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Sub-title: Chinese Communist Party plays ‘leading role’ in promoting autocracy, think tank says.
Description: "The Chinese Communist Party plays “a leading role in promoting authoritarian norms” around the world as some leaders show a willingness to collaborate in spreading new forms of repression, according to a report from Washington-based think tank Freedom House. However, even as democratic freedom suffers global setbacks, fundamental rights continue to have “an appeal and capacity for renewal” in places like Myanmar, where people have shown they are willing to risk their lives in pursuit of freedom, the report found. Among the 56 countries listed as “Not Free” around the world, North Korea, China and Myanmar were listed as among “the worst of the worst.” Additionally, out of 39 countries in the Asia-Pacific region, nine were listed as “not free” and 13 were deemed only “partly free.” “Political rights and civil liberties declined across the region as authoritarian forces moved to consolidate their power,” the report said. “The trend was most dramatic in Afghanistan and Myanmar, where elected civilian leaders were forced from office.” The report noted the arrests in early 2022 of prominent pro-democracy politicians in Hong Kong who took part in primary elections to consolidate the democratic opposition. They continued to be detained through December’s Legislative Council balloting – something that Freedom House said “underscored Beijing’s success in dismantling the territory’s semi-democratic institutions.” Crackdowns in Asia also affected journalists and civil society movements, especially in countries whose institutions were already vulnerable, the report said. China, Myanmar “In China, one of the world’s most restrictive media environments, journalists faced heightened scrutiny and rigorous political indoctrination when attempting to renew their press licenses, and even individuals who engaged in solitary forms of protest were punished with prison sentences,” it said. The biggest contraction in freedom took place in Myanmar, which has seen the widespread arrests of civilian political leaders following the 2021 military coup d’etat, Freedom House said. “Over a thousand people have been killed as security forces crack down on pro-democracy protests, and thousands of others have been thrown in jail and tortured,” the report said. “The military authorities imposed curfews, repeatedly shut down the internet, raided universities, and searched for human rights defenders and pro-democracy activists to arrest.” The country’s recent turmoil is “another sign that international deterrents against antidemocratic behavior are losing force,” the report said. However, Freedom House noted that “a widespread civil disobedience movement against the military coup has persisted in the face of violent reprisals.” Resistance has denied the military regime “legitimacy and crippled its ability to function as a government, reflecting both the people’s commitment to democracy and the power it gives them to shape events.” In Singapore, authorities forced one of the few independent news outlets to close after its license was suspended. And in Thailand, authorities expanded their ability to prosecute people for publishing news that could incite fear in the public. China’s leading role Worldwide, the enemies of liberal democracy “are accelerating their attacks” as regimes “have become more effective at co-opting or circumventing the norms and institutions meant to support basic liberties, and at providing aid to others who wish to do the same,” the report said, noting that there have been 16 consecutive years of decline in global freedom. “The leaders of China, Russia, and other dictatorships have succeeded in shifting global incentives, jeopardizing the consensus that democracy is the only viable path to prosperity and security, while encouraging more authoritarian approaches to governance,” it said. The Chinese Communist Party “offers an alternative to democracies as a source of international support and investment, helping would-be autocrats to entrench themselves in office, adopt aspects of the CCP governance model, and enrich their regimes while ignoring principles like transparency and fair competition,” the report said. “At the same time, the CCP has used its vast economic clout and even military threats to suppress international criticism of its own violations of democratic principles and human rights, for instance by punishing governments and other foreign entities that criticize its demolition of civil liberties in Hong Kong or question its expansive territorial claims.” Freedom House pointed to a Marriott hotel’s refusal to host a November 2021 World Uyghur Congress gathering in the Czech Republic, saying it preferred to observe “political neutrality.” New Zealand’s Parliament also refrained from identifying Beijing’s actions in Xinjiang province as a genocide after the trade minister said such language could hurt economic relations with China. Turkey was once a haven for Uyghurs fleeing China, but the country “has increasingly shifted its stance to meet Beijing’s demands” by making it more difficult for Uyghurs to obtain permanent residence permits, the report found..."
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Source/publisher: "RFA" (USA)
2023-03-09
Date of entry/update: 2023-03-09
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Twenty-six workers from the Myanmar Pou Chen Co. factory, which makes shoes for Adidas, have asked the global sportswear brand to investigate labor conditions there and help them get back their jobs back. “The brand’s knowledge [of working conditions] and our actual situation may be very different. So I would like them to closely observe what is happening on the ground and stand with our workers,” said Ma Phyo Thida Win, 26, a labor union president at the Myanmar Pou Chen factory. The workers were fired in October after leading a three-day strike at the factory in Shwe Pyi Thar Township, Yangon, over 21 points including low wages and workplace discrimination. The Myanmar Pou Chen plant produces over 38,000 pairs of Adidas shoes per day under Taiwanese ownership. The workers demanded a rise in the daily wage from 4,800 kyats to 8,000 kyats amid economic hardship and soaring prices for everyday goods. The factory management rejected the demand. The first day of the strike saw a truck full of soldiers deployed to the factory. An army officer then used threats and intimidation in an effort to break up the strike, workers said. The strikers remained within the factory grounds over fear of a crackdown if they ventured on to the streets. “But the military truck with about two-dozen armed soldiers followed us everywhere we marched inside the factory estate,” said one worker, speaking on condition of anonymity for safety reasons. The strike swelled to around 2,000 workers on Oct 27. The Pou Chen factory employs around 7,000 workers and is one of the biggest shoe factories in Myanmar. On October 28, the factory management announced it had fired 26 unionized workers for breaching employment contracts. Security guards ejected the 26 from the factory, according to the union. The factory management declined to comment. Workers inside the factory attempted to continue the strike without the unionists, but were threatened with dismissal by the management and arrest by the soldiers. The Labour Relations Department held three meetings over the dispute in November, but the factory management refused to reinstate the 26 workers. The workers then filed a case with the Ministry of Labour, Immigration and Population in Naypyitaw, explaining that union leader Ma Phyo Thida Win had worked at Pou Chen for over four years. The ministry handed the case to Shwe Pyi Thar Township Labor Department, which held meetings with those involved in the dispute on Nov. 22, 25 and Dec. 8. However, the factory management still refused to take the workers back, and instead proposed financial compensation. The workers declined the offer, asking only for their jobs back. “Under labor law, this case is considered a personal dispute between the workers and the employer. If the workers are not satisfied, they can sue the factory owner in a civil court. But we don’t trust the judicial system under the junta, so, the only option left to us is to go to Adidas,” said a labor rights activist who is assisting the Pou Chen workers..."
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Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2022-12-12
Date of entry/update: 2022-12-12
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Telenor has completed the sale of Telenor Myanmar.
Description: "In line with the sales and purchase agreement, Telenor has received USD 50 million (approximately NOK 450 million) at closing. The remaining USD 55 million shall be received in equal installments over the coming 5 years. Closing of the transaction will only have minor impact on the equity of Telenor Group. However, the reclassification of accumulated losses related to translation differences earlier recognized in other comprehensive income will impact the income statement negatively with approximately NOK 0.8 billion. The derecognising of the cash balance in Telenor Myanmar and the proceeds received at closing results in a net negative cash flow impact of around NOK 1.5 billion. The transaction will be booked in Q1. Due to the uncertain situation in Myanmar, the deferred payment will not be recognized in the accounts at closing..."
