village, Kyaik Hto Township, Mon State, who the junta forces have arrested for commenting to condemn the military’s inhumane mass killings. Two related incidents occurred after civilians were abducted for condemning atrocities committed by the regime. The Administration Department detained and charged all three young men in Kyaik Hto Township. “Two of them were accused of being associated with the People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) after the junta troops inspected their mobile phones,” a reliable source close to the police said. “My son is innocent, living and working in the welding metals workshop in the family business. We will try to face this case legally,” the father of Paing Thu, told the reporter. Recently, the junta’s intelligence network has been monitoring youth activist accounts like Paing Thu’s Facebook since the beginning of this year and has conducted in-depth surveillance systems across the State. Anyone caught commenting or writing about the National Unity Government or news related to the pro-democracy movement is tracked by the well-trained technology groups financed and supported by the junta, according to a staff of the Civil Disobedience Movement from the Ministry of Home Affairs, Mon State. HURFOM also reported aid workers having their rights violated by the junta. The military is weaponizing aid delivery. More than 40 civilians, including members of charity service volunteers, were abducted and interrogated by the Junta Forces in Kawkareik township, Karen State. HURFOM’s field report stated that 42 people had been abducted between 9 and 11 May. The detainees were members of the free funeral service, rescue ambulance charity members, former school teachers, and ordinary civilians, including former civil servants in Kawkareik. “Yes, I can confirm all arrests. As far as I know, social workers are based in Kawkareik township. They are now being held in a military interrogation center,” said a family spokesperson. “For a long time, the administrative council wanted to blame social charity service members and social relief groups for their operations. Now they are targeting them directly,” said a former social group member, referring to the pressure on social workers by the junta council. “I heard they came to arrest with detailed wanted lists and profiles. This must be the first time many people have been arrested in Kawkareik. Today, they were knocking on the doors of other neighbourhoods who they suspected,” said a woman close to ‘Palae Phyu’ local charity group. Since the coup, at least five social workers in Kawkareik District have been arrested and charged with violating the counter-terrorism Law in connection with the local armed groups, according to HURFOM records. Throughout May 2023, HURFOM also reported a rise in the number of people being abducted by the junta and used as human shields. The junta troops are committing crimes against humanity in Tanintharyi Region by arresting local civilians and forcing them to be their guides through armed conflicts. This is also a direct violation of the law of war, reported local Dawei residents. On April 26, when the military troops marched towards the Ra-nge and Waerik villages in Thayet Chaung Township, Dawei District, nearly 100 local people were arrested and released two days later by demanding ransom payments. “Those who can be redeemed with money are released quickly,” said a villager. Villagers continue to be arrested and subjected to severe abuse. According to International Humanitarian Law, using human shields is strictly prohibited. This is also stated in the Geneva Convention. The fact that the military regime carelessly embarks on missions intended to devastate communities makes it clear that they act with impunity. According to local sources, the junta forces that entered the villages in eastern Dawei these days arrested at least ten villagers from three villages in the area and used them as human shields along with its troops on 21 May 2023: “At least five or five villagers from the village of Dar Thwe Kyauk were taken away and forced to go ahead and act as guides. Also, they entered Ah Nya Pyar village, arrested two more people, and then went down to U Yin Kyi village,” said the locals. A field report from the northern Dawei District indicated that the junta forces and their alliance militias entered the village with about fifty troops. They arrested nearly thirty local workers as human shields on the morning of May 8, 2023. The local sources confirmed that those detained and used as human shields worked in a plantation near Wet Chaung village, Pagaw-Soon village tract, Yebyu Township. “The local farm workers were arrested on the morning of May 8 when they left for work. After that, the junta forces took the villagers as their protection to the operation area where they wanted to go. The detainees were all taken with hands tied in the back,” said another anonymous source from the administrative area of KNU Brigade No.4. According to the ground information received by HURFOM, six women were arrested on the evening of May 8, with twenty people from Wet Chaung Village in Yebyu Township. “The first junta battalion is a joint unit of Infantry Battalion No.273 and Infantry Battalion No.406. The troop force is about 20 or 30 soldiers. They captured people from Wet Chaung village and used them as human shields. Another junta military column entered the nearby Kha Mout Chaung and seized the properties belonging to the locals. They took another ten villagers from Kha Mout Chaung when they left the village,” said an eyewitness source. Those who escaped said that while stationed at the school in Kha Mout Chaung village, the junta troops broke into some houses in the village and looted valuables and other livestock. “The use of human shields is a war crime. No other armed actor has done such a despicable act in this age,” a spokesman for the local PDF said while condemning the act as a war crime and a severe crime against humanity. “Since we are resisting the junta council to minimize the harm to the people, we will not fight if there is a possibility that the people will be affected by the fighting on both sides. The junta military is taking advantage of this and attacking our forces in this area,” he continued. Another worrying observation by HURFOM over this last month is that the houses and properties of those accused of supporting the revolutionary movement continue to be seized in Karen and Mon states. According to local people, the junta sealed off the houses and properties of those accused of disseminating and supporting the People’s Defense Forces in Karen State and Mon State and issued arrest warrants for the fugitives. Between 10 to 14 May, soldiers isolated the properties of five civilians. They confiscated their homes in Myawaddy and Kyaik Hto due to unjust accusations. Across two days between 12 and 14 May, two local people from Kyaik Hto, Mon state, were arrested by the junta and charged with the deeply flawed and controversial anti-terrorism act. Their homes and shops were sealed. The estimated value of the houses and properties contained by the regime is worth more than one hundred million kyats. According to HURFOM’s previous data, there have been eight cases of seized assets in Myawaddy and fourteen cases in Thaton District, including Kyaik Hto in Mon State. During the last weeks of the month, the military also targeted young women, some as young as 15 and detained them for unjust causes. On May 19, family members reported that the junta in Launglon, Dawei arrested a 16-year-old. She has not been heard from since 22 May. According to family members and friends, the junta arrested Ma Yin Phuu Pwit, a teenager. She was taken away at a family-owned restaurant in Maungmakan Beach: “Military intelligence came first in civilian clothes with the exact names of the person and store. Then the junta soldiers from the Moungmakan police station arrived in a car and arrested our daughter.” Almost all police forces came and arrested her in civilian clothes. The resident said, “Yin Phuu Pwit is a person who sells and buys online, and it is not yet known exactly why she was arrested. Usually, the junta targets successful people. The military constantly watches them. We don’t know precisely whether Yin Phuu Pwit has shared current movement-related posts or written comments,” another resident assumed. “One possibility is that, like previous cases, the junta military arrested her on suspicion of helping the revolution.” A few days later, another young woman was abducted by the junta. According to local sources, Ma Chaw Su Ther, who lives in Maung Ngan quarter, Mon State, was abducted by the junta intelligence at 3 PM on May 22 for allegedly ‘spreading false news’ on social media. The detainee is 21 years old. She was arrested at home. The junta said they found information on her Facebook which could ‘negate to the state and public unrest.’ Ma Chaw Su Ther (Mi) was sentenced and charged with 56/2023, section 505-A of the Penal Code at the court. Currently, many social network users are being monitored. Women and young girls continue to be targeted by the military junta. The lawlessness has also disrupted pathways of accountability for survivors of sexual violence. Mon women’s groups are warning of increased child sexual abuse incidents in villages across Mon State with no action being taken by the authorities. Women’s groups cannot assist the victims due to the political crisis and security concerns. “We’ve heard many cases of child rape in villages. We’re in a difficult situation to help the victims. The rule of law has failed in Burma, and the police haven’t handled these cases,” said a Mon women leader. Since the coup, the rights of children have been widely violated. The number of domestic violence and sexual abuse cases has also increased. Due to security concerns, it is difficult to get detailed information on the exact number. Junta-appointed village administrators have blocked the legal trials of cases involving child sexual abuse, making it difficult to pursue justice for the victims. Mon women’s groups also mention the junta for freeing convicted child rapists. Further, the increasing surveillance and abuse of law show the deeply worrying extent to which the junta is willing to go to create an illusion of legitimacy. In reality, the people have widely rejected the military and will continue working toward their freedom and dismantling militarized systems. These acts of violence are rooted in the sinister legacy of the military junta. Unless true and meaningful accountability ensures the regime and those complicit in all crimes are held responsible in a court of law, these crimes will continue to occur. Situation Overview Karen State The HURFOM documentation team reported heavy attacks against civilians in Karen State. The assaults came when no active fighting resulted in severe injuries to women and children. Indiscriminate in nature, the ongoing brutalities by the junta have created an atmosphere of deep insecurity and fear throughout the State. According to the Karen National Union (KNU) Central Information Department from Brigaed No. 3, the junta forces shot a 23-year-old Karen villager dead in Kyauk Kyi Township, Nyuang Lay Bin District Bago region. They inhumanely tortured another two villagers during the interrogation in the military camp. On May 3 at 7:20 PM, Saw Lay Lay Htoo, a resident of Tagondai Ward, Natthankwin Town, Kyauk Kyi Township, Nyaung Lay Bin District, was reportedly shot dead by security troops in front of Natthankwin General Hospital while returning to work from Yay Twin Kon Ward. A witness who went to help Saw Lay Lay Htoo told reporters the junta soldiers opened fire. The perpetrator was one of the patrolling officers on their sentry duty returning from Bon-Tha-Taw Ward: “I heard a gunshot and found the body on the road. No one dares goes to see him,” she said. The victim’s motorcycle and the body were lying on the road. The wallet and phone belongings were taken away. Junta battalions are continuously firing at the residences of the local people with artillery weapons. In some cases, although there was no armed conflict in the area, local people, including women and children, were killed or injured when they opened fire on community homes with artillery. On May 5, LIB No. 97, based in Kawkareik Township, fired artillery at 7:30 am. A 58-year-old woman was injured. “Artillery motors fell into our village and exploded. They continued firing until nightfall, some of which exploded in the courtyard,” said a local source. The victim, Naw Ma Latt, age 58, from the middle quarter of the village, was hit by artillery on the right side of her head. It’s not life-threatening, but it needs a lot of treatment. Currently, there are no medical teams in the village. LIB No.97 and military troops at Hlaing Wa Hill constantly fired artillery mortars around the town. Due to that random fire, Kawkareik residents are terrified of explosions that sometimes hit their quarters. “Their military base is at Hlaing Wa Hill, and no one dares to go out to work and eat because they are shooting randomly from there. More than ten people were injured and died when they opened fire. Local people, including their livestock animals, faced every loss of homes, property, and livelihoods. Most of the firing came from LIB No.97. Although there was no fight, they just wanted to shoot randomly. On the one hand, we are facing the risk of life, and on the other hand, we are all facing famine”, said a resident. Attacks can happen at any time. Artillery shells exploded in the brick factory site near the exit of Kawkareik town, in Karen State, at around 6:00 AM on May 6. One civilian was killed, and six were injured during the explosion. According to an anonymous witness, the military troops were based in the hills on the eastern side of Kawkareik town. They fired many artillery indiscriminate shots toward the local Karen villages. Many of these shootings fell near residential areas and inside the neighbourhood. Some houses were destroyed and burnt by mortar shells. The villagers fled from their homes when they heard the shots fired. Some of those who couldn’t run were sheltering in trenches. All six civilians injured by the mortar shells fired by the military troops were not local villagers. According to a resident near the house, they were killed and wounded while temporarily moving here due to job opportunities. “Almost all the houses and neighbourhoods in this area can be said to be battlefields. The military troops are stationed in at least three places around this area and firing daily. Nowhere can be said to be safe anymore. Travelling from one place to another is no longer easy for work or other matters. It becomes really difficult to work for a living. We also need humanitarian support. Many people are fleeing and staying near this city. I would like to request the donors and social groups to support us,” a fifty-year-old who spoke to HURFOM said. On 7 May, the junta carried out indiscriminate attacks, despite no armed conflict in the area. The regime deployed airstrikes to bomb a village where Karen people lived in Ye Township, Mon State. It happened twice on the night of May 7 and the morning of May 8. Due to this sudden aerial attack, at least eight local villagers were seriously injured. Three were in critical condition, and an estimated 500 local villagers fled their homes in War Pa Tae village, a Karen ethnic majority village located in Bay Lamu village tract. One of the villagers fleeing the attack said that the military started the aerial attack with an air jet on May 7: “We heard the sound of a jet plane at 11:00 PM. We immediately realized it was not a typical plane sound and ran to hide in the ditch by our homes. As expected, the sound of a bomb explosion began near the school.” There has not been any fighting or conflict around Chaung Hnit Kwa, War Pa Tae, and Tha Pa Taw villages. “I can’t understand why they came to fight with an airstrike,” said a local villager. As many as eight villagers were injured in the bomb attack, three of whom were seriously injured. Two Tha Pa Taw village members inside their hut outside War Pa Tae village were also injured by the attack on May 8. At least five houses, one school, and other village buildings were destroyed. Approximately 500 local people from three villages Chaung Hnit Kwa, Bay Lamu and Tha Pa Taw villages and the surrounding areas, who fled from the attack. According to independent sources of two villagers from Tha Pa Taw village (a neighbouring village of War Pa Tae village), due to air strikes on May 7th and 8th, residents of Tha Pa Taw and other villages are fleeing the war. Three members of the PDF in the area were killed, and at least five were injured. However, HURFOM is still trying to confirm this information. At present, the villagers from Chaung Hnit Kwa, Bay Lamu, Tha Pa Taw and other villages who fled from the fighting are hiding in the jungles in the southeast of Ye Township (west side of the mountain) and are areas that rescue and social charity groups cannot reach the moment. Children, women, and the elderly are the most affected by war. Food, drinking water, and accommodation are urgently needed, said a KNU Battalion Medical Team No.16 member. Destruction of property is yet another crime being committed by the junta during their clearance operations. According to the field data collected from the evening of May 9, at 5 am, a village Church, a primary school run by the community, and an estimated 20 homes were demolished by the Junta artillery weapons in Poe-Lo-Noh-Pho village, Kyaukgyi township, Nyaung Lay Bin district. “The troops must have been from LIB No.439 or the Artillery Regiment Command No.351. They destroyed these buildings with artillery mortars from their base station, three kilometres from this village,” said a KNU Brigade No.3 member who did not want to be named. Even earlier that day, the junta troops attacked and raided Lae Wai Gyi village in Kyaukgyi Township, destroying more than 30 houses. A school, a church, and all other buildings of the nursery school and the common area were also burnt down by the same troops, according to the field research conducted by the documentation team from Brigade 3 areas. Lae Wai Kyi and Poe-Lo-Noh-Pho villages in Kyaukgyi Township have more than 120 houses and a population of more than 1,200. According to KNU Brigade No.3, most residents have been fleeing due to such comprehensive clean-up operations and have been unable to return to their homes. Since May 13, 2023, the military has been destroying asphalt roads connecting villages in Kawkareik Township, Karen State: “They also destroyed the road near the Taung Kyar Inn Bridge. The Vice Commander of the LIB 343 LIB supervised the destruction. They destroyed roads with a backhoe. Now about 30 villages have lost connection with Kawkareik. All villagers are in trouble,” said a local farmer. On May 13, the military also destroyed roadways connecting Southern Kawkareik, and on May 14, they destroyed the section of the road between Kawkareik – Kyaik Done Road and Ka Mile Gone Road. Then, they destroyed an asphalt road nearby Taung Kyar Inn Bridge on May 17. “We can’t transport fruits from our plantation or sell fruits and vegetables farmed in our villages. We can’t do anything. We have to use the Kyarinnseikyi route to go to Mawlamyine, and it’s very far away. We are all struggling with transportation,” said a Kaw Ka Rate Town fruit seller. After destroying roads, the military junta indiscriminately launched artillery attacks targeting villages alongside the Hong Tha Yaw River. “They are afraid that the revolutionary forces will enter the town and attack them. This is why they’ve destroyed the roads,” said a Kaw Ka Rate resident. On 21 May, artillery shots killed an innocent child, injured two, and forced more than 12,000 villagers from nine villages to flee their homes. The junta’s indiscriminate firing into villages with artillery weapons persists in Nyaung Lay Pin District. According to the information received on the morning of May 20, 2023, the junta military’s joint forces LIB No.599, LIB No.590, IB No.44, and IB No.84 opened fire with more than 50 shots in Sa Wae and Kyung Taw villages in Mu Township. These areas are all controlled by the Karen National Union in eastern Bago, on the border of Mon State. Since the early morning of May 18, these collective forces have been shooting continuously from the outside of the village where they are stationed. Until now, a 14-year-old boy has died. And then, a 47-year-old woman and another 18-year-old boy were injured by mortar shells. In addition to the casualties, many houses and livestock, including a monastery, were destroyed, confirmed by those fleeing the two villages. According to local officials from KNU Brigade 3, food, supplies and accommodation assistance in new places are urgently needed. According to a ground report released by KNU Brigade 6’s information Department, on May 23, at 11:30 PM, the junta air forces deployed two bombs with a jet fighter. The attack damaged some homes and a church in Kha Lae Law Kyae village in Maw Khee village tract, Kawkaraik, Karen State. It is believed to have come directly from the Nay Pyi Taw Air Force Base. There were no casualties, but the church was destroyed entirely. Religious buildings continued to be destroyed, as are places people use often. We have been fighting from war for four decades.” On May 22, one school, two residential houses, and one common wooden hall were damaged due to two shootings by a drone in Nyaung Kon village, Mu Township, #Karen KNU Administrative area. According to information from ground service providers, as many as 21,880 civilians were displaced during May 2023 due to indiscriminate aerial attacks and Artillery firing by the junta council battalions. Out of the 55 local residents of Kawkareik #Karen who were arbitrarily abducted and interrogated by the Junta forces, only four were released by paying ransom demands, according to the families. Sources close to the released villagers confirmed that the remaining 50 arbitrarily arrested are being tortured and detained daily, even in an army interrogation center. Based on groundless accusations of information and financial support to the joint forces of Karen National Liberation Army and People’s Defense Force based in Kawkareik township, a total of 54 people from Kawkaraik were arrested and interrogated in a military camp from May 7 to 22 by the Junta forces. Last May 25, about 4 people from this group were released because the relevant family members decided to ransom them at the Junta’s demand. Although it could not be confirmed how much was paid for each person, outside information stated that each person was paid more than 20 lakhs Myanmar Kyat. Sources close to some detainees conveyed that about 50 inmates who could not pay for ransom have lost contact with their family members. “These people were arrested on false accusations that they were helping Captain Kyaw Thet, who equipped defensive resilience operations in this area and Kyar Phyu (white tiger) armed troops. The perpetrator troop is the Infantry Battalion IB#97, based out of the city of Hlaing Bawk,” he said. Among the more than 50 residents who were abducted from May 1 to May 21, about 4 have been freed after paying money, but some of them have not been able to communicate with their family members, said a person close to the family members of those arrested. According to sources close to the village administrator, in addition, the villages outside the town, such as Sawhe, Nyaung Kile, Htee Po San, Hlaing Sein, Nyaung Nile and Yan Kok village administrators were also detained and interrogated on May 22. They were released after being demanded to report the activities of the local defence armed groups to the Junta and the general administrative department. Currently, the Junta military is working to eliminate village-to-village roads and highways in Kawkareik Township so that the other armed forces in the area cannot easily use them. Aircraft and drones frequently fly around, firing Artillery upon suspecting villages or areas and persistently making a threat, and the residents are still fleeing from their homes. Mon State Indiscriminate junta artillery fire at local villagers in Bilin Township, Mon State continues as civilians are routinely injured due to such attacks. On May 6, at 9 PM, the military fired several artillery mortars into Ah Lu Lay village, Bilin Township. According to the ground news team, at least one woman ..and one man was injured. As a result of the attack, more than 300 villagers fled, and some still could not return homes. A 40-year-old man said that the Army often attacks Ah Lu Lay village. At least a dozen artillery mortars were fired indiscriminately by the junta forces stationed at the foothills of Along Taung and in front of the school, injuring two civilians from Ah Lu Lay: “Three houses were damaged due to heavy weapons. One couple, husband and wife, also were injured and had to flee.” Although their injuries are not life-threatening, the villagers are overwhelmed with fear due to constant attacks. These attacks led to another 300 IDPs from this area. There is no opportunity to work for their livelihoods, and a lack of security prevents humanitarian aid. We are suffering a lot here,” said a resident. “Artillery mortar shells burst into the village, and U Nay Myo Kyaw’s arm and Daw Khin San Yi’s face were badly hit by the artillery shells,” said eyewitnesses. “It will be difficult to return to a normal state and to return to work to earn a living, even though it was not life-threatening,” said the neighbors who fled to a secure place. On the morning of 18 May, a witness confirmed that a 35-year-old innocent villager from Ah Nin village, Thanbyuzayat, Mon State, was shot dead in the clash between the junta-backed forces and the KNU troops. The military and joint forces of the militia entered the village of Ah Nin and deployed troops at night. They raided the houses of unsuspecting people. Many villagers were trapped inside the town. Individuals from outside did not dare to enter. They fled to farms and other villages for shelter. Junta forces have been stationed around the village of Ah Nin in Thanbyuzayat Township, Mon State, since the beginning of the evening of May 17. The village has been controlled and blocked, trapping more than 300 villagers. The KNU came from outside the village to surround the junta’s troops stationed inside. The military started firing their guns, killing a 35-year-old individual. It is still unknown who he was. The villagers are very concerned and afraid of impending disaster from being used as hostages since the military has been stationed around the village. Tanintharyi Region The Junta Council sealed off the assets of a local businessman for allegedly supporting the local armed forces and detained him for over a month. On May 6, in Kawthaung District #southern Taninthayi Region, residents said that a group of junta forces, including the GAD and military officers, seized the property of one local businessman in Bokpyin Township. The victim, U Aung Zaw Oo, is an anti-Regime Activist and a local businessman from Kamar-Chaung village, and his family opened a gas station business a few years ago. “On that day (May 6), his Gas Station, the house, and the tea shop, as well as the entire plot of land, have been sealed and seized by the joint SAC troops,” according to the local witnesses. U Aung Zaw Oo was arrested by the junta forces at his home on April 4 on the unjust accusation of supporting the People’s Defense Forces and charged with section 50 (J) of the existing anti-terrorist law. He was arrested and confined until today at the police station in Bokpyin. On April 4, 4 residents, including U Aung Zaw Oo, were arrested, and 3 of them were released 6 days later, but U Aung Zaw Oo continued to be detained, and more than a month later, his family’s property was sealed. “Whenever the Junta forces and their intelligence in Bokpyin town receive suspicious information about the revolution, they arrest and inspect people. In some cases, the seizures were carried out before the accused were found guilty in court and had their property confiscated. Meaning the Junta forces have wholly disregarded the law.” A 39-year-old law specialist stated. “The punishment of someone not responsible for any alleged wrongdoing is prohibited under international rules for armed conflict.” He continued. Homes and other properties belonging to anti-regime activists have not been sealed in Bokpyin township for a long time. “The most expensive assets and properties have been seized (by the Junta) this time,” said a resident of Bokpyin Town told HURFOM. The Junta troops attacked the People’s Defense Armed Forces and committed two cases of arbitrarily arresting and torturing the residents with false accusations in townships of the Tanintharyi Region. There is a constant flow of violence, sometimes resulting in murder. According to the field team’s report on May 9, the local eyewitnesses confirmed that two men from the village of Wae Yit village in Thayet-Chaung Township, Dawei District, Tanintharyi Region, were stopped and searched, then arrested and beaten by the junta troops with false accusations and were injured. The incident occurred on the morning of May 9, 2023. “The victims, Ko Myo Myint Lay, over 40 years old, and Ko Kang Kang, 30, who live from hand-to-mouth, were tied their hands from the back and severely beaten by the soldiers with their gun butts and kicked by the boots.” A 40-year-old eyewitness from Wae Yit said. “The troop must be from Infantry Battalion No.403 or 404. Right now, they are the only ones patrolling around this village and enforcing the military offensive against the PDFs in the areas,” said a 25-year-old resident. It was not detailed why the two male villagers were arrested and beaten. According to a source close to the victims, the support allegations are likely connected with a local PDF group. “The forces that arrested and beat Ko Kang Kang were junta military stationed at Tha Win Wa village Police Station. They were from IB No.403. When they went to Ya Nge village, they met Ko Myo Myint Lay again and beat them up. Friends of Ko Kang Kang confirmed that he suffered a fractured head, and Ko Myo Myint Lay had a broken rib due to the beating. “I am pretty sure both detainees were not associated with any political movements or armed groups,” he continued. On May 9, around 9:30 pm, about 50 military council soldiers were fully armed and stationed at the Ya Nge village monastery in Thayet-Chuang Township. They went around the village to forcefully raid unsuspicious homes and cause irritation. Some villagers (an estimated 70 households) did not dare to stay in their houses and fled to nearby places. Early morning of May 10, the junta military consisting of more than 30 soldiers from Infantry Battalion No.403 raided Nyaung Zin village in Thayet Chaung Township, #Dawei, abducted about 14 local villagers, including five women, and beat them on the road, according to eyewitnesses. Before entering the village, they stormed into Nyaung Zin village, threatening to shoot with weapons from two lorries. A 40-year-old villager told the incident on the evening of May 10 that most of those arrested were villagers who went out to shop for food in the morning, “We usually see that they go in by military trucks and lorries. This time, the junta forces used civilian trucks, like a lorry truck carrying stones or a garbage truck. They indiscriminately fired into the village and grabbed the villagers they saw on the street that morning. The majority of the detainees were young men. Those who refused to detain were kicked in the boots and hit by gun butts. It happened around 6:30 in the morning,” said the residents. According to the sources of three local villagers, these perpetrators’ units were from the Junta’s Light Infantry Battalion LIB No.403, operating under the Coastal Regiment Command based in #Dawei. “One of us saw their badges and mentioned LIB 403. Some troops searched the houses along the road in the middle village,” said a 50-year-old witness from Nyaung Zin. All 14 detainees were confirmed interrogated and beaten on the side of the road until 2:00 pm; later on, four men were taken away with their faces covered and their hands tied behind their backs, the residents said. Nyaung Zin Village is a large village on the Dawei-Myeik highway, about 8 miles away from Dawei. Last April 23, more than 90 local people, including 3 children, were arrested in Ya Nge village by the junta military during the local operation; some were released in the following days. However, the remaining villagers have not been released yet. According to local sources, the junta has increased their presence in Dawei City, Tanintharyi Region. The city entrance and exit have been more stringent, and suspects have been arrested on various charges. Sources close to the victims confirmed about eight people, including local women, were arrested in one night on May 17. “All the main roads leading into Dawei, including the small lanes, are under strict control by the junta and Pyu Saw Htee militias. There is suspicion since there is more control and inspection.” On 17 May, three women and five men were arrested overnight. The youngest person who was abducted at 11:40 pm was a 17-year-old boy. Some of those arrested are not from Dawei, but they hold different regions of ID cards. Patrols and house checks are still being conducted outside the city. Local witnesses said that on May 17, six Dawei residents and two others from far away were arrested in one night. Residents also stated that they opened fire at several points with heavy weapons before entering the village: “The sound of gunfire and artillery started at 9 PM. We heard around 10 gunshots and several explosions. Their forces consisted of around 150 junta soldiers, and they entered this side yesterday morning,” said a 50-year-old villager from the area. Villages in this area, such as Pa Kari, Pa Khab and Tha Yat Ngok villages have been repeatedly raided by junta troops for the past 6 months, which also forced most of the local residents (an estimated 8,000) to flee and evacuate for a long time. Most villagers of U Yin Kyi, Dar Thwe Kyauk, and Ah Nya Pyar villages, which had been raided recently, are local farmers who rely on farming, orchard, and plantation for their livelihoods. Villagers reported that 9 residents of Bang La Moot village and East Maw Ton village in Tanintharyi township, who have been arbitrarily arrested since May 22, have not been released. “All 9 were arrested as a group on the night of May 22 by the Artillery Unit No.306 and the joint unit of LIB No.557 for allegedly supporting the Local Defense Forces. It was around 9PM. About 3 women from East Maw Ton village and Panut village were included. It is confirmed that it was unknown at which military camp they were taken and detained. Last week, the junta entered Panut village of Bang La Moot village tract and arrested four male villagers. It cannot be confirmed yet whether they have been released or not. The number of disappearances in Tanintharyi, where the arrests are being made, has increased from 5 to 16 now. Due to arbitrary arrests by the junta military, who made various accusations and tortures during the interrogation, three suspected prisoners died while detained and examined. “Nowadays, arrests are often made with specific information.” This is a sign that informers are always in the community. On May 22, they arrested a lot of men at Panut Nge. They went to the houses and arrested people with the exact list of names. They gave various reasons to arrest. There is even an accusation of involvement in the violence that goes beyond supporting the revolution,” said a local man. According to the information received this morning, the arrested victims are being detained and examined in Artillery Unit No.306 and LIB No.557. Until now, no one has been released yet. On May 20, a total of 10, 7 elderly women and 3 men from Yebyu village, Taninthayi township, were arrested by the junta military, and some half of them were released. Key Findings Inflation across all target areas has devastatingly affected civilians who cannot meet their basic needs. The extortion of civilians is ongoing. Residents of Thanbyuzayat reported that the Ward Administrative Chairman is arbitrarily levying money from the people to reconstruct the district administration office that was destroyed by a mine explosion. Mon women’s groups are warning of increased child sexual abuse incidents in villages across Mon State with no action being taken by the authorities. Clashes have led to forced internal displacement in Burma as instability and tensions move people from their homes. Police and junta-backed militias continue to initiate door-to-door checks and arrest those on their wanted lists. Motorcycles, mobile devices, and money are confiscated and extorted from civilians at checkpoints stationed by the junta deliberately along critical routes. Civilians are forced to pay excessive bribes to retrieve their possessions. However, very few were able to afford the high costs. Torture remains rampant in Burma and across target areas where innocent civilians are subjected to gruelling, horrifying acts by the junta to extract information. The international community, including UN bodies and ASEAN, is not responding swiftly enough to the situation in Burma, which demands urgent attention and consequences for the junta. Military impunity remains deeply ingrained in the institutions representing the Tatmadaw, which only encourages the junta to continue perpetrating human rights violations. Children are targeted by the military junta and deprived of basic needs, including medical attention, food, education, and the right to live safely. The junta’s arbitrary arrests and unlawful detention are ongoing, as are warrantless raids and indiscriminate firing into civilian areas. Recommendations The Human Rights Foundation of Monland immediately calls for the following: A referral of the situation on the ground in Burma is to be made immediately by the United Nations Security Council to the International Criminal Court. Concerted and coordinated action by global actors for an urgently mandated international arms embargo which would prevent the free flow of weapons into the hands of the murderous junta. Aviation fuel sanctions to put an effective end to the airstrikes in Burma, which have contributed to significant loss of life, particularly among innocent civilians. Targeted sanctions on military junta officials and their families and holds on their financial assets and possessions undercut their ability to conduct corrupt business dealings abroad. Strengthened and renewed protection mechanisms grant civilians who are vulnerable and at risk of assault a position where they can access justice referral and accountability pathways. Renewed and continued funding support for local organizations responding to the needs of their communities on the ground. Crossborder aid pathways must be accessed, and all humanitarian aid must be in the hands of local actors. Foreign investors in Burma must immediately cease their operations and withdraw their involvement from all development projects in the country, including but not limited to airports, seaports, and cement businesses. An abrupt and immediate halt to the use of torture by the military junta, and further, we call for investigations to probe the unlawful deaths of civilians in Burma who have been tortured to death, as well as those who have been forced to endure trauma and long-term injuries as a result..."
