Freedom of opinion and expression: standards and mechanisms

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Description: International standards ... Individual complaints-model questionnaire ... Annual Reports ... Country visits ... Press releases ... Issues in Focus ... Documents ... Links
Source/publisher: Office of United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
Date of entry/update: 2010-11-30
Grouping: Websites/Multiple Documents
Language: English
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Description: "In October 2008, the Myanmar censorship board suspended the publication of True News weekly journal for two months as the journal had violated the censorship rules. The censorship board, also known as the Press Security and Registration Board (PSRD), penalized the journal for publishing a photo of child labour on its front-page and failing to submit adequate information prior to publication. The suspension was a big loss for the journal that had been launched a month previously. It forced the journal to reorganize its editorial team and persuade its staff not to leave the paper. The most unfortunate effect was that the journal lost the bulk of its readership. Myanmar is one of the most highly censored countries in the world and it is not unusual for private publications to face punishments such as the one experienced by True News. Because of the strict nature of the censorship policy in Myanmar, private papers have to take extra care not to break the rules. In the authoritarian context, the rulers view the press as a servant of the state and the press is completely dominated by the state, whereas in the context of Libertarian theory the press is viewed as an independent institution that informs and entertains the general public, discovers the truth, promotes democracy and performs the role of watchdog of government accountability1. The Myanmar government, like other authoritarian regimes, heavily censors publications and penalizes the private press if they violate the censorship policy. Private newspapers in Myanmar are either directly or indirectly affected by the government censorship policy. An interest group called the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) has described the censorship process in Myanmar as ‘arbitrary, intensive, and highly restrictive’2. Since publications are still facing suspension and closure orders, publishing a newspaper in Myanmar is considered to be a risky business. In addition, journalists who are associated with exiled media groups are targeted and arrested by the regime and given long prison terms. In September 2011, the nominally- civilian government gave a ten-year prison sentence to twenty-one year old Sithu Zeya who was working for the exiled media group Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB), based in Norway3. According to a CPJ 2011 Special Report, Myanmar ranked among the ‘world’s five worst jailers of the press for four consecutive years’4. CPJ said at least fourteen journalists and media support workers were in prisons across the country as of September 2011, while the independent media freedom monitoring group, Reporters Without Borders, reported that seventeen journalists and three netizens were behind bars as of 20115. The CPJ report said, “Journalists are typically charged with violating the country’s censorship laws, among the strictest in the world, or engaging in “anti-state” activities such as disseminating information to the outside world”6. Reporters Without Borders’ Press Freedom Index 2010 stated that Myanmar is one of the world’s most repressive countries, together with Iran, North Korea and Syria, toward the press and journalists. It put Myanmar at 174 out of 178 in its annual Press Freedom Index as the government imposed strict censorship rules on the press, restricted the freedom of journalists to report and detained journalists. Fortunately, True News has survived although it faced one of the most severe punishments in PSRD history. However, The Action Times journal that was banned for a month at the same time never appeared in the market again. In Action Times’ case, the journal was suspended for ‘modification of the approved version’ when it was published7. According to journalists interviewed, the suspension of The Action Times for a month so financially threatened the journal that is was forced to close. With a population of over fifty-eight million8 and total adult literacy rate of 92%9, the press industry in Myanmar has a lot of potential to expand its market. A report released by Reporters Without Borders in 2010 said Myanmar’s people are ‘big media consumers’. The report was based on a poll of 2,950 people across the country who were asked how the public get their news. The report said the rate of reading print media in Myanmar (36 %) is ‘high for a developing country’. Although the press industry in Myanmar has the potential to expand its market, many scholars, rights groups and media professionals claim that the development of press industry is hindered by the strict censorship policy. Nwe Nwe Aye (2010: 56) claimed that “the circulation of state-owned daily newspapers and private owned weekly journals combined remains relatively low compared to countries in the region”. For example, whereas Thailand with a population of sixty-five million published 3 million copies per day in 2007, Myanmar with fifty-four million people published only 400,000 copies a day in 2005. The Press Freedom Index shows that Thai media enjoys more media freedom than their counterparts in Myanmar. Critics claim that censorship undermines journalistic work and the development of private press industry as a whole. They say that media in an authoritarian context can neither assume a watchdog role nor promote democracy. 