Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy
Individual Documents
Sub-title:
Over the last fifteen years, an illicit economy – comprising everything from unregistered casinos to online scamming operations – has boomed along a stretch of the Mekong River separating Laos and Myanmar. Regional states will need to work together to rein in the criminal syndicates behind it.
Description:
"What’s new? Myanmar’s Shan State and northern Laos’s Bokeo province have become a contiguous zone of vibrant criminality, much of it beyond the reach of state authorities. The Mekong River, which bisects the zone, is also an axis of geopolitical competition, complicating efforts to combat organised crime.
Why does it matter? The sheer size of illicit businesses, which dwarf the legal economies of both Shan State and northern Laos, means that they have an enormous local impact, entrenching corruption, weakening governance institutions and damaging community bonds in both these areas. The effects ripple throughout the region and beyond.
What should be done? Though geopolitical competition between the U.S. and China may get in the way, a coordinated regional approach to addressing criminality should be a top political priority. In addition to intelligence sharing and joint law enforcement operations, interested governments should work together to address underlying governance and socio-economic issues.
Executive Summary
Myanmar’s Shan State and Laos’s Bokeo province, which straddle the Mekong River, have emerged as a contiguous zone of vibrant criminality, much of which is beyond the reach of national authorities. Unregulated casinos, money laundering, drug production and trafficking, online scamming operations, and illegal wildlife trade all thrive, entrenching corruption, weakening governance and damaging the bonds that create community. The criminal networks involved have regional – in some cases, global – reach and can rapidly shift from one jurisdiction to another to minimise risks to their operations. A coordinated regional approach is thus vital for tackling them. But geopolitical competition between China and the U.S. complicates coordination. Regional states continue to rely heavily on unilateral criminal justice responses, but collaborative law enforcement is needed, as are multi-state efforts to ameliorate the governance and socio-economic problems that allow these criminal syndicates to prosper. Ideally, these efforts would involve agencies with migration, development and other relevant expertise.
Parts of the Mekong, particularly the 100km section that forms the Myanmar-Lao border, have long been a frontier of unregulated and illicit trade, far from centres of power and commerce. Given its importance as a conduit between China and South East Asia, in recent decades governments have aspired for the Mekong to become a major transport route. But along with physical obstacles – sandbanks, shoals and rapids – insecurity has impeded riverborne trade, most commonly in the form of piracy and extortion of boats plying the route. The situation came to a head in October 2011, when thirteen Chinese merchant mariners were murdered – the deadliest attack on Chinese nationals abroad since World War II. China pinned the blame on Myanmar pirates, whose leader it captured in Laos and executed following a complex extra-territorial police operation. (It later emerged that others may have been primarily responsible.) Beijing then initiated joint gunboat patrols with neighbouring countries, allowing it to project force down the Mekong.
While these actions put an end to piracy on this key stretch of river, they did not deter other forms of crime. Since 2011, the territories on the Myanmar and Lao sides of the Mekong have emerged as hotbeds of illegal activity, from drug production and trafficking to online gambling, money laundering and cyber-scam operations that often use captive workers from around the world. Not only do transnational criminal organisations operating in this zone benefit from lax or non-existent regulations, but they also take advantage of its multi-jurisdictional character, quickly shifting operations from one place to another to evade crackdowns.
Coordinated law enforcement across the region is crucial if governments want any chance of tackling these expanding criminal activities, but other capabilities must also be brought to bear. Authorities in the region need to acknowledge that any solution to this transnational problem will involve government agencies from several jurisdictions – as opposed to the typical security or police approach that treats immediate symptoms, but not the fundamental causes of the problem, including weak governance and rampant corruption, not to mention a willingness or desire of some jurisdictions to court illicit investments.
The Mekong is a locus of big-power rivalry, where longstanding U.S. ties with Thailand and other countries are being tested by China’s rising power.
So far, however, a coordinated response is lacking, in large part due to geopolitical considerations. The Mekong is a locus of big-power rivalry, where longstanding U.S. ties with Thailand and other countries are being tested by China’s rising power and regional ambitions. The contestation has greatly limited cooperation between Western governments and China on transnational crime in the Mekong, while making it difficult for other countries to balance their relations with the two.
China is by far the most influential actor and could play a critical role if it chose to. China could adopt a more consistent approach to criminality in the Mekong sub-region, using its influence over regional governments and non-state actors to curtail illicit activities. But Beijing is also guided by strategic considerations, including its inclination to view economic investment, even if it is partly illicit, as something that can help build peace along its borders, and its desire to leverage enclaves in its neighbourhood controlled by pliant entities in order to project its power. It has thus far tended to focus on law enforcement only selectively, responding only when it considers its national interests under direct threat, including with crackdowns on online gambling and efforts to shut down online scam operations across South East Asia. At the same time, it has ignored much of the crime in locations controlled by entities and enterprises friendly to China.