Source/publisher: Telenor Group
2022-03-25
Date of entry/update: 2022-03-25
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Access Now, outraged by today’s announcement that the Myanmar Investment Commission has approved the sale of Telenor Myanmar, is calling for international actors to implement sanctions and stop the company’s irresponsible disposal of its Myanmar operations to a company whose 80% majority shareholder is military-linked Shwe Byain Phyu Group. “It’s not over until it’s over,” said Wai Phyo Myint, Asia Pacific Policy Analyst at Access Now. “The Telenor sale approval does not come as a surprise, but it is a major kick in the guts for human rights defenders on the ground. The purchaser, Shwe Byain Phyu, may not be sanctioned now — but it needs to be. International actors must recognize and take action against the company’s multiple and flagrant links to the military.” Telenor’s sales agreement is with M1 Group, which will buy Telenor Myanmar through its Singapore-registered entity Investcom Pte Ltd — the majority of which will be owned by military-linked Shwe Byain Phyu Group. Telenor noted that it had “not been party to any dialogue between M1 and its local partner,” even as it claims that it screened the transaction as sanctions compliant. Shwe Byain Phyu Group’s Chairperson, Thein Win Zaw, and Director, Tin Latt Min (Zaw’s wife) have corporate connections with multiple military-linked individuals and companies sanctioned by the United States, European Union and United Kingdom. This includes: Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited (MEHL); Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC); Myanmar Gems Enterprise (MGE); Forest Products Joint Venture Corporation (FPJVC); and the individuals, Tay Za; and Pyae Phyo Tay Za. These operators have been sanctioned for their involvement in largely-documented human rights abuses — a web in which Shwe Byain Phyu appears to be an active player. “Telenor must be held accountable for the disastrous rights impacts which will flow from relinquishing the data of 18 million subscribers to a ruthless regime,” said Golda Benjamin, Asia Pacific Campaigner at Access Now. “The company has followed an approach of willful ignorance of the human rights consequences to the people of Myanmar because of their decision to leave the country.” If the handover goes ahead, Myanmar’s telecommunications sector will be stained in khaki. Telenor Myanmar’s near 30% share of the market would add to the approximately 55% already held by military-owned Myanmar Posts and Telecommunications (MPT) and Telecom International Myanmar Company Limited (MyTel). Qatar’s Ooredoo holds the remaining 15%, and is likely complying with military surveillance orders. Unless the Telenor Myanmar sale is prevented, the new management will presumably also activate dangerous intercept surveillance technology. Access Now has repeatedly emphasized serious risks to the rights to privacy, expression, association, and security from the disposal of Telenor Myanmar, and urged Telenor Group to address warnings raised by the people of Myanmar, civil society and its own investors. The sale must be stopped..."
Source/publisher: Access Now
2022-03-18
Date of entry/update: 2022-03-18
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Telenor Group has been informed that the Myanmar Investment Commission has given final regulatory approval to the sale of Telenor Myanmar to M1 Group. During the regulatory approval process the Myanmar authorities made it a condition that M1 Group should have a local partner in the ownership of Telenor Myanmar after the transaction between Telenor and M1 closes. “Telenor has to leave Myanmar to be able to adhere to our own values on human rights and responsible business, and because local laws in Myanmar conflict with European laws. The security situation is extreme and deteriorating, and we must ensure that our exit does not increase the safety risk for employees. With limited options available, the sale of Telenor Myanmar is deemed to be the most realistic alternative to keep our employees safe. Because of the current situation, we are significantly constrained in our choices and with this approval the transaction can be finalised. Telenor has not been party to any dialogue between M1 and its local partner,” says Sigve Brekke, President and CEO of Telenor Group. Telenor’s sales agreement is with M1 Group alone, and this has remained unchanged during the approval process. However, the regulatory approval requires that M1 ensures a local majority owner after the closing of the transaction between Telenor and M1. Telenor has confirmed to the regulator that the sales agreement between Telenor and M1 does not prevent M1 from entering a local partnership. M1 has informed Telenor that its local partner Shwe Byain Phyu has acquired 49 percent of Investcom, the Singapore-based company set up by M1 for the purchase of Telenor Myanmar. After the transaction closes between M1 and Telenor, M1 will sell additional 31 percent of Investcom shares to Shwe Byain Phyu. Telenor has not been involved in any discussions between M1 and their local partner. Sanctions screening from external consultants has assured Telenor that Shwe Byain Phyu and its owners are not subject to any current international sanctions. “We are deeply saddened for the society and people of Myanmar who are experiencing an extremely difficult situation. Leaving Myanmar was a decision we made with heavy hearts, and I would like to thank our employees and customers for their dedication to Telenor throughout our years in Myanmar,” continues Brekke. Telenor is in dialogue with M1 Group to ensure that customers, partners, and employees experience a smooth transition, and will close the transaction as soon as possible. The business will continue to operate under the brand name Telenor Myanmar for four months and have a transition service agreement with Telenor for six months..."
Source/publisher: Telenor Group
2022-03-18
Date of entry/update: 2022-03-18
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "DUBAI, United Arab Emirates--(BUSINESS WIRE)--M1 Group has been informed that the Myanmar Investment Commission has approved Telenor Group’s application for the sale of Telenor Myanmar to Investcom PTE Ltd., an M1 Group affiliate. M1 Group will be working with Telenor Group and all stakeholders to ensure continuity, stability, and reliability for all Telenor Myanmar customers, employees, and business partners; and will close the transaction as soon as possible. In response, Azmi T. Mikati, CEO of M1 Group, said: “We are pleased with the outcome of the official decision. M1 Group is committed to support Investcom PTE in providing essential communications services and investing to develop the telecommunications infrastructure, even in the face of the most challenging circumstances. Investcom will conduct business in Myanmar purposefully to benefit the people of Myanmar, who rely on communication services as a vital function of their lives.” Mr. Mikati further added: “M1 Group has a decades-long track record in delivering essential services to people in emerging economies around the world. M1 Group has always, and will always, remain committed to upholding human rights, respecting the laws of the countries it operates in while advocating for consumer protection regulations, especially in terms of data security, data resilience, privacy, connectivity, roaming, and internet access. M1 Group is not shying away from extending its technical know-how to support the people of Myanmar, even amidst uncertainty. Our commitment is to ensuring everyone has access to high-quality telecommunications they can rely on.” M1 Group first announced the agreement with Telenor Group to acquire its Myanmar operations in July 2021. The decision to invest in Myanmar was based on the fundamental premise that every individual, in every country, has the right to have access to essential telecommunications infrastructure. It also reflects M1 Group’s steadfast commitment to supporting economic growth, even under the most stressful conditions, and to ensuring the development of a world-class telecom operation. For the Myanmar market, M1 Group is partnering with the Shwe Byain Phyu (SBP) Group, through Investcom PTE, which is the new entity that will take over ownership. M1 Group remains committed to play a valuable role in the lives of people in Myanmar and preserving the values of care, trust, solidarity and technology edge, all while striving for advancement and social impact, remaining close to people’s hearts. Mr. Mikati concluded: “I wish to thank the entire management team and employees of Telenor Myanmar for their tiresome efforts to build Telenor Myanmar into the market leader it is today. M1 Group firmly intends to play a valuable role in the lives of the people of Myanmar by delivering essential communications services in a purposeful, sustainable and socially responsible way. We cherish the relationships established with customers and business partners in Myanmar through Telenor’s operations and we are committed to building trust and striving for social impact and technology development to benefit the people of Myanmar..."
Source/publisher: Business Wire
2022-03-18
Date of entry/update: 2022-03-18
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: ESG-labeled funds have over $13B worth of holdings in companies linked to Myanmar’s brutal military regime, a financial investigation reveals.