Source/publisher: Human Rights Foundation of Monland
2023-05-30
Date of entry/update: 2023-05-30
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Description: "Key Event Details Location of Incident: Multiple villages in Sagaing Township (စစ်ကိုင်းမြို့နယ်), Sagaing Region (စစ်ကိုင်းတိုင်းဒေသကြီး): TheInn Sa Village (အင်းစရွာ) [22.118200, 95.694976] Taung Kyar Village (တောင်ကြားရွာ) [22.099079, 95.705261] Mu Thar Village (မူးသာရွာ) [22.106790, 95.658927] Ma Gyi Kone Village (မကျီးကုန်းရွာ) [22.108310, 95.665611] Taung Myo Village (တောင်မြို့ရွာ) [22.080650, 95.667137] Ywar Htaung Village (ရွာထောင်ရွာ)‌ [22.065469, 95.646293] Ywar Thit Village (ရွာသစ်ရွာ) [22.068687, 95.656561] Ta Pa Yin Kwe Village (တပုရင်းကွဲရွာ) [22.049150, 95.669937] Date/Time of Incident: 20 - 24 April 2023 Alleged Perpetrator(s) and/or Involvement: Light Infantry Division (LID) 99 People’s Defence Forces (PDF) Summary of Investigation: It is alleged that the Myanmar military’s LID 99 set fire to eight villages, causing the mass displacement of residents, following PDF activity in the area. Myanmar Witness verified (to varying levels) six of the eight fires through NASA’s Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS), satellite imagery analysis and analysis of user-generated content (UGC). They occurred in villages in close proximity to one another between 20-25 April 2023. Fires in Inn Sa and Ta Pa Yin Kwe villages were verified using FIRMS, Sentinel and UGC. Fires in Mu Thar and Taung Kyar villages allegedly destroyed 400 houses. Myanmar Witness assessed Sentinel imagery and believes that fires occurred between 20-25 April 2023. While no UGC could be geolocated of the remaining villages, FIRMS registered fire data in Ywar Thit on 23 April 2023, and Sentinel data reveals fire damage in Taung Myo and Ywar Htaung villages between 20-25 April. The fires in Ma Gyi Kone (မကျီးကုန်းရွာ) and Taung Kyar could not be verified due to a lack of UGC, FIRMS data or satellite imagery. Following these events, reports of mass displacement and a graphic beheading surfaced online. Myanmar Witness will continue to search for verifiable information. Summary On 20 April 2023, a column of around 100 military personnel entered Sagaing through Myinmu Township (မြင်းမူမြို့နယ်), according to Mandalay Free Press. Eight villages were allegedly set on fire between 20 - 24 April 2023 according to multiple media sources, reportedly causing mass displacement and the destruction of civilian infrastructure. According to Khit Thit, the systematic burning of villages by the military was retaliation for a People Defense Force (PDF) attack in Kywei Pon (ကြွယ်ပုံ) — an alleged Pyu Saw Htee aligned village — on 13 April 2023. The unnamed PDF group allegedly attacked the military’s Thingyan festival in Kywei Pon with a drone. According to a report by the Security Administration Council (SAC), eight people, including five children, were killed and 30 others were injured in the attack. Myanmar Witness has been unable to verify these claims. Myanmar Witness verified six of the eight fires through FIRMS, satellite imagery analysis and analysis of user-generated content (UGC). They occurred in villages in close proximity to one another between 20-25 April 2023. For example, Myanmar Witness geolocated UGC of the destruction of civilian infrastructure in Inn Sa (အင်းစ) and Ta Pa Yin Kwe (တပုရင်းကွဲရွာ) and chronolocated the UGC to within the time period investigated. It is claimed that another two villages, Mu Thar (မူးသာ) and Taung Kyar (တောင်ကြား), were set on fire on 21 April 2023, resulting in the destruction of 400 houses. By analysing the visible changes to the ground on Sentinel imagery, Myanmar Witness believes that it is likely that fires occurred between 20-25 April 2023. While no UGC could be geolocated of the remaining villages, FIRMS registered fire data in Ywar Thit (ရွာသစ်ရွာ) on 23 April 2023, and Sentinel data indicates fire damage in Taung Myo (တောင်မြို့ရွာ) and Ywar Htaung (ရွာထောင်ရွာ)‌ between 20-25 April. The fires in Ma Gyi Kone (မကျီးကုန်းရွာ) and Taung Kyar could not be verified due to a lack of UGC, FIRMS data or satellite imagery. Social media claims related to these fires, the displacement of civilians, and troop movements places responsibility for the fires and destruction with the Myanmar military. Myanmar Witness has collected these claims; however, has been unable to verify them. The fires occurred in villages in close proximity to one another, in an area where there was alleged PDF activity. Myanmar Witness continues to monitor information related to these events to build a picture for accountability. Myanmar Witness has been able to verify the following: Fire in Inn Sa. Geolocation of images of fire-damaged structures, including a monastery, which were likely taken on 21 April 2023. FIRMS and Sentinel data corroborates that Inn Sa was on fire on 21 April 2023. Fire in Ta Pa Yin Kwe. Geolocation of UGC showing burn damage to structures. FIRMS data indicates the fire damage occurred on 23 April 2023. Fire in Ywar Thit. FIRMS data indicates fires on 23 April 2023. Loss of vegetation consistent with fire damage in six of eight villages. Sentinel imagery shows a loss of vegetation, allegedly burned by the military, between 20 April 2023 and 25 April 2023. The investigation walkthrough Myanmar Witness has identified UGC, FIRMS data and satellite imagery which has allowed the verification of six out of eight reported fires. Additionally, Myanmar Witness has identified claims related to Myanmar military troop movements which could signal attribution for these fires; however, Myanmar Witness has been unable to verify these claims at present. The following map provides an overview of the investigated events..."
Source/publisher: Myanmar Witness
2023-05-29
Date of entry/update: 2023-05-29
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Military junta troops launched an airstrike and dropped bombs in Myawaddy, Kayin State and Demoso, Kayah State from May 15th to 21st. Junta troops also launched an airstrike, dropped bombs and cut off the Tele communication and mobile data in Mawlite Township, Sagaing Region.Military Junta troops arrested ‌about 60 civilians including the children from Kani Township and Shwebo Township in Sagaing Region as hostages. The military’s head of the prison in Thayarwady Prison established a terrorist group named Eagle Group in the prison and ordered them to commit human rights abuses against the relocated political prisoners by beating, torturing, and forcing labor in Thayarwady Prison. Military Junta troops and Pyusawhtee force arrested the locals, threatened and still extorted money in Shwebo Township and Kyunhla Township in Sagaing Region. In the East Bago region, the military troops arrested the civilians who were crossing the 4 miles gate which is part of the Taungoo- Thandaung Road and extorted from them.4 civilians died including a child and 2 were injured by the Military’s heavy and light attacks..."
Source/publisher: Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
2023-05-22
Date of entry/update: 2023-05-22
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Description: "It was hard not to feel a sense of déjà vu when the military stepped in to assume absolute power in February two years ago. It was like 1988 all over again. Demonstrators staged initially peaceful protests in the streets of cities and towns all over the country and were met with bullets from the military. Many were killed, and activists of various kinds fled to the border areas where they linked up with the ethnic rebel armies, which have been resisting central government control for decades. A government truly representing the people was set up and became active mostly in exile. A broader front including some of the ethnic armed groups was formed. And the struggle to topple an immensely unpopular military regime continued without anyone seeming to win the war. Those are the most common superficial observations—because there are fundamental differences between what happened after 1988 and now. As a journalist who has covered Myanmar affairs for more than 40 years—including the 1988 uprising and its aftermath—I have been approached by some close friends who have asked me to explain why the current uprising is not just a repeat of what happened in the late 1980s and early 1990s. First of all, mobile phones and the internet, with their associated digital media and email, did not exist in the 1980s. I was banned from visiting the country at that time, but managed with extreme difficulty to get news through a confidential network of raspy telephone lines and occasional letters, which were hand-delivered to me in Bangkok by trusted contacts. I would not have been able to write my articles for the now defunct Far Eastern Economic Review without the help of those contacts inside the country, and I am forever grateful to them for providing me with up-to-date information, often at great risk to themselves. Photos had to be taken by cumbersome cameras with film, and the rolls smuggled out of the country and developed in Thailand or elsewhere. Some grainy video recordings also made it to safety outside Myanmar, as did printed material ranging from flyers and posters to independently produced newspapers and journals. What has been preserved constitutes important historical material, but it is limited and cannot be compared with what is available online today. Now, nothing happens inside Myanmar—a protest, a gun battle, an assassination or an atrocity—without the outside world getting to know about it within a day or two, or even hours. Young people in Myanmar are very cyber savvy and continue to outsmart the military, which is much less adept at using online technology. At the same time, it is important to remember that the brutality the military unleashed on the protests in the cities and towns in 1988 was far worse than what was witnessed after the 2021 coup. When people took to the streets on Aug. 8, soldiers sprayed automatic rifle fire into crowds of unarmed people not only in Yangon, where even armored vehicles equipped with Bren machine guns were used to crush the demonstrations, but also in Bago, Sagaing, Taunggyi and many other places. An especially bloody and virtually unpublicized event took place in Sagaing on Aug. 11 when troops and policemen commanded by Kyaw Zwa, an army veteran and the local head of the ruling Burma Socialist Program Party as well as chairman of the Sagaing Division’s People’s Council, gunned down at least 100 demonstrators, among them many Buddhist monks. According to estimates by local medical personnel, thousands of civilians—not hundreds as often mentioned in later writings about the uprising—were gunned down by the military in 1988. It would have been 3,000 countrywide in August, and another 1,000 when the military stepped in to reassert their grip on power on Sept. 18, which was also when a new junta, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), was formed. The carnage prompted about 10,000 mostly young, urban activists to leave their homes and trek through the jungle and over the mountains to remote border areas controlled by the Karen National Union (KNU), the New Mon State Party (NMSP), the Karenni Army, and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA). Only a handful made it to areas in northeastern Shan State where the Communist Party of Burma had its strongholds, and no one went to the area on the Thai border controlled by the drug lord Khun Sa because they knew that he had a tacit business arrangement with the Myanmar military. In January 1996, Khun Sa also surrendered, dissolved his army and moved with his closest business associates to Yangon. The flight to the border led to the formation of a number of alliances and fronts. On Nov. 5, 1988, the All Burma Students’ Democratic Front (ABSDF) was set up at a meeting in Kawmorrah, a KNU camp on the Thai border (which now, incidentally, is called Shwe Kokko, a new town under the control of a junta-allied Border Guard Force—and where many of the newly built casinos are located). Two weeks later, the ethnic Burman resistance and several ethnic armed groups formed the Democratic Alliance of Burma (DAB). Then came the May 18, 1990 election, which resulted in a resounding victory for the National League for Democracy (NLD). But the assembly that was elected was never convened. Instead, the SLORC began arresting elected MPs—and more pro-democracy activists fled to the border. On Dec. 18 that year, they formed the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB), which in turn led to the formation of a broader front including NLD exiles, members of the NCGUB and the ethnic armed groups called the National Council of the Union of Burma, or NCUB. After the NCGUB was formed, I wrote a then-much-criticized article for the Far Eastern Economic Review titled “Cry of Desperation”. I stressed that no foreign country was likely to recognize the border-based “cabinet” and it was unlikely that it would have any impact on the situation inside Myanmar. The resistance was holed up in camps along Myanmar’s borders and the plethora of groups and acronyms also made sympathizers outside the country confused; who should they listen to and cooperate with? Who was who in the alphabet soup of armies and fronts? I visited the resistance camps on the Myanmar side of the border with Thailand several times and also went to Mangshi and Ruili in Yunnan, China, where I met activists based in Kachin State. It was, to be absolutely frank, not an encouraging sight. I had no reason to doubt the sincerity of the young ABSDF activists who had given up everything to fight for what they believed in. But the way in which they bore uniforms adorned with flashes and insignia, and had their organization structured into numbered military units, made them no different from other armed groups fighting in the jungle-clad frontier areas. And it did not last long. The ABSDF soon split into competing factions and, for a while, there were even two ABSDFs. The activists in Kachin State even turned against each other; one group accused another of being government agents and killed them in a grisly massacre. The DAB collapsed when several of the ethnic armed groups entered into ceasefire agreements with the military. The NCGUB never became more than an acronym. In the mid-1990s, I visited Dr. Cynthia Maung, an ethnic Karen doctor who ran—and still runs—a clinic in the Thai border town of Mae Sot. I asked her what kind of patients from the ABSDF she had received over the years, and she summed it up succinctly: “Well, the first year, it was mostly malaria cases. Then came those with gunshot wounds. Now it’s mostly deliveries.” The activists were young people from urban areas who were not used to the hard life in the jungle, and became sick from malaria and other diseases. Those who were determined to fight and still had some strength left ventured out onto the battlefield, and were often wounded. In the end, many settled down in Mae Sot and other border towns, had children and raised families. Many former activists also ended up in exile, primarily in Europe, Australia, Canada and the United States. What remained of the ABSDF finally gave up the armed struggle and decided to focus on disseminating information about the dictatorship and networking with international NGOs. But that, curiously, did not prevent the ABSDF from being one of eight “armed groups” which signed a so-called “Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement” (NCA) with the military in October 2015. Needless to say, of the signatories, only two—the KNU and the Restoration Council of Shan State—had armies worth the name. On Feb. 18, 2018, the government proudly announced that two more groups, the Lahu Democratic Union and the NMSP, had signed the NCA. But the Lahu outfit is little more than an NGO based in Thailand, and today’s Mon army is tiny compared to what it once was. The NMSP had, in any event, entered into a ceasefire agreement with the military in June 1995, so it was unclear what difference it would make. Although the NCA is a signed agreement and those struck in the late 1980s and 1990s were not (the sole exception being the ceasefire with the KIA, which insisted on having it formalized in writing), there is no reason—and there never was one—to believe that the military would be seriously interested in finding a peaceful, political solution to Myanmar’s civil wars. The KIA came under attack in June 2011 and fighting broke out between the military and the KNU as well as the Chin National Front, another NCA signatory, shortly after the February 2021 coup. It is true that there are some striking similarities between the situation after the 1988 uprising and today. The National Unity Government (NUG), set up by elected MPs and others in April 2021, seems to mirror the NCGUB, and the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC), which combines Burman and ethnic armies, looks like a contemporary version of the NCUB. But a closer look at today’s resistance reveals that the most obvious difference between then and now, access to the internet, is not the only one. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the activists actually believed that some foreign “uncles” would come and support them. After all, the US Congress had issued statements condemning the dictatorship, and so had the European Union, Australia, and other democracies around the world. Today’s fighters for democracy seem to have no such illusions. They know that Myanmar is not Ukraine and no weapons or other material support will come from abroad. Relying on their own resources, they are fighting with home-made guns and weapons captured from the military and the police, and they have also brought the war to the Myanmar heartland. Although many of the resistance fighters were trained by the Karen or Kachin armies and did get some weapons from them as well, it’s no longer a jungle-based insurgency. Financial support for the struggle comes from the many Myanmar nationals living in exile, including through some imaginative methods like a popular online video game, which also serves as a propaganda tool. It’s now or never. The resistance in the heartland is often lumped together as the “People’s Defense Forces”, or PDFs, but that doesn’t mean that they are under any effective central command. Nor do they necessarily take orders from the NUG. But that also makes them harder to crush, because the military can’t find out who the leaders are, and how and where they operate. There are dozens of local resistance armies that depend on popular support in their respective areas and given the nationwide, deep-rooted hatred of the military, it is not difficult for the activists to mingle with crowds anywhere. It is obvious that the generals messed with the wrong generation when they staged their ill-fated coup. Another important difference is that the economy was in a shambles after the 1988 uprising but, to the surprise of many, the SLORC (renamed the State Peace and Development Council in 1997) managed to not only rebuild but, by attracting foreign investment, also create a fledgling capitalist system to replace the old “socialism” that had prevailed from 1962 to 1988. The economic fallout of the 2021 coup is a severe crisis. Foreign investors are leaving and those who remain are reeling under the effects of boycotts and sanctions. In this area, digital media have made a decisive impact. The true extent of the 1988 massacres was little known outside the country, and although some sanctions were imposed even then, they were limited and had little or no effect. Today, the viciousness of the military is well documented, and anyone doing business with them is named and shamed on the internet. The adversary the pro-democracy forces are facing is also not the same as before. Junta leader and self-appointed prime minister Senior General Min Aung Hlaing lacks the capabilities and military skills of his predecessors. Moreover, he is uncharismatic and every time he appears in public or on the TV, he appears nervous and unsure of himself. But if he is replaced, it would most likely be by someone who is more hardline than he is, such as Vice Senior General Soe Win, who often oversees operations, including devastating air strikes, against any identifiable resistance stronghold; more often than not, these turn out to be villages and entire towns. The military may be more isolated from the public at large than ever before and it has become the country’s most hated institution. There is also little doubt that the various resistance forces continue to enjoy popular support, and two years after the coup they have not given up. Rather, fighting across the country is intensifying. But there is a huge problem facing the resistance forces: They do not today have the weaponry that is needed to defeat the well-armed military with all the firepower it has at its disposal, the most devastating being air power. The military may not win the war, but they also cannot lose. And mediation efforts by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have failed and even backfired on the bloc as it has exposed its weaknesses. Guided by two cardinal principles, noninterference and consensus, there is actually nothing it can do when there is a crisis in a member country. International peacemakers and conflict-resolutionists have time and again shown that their efforts have been a waste of time and money; the generals simply won’t listen and, even if they pretend to, they won’t take any advice from such outsiders. That brings us to the sad reality: the military has been in power under different guises since General Ne Win’s coup in 1962, and nothing is likely to change unless and until there is a split at the top or a mutiny within the ranks. That was true in the late 1980s and remains so today. But such a development could also lead to an even bloodier civil war, a potentially devastating scenario for which the outside world and all those involved in Myanmar must be prepared. Nevertheless, if the military remains united, the decades-long civil wars will continue to bleed the country for years to come—and the main victims will be the people of Myanmar, who are suffering under the brutal rule of a power-obsessed clique of men in green..."