Ideally, the U.S. and China should set aside their geopolitical rivalry when it comes to cooperating on combating transnational crime in the Mekong. Doing so could encourage greater Chinese cooperation with initiatives such as the U.S.-led Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats, as well as the Thai operations and intelligence centre on transnational organised crime in the Mekong. Although this scenario is more aspirational than likely, the two powers could also bring about enhanced regional collaboration by focusing on ways in which their respective Mekong cooperation platforms (the Mekong-U.S. partnership and the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation) could support initiatives to tackle the governance and socio-economic factors that allow organised crime to flourish, with programs designed to foster good governance, fight corruption, alleviate poverty and create jobs.
It is equally important to address the human cost of transnational crime. States should provide more assistance to secure the release of, and support, the thousands of people from countries across the world being held against their will and often severely abused in online scam centres where they are forced to carry out criminal activities in Myanmar, Laos and elsewhere in the region. Too often, these people, even if they are rescued or able to escape, are held on immigration offences or charged for the crimes they were forced to commit. A more proactive approach from their embassies in the relevant countries is needed, as is a victim-centred approach from the countries where they were held or fled to.
Reining in the sprawling illegality that has grown along the Mekong will not be easy. But the consequences of permitting the region’s illicit businesses to keep booming are too great for governments not to try their best. Better coordination is the place to start.
I.
Introduction
Over the last decade and a half, a vibrant criminal economy has arisen in the Mekong sub-region, based on illegal drug production, unregistered casinos, online gambling and money laundering, and most recently, sophisticated online scamming operations. The tens of billions of dollars in illicit profits have driven criminal syndicates to make huge casino and infrastructure investments, which have flowed into poorly governed jurisdictions with weak regulatory enforcement or into semi-autonomous enclaves beyond the state’s reach, particularly in Myanmar. The bribery and other corruption that allows these criminal activities to flourish have further corroded state institutions in the region.
Two areas have emerged as hotspots: Laos’s Bokeo province, home to the Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone, and Myanmar’s Shan State, particularly the district to the east of the Salween River bordering China, Laos and Thailand, known in British colonial times as Trans-Salween (see the map in Appendix B). Together, these form a transnational zone of criminality straddling the geopolitically important Mekong River. The 2021 coup in Myanmar has unleashed centrifugal forces that have eroded Naypyitaw’s influence over trans-Salween Shan State. Non-state armed groups have subsequently tightened their grip in the area, resulting in a surge of illicit activity.
This report examines the political and economic dynamics at play and the associated security and governance risks. It also explores the geopolitical context, looking in particular at how insecurity and piracy along this stretch of the Mekong has prompted extraterritorial Chinese projection of force downstream, at the same time that the U.S. is increasing its security cooperation with Thailand just to the south. The report is based on Crisis Group field research, including trips to Thailand in April and November 2022 and February 2023, as well as to northern Thailand and Laos’s Bokeo province in March 2023. Interviews were conducted with a wide range of interlocutors, including police, anti-narcotics officials and representatives of foreign law enforcement agencies, as well as analysts and journalists. The majority of interviewees were men, reflecting the make-up of law enforcement agencies in these countries; the cohorts of analysts, journalists and residents were more gender-balanced. Research in Myanmar was conducted remotely, facilitated by Crisis Group’s longstanding relationships with key sources in the country.
II.
Political Economy and Geopolitics of the Golden Triangle
A.
Commerce, Connectivity and Crime
The Mekong River, which flows almost 5,000km from the Tibetan plateau to the delta in southern Vietnam, is the third-longest river in Asia and a key trade route between China and South East Asia.1 The 100km section of the river linking China to the Golden Triangle – where Myanmar, Laos and Thailand meet – has for decades been a zone of unregulated and illicit commerce (see map in Appendix B).
Located at the junction of different kingdoms and principalities, the Golden Triangle was historically a locus of trade and migration.2 But its distance from key commercial and political centres also meant it was little controlled or taxed. From the late eighteenth to the early twentieth centuries, opium cultivation expanded in the region, and in remote areas opium resin became a key means of exchange.3
After World War II came to an end, conflict persisted in the Golden Triangle. Fleeing Mao Zedong’s communist army, the Chinese nationalist Kuomintang armed forces occupied parts of Myanmar’s Shan State, while communist insurgencies in Laos and Thailand set up bases in the area. Opium was a convenient cash crop for farmers in conflict-affected areas, and the opium trade helped fund the various armed groups operating in the region. The Kuomintang became particularly prominent in the trade. By the 197os, the Golden Triangle was the largest source of illicit opium in the world, before declining significantly in the 1990s as a result of opium cultivation bans and a drug market shift to methamphetamines.4
The Mekong, as both a natural border and a conduit, played an important role in the opium and other illicit trades, as well as in licit sub-regional business. China and other countries had ambitious plans to make the Mekong into a major licit trade route. In recent decades, trade volumes have increased, but the many rapids, sandbanks and rocky shoals along the river’s course from China to the Golden Triangle – as well as the threat of ambush by insurgents and criminal gangs – have kept it from becoming the transport corridor Asian strategists hoped it would be.5
B.