Description: "Companies with ties to Myanmar’s military are benefitting from over $13 billion in ESG-labeled investments, according to financial records and other information compiled and published today by Inclusive Development International and ALTSEAN-Burma. In their report, “The Myanmar ESG Files: How ‘responsible investment’ is enabling a military dictatorship,” the human rights advocacy groups document how hundreds of ESG (Environmental, Social and Governance) funds hold shares in 33 corporations that are enabling a brutal regime responsible for genocide and crimes against humanity. The $3.9 trillion ESG investing industry, which promotes itself as a way for investors to align their money with their values, is the fastest growing sector of financial services. “Activists on the ground have been risking their lives and liberty to stop the flow of money, weapons and other resources that has allowed the military to maintain its illegitimate grip on power,” said Debbie Stothard, founder and coordinator of ALTSEAN-Burma. “It’s shocking and devastating to see so-called ‘responsible investment’ doing the opposite.” Companies receiving “sustainable investment” include weapons dealers that are arming the regime, tech firms serving the military-controlled national police force, and others that direct profits to the military, allowing it to surveil and violently crush dissent. Data compiled by Inclusive Development International and published today in an open-access online database show that ESG-labeled funds continued to hold shares in these companies even after Myanmar’s military was found responsible for two of the most egregious and well-publicized human rights crimes in recent history: the genocide perpetrated against the Rohingya and last year’s bloody coup and subsequent crackdown on pro-democracy protesters. “That dozens of companies with ties to Myanmar’s genocidal regime are included in ESG portfolios shows just how large the gulf is between ‘responsible investment’ marketing claims and reality,” said David Pred, executive director of Inclusive Development International. “The foundation of this fraudulent industry is a deeply flawed ESG ratings system, which is in urgent need of regulation.” From responsible investing to ESG greenwashing Tailoring investment strategies to consider ESG issues is increasingly common. Yet while the ESG investing industry is capitalizing on public demand for ethical and sustainable investing options, it is directing capital in ways that are neither – as evidenced by information revealed in the Myanmar ESG Files. This is in part because the process through which companies’ ESG practices are rated and then used to tailor investment portfolios typically only reflects information considered “financially material.” That means a company’s links to gross human rights abuses are only relevant insofar as they threaten its future profitability and share price. ESG ratings can also mask serious human rights abuses because they are based on an amalgamation of information about numerous indicators and a diverse range of environmental, social and governance issues. As a result, a company making and selling weapons used to perpetrate genocide and war crimes in Myanmar can effectively compensate for the reputational risks of that behavior and raise its ESG rating by, for example, committing to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions. The role of ESG index providers Firms that translate ESG ratings into suggested investment portfolios (ESG indexes), including MSCI, FTSE Russell and S&P Dow Jones Indices, have enormous leverage to improve human rights compliance among companies seeking a spot on their indexes. Under the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, they have a responsibility to exercise that leverage – including by excluding companies that refuse to stop enabling the Myanmar military’s human rights abuses. Information documented in the Myanmar ESG Files demonstrates that all three firms are failing to do so. The low bar for securing a place in ESG funds does more than direct “responsible investment” to the wrong place. It makes it harder to hold some of worst corporate offenders accountable. The “ESG” stamp of approval undermines the efforts of communities and human rights defenders to secure redress for corporate abuses by making investors less likely to engage and use their leverage to compel action. “Real socially responsible investing could be a crucial catalyst for advancing human rights in business,” said Pred. “But without a complete overhaul, the ESG investing industry is actually doing the opposite – greenwashing abusive companies and diverting energy from this potentially powerful force for good, with real human costs in Myanmar and around the world.”..."
Source/publisher: Inclusive Development International
2022-03-09
Date of entry/update: 2022-03-10
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Since the coup on Feb. 1 last year, Myanmar has earned the dubious distinction of being the world’s second worst jailer of journalists after China. The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) stated in a December report that at least 26 journalists had been imprisoned in Myanmar for their reporting since the takeover, compared with none behind bars in 2020, adding that “the actual number of jailed journalists in Myanmar may be much higher than CPJ’s tally. Many news organizations are reluctant to identify their detained freelancers, stringers, and other non-staff reporters they rely on for news, photographs, and video, due to concerns they could face harsher penalties if they are found to be associated with their news outlets.” According to a report issued in February this year by Reporters Without Borders, as many as 60 media workers are currently held in Myanmar. Many have been tortured in custody and at least three have been murdered by junta soldiers. Turning to China But when those brutal measures did not halt the flow of information to people in and outside the country, the junta turned to a logical and experienced partner for censorship and surveillance assistance: China. At the end of last year, security officials in the region found out that Chinese internet technicians were helping their Myanmar counterparts develop blocking and monitoring capabilities. The aim, they say, is to establish firm and effective control over what can and cannot be accessed online in Myanmar, similar to the infamous “Great Firewall of China”, which China’s security officials have used for years to police online activities of known dissidents and even identify anonymous users. In essence, it means that the authorities would be able to block access to selected foreign websites and to slow down internet traffic in and out of the country. Among foreign internet tools that have been blocked in China are Google Search, Facebook, Twitter and Wikipedia; that has been done by using hardware from Huawei and Semptian, two major Chinese service providers. It is unclear whether the same hardware is being used in Myanmar, but, if that is the case, it would make it possible for China’s security services to tap into the Myanmar military’s computers and collect sensitive and classified information that would have been hard to come by with only human intelligence. China has every reason to watch not only Myanmar’s dissidents but also the often unpredictable generals, whom they do not fully trust, and that is actually not new. Technicians working for companies close to the Ministry of State Security (MSS), China’s main intelligence agency, are known to have been hacking into the computers and databases of the state-owned Myanmar Post and Telecommunications, a major internet service provider and operator of mobile phones also used by the military, and that has been going on for years. The close relationship between Chinese hackers and the MSS was revealed when two US-based hackers, Li Xiaoyu and Dong Jiazhi, were indicted in Spokane, Washington on July 7, 2020. According to court documents, they had on behalf of the Chinese government “gained unauthorized access to computers around the world and stole terabytes of data.” Apart from collecting information from a host of Western countries, among them the US, Australia, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, Spain and Britain, the indictment states that they “provided the MSS with email accounts and passwords belonging to a Hong Kong community organizer, the pastor of a Chinese church in Xi’an, and a dissident and former Tiananmen Square protestor…and the office of the Dalai Lama.” Curiously, the MSS, the court document says, provided Li with malware to help him compromise “the mail server of a Burmese [Myanmar] human rights group.” The identity of that human rights group was not revealed during the hearings in Spokane, but it shows to what length MSS and its hackers are going to monitor a wide variety of governmental as well as civilian actors in countries of interest. Alarming developments For the Myanmar public, the most alarming aspect of these developments is that Chinese technicians have been training junta operatives to obtain information on political dissidents and protesters, including how to bypass Virtual Private Networks, or VPNs, and monitor SMS traffic on mobile phones. As The Irrawaddy reported on Jan. 24, the junta banned social media after last year’s coup, including Twitter, Instagram and Facebook, but people continued to access those sites using VPNs. Then the junta presented the draft for a new cybersecurity law that would give it the right to imprison anyone who accesses banned sites with the help of VPNs. According to a Feb. 11 Al Jazeera report, the junta has increased taxation of the telecom sector leading to prices being doubled in the past two months—and thus making it expensive and more difficult for ordinary people to use the internet altogether. The draft law, The Irrawaddy reported, “would grant the junta unlimited power to access user data, ban content it dislikes, restrict internet providers and intercept data, and imprison those criticizing the regime online and employees of non-compliant companies.” Recent reports of random arrests in Yangon and Mandalay of people who have used VPNs also show that the Chinese-installed firewall is working. While it is difficult to see exactly what a VPN user has accessed, the firewall will reveal who is using it and if that is against the law, the user could be arrested. If the Chinese experience is anything to go by, there are ways around all those repressive measures, there are ways users have managed to bypass the rules. In 2017, the Chinese government declared all unauthorized VPN services to be illegal and there, as in Myanmar, people have been arrested for using them. But, as writer Daniel Anderson pointed out in technology publication