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Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2023-05-08
Date of entry/update: 2023-05-08
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Telegram တွင်လည်း နေ့စဥ် စစ်ရေးဆိုင်ရာသတင်းအကျဥ်းချုပ်ကို ဖတ်ရှု့နိုင်ပါသည်။ https://t.me/modnugmyanmar ရန်သူ့စစ်တပ်၏ အကြမ်းဖက်မှူများ၊ တပ်တည်၊ တပ်လှုပ် သတင်းများ၊ အကြမ်းဖက်ထောက်တိုင်များ၏ သတင်းအချက်အလက်များစသည့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်နှင့်ပတ်သက်သော သတင်းများကို အောက်ပါအတိုင်း ပေးပို့နိုင်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
2023-05-04
Date of entry/update: 2023-05-04
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Description: "Introduction 1.16th April 2023 marked the second anniversary of the formation of the National Unity Government (NUG) with the consent of National Unity Consultative Committee (NUCC). The NUCC is a coalition of political forces representing Myanmar’s people. It includes the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, whose de jure legitimacy rests on electoral victory in the 2020 general election. The NUCC also includes representatives of ethnic revolutionary organizations, civil society, and other political forces with de facto legitimacy derived from their high level of public support. Domestic and international observers deemed the 2020 general election free and fair. Turnout was 75.96%. Over the two years, the NUG has exercised its authority as a legitimate government, recognized and backed by the Myanmar public and has worked hard to reward the public’s trust in cooperation with all the revolutionary forces. International Relations 2. In the last two years, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been meeting with ASEAN, EU and officials from many other countries, informing them of the current political conditions of Myanmar. The Ministry has also worked consistently to mobilize humanitarian aid, seek economic sanctions against the military junta and their family members, seek prosecutions, and help restore democracy in Myanmar. Meetings have also been held with foreign ministers, members of the United States Congress and Senate, and the National Security Adviser to United States President Joe Biden. Not only has the NUG been able to open representative offices in eight countries, including the United States, United Kingdom, Czech Republic, Australia, France, Norway, South Korea, and Japan, it has also managed to give assistance and protection to resident Myanmar citizens, in liaison with relevant authorities in these countries. In addition, it advocated for the incorporation of the Burma Act 2022 into National Defence Authorisation Act 2023. It has also established liaison with parliaments in seven countries. The NUG is also in the process of implementing the Policy on Rohingya in Arakan State. As announced in 2021, NUG policy is that Rohingya will be repatriated with dignity and of free will and be given equal rights in all aspects of law. The NUG has also systematically collected evidence and collated data on 171 atrocities committed by the military junta. These include crimes against humanity and mass killings of ethnic groups. The NUG has submitted the evidence to the UN’s Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM) of the Human Rights Council so that justice can be served in the post revolution period. On 1st February it announced that all objections against the case of Ethnic Cleansing of Rohingya People brought against Myanmar by Gambia in the International Court of Justice were withdrawn. With the help of expert organisations with special interests in universal jurisdiction, cases have been brought against the military junta in Germany, Argentina, and Turkey. There will be more prosecutions brought forward in other countries with their help. A case has also been filed against the military council in the International Criminal Court in accordance with the Rome Statute Penal code 12 (3) on 17th July 2021. We will continue to strive to achieve truth and justice. Military Affairs and Defections to the People’s Embrace 3.Within this two-year period, we have been able to assemble a fighting force with manpower stronger than our enemy by, with more than 300 battalions of the People’s Defence Forces (PDF) plus village-based people’s defence forces in 250 townships. By becoming allied with Ethnic Revolutionary Organisations, we have been able to establish a Central Command and Coordination Committee (C3C) and Joint Coordination Committee (J2C), aiming to develop a systematic chain of command in each theatre of the conflict. With monetary help from the Myanmar public and by allying with the Ethnic Revolutionary Forces we have been able to arm the PDFs to a certain standard. We have also been successful in manufacturing arms and munitions ourselves. However, to be able to achieve victory against a well-armed enemy, we are trying hard to source much-needed anti-aircraft weapons. Based on the guerrilla warfare ethos of village-based forces encircling towns, we have been able to make territorial gains in villages and village tracts with the aim of threatening townships and districts held by the enemy and disrupting their line of communications and chain of command as the next step. What started as a phase of strategic defence, has now progressed to the phase of strategic equilibrium. For us to move on to the next phase of strategic counter-offensive we are in the process of trying to acquire strategic armaments. According to our records, during the phase of strategic defence, there was an estimated loss of enemy’s 30,000 lives lost, with 10,000 or so injured. In addition, 13,000 men and women have defected from the army and police force to the public side, acting on their dissent against the coup. Development of Interim Local Government 4. After the development of Interim Local Public Administration Central Committee and its policy advancement in September 2021, to date the NUG has been able to establish Township People’s Administration in 171 Townships in the NUG controlled Free Zones and District level Administrations in 10 districts as well. Administrative offices were set up at the same time as the People’s Police Force was formed for the safety of the public, on 7th June 2022. A 169-strong police force in interim administrative areas is in place, where basic police training takes place together with criminal investigations and gathering of information on the military council with the intention of averting their atrocities. A taxation system has also been instituted in these areas and 10 billion Myanmar Kyats revenue has been collected. The income from taxation has been used for defence and the rebuilding of the local area and humanitarian aid. Regular discussions and consultations with State Consultative Councils and Committees Representing Hluttaw take place to ensure that regional administrations take place in respective in Regions, Divisions and Federal units. On 5th June 2021 the NUG organised and formed the Ministry of Justice with civil servants, judiciary officials, judges and academics who were all part of the Civil Disobedience Movement in order to afford justice and uphold the rule of law for the public during the interim and transition periods. At the moment, in this interim period, there are 25 township law courts with 118 judges who are able to pass judgement on criminal and civil cases. Alliance Relationship 5. The various ministries of the NUG are continually collaborating with our ethnic allies on various aspects of management. This cooperation has not only improved relationships, but also created a strong bond. The Alliance Relationship Committee (ARC) was formed on 4th January 2022 and together all political, military, security, defence and administrative concerns were being coordinated and resolved. The Alliance Relationship Committee, collectively with Ethnic Organisations including the Ethnic Revolutionary Organisations, political parties, revolutionary forces and various consultative councils have all been in consultation and have worked together in matters ranging from humanitarian aid to military affairs, defence, health and education. There have been conferences and meetings to achieve more unity and consensus to rid the country of military dictatorship and work towards building a future federal democracy. Public Services 6. A force of over 100,000 teachers and education officials, who took part in the Civil Disobedience Movement are providing primary education, higher education, vocational training, and teachers’ training nationally, either through online teaching or face to face on the ground teaching and use of digital-based learning methods. There are 70 online schools, 5000 schools on the ground where face-to-face teaching takes place with 60,000 teachers and a student population of over 750,000. There are also pupils using the Digital-based learning methods. There are 304 townships where township education boards have been formed with links to the Ministry of Education. Education Policy of Federal Democracy is being drafted by a combined committee of the NUG-NUCC. Primary Education Congress and Higher Education Congresses have been held and the motions passed at these meetings are being implemented. Basic Education Completion Assessment (BECA) was held February 2023 and April 2023 and 23,000 candidates took part online and 38,877 students sat for the assessment at 329 centres. NUG was able to provide humanitarian assistance worth of 66 billion Myanmar Kyat (USD 2.3 million). This food assistance reaches over 200,000 internally displaced each month. Temporary accommodation, such as tents, has been provided for and to date a total of 2239 tents had been provided for. 798 bomb shelters have been built in schools for pupils to take protection from the terrorist council’s air strikes, and 117 million Kyats has been spent from donation money. Educational leaflets were also printed to inform people about the full range of dangers. 352 aid workers from different states and regions were trained on community level harm reduction and emergency response measures. A needs assessment on humanitarian aid was carried out in 39 townships within Sagaing and Magway divisions, where the number of internally displaced is highest. The assessment has been shared with donor countries, the United Nations, and the ASEAN. In order to reduce civilian casualties and to provide safe humanitarian aid corridors, an inclusive humanitarian aid forum is being established with the help of allied ethnic forces, civil society organisations and allied countries. The “Mind Healer” social media Facebook page, a mental health support program has assisted 823 civilians and 422 CDM civil servants. Support has also been provided to 469 political prisoners, including some transgender prisoners, 400 adolescent political prisoners, 111,914 pregnant and lactating women, and 3,000 people those who needed emergency safe houses and camp training. Data on crimes committed by the military council against children are being documented and reported. The dissemination of information on children’s rights and the prevention of recruitment of child soldiers are widely done. The medical and surgical treatment of people wounded by the military council, providing prosthesis to amputees and performing emergency caesarean sections to deliver babies are all part of the care that is being provided by NUG. The military council is conducting air strikes against hospitals and clinics, as well as ground raids, attacks and arson. To prevent aerial attacks and offer emergency aid, we are providing the necessary training in first aid and procuring emergency kits. In 198 Townships (60% of the townships in the country), there are 66 hospitals, 159 clinics, 250 mobile clinics providing routine and emergency health care with a total of 3,832 health workers of whom 78% are professionals who joined the Civil Disobedience Movement. In addition, the ethnic health organizations have a significant health work force. The total healthcare expenditure was US$ 2,000,000. Civil Disobedience Movement 7. In order to support all civil servants who take part in the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), the CDM Success Committee was formed on 27th April 2021 with Union Ministers, deputy Ministers, representatives from CRPH and an extensive network of CDMers. This committee submitted the September 2021 CDM Report to UN credential, published the one-year anniversary CDM Information Report and collected the CDM surveys. In addition, budget calculations are being carried out to award the CDM prizes and to make salary payments. About 4,000 million Myanmar Kyats was used to support the emergency needs of 20% of the CDM heroes out of all CDM heroes (210,639) connected with the CDM Success Committee. Ministries are also supporting the CDM staff of their relevant ministries. A CDM/Non-CDM policy was drafted in September 2021 and was approved by the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) on 20th January 2023. The CDM Success Committee has now formed a sub-committee to draft the CDM related civil servant law according to the paragraph (3) of the approved “Civil Servant CDM Policy”. Finance & Business Sector 8. The Ministry of Commerce and other ministries, revolutionary forces and strike groups conducted a public boycott campaign of and export prevention of military products. A total fund of 171,677,440 Myanmar Kyat was raised to offer small and medium enterprise loans and for the revolution. The Ministry of Planning, Finance and Investment is stopping the fund flow to the military council, while also raising funds required to fulfil the people’s wish of establishing a federal democracy union. We are working closely with the public, international governments, agencies, revolutionary forces, civil society organisations and community-based organisations. We have published the list of military associated commodities targeted by the boycott, with the aim of reducing the flow of funds to the military council. Regarding the income generation for the necessary funds for the development of the Federal Democratic Union, the following table describes the breakdown of incomes from Spring Lottery, United Bond, End of Dictatorship, Early Partnership Program, NUG pay, Income tax, Revenue and penalties of the Ministry of Planning, Finance and Investment. Table showing National Unity Government’s 2-year Income and Expenditure No Period Programs Income Expenses Comment USD MMK 1 Apr 2021-Apr 2023 Spring Lottery 918,800,000 CDM support 30% was used for Spring Lottery prizes and 70% was used for CDM support 2 Apr 2021-Apr 2023 United Bond 48,000,000 NUG Ministries, Revolutionary forces Cabinet, Security and Defence, Finance Commission agreed projects 3 Apr 2021-Apr 2023 End of Dictatorship 13,500,000 4 Apr 2021-Apr 2023 Early Partnership Program 94,648,000 5 Apr 2021-Apr 2023 NUG Pay 12 billion NUG Pay users DMMK Management team is overseeing the cash flow 6 Apr 2021-Apr 2023 Revenue, tax, Penalties 10 billion Distributed and used according to the NUG Revenue Policy Expenses made as per supervision of Interim Local Governance Central Committee Summary 9. The National Unity Government will continuously analyse its successes and challenges, in order to implement the one-year plan. We are committed to implement the processes that will determine the final battle. We hereby affirm that the National Unity Government, which is based on the will of the entire people, will continue along the path laid out in the Federal Democracy Charter principles towards a Federal Democratic Union, which is the goal of all the revolutionary forces..."
Source/publisher: National Unity Government of Myanmar
2023-05-03
Date of entry/update: 2023-05-03
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "၁။ ယနေ့သည် ဗုဒ္ဓဘာသာဝင်များ၏ အလေးအမြတ်ထားရာ နေ့ထူးနေ့မြတ်တစ်ရက်ဖြစ် သလို ဗုဒ္ဓသက္ကရာဇ် ၂၅၆၇ ခုနှစ်သို့ ကူးပြောင်းရောက်ရှိရာ နေ့တစ်နေ့လည်းဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ဤမွန်မြတ်သော နေ့ထူးနေ့မြတ် အချိန်အခါသမယတွင် ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတမြန်မာ နိုင်ငံတော်၏ နိုင်ငံသူ၊ နိုင်ငံသားများအားလုံး ကိုယ်စိတ်နှစ်ဖြာကျန်းမာ ချမ်းသာကြပါစေ ကြောင်း မေတ္တာပို့သလျက် နှုတ်ခွန်းဆက်သအပ်ပါသည်။ ၂။ ဗုဒ္ဓနေ့တွင် အလောင်းတော်ဖွားမြင်တော်မူခြင်း၊ သဗ္ဗေညုတဉာဏ်တော်ကိုရရှိခြင်း၊ ပရိ နိဗ္ဗာန် စံဝင်တော်မူခြင်းဟူသော ဖြစ်စဉ်များသည် ကဆုန်လပြည့်နေ့တွင်သာ တိုက်ဆိုင် စွာ ဖြစ်ပေါ်လာခဲ့ခြင်းကြောင့် အလွန်ထူးခြားသော နေ့ထူးနေ့မြတ်တစ်နေ့ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ လောကတွင် အကြောင်းအကျိုးမှ လွတ်ကင်းပြီး မည်သည့်အရာမျှ ဖြစ်ပေါ်ခြင်းမရှိ ကြောင်း လက်တွေ့ကျင့်ကြံသိရှိတော်မူခဲ့ပါသည်။ ၃။ မြတ်စွာဘုရားရှင်သည် သဗ္ဗေညုတဉာဏ်ကို ရရှိတော်မူပြီး နှစ်လအကြာ ဝါဆိုလပြည့် နေ့မှ စတင်ကာ သူ၏ အယူဝါဒများကို လောကတခွင် ပျံ့နှံ့အောင် ကြိုးစားတော်မူခဲ့ ပါသည်။ သံသရာမှ လွတ်မြောက်ရာလမ်းကို မိမိကိုယ်တိုင်လည်း ရရှိအောင် ကြိုးစား အားထုတ်ခဲ့သလို သတ္တဝါအများကိုလည်း ထိုလမ်းကို ကောင်းမွန်စွာ လျှောက်လှမ်းနိုင် အောင် လမ်းညွှန်ပြသခဲ့ပါသည်။ ရှေ့ဆောင်ပြီး ကိုယ်တိုင်ကျင့်ကြံခဲ့သလို အများကို လည်း ကျင့်ကြံစေခဲ့ပါသည်။ မိမိသွားလိုသော၊ မိမိရယူလိုသောအရာကို ကိုယ်တိုင်ရယူ မှသာ အောင်မြင်ရယူပိုင်ဆိုင်နိုင်ကြောင်းကို လက်တွေ့အားဖြင့် ကိုယ်တိုင်ကျင့်ကြံကာ ဟောကြားတော်မူခဲ့ပါသည်။ ၄။ ထို့ကြောင့် မိမိတို့လိုလားတောင့်တအပ်သော နိုင်ငံတော်သစ်ကို ကြိုးပမ်းရာတွင် မြန်မာ ပြည်သူ၊ ပြည်သားများ၏ ကြိုးစားအားထုတ်မှုသာ အဓိကကျသည်မှာ ဧကန်မလွဲပင်ဖြစ် ပြီး ပြည်သူများ၏ မဆုတ်မနစ်တိုက်ပွဲဝင်မှုများကြောင့် ယခုဆင်နွှဲနေသော နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးသည် မုချဧကန်အောင်မြင်မည်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးတွင် ပါဝင်ရင်း အသက်ပေးလှူသွားကြသော မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသူနိုင်ငံသားများ မြင့်မြတ်ရာ ဘုံဌာနတွင် ရောက်ရှိ ခံစားနိုင်ကြပါစေကြောင်း ဆုတောင်းမေတ္တာပို့သလျက် ကဆုန်လပြည့် (ဗုဒ္ဓနေ့) အခါသမယတွင် ဗုဒ္ဓမြတ်စွာ၏ စံနမူနာပြုထိုက်သော အကျင့်တရားများကို ကျင့်ကြံအား ထုတ်ပွားများနိုင်ကြပါစေကြောင်း ဆန္ဒပြုရင်း ဤသဝဏ်လွှာကို ပေးပို့အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher: National Unity Government of Myanmar
2023-05-03
Date of entry/update: 2023-05-03
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Format : pdf
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Description: "Telegram တွင်လည်း နေ့စဥ် စစ်ရေးဆိုင်ရာသတင်းအကျဥ်းချုပ်ကို ဖတ်ရှု့နိုင်ပါသည်။ https://t.me/modnugmyanmar ရန်သူ့စစ်တပ်၏ အကြမ်းဖက်မှူများ၊ တပ်တည်၊ တပ်လှုပ် သတင်းများ၊ အကြမ်းဖက်ထောက်တိုင်များ၏ သတင်းအချက်အလက်များစသည့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်နှင့်ပတ်သက်သော သတင်းများကို အောက်ပါအတိုင်း ပေးပို့နိုင်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
2023-05-03
Date of entry/update: 2023-05-03
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
Size: 651.41 KB