1.1 Rationale of the study The aim of the study is to access the impact of censorship on the private press industry and journalistic work in Myanmar. While the study will include discussion of the potential for more media freedom under the new government, it mainly focuses on the media under the military government from 1988-2010. This report is based on surveys and in-depth interviews with journalists, publishers and executives from newspapers, journals and publishing houses in Myanmar. The survey was carried out from August to September 2011, including 77 journalists who represent over 10 private publications in Myanmar. In addition, in-depth interviews with publishers were also included to study the impact of censorship on the business of private newspapers. The interviews with publishers and experts were conducted via emails and personal meetings throughout my fellowship period from October 2011 to March 2012. They were asked questions regarding censorship and how it impacts on their reporting and creativity, as well as on the business of the newspapers. The study focuses on Myanmar’s two biggest cities Yangon and Mandalay, which are home to most of the media companies in the country. In addition, the study also included journalists in Nay Pyi Taw, the new capital city where government ministries are located. The paper tries to answer two key questions: 1. What has been the impact of censorship on journalistic work and the quality of newspaper publishing? 2. What has been the impact of censorship on the private press industry? 1.2 Organization of the paper This paper has been organized into five parts. Chapter 1 includes an introduction that describes censorship in Myanmar and the rationale behind the research study. Chapters 2 will emphasize the history of censorship, why governments use censorship and how it evolves. In addition, a comparative study of the censorship of authoritarian states such as Zimbabwe, Syria, and Vietnam will be presented. Chapter 3 includes a brief history of print news media in Myanmar. This part will focus on the period after independence and up to the present day. Because the British introduced the newspaper to Myanmar, a brief background of colonial rule in Myanmar will also be included to explain the history of the press industry in Myanmar. In addition, newspaper history will be presented in order to compare the newspaper industry in the colonial period, after independence, under the socialist regime and most recently, under the military government. Chapter 4 contains the major part of this study, covering the impact of censorship on journalistic work and the production of quality newspapers. Moreover, it closely looks into the relationship between the development of the private press industry and censorship. Surveys and in-depth interviews with nearly 80 reporters and editors will be included to assess the impact of censorship on journalistic works and publishing quality newspapers. Interviews with ten publishers and media executives will be described in order to assess the impact of censorship on newspaper businesses. This section also explores the censorship’s impact on revenue, readership and brand image of the newspaper. In addition, this chapter will look at the prospect of media freedom and market potential. Chapter 5 is the conclusion of the report. This chapter will present major findings and give recommendations based on the findings..."
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Source/publisher: Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism and University of Oxford
2012-00-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-10-13
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "In the months before the Myanmar military's Feb. 1 coup, the country's telecom and internet service providers were ordered to install intercept spyware that would allow the army to eavesdrop on the communications of citizens, sources with direct knowledge of the plan told Reuters. The technology gives the military the power to listen in on calls, view text messages and web traffic including emails, and track the locations of users without the assistance of the telecom and internet firms, the sources said. The directives are part of a sweeping effort by the army to deploy electronic surveillance systems and exert control over the internet with the aim of keeping tabs on political opponents, squashing protests and cutting off channels for any future dissent, they added. Decision makers at the civilian Ministry of Transport and Communications that delivered the orders were ex-military officials, according to one industry executive with direct knowledge of the plans and another briefed on the matter. "They presented it as coming from the civilian government, but we knew the army would have control and were told you could not refuse," the executive with direct knowledge said, adding that officials from the military-controlled Ministry of Home Affairs also sat in on the meetings. More than a dozen people with knowledge of the intercept spyware used in Myanmar have been interviewed by Reuters. All asked to remain anonymous, citing fear of retribution from the military junta. Neither representatives for the junta nor representatives for politicians attempting to form a new civilian government responded to Reuters requests for comment. Budget documents from 2019 and 2020 for the previous government led by Aung San Suu Kyi that were not disclosed publicly contain details of a planned $4 million in purchases of intercept spyware products and parts as well as sophisticated data extraction and phone hacking technology. The documents were provided by activist group Justice for Myanmar and were independently verified by Reuters. Reuters was not able to establish to what extent senior non-military people in Suu Kyi's government had been involved in the order to install the intercept. The idea of a so-called 'lawful intercept' was first floated by Myanmar authorities to the telecommunications sector in late 2019 but pressure to install such technology came only in late 2020, several sources said, adding that they were warned not to talk about it. The intercept plans were flagged publicly by Norway's Telenor (TEL.OL) in an annual update on its Myanmar business, which is one of the country's biggest telecom firms with 18 million customers out of a population of 54 million. Telenor said in the Dec. 3 briefing and statement posted on its websites that it was concerned about Myanmar authorities' plans for a lawful intercept able to "directly access each operator and ISP's systems without case-by-case approval" as Myanmar did not have sufficient laws and regulations to protect customers' rights to privacy and freedom of expression. In addition to Telenor, the affected companies include three other telecom firms in Myanmar: MPT, a large state-backed operator, Mytel, a venture between Myanmar's army and Viettel which is owned by Vietnam's defence ministry, and Qatar's Ooredoo (ORDS.QA). MPT and Mytel are now under the full control of the junta, the sources said. There are about a dozen internet service providers. Telenor