ACM Queue as early as 2012, the basic censorship circumvention strategy is to use proxy nodes and encrypt the data. Bypassing the firewall in China is known as fanqiang, or “climb over the wall”. Freegate, Ultrasurf, Psiphon and Lantern are free software that can be used to bypass Internet censorship firewalls using an HTTP proxy server combined with encryption protocols. Some people are using SIM cards from foreign countries to access VPNs and there are also certain VPNs which still work in China. According to Reporters Without Borders, China may have exported Internet surveillance technology not only to Myanmar but also Cuba, Iran, Vietnam, Zimbabwe and Belarus. Roskomnadzor Agency, the Russian state’s agency for monitoring, controlling and censoring mass media, is also known to have at least in the past collaborated with Chinese firewall officials. But in none of those countries has the firewall been 100 percent effective, which goes to show that the technology is not perfect or without loopholes. Exactly how Myanmar’s military authorities are going to use its firewall and enforce those new laws remains to be seen. But given the number of VPN users in Myanmar who would have to be identified and monitored, and the limited knowhow of the junta’s own internet technicians, it is hard to imagine that tech-savvy young people will not find their own ways of “climbing over the wall”. Recent arrests may just be attempts at intimidating the public by picking up a few unlucky users. Once a country has opened its doors to the outside world via cyberspace, it cannot close them again. And the Myanmar junta may be playing with fire when it comes to using imported technologies such as the Chinese firewall. As we have seen, China’s security agencies will be spying on them too..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2022-02-22
Date of entry/update: 2022-02-22
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Proposed Law Threatens Rights to Privacy, Expression, Access to Information
Description: "(Bangkok) – Myanmar’s military junta has revived a draconian cybersecurity bill that would provide sweeping powers to the authorities, Human Rights Watch said today. The current draft would allow the junta, in power since the military coup on February 1, 2021, to access user data, block websites, order internet shutdowns, and prosecute critics and representatives of noncomplying companies. The Cybersecurity Law was initially proposed a week after the coup. The current draft, an unofficial translation of which can be found here, includes new provisions that would ban use of virtual private networks (VPNs), abolish the need for certain evidentiary proof at trial, and require online service providers to block or remove online criticism of junta leaders. Ten international chambers of commerce in Myanmar issued a joint statement on January 28, 2022, that said the proposed law “disrupts the free flow of information and directly impacts businesses’ abilities to operate legally and effectively in Myanmar.” “Myanmar’s military junta has taken a terrible draft cybersecurity law and made it even worse,” said Linda Lakhdhir, Asia legal adviser at Human Rights Watch. “The junta should scrap this bill, which would further devastate free expression and access to information across the country.” The draft law would apply to all those providing “Digital Platform Services,” defined to include “any over the top (OTT) service that can provide the service to express data, information, images, voices, texts and video online by using cyber resources and similar systems or materials.” The law thus applies not only to social media and other content-sharing platforms, but to digital marketplaces, search engines, financial services, data processing services, and communications services providing messaging or video calls and games. While companies licensed under the Telecommunications Act are excluded from the definition of Digital Platform Service providers, the restrictions on use of VPNs and the requirement that companies cooperate with investigations are made specifically applicable to such companies. Under a new provision, the use of VPNs to browse the internet would be a criminal offense without specific permission from an as-yet-unspecified ministry authorized to deal with cybersecurity. Use of an unauthorized VPN would be punishable by up to three years in prison. Virtual Private Networks, which allow a user access to blocked content, have played a critical role in enabling internet users in Myanmar to access sites blocked by the military since the coup and to access the internet without disclosing their true location. VPNs are also routinely used by businesses and individuals to ensure privacy and security. Another newly added provision would allow the authorities to order Digital Platform Service providers to block or remove content about which there is a “legitimate complaint” that the content “damages a person’s social standing and livelihood.” It would not require the information to be false or require a court order. In effect, the new provision would allow the authorities to order the removal of any content critical of individual military leaders or others linked to the junta, Human Rights Watch said. The draft law also retains provisions from the earlier draft requiring online service providers to block or remove a wide range of information at the instruction of the authorities. Prohibited content includes “misinformation and disinformation,” information “causing hate, disrupting the unity, stabilization and peace,” and statements “against any existing law.” Anyone who posts “misinformation or disinformation” faces a minimum of one year and up to three years in prison if they are found to have done so “with the intent of causing public panic, loss of trust or social division.” Since any criticism of the coup or the military could be deemed as intending to cause “loss of trust” in the junta or social division, the junta could use these provisions as sweeping censorship tools. Both Digital Platform Service providers and telecommunications companies would be required to cooperate with the authorities investigating a broad range of offenses, including those under the cybersecurity law. Failure to do so would be punished by a range of penalties up to and including revocation of their license to operate in Myanmar. The scope of the “interventions” with which businesses must cooperate is unclear, leaving open the possibility that this law could be used to force telecommunications companies to facilitate the live interception of communications. Last May, Reuters reported that the military, through the civilian government then in power, had forced telecommunications and internet service providers to install live intercept capabilities in the months leading up to the coup. The bill, as with the Telecommunications Act, would effectively dispense with the legal requirement for a prosecutor to bring digital evidence to court, providing that: the evidence relating to prosecuting an offense filed under this law is not easy to bring to court, it can be presented with a report or other relevant documentation on how the evidence is kept without going to court. Such submission shall be deemed to have been presented as evidence before the court and may be administered by the relevant court in accordance with the law. Any dispute over digital evidence would have to be submitted to the National Digital Laboratory created under the law, and the decisions of that body would be final. This provision violates defendants’ rights to a fair trial and due process, which require that any evidence be presented against them, Human Rights Watch said. Myanmar does not have any privacy or data protection laws that regulate the collection, use, and storage of personal data to safeguard against abuse when data is collected and retained even for legitimate purposes. The current version of the cybersecurity bill retains problematic provisions further undermining data privacy. Digital Platform Service Providers would be required to keep a broad range of user data, including the person’s name, internet protocol (IP) address, phone number, ID card number, physical address, “user record,” and “other information as directed” for up to three years. Providers with at least 100,000 users in Myanmar would have to ensure that devices storing that data are “maintained in accordance with data classification rules” – rules that the bill does not define. Those who fail to comply would face up to three years in prison. Given the broad applicability of the law, this provision also poses serious risks for those using online payment systems. Companies would have to provide this data to the authorities when requested “under any existing law.” The bill gives the authorities wide scope to block services and order internet shutdowns. The ministry assigned to implement cybersecurity matters, with approval from the junta, would be able to temporarily prohibit any digital platform provision, temporarily control devices related to provision of digital platform services, and issue a final ban on any digital service platform provider in Myanmar. The United Nations Human Rights Committee, in its General Comment No. 34 on the right to freedom of expression, states that governments may impose restrictions on free expression only if they are provided by law and are necessary for the protection of national security or other pressing public need. To be provided by law, a restriction must be formulated with sufficient precision to enable an individual to regulate their conduct accordingly. “Necessary” restrictions must also be proportionate, that is, balanced against the specific need for the restriction being put in place. Nor can these restrictions be overbroad. Myanmar’s cybersecurity bill falls far short of these standards. It fails to require that “disinformation” or “misinformation” would have to cause real harm to a legitimate interest, or to clearly define the content that is prohibited. The resulting lack of clarity would severely chill the discussion of controversial subjects out of fear of prosecution, Human Rights Watch said. Further, mandatory third-party data retention fails to meet international human rights standards on the right to privacy. Such measures are neither necessary nor proportionate, are particularly prone to abuse, and circumvent key procedural safeguards. They limit people’s ability to communicate anonymously and may increase the threat of hacking or other data breaches. “The proposed cybersecurity law would consolidate the junta’s ability to conduct pervasive censorship and surveillance and hamper the operation of businesses in Myanmar,” Lakhdhir said. “Governments that do business with the junta should recognize the information risks if the bill as drafted becomes law.”..."