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Description: "၁။ ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ်၊ ဧပြီလ ၁၆ ရက်နေ့သည် ပြည်တွင်းပြည်ပ ရွေးကောက်ပွဲလေ့လာစောင့် ကြည့်ရေး အဖွဲ့အစည်းများက လွတ်လပ်၍တရားမျှတသော ရွေးကောက်ပွဲအဖြစ် အသိအမှတ်ပြုခဲ့ကြပြီး မဲပေးပိုင်ခွင့် ရှိသူဦးရေ၏ ၇၅.၉၆ ရာခိုင်နှုန်းမဲပေးခဲ့ကြသည့် ၂၀၂၀ ရွေးကောက်ပွဲရလဒ်ကို အခြေခံကာ ပေါ်ပေါက်လာခဲ့သည့် ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော် ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီက ၂၀၂၀ ရွေးကောက်ပွဲမှရရှိသော လူထုထောက်ခံမှုအရ တရားဝင်မှု (De Jure Legitimacy) ကိုကိုယ်စားပြုသည့် နိုင်ငံရေးအင်အားစုများနှင့် အခြားနည်းလမ်းများဖြင့် ရရှိသော လူထုထောက်ခံမှုအရ တရားဝင်မှု (De Facto Legitimacy) ကိုကိုယ်စားပြုသော နိုင်ငံရေးအင်အားစု များ၏ တပ်ပေါင်းစုအဖြစ်ဖွဲ့စည်းခဲ့သည့် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေး အတိုင်ပင်ခံကောင်စီ၏ သဘောတူညီမှုဖြင့် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရကို ဖွဲ့စည်းကြောင်း ကြေညာခဲ့သည်မှာ (၂) နှစ်တင်းတင်းပြည့်ခဲ့ပြီဖြစ်သည်။ အဆိုပါ (၂) နှစ်တာကာလအတွင်း အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရသည် ပြည်သူလူထုက ပေးအပ်ထားသော ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်၏ တရားဝင်အစိုးရတစ်ရပ်အဖြစ် တာဝန်များကို တော်လှန်ရေးအင်အားစု များအားလုံးနှင့် လက်တွဲကာ ဦးလည်မသုန် ကြိုးစားထမ်းရွက်လျက်ရှိကြောင်း ပြည်သူလူထုထံသို့ အစီရင်ခံ တင်ပြအပ်ပါသည်။ နိုင်ငံတကာဆက်ဆံရေး ၂။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၏ (၂) နှစ်တာအစိုးရသက်တမ်းတွင် နိုင်ငံခြားရေး၀န်ကြီးဌာနသည် အာဆီယံ, EU အပါအ၀င် နိုင်ငံတကာအစိုးရအဖွဲ့ တာဝန်ရှိသူများနှင့် တွေ့ဆုံခဲ့ပြီး မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ ပကတိအခြေအနေများကို နိုင်ငံတကာကသိရှိစေရေး၊ လူသားချင်းစာနာထောက်ထားမှု အကူအညီများရရှိရေး၊ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေး အစိုးရအား တရားဝင်အစိုးရအဖြစ် အသိအမှတ်ပြုရေး၊ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုနှင့် ၄င်းတို့၏ဆက်စပ် မိသားစုဝင်များအား စီးပွားရေးအရပိတ်ဆို့ အရေးယူနိုင်ရေး၊ နိုင်ငံတကာခုံရုံးတွင် ဥပဒေနှင့်အညီ ထိရောက်စွာ အရေးယူဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်ရေးနှင့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင် ဒီမိုကရေစီပြန်လည်ဖော်ဆောင်နိုင်ရေး တို့အတွက် တောင်းဆို မှုများ၊ ဆွေးနွေးမှုများကို တစိုက်မတ်မတ်လုပ်ဆောင်ခဲ့ပါသည်။ နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီးများ၊ လွှတ်တော်ကော်မတီ ဥက္ကဌများ၊ လွှတ်တော်အမတ်များ၊ US သမ္မတဂျိုးဘိုင်ဒင်၏ အမျိုးသားလုံခြုံရေးအကြံပေး တို့နှင့်ပါ တွေ့ဆုံဆွေးနွေးမှုများ ဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်ခဲ့သည်။ အမေရိကန်ပြည်ထောင်စု၊ ယူကေနိုင်ငံ၊ ချက်သမ္မတနိုင်ငံ၊ သြစတြေးလျနိုင်ငံ၊ ပြင်သစ်နိုင်ငံ၊ နော်ဝေနိုင်ငံ၊ တောင်ကိုရီးယားနိုင်ငံ၊ ဂျပန်နိုင်ငံစတဲ့ နိုင်ငံပေါင်း (၈) နိုင်ငံတွင် ကိုယ်စားလှယ်ရုံးများကို ဖွင့်လှစ်နိုင်ခဲ့ပြီး အကြောင်းအမျိုးမျိုးကြောင့် နေရပ်စွန့်ခွာခဲ့ရသော မြန်မာ နိုင်ငံသားများအရေးနှင့် ရွှေ့ပြောင်းပြည်သူများ၊ ပြည်ပတွင် အခက်အခဲကြုံနေရသော ပြည်သူများကို အကာအကွယ်ပေးနိုင်ရေး သက်ဆိုင်ရာနိုင်ငံများနှင့် ချိတ်ဆက်ဆောင်ရွက်ခဲ့သည်။ ထို့အပြင် အမေရိကန် ပြည်ထောင်စု အမျိုးသားကာကွယ်ရေး လုပ်ပိုင်ခွင့်အက်ဥပေဒ ၂၀၂၃ တွင် The Burma Act of 2022 ကို ပေါင်းစပ်ထည့်သွင်းနိုင်ရန် ကြိုးပမ်းခြင်းနှင့် နိုင်ငံပေါင်း (၇) နိုင်ငံရှိ လွှတ်တော်များနှင့် ချိတ်ဆက်ဆောင်ရွက် ခြင်းများကို ပြုလုပ်ခဲ့ပါသည်။ ရိုဟင်ဂျာအရေးနှင့်ပတ်သက်၍ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအနေဖြင့် ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်က ထုတ်ပြန်ထားခဲ့သည့် “ရခိုင်ပြည်နယ်ရှိ ရိုဟင်ဂျာပြည်သူများဆိုင်ရာ မူ၀ါဒသဘောထား” နှင့်အညီ ရိုဟင်ဂျာပြည်သူများ မိမိတို့နေရပ်သို့ မိမိတို့ကိုယ်ပိုင်ဆန္ဒသဘောဖြင့် ဂုဏ်သိက္ခာရှိရှိ ပြန်လည်အခြေချ နေထိုင်ရေးနှင့် ဥပဒေအရ တန်းတူအခွင့်အရေးရနိုင်ရန်အတွက် လုပ်ဆောင်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။ စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ ရက်စက်ယုတ်မာမှုများအတွက် ဤတော်လှန်ရေး ကာလအလွန်တွင် တရားမျှတ မှုရရှိရေးအတွက် ၎င်းတို့ကျုးလွန်နေသည့် စစ်ရာဇဝတ်မှုများနှင့် မျိုးနွယ်စုအလိုက် သတ်ဖြတ်မှုများကို စနစ်တကျ မှတ်တမ်းကောက်ယူ၊ ပြုစုသိမ်းဆည်းပြီး သက်သေခိုင်လုံသော (၁၇၁) မှုကို မြန်မာနိုင်ငံဆိုင်ရာ ကုလသမဂ္ဂစုံစမ်းစစ်ဆေးရေးအဖွဲ့ (IIMM) ထံသို့ပေးပို့ပေးပြီး ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာတရားရုံး (ICJ) တွင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံနဲ့ ဂမ်ဘီယာနိုင်ငံတို့အကြား တရားရင်ဆိုင်နေဆဲအမှုဖြစ်သော ရိုဟင်ဂျာပြည်သူများ အပေါ် လူမျိုးတုန်းသတ်ဖြတ်မှုနှင့်ပတ်သက်ပြီး ကနဦးကန့်ကွက်ခဲ့မှုအားလုံးကို ပြန်လည်ရုတ်သိမ်းကြောင်း ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ (၁) ရက် ၂၀၂၂ တွင် ပေးပို့အကြောင်းကြားခဲ့ပါသည်။ ကျွမ်းကျင်သော အဖွဲ့အစည်းများနှင့် ပူးပေါင်းပြီး နိုင်ငံ၏တရားစီရင်ရေးဆိုင်ရာယန္တရား (universal jurisdiction) ကိုအသုံးပြုကာ စစ်ကောင်စီအား ဂျာမနီ၊ အာဂျင်တီးနားနှင့် တူရကီတို့တွင် တရားစွဲဆိုထားပြီး အခြားနိုင်ငံများတွင်လည်း ဆက်လက်စွဲဆိုနိုင်ရန် ကြိုးပမ်းနေသည်။ အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာရာဇဝတ်ခုံရုံး (ICC) တွင်လည်း စစ်ကောင်စီအား အမှုတင်သွင်း အရေးယူနိုင်ရန် ရောမသဘောတူစာချုပ် (Rome Statute) ၏ ပုဒ်မ ၁၂(၃) နှင့် အညီတရားစီရင်မှုကိုလက်ခံကြောင်း ဇူလိုင်လ (၁၇) ရက် ၂၀၂၁ တွင်တင်သွင်းခဲ့ကာ အမှန်တရားနဲ့တရားမျှတမှုကိုရရှိရန် ဆက်လက်ကြိုးပမ်း ဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည်ဖြစ်သည်။ စစ်ရေးနှင့် ပြည်သူ့ရင်ခွင်ခိုလှုံမှုအခြေအနေ ၃။ တစ်နိုင်ငံလုံးတွင် PDF တပ်ရင်းနှင့် စစ်ကြောင်း စုစုပေါင်း (၃၀၀) ကျော် ၊ ရပ်ရွာအခြေပြု ပြည်သူ့ ကာကွယ်ရေးအဖွဲ့ (ပကဖ) များကို မြို့နယ်ပေါင်း(၂၅၀)ကျော်တွင် စနစ်တကျဖွဲ့စည်းတည်ထောင်ထား ပြီး လူအင်အား (Man Power) အရ မိမိတို့၏တိုက်ခိုက်ရေးအင်အားသည် ရန်သူ့ထက် “သာလွန် အင်အား” ဖြစ်အောင် ဤအချိန် (၂) နှစ်အတွင်း စုဖွဲ့တည်ဆောက်နိုင်ခဲ့သည်။ မဟာမိတ် တိုင်းရင်းသားတော်လှန်ရေးအဖွဲ့များနှင့် အတူပူးပေါင်းကာ ဗဟိုကွပ်ကဲရေးနှင့် ပေါင်းစပ် ညှိနှိုင်းရေးကော်မတီ (Central Command and Coordination Committee - C3C) ၊ ပူးပေါင်းညှိနှိုင်းရေးကော်မတီ (Joint Coordination Committee - J2C) တို့ကို စုဖွဲ့လုပ်ဆောင်လျက်ရှိသည်။ အစိုးရသက်တမ်း (၂) နှစ်တာ ကာလအတွင်း မဟာမိတ် ERO များနှင့် ခုခံတော်လှန်စစ် ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်မှုများမှတဆင့် စနစ်ကျသော ထိန်းချုပ်ကွပ်ကဲမှု စနစ်တစ်ခုအောက်တွင် စစ်ဆင်ရေးနယ်မြေအလိုက် Chain of Command တည်ဆောက် ခြင်းများ ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိသည်။ ပြည်သူလူထုတရပ်လုံး၏ လှူဒါန်းကူညီမှု၊ မဟာမိတ်တိုင်းရင်းသား တော်လှန်ရေးအဖွဲ့များနှင့် လက်တွဲဆောင်ရွက်မှုတို့ကြောင့် PDF တပ်မတော်အတွက် လက်နက်တပ်ဆင်မှုကို အတိုင်းအတာတစ်ခုအထိ တပ်ဆင်နိုင်ခဲ့ပြီဖြစ်သည်။ ထို့အပြင် ကိုယ်ပိုင်လက်နက်ခဲယမ်း ထုတ်လုပ်ခြင်းကဏ္ဍ သည်လည်း များစွာအောင်မြင် ပေါက်ရောက်နိုင်ခဲ့ပြီဖြစ်သည်။ ရန်သူနှင့် ကောင်းစွာနှိုင်းယှဉ်နိုင်သည့်၊ ပွဲသိမ်းအဆင့် တိုက်ခိုက်နိုင်သည့် လက်နက်အင်အား အခြေအနေသို့ရောက်ရန်၊ လေကြောင်းရန်ကို တန်ပြန် တိုက်ခိုက်နိုင်ရန်၊ ခုခံနိုင်ရန်အတွက် ဗျူဟာမြောက် လက်နက်ပစ္စည်းများ အလုံအလောက် ရရှိနိုင်ရန်လည်း ဆက်လက်ကြိုးပမ်းလျက်ရှိသည်။ “ကျေးလက်ကို အခြေပြု၊ မြို့ပြကို ဝန်းရံ” ဟူသည့် အခြေခံ ပြောက်ကျားစစ်နည်းဗျူဟာနှင့်အညီ ယခုအခါ ကျေးလက်ဒေသအများစုကို မိမိတို့စိုးမိုးနယ်မြေအဖြစ် တည်ဆောက်ခဲ့နိုင်ပြီး တော်လှန်ရေး၏ နောက်တဆင့်အဖြစ် မြို့ပြဒေသများကို ခြိမ်းခြောက်နိုင်ရေး၊ ရန်သူ့ဗျူဟာမြောက် ဆက်သွယ်ထောက်ပို့ရေးလမ်း ကြောင်းများ (Line of Communication) ကို ဖြတ်တောက် ထိန်းချုပ်နိုင်ရေးအတွက် ကြိုးပမ်းလျက်ရှိပါသည်။ စစ်မဟာဗျူဟာအရ ခံစစ် (Phase of Strategic Defense) ဖြင့် စတင်ခဲ့ရသော ပြည်သူ့ခုခံတော်လှန်စစ်သည် ယခုအခါ တန်ပြန်ထိုးစစ်အကြိုကာလ (Phase of Strategic Equilibrium) သို့ အပြည့်အဝရောက်ရှိခဲ့ပြီဖြစ်သည်။ နောက်ဆုံးအဆင့်ဖြစ်သော စစ်မဟာဗျူဟာအရ တန်ပြန်ထိုးစစ်ကာလ (Phase of Strategic Counter Offensive) သို့ ဆက်လက်တက်လှမ်းနိုင်ရေးအတွက် မဟာဗျူဟာမြောက် စစ်လက်နက်ပစ္စည်းများ ရှာဖွေတပ်ဆင်မှုကို အားစိုက်ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိသည်။ မှတ်တမ်းများအရ ပြည်သူ့ခုခံတွန်းလှန်စစ်အတွင်း ခန့်မှန်းရန်သူ့အင်အား ၃သောင်းခန့် ထိခိုက်သေဆုံးသည် အထိ ချေမှုန်းနိုင်ခဲ့ပြီး (၁) သောင်းကျော် ထိခိုက်ဒဏ်ရာရရှိစေခဲ့သည်။ စစ်အာဏာသိမ်းမှုကို လက်မခံသည့် တပ်မတော်သားနှင့်ရဲ (၁၃,၀၀၀)ဦးကျော် ပြည်သူ့ရင်ခွင်ခိုလှုံ လာခဲ့သည်။ ကြားကာလဒေသန္တရ ပြည်သူ့အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးဖော်ဆောင်မှု ၄။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအနေဖြင့် ကြားကာလဒေသန္တရ ပြည်သူ့အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးဖော်ဆောင်မှု ဗဟိုကော်မတီကို ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ် စက်တင်ဘာလမှစတင်၍ ဖွဲ့စည်းပြီး ကြားကာလဒေသန္တရ အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးဖော်ဆောင်မှု လုပ်ငန်းများအား မူဝါများချမှတ်အကောင်အထည်ဖော် ဆောင်ရွက်ခဲ့ရာ လက်ရှိ အချိန်အထိ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ စိုးမိုးထိန်းချုပ်နယ်မြေများတွင် မြို့နယ်ပြည်သူ့ အုပ်ချုပ်ရေး အဖွဲ့များကို (၁၇၁) မြို့နယ်ဖွဲ့စည်းနိုင်ခဲ့ပြီး ခရိုင်ပေါင်း (၁၀) ခရိုင်ကိုလည်း ခရိုင်အဆင့် ပြည်သူ့အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးအဖွဲ့ ဖွဲ့စည်းနိုင်ခဲ့ပြီဖြစ်သည်။ အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးရုံးများနှင့်အတူ ပြည်သူလူထုဘဝလုံခြုံစေရန် ရည်ရွယ်လျက် ပြည်သူ့ရဲတပ်ဖွဲ့ကို ဇွန်လ (၇)ရက် ၂၀၂၂ တွင်စတင်ဖွဲ့စည်းခဲ့ပြီး ယခုအခါ ကြားကာလအုပ်ချုပ်ရေး နယ်မြေ ဒေသများတွင် ရဲတပ်ဖွဲ့ဝင်အင်အား (၁၉၆) ဦးနှင့် အခြေခံရဲသင်တန်းများပို့ချခြင်း၊ ရဲမှုခင်းများစစ်ဆေးခြင်း၊ စစ်ကောင်စီ၏သတင်းများ စုဆောင်းပြီး အကြမ်းဖက်နှိမ်နှင်းခြင်း လုပ်ငန်းစဉ်များ ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။ အဆိုပါနယ်မြေများတွင် အခွန်စနစ်ကိုလည်း စတင်ကျင့်သုံးနေပြီး ယနေ့အချိန်အထိ အခွန်နှင့် ဒဏ်ကြေးအတွက် မြန်မာကျပ်ငွေ ၁၀ ဘီလီယံကျော်ကောက်ခံရရှိပြီး ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ၎င်းအခွန်ဘဏ္ဍာငွေများကို မြို့နယ်များအတွင်း လိုအပ်လျက်ရှိသော ဒေသကာကွယ်ရေး၊ ပြန်လည်ထူထောင်ရေးလုပ်ငန်းစဉ်များနှင့် လူသားစာနာလုပ်ငန်းများတွင် ပြန်လည်ခွဲဝေသုံးစွဲလျက်ရှိပါသည်။ ပြည်နယ်အတိုင်ပင်ခံကောင်စီများ၊ လွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြု ကော်မတီများနှင့်လည်း ပုံမှန်ဆွေးနွေးတိုင်ပင်မှုများပြုလုပ်၍ သက်ဆိုင်ရာတိုင်း ဒေသကြီး/ ပြည်နယ်/ဖက်ဒရယ်ယူနစ်များ၏ ဒေသန္တရအုပ်ချုပ်ရေးလုပ်ငန်း အကောင်အထည်ဖော်ဆောင်မှု များကို တိုင်ပင်ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရသည် ကြားကာလနှင့် အသွင်ကူး ပြောင်းရေးကာလများတွင် ပြည်သူများကို ကာကွယ်စောင့်ရှောက်မှုပေးနိုင်ရန်နှင့် တရားဥပဒေ စိုးမိုးစေရန် ရည်ရွယ်၍ တရားရေးရာဝန်ကြီးဌာနကို ဇွန်လ (၅) ရက် ၂၀၂၁ခုနှစ်တွင် CDM လှုပ်ရှားမှု၌ ပါဝင်ခဲ့သော နိုင်ငံ့ဝန်ထမ်းများ၊ ဥပဒေအရာရှိများ၊ တရားသူကြီးများ၊ ဥပဒေပညာရှင်များနှင့် ဖွဲ့စည်းခဲ့ပါသည်။ ယခုအခါ မြို့နယ်တရားရုံး (၂၅)ရုံးတွင် တရားသူကြီး (၁၁၈)ဦး ခန့်အပ်ထားရှိပြီး တရားစီရင်ရေးအာဏာများ စတင်ကျင့်သုံးဆောင်ရွက်လျက် ရာဇဝတ်မှုနှင့် တရားမမှုများကို ဖြေရှင်းဆောင်ရွက်နေပြီဖြစ် သည်။ မဟာမိတ်ဆက်ဆံရေး ၅။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၏ ဝန်ကြီးဌာနများအနေဖြင့်လည်း ၎င်းတို့သက်ဆိုင်ရာကဏ္ဍအလိုက် တိုင်းရင်းသားမဟာမိတ်အင်အားစုများနှင့် ချိတ်ဆက်ကာ ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်မှုများ လုပ်ဆောင်လျက်ရှိပြီး ပိုမိုအားကောင်းသောဆက်ဆံရေးကို ထူထောင်နိုင်ခဲ့သည်။ တစ်ဖက်တွင်လည်း မဟာမိတ်ဆက်ဆံရေး ကော်မတီ (ARC) ကို ၂၀၂၂ ခုနှစ်၊ ဇန်နဝါရီလ (၄) ရက်နေ့မှစတင်ဖွဲ့စည်းခဲ့ပြီး နိုင်ငံရေး၊ စစ်ရေး၊ လုံခြုံရေး၊ ကာကွယ်ရေးနှင့် အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးဆိုင်ရာကိစ္စရပ်များကို လက်တွဲညှိနှိုင်းဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်ရန် ကြိုးပမ်းခဲ့ပါသည်။ မဟာမိတ်ဆက်ဆံရေးကော်မတီအနေဖြင့် တိုင်းရင်းသားအဖွဲ့အစည်း ERO များအပါအဝင်၊ နိုင်ငံရေး ပါတီများ၊ တော်လှန်ရေးအင်အားစုများ၊ အတိုင်ပင်ခံကောင်စီများနှင့် သီးခြားတွေ့ဆုံဆွေးနွေးမှုများ ပြုလုပ်ခဲ့ပြီး လူသားချင်းစာနာမှု အကူအညီဆိုင်ရာကိစ္စများအပါအဝင် စစ်ရေး၊ ကာကွယ်ရေး၊ ကျန်းမာရေး၊ ပညာရေး ကဏ္ဍများတွင် ကျယ်ကျယ်ပြန့်ပြန့် လက်တွဲဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုအား ဖြုတ်ချနိုင်ရေးနှင့် အနာဂတ်ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စု ထူထောင်ရေးတို့အတွက် နိုင်ငံရေးဆိုင်ရာ သဘောတူညီချက်များရရှိကာ ယခုထက်ပိုမိုသည့် ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်မှုများကို စုစည်းညီညွတ်စွာ ဖော်ဆောင်နိုင်ရေး ဆွေးနွေးပွဲများစဉ်ဆက်မပြတ် ပြုလုပ်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။ ပြည်သူ့ဝန်ဆောင်မှု လုပ်ငန်းများ ၆။ ပြည်သူလူထု၏ ပညာရေးအဆက်ပြတ်မှု မဖြစ်စေရေးအတွက် CDM ဆရာ/မများ၊ ပညာရေးဝန် ထမ်းများ စုစုပေါင်းအင်အားတစ်သိန်းခွဲကျော်ဖြင့် အခြေခံပညာ၊ အဆင့်မြင့်ပညာ၊ သက်မွေးဝမ်းကျောင်း ပညာနှင့် ဆရာအတတ်သင်ပညာရပ်များကို တစ်နိုင်ငံလုံးအတိုင်းအတာဖြင့် online, on ground သင် ကြားရေး များအပြင် Digital Based Learning စနစ်များဖြင့် ဝန်ဆောင်မှုများ ပေးလျက်ရှိသည်။ ပညာရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနနှင့် ချိတ်ဆက်ဆောင်ရွက်နေသော online ကျောင်း (၇၀)ကျော်ရှိပြီး အသိအမှတ်ပြုမူဝါဒနှင့်အညီ ဖွင့်လှစ် သင်ကြားခြင်း၊ on ground ကျောင်းပေါင်း (၅၀၀၀) ကျော်၊ ဆရာ/မပေါင်း (၆၀,၀၀၀) ကျော်နှင့် ကျောင်းသား/ သူပေါင်း (၇၅၀,၀၀၀) ကျော်ခန့် ပညာသင်ကြားလျက်ရှိသည်။ ပညာရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနနှင့် ချိတ်ဆက်ပြီး မြို့နယ်ပညာရေးဘုတ်အဖွဲ့ကို (၃၀၄) မြို့နယ်တွင်ဖွဲ့စည်းကာ အကောင်အထည်ဖော် ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိသည်။ ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ ပညာရေးပေါ်လစီကို NUG-NUCC ပူးပေါင်းလုပ်ငန်းကော်မတီ၏ ပူးပေါင်းပါဝင်မှုနှင့် ဆက်လက်ရေးဆွဲ အကောင်အထည်ဖော်လျက်ရှိသည်။ အခြေခံပညာညီလာခံ၊ အဆင့်မြင့်ပညာညီလာခံတို့ကို ကျင်းပနိုင်ခဲ့ကာ အဆိုပါညီလာခံများမှရရှိသော ဆွေးနွေးဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်များကို အခြေခံ၍ ပညာရေး အကောင်အထည်ဖော်မှုများ ဆောင်ရွက်နေပါသည်။ BECA (Basic Education Completion Assessment) အခြေခံပညာပြီးမြောက်ကြောင်း စစ်ဆေးအကဲဖြတ်ခြင်းကို ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ်၊ ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလမှ ဧပြီလအထိ online, offline ဖြေဆိုခဲ့ရာ online အနေဖြင့် ကျောင်းသားပေါင်း (၂၁၀၀၀) ကျော်ဖြေဆိုခဲ့ပြီး စာစစ်ဌာန (၃၂၉) ခုတွင် ကျောင်းသားပေါင်း (၃၈၈၇၇) ဦးဖြေဆိုခဲ့သည်။ PDF ရဲဘော်များလည်း ပါဝင်ဖြေဆိုခဲ့ကြသည်။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရဖွဲ့စည်းပြီး (၂) နှစ်တာကာလအတွင်း အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီကြောင့် ဘေးဒုက္ခရောက်နေရသော ပြည်သူများအတွက် ငွေကျပ် ၆.၆ဘီလီယံခန့် (USD ၂.၃ မီလီယံ) လူသားချင်းစာနာမှု အကူအညီများ ပေးအပ်နိုင်ခဲ့ပါသည်။ တစ်လလျှင် ပျမ်းမျှစစ်ဘေးရှောင်ပြည်သူ ၂ သိန်းကျော်ကို စားနပ်ရိက္ခာ ထောက်ပံ့ပေးနိုင်ပါသည်။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုကြောင့် နေအိမ်များဆုံးရှုံးခဲ့ရသည့် ပြည်နယ်နှင့်တိုင်း အသီးသီးတို့မှ ဒေသခံပြည်သူများအတွက် ယာယီတဲများ ပြန်လည်ဆောက်လုပ်ပေးခဲ့ရာ လက်ရှိအချိန်အထိ ပြည်သူကလှူဒါန်းသည့် ရန်ပုံငွေဖြင့် ယာယီတဲပေါင်း (၂,၂၃၉) လုံးဆောက်လုပ်ပေးပြီးဖြစ်ပါသည်။ အကြမ်းဖက် စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ လေကြောင်းတိုက်ခိုက်မှုများကြောင့် အရပ်သားပြည်သူများ အသက်ဆုံးရှုံးရမှု လျှော့ချနိုင်ရန် ရန်ပုံငွေကျပ် (၁၁၉) သန်းခန့်အသုံးပြု၍ ကြားကာလပညာရေးဖော်ဆောင်နေသော စာသင်ကျောင်းများတွင် ဗုံးခိုကျင်း (၇၉၈) ကျင်းတူးဖော်ပေးခဲ့ပြီးဖြစ်သည်။ထို့အပြင် ဘေးအန္တရာယ်အမျိုးမျိုးနှင့် ပတ်သက်သည့် အသိပညာပေးခြင်း၊ စာစောင်များထုတ်ဝေ ဖြန့်ဖြူးခြင်းနှင့်စာသင်ကျောင်းများတွင် ဇာတ်တိုက်လေ့ကျင့်ခန်း များ ဆောင်ရွက်ပေးခဲ့ပါသည်။ တိုင်းဒေသကြီးနှင့် ပြည်နယ်အသီးသီးမှ လူသားစာနာတာဝန်ခံ စုစုပေါင်း (၃၅၂) ဦးကိုလည်း အရပ်သားထိခိုက်မှုလျှော့ချရေးနှင့် အရေးပေါ်တုံ့ပြန်ရေးလုပ်ငန်းဆိုင်ရာ သင်တန်းများ ပေးအပ်ခဲ့ပါသည်။ နိုင်ငံတကာမှ လူသားချင်းစာနာမှု အကူအညီများရရှိနိုင်ရေးအတွက် စစ်ဘေးရှောင် ပြည်သူအများဆုံးရှိသည့် စစ်ကိုင်းတိုင်းဒေသကြီးနှင့် မကွေးတိုင်းဒေသကြီးအတွင်း မြို့နယ်ပေါင်း (၃၉) မြို့နယ် တွင် လူသားချင်းစာနာကူညီမှုဆိုင်ရာ လိုအပ်ချက်ဆန်းစစ်လေ့လာခြင်း ဆောင်ရွက်ခဲ့ပြီး အစီရင်ခံစာ ကိုလည်း အလှူရှင်နိုင်ငံများ၊ ကုလသမဂ္ဂနှင့်အာဆီယံသို့ ဖြန့်ချီပေးပို့ခဲ့ပါသည်။ ထို့အပြင် အရပ်သားထိခိုက်မှု လျှော့ချရေးနှင့် ဘေးကင်းလုံခြုံသည့် လူသားချင်းစာနာမှုအကူအညီပေးရေးစင်္ကြန်များ ဖော်ဆောင်နိုင်ရန် အလို့ငှာ တိုင်းရင်းသားတော်လှန်ရေးမဟာမိတ်များ၊ အရပ်ဘက်လူမှုရေးအဖွဲ့အစည်းများ၊ မိတ်ဖက်နိုင်ငံများနှင့် ပူးပေါင်း၍ အားလုံးပါဝင်သော လူသားချင်းစာနာကူညီမှုဆိုင်ရာဖိုရမ်တစ်ခု ကျင်းပနိုင်ရေးကိုလည်း စီမံ ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။ Mind Healer စိတ်ခွန်အားပေးသူများ Facebook စာမျက်နှာမှ အကူအညီလိုအပ် သူများအား နှစ်သိမ့်ဆွေးနွေး အကြံပေးခြင်းကိုလည်း ပြုလုပ်ပေးလျက်ရှိရာ စုစုပေါင်း ပြည်သူ (၈၂၃) ဦးနှင့် CDM ဝန်ထမ်း (၄၂၂) ဦးကို ဝန်ဆောင်မှုပေးနိုင်ခဲ့သည်။ ထောင်တွင်းမတရားဖမ်းဆီးခံရသော နိုင်ငံရေးအကျဉ်းသူများနှင့်လိင်စိတ်ကွဲပြားသူ(၄၆၉) ဦး၊ လူငယ် နိုင်ငံရေး အကျဉ်းသား (၄၀၀) ဦး၊ ကိုယ်ဝန်ဆောင်မိခင်နှင့်နို့တိုက်မိခင်များ (၁၁၁,၉၁၄) ဦး၊ အရေးပေါ် အခြေအနေတွင် နေထိုင်ရန်လိုအပ်မှုနှင့် camp အုပ်ချုပ်မှုသင်တန်း (၃,၀၀၀) ဦးတို့ကို ထောက်ပံ့ပေး ခဲ့သည်။ ထို့အတူ ကလေးများအပေါ် စစ်ကောင်စီမှကျူးလွန်သော ရာဇဝတ်မှုများကို မှတ်တမ်းတင်ခြင်းနှင့် အစီရင်ခံခြင်း၊ ကလေးသူငယ်များနှင့်ပတ်သက်သည့် သတင်းအချက်အလက်များ ဖြန့်ဝေခြင်းနှင့် စုဆောင်း ခြင်း၊ ကလေးစစ်သားစုဆောင်းမှုတားမြစ်ခြင်း လုပ်ငန်းများကိုလည်း ကျယ်ကျယ်ပြန့်ပြန့် ဆောင်ရွက်လျက် ရှိပါသည်။ စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ အကြမ်းဖက်တိုက်ခိုက်မှုကြောင့် ဖြစ်ပေါ်လာသော ထိခိုက်ဒဏ်ရာရမှုများအား ကုသမှုပေးခြင်း၊ ခွဲစိတ်ကုသမှုပြုလုပ်ခြင်း၊ ခြေလက်အင်္ဂါဆုံးရှုံးသူများအား ခြေတုလက်တုတပ်ဆင်ပေးခြင်း၊ အရေးပေါဗိုက်ခွဲကလေးမွေးဖွားပေးခြင်း အစရှိသော ကျန်းမာရေးစောင့်ရှောက်မှုများကိုလည်း လုပ်ဆောင်ပေး လျက်ရှိပါသည်။ ပြည်သူလူထုနှင့် ကျန်းမာရေးစောင့်ရှောက်မှုပေးနေသော ဆေးရုံ/ဆေးခန်းများအား အကြမ်းဖက် စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ လေကြောင်းရန်တိုက်ခိုက်မှု၊ စစ်ကြောင်းထိုးတိုက်ခိုက်မှု၊ မီးရှို့ဖျက်ဆီးမှုစသည့် အကြမ်းဖက် လုပ်ရပ်များမှကာကွယ်နိုင်ရန် ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။ စာသင်ကျောင်းများ၊ ဆေးရုံများတွင် လေကြောင်းရန်ကာကွယ်ရေးနှင့် အရေးပေါ်ရှေးဦးသူနာပြုစုရေးတို့အတွက် လိုအပ်သောသင်တန်းများနှင့် အရေးပေါ်ဆေးအိတ် ဝယ်ယူရေးအတွက် ထောက်ပံ့မှုများကိုလည်း ပြုလုပ်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။ မြေပြင်တွင် ဆေးရုံပေါင်း (၆၆) ခု၊ ဆေးခန်းပေါင်း (၁၅၉) ခု၊ ရွေ့လျား ဆေးခန်းပေါင်း (၂၅၀) ကျော်တို့ဖြင့် အရေးပေါ် ကျန်းမာရေးစောင့်ရှောက်မှုနှင့် ပဏာမကျန်းမာရေးစောင့်ရှောက်မှုများ ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။ မြို့နယ်ပေါင်း (၁၉၈) မြို့နယ် (တစ်နိုင်ငံလုံး၏ ၆၀ %) တွင် မြို့နယ်ကျန်းမာရေးတာဝန်ခံများရှိပြီး ဝန်ကြီးဌာနနှင့်လက်တွဲ ချိတ်ဆက်၍ ကျန်းမာရေးဝန်ဆောင်မှုပေးနေသည့် ကျန်းမာရေးလုပ်သားစုစုပေါင်းမှာ (၃,၈၃၂) ဦးဖြစ်ကာ ကျန်းမာရေးလုပ်သားများ၏ (၇၈%) မှာ CDMers များဖြစ်သည်။ ထိုလုပ်သားစုစုပေါင်းထဲတွင် တိုင်းရင်းသား ကျန်းမာရေးအဖွဲ့များ၌ရှိသော ကျန်းမာရေးလုပ်သားများအင်အားပါဝင်ခြင်း မရှိသေးပါ။ ကျန်းမာရေးအသုံးစရိတ် အနေဖြင့် အမေရိကန်ဒေါ်လာ ၂ သန်း သုံးစွဲခဲ့ပြီးဖြစ်သည်။ အာဏာဖီဆန်ရေးလှုပ်ရှားမှု(CDM) ၇။ အာဏာဖီဆန်လှုပ်ရှားမှု (CDM) တွင် ပါဝင်ခဲ့ကြသော CDM ပြည်သူ့သားကောင်းများအား ပံ့ပိုးကူညီမှု ပေးနိုင်ရေးအတွက် ၂၀၂၁ ဧပြီလ ၂၇ ရက်နေ့တွင် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ ပြည်ထောင်စုဝန်ကြီးများ၊ ဒုတိယဝန်ကြီးများ၊ CRPH ကိုယ်စားလှယ်များပါဝင်၍ CDM Success Committee အားဖွဲ့စည်းခဲ့ကာ CDM လှုပ်ရှားမှုတွင် ပါဝင်ခဲ့သူများနှင့် CDM ကွန်ယက်ချိတ်ဆက်ခြင်း၊ CDM ဆောင်ရွက်မှုအစီရင်ခံစာအား ၂၀၂၁၊ စက်တင်ဘာလတွင် UN Credential အတွက် ထုတ်ပြန်ခြင်း၊ CDM လှုပ်ရှားမှုတစ်နှစ်ပြည့် အထိမ်းအမှတ်အဖြစ် CDM အချက်အလက်အစီရင်ခံစာအား ထုတ်ပြန်ခြင်း၊ CDM စစ်တမ်းကောက်ယူခြင်းတို့ကို ဆောင်ရွက်ခဲ့သည်။ ထို့အပြင် CDM ဆုချီးမြှင့်ရေးနှင့် လစာဘတ်ဂျက်တွက်ချက်မှုများ ဆောင်ရွက်ခြင်း၊ နှစ်ပတ်လည်လုပ်ငန်း တိုးတက်မှုဆိုင်ရာ စစ်တမ်းကောက်ယူ၍ ပိုမိုကောင်းမွန်သောလုပ်ငန်းစဥ်များ ဖော်ဆောင်ရန်လည်း ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။ CDM Success Committee နှင့်ချိတ်ဆက်ထားသော CDM နိုင်ငံ့သူရဲကောင်း (၂၁၀၆၃၉) အနက်မှ (၂၀%) နှုန်းခန့်၏ အရေးပေါ်လိုအပ်ချက်များအတွက် မြန်မာကျပ်ငွေသန်း (၄,၀၀၀)ခန့် ကူညီထောက်ပံ့ပေးနိုင်ခဲ့ပါသည်။ ဝန်ကြီးဌာနများအနေဖြင့်လည်း ဌာနအလိုက် CDM ဝန်ထမ်းများအား အသီးသီး ကူညီထောက်ပံ့လျက်ရှိသည်။ ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ စက်တင်ဘာလမှစတင်၍ အာဏာဖီဆန်ရေးလှုပ်ရှားမှုဆိုင်ရာ နိုင်ငံ့ဝန်ထမ်း CDM/ Non CDM မူဝါဒမူကြမ်းအား နိုင်ငံ့ဝန်ထမ်း CDMများ၏ သဘောထားခံယူဆွေးနွေးရေးသားခဲ့ပြီး အမျိုးသား ညီညွတ်ရေးအတိုင်ပင်ခံကောင်စီက ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ်၊ ဇန်နဝါရီ လ ၂၀ ရက်တွင် အတည်ပြုထုတ်ပြန်ပေးခဲ့သည်။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအတိုင်ပင်ခံကောင်စီက အတည်ပြုထုတ်ပြန်ထားသည့် “နိုင်ငံ့ဝန်ထမ်း CDM မူဝါဒ” အပိုဒ် (၃) နှင့်အညီ ဥပဒေကြမ်းတစ်ရပ် ပေါ်ထွန်းလာရေးအတွက် CDM အောင်မြင်ရေးကော်မတီသည် အကြမ်းမဖက်အာဏာဖီဆန်ရေး လှုပ်ရှားမှုဆိုင်ရာ နိုင်ငံ့ဝန်ထမ်းဥပဒေမူကြမ်းရေးဆွဲရေး ကော်မတီတစ်ရပ် ဖွဲ့စည်းကာ ဥပဒေမူကြမ်းရေးဆွဲလျက်ရှိပါသည်။ ဘဏ္ဍာရေးနှင့် စီးပွားရေးကဏ္ဍ ၈။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ စီးပွားရေးနှင့် ကူးသန်းရောင်းဝယ်ရေး ဝန်ကြီးဌာနအနေဖြင့် တော်လှန်ရေးအင်အားစုများ၊ မြေပြင်သပိတ်အဖွဲ့များ၊ ပြည်သူများနှင့်ပူးပေါင်း၍ စစ်တပ်ထုတ်ကုန် သပိတ်မှောက်ကမ်ပိန်းအား ဆောင်ရွက်ခဲ့ခြင်းနှင့် CDM Product များအား ပြည်ပနိုင်ငံများသို့ တင်ပို့ရောင်းချ ခြင်းတို့ကို ဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်ခဲ့ပါသည်။ MSME ချေးငွေများထုတ်ပေးနိုင်ရန်နှင့် တော်လှန်ရေးအတွက် လိုအပ်သောကဏ္ဍများအတွက် ပံ့ပိုးကူညီနိုင်ရန် ရံပုံငွေရှာဖွေခြင်းများကိုလည်း ဆောင်ရွက်ခဲ့ကာ ကျပ်သိန်းပေါင်း (၁၇၁,၆၇၇,၄၄၀) ထိ ကူညီပံ့ပိုးနိုင်ခဲ့သည်။ စီမံကိန်း၊ ဘဏ္ဍာရေးနှင့် ရင်းနှီးမြှုပ်နှံမှုဝန်ကြီးဌာနအနေဖြင့် အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်ကာင်စီထံ စီး၀င်လာမည့် ဘဏ္ဍာငွေကြေးအထောက်အပံ့များကို တားဆီးပိတ်ပင်ခြင်းနှင့် ပြည်သူလူထု၏ လိုလားတောင့်တချက်နှင့်အညီ ပေါ်ပေါက်လာမည့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ ပြည်ထောင်စုတည်ဆောက်ရာတွင် အထောက်အပံ့ရစေမည့် ဘဏ္ဍာငွေများ ရရှိစေရေးမူဝါဒ (၂) ရပ် ချမှတ်ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ ဝင်ငွေဖြတ်တောက်ပိတ်ဆို့ရေးနှင့်ပတ်သက်၍ ပြည်သူလူထု၊ နိုင်ငံတကာအစိုးရများနှင့် အဖွဲ့အစည်းများ၊ တော်လှန်ရေးအစုအဖွဲ့များ၊ CSO/CBO များနှင့် လက်တွဲပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်ခဲ့ပြီး စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ ထုတ်ကုန် ပစ္စည်းများကို မသုံးစွဲရေး (Boycott) ပြုလုပ်ရန် စစ်တပ်ထုတ်ကုန်ပစ္စည်းများ၊ စီးပွားရေးလုပ်ငန်းများကို ပြည်သူလူထုသိရှိစေရန် ထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာထားပါသည်။ ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ ပြည်ထောင်စုတည်ဆောက်ရာတွင် အထောက်အပံ့ရစေမည့် ဘဏ္ဍာငွေများ ရရှိစေရေးနှင့်စပ်လျဉ်း၍ စီမံကိန်း၊ ဘဏ္ဍာရေးနှင့် ရင်းနှီးမြှုပ်နှံမှုဝန်ကြီးဌာနမှ အကောင်အထည်ဖော် ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိသော အောင်လံလွှင့်ချီနွေဦးထီ၊ United Bond, EOD, Early Partnership Program, NUGPay, အခွန်၊ အကောက်၊ ဒဏ်ကြေးစသည်တို့မှရရှိသော ဝင်ငွေနှင့်သုံးစွဲမှုခြေပြဇယားမှာ အောက်ပါအတိုင်း ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ နိဂုံး ၉။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအနေဖြင့် တစ်နှစ်တာအစီအမံ၏ ရည်မှန်းချက်များ ပေါက်မြောက်အောင်မြင် ရေးနှင့် စိန်ခေါ်မှုများအားကျော်လွှားနိုင်ရေးတို့ကို စဉ်ဆက်မပြတ်လေ့လာသုံးသပ်ကာ အဆုံးသတ်တိုက်ပွဲ အတွက် အဆုံးအဖြတ်ပေးနိုင်မည့် လုပ်ငန်းစဉ်များကို ဆက်လက်ကြိုးပမ်း အကေင်အထည်ဖော် ဆောင်ရွက် သွားမည်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ပြည်သူလူထုတစ်ရပ်လုံး၏ သဘောထားဆန္ဒအပေါ် အခြေခံထားသည့် အမျိုးသား ညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရနှင့်တကွ တော်လှန်ရေးအင်အားစုများအားလုံး၏ ရည်မှန်းချက်ပန်းတိုင်ဖြစ်သော ဖက်ဒရယ် ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စုဆီသို့ ပြည်သူလူထုက ဆုံးဖြတ်ပြဌာန်းသော ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပဋိညာဉ် လမ်းကြောင်းအတိုင်း ဦးလည်မသုန် ချီတက်ခရီးဆက်သွားမည်ဖြစ်ပါကြောင်း ကတိသစ္စာပြု အစီရင်ခံအပ် ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher: National Unity Government of Myanmar