declined to respond to questions from Reuters for this article, citing unspecified security concerns for its employees. MPT, Mytel and Ooredoo did not respond to requests for comment. Japanese trading house Sumitomo Corp (8053.T), which together with wireless carrier KDDI Corp (9433.T) announced in 2014 planned investment of $2 billion in MPT, declined to comment. KDDI and Viettel did not respond to requests for comment. Many governments allow for what are commonly called 'lawful intercepts' to be used by law enforcement agencies to catch criminals. But in most democratic countries and even some authoritarian regimes, such technology is not ordinarily employed without any kind of legal process, cybersecurity experts say. The Myanmar military, in contrast, is directly operating invasive telecoms spyware without legal or regulatory safeguards to protect human rights in place, according to industry executives and activists. Even before the coup, Myanmar's military wielded outsized influence in the democratically elected civilian government led by Suu Kyi. It had an unelected quota of 25% of parliamentary seats and the constitution gave it control of several key ministries. It also had extensive sway at the communications and other ministries through the appointment of former army officers. That has become total control since the coup.....TRACINGS AND INTERCEPTIONS: According to three sources at firms with knowledge of the surveillance system, not every telecom firm and internet service provider has installed the full intercept spyware. Reuters was not able to establish how broadly it has been installed and deployed. But military and intelligence agencies are conducting some tracing of SIM cards and interception of calls, two of those sources said. One source said calls being redirected to other numbers and connecting without a dial tone were among the signs of interception. A legal source with knowledge of cases against people involved in the protests also said there was evidence of monitoring spyware being used to prosecute them. Reuters has not seen any documents supporting the claim. A senior civil servant who is aiding ousted politicians seeking to form a parallel government also said their group has been warned by people working for the junta but sympathetic to protesters that phone numbers are being traced. "We have to change SIM cards all the time," the senior civil servant said. According to Amnesty International's Security Lab and three other tech experts, the intercept products outlined in the government budget documents would enable the bulk collection of phone metadata - data on who users call, when they call and for how long - as well as targeted content interception.....CABLES CUT, ACTIVISTS' PHONES BLOCKED: Among the military's first actions on Feb. 1 was to direct armed soldiers to break into data centres nationwide at midnight and slash internet cables, according to employees at three firms who showed Reuters photos of severed cables. At one data centre where employees resisted, soldiers held them at gunpoint and also smashed monitors to threaten them, said one source briefed on the matter. Though the internet was mostly restored with hours, the army began shutting it down nightly. Within days, the army had secretly ordered telecom firms to block the phone numbers of activists, junta opponents and human rights lawyers, providing the firms with lists, according to three industry sources briefed on the matter. Those orders have not been previously reported. The sources added that operators are required by law to share customer lists with authorities. The army also directed the blocking of specific websites. Facebook (FB.O), which was used by half the country and quickly became crucial to protest organisers, was among the first to be banned, followed by news sites and other social media platforms. read more When opposition grew in March, the military cut access to mobile data altogether, leaving most in Myanmar without access to the internet. "Firms have to obey the orders," one industry source said. "Everyone knows that if you don't, they can just come in with guns and cut the wires. That's even more effective than any intercept." Telenor and Ooredoo executives who protested were told to stay quiet or the companies would face losing their licences, four sources said.....THE ARMY'S TIGHTENING GRIP: Under previous juntas that ruled between 1963 and 2011, activists and journalists were routinely wiretapped and smartphones were scarce. As Myanmar opened up, it became a telecoms success story with a thriving, if nascent, digital economy. Mobile phone penetration, in 2011 the second-lowest in the world after North Korea at 6.9%, soared to stand at 126% in 2020. The civilian government's first known move towards nationwide surveillance came in 2018, with the establishment of a social media monitoring system it said was aimed at preventing the influence of foreign forces. It followed that with a biometric SIM card registration drive last year, saying multiple SIM card use was undesirable and a central database was necessary. Authorities are now seeking still more power over telecommunications. The communications ministry proposed a new law on Feb. 10 that states internet and telecom firms will be required to keep a broad range of user data for up to three years and remove or block any content deemed to be disrupting "unity, stabilisation, and peace", with possible jail terms for those who don't comply. In late April, the junta began ordering telecom operators to unblock certain websites and apps, starting with the apps of local banks, said three people briefed on the development. Microsoft Office, Google's Gmail, Google Drive and YouTube have also since been unblocked. Asked about the unblocking, a Microsoft representative said the company had not engaged with officials in Myanmar. Google did not respond to requests for comment. Industry sources and activists believe these moves are part of an attempt by the junta to establish its version of the internet, akin to what China has done with the "Great Firewall". "The military wants to control the internet so it will be a safe zone but only for them," said one industry executive. "We've gone back five years in time."..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Reuters" (UK)
2021-05-19
Date of entry/update: 2021-05-19