Source/publisher: "Human Rights Watch" (USA)
2022-02-15
Date of entry/update: 2022-02-15
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "SPECIALLY DESIGNATED NATIONALS LIST UPDATE The following individuals have been added to OFAC's SDN List: OO, Thida (a.k.a. OO, Daw Thida; a.k.a. OO, Thi Da), Burma; DOB 27 Nov 1964; POB Rangoon, Burma; nationality Burma; citizen Burma; Gender Female; Passport DM003921 (Burma) issued 02 Aug 2017 expires 01 Aug 2027; Union Attorney General (individual) [BURMA-EO14014]. OO, Tin (a.k.a. OO, U Tin), No. 22, Thanlwin Street, Pyinyawady Condominium, No. 5 Quarter, Yankin Township, Rangoon, Burma; DOB 24 Nov 1952; nationality Burma; citizen Burma; Gender Male; National ID No. 5KALATANAING127084 (Burma); Chairman of Anti-Corruption Commission (individual) [BURMA-EO14014]. OO, Tun Tun (a.k.a. OO, Htun Htun; a.k.a. OO, U Htun Htun; a.k.a. OO, U Tun Tun), Naypyitaw, Burma; DOB 28 Jul 1956; nationality Burma; citizen Burma; Gender Male; Chief Justice of Union Supreme Court (individual) [BURMA-EO14014]. TAY ZA, Htoo Htet (a.k.a. TAYZA, Htoo Htet), Burma; DOB 24 Jan 1993; alt. DOB 24 Jan 1994; citizen Burma; Gender Male (individual) [BURMA-EO14014] (Linked To: ZA, Tay). TAY ZA, Pye Phyo (a.k.a. TAY ZA, Pyae Phyo; a.k.a. TAYZA, Pye Phyo), Burma; DOB 29 Jan 1987; POB Burma; nationality Burma; Gender Male (individual) [BURMA-EO14014] (Linked To: ZA, Tay). THAUNG, Jonathan Myo Kyaw (a.k.a. TAUNG, Jonathan Kwang; a.k.a. THAUNG, Jonathan Kwang; a.k.a. THAUNG, Jonathan Kyaw; a.k.a. "MYO, Jonathan"), Burma; DOB 29 Dec 1981; nationality Burma; Gender Male (individual) [BURMA-EO14014] (Linked To: MYANMA ECONOMIC HOLDINGS PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED). ZA, Tay, Singapore; Burma; DOB 18 Jul 1964; alt. DOB 18 Jul 1967; POB Burma; citizen Burma; Gender Male; Passport 306869 (Burma); National ID No. MYGN 006415 (Burma) (individual) [BURMA-EO14014]. The following entities have been added to OFAC's SDN List: DIRECTORATE OF PROCUREMENT OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF DEFENSE SERVICES ARMY (a.k.a. DIRECTORATE OF PROCUREMENT, OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF ARMY, THE REPUBLIC OF THE UNION OF MYANMAR; a.k.a. MYANMAR DIRECTORATE OF PROCUREMENT; a.k.a. "DIRECTORATE OF DEFENSE PROCUREMENT"; a.k.a. "DIRECTORATE OF PROCUREMENT"), Nay Pyi Taw City, Burma; Target Type Government Entity [BURMA-EO14014]. KT SERVICES & LOGISTICS KTSL COMPANY LIMITED (a.k.a. KT SERVICES & LOGISTICS CO., LTD; a.k.a. KT SERVICES AND LOGISTICS CO., LTD; a.k.a. KT SERVICES AND LOGISTICS COMPANY LIMITED; a.k.a. KT SERVICES AND LOGISTICS KTSL COMPANY LIMITED), Pyay Road, A4/A5 Kamayut Township, Rangoon 11201, Burma; Registration Country Burma; Organization Established Date 18 Feb 2014; Registration Number 108301848 (Burma) [BURMA-EO14014] (Linked To: MYANMA ECONOMIC HOLDINGS PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED). The following deletions have been made to OFAC's SDN List: OMAN PRIDE Crude Oil Tanker; Additional Sanctions Information - Subject to Secondary Sanctions; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9153525 (vessel) [SDGT] (Linked To: BRAVERY MARITIME CORPORATION)..."
Source/publisher: United States Department of the Treasury (USA)
2022-01-31
Date of entry/update: 2022-01-31
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: " As 2021 comes to an end, it has been more than five months since Telenor announced the cut-and-run of its Myanmar operations. Their decision to sell to M1 Group — an investor with a disastrous human rights record — remains in a quandary. What is clear, however, is that Telenor’s users still have no answers to how their rights will be protected. This is unacceptable. “For months, Access Now and civil society have continued to pressure Telenor to address the rights risks the disposal will generate, to no avail,” said Dhevy Sivaprakasam, Asia Pacific Policy Counsel at Access Now. “While our questions linger unanswered, human rights in Myanmar languish on the chopping block.” In July, the Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations (SOMO) submitted a complaint on behalf of 474 civil society organizations to — and now accepted by — the OECD’s Norwegian National Contact Point, breaking down how the sale failed to meet OECD’s responsible disengagement standards. In August, Access Now and 44 organizations addressed a letter to Telenor’s Board, highlighting how Telenor had “dumped the Myanmar outfit at a discounted rate, failed to provide any kind of risk assessment [or] indication of how it would deal with the repercussions of such a risky and irresponsible sale.” In September, Telenor’s leadership engaged with civil society and committed to human rights principles in response to both the NCP complaint and the letter — but omitted mentioning any concrete steps it would take to achieve these principles. Telenor emphasized that military orders to activate intercept technology in their network had made a sale inevitable — raising further red flags about potential military surveillance and abuse of user data. In October, Access Now again contacted Telenor’s Board seeking clarification about protections against these risks. None came. In November, Reuters reported that M1 Group was looking to partner with a Myanmar company to buy out Telenor’s operations. Telenor declined further comment. So — again — last week, civil society found itself repeating the dangers of potential military abuse of users’ data from Telenor’s “reckless” actions. “How many times will civil society need to raise these same issues before there are genuine answers? As 2022 draws near, one thing is clear — business is definitely not as usual,” said Raman Jit Singh Chima, Asia Pacific Policy Director at Access Now. “No matter whom they sell to, Telenor must be held accountable for its irresponsible and damaging exit from the country.” The obligation to uphold and protect the human rights of people in Myanmar lies not only with Telenor, but across the telecommunications sector and its actors. Their data handling practices bring with them equal obligations to ensure data protection and users’ privacy and security..."