2023-05-03
Date of entry/update: 2023-05-03
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Telegram တွင်လည်း နေ့စဥ် စစ်ရေးဆိုင်ရာသတင်းအကျဥ်းချုပ်ကို ဖတ်ရှု့နိုင်ပါသည်။ https://t.me/modnugmyanmar ရန်သူ့စစ်တပ်၏ အကြမ်းဖက်မှူများ၊ တပ်တည်၊ တပ်လှုပ် သတင်းများ၊ အကြမ်းဖက်ထောက်တိုင်များ၏ သတင်းအချက်အလက်များစသည့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်နှင့်ပတ်သက်သော သတင်းများကို အောက်ပါအတိုင်း ပေးပို့နိုင်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
2023-05-02
Date of entry/update: 2023-05-02
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Description: "Telegram တွင်လည်း နေ့စဥ် စစ်ရေးဆိုင်ရာသတင်းအကျဥ်းချုပ်ကို ဖတ်ရှု့နိုင်ပါသည်။ https://t.me/modnugmyanmar ရန်သူ့စစ်တပ်၏ အကြမ်းဖက်မှူများ၊ တပ်တည်၊ တပ်လှုပ် သတင်းများ၊ အကြမ်းဖက်ထောက်တိုင်များ၏ သတင်းအချက်အလက်များစသည့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်နှင့်ပတ်သက်သော သတင်းများကို အောက်ပါအတိုင်း ပေးပို့နိုင်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
2023-05-01
Date of entry/update: 2023-05-01
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Telegram တွင်လည်း နေ့စဥ် စစ်ရေးဆိုင်ရာသတင်းအကျဥ်းချုပ်ကို ဖတ်ရှု့နိုင်ပါသည်။ https://t.me/modnugmyanmar ရန်သူ့စစ်တပ်၏ အကြမ်းဖက်မှူများ၊ တပ်တည်၊ တပ်လှုပ် သတင်းများ၊ အကြမ်းဖက်ထောက်တိုင်များ၏ သတင်းအချက်အလက်များစသည့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်နှင့်ပတ်သက်သော သတင်းများကို အောက်ပါအတိုင်း ပေးပို့နိုင်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
2023-04-29
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-29
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "1. Implementation of the foundation of federal democratic higher education.....2. Acting President pays respects to Islamic community.....3. NUG arms battalions in Mogok.....4. NUG delivers aid to Pazigyi victims..."
Source/publisher: National Unity Government of Myanmar
2023-04-24
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-28
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "National Unity Government Weekly Press Update (17/2023)..."
Source/publisher: National Unity Government of Myanmar
2023-04-24
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-28
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Telegram တွင်လည်း နေ့စဥ် စစ်ရေးဆိုင်ရာသတင်းအကျဥ်းချုပ်ကို ဖတ်ရှု့နိုင်ပါသည်။ https://t.me/modnugmyanmar ရန်သူ့စစ်တပ်၏ အကြမ်းဖက်မှူများ၊ တပ်တည်၊ တပ်လှုပ် သတင်းများ၊ အကြမ်းဖက်ထောက်တိုင်များ၏ သတင်းအချက်အလက်များစသည့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်နှင့်ပတ်သက်သော သတင်းများကို အောက်ပါအတိုင်း ပေးပို့နိုင်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
2023-04-25
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-25
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Description: "Telegram တွင်လည်း နေ့စဥ် စစ်ရေးဆိုင်ရာသတင်းအကျဥ်းချုပ်ကို ဖတ်ရှု့နိုင်ပါသည်။ https://t.me/modnugmyanmar ရန်သူ့စစ်တပ်၏ အကြမ်းဖက်မှူများ၊ တပ်တည်၊ တပ်လှုပ် သတင်းများ၊ အကြမ်းဖက်ထောက်တိုင်များ၏ သတင်းအချက်အလက်များစသည့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်နှင့်ပတ်သက်သော သတင်းများကို အောက်ပါအတိုင်း ပေးပို့နိုင်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
2023-04-23
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-23
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ်၊ ဧပြီလ (၅)ရက်နေ့ မှ (၂၂) ရက်နေ့အထိ နောင်ချိုမြို့နယ်နှင့်ပြင်ဦးလွင်မြို့နယ် နယ်စပ်ဒေသ များတွင် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ကာကွယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန၊ ပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်မတော် (PDF) (မန္တလေး)နှင့် ရန်သူ့တပ်များ တိုက်ပွဲပြင်းထန်စွာ ဖြစ်ပွားခဲ့သည်။ ရန်သူ့တပ်ဘက်မှ အင်အား (၉၀၀)နှင့်(၁၀၀၀) ကြားရှိခဲ့ပြီး ခလရ(၁၄၇) ၊ ခလရ (၂၅၃) ၊ ခလရ (၂၅၈) ၊ ခမရ (၅၀၈) ၊ အမတ (၂၀၆) ၊ ခမရ(၄၁၉) ၊ ခမရ (၁၄)၊ အင်အား(၄၀)ပါ စနိုက်ဘာအထူးတပ်ဖွဲ့နှင့်ဒေသခံ ပြည်သူ့စစ် တပ်ဖွဲ့များပါဝင်တိုက်ခိုက်ခဲ့သည်။(၁၈)ရက်တာတိုက်ပွဲအတွင်း တစ်နေကုန်ရင်ဆိုင် တိုက်ခိုက်ရသော တိုက်ပွဲကြီး (၄) ကြိမ်နှင့် တိုက်ပွဲငယ် (၁၈) ကြိမ် ဖြစ်ပွါးခဲ့သည်။ ရန်သူ့တပ်ဘက်မှ Yak 130၊ MiG 29၊ SU 30၊ K8W အမျိုးအစား လေယာဉ်များ၊ Mi 35 ရဟတ်ယာဉ် များဖြင့် လေကြောင်းတိုက်ခိုက်မှု (၃၃) ကြိမ် ပြုလုပ်ခဲ့ပြီး လက်နက်ကြီးပစ်ကူအနေဖြင့် (၆၀)မမ ၊ (၈၁)မမ ၊ (၁၂၀) မမ ၊ (၁၅၅)မမ များ အလွန်အကျွံ အသုံးပြုခဲ့သည်။ ရန်သူ့တပ်၏လက်နက်ကြီး ရမ်းသမ်းပစ်ခတ်မှုကြောင့် ကျေးရွာ များအတွင်းသို့ လက်နက်ကြီးများ ကျရောက်ခဲ့ပြီး နေအိမ်ပျက်စီးမှုများပြားကာ အရပ်သား (၇) ဦး သေဆုံး အပါအဝင် ဒဏ်ရာရသူ တစ်ချို့ ရှိခဲ့သည်။ ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ်၊ ဧပြီလ (၂၂) ရက်နေ့တွင် မြေပြင်သတင်းအရ ရန်သူ့တပ် အခြေပြုတပ်စွဲထားသည့် ခလရ(၁၄၇) စခန်းကုန်းသို့ မနက်(၃)နာရီခန့်တွင် ချဥ်းကပ်ခဲ့ပြီး ထိုးစစ်ဆင်တိုက်ခိုက်ခဲ့ရာ ရန်သူ့တပ်များက စခန်းကုန်း စွန့်ခွာ ထွက်ပြေးသဖြင့် မိမိတို့တပ်ဖွဲ့ဝင်များမှ အစားထိုး နေရာယူခဲ့သည်။ ထို့နောက် မိမိတို့တပ်ဖွဲ့များ အခြေပြုနေရာ ယူထားရာ နေရာသို့ အိမ်စီးကား(၂) စီး ရောက်ရှိလာရာ အိမ်စီးကားပေါ်တွင် ရန်သူ့တပ် ယူနီဖောင်းဝတ်တဦး ပါလာသဖြင့် တားမြစ်စစ်ဆေးရာ မရပ်ပေးသဖြင့် ပစ်ခတ်ဖမ်းဆီးခဲ့သည်။ Toyota Corolla အိမ်စီးကားတစီး ရပ်တန့်သွားပြီး ကားပေါ်မှ ခလရ(၁၄၇) တပ်ရင်းမှူး ဒုတိယဗိုလ်မှူးကြီး မြတ်မင်းထွန်းအား သက်သေခံပစ္စည်းများ နှင့်တကွ အသေဖမ်းဆီးရရှိခဲ့သည်။ ဧပြီလ(၂၂)ရက်နေ့တွင်ပင်နောင်ချိုမြို့ပေါ်ရှိရန်သူ့တပ်၏ခလရ(၁၁၄)နှင့်ခလရ(၁၁၅)တို့အား ရှော့တိုက်ဒုန်း များဖြင့် သွားရောက်ပစ်ခတ်တိုက်ခိုက်ခဲ့ရာ ခလရ(၁၁၄) တပ်ဝန်းအတွင်းသို့ ကျရောက် ပေါက်ကွဲပြီး ရန်သူ့ တပ်သား (၅) ဦးသေဆုံးခဲ့ကာ ခလရ(၁၁၄) ဒုတပ်ရင်းမှူး သေဆုံးသည်ဟု သိရှိရသော်လည်း ဆက်လက် စုံစမ်း နေဆဲဖြစ်သည်။ တိုက်ပွဲကာလအတွင်း ရန်သူ့တပ်၏ ခလရ(၁၄၇) တပ်ရင်းမှုး ဒုတိယဗိုလ်မှုကြီး တစ်ဦး ၊ ခလရ(၂၅၈) မှ တပ်ခွဲမှုး ဗိုလ်ကြီးတစ်ဦးနှင့်ခလရ (၂၅၃) မှ တပ်ခွဲမှုး ဗိုလ်ကြီးတစ်ဦး အပါအဝင် ရန်သူ့တပ်သား (၁၀၀)ဦး ဝန်းကျင်ထိ သေဆုံးခဲ့ပြီး ခလရ(၂၅၃)မှ စစ်ကြောင်းမှူးအပါအဝင် အများအပြားထိခိုက်ဒဏ်ရာရရှိခဲ့သည်။ မိမိတို့ဘက်မှ ပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေးရဲဘော် (၁၁)ဦး အသက်ပေးလှူခဲ့ရပြီး ထိခိုက်ဒဏ်ရာရမှု တစ်ချို့ ရှိခဲ့သည်။ ရန်သူ့တပ်ထံမှ MA(3) 3 လက် ၊ 5.56 ကျည် အများအပြား ၊ 9မမ ကျည် အတောင့်(၂၀)၊ (60)မမ အသီး (10)လုံး နှင့် အခြား ဆက်စပ်ပစ္စည်းများသိမ်းဆည်းရမိခဲ့ကြောင်း သတင်းထုတ်ပြန်အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
2023-04-23
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-23
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Telegram တွင်လည်း နေ့စဥ် စစ်ရေးဆိုင်ရာသတင်းအကျဥ်းချုပ်ကို ဖတ်ရှု့နိုင်ပါသည်။ https://t.me/modnugmyanmar ရန်သူ့စစ်တပ်၏ အကြမ်းဖက်မှူများ၊ တပ်တည်၊ တပ်လှုပ် သတင်းများ၊ အကြမ်းဖက်ထောက်တိုင်များ၏ သတင်းအချက်အလက်များစသည့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်နှင့်ပတ်သက်သော သတင်းများကို အောက်ပါအတိုင်း ပေးပို့နိုင်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
2023-04-21
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-21
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Telegram တွင်လည်း နေ့စဥ် စစ်ရေးဆိုင်ရာသတင်းအကျဥ်းချုပ်ကို ဖတ်ရှု့နိုင်ပါသည်။ https://t.me/modnugmyanmar ရန်သူ့စစ်တပ်၏ အကြမ်းဖက်မှူများ၊ တပ်တည်၊ တပ်လှုပ် သတင်းများ၊ အကြမ်းဖက်ထောက်တိုင်များ၏ သတင်းအချက်အလက်များစသည့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်နှင့်ပတ်သက်သော သတင်းများကို အောက်ပါအတိုင်း ပေးပို့နိုင်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
2023-04-20
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-20
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Description: "January 4th of this year marked the 75th anniversary of Burma gaining independence from Great Britain. Normally, there would be nationwide celebrations on Independence Day; in the past, the government would conduct a huge ceremony in the capital, Nay Pyi Taw, while the people around the country would hold fairs and games for everyone to participate in. Some popular games include သံပုံးရိုက် (tan-bone-yite), in which a blindfolded person has to smash an iron container placed approximately ten feet from him, အာလူးကောက် (r-luu-kauk) which is a short-distance marathon where the competitors have to collect potatoes assembled in front of them and put them in a sack, hence the name, which literally means “picking up potatoes.” However, this year, the atmosphere was more subdued. Although the military was keen to celebrate Independence Day’s Diamond Jubilee, the number of fairs and games organized by normal people were much fewer than in previous years. Indeed, when I took a stroll through my neighborhood on that day, I saw that, although utility poles were adorned with flags, only a handful of people turned out to play games. In previous years, a large crowd, children and adults alike, participated in fairs and games. Elderly people were seen sitting on the verandas watching the games. People contributed money to award winners in various competitions. None of this could be seen this year. Independence Day celebrations are not the only events affected by the 2021 military coup. Other annual fairs and special markets attract smaller crowds than usual, too. A fair is held annually near where I live; I do not know who arranges it, but the organizers normally hold it in December. Peddlers from around Rangoon come to display their wares, and most makeshift shops sell food. The fair attracts many people, and sometimes, it takes quite an effort to make your way through the crowd. Last December, the fair was held for the first time in two years, but only a few people came; even I, who frequented the previous year, did not go. On December 23rd, a bomb exploded in the fair, and two people, one of them rumored to be a child, were wounded, further discouraging people from going to fairs. As mentioned above, I left my apartment to walk around my neighborhood on Independence Day. Walking in the evenings is a habit I acquired last year. In 2019, before the COVID-19 pandemic hit the country, I spent my evenings participating in extracurricular activities at the university or at home comfortably watching a new movie. But beginning in March 2022, there have been frequent electricity cuts throughout the country, and sometimes we only get six hours of electricity per day. With so few things to occupy myself with without electricity, I gained the habit of taking a walk in the evening. Before the coup, under the semi-democratic government led by Aung San Suu Kyi, we had electricity 24/7 only, with occasional electricity cuts when the government needed to repair a generator or cut down some branches from the trees, which interfered with electric cables. People are still adjusting to a new normal with power shortages. Officially, the government declared that there would be four hours of electricity cut each day; however, the daily electricity cuts would often last longer. One outcome of electricity cuts is that rechargeable emergency LED light bulbs, mostly imported from China, some of the more expensive ones from Thailand, have become necessary household appliances. If you visit a friend, you will likely see an orange-colored LED bulb hanging from a nail on the wall. Most of the people in Rangoon live in cramped apartments with poor lighting and ventilation. Therefore, it is necessary to have the lights on even during the day. For Rangooners, it has become a chore to charge the lightbulbs whenever the electricity is turned on. Sometimes, we do not have time to recharge emergency light bulbs and cell phones because electricity is cut off without warning. The worst thing is that my laptop’s battery has broken down and, although I could use it when there is electricity, I cannot charge it. I could walk into a nearby IT shop to replace the battery, but I cannot afford it. A young man like me, who does not want to continue my education under the junta-controlled education system, does not have a degree, which makes it hard to get a permanent job. Since the coup, many foreign businesses and companies have left the country, some out of conscience, others due to international sanctions. These departures left these companies’ former staff without jobs. In addition, university students who decided not to attend school under the junta are jostling for the few remaining positions. The result is disastrous. While employers exploit the workers who work for them by cutting their salaries and extending their working hours, it has become extremely difficult for youth without work experience or personal connections to get a job. As if that is not enough, inflation is worsening day by day. In two years, the price of imported commodities has increased twofold. Most consumer goods in Burma come from China and Thailand. Even the price of rice, one of the few things in which Burma is self-sufficient, has increased. According to the data published by The Irrawaddy, the price of rice rose from 52,000 per sack MMK in January 2020 to 100,000 MMK per sack in August 2022. Likewise, the price of gasoline, the most important imported commodity, also increased from 665 MMK per liter in January 2020 to 2400 MMK per liter in August 2022. Common laborers, their families, and the shrinking middle class are hit the hardest. The junta tried to control the rising prices of essential commodities, such as rice and oil, but to no avail. They also forced merchants and shop owners to sell those commodities at a fixed price. Often, you could see people standing for hours in line to buy rice, cooking oil, and eggs at a lower rate. The price of petroleum and IT products also soared. When the global economy declined at the beginning of 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic, we used to joke around that “I will drink gasoline instead of water” because, at that time, a liter of water cost 300MMK, and a liter of gasoline was only 250MMK. Now a liter of gasoline costs around 3000MMK. Foreign currency exchange rates are also rising; the junta ordered banks to exchange foreign currency at fixed prices, but in the black market, you would pay approximately 3000MMK for one US dollar. My stroll through the neighborhood took me to Kan-daw-gyi, or The Royal Lake. A bronze statue of General Aung San stands on the bank near a public park. During colonial times, a statue of King Edward VII stood there, surrounded by beautifully carved marble pillars. It was replaced with the statue of General Aung San after independence. However, the pillars were left intact until a couple of years ago when they were demolished by the municipality. It is only one among many of the early 20th Century structures dismantled to make way for modern steel and concrete abominations. I doubt that there would be many people like me, who mourned for those architectural beauties. Indeed, most of the people I am acquainted with do not care for the beautiful colonial-era buildings built in neoclassical style. In my eyes, they are more than just old buildings. They make Rangoon the Rangoon I know today; they are an integral part of the city. When I see them, most are still standing but in bad condition, they remind me of the days when Rangoon was more cosmopolitan, back when those buildings were gleaming with fresh paint when Rangoon resembled the New York of the East, where Jews, Muslims, Burmans, and Europeans lived in their respective quarters next to each other. Indeed, when you got off the ship to set foot on Rangoon’s soil, there was little chance that the first language you would hear was Burmese. During the previous decade, when Burmese people enjoyed some limited freedom, Yangon Heritage Trust, an organization founded by historian Thant Myint-U, led the effort to renovate and repair old buildings. The organization also installed blue-colored plaques at some of the culturally and politically significant buildings to commemorate them. After the coup, although the junta declared some well-known old buildings as heritage buildings, there have been no visible efforts to preserve them. One of the abandoned buildings which play a significant role in Rangoon’s political role is The Mahatma Gandhi Memorial Building in downtown Rangoon. In 1990, NLD party held a conference there which would later be known as “Gandhi Conference”. Sadly, the building is left to rot and crumble. The outer walls are covered in moss and tree roots; the windows are boarded up, and birds and rodents have made the building their home. There are many other buildings like it declared as “unsuitable for living” and demolished to make way for modern high-rises. At the same time, religious buildings are faring a lot better due to the funds from the devotees. An Armenian Church dedicated to St. John the Baptist, one of the few buildings still standing built in the late 19th Century, is still in good condition. The two great cathedrals of Rangoon, St. Mary’s and the Holy Trinity, also look like they were built yesterday. However, the priests, who run those religious institutions, and many Buddhist monks are under severe criticism for cooperating with the junta. In the past two years, the head of the junta, Senior-general of the armed forces, and self-proclaimed Prime Minister, Min Aung Hlaing, visited churches, mosques, and Buddhist monasteries and met with prominent leaders of various religious communities. Some of the famous religious leaders were heavily censured by their followers. I stood looking at the statue of General Aung San, lost in thought, pondering those matters, oblivious to my surroundings. I was jerked back to reality when two military vehicles sped past the statue, sirens wailing loudly. Both are pick-up mini trucks manufactured by a Chinese automobile maker called FAW, indicating the growing Chinese influence on the country. The soldiers were armed to the teeth, ready to shoot anyone who dared to attack them. During the past months, the sight of military vehicles patrolling the neighborhoods has been common. At important junctions, the military has built dull, grey two-storied buildings with a flat area at the top to observe the buildings’ immediate surroundings constantly. They are equipped with toilets, solar panels, and accommodations for the soldiers on duty. You could always see three or four military personnel and police officers on top of those buildings, chatting idly. People despise the police and military so much that they invented imaginative vocabularies for referring to anything related to the military. For instance, the traffic police are nicknamed “duck egg” after the white round helmets they wear, while the watchtowers are referred to as “dog toilets,” a phrase that equates them with Rangoon’s public toilets. The soldiers, the military vehicles, and the watchtowers combined induce terror and