The 2011 Naw Kham Incident
The most serious security incident on the Mekong in recent decades occurred on 5 October 2011, when thirteen Chinese merchant mariners were killed execution-style and their bodies thrown overboard from the two cargo barges they were crewing. The killings took place on the stretch of river passing through the Golden Triangle, just inside Thai waters.6 It was the deadliest attack on Chinese nationals abroad since World War II, eliciting a furious response from Beijing. For the first time, China sent gunboats down the Mekong, beyond its own territory – patrols that it subsequently made regular.7
Thailand’s elite Pha Muang anti-narcotics unit stated that it had seized a large quantity of drugs in a raid on the barges, during which it claimed to have engaged in a shootout with heavily armed smugglers; it alleged that these men had then fled upriver in speedboats, leaving one barge’s captain dead in the wheelhouse.8 Over the following days, locals found the bodies of twelve more of the Chinese crew, most of whom had been bound, gagged and shot at close range, floating in different locations just downstream. The Thai authorities immediately blamed the murders on a criminal gang from Myanmar led by a notorious but elusive Shan warlord named Naw Kham, who as discussed below had been responsible for previous acts of piracy and kidnapping on the Mekong.9
Naw Kham maintained his innocence, but he was found guilty and executed with three accomplices in March 2013.
Chinese authorities put considerable pressure on Thailand, Myanmar and Laos to cooperate closely with the director of the Chinese Ministry of Public Security’s anti-drug bureau, who was heading the task force investigating the killings.10 Beijing reportedly secured agreement from these countries that its task force could pursue and apprehend suspects in their territory, as well as for joint patrols along a 337km section of river.11 After failed attempts to capture Naw Kham in Laos and then in Myanmar’s Shan State, he and several members of his gang were finally caught in April 2012, in a boat anchored along the Mekong in Laos, near the port of Ban Mom.12 Lao authorities extradited them to China, where they were tried for killing the Chinese sailors. Naw Kham maintained his innocence, but he was found guilty and executed with three accomplices in March 2013; his final moments were broadcast live on state television.13
The investigation had revealed some inconvenient facts, however. The initial claims by Thailand’s Pha Muang unit about its raid on the barges were inconsistent with witness testimony. In a shocking twist, Thai and Chinese investigators concluded that it was actually members of the law enforcement unit who had likely shot the sailors, allegedly in coordination with Naw Kham’s gang.14 A month after the killings, Thai authorities announced that they had arrested nine Pha Muang soldiers, including two commissioned officers, for murdering the merchant mariners, dumping the bodies and tampering with evidence.15 The soldiers subsequently “disappeared from the justice system” according to the Bangkok Post, and there is no record of them ever being charged or convicted.16
In Naw Kham’s Chinese trial, prosecutors claimed that the soldiers were a rogue unit on the gang’s payroll, though without providing evidence in court.17 Some experts on the Golden Triangle drug trade have suggested that the killings were a false flag operation by unknown persons intended to frame Naw Kham – and more broadly, to present Mekong security issues as stemming from lawlessness in Myanmar – noting that he would have been unlikely to order the murders given that they were certain to trigger massive retribution from China (discussed further in Section III.A below).18
C.
Security Cooperation and Geostrategic Rivalry
The killings brought a much more assertive Chinese security posture on the Mekong. Several factors were at play: domestic pressure to safeguard the lives of Chinese citizens overseas; the growing importance of the licit Mekong trade, which had tripled in volume between 2004 and 2011; and concern about the far greater illicit trade flows, particularly drugs. The Mekong’s geopolitical importance, which Beijing views as part of its neighbourhood but where the U.S. has longstanding security cooperation and development programming, was a fourth element.19
Beyond the operation to capture Naw Kham itself, the most visible aspect of this new posture is what Beijing presents as “joint river patrols” by the four riparian states – China, Laos, Myanmar and Thailand – to which it secured agreement in December 2011 (see Section II.B above).20 Chinese gunboats – which bear police markings but carry military-grade firepower – form the backbone of these monthly patrols. A Lao boat accompanies them for the final few kilometres from Ban Mom (160km downstream from the Chinese border) to the Thai-Lao-Myanmar trijunction; a Myanmar boat occasionally also joins.21 The vessels that Laos and Myanmar use are old patrol boats donated by China.22 Thailand, on the other hand, has never agreed to these patrols entering its waters, so in practice the joint China-Lao-Myanmar patrols stop at its border near Sop Ruak.23
The patrols quickly achieved their immediate security objective, ending piracy on this part of the Mekong, but they had little impact on other criminal activities such as drug smuggling (see Section III).24 Western security experts who spoke to Crisis Group have presented this situation as Laos “laundering a Chinese presence” on the river, allowing Beijing to extend its reach far beyond its borders; they also suggested that, for China, the patrols are a “signal of its capability and intent, which could be rapidly stepped up if needed”.25
Such comments reflect the geopolitical sensitivity of the Mekong, where a more powerful and assertive China is increasingly challenging long-term U.S. security interests (discussed further in Section V).