Source/publisher: Access NOW
2021-12-17
Date of entry/update: 2021-12-17
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "As Myanmar continues its transition from a military state to a quasi-democratic one, its eco- nomic growth rates have risen concomitantly (World Bank Group 2014, 7). Given the penury to which the country descended over the military period, Myanmar's masses would appear poised to reap benefits from this growth, as the rising tide lifts all boats (Farrelly 2016). How- ever, closer examination of the structure of the political economy (see Chapter 18; Nyo Tun 2016) dampens enthusiasm: average Myanmar people face four interlacing challenges - a highly resource-extractive growth model; agrarian displacement; few good jobs to reabsorb displaced labourers; and inadequate or eroding safety nets - that may leave them materially worse off. First, Myanmar's growth model remains dependent on natural resource extraction (Bissinger 2012; World Bank Group 2014, 16), a phenomenon which in comparative cases has led to marked increases in inequality (Gylfason & Zoega 2002). Such extractive sectors, which in Myanmar include the illicit drugs trade (Winn 2015), have few economic linkages - meaning they create few jobs relative to the rents they generate. Current market liberalisation is merely facilitating an intensification of such resource exploitation, as foreign investment skews mas- sively towards the extractive sector (World Bank Group 2014, 16). Myanmar's exceedingly thin political-economic elite (only 7.5 per cent of the population is middle class or afiluent - see Shein Thu Aung 2013) has benefited by illicitly capturing resource rents, policing entrance to this rarefied stratum by requiring personalised connections to a military-elite clique (Larkin 2015); by entrenching themselves as the only viable businesses (Ford et al. 2016) they potentially crowd out non-aligned prospective entrants. Second, legal 'reforms' have made land an alienable asset, providing an alluring investment opportunity for agribusinesses, industrial zone managers, narcotics money launderers (Meehan 2011) and land speculators. These reforms together with the aforementioned land-intensive resource extraction put immense pressure on the livelihood base of Myanmar's poor: land is being stripped from both peasants and urbanites through means both 'legal' (evictions and debt dispossession) and extra-legal (violent land grabs). Third, infrastructure and logistics deficits - not to mention a global political-economic structure that provides barriers to economic 'structural transformation' for such a late 'late developer' (Waldner 1999) - mean that displaced masses are not reabsorbed into any bourgeoning high productivity economic sector such as manufacturing. 404 Class and inequality Finally, meagre public services do not provide the marginalised with opportunities to break the cycle of underemployment: education and health in particular are sectors in which the wealthy consume high-quality private services (often outside Myanmar), while the poor survive on underfunded and under-qualified public options. Further, resource rent management pro- cesses remain inscrutable (World Bank Group 2014, 42) and hence revenues may be siphoned off rather than being allocated to those starved public good sectors. Added to this, traditional networks of care and support may be eroding: increasingly necessary migration (ILO 2015) disrupts village life and horizontal community bonds therein (Boutry 2013), while an ascendant bourgeois ethos celebrating individual accomplishment combined with elite reorientation to a now-accessible global consumptive marketplace means that vertical patronage bonds may degrade. Myanmar is hence rapidly becoming a visibly unequal place, as a military-business elite asserts itself, flaunting luxuriant lifestyles (Mahtani 2014) that flourish in the interstices of the country's largely destitute environment. This is a moment of explicit class consolidation - complete with the ideological succour provided by self-help gurus justifying accumulation as available to all with 'positive' attitudes. How will the excluded respond: will the pullulating protests roiling in Myanmar today mobilise broader movements? Or will the poor feel placated by the country's ubiquitous 'development' discourse, believing broad benefits (either material or only symbolic) will trickle down to them (Prasse-Freeman 2014)? This chapter will proceed by sketching Myanmar's political economy over the past two centuries, focusing on facets that prevented both grossly unequal conditions from developing and class-consciousness from forming. It will then tum to the current political economy, further elaborating the four challenges sketched above. The chapter will then conclude with a discus- sion of perceptions of class and inequality in the country. Historical equality in shared exploitation As elaborated by scholars of dynastic Myanmar and Southeast Asia (Scott 2009, Aung-Thwin 1990, and Lieberman 1984, inter alia), Myanmar's pre-colonial political economy revolved around the control of rice paddy production. Authorities built decentralised systems of taxation and regulation through which they garnered tribute from regional leaders, who in turn extracted resources from those further away institutionally and physically. Critical for our purposes, within this political economy key institutions helped peasants manage exploitation. Aung-Thwin (1984) outlines the way subjects sought out bonded relationships to patrons or institutions that secured their lives and livelihoods, while Scott (1972) describes how the political-economic 'terms of trade' were relatively decent for a peasant producer who could nonetheless rely on kin and village to mitigate shocks. In later work, Scott (2009) posits that if elites violated the terms of these bonds, the hills and swamps surrounding Myanmar's lowlands provided areas to which subjects could flee (c( Lieberman 2010, 339-342). While more research is necessary to assess whether this compelled any concessions by rulers, at the very least the evidence suggests that conditions eroded for peasants during the colonial period. The British colonial project (1824-194 7) generally undermined village risk manage- ment mechanisms (by enclosing common resources and inducting peasants into the perilous cash economy - see Scott 1972, 25-26), and in particular radically transformed the Delta areas of the Ayeyawaddy river into an enormous rice producer by inducing peasants to clear swamps and plant paddy. While this turned Myanmar into 'the rice bowl of Asia', historian Ian Brown describes the ultimately disastrous effects of this colonial rice-export economy: by continually rejecting legal and policy protection schemes for farmers (such as conditional debt forgiveness laws or crop diversification policies), the colonial administration made peasants vulnerable to 405 Elliott Prasse-Freeman and Phyo Win Latt cycles of dispossession. The British themselves noted the way they were undermining the long- term health of the Burmese political economy, and yet chose to only deepen their extraction practices (Brown 2013, 37-44). Moreover, this myopic focus on rice retarded the development of any non-rice sectors (including more human capital-intensive ones); further, by importing Indian clerks to run the administration, and by promoting Indian (and Chinese) capital to lubri- cate the economy, the colonial period systematically excluded Burmese from the state and the few advanced sectors of the economy. Hence, external shocks such as the Great Depression and World War II decimated the brittle economy, and Burma staggered into independence with little capital (Indians had fled or been expelled), rice fields destroyed, infrastructure cut, without domestic manufacturing, with few experienced administrators and facing a country-wide insur- gency exacerbating those challenges. Against conventional wisdom about Burma's bright post- independence future, the country was hardly poised to be a successful economy before the mismanagement of the military period. The military era further exacerbated Myanmar's decline. In the context of economic and administrative ruin, and numerous insurgencies mobilised along ideological and ethnic lines, Burma's military emerged as an ambitious and capable actor (Callahan 2003), ultimately able to build a hybrid rentier state (Prasse-Freeman 2012): while fighting off those many insurgencies, the military-state apparatus extracted the country's natural resources and cut a set of 'bargains' with the populace. Rural dwellers got land, but were compelled to give up much of their rice yield to the state; urbanites got cheap rice, but there was no competent industrialisation and no growth. Both groups were denied political freedoms. The military was able to violate those bargains at whim - as in the Delta area where thousands of farmers were dispossessed of their land after not delivering their rice yield quotas (GRET 2015). Yet, such expedient violations bring into question claims such as Brown's that the military governments of this era 'stressed equity rather than increased productivity' (Brown 2013, 185); when read through the lens of the military's interests, low inequality was less a policy goal - less a choice for which 'produc- tivity' was sacrificed - than a secondary effect