resentment among the civilians. The police and military are regarded not so much as protecting the citizens of Rangoon from danger and harm as foreign forces occupying and oppressing the civilian population. When the military vehicles left, I went over to one of the benches surrounding the statue to sit. A couple of middle-aged women sat on a bench near mine. Although they were not talking very loudly, I could make out their conversation. One of them was explaining to the other about her son’s plan to go to Japan and how difficult it is to get a passport. Hearing this made my mind wander again. Almost all the people I know are studying Japanese. Japanese language schools are popping up around the city like mushrooms after rain, and every bookshop downtown sells Japanese language textbooks. Although I am not planning to immigrate to Japan, I heard that even filling out a registration form for taking the Japanese language exam is very competitive. Getting a passport is almost impossible with so many people trying to get one and so many corrupt officials trying to make a profit out of this collective obsession with going abroad. You have to spend a lot of money to get your hands on the red-covered book. Usually, people from the countryside have to rent accommodation near the passport office since they have to wait two or three days for the passport application process to be complete. With so many young people trying to leave the country, within a decade or two, there would be no educated people left in Burma. It is understandable; there is no opportunity for them here, either educational or economic. As far as the junta is concerned, there are only two things worth doing; making the country presentable to the international community, such as holding a rigged election to create the illusion that Burma is on the road to democracy again, and suppressing all the opposing voices which would disrupt their hold on power. They are not interested in improving the education system, the economy, or the public healthcare system. They would drop the country into a chasm if need be. The number of high school graduates who apply for government-funded universities is also alarmingly low. Many brave teenagers are defying the junta by refusing to enroll in the institutions run by them. The result is that wealthy families send their children to developed countries to pursue tertiary education; most young boys and girls who are not that fortunate try to get out of the country in any way they can. Many study Japanese and try to immigrate to Japan; some try to get a job in the service sector in the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Singapore. It is sad to see so many young people losing their opportunities. Heavy with negative thoughts, I rose from the bench and started to trudge home in the waning dusk. I passed a bus stop where people, some sitting, most standing, carrying lunch boxes in their hands, were waiting for transportation that would carry them to the suburbs. Since the coup, bus fares are also increasing due to the constantly increasing gas price. The quality of public transportation is declining; with high gas prices, bus drivers no longer turn on the air-conditioner, making traveling by bus in Rangoon’s insufferable hot weather a living hell. Occasionally, gangs of bandits would get on the buses and violently take cell phones and valuables from the passengers. People get no protection from anyone. The police are too busy hunting political opponents and the judges are busy staging show trials to sentence them. I walked toward my apartment. My heart was heavy, like every day, and I wondered whether my countenance betrayed my thoughts. The faces of most people I passed were somber and dull. Considering whether I would be happy again living in Rangoon, I ascended the darkened staircase to my sanctuary after another aimless day in the city..."
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Source/publisher: Tea Circle (Myanmar)
2023-03-28
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-20
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Description: "Telegram တွင်လည်း နေ့စဥ် စစ်ရေးဆိုင်ရာသတင်းအကျဥ်းချုပ်ကို ဖတ်ရှု့နိုင်ပါသည်။ https://t.me/modnugmyanmar ရန်သူ့စစ်တပ်၏ အကြမ်းဖက်မှူများ၊ တပ်တည်၊ တပ်လှုပ် သတင်းများ၊ အကြမ်းဖက်ထောက်တိုင်များ၏ သတင်းအချက်အလက်များစသည့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်နှင့်ပတ်သက်သော သတင်းများကို အောက်ပါအတိုင်း ပေးပို့နိုင်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
2023-04-19
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-19
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Description: "Telegram တွင်လည်း နေ့စဥ် စစ်ရေးဆိုင်ရာသတင်းအကျဥ်းချုပ်ကို ဖတ်ရှု့နိုင်ပါသည်။ https://t.me/modnugmyanmar ရန်သူ့စစ်တပ်၏ အကြမ်းဖက်မှူများ၊ တပ်တည်၊ တပ်လှုပ် သတင်းများ၊ အကြမ်းဖက်ထောက်တိုင်များ၏ သတင်းအချက်အလက်များစသည့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်နှင့်ပတ်သက်သော သတင်းများကို အောက်ပါအတိုင်း ပေးပို့နိုင်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
2023-04-18
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-18
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Description: "၂၀၂၃ခုနှစ်၊ ဧပြီလ (၅) ရက်နေ့၊ ည(၁၀)နာရီတွင် မကွေးတိုင်း၊ ဆိပ်ဖြူမြို့နယ်ရှိ အမှတ်(၂၂) ကာကွယ်ရေးပစ္စည်းစက်ရုံသို့ သွယ်တန်းထားသည့် ဓာတ်အားလိုင်းများကို (၂)နေရာခွဲ၍ ဖြိုချ တိုက်ခိုက်ခဲ့သည်။ထို့နောက် ဧပြီလ (၈)ရက်နေ့၊ ည(၁၀)နာရီတွင် ထပ်မံ တိုက်ခိုက်ရာ အပြီးသတ် အောင်မြင်စွာ ဖြိုချနိုင်ခဲ့သည်။ ဧပြီလ (၁၀)ရက်နေ့၊ ညနေ(၅:၃၀)နာရီတွင် ဆိပ်ဖြူမြို့နယ်၊ တမကောက်ကျေးရွာအနီးရှိ ဓာတ်အားပေး လိုင်းကို ပြုပြင်ရန်လာသည့် ရန်သူ့တပ်သား(၁၅)ဦးကို လက်နက်ကြီးနှင့်Drone ပေါင်းစပ်အသုံးပြုကာ တိုက်ခိုက်နိုင်ခဲ့ပြီး ရန်သူ့တပ်သား (၂)ဦး သေဆုံးကာ (၃) ဦး ပြင်းထန်စွာ ဒဏ်ရာရရှိခဲ့ပါသည်။ တိုက်ခိုက်မှုများကို ပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်မတော်(PDF)ပခုက္ကူခရိုင်အမှတ်(၄)တပ်ရင််း၊အမှတ်(၁၁) တပ်ရင်း၊ အမှတ်(၁၉) တပ်ရင်း၏ ဆိပ်ဖြူဘာမထီတပ်ခွဲ (၁/၂)၊ တပ်ခွဲ(၃) ဆိတ်ဖြူ ဗိုလ်မထားတပ်ဖွဲ့၊ ဂန့်ဂေါခရိုင် အမှတ်(၅) တပ်ရင်း၊ ဆိပ်ဖြူမြောက်ပိုင်း ပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်ဖွဲ့ (NSP) ပကဖတို့ ညီညွတ်စွာဖြင့် ပူးပေါင်း တိုက်ခိုက်ခဲ့ခြင်း ဖြစ်ကြောင်း သတင်းထုတ်ပြန်အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
2023-04-18
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-18
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Every dictatorship believes it needs a secret police force in order to survive in power, and the more brutal, the more effective. Nazi Germany had its Gestapo, or Geheime Staatspolizei: “The Secret State Police.” The Shah of Iran depended on Savak, the country’s domestic security and intelligence service, and Romania’s dictator Nicolae Ceausescu had his dreaded Securitate, “Department of State Security.” And Myanmar’s generals have their military intelligence service, which over the years has changed its name but always remained a main pillar of state power. But because of its secretive nature, Myanmar’s military intelligence has also on at least two occasions morphed into a state within the state, which became a threat to the established order and, therefore, was purged with some of its leaders receiving lengthy prison sentences. The question of maintaining that blind loyalty is the reason why Myanmar’s current dictator, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, is keeping his top intelligence operatives closer to him than his predecessors did. Lieutenant General Ye Win Oo, head of what since 2020 has been called the Office of Chief of Military Security Affairs (OCMSA), accompanies Min Aung Hlaing at all meetings with the junta-appointed cabinet, to meetings with foreign diplomats, and during trips abroad. Lt-Gen Ye Win Oo went to Russia with Min Aung Hlaing in June 2021 to attend the 9th Moscow Conference on International Security, and again in July 2022 to meet state-owned nuclear energy and weapons companies. During the second trip, Ye Win Oo’s wife Nilar and other spouses of the generals also went along, but more for shopping in Moscow than to participate in any important meetings. Since the 2021 coup, Lt-Gen Ye Win Oo has been responsible for tracking down opponents to the junta and he also runs the military’s interrogation centers where detainees are subjected to torture, which usually includes electric chocks, burning of genitalia, pouring boiling liquid or chemical solutions down the mouths of victims, and rape if those arrested are women. The Internet and social media have made it possible to disseminate such information to the outside world, but the methods are as old as Myanmar’s military intelligence itself. It dates back to General Ne Win, who seized power in 1962 and built up one of Asia’s most ruthless as well as efficient secret police forces. Originally called the Military Intelligence Service (MIS), it was known down to the lowliest non-English speaking peasant as em-eye and everybody feared it. Informants could be everywhere, sometimes even within dissident families. Ne Win was originally trained by the Japanese, in Tokyo in 1940-41 and when they occupied the then Burma 1942-45. US Lieutenant Colonel James Mc Andrew states in his 2007 study of Myanmar’s military intelligence apparatus: “Chosen for both ‘guerilla tactics and clandestine activities’ and ‘special’ leadership training was the future dictator and longtime strongman, Ne Win. Significantly, this curriculum included intelligence training provided by the Kempeitai, the brutal Japanese Military Police and counterintelligence organization. Being selected for Kempeitai is more than noteworthy in hindsight, and it must be viewed as an important early demonstration to Ne Win that maintaining coercive intelligence and counterintelligence organizations were essential to maintaining authoritarian rule.” Ne Win’s trusted intelligence chief for many years was his subordinate Brigadier General Tin Oo — not to be confused with the National League for Democracy (NLD) leader Tin Oo, or Tin U, a retired general and former army chief. ‘MI Tin Oo’, as he became known, was trained by the US’s Central Intelligence Agency on the US-held Pacific island of Saipan in 1957, and so was Lay Maung, who rose to become a top jurist for the military and Myanmar’s foreign minister 1980-1981. In those days, US support for Myanmar’s military was motivated by the fact that it fought against the insurgent Communist Party of Burma, but that cooperation came to an abrupt end in 1961 when the military and the People’s Liberation Army of China began joint operations against remnants of US-supported, nationalist Chinese Kuomintang forces who had been ensconced in eastern Shan State since their defeat in China’s civil war. Even if judicial executions of political opponents were the exception rather than the rule, anyone suspected of having contacts with the political or ethnic opponents of Ne Win’s regime was likely to be arrested and tortured while in jail. The MIS also had its own prison and torture center, the infamous Yay Kyi Aing, or “Clearwater Pond”. Many political prisoners were tortured to death there and in other, smaller MIS-run jails all over the country. The MIS kept a watchful eye not only on ordinary citizens, but especially army officers with perceived liberal ideas, which apart from constant rotations, corruption and institutional brutality contributed to the remarkable cohesiveness of Myanmar’s armed forces. MIS agents also watched politicized exiles living in Britain, West Germany, Thailand, Australia and the USA. For many years, mutual suspicion neutralized them as a political force because no one was ever sure who was an informant or not. In the 1970s and 1980s, the MIS was becoming increasingly powerful, and, at the time, Rodney Tasker characterized MI Tin Oo in the Far Eastern Economic Review: “He and his MIS colleagues were men of the world compared with the other short-sighted, dogmatic figures in the Burmese leadership. They were able to travel abroad, talk freely to foreigners and generally look beyond the rigid confines of the corrupt regime….although ruthless, he built up a reputation as a gregarious, open-minded, charismatic figure — a direct contrast to some of his mole-like colleagues in the leadership.” But in May 1983, Ne Win’s regime suddenly and unexpectedly announced that Tin Oo had been “permitted to resign” along with his former aide, Colonel Bo Ni. They had been purged ostensibly because their wives were corrupt — a charge that could be brought against any army officer in the country. Tin Oo and Bo Ni were subsequently jailed — and the entire MIS apparatus purged as well. The reason behind the move, however, remained a matter for conjecture. It was suggested at the time that the urbane MIS people had become too powerful for comfort and had almost managed to establish another state-within-a-state, which threatened Ne Win’s inner circle of hand-picked, less-than-intelligent yes men. Whatever the reason behind the purge, it had immediate effects on the security situation in the country. On October 9, 1983, 21 people, including four visiting South Korean cabinet ministers, were killed in a powerful explosion in Yangon. Three North Korean military officers were behind the atrocity. One of them was killed in a shoot-out with Burmese security forces, while the other two were captured alive. One of the bombers was executed in 1985, the other remained in Yangon’s Insein Prison until he died of natural causes in 2008. Observers at the time believe that the incident would never have taken place if MI Tin Oo had still been in charge; it clearly indicated that the military intelligence apparatus was no longer what is used to be. A new intelligence chief, General Khin Nyunt, was appointed in 1984. His Directorate of the Defense Services Intelligence (DDSI) soon became almost as efficient as the old outfit, and Khin Nyunt in many ways also resembled Tin Oo; he was fairly young and reasonably bright, but could be exceedingly ruthless whenever this was considered expedient by the old dictator, Ne Win. Less than four years after Khin Nyunt began rebuilding Myanmar’s shattered military intelligence apparatus, the country faced the largest civil unrest in its history. Millions of people nationwide marched against Ne Win’s regime and for a return to the democracy that the country had enjoyed before the 1962 coup. Any regime anywhere would have collapsed under the pressure of an entire population rising up against tyranny. That was not the case with Myanmar’s military-dominated regime, however. Thousands of people were gunned down in the streets of Yangon and elsewhere as the military stepped in, not to overthrow the government but to shore up a regime overwhelmed with popular protest. After the military had crushed the uprising, the DDSI was expanded. By 1991, nine new units were established and the DDSI also operated 19 detention centers, seven of them of Yangon, of which Yay Kyi Aing was still the most notorious. Undercover DDSI agents covered every movement of the NLD’s leaders and other opponents of the regime. However in 2004 Khin Nyunt, who had become prime minister, was ousted and arrested along with up to 3,500 intelligence personnel countrywide, including some 300 senior officers. Khin Nyunt’s fall from grace followed the death of his mentor Ne Win in December 2002. The old general had been placed under house arrest earlier that year, allegedly because of the corrupt behavior of his daughter, Sanda Win, her husband Aye Zaw Win — and the couple’s three unruly grandsons, who had terrorized private businessmen in Yangon with demands for bribes and “protection money.” But few doubted that the move against Ne Win and his family came as preparation for the post-Ne Win era; to make sure that Khin Nyunt’s influence would be limited. The dictator, who had ruled with an iron fist for several decades, was cremated near his home in Yangon. The funeral was attended by a handful of family members and about 20 plainclothes military officers, none especially high-ranking. Khin Nyunt’s ouster was not, as some reports in the foreign media at the time suggested, a power struggle between the “pragmatic” intelligence chief and “hardliners” within the military regime. A more plausible explanation for the purge was that Khin Nyunt and his DDSI had accumulated significant wealth through involvement in a wide range of commercial enterprises. They were building up a state within a state — like the old MI Tin Oo had done in the 1970s — and not sharing their riches with the rest of the military elite. Like Ne Win, the new dictator, Senior General Than Shwe, did not want to have any potential rivals around him, and Khin Nyunt clearly had political ambitions. He was a man not to be trusted. Immediately following the ousting of Khin Nyunt, the latest intelligence outfit, the Office of the Chief of Military Intelligence [the expanded DDSI], was dissolved and an entirely new organization established: the OCMSA, which was placed under more direct military control. It is highly unlikely that Lt- Gen Ye Win Oo will repeat the mistakes which MI Tin Oo and Khin Nyunt committed, and Min Aung Hlaing may, at least for the foreseeable future, be secure. OCMSA remained active throughout the decade of openness from 2011 to 2021, carefully watching the activities of politicians, activists and journalists. But Lt-Gen Ye Win Oo and his men unleashed the full force of the organization’s most brutal operatives after the 2021 coup. According to the rights group the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP), 3,194 people have been killed since then, while 17,075 people have been detained and 5,274 of them have been sentenced by a court. A total of 108 prisoners received the death penalty, 121 of them are in absentia. 150 are currently on death row awaiting execution. So far, according to AAPP’s data, 3,874 have been released from prison. Until the 1988 uprising, Myanmar’s military intelligence conducted only limited operations overseas, mainly collecting information and giving the exiled community a scare. But after the dramatic events of the late 1980s and the subsequent flight of thousands of pro-democracy activists, especially to Thailand, its agents became more operational outside the country. Khin Nyunt’s right-hand man, Colonel Thein Swe sent thugs to beat up activists and, allegedly, ordered murders when he was defense attaché in Bangkok. In the early 1990s, the colonel built up an extensive network among diplomats, spies, informants and some media in Thailand. He was rewarded by being made the top-ranking intelligence officer under Khin Nyunt after he returned to Myanmar. There is now every indication that the OCMSA is even more active in foreign countries. To the surprise of many, not only are regular operatives involved in keeping a watchful eye on activists, journalist and others in Thai cities like Chiang Mai and Mae Sot, but people who once played roles in the pro-democracy movement and the so-called “peace process” during the 2011-2016 U Thein Sein presidency have become informants. At home in Myanmar, as The Irrawaddy has reported, old loyalties to military supremacy remain: even military intelligence operatives who were purged or sidelined in 2004 have been used as advisers. Among them are Colonel Ngwe Tun who was at the Defense Services Academy in Pyin Oo Lwin at the same time as Min Aung Hlaing, Lieutenant Colonel Nyan Linn, who in 1988 was responsible for distributing leaflets condemning democracy leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, Sai Aung Thein who used to serve in Kengtung in Shan State, Myint Htay, an operative who liaised with Pa-O militia leader Aung Kham Hti, Lin Mingxian, another militia leader at Mong La on the Myanmar-China border, and Thein Swe, the horror man of Bangkok who has become a Brigadier General. As Ne Win once put it, lukaun lutaw, which refers to his preference for promoting loyal cronies rather than talented persons. Significantly, Major General Kyaw Win, an intellectual who Than Shwe in 1993 appointed deputy head of DDSI to counterbalance the rising power of Khin Nyunt, has not been seen since the coup. The future of the pro-democracy movement depends on its ability to understand the inner workings of Myanmar’s past and present military intelligence services [which to all intents and purposes have been a secret police], to map the current OCMSA’s activities, and counter them with increased vigilance in the streets — as well as in cyberspace. New, sophisticated electronic surveillance equipment, not available before, has been obtained from firms in Singapore and Israel. And with the military and its most repressive organ of power operating more closely than in the past, domestically as well as in foreign countries, the dangers are real..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2023-04-17