III.
Laos’s Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone
A.
An Emerging Hub of Illicit Activity
Along with the growth in legal trade on the Mekong over the last two decades, and despite the suppression of piracy, there has been an even more rapid surge in illicit economies, including drug smuggling, gambling and associated criminal activities. The sprawling Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in Laos’s Bokeo province, which includes the Kings Romans casino, has emerged as a hub for these (see the map in Appendix B). In January 2018, the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned the casino for “drug trafficking, money laundering, bribery, and human and wildlife trafficking” it was alleged to be facilitating.26 A leading business intelligence analyst has since called the development “the world’s worst special economic zone”.27
Located on the banks of the Mekong, just across from Thailand, the SEZ is operated on a 99-year lease held by Kings Romans Group (also known as Dok Ngiew Kham Group), a Hong Kong-registered company founded by Chinese national Zhao Wei, who is the SEZ’s chairman. The Lao government also has an equity stake in the SEZ.28 Construction began in 2007, and while the investment promotion materials promised an ambitious manufacturing, agribusiness and tourism development, the Kings Romans casino was the first venture to be built.29 The SEZ covers an area of 10,000 hectares, of which 7,000 are forested hills and a nature reserve; the urban development area takes up 1,000 of the remaining 3,000 hectares.30
A veteran of Macao’s casino industry, Zhao Wei made his name (and likely his fortune) running casinos in Myanmar’s ethnic armed group-controlled town of Mongla on the Chinese border from 2001, catering to Chinese getting around Beijing’s ban on domestic gambling.31 In 2005, China closed the crossing into Mongla and cut off the town’s electricity supply after such a casino held several Chinese citizens for ransom for non-payment of debts, amid claims that Chinese provincial officials had also been gambling there with state funds.32 Deprived of clients, the casinos closed down, likely prompting Zhao Wei’s move to Laos. In 2018, U.S. sanctions named Zhao Wei as the head of a Transnational Criminal Organization.33 In China, however, he is regularly interviewed in state media, which hails his rags-to-riches story; the SEZ itself is portrayed as a development achievement.34
Authorities have alleged that the Kings Romans casino engages in money laundering, drug smuggling and other illegal activities. Thailand claimed the casino was the intended destination for the drugs found on the barges at the centre of the October 2011 murders of Chinese sailors (see Section II.B above), and the month before that, a joint Lao-Chinese law enforcement operation found a large haul of methamphetamines (known as yaba) on casino grounds.35
The emergence of Kings Romans as a centre of illicit activity likely represented unwelcome competition for Naw Kham, who was the biggest smuggler on the Mekong at the time.36 In April 2011, Naw Kham’s henchmen seized a casino boat and held the nineteen passengers and crew hostage until Zhao Wei paid a reported $750,000 ransom, which Naw Kham reportedly described as a “protection fee”.37 Thus, whatever the truth of the October 2011 killings, Kings Romans was a clear beneficiary in the aftermath: Naw Kham’s capture rid the casino of its main rival in illegal trade, and Chinese-led river patrols improved security a great deal in the SEZ. China also made out well. Naw Kham’s protection racket was an impediment to Chinese trade down the Mekong, and though it is a private entity, the SEZ has close ties to China (as evidenced by the treatment Zhao Wei receives in the Chinese press). Bejing can use it to project Chinese power in a geopolitically important area.
B.
Expansion of the Special Economic Zone
Over the last decade, the SEZ has expanded significantly. On a two-day visit in March, Crisis Group witnessed a city-scale development, featuring more than twenty hotels, dozens of high-rise office buildings, schools and hospitals, water treatment and sanitation facilities, and an international airport nearing completion. The lingua franca in the enclave is Chinese, as is most signage, and nearly all goods and services must be paid for in Chinese yuan rather than Lao kip. Interviews with residents, as well officials in the region, indicated that SEZ authorities have sole de facto jurisdiction, with law enforcement handled by a “public security bureau” – a private police force operated by the SEZ, modelled on China’s units of the same name.38 Lao police and other authorities reportedly need permission from the SEZ to enter.39
The Kings Romans Group, which runs the casino as well as a number of other projects in the zone, also leases land and commercial and residential property to other businesses and individuals. Residents told Crisis Group that 70,000 Chinese nationals live and work in the zone, although many had left during the COVID-19 pandemic and were returning gradually; there are also several thousand professional workers from other countries, and many thousands of semi-skilled and unskilled workers, the majority from Myanmar.40 SEZ authorities claim that infrastructure and services are expanding beyond their current 100,000-resident capacity to accommodate 300,000 (a population 50 per cent larger than that of Chiang Rai, a nearby Thai city), as well as two million tourists annually, which is what the airport can handle.41 The Kings Romans Group claims to have invested $2 billion in the SEZ, the equivalent of more than 10 per cent of Lao GDP.42
The airport is particularly important for the SEZ’s future, as it will allow visitors, particularly those from mainland China, to fly in directly, thereby bypassing other jurisdictions. The nearest major airport at present is in Chiang Rai – a 61km drive across the Thai-Lao border. Other gambling centres are more conveniently located for mainland Chinese visitors, particularly the string of more than a dozen casinos in Myanmar’s south-eastern Myawaddy township, including the massive Shwe Kokko development, which are located a few kilometres from Thailand’s Mae Sot airport, and can be reached via informal border crossings with no Thai or Myanmar immigration procedures.43 The new airport will make the Golden Triangle at least as handy.