derived from the military's prosecution of its organisational objectives. As Brown himself notes, the military never addressed landlessness (in fact, scholars at GRET show that the military created it), and by 2000 'nearly ten million people [were) largely dependent on laboring wages alone' {Brown 2013, 185). Unlike other so-called late-developers in the greater region (such as Taiwan and South Korea - see Waldner 1999), the rents extracted by the military were not reinvested into the building of an advanced manu- facturing sector (hence structurally transforming the economy), but were rather directed at maintaining a system of political domination through an ever-growing apparatus of organised violence. As we will elaborate on below, the military's self-interests subverted any rhetorical pretence for equality and socialism; people were equal in their poverty (Khin Maung Kyi et al. 2000, 130--131). As the military continued throughout the 1990s and 2000s to consolidate its position within the state, it relinquished some direct control of the economy, pivoting towards market experi- mentation by encouraging an improvisational quasi-entrepreneurial form of wealth extraction, one that resulted in two significant transfers of productive resources. The first saw the dispos- session of average Burmese people: various state agencies were encouraged to embrace the market economy by serting up their own 'development' projects, meaning that ill-equipped ministries grabbed land from farmers and attempted to establish industrial projects (sugar pro- duction, etc.), with predictably disastrous results (see Woods 2014); as the military continued to win wars against ethnic and other various non-state armed groups, it collaborated with those vanquished elites for shared resource exploitation (Woods 2011), resulting in marginalisation of ethnic masses (Brenner 2015)..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Elliott Prasse-Freeman and Phyo Win Latt
2018-00-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-10-12
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: The junta has enforced an internet blackout in a total of 22 townships in Chin and Kachin states and Magway, Mandalay and Sagaing regions
Description: "The junta cut off mobile internet access and most Wi-Fi services to 11 townships in war-torn areas of Chin State and Magway Region at 6pm on Thursday evening, according to locals and members of the local resistance forces in the area. The affected townships are Gangaw, Htilin and Myaing in Magway Region, and Falam, Kanpetlet, Matupi, Mindat, Paletwa, Tedim, Thantlang and Tonzang in Chin State. Locals have said that the internet blackout will make it difficult for locals to both send and receive information on the conditions in the region. “After the internet connection is cut off, the phone connection may also be cut off. In that case, I don't think the situation will be easy,” a Mindat resident told Myanmar Now. A church and several buildings were hit by artillery shells fired by the Myanmar army during a clash with the Chinland Defence Force (CDF) on September 22 in Mindat. Fighting broke out between the junta’s troops and the CDF in Thantlang on September 18, forcing nearly the entire population of the town to flee. At least 18 homes and a government building were set ablaze by the junta’s artillery fire, and a Christian pastor who tried to put out the fire was shot dead by the Myanmar army troops. Soldiers cut off the ring finger on his left hand to steal the pastor’s wedding band; details of the act went viral on social media. In the Chin State capital of Hakha, internet access was still available on Saturday morning, according to locals. Since September 14, the internet connection has been cut off in Myingyan and Mogok in Mandalay Region; Taungdwingyi in Magway Region; and Ayataw, Butalin, Kani, Pale, Taze, Ye-U and Yinmabin in Sagaing Region. Hpakant in Kachin State has suffered an internet blackout since August. The recent addition of 11 townships in Magway and Chin State to the blackout on Thursday brings the total of townships without internet access to 22. A spokesperson from the anti-junta Mindat People’s Administration Team speculated that the restrictions on internet access were likely timed to occur as the military intensifies operations in the region to suppress the resistance movement. “It is either that they cut the internet and the flow of information because they fear that we will step up offensives against them, or they are preparing to get the upper hand to launch offensives against us,” the spokesperson said. He insisted, however, that the lack of internet access would not have a major impact on the activities of local guerrilla groups, which do not rely on the internet for communication. An official from the Yaw Defence Force (YDF), a local resistance group operating in Gangaw, Myaing and Htilin townships in Magway, echoed the assessment of the situation by the spokesperson of the Mindat People’s Administration Team. “The military cut the internet because they can’t win. It is their usual tactic and won’t have much impact on the revolutionary forces. We will continue what we are supposed to be doing, regardless,” the YDF official said. The military council has not published information on the cuts. Following the February 1 military coup, the junta imposed tight controls on the internet nationwide in an effort to suppress news of its brutal crackdowns on peaceful anti-dictatorship protests. Internet freedom in Myanmar has since collapsed, creating what Freedom House (FH) and Free Expression Myanmar described as “the most severe decline ever documented” in FH’s annual Freedom of the Net global surveys on and analysis of the issue. “As part of its attempt to crush dissent and maintain power, the military junta shut down internet service, blocked social media platforms and websites, seized control of the telecommunications infrastructure, and ramped up intrusive surveillance,” Myanmar’s Freedom of the Net report, released on September 21, said. In 2019, at the height of the conflict between the Myanmar military and the Arakan Army, much of northern Rakhine State lost internet access for more than a year..."
Source/publisher: "Myanmar Now" (Myanmar)
2021-09-25
Date of entry/update: 2021-09-26
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Since the “Going Out Policy” was initiated in 1999 by the Chinese Government to promote Chinese investments abroad, the footprint of Chinese enterprises has expanded considerably. This has been further accelerated by President Xi Jinping’s launch of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)1 in 2013, after which China committed to work “together with other countries to foster the environmentally-friendly and sound development of the Belt and Road, featuring peace and the exchange of wisdom, and to build a global economy more vibrant, open, inclusive, stable and sustainable.”2 These efforts have facilitated a massive expansion of Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI), which is valuable as developing countries need FDI to boost their development. To support these overseas development goals, the Chinese Government, state agencies and business associations continue to issue a growing matrix of policies, regulations and guidelines to establish social and environmental safeguards for its FDI. In regulating the diverse economic activities of private and state-owned enterprises overseas, these documents seek to reinforce social integrity, environmental protection, workplace and personnel safety, among many other goals. As Chinese businesses – particularly energy, construction, and mining and metals companies – continue to venture abroad3 , civil society and the media have reported an unfortunate increase in social, environmental and human rights violations – particularly in Asia, Africa and Latin America (See Section 3.1). All FDI from any country must now be informed by and directed to meet the twin challenge of addressing worsening inequality of power and wealth, while also tackling the challenges associated with climate change. It is therefore important for Chinese companies to ensure they address these issues. Between 2013 and 2020, the Business & Human Rights Resource Centre (Resource Centre) recorded 679 human rights abuse allegations linked to Chinese business conduct abroad, and 102 company responses to these allegations. In analysing the data further, this report intends to support civil society organisations in host countries of Chinese investments to make informed decisions about their advocacy for responsible business conduct of Chinese companies. This report also presents data and analysis to assist businesses, investors, the Chinese Government and governments of states hosting Chinese investments to take further action to fulfil the development commitments related to China’s international economic cooperation4 and the responsible business conduct guidelines established through the years..."
Source/publisher: Business and Human Rights Resource Centre (BHRRC)
2021-08-11
Date of entry/update: 2021-08-15
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: This is not a good time to travel without a Citizenship Scrutiny Card. Those who do are advised to carry extra cash to pay off soldiers and police at checkpoints… and to scrub their phones before their journey.