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-17
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "၁။ ယနေ့ ကျရောက်သော ဗမာပြည်သူ့လွတ်မြောက်ရေးတပ်တော်(BPLA) တပ်တည်ထောင်ခြင်း (၂) နှစ်ပြည့်အား လှိုက်လှဲစွာ ဂုဏ်ပြုကြိုဆိုပါသည်။ ၂။ ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ် ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ (၁) ရက်နေ့ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်မှ မတရား အာဏာသိမ်းယူမှုနောက်ပိုင်း စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ကျဆုံးရေး၊ တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူလူထုတရပ်လုံး အဖိနှိပ်ခံဘဝမှ လွတ်မြောက်ရေး၊ တရားမျှတမှုရှိပြီး တန်းတူညီမျှသည့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ ပြည်ထောင်စုကို ထူထောင်ရေး အစရှိသည့် ရည်မှန်းချက်များဖြင့် ဗမာလူမျိုးစုကိုယ်စား တပ်တော်တရပ်ကို တည်ထောင်လျက် ပြည်သူ့ခုခံတွန်းလှန်စစ်ကို ဆင်နွှဲလာခဲ့သည်မှာ ယနေ့အချိန်တွင် (၂) နှစ်တင်းတင်း ပြည့်မြောက်ခဲ့ပြီ ဖြစ်သည်။ ၃။ ပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်ဖွဲ့များ တည်ထောင်ရာတွင် အဘက်ဘက်မှ ဝိုင်းဝန်းပံ့ပိုးကူညီ လက်တွဲခေါ်ယူပေးသော ညီနောင်မဟာမိတ် တော်လှန်ရေးအဖွဲ့အစည်းများ အားလုံးကို ဗမာပြည်သူလူထုကိုယ်စား မမေ့မလျော့ ကျေးဇူးတင်ရှိနေမည်ဖြစ်သည်။ ၄။ (၂) နှစ်တာ နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးခရီးအတွင်း အသက်၊သွေး၊ချွေးပေးဆပ် စွန့်လွှတ်ခဲ့ရသော ရဲဘော်များနှင့်တကွ ပြည်သူတစ်ဦးတစ်ယောက်ချင်းစီအား ပြည်သူ့သူရဲကောင်းများအဖြစ် အစဉ်အမြဲ အောက်မေ့သတိရလျက် မပြီးဆုံးသေးသော တော်လှန်ရေးခရီးကို ပိုမိုအားသွန်ခွန်စိုက် ဆက်လက် လျှောက်လှမ်းကြရမည်ဖြစ်သည်။ ၅။ ဗမာပြည်သူ့လွတ်မြောက်ရေးတပ်တော် (BPLA) သည် စစ်စည်းကမ်းသေဝပ်ပြီး စနစ်ကျသည့် တပ်တော်တရပ်ဖြစ်သည်နှင့် အားလျော်စွာ ဘုံရည်းမှန်းချက်၊ ဘုံပန်းတိုင် ရောက်ရှိရေးအတွက် စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်အား အခြားသော ညီနောင်မဟာမိတ် တော်လှန်ရေး အင်အားစုများ၊ ပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်ဖွဲ့များနှင့် လက်တွဲညီညီ ခုခံတွန်းလှန်တိုက်ပွဲဝင်လျက် အနာဂတ် ဖက်ဒရယ် တပ်မတော်တွင်လည်း ကြီးကြီးမားမားအားဖြည့် ကူညီနိုင်ပါစေဟု နှစ်သစ်ဆုမွန်ကောင်း တောင်းလျက် ယနေ့ ကျရောက်သည့် တပ်တည်ထောင်ခြင်း (၂) နှစ်ပြည့် အခမ်းအနားသို့ ဤသဝဏ်လွှာကို ဂုဏ်ယူစွာဖြင့် ပေးပို့အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
2023-04-17
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-17
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "၁။ ယနေ့ ၂၀၂၃ခုနှစ်၊ ဧပြီလ (၁၅)ရက်နေ့တွင် ကျရောက်သည့် (၅၅)နှစ်မြောက် ကယောအမျိုးသားနေ့ကို ဂုဏ်ပြုကြိုဆိုကြောင်းနှင့် ကယောတိုင်းရင်းသားများနှင့်အတူ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံရှိ တိုင်းရင်းသားလူမျိုးစုများအားလုံး စိတ်၏ချမ်းသာခြင်း၊ ကိုယ်၏ ကျန်းမာခြင်း နှင့် ပြည့်စုံ၍ ဘေးအပေါင်း၊ ရန်အပေါင်း ကင်းဝေးလုံခြုံကြပါစေကြောင်း ဆုတောင်း မေတ္တာ ပို့သအပ်ပါသည်။ ၂။ ဤနေ့ထူးနေ့မြတ်သည် ကယောလူမျိုးတို့၏ အစဉ်အလာကြီးမား၍ တစ်မူ ထူးခြားသော ဓလေ့ထုံးတမ်း၊ ယဉ်ကျေးမှုအမွေအနှစ်နှင့် ဘာသာစကားများကို ထိန်းသိမ်း စောင့်ရှောက်ခြင်း၊ မိမိတို့၏ ဇာတိသွေး၊ ဇာတိမာန် ဖော်ထုတ်ခြင်း၊ အမျိုးသားရေး ဝိသေသန လက္ခဏာများကို ဖော်ထုတ်ခြင်းနှင့် ကယောဟူသည့် မူလအမည်နာမသို့ ပြောင်းလဲခေါ်ဆို ခြင်း အထိမ်းအမှတ်အဖြစ် ကယောအမျိုးသားနေ့ကို ကျင်းပပြုလုပ်ခဲ့သည်မှာ ယနေ့ဆိုလျှင် (၅၅)နှစ်သို့တိုင်အောင် ရောက်ရှိလာခဲ့ပြီ ဖြစ်သည့်အတွက် များစွာ ဂုဏ်ယူ ဝမ်းမြောက် မိပါသည်။ ၃။ ကယောလူမျိုးများ၏ ထူးထူးခြားခြားအောင်မြင်မှုများနှင့် ကယောပြည်နယ်၏ နွေဦး တော်လှန်ရေးတွင် တက်ညီလက်ညီ အားသွန်ခွန်စိုက် ပါဝင်ဆောင်ရွက်ခဲ့မှုများ၊ ကယော ပြည်သူများ၏ အရေးပါသည့် ပံ့ပိုးကူညီမှုများအားလည်း အသိအမှတ်ပြု လေးစားကျေးဇူး တင်ရှိအပ်ပါသည်။ ၄။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ တရားရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနအနေဖြင့်လည်း တိုင်းရင်းသား များ၏ ဓလေ့ထုံးတမ်းနှင့် လိုက်လျောညီထွေမှုရှိသည့် ဖက်ဒရယ်တရားစီရင်ရေးတစ်ရပ် ဖြစ်ပေါ်လာစေရန် အတွက် ဦးလည်မသုန် ကြိုးစား ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိရာ ကယောလူမျိုးများ အပါအဝင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသူ နိုင်ငံသားများအားလုံး တရားမျှတမှုနှင့် တန်းတူညီမျှမှုဆိုင်ရာ အခြေခံမူများရရှိစေရန်နှင့် သာယာဝပြောစွာ နေထိုင်နိုင်ပြီး ပိုမိုငြိမ်းချမ်းသော ဖက်ဒရယ် ဒီမိုကရေစီနိုင်ငံတော်သစ် တည်ဆောက်ရန် ကယောလူမျိုးများ၊ အခြားတိုင်းရင်းသား ညီအစ်ကို မောင်နှမများနှင့် လက်တွဲ၍ အာဏာရှင်စနစ် အမြစ်ပြုတ်အောင် ဆက်လက် ဆောင်ရွက် သွားပါမည်။ ၅။ ကျွန်ုပ်တို့ သွေးချင်းညီအစ်ကိုမောင်နှမများသည် တွဲလက်ခိုင်မြဲ စည်းလုံးစွာဖြင့် ကြမ်းကြုတ် ရက်စက်လှသော စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ဆိုးကို အတူတကွ တွန်းလှန်တိုက်ထုတ်၍ စစ်မှန်သော ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီနိုင်ငံတော်သစ်ကို တည်ဆောက်နိုင်လိမ့်မည်ဟု ဧကန်မုချ ယုံကြည်လျက် ဤမင်္ဂလာ အခါသမယတွင် (၅၅)နှစ်မြောက် ကယောအမျိုးသားနေ့အား ဝမ်းမြောက်ဝမ်းသာ ဂုဏ်ပြုအပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Labour - National Unity Government of Myanmar
2023-04-15
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-15
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Format : pdf
Size: 182.03 KB
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Description: "Telegram တွင်လည်း နေ့စဥ် စစ်ရေးဆိုင်ရာသတင်းအကျဥ်းချုပ်ကို ဖတ်ရှု့နိုင်ပါသည်။ https://t.me/modnugmyanmar ရန်သူ့စစ်တပ်၏ အကြမ်းဖက်မှူများ၊ တပ်တည်၊ တပ်လှုပ် သတင်းများ၊ အကြမ်းဖက်ထောက်တိုင်များ၏ သတင်းအချက်အလက်များစသည့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်နှင့်ပတ်သက်သော သတင်းများကို အောက်ပါအတိုင်း ပေးပို့နိုင်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
2023-04-14
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-14
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Format : pdf
Size: 454.06 KB
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Description: "Telegram တွင်လည်း နေ့စဥ် စစ်ရေးဆိုင်ရာသတင်းအကျဥ်းချုပ်ကို ဖတ်ရှု့နိုင်ပါသည်။ https://t.me/modnugmyanmar ရန်သူ့စစ်တပ်၏ အကြမ်းဖက်မှူများ၊ တပ်တည်၊ တပ်လှုပ် သတင်းများ၊ အကြမ်းဖက်ထောက်တိုင်များ၏ သတင်းအချက်အလက်များစသည့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်နှင့်ပတ်သက်သော သတင်းများကို အောက်ပါအတိုင်း ပေးပို့နိုင်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
2023-04-12
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-13
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
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Description: "၂၀၂၃ ခုနစ်၊ ဧပြီလ ၁၁ ရက်၊ မနက်ပိုင်းတွင် စစ်ကိုင်းတိုင်း၊ ကန့်ဘလူခရိုင်၊ ကန့်ဘလူ မြို့နယ်၊ မလည်တိုက်နယ်၊ ပဇီကြီးကျေးရွာ၌ အရပ်သားပြည်သူများ စုဝေးနေချိန် အကြမ်းဖက် စစ်ကောင်စီမှ လေကြောင်းဖြင့် တိုက်ခိုက်မှုကြောင့် အမျိုးသမီးများနှင့် ကလေးသူငယ်များ အပါအဝင် အပြစ်မဲ့ပြည်သူများ အစုအလိုက်အပြုံလိုက် သေဆုံးမှုနှင့်၊ ထိခိုက်ဒဏ်ရာရရှိမှုများ ဖြစ်ပွားခဲ့ကြောင်း သိရှိရသည်။ ယင်းဖြစ်ရပ်နှင့် စပ်လျဉ်း၍ အသက်ဆုံးရှုံးသွားကြသူများနှင့် ထိခိုက်ဒဏ်ရာ ရရှိသူများ အတွက် ၎င်းတို့၏ မိသားစုဝင်များနှင့်အတူ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ တရားရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန အနေဖြင့် များစွာ စိတ်ထိခိုက် ဝမ်းနည်းကြေကွဲရပါသည်။ ယခုဖြစ်ရပ်မှာ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ ရည်ရွယ်ချက်ရှိရှိ မြန်မာပြည်သူ၊ ပြည်သား များအပေါ် အစုလိုက်အပြုံလိုက် သတ်ဖြတ်မှုနှင့် ရက်စက်ကြမ်းကြုတ်သော စစ်ရာဇဝတ်မှု၊ လူသားမျိုးနွယ်စုအပေါ် ကျူးလွန်သော ရာဇဝတ်မှုများအား ပြောင်ပြောင်တင်းတင်း ကျူးလွန်ခဲ့ ခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။ တရားရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနအနေဖြင့် ယခု ကျူးလွန်သည့်ကိစ္စ၌ ပါဝင် ပတ်သက်သူ၊ ကျူးလွန်သူများ အားလုံးတို့အား စုံစမ်းဖော်ထုတ်၍ ထိုက်သင့်သည့် ပြစ်ဒဏ်များ မလွဲမသွေ ကျခံစေရန်နှင့် ထိခိုက်နစ်နာမှုများအတွက် တရားမျှတမှု ရရှိနိုင်စေရန် စွမ်းစွမ်းတမံ ကြိုးပမ်း ဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်း သဘောထား ထုတ်ပြန် ကြေညာလိုက်သည်။..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Justice - NUG
2023-04-11
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-11
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
Size: 120.23 KB
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Description: "၁။ စစ်ကိုင်းတိုင်း၊ ကန့်ဘလူမြို့နယ်၊ မလယ်တိုက်နယ်၊ ပဇီကြီးကျေးရွာကို ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ်၊ဧပြီလ ၁၁ ရက်၊ ယနေ့မနက်ပိုင်းတွင် အာဏာသိမ်းအကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်က လေကြောင်းတိုက်ခိုက် ခဲ့သည့်အတွက် ကလေးငယ်များနှင့်ကိုယ်ဝန်ဆောင်များအပါအဝင် အရပ်သားပြည်သူ အများအပြား သေဆုံးခဲ့ရသည်။ ၂။ အသက်ဆုံးရှုံးသွားရသူများနှင့် ထိခိုက်ဒဏ်ရာရသူများအတွက် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ကာကွယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနအနေဖြင့် အထူးပင် ဝမ်းနည်းကြေကွဲရကြောင်းနှင့် သက်ဆိုင်သူများ၏ မိသားစု များနှင့်တသားတည်း အတူတကွရှိနေပါကြောင်း အထူး ဖော်ပြလိုသည်။ ၃။ အာဏာသိမ်းအကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်သည် အရပ်သားနှင့် လက်နက်ကိုင်ဟူ၍ သတ်မှတ်ခွဲခြားခြင်းမရှိ အလွန်အကျွံ အင်အားသုံး တိုက်ခိုက်နေကြောင်း ယခုဖြစ်ရပ်က ထပ်မံသက်သေပြနေသလို စစ်ရာဇဝတ်မှု ထပ်မံကျူးလွန်ခြင်းလည်း ဖြစ်သည်။ ၄။ ဤအကြမ်းဖက်လုပ်ရပ်အပါအဝင် အကြမ်းဖက်လုပ်ရပ်များ အားလုံးသည် စက်ဆုတ်ရွံရှာဖွယ် ကောင်းသော စစ်ရာဇဝတ်မှုများ၊ လူသားမျိုးနွယ်စုပေါ် ကျုးလွန်သော ရာဇဝတ်မှုများ ဖြစ်သည်။ ၅။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင် စစ်အာဏာသိမ်းမှု အဆုံးသတ်ပြီး စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ကို မြန်မာ့မြေပေါ်မှ အပြီးတိုင် ဖယ်ရှားနိုင်မှသာ တိုင်းပြည်လူထု တည်ငြိမ်အေးချမ်းမှုရပြီး သာယာဝပြောရေးဆီ ဦးတည် နိုင်မည်ဆိုသည်ကို ယနေ့ဖြစ်ရပ်က ထပ်လောင်း သတိပေးလိုက်သည်ဟု မိမိတို့မှတ်ယူသည်။ ထိခိုက် ဆုံးရှုံးရသည့် လူထုဘဝများအချည်းနှီးမဖြစ်စေရေး၊ တပြိုင်တည်းတွင် စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်အမြစ်ဖြတ်ရေး ရည်မှန်းချက် အမြန်ဆုံး ပေါက်ရောက်အောင်မြင်စေရေး ပိုမို၍ အစွမ်းကုန် အားထုတ် လုပ်ဆောင်သွားမည့် အကြောင်း အခိုင်အမာ ကတိပြုလိုက်သည်။ ..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
2023-04-11
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-11
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
Size: 739.53 KB
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Description: "Telegram တွင်လည်း နေ့စဥ် စစ်ရေးဆိုင်ရာသတင်းအကျဥ်းချုပ်ကို ဖတ်ရှု့နိုင်ပါသည်။ https://t.me/modnugmyanmar ရန်သူ့စစ်တပ်၏ အကြမ်းဖက်မှူများ၊ တပ်တည်၊ တပ်လှုပ် သတင်းများ၊ အကြမ်းဖက်ထောက်တိုင်များ၏ သတင်းအချက်အလက်များစသည့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်နှင့်ပတ်သက်သော သတင်းများကို အောက်ပါအတိုင်း ပေးပို့နိုင်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
2023-04-10
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-10
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
Size: 188.26 KB
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Description: "National Unity Government Weekly Press Update (15/2023)..."
Source/publisher: National Unity Government of Myanmar
2023-04-10
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-10
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
Size: 2.36 MB
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Description: "၁။ ၁၉၉၇ ခုနှစ်မှစ၍ ရခိုင်တက္ကသိုလ်ကျောင်းသားလူငယ်များနှင့် လူလတ်ပိုင်းများ၏ စုစည်းလှုပ်ရှားမှုမှ ရက္ခိုင့်တပ်တော် ပေါ်ပေါက်လာရန် အစပြုခဲ့သည်။ ရက္ခိုင့်တပ်တော် ကို ၂၀၀၉ ခုနှစ်၊ ကချင်ပြည်နယ် လိုင်ဇာတွင် ရခိုင်လူငယ် ၂၆ ဦးဖြင့် စတင်ဖွဲ့စည်းခဲ့သည်။ ၂၀၀၉ ခုနှစ်၊ ဧပြီလ (၁၀) ရက်မှစ၍ ရခိုင်တစ်မျိုးသားလုံး၏ ကိုယ်ပိုင်အုပ်ချုပ်ခွင့်၊ ကိုယ်ပိုင်ပြဋ္ဌာန်းခွင့် နှင့် ကိုယ့်ကြမ္မာ ကိုယ်ဖန်တီးခွင့် ရရှိရေးတို့အတွက် ရက္ခိုင့်တပ်တော်ကို ဖွဲ့စည်းတည်ထောင် ခဲ့သည်မှာ ဒီကနေ့ ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ်၊ ဧပြီလ ၁၀ ရက်နေ့သည် (၁၄)နှစ်မြောက် နှစ်ပတ်လည်သို့တိုင် ရောက်ရှိလာခဲ့ပြီ ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ၂။ ဒီကနေ့ (၁၄)နှစ်မြောက် နှစ်ပတ်လည်နေ့တွင် တစ်နိုင်ငံလုံးရှိ တိုင်းသူပြည်သားအားလုံးကို ဆယ်စုနှစ်ပေါင်း များစွာ ဆင်းရဲဒုက္ခပေးနေသည့် စစ်အုပ်စု၏ ဖိနှိပ်မှုများကို တောင်ပေါ်၊ မြေပြန့် ကျေးလက်၊ မြို့ပြ မကျန် တော်လှန်နေကြချိန်တွင် ကျန်တိုင်းရင်းသား သွေးချင်းညီနောင်များ နှင့်အတူ ဒိုးတူပေါင်ဖက် ညီညီညွတ်ညွတ် လက်တွဲတိုက်ပွဲ၀င်နေကြသည့် ရက္ခိုင့်တပ်တော်ကို ဘေးအန္တရာယ်အပေါင်းမှ ကင်းကွာ၍ ကိုယ်စိတ်နှစ်ဖြာ လုံခြုံကျန်းမာကြပါစေကြောင်း ဆုတောင်းမေတ္တာ ပို့သအပ်ပါသည်။ ၃။ ယနေ့အချိန်အခါတွင်လည်း ရခိုင်ဒေသများတွင် စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ် အပါအဝင် အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ဟူသမျှကို ပြတ်ပြတ်သားသား ဆန့်ကျင်တိုက်ဖျက်ပြီး တိုင်းရင်းသားလူမျိုးများ အားလုံးအတွက် တန်းတူညီမျှမှု၊ အာမခံချက်ရှိသော ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ ပြည်ထောင်စုတည် ဆောက်ရေးအတွက် တိုက်ပွဲများတွင် ပေးဆပ်အနစ်နာခံကာ စွမ်းစွမ်းတမံ ပါ၀င်နေကြသည့် မဟာမိတ်များနှင့်အတူ ရက္ခိုင့်တပ်တော်၏ ကြိုးပမ်းအားထုတ်မှု ပေးဆပ်အနစ်နာခံမှုများကို များစွာ အသိအမှတ်ပြုပါသည်။ ရက္ခိုင့်တပ်တော်တည်ထောင်ခဲ့သည့် (၁၄)နှစ်တာ ကာလအတွင်း ရခိုင်တစ်မျိုးသားလုံး ယုံကြည်အားကိုးရသည့် တပ်တော်အဖြစ် ရပ်တည်နိုင်ခဲ့မှုအပေါ် များစွာ ဂုဏ်ယူမိပါသည်။ ၄။ ရက္ခိုင့်တပ်တော်၏ခေါင်းဆောင်များ နှင့် ရခိုင်တစ်မျိုးသားလုံး လိုလားတောင့်တသည့် တရားမျှတမှု ရရှိရေးကို ဦးတည်လျက် ကိုယ်ပိုင်အုပ်ချုပ်ခွင့်၊ ကိုယ်ပိုင်ပြဋ္ဌာန်းခွင့် နှင့် ကိုယ့်ကြမ္မာ ကိုယ်ဖန်တီးခွင့်များ အမြန်ဆုံး ပိုင်ဆိုင်နိုင်ပါစေကြောင်း ဆုမွန်ကောင်းတောင်းလျက် ဤဂုဏ်ပြုသဝဏ်လွှာအား ပေးပို့အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Justice - NUG
2023-04-10
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-10
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
Size: 169.47 KB
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Description: "Telegram တွင်လည်း နေ့စဥ် စစ်ရေးဆိုင်ရာသတင်းအကျဥ်းချုပ်ကို ဖတ်ရှု့နိုင်ပါသည်။ https://t.me/modnugmyanmar ရန်သူ့စစ်တပ်၏ အကြမ်းဖက်မှူများ၊ တပ်တည်၊ တပ်လှုပ် သတင်းများ၊ အကြမ်းဖက်ထောက်တိုင်များ၏ သတင်းအချက်အလက်များစသည့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်နှင့်ပတ်သက်သော သတင်းများကို အောက်ပါအတိုင်း ပေးပို့နိုင်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
2023-04-09
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-09
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Format : pdf
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Description: "Telegram တွင်လည်း နေ့စဥ် စစ်ရေးဆိုင်ရာသတင်းအကျဥ်းချုပ်ကို ဖတ်ရှု့နိုင်ပါသည်။ https://t.me/modnugmyanmar ရန်သူ့စစ်တပ်၏ အကြမ်းဖက်မှူများ၊ တပ်တည်၊ တပ်လှုပ် သတင်းများ၊ အကြမ်းဖက်ထောက်တိုင်များ၏ သတင်းအချက်အလက်များစသည့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်နှင့်ပတ်သက်သော သတင်းများကို အောက်ပါအတိုင်း ပေးပို့နိုင်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
2023-04-08
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-08
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Description: "Telegram တွင်လည်း နေ့စဥ် စစ်ရေးဆိုင်ရာသတင်းအကျဥ်းချုပ်ကို ဖတ်ရှု့နိုင်ပါသည်။ https://t.me/modnugmyanmar ရန်သူ့စစ်တပ်၏ အကြမ်းဖက်မှူများ၊ တပ်တည်၊ တပ်လှုပ် သတင်းများ၊ အကြမ်းဖက်ထောက်တိုင်များ၏ သတင်းအချက်အလက်များစသည့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်နှင့်ပတ်သက်သော သတင်းများကို အောက်ပါအတိုင်း ပေးပို့နိုင်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
2023-04-05
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-05
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Description: "Telegram တွင်လည်း နေ့စဥ် စစ်ရေးဆိုင်ရာသတင်းအကျဥ်းချုပ်ကို ဖတ်ရှု့နိုင်ပါသည်။ https://t.me/modnugmyanmar ရန်သူ့စစ်တပ်၏ အကြမ်းဖက်မှူများ၊ တပ်တည်၊ တပ်လှုပ် သတင်းများ၊ အကြမ်းဖက်ထောက်တိုင်များ၏ သတင်းအချက်အလက်များစသည့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်နှင့်ပတ်သက်သော သတင်းများကို အောက်ပါအတိုင်း ပေးပို့နိုင်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
2023-04-04
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-04
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "အမှတ်(၁) စစ်ဒေသ၊ စစ်ကိုင်းတိုင်း၊ မကွေးတိုင်း၊ မန္တလေးတိုင်း၊ ရှမ်းပြည်နယ် မြောက်ပိုင်းတို့တွင် ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ် ​ဖေ​ဖော်ဝါရီလအတွင်း တိုက်ပွဲပေါင်း (၄၁၇) ကြိမ် ဖြစ်ပွားခဲ့ပြီး ရန်သူ (၆၄၉) ဦး သေဆုံး၍ (၇၅၆) ဦး ထိခိုက်ဒဏ်ရာရရှိခဲ့သည်။ မိမိရဲဘော် (၃၃) ဦး တော်လှန်ရေးအတွက် အသက်ပေးလှူခဲ့ရပြီး (၉၇) ဦး ထိခိုက်ဒဏ်ရာရရှိခဲ့သည်။ ရန်သူ့ထံမှ လက်နက်မျိုးစုံ (၃၀)လက် အပါအဝင် ခဲယမ်းမီးကျောက် အမြောက်အမြား သိမ်းဆည်းရမိခဲ့သည်။ ဤ တိုက်ပွဲများကို အမှတ်(၁) စစ်ဒေသကွပ်ကဲမှုအောက်ရှိ PDF၊ ပကဖနှင့် EROs ပူးပေါင်းအဖွဲ့များက ဆင်နွှဲခဲ့ခြင်းဖြစ်ကြောင်း သတင်းထုတ်ပြန်အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
2023-04-04
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-04
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ်၊ ဧပြီလ (၃) ရက်နေ့ ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ်၊ မတ်လ(၃၁)ရက်နေ့တွင် ဂန့်ဂေါခရိုင်၊ ဂန့်ဂေါမြို့နယ်၊ ကန်ရွာ နယ်မြေခံရဲစခန်းကို ပြည်သူ့ ကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်မတော်(ဂန့်ဂေါခရိုင်) ခရိုင်တပ်ရင်းများဖြစ်ကြသည့် အမှတ် ၁၊ ၇၊ ၁၁၊ ၁၂၊ ၁၄၊ ၁၉ တပ်ရင်း(၆)ရင်းတို့နှင့်အတူ ABSDF၊ HYPER UAV FORCE၊ ပကဖ ရဲဘော်များဖြင့် ဝင်ရောက် တိုက်ခိုက် ခဲ့ပါသည်။ မနက်(၆)နာရီမှစတင်ပစ်ခတ်ခဲ့ပြီး စခန်းအတွင်းသို့ ဝင်ရောက်ရန် အပြင်းအထန် ကြိုးစားခဲ့သည်။ နယ်မြေခံရဲစခန်းအတွင်းသို့ မနက် (၉) နာရီတွင် ဝင်ရောက်နိုင်ခဲ့ပြီး စခန်းကို စတင်မီးရှို့ နိုင်ခဲ့ ပါသည်။ စတင်ဝင်ရောက်သည့်အချိန်တွင်ပင် ရန်သူ့ဘက်မှ တိုက်လေယဥ် တစ်စီးဖြင့် (၂) ကြိမ် တိုင်တိုင် ပစ်ခတ်ခဲ့သည်။ ဆက်လက်ပြီး ရန်သူ့တပ်က ရဟတ်ယာဥ်၊ တိုက်လေယာဥ် တို့ဖြင့် (၇) ကြိမ်တိတိ လာရောက်ပစ်ခတ်ခဲ့ပါသည်။ ထိုသို့အကြိမ်များစွာ လာရောက်ပစ်ခတ်ခဲ့သော်လည်း မိမိတို့ တပ်ပေါင်းစု ရဲဘော်များအနေဖြင့် လုံးဝ နောက်မဆုတ်ဘဲ ရဲစခန်းအတွင်းသို့ (၄) ကြိမ်တိတိ ပြန်လည် ဝင်ရောက် တိုက်ခိုက်ခဲ့သည်။ (၄) ကြိမ်တိတိ ဝင်ရောက်ကာ စခန်းကိုသိမ်းရန် ကြိုးစား ခဲ့သော်လည်း နေ့လည် ၂ နာရီ ခန့်တွင် Mi-17 ဖြင့် (၃) ကြိမ်တိတိ စစ်ကူလာချသဖြင့် မိမိတို့ဘက်မှ ပြန်လည်ဆုတ်ခွာခဲ့ပါသည်။ ပြန်လည်ဆုတ်ခွာချိန်တွင် ရန်သူ့စခန်း၏ (၇၅) ရာခိုင်နှုန်းခန့်ကို မီးရှို့ဖျက်ဆီးနိုင်ခဲ့သည်။ ရန်သူ့ ဘက်မှ (၄၅)ဦး ခန့်သေဆုံးပြီး၊ (၁၀)ဦး ပြင်းထန်ဒဏ်ရာရရှိကြောင်း သိရသည်။ G3(၄)လက်၊ G4(၁)လက်၊ G3 မောင်းတုံး(၁)ခု၊ ကျည်ဘောက်(၄)ခု၊ လက်ပစ်ဗုံး(၂)လုံး၊ စကားပြောစက်(၂)လုံး၊ ဖုန်း(၇)လုံး၊ Laptop (၁)လုံး၊ ဓား(၁)လက်၊ ငွေ(၆၀၈၀၀)ကျပ်နှင့် အခြားအသုံးအဆောင်ပစ္စည်းများ သိမ်းဆည်းရမိခဲ့ပါသည်။ တိုက်ပွဲအတွင်း မိမိတို့ပူးပေါင်းတပ်ဖွဲ့မှ ပြည်သူ့ရင်သွေး ရဲဘော်(၂)ဦး ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ တိုင်းပြည်သစ်အတွက် အသက်ပေးလှူသွားခဲ့ပြီး ရဲဘော်တစ်ဦး နင်းမိုင်းမိကာ ခြေထောက်တဖက် ဆုံးရှုံးခဲ့ရသည်။ အခြားထိခိုက်ဒဏ်ရာရသူ (၉)ဦး (မစိုးရိမ်ရ)ရှိခဲ့ပြီး ကျန်ရဲဘော်များ ဘေးကင်းစွာ ဆုတ်ခွာ နိုင်ခဲ့ပါသည်။ တိုက်ပွဲမပြီးခင်ချိန်တွင်လူမှုကွန်ရက်များပေါ်သို့တိုက်ပွဲနှင့်ပတ်သက်သောသတင်းအမှားများ ပြန့်နှံ့ ခဲ့ပါသည်။ တိုက်ပွဲမပြီးဆုံးခင်တွင် လူမှုကွန်ရက်များပေါ်သို့ တိုက်ပွဲသတင်းပြန့်နှံ့ခြင်းမရှိစေရန် သက်ဆိုင်ရာကွပ်ကဲမှုအဆင့်ဆင့်က ကြပ်မတ်စိစစ်ရမည်ဖြစ်ပြီး သတင်းမီဒီယာများအနေဖြင့်လည်း တိုက်ပွဲမပြီးဆုံးခင် သတင်းထုတ်ပြန်မှုများကို စောင့်စည်းထိန်းချုပ်ပေးပါရန် လေးစားစွာ ညှိနှိုင်းရင်း ယခုတိုက်ပွဲ သတင်းကို ထုတ်ပြန် အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
2023-04-03
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-03
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "1. Union Election Commission assigned by SAC considered a branch of terrorist organization 15/03/2023.....2. NUG urge international community to support them in ending the SAC’s atrocious crimes 16/03/2023.....3. UN Ambassador Kyaw Moe Tun says terrorist military committed 60 massacre over last 2 years 13/03/2023.....4. Military-organized sham election will create more bloodshed across the country.....5. Nearly 400 million MMK in aid distributed in February 16/03/2023.....6. SAC massacres resulted in 766 civilians dead 16/03/2023.....7. Destroying youth’s education is tantamount to destroying country’s future..."