At first, the builders planned to put the airport inside the SEZ, but the Golden Triangle’s proximity to Thai and Myanmar airspace precluded that option, so Zhao Wei instead reached agreement with Laos on a joint venture at the site of an existing airstrip at Tonpheung, a 5km drive from the SEZ along a recently completed four-lane highway.44 When Crisis Group visited in March, construction of the terminal appeared nearly finished, ahead of its slated mid-2023 opening. The first test flight to the airport was completed in December 2021, with some domestic flights taking place in 2022.45
The SEZ is also planning to establish a significant port facility on the Mekong. In 2020, a Kings Romans Group subsidiary reportedly paid the Lao government $50 million for a majority stake in a port development project at Ban Mom, a few kilometres upriver from the SEZ.46 When completed, the port development – which covers an area of more than 2,000 hectares, twice the size of the SEZ’s main development area – will include hotels, office buildings and large warehouses. It is to handle cargo coming into the SEZ. Law enforcement officials have expressed concern about the development, given that the SEZ is a known storage and trans-shipment point for drugs and other illicit goods.47 This new infrastructure could attract many more people to Bokeo province outside the SEZ. Chinese residents of the SEZ are already beginning to move to nearby towns, where rents are lower.48 It could also enable significant new criminal activity in the province.
When Crisis Group visited the SEZ, it was clear that the zone was rebounding quickly post-COVID. New construction included a golf resort, a Venice-inspired “water street” and a major land reclamation project on the Mekong riverfront, which, according to signage and interviews, was for hotel and restaurant development.49 Crisis Group also found evidence of illegal activities in the SEZ, including:
The operation of scam centres. As reported elsewhere and corroborated by Crisis Group interviews with participants and others with direct knowledge, these centres are run mostly by ethnic Chinese criminal gangs who pay or trick young men and women from China, Malaysia, Thailand and South Asia, and as far away as Nigeria, Brazil and the Republic of Georgia, to work on sophisticated operations targeting victims around the world online with fake investments, sham romances and other such scams.50 Locals identified several buildings where they said scam centres operate or previously did, some of which were being refurbished. These locations did not have window bars or other obvious security, reportedly because the workers were employed willingly and were paid, which locals and experts said was the most common arrangement.51 That said, Crisis Group identified a suspicious compound in the central part of the SEZ, consisting of four high-rise buildings with bars on the windows and strict perimeter security (high fences, razor wire, spotlights). The sole entrance was under 24-hour guard, and exiting vehicles were searched. Locals told Crisis Group that people from China and some other countries were locked up and forced to work as scammers in the compound.52
Money laundering. As stated in the U.S. Treasury sanctions designation and as experts told Crisis Group, significant money laundering takes place in the Golden Triangle SEZ, in particular at the Kings Romans Casino.53 Crisis Group witnessed multiple separate million-dollar cash transactions at the cashier’s desk on the gaming floor of Kings Romans casino, with the bills (in bundles of 100-yuan notes) transported in plastic shopping bags or holdalls.54 In addition to in-person gambling, online casino operations represent another opportunity for money laundering, although the Lao authorities have attempted to crack down on such operations at China’s behest.55 Organised crime experts have also identified major construction projects in the SEZ (see above) as potential channels for money laundering.56
Wildlife crime. Crisis Group identified what an employee said was a bear and tiger farm, ie, a facility for breeding these protected species for the purpose of wildlife trafficking. While marked as a “zoo” on a map displayed in the SEZ, the employee prevented Crisis Group staff from entering the compound, stating that it was not open to the public, but confirming that the site held “many” bears and tigers, which were bred there. The employee declined to call the owner or manager, saying he was instructed not to give out their contact details. The Environmental Investigation Agency, an NGO, named this same location as an illegal tiger and bear farm and abattoir.57 Other sources said the Kings Romans Group has obtained a zoo licence from the Lao authorities to avoid a 2018 government ban on tiger farms.58 Crisis Group also spotted bottles of tiger bone wine on sale in the SEZ, which the vendor said was locally produced.59 Previously, caged bears and tigers had been on display for visitors in the compound of the Kings Romans casino, but these were moved to the new “zoo” location around five years ago.60
In addition, a Lao women’s rights organisation has claimed that there is widespread human trafficking not only of scam centre workers, but also of young women for sexual exploitation in entertainment establishments in the SEZ, and that some scam centre workers are forced into prostitution if they are unable to perform well as scammers.61