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, among others, are platforms enabling free expression of information and ideas, but they are also increasingly used to spread fake news and hate speech - making serious public policy discussions more difficult and thereby undermining democracies. What is the state of freedom of speech around the world? Is democracy under threat from all the misinformation and manipulation? And how do you police the internet without censorship and restricting freedom of expression? David Kaye, the UN special rapporteur for freedom of expression, is an independent expert who is tasked by the UN Human Rights Council to report and monitor on the freedom of expression globally - including on the internet and social media. "The problem that we see all around the world today is that governments are increasingly interfering with all sorts of human rights, but in terms of my mandate, they are interfering increasingly with everyone's right to freedom of expression and this is unfortunately a global phenomenon," he told Al Jazeera. Since 2014, when Kaye started his role, he has seen the state of freedom of expression going backwards. "We have seen increasing efforts by political leaders, by governments to restrict the kind of robust debate that we expect in democratic societies. We see an increasing concentration of media controlled by the state, it's been deeply problematic over the last couple of years." While the US has traditionally played a role in advocating for freedom of expression, US President Donald Trump may be sending a different message. "When you have a president who attacks the media on a regular basis, where he calls the media 'the enemy of the people' which I think he does for strategic purposes to sow doubt in the people's opinion about media and in the truthfulness of traditional reporting, I think that's deeply problematic," Kaye said, adding, "the rhetoric gives some comfort to authoritarians." While Kaye says some societies - like North Korea - are "closed", others may have journalists targeted for their words. The brutal murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi on October 2, 2018, inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, Turkey, has led to a demand for accountability and transparency. US intelligence agencies have concluded that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, also referred to as MBS, ordered the murder of Khashoggi - a conclusion the Saudi kingdom denies. Kaye says there is a broader issue of inaction in the face of Khashoggi's murder. "There's been no effort in the UN system by states to seek to censure Saudi Arabia, except in one instance led by Iceland actually in the Human Rights Council. Except for that, in an informal way, there's been very little censure of Saudi Arabia for its role in the killing of Jamal Khashoggi and I think that is frankly a travesty," he said. "All of the threads lead back to the crown prince. He is responsible, I think that seems pretty clear. Whether it amounts to criminal culpability, I think is a question I would really like to see handled by the structures of the UN system." The UN determined that the ability to use Facebook was one of the motivators for people to incite violence against the Rohingya in 2016 and 2017. "Facebook really did not do anything in the face of that incitement of violence even though that was inconsistent with its own rules for participating in the service," Kaye said. Facebook acknowledged it wasn't doing enough to prevent the incitement of violence against the Rohingya community and created additional rules to address the issue, but Kaye noted in many instances it is a real question whether companies are consistently enforcing these rules. "The major problem here is that we don't know because they are not transparent about their implementations of their rules." Kaye said government regulation to ensure transparency may be a solution but the other issue is policing the internet without censorship. According to Kaye, the internet itself has changed and it is no longer a place where you can discover a whole world of information without any restrictions. "It was very difficult for governments to impose restrictions. But that internet is gone," he said. "The internet in the last 15 years has made censorship easier, rather than allow us to reach what we had expected at some level, which might have been a naive expectation of a nirvana of free speech online." "
Creator/author: David Kaye (interviewee), James Bays (interviewer)
Source/publisher: Al Jazeera (Talk to Al Jazeera) via Youtube
2019-06-09
Date of entry/update: 2019-06-09
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: English
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Description: Article 19
Source/publisher: Office of United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
Date of entry/update: 2010-11-30
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: English
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Description: Article 19
Source/publisher: Office of United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
Date of entry/update: 2010-11-30
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: Burmese/ မွနျမာဘာသာ
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Description: Article 19
Source/publisher: Office of United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
Date of entry/update: 2010-11-30
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: English
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Description: Article 19
Source/publisher: Office of United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
Date of entry/update: 2010-11-30
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: Pwo-Karen
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Description: Article 19
Source/publisher: Office of United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
Date of entry/update: 2010-11-30
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: S'gaw-Karen
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Description: Article 19
Source/publisher: Office of United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
Date of entry/update: 2010-11-30
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: Shan
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Description: Commission on Human Rights resolution 2003/42
Source/publisher: UNHCHR
2003-04-23
Date of entry/update: 2010-11-30
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: English
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