Source/publisher: National Unity Government of Myanmar
2023-03-20
Date of entry/update: 2023-03-21
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "National Unity Government Weekly Press Update (12/2023)
Source/publisher: National Unity Government of Myanmar
2023-03-20
Date of entry/update: 2023-03-21
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Description: "The National Unity Government today announces that it is sending a formal demand letter to the PTT Exploration and Production Public Company with respect to flows of funds from the Yadana Project. These funds are enabling the military junta to prosecute its violence against Myanmar people. This action is necessitated by the ongoing human rights abuses and increased violence that the junta is inflicting on innocent civilians across our country. The recent dreadful violence in Shan State is the latest in a long series of barbaric acts that have been condemned by the United Nations Security Council, by the United Nations Special Rapporteur and by governments across the world. The United Nations, in Security Council Resolution 2669, expressed its deep concern at all forms of violence across the country, and attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure, and has demanded an immediate end to all forms of violence throughout the country. To this end, it is imperative to stop the flow of foreign currency to the junta. It is this income that enables the junta to purchase the weapons that are being used to kill civilians indiscriminately, to attack hospitals and schools, and to inflict such huge suffering that, according to the United Nations, some 1,704,000 internally displaced persons have had to flee their homes since the coup. A further million people are seeking refuge in our neighbouring countries. This is an immense human tragedy. All companies and governments should see it as their duty to assist the National Unity Government in stopping the funds to the junta that enable this violence, for the sake of our common humanity. Impelled by these concerns, the National Unity Government is therefore delivering to PTT a formal demand letter with respect to the Yadana Project. This letter seeks information on the revenues that have been delivered to the junta under the relevant contracts, as well as monthly reports and other details of work done since the coup. You sent The letter lays out that all future payments from the operation of the Yadana Project be delivered to an account that the National Unity Government shall designate, these funds to be retained there for the good of the people of Myanmar. The National Unity Government seeks in no way to harm PTT, nor to interrupt supply. Our action is designed to enable PTT to ensure that its activities are aligned with fundamental human rights. We will support PTT in the company's public commitment to follow the advice of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. Our action follows PTT's decision to suspend some of its operations in Myanmar due to what PTT itself has called the "violence and unrest" in the country. PTT did the right thing in suspending some activities. This letter provides PTT with a further opportunity to stand up for human rights, and against violence. We hope that PTT will comply with the terms of our letter, and work with then National Unity Government. If PTT do not engage with us in this process, we will have no choice but to commence an arbitration under the terms of the appropriate agreement, and to use international law to stop the use of these funds to pay for the junta's war against the fundamental human rights and dignity of the people of Myanmar..."
Source/publisher: National Unity Government of Myanmar
2023-03-20
Date of entry/update: 2023-03-20
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "The Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD) is one of the most powerful political parties in Myanmar. Founded in 1988, the SNLD has strongly rejected the poll proposed by Myanmar’s military regime. The party has decided not to register with the junta-appointed Union Election Commission (UEC), even though the new Political Parties Registration Law enacted by the regime in February requires political parties to re-register with the UEC within two months or face dissolution. The SNLD won 42 seats in the 2020 general election, the third-highest number of seats at the national level. It also won the second-highest number of seats in the 1990 general election. One previous SNLD party chair, Khun Tun Oo, resigned from the National Convention staged by the previous military regime to draft the 2008 Constitution. Khun Tun Oo and SNLD party secretary Sai Nyunt Lwin were also prosecuted and jailed on an array of charges including high treason for founding the Shan State Consultative Council in February 2005. The men were released in 2012. SNLD general secretary Sai Leik talked to The Irrawaddy recently about the party’s decision not to re-register with the junta-controlled UEC, and how the party will continue to play a role in Myanmar’s politics regardless. We heard that the SNLD will not re-register with the UEC. Why? Firstly, it is difficult to travel because of security concerns. We don’t have enough time to meet party members and seek their opinions. It is especially difficult to meet our party members in Kayah and Kachin states. Secondly, we don’t think it is fair to order political parties to re-register when the regime hasn’t announced the day the election will be held. So we have decided not to register. If you don’t re-register the SNLD faces being dissolved, its members possibly arrested and its assets potentially seized. How will the SNLD survive? They [the junta] haven’t enacted an election law. And they haven’t announced the day of the election. The military has extended its rule, using what it calls an extraordinary situation as an excuse. So can the election law be enacted in an extraordinary situation? If we don’t re-register, our registered status will be annulled. But we don’t think the regime will take punitive action for failing to register. There are previous cases. Formerly, they asked political parties to get their financial records audited. But some parties refused and [the military] didn’t do anything to them. Anyway, as they call it an extraordinary situation, we should expect unusual circumstances and we have braced ourselves for that. Some ethnic parties have re-registered, saying that elections are the foundation of democracy and that an election will help solve the current political crisis. What is your view on that? It is just an assumption that an election is the way out of the current political crisis. But the question is when and how that election will be held and what the election law says. Nothing is ready yet. And the most important thing is that we need to make sure that the election can bring about change. If the election can’t trigger positive change for the country, it can’t be the answer. Rather than one party hastily holding the election, it would be more meaningful if we all work together for a poll that is acceptable and beneficial to the Myanmar people and that the international community would recognize, and that meets the democratic norms and would definitely bring democratization to the country. How will the SNLD engage in politics if it is dissolved? We are a member of the Committee for Shan State Unity. We once issued a statement as a member. We have a policy for the peaceful co-existence of all people living in the Union. There are many things that we can do for the betterment for the country, either in the peace process or social welfare work or research work. We in the SNLD will always do our part for the interests of the country by representing and helping the people. We will continue to help the people..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2023-03-20
Date of entry/update: 2023-03-20
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "၁။ ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ်၊ မတ်လ ၂၀ ရက်တွင် ကျရောက်သည့် (၃၅)နှစ်မြောက်၊ ချင်းတော်လှန်ရေးနေ့တွင် ခေတ်အဆက်ဆက် တော်လှန်ရေးအတွင်း အသက်ပေးလှူသွားကြသော ရဲမေရဲဘော်များနှင့် ချင်းလူ မျိုးအားလုံးကို လေးစားစွာ ဦးညွတ်ဂါရဝပြုပါသည်။ ၂။ ယနေ့အချိန်အခါသည် စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်နှင့် အာဏာရှင်မှန်သမျှ အမြစ်ပြတ်ချေမှုန်းရေး၊ ချင်းအမျိုးသားများ၏ ကိုယ်ပိုင်ပြဌာန်းခွင့် ပြန်လည်ရရှိရေးနှင့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စု တည်ဆောက်ရေးအတွက် ချင်းအမျိုးသားလက်နက်ကိုင်တော်လှန်ရေး စတင်ခဲ့သည့် (၃၅) နှစ်ပြည့် ချင်းတော်လှန်ရေးနေ့အချိန်အခါဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ၃။ … ယခုအခါ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံနေရာအနှံ့အပြားတွင် ဆင်နွှဲနေကြသော နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးတွင်လည်း အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီအား တော်လှန်တိုက်ပွဲဝင်ရာ၌ CNF/CNA ရဲမေရဲဘော်များ၊ ချင်းဒေသကာ ကွယ်ရေးတပ်ဖွဲ့ဝင်များနှင့် ချင်းလူမျိုးများ၏ စွန့်လွှတ်အနစ်နာခံမှုနှင့် ပေးဆပ်မှုတို့ကို အထူးလေး စားဂုဏ်ယူပါကြောင်း ဖော်ပြလိုပါသည်။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ သာလွန်အင်အား အသုံးပြု၍ လူမဆန်သည့် အကြမ်းဖက်တိုက်ခိုက်မှုအပေါင်းကို ရွပ်ရွပ်ချွံချွံပြန်လည် ခုခံတိုက်ခိုက်သည့် ချင်း တော်လှန်ရေးအင်အားစုများ၏ ခိုင်မာသော စိတ်ဓာတ်နှင့် ဇွဲ၊လုံ့လ၊ဝီရီယတို့သည် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအနှံ့ အပြားမှ တော်လှန်ရေးအင်အားစုများ အားလုံးအတွက် အတုယူလေးစားဖွယ်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ တစ်ဖက် မှာလည်း အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ အကြမ်းဖက်မှုများကြောင့် နေရပ်စွန့်ခွာကြရသူများနှင့် အသက်အိုးအိမ်စည်းစိမ် ဆုံးရှုံးကြရသည့် ချင်းလူမျိုးများအားလုံးနှင့် ထပ်တူ ဝမ်းနည်းခံစားရပါ ကြောင်း အလေးအနက်ဖော်ပြလိုပါသည်။ ၄။ စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်အပါအဝင် အာဏာရှင်စနစ်မှန်သမျှ အမြစ်ပြတ်ရေး၊ ချင်းအမျိုးသား၏ ကိုယ်ပိုင်ပြဌာန်းခွင့် ရရှိရေးနှင့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စု တည်ဆောက်ရေးအတွက် ချင်း တော်လှန်ရေးအင်အားစုများနှင့် ချင်းတစ်မျိုးသားလုံးမှ ဆထက်တိုး ပိုမိုစွမ်းဆောင်နိုင်ပြီး အောင် မြင်မှုများကို မြန်ဆန်စွာ ရရှိနိုင်ပါစေကြောင်း ဆန္ဒပြုရင်း ဤသဝဏ်လွှာအား ပေးပို့အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher: National Unity Government of Myanmar
2023-03-20
Date of entry/update: 2023-03-20
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Description: "Warning: Graphic Content Myanmar’s junta is deploying massive reinforcements as it steps up its atrocities during its scorched earth campaign aimed at retaking control of the resistance strongholds of Sagaing Region and Chin and Kayah states. The military regime has lost control of most of the rural areas in Sagaing, Chin and Kayah, while its forces and officials in the towns also face frequent attacks from resistance forces. Special task forces deployed by the junta have committed war crimes and crimes against humanity against both resistance fighters and civilians including massacres, the beheadings of victims and the use of sexual violence, while also employing indiscriminate air and artillery strikes and looting and burning villages. The regime atrocities are aimed at deterring civilians from becoming involved in or supporting the resistance movement. The much greater use of atrocities has been reported recently in Sagaing, as well as Kayah and southern Shan states, and comes after the military regime imposed martial law in February in 40 more townships across four regions and four states including Sagaing and Kayah and Chin states. Since martial law was imposed, an estimated 5,000 junta reinforcements have been sent to Sagaing and Chin and Kayah States, the strongholds of resistance to the military dictatorship, according to local People’s Defense Forces (PDF) and ethnic armed organizations. Military observers said the regime’s deployment of more troops seemed to be a desperate attempt to regain control of the resistance strongholds. Thet Htar Maung, a local military analyst, said he expected more intense fighting in Chin and Kayah states, because the resistance fighters in those regions are better-trained. “The fighting will be bloodier and more frequent,” he said. Since February 23, intense clashes have been reported in many townships in Kayah State and the neighboring townships of Pinlaung and Pekon in southern Shan State. PDFs and the Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF), the Karenni Army and the Pa-O National Defense Force have been fighting up to 12 Myanmar military columns totaling 2,000 soldiers which have been raiding villages and the forest. Another 1,000 junta reinforcements have been sent from Mandalay to Sagaing Region in recent days, where several military columns are raiding and torching villages daily in a number of townships. Fierce clashes have also taken place in Chin State in western Myanmar over the last week. A combined force of fighters from the Chin National Army (CNA) and Chinland Defense Force (CDF) has been battling junta reinforcements sent from Sagaing’s Kale Township and traveling in a convoy of 30 vehicles, including two armored cars, along the Tedim-Falam Road, according to Salai Htet Ni, the spokesperson of the Chin National Front, the CNA’s political wing. Fighting also broke out on Thursday in Mindat Township, southern Chin State, when CNA and CDF fighters attacked a regime convoy of 80 vehicles sent from Magwe Region and traveling the Mindat-Kyaukhtu Road. Days before the arrival of the convoy, five junta fighter jets conducted airstrikes between Magwe Region’s Kyaukhtu and Mindat without any provocation, said Salai Htet Ni. Terrifying escalation of junta atrocities On March 11, Myanmar junta troops massacred 22 civilians including three Buddhist monks during a raid on Nam Name Village in Pinlaung Township, southern Shan State. Having occupied a hill near the village on March 9, the junta soldiers raided Nam Name on March 11 while also shelling the village. The following day, resistance fighters found the bodies of 22 people, including three monks, who had been shot dead at the village monastery. The resistance said that 11 more village residents who had sheltered at the monastery during the raid are also missing. Pro-regime Telegram channel Ko Thet shared photos of some of the victims, describing them as PDF and KNDF fighters killed by regime soldiers in Nam Name. Blood can be seen dripping from the victims in the photos. Regime spokesperson Major General Zaw Min Tun said via-military owned media that PDF fighters were captured in the raid along with weapons. The Ko Thet Telegram channel has since removed the photos of the victims and accused the KNDF and PDFs of massacring them. In an online press conference held on March 16 by the human rights ministry of Myanmar’s civilian National Unity Government, Dr. Ye Zaw, a doctor in charge of Kayah State’s medics, said that he had seen the bodies of the Nam Name victims and that most of the victims had been shot multiple times. Some of the victims had broken limbs and head injuries, indicating that they had been tortured before being killed. Another junta special task force of around 100 soldiers killed and beheaded 20 resistance members and massacred 16 civilian detainees, including three woman who were raped before being killed, during a series of raids from February 23 to March 15 in Ayadaw, Myinmu and Sagaing townships in Sagaing Region. On Monday, a Myanmar military detachment shot dead a resistance detainee and beheaded another during an operation in Sagaing’s Khin-U Township, according to local sources. Regarding the regime’s escalating offensives, the spokesperson for the Karenni military central information committee, Khu Nye Reh, said that the resistance would fight back as best as they can. “There has to be defense if there’s an offensive and people will have to suffer. But I want to encourage them not to feel bad and to stay with us till the regime is toppled and we get the federal democracy we all dream of,” he said..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2023-03-17
Date of entry/update: 2023-03-17
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "1. The National Unity Government is the legitimate people’s government formed by the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, comprising elected members of Pyidaungsu Hluttaw. 2. As the terrorist military council unjustly seized power from the people by means of force, the entire population across the country has taken up arms and joined the Spring Revolution in accordance with their right to self-protection. 3. As the Spring Revolution marks the 2nd anniversary, the National Unity Government has gained control over certain territories through the leadership of the people and battles fought by the revolutionary forces. 4. It has been known far and wide that the ongoing inhumane atrocities committed by the terrorist military council have resulted in countless loss of lives and properties of the people of Myanmar. Therefore, there is an urgent need for humanitarian assistance for the affected people. 5. The National Unity Government has been providing as much humanitarian aids as possible to the people for their losses due to the atrocities committed by the terrorist military council. Hence, we urge all international organizations to cooperate with us in providing assistance to the people of Myanmar. 6. In order to ensure effective provision of humanitarian assistance to those in need and to ensure security for aid workers, we strongly urge all local and international non-governmental organizations and civil society organizations to seek prior authorization from the respective ministries of the National Unity Government before taking surveys, implementing projects, and traveling through or within the areas administered by the National Unity Government..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Home Affairs and Immigration - Myanmar
2023-03-17
Date of entry/update: 2023-03-17
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "၁။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရသည် ပြည်သူလူထုမှ ရွေးကောက်တင်မြှောက်ထား သည့် ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားလှယ်များဖြင့် ဖွဲ့စည်းထားသော ပြည်ထောင်စု လွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီက တာဝန်ခံဖွဲ့စည်းထားသည့် ပြည်သူ့အစိုးရ တစ်ရပ်ဖြစ်သည်။ ၂။ အာဏာသိမ်း အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီသည် ပြည်သူ့အာဏာကို လက်နက်ဖြင့် မတရားသိမ်းပိုက်ရယူခဲ့သည့်အတွက် ပြည်သူလူထုတစ်ရပ်လုံးက ရရာလက်နက်ဆွဲကိုင်၍ မိမိကိုယ်မိမိ ခုခံကာကွယ်ပိုင်ခွင့်အရ၊ သမိုင်းဝင် ပြည်သူ့နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးကို တစ်နိုင်ငံလုံးအတိုင်းအတာဖြင့် ဆင်နွှဲနေကြပါသည်။ ၃။ ပြည်သူ့နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေး (၂) နှစ် ပြည့်လာသည့်အချိန်တွင် ပြည်သူ့ဦးဆောင်မှု၊ တော်လှန်ရေးအင်အားစုများ၏ တိုက်ပွဲဝင်မှုတို့၏ အသီးအပွင့်အဖြစ် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေး အစိုးရသည် စိုးမိုးထိန်းချုပ်နယ်မြေများ ရရှိလာခဲ့ပြီဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ၄။ အာဏာသိမ်း အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ လူမဆန်စွာ ရက်စက်ကြမ်းကြုတ်ယုတ်မာ မီးရှို့ သတ်ဖြတ်မှုများကြောင့် ပြည်သူလူထု၏ အသက်အိုးအိမ်စည်းစိမ်များစွာ ဆုံးရှုံးနစ်နာနေ ရသည်မှာ ကမ္ဘာအသိဖြစ်သည်။ ထို့အတွက် မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထုသည် လူသားချင်းစာနာ ကူညီမှုများ များစွာ လိုအပ်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။ ၅။ အာဏာသိမ်းအကြမ်းဖက် စစ်ကောင်စီကြောင့် ဒုက္ခရောက်နေကြရသည့် ပြည်သူလူထု၏ နစ်နာဆုံးရှုံးမှုများကို အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအနေဖြင့် အတတ်နိုင်ဆုံး လူသားစာနာမှုအကူအညီများ ဆောင်ရွက်ပေးလျက်ရှိပါသည်။ နိုင်ငံတကာအဖွဲ့အစည်းများ အနေဖြင့်လည်း အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရနှင့် လက်တွဲ၍ ဝိုင်းဝန်ကူညီပေးကြပါရန်လည်း တိုက်တွန်းအပ်ပါသည်။ ၆။ အမှန်စင်စစ် အကူအညီလိုအပ်နေသော ပြည်သူလူထုထံသို့ လူသားချင်းစာနာကူညီ ပေးမှုများ ထိထိရောက်ရောက် ပံ့ပိုးနိုင်ရန်၊ ပေါင်းစပ်ညှိနှိုင်းမှုများဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်ရန်နှင့် တော်လှန်ရေးကာလဖြစ်သည့်အတွက် လုံခြုံရေးဝန်ဆောင်မှုများ ပံ့ပိုးပေးနိုင်ရန် အလို့ငှာ ပြည်တွင်းအစိုးရမဟုတ်သော အဖွဲ့အစည်းများ၊ အရပ်ဘက်အဖွဲ့အစည်းများနှင့် နိုင်ငံတကာ အစိုးရမဟုတ်သောအဖွဲ့စည်းများအနေဖြင့် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၏ ထိန်းချုပ်နယ် မြေများအတွင်း စစ်တမ်းကောက်ယူခြင်း၊ ဖြတ်သန်းသွားလာခြင်းနှင့် စီမံကိန်းလုပ်ငန်းများ ဆောင်ရွက်ခြင်းတို့အတွက် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ သက်ဆိုင်ရာဝန်ကြီးဌာနများသို့ ကြိုတင်အသိပေးအကြောင်းကြား‌ပြီးမှသာ ဆောင်ရွက်သွားရန် လေးနက်စွာ အသိပေး အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Home Affairs and Immigration - Myanmar
2023-03-17
Date of entry/update: 2023-03-17
Grouping: Individual Documents
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