There is, however, evidence that the SEZ authorities are becoming more cautious about overt illegal activities. Examples include the removal of protected species from cages near the Kings Romans casino following the 2018 Lao ban on tiger farms, as well as a crackdown on online casinos (see above). More recently, authorities have shuttered several scam operations, particularly those using enslaved workers. This action followed pressure on SEZ management from the Lao government, and pressure on both from Beijing, as the plight of trafficked workers from numerous countries has become a prominent diplomatic issue in the region.62 As a result, many of the scam centres, as well as online gambling operations, are relocating to Myanmar, in particular Tachileik in Shan State as well as Shwe Kokko and other spots close to Myawaddy in Kayin State.63
This shift is not limited to the Golden Triangle SEZ: other such casino and crime zones are located in Cambodia, Laos, the Philippines and Vietnam, and some of these have also started to relocate to Myanmar in response to increased pressure from local authorities, at China’s behest.64
There is also evidence that scam operations are quickly evolving, with increased professionalism and technical sophistication, while reports of human trafficking and forced criminality in this sector continue.65 Interpol issued a global warning on scam centres in the Mekong sub-region on 7 June, noting that their rapid spread represents a “serious and imminent threat” to public safety.66
IV.
Myanmar’s Trans-Salween Shan State
A.
Armed Groups and the Illicit Political Economy
The theatre of decades of conflict between the Myanmar military and ethnic armed groups, Myanmar’s Shan State has long been the epicentre of illicit activities in the Mekong sub-region. It is one of the largest global production centres of crystal methamphetamine, as well as amphetamine tablets and heroin – a drug trade so large and profitable that it dwarfs the state’s formal economy. Drugs lie at the heart of Shan State’s political economy, fuelling both criminality and conflict.67 Shan State is also home to at least 60 casinos, most of which are unregulated and therefore hotspots for money laundering and other crimes, according to the Financial Action Task Force, the international watchdog in charge of tackling money laundering and terrorist financing.68
Both casinos and drug production facilities tend to be located in parts of Shan State held by militias and other paramilitary units allied with the Myanmar military, as well as in enclaves controlled by non-state armed groups.69 Casinos are mostly aimed at Chinese gamblers, so have generally been situated close to the Chinese frontier – particularly in and around Laukkaing and Mongla.70 In recent years, however, China has increasingly cracked down on casinos and online gambling operations sitting along its borders. As a result, these businesses have moved farther afield, including to the Golden Triangle SEZ in Laos (see Section III.B above) and to the nearby town of Tachileik in Shan State, next to Thailand, which hosts more than a dozen casinos.71 (They have also moved to the area around Myawaddy in Kayin State, where Shwe Kokko is located.72)
Criminals ... need good transport links to China ... Some parts of Shan State meet these requirements well.
These illicit businesses require a kind of predictable insecurity. Areas controlled by militias or non-state armed groups that have ceasefire deals with the Myanmar military are ideal from their perspective, as they allow both casinos and drug production and storage facilities to remain beyond the reach of law enforcement, while keeping the significant investments safe.73 Criminals also need good transport links to China – the source of most of the precursor chemicals used to produce the drugs and the place where most of the gamblers come from.74 Some parts of Shan State meet these requirements well.
The first are areas under the control of Border Guard Forces (such as BGF1006 in the Kokang region on the Chinese border and BGF1009 in Tachileik on the Thai frontier) and other militias allied with the Myanmar army.75 Some of these groups are large, well-armed and involved in a range of licit and illicit businesses. In return for carrying out security duties in their areas (essentially, preventing the emergence or incursion of anti-government armed groups), and at times fighting alongside the military, they are given the authority to carry arms and permission to conduct business. The military appears to turn a blind eye to their illicit activities – which, not surprisingly, they engage in liberally, given that they receive no funding or other resources from the military. These groups operate checkpoints to restrict access to their areas or businesses, giving them a great deal of autonomy.
Also fitting the bill are enclaves under the control of ethnic armed groups that have durable ceasefires with Naypyitaw, such as the special regions run by the United Wa State Army (UWSA) and the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA, or “Mongla group”) on the Chinese border, as well as the UWSA’s 171 military region abutting Thailand. Both groups agreed to ceasefires in 1989 that were reaffirmed in 2011, and neither has had serious clashes with the Myanmar army over those accords’ three decades in effect. At the same time, these enclaves are defended by large, well-equipped forces, and neither the Myanmar military nor civilian authorities can enter without permission.
Illicit enterprises that dwarf legitimate ones have fuelled a political economy inimical to peace and security. On one hand, the militias and other armed actors that control areas where crime flourishes have a major disincentive to demobilise, given that they need weapons and territorial control to keep their revenue flowing. They make the money through informal taxation of legal and illegal trade. On the other hand, the Myanmar military, which – at least in theory – has ultimate authority over militias and Border Guard Forces, views such semi-autonomous entities as necessary for helping it combat the various ethnic armed groups. As discussed below, the military has become even more reliant on such groups as conflict has proliferated following the February 2021 coup.
B.
Impact of the 2021 Coup
The February 2021 coup transformed the security landscape and political economy of Myanmar’s border areas. The numerous armed resistance groups formed in response to the coup, many of which have received support from established ethnic armed organisations, have left the Myanmar military battling an array of foes across a wide geographical area.76 Stretched thin, the military has, as noted, become more reliant on Border Guard Forces and other militias to contain the armed resistance, reducing its willingness and ability to constrain these allies’ activities. It is a contrast to the pre-coup situation, when the military sought to impose limits on its allied militias – including disarming the Kaungkha Militia and pressuring the Kayin Border Guard Force, for example – out of concern that they could become too rich and well-armed to rein in if the need arose.77
This transformed security landscape and political economy is particularly striking in Shan State, which has seen much less fighting than other areas since the coup. As the Myanmar military has shifted its focus – and more recently, some of its troops – to more restive areas, the local balance of power has changed.78 The shift has been to the detriment of some groups, such as the Restoration Council of Shan State. The ethnic armed group, which has a ceasefire agreement with the military, has lost considerable territory and power now that it no longer has the same level of backing in its expansionist moves against rival groups that do not have ceasefires, such as the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP).79
Other groups have benefited from the post-coup situation, most significantly the UWSA, the country’s largest ethnic armed group.
Other groups have benefited from the post-coup situation, most significantly the UWSA, the country’s largest ethnic armed group. The UWSA’s goal is for Myanmar to formally recognise its autonomous areas as a separate Wa State, with the same status as other ethnic states in Myanmar – and preferably to expand its territory so that its two separate enclaves are connected.80 Since the coup, the group has enlarged its area of influence to cover much of Trans-Salween – the part of Shan State between the east bank of the Salween (Thanlyin) River and the Chinese, Lao and Thai borders (see the map in Appendix B).81 In the past, the Myanmar army operated bases and checkpoints to limit UWSA expansionism, but it no longer has the ability to do so.82 Since the coup, UWSA has also been more assertive in projecting force across the Salween River in several locations, which analysts suggest is an attempt to tip the balance of power toward its allies (such as the TNLA and the SSPP) in these areas, and thereby protect its flank, rather than a plan to expand its territory west of the Salween.83
While the Myanmar military controls Kengtung and other towns and main roads in trans-Salween Shan State, its grip is weaker in the hinterland. The same is true of the Restoration Council of Shan State, which has mostly retreated to its base areas. Border Guard Forces allied with the Myanmar military have a powerful presence in the Kokang Self-Administered Zone and the town of Tachileik, but they are focused on running illicit businesses rather than challenging the UWSA.84
Weaker state institutions and a curtailed Myanmar military posture in Trans-Salween have also made criminal activity easier and thereby boosted the illicit economy. The drug trade, particularly in opium, has thrived since the coup, and large-scale methamphetamine production has migrated from northern Shan State to the areas around Tachileik (controlled by the Lahu BGF1009) and Monghsat (controlled by the UWSA).85 In addition, scam operations and online gambling have relocated from the Golden Triangle SEZ in Laos to Tachileik and other parts of Trans-Salween and Kayin State (see Section III.B above). While swathes of Myanmar are in the midst of violent conflict, and economic conditions for most people are extremely difficult, Tachileik is a boomtown, with casinos, nightclubs and video karaoke (“KTV”) establishments doing a roaring business.86
The coup also appears to have resulted in an increase in funds flowing from groups in the Trans-Salween into the broader Myanmar economy.87 Many assets and businesses have declined in value following the coup, even as these groups have gained purchasing power, due to the sharp devaluation of the Myanmar kyat (most illicit profits are in foreign currency).88 In addition to Mandalay and Yangon, the northern Shan State capital Lashio has seen a wave of new property-related investment, with Wa and Kokang companies building hotels, condominiums and even a casino, something that the authorities would likely not have allowed before the coup.89 Myanmar has long had a poor record on seizing the proceeds of organised crime and on combating money laundering. Its prospects of improving this performance evaporated after the coup, which contributed to its blacklisting by the Financial Action Task Force in October 2022.90
V.
An Unmet Challenge: Geopolitics and the Mekong Sub-Region
A.