Description: "When my purse was stolen in Yangon last December, I lost many of my most important documents: my Citizenship Scrutiny Card, driver’s licence, student card and ATM cards. I put off replacing my CSC (often referred to as a National Registration Card, or NRC) because it would require a trip to my hometown, the Mon State capital, Mawlamyine. But after the February 1 coup d’etat, it felt dangerous to not have a national ID card. I also realised that I needed a CSC so I could replace the other lost cards. Up until four months ago, this wouldn’t have been a problem. To get to Mawlamyine, I would have just told the express bus line my CSC number – that would have been enough. There were no checkpoints or inspections at which security forces asked to see the real thing. Unfortunately, travel in Myanmar has become more difficult since the coup. There are now many checkpoints, and sometimes soldiers and police even search passengers’ luggage and mobile phones. If they find anything suspicious, such as indications of support for protests or the Civil Disobedience Movement, they don’t hesitate to make an arrest. I was anxious about the trip, and for good reason – when you arrive at a checkpoint, the first document they ask for is your CSC. In the past, if we needed to travel without our ID, we could take a letter of recommendation from our ward administration office or the nearest police station. However, the administrator of my ward had joined the CDM and the ward administration office was the target of a bombing in early April. I didn’t want to go to the police station because I was worried about being arrested. I didn’t have any good options. In the end, I decided to risk it and travel with a photocopy of my CSC. I departed Yangon for Mawlamyine on an express bus and the first checkpoint was at the entrance to Bago Region. We didn’t have to disembark; heavily armed police and soldiers boarded the bus. I showed the police a photocopy of my CSC, and explained that the original had been lost and I was travelling to Mawlamyine to be issued with a replacement. The police warned me that I could be arrested for travelling without an ID card or a recommendation letter, but after checking my luggage, they allowed me to continue my journey. Although the police at the second and third checkpoints were intimidating and threatening, they also let me go. At the final checkpoint we had to disembark and present our CSCs. When I showed the photocopy of my CSC, a soldier said I could be fined for travelling without the original. They started asking lots of questions: Where was my CSC? Why hadn’t I brought it? What was I planning to do in Mawlamyine? The soldier said that their questioning might take so long that my bus would have to leave me behind. Wouldn’t it be better, he said, to pay an “understanding fee” instead? I gave him K10,000 and quickly reboarded the bus, eventually arriving at my destination. After the nerve-wracking journey, I was pleasantly surprised at how easy it was to replace my CSC in Mawlamyine. At the Immigration Department office, I handed over the necessary documents, paid what was euphemistically described as a “service fee” of K50,000, and collected a new CSC the next day. The official fee for replacing a CSC is around K2,000. To make my previous card in 2014, I had to spend two days at the Immigration Department and then wait another 10 days before I could collect the card. That time, though, they didn’t ask for any extra money. Security during the return journey to Yangon was noticeably tighter, apparently because soldiers and police were trying to intercept people returning to Yangon from training in Karen National Union-controlled territory. At the first checkpoint, about three hours from Mawlamyine, police and soldiers inspected the luggage of every passenger on the express bus, as well as checking their ID cards. Any passenger with a CSC that was not issued in Mon State was closely questioned about the purpose of their journey. At the next checkpoint, named Mokepalin, on the Mon State side of the Sittaung River that divides Mon State and Bago Region, a boy seated in front of me was taken off the bus. I heard a soldier say the boy’s CSC was issued in Ayeyarwady Region and he needed to be checked more closely. When the bus pulled away, I noticed about 60 young men sitting at the checkpoint, who seemed to have been detained for further questioning. There were even a few people in handcuffs, but when I asked a soldier who they were, he shouted at me not to ask questions or I would be arrested. I kept my mouth shut. At the third checkpoint, I encountered a new problem. I no longer had to explain why I was travelling with a photocopy of my ID card – I now had a brand new one. But now a policeman wanted to know why my CSC was so new. When I explained, he responded by asking for “tea money”. I gave him K10,000. At the fourth checkpoint, near the town of Payagyi in Bago Region, both our ID cards and mobile phones were checked. I didn’t have a problem because I had already deleted social media posts, data and contacts from my phone, but some of the other passengers hadn’t been so smart. When the police found social media posts or images about the protest movement on their phones, they were arrested or threatened with arrest. Three people paid bribes to avoid being detained: one passenger had to pay K50,000 and the others K100,000 each. We speculated as to why the size of the bribe varied; was it because of the nature of their social media posts, or just how much money the police figured they might be carrying? The woman sitting next to me was a frequent traveller between Mawlamyine and Yangon, and I asked her if our experience had been unusual. “Before, we could travel everywhere without having to worry too much,” she responded. “Now it feels like we are totally in the darkness … they are bullying the people with their weapons.”..."
Source/publisher: "Frontier Myanmar" (Myanmar)
2021-05-31
Date of entry/update: 2021-05-31
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "With chubby cheeks and a nervous smile, 18-year-old Kai is preparing to attack his judo coach on stage in front of hundreds of onlookers. Light beaming from the raised platform illuminates the crowd sitting cross-legged on the grass of the park in Yangon, Myanmar’s largest city, drawn to the spectacle and the colourful striped flags. Some of them are familiar with the symbolism of the flags’ rainbow colours. They have been waiting for this, January’s fourth annual Pride festival, in a country where same-sex relations are criminalised and the LGBT community is openly mocked. “Everyone is proud. I am so proud of them,” says Kai, a University of Yangon student who only has one name. Building up the courage to get on stage, he points his little finger – painted pink to symbolise a call for legislative change – to the sky. “Raise your hand and say ‘I am gay,’” he shouts. This is a bold declaration in Myanmar, which is among Asia’s laggards in terms of LGBT rights. In 2018, India abolished a colonial-era law banning homosexuality that had similarities to Myanmar’s current legislation. In the same year, Hong Kong began to grant visas to international dependents in same-sex partnerships. Taiwan went a step further in 2019 and legalised gay marriage..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "South China Morning Post" (Hong Kong)
2020-02-13
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-18
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "A MAN who is fighting to legalise the use of cannabis in Myanmar was fined recently for wrongful demonstration in Yangon. Ko Sein Hla Maung was fined 20,000 kyat (RM55) by the court for leading the demonstration in a public park, calling for the legalisation of marijuana according to The Myanmar Times. After the hearing Ko Sein said he remains undaunted and vows to pursue the movement, called "Marijuana Revolution", that aims for the government to allow the use of cannabis legally. He said punitive action such as sending people to prison for using marijuana would destroy them. Legalising the plant however could help boost the economy, provide employment and even help the country strengthen its coffers, he added. Ko Sein and his fellow advocates who were present at the court hearing said they will be consulting experts and legislators on how to go about their effort to legalise the plant. Anyone caught having possession of less than 100 grams of marijuana they can be sentenced to up to 10 years in prison. Possession of over 100 grams could result in life imprisonment..."
Source/publisher: "New Straits Times" (Malaysia)
2019-11-27
Date of entry/update: 2019-11-27
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "On today, the 21 November, the people of Myanmar celebrate their National Day, an annual public holiday for the country, celebrated on the tenth day following the full moon of the month of Tazaungmone, the eighth month of the country’s calendar. The holiday marks the anniversary of the beginning of student-led protests against the British in 1920. As with most of ASEAN, from the earliest days of colonisation, there was a strong feeling of resentment against the rule of Myanmar’s colonisers. The student protests of 1920 were seen as the start of the resistance movement that ultimately led to independence from Britain in 1948. In 1920, on the tenth day following the full-moon day of Tazaungmone, students from the Rangoon and Judson Colleges began protests against the British administration’s Rangoon University Act of 1920. The Act raised the status of Rangoon College to that of a university, but the changes in the administration and curriculum were seen to exclude the local population. The protests ignited a call for nationalism among students, the basis of which formed the key elements of the country’s independence movement. Today, however, Myanmar’s leadership seem to have forgotten the spirit of the 1920 student protests..."
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Source/publisher: "The ASEAN Post" (Malaysia)
2019-11-21
Date of entry/update: 2019-11-24
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Myanmar one of more than 40 countries where laws introduced by British entrench discrimination against LGBT people.
Description: " Khin Maung Htun, a gay man in Myanmar, was standing on the street one night last year scrolling through his phone when police showed up to arrest some men who had been fighting nearby. The brawl had nothing to do with him; he had not even realised it was going on. But one of the police officers happened to know some acquaintances of his and recognised his face. "He is gay," the officer told his colleagues as he pointed at Khin Maung Htun, "so arrest him too." More: Singapore court to hear cases seeking to decriminalise gay sex... Charges in Mongolia LGBT attack hint at changing attitudes...Gay fathers get less paid parental leave than other couples... At the police station, he was made to kneel down with the other men as police kicked them. Then he was singled out by an officer who demanded to know why he was gay, before slapping him....."
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Source/publisher: "Al Jazeera" (Qatar)
2019-11-13
Date of entry/update: 2019-11-13
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: ''Representing each of Myanmar’s 14 States and Regions, more than 130 civil society members attended the event, which was co-hosted with the Myanmar National Human Rights Commission in collaboration with Dan Church Aid, Norwegian Church Aid, Equality Myanmar and the Local Resource Center. The ICJ’s Asia Pacific Regional Director, Frederick Rawski, introduced the Forum objectives which were to raise awareness of the rights, obligations and reporting processes associated with Myanmar’s ratification of the ICESCR on 6 October 2017. As a State Party to the ICESCR, Myanmar is obliged to respect, protect and fulfill a variety of human rights including the rights to: decent work, an adequate standard of living, adequate housing, food, water and sanitation, social security, health, and education...''
Source/publisher: International Commission of Jurists (ICJ)
2018-11-26
Date of entry/update: 2019-01-31
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: English
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