A Transnational Challenge
As described above, Myanmar’s trans-Salween Shan State and northern Laos’s Bokeo province have become a contiguous zone of vibrant criminality, much of which is beyond the reach of either state’s authorities. The sheer size of the area’s illicit economies, which dwarf the legal economies of Shan State and northern Laos, means that they have an enormous impact – entrenching corruption, weakening governance institutions and damaging social capital (that is, the networks of trust and cooperation that contribute to a community’s wellbeing).91 The effects ripple well beyond Myanmar and Laos. For example, the majority of victims of trafficking for scam operations are foreign nationals. Narcotics produced in the Golden Triangle are distributed across the region, reaching as far as Australia and Japan.92 Illicit profits also move to be laundered or invested, including in the legal economies of Yangon, Mandalay and Vientiane, as well as farther afield.
Tackling the sub-region’s vast criminality is a daunting task for several reasons. The riparian topography of this zone is part of the challenge. Bisecting the area is the Mekong River, which marks the Myanmar-Lao border. Because of the large volume of legal trade along the river within which contraband can be hidden, and control of several ports by non-state entities, the river serves as an enabler of criminal activity rather than any sort of barrier to it.
The multi-country nature of the criminal zone ... provides jurisdictional hedging opportunities for criminal organisations.
The multi-country nature of the criminal zone spanning Trans-Salween and Bokeo Province creates further difficulties. It provides jurisdictional hedging opportunities for criminal organisations, allowing them to quickly relocate from one country to another in response to threats, such as the recent migration of scam operations from the Golden Triangle SEZ to Tachileik (see Section IV.B above). It also allows criminal organisations to leverage the comparative advantages of the two jurisdictions. For example, the operators of illicit methamphetamine labs prefer to set them up in parts of Trans-Salween that are beyond state control. Precursor chemicals for these labs used to come mainly from China, directly across the border. While Chinese measures have reduced the flow, many are now arriving via Laos, where unlike Trans-Salween there are licit industries with a legitimate need for such chemicals – and hence fewer restrictions.93 The Mekong provides an easy way to get the chemicals undetected.
For these and other reasons, addressing the upper Mekong’s sprawling criminality is a transnational challenge that requires a transnational solution. But any such effort would need to be mounted in a geopolitically sensitive region, where the major state players are either outright competing or seem to feel they gain most by working separately. Progress has therefore been halting at best.
B.
U.S.-China Competition
China and the U.S. have major interests in the upper Mekong but show little appetite for cooperation when it comes to tackling crime. Indeed, they have been increasingly competing for influence over the Mekong sub-region, which both consider vitally important.94 From Washington’s perspective, a powerful and assertive China is increasingly challenging long-term U.S. security interests, including its alliance with Thailand, which has drifted in recent decades with the demise of its anti-communist strategic rationale and Bangkok’s hedging in the face of major- power competition.95 From Beijing’s perspective, Washington continues to meddle too close to its borders, while China believes its efforts to assert itself as the dominant regional country are consistent with its status as a world power. Other Mekong countries report feeling increasing pressure to choose sides between the two superpowers, something that most have resisted doing.96
The Mekong River itself is at the centre of the sub-regional competition, given that it is both a key source of water supply and a strategic transport and trade route. As noted, Beijing has – particularly since the 2011 Naw Kham incident – increased the projection of its economic and security clout down the river, up to Thailand’s border. China has also built eleven dams on its section of the Mekong mainstream. In recent years, other states and think-tanks have accused Beijing of using these to hold back water during droughts and taking other steps that adversely affect downstream countries – including U.S. ally Thailand and U.S. partner Vietnam.97 While there is debate about the extent to which China’s dams contribute to downstream droughts, the lower Mekong countries are quietly concerned that China may use the dams as a source of leverage.98
Competing sub-regional cooperation frameworks are another manifestation of this growing rivalry. As part of the Obama administration’s pivot or “rebalance” to Asia, the U.S. launched the Lower Mekong Initiative in 2009, which became the Mekong-U.S. Partnership in 2020.99 The Partnership emphasises “soft infrastructure” to support lower Mekong countries’ “autonomy, economic independence, good governance and sustainable growth” through programs on development cooperation, transboundary water and natural resources management, non-traditional security, energy and infrastructure.100 The Partnership has broad membership, aiming to keep extra-regional powers engaged in the region.101 While U.S. efforts in the lower Mekong are mainly pitched at capacity building and engaging local institutions, they are also linked to its strategy of securing a “free and open Indo-Pacific”; at the East Asia Summit foreign ministers’ meeting in August 2021, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken called for “a free and open Mekong”.102
In 2016, China launched its own initiative, the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation framework (the Mekong is known as the Lancang in China), at least partly in response to the Lower Mekong Initiative.103 The framework is exclusive, including only China and the five lower Mekong countries.104 Under Beijing’s leadership, Lancang-Mekong Cooperation is an extension of the Belt and Road Initiative. It has emphasised concrete outcomes, launching projects to step up regional connectivity through Chinese investment in hard infrastructure.105 At the same time, observers have noted that the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation serves as Beijing’s “own regional house where it can enjoy almost exclusive influence over other Mekong capitals”.106
Because these competing frameworks are aimed at advancing U.S. and Chinese strategic interests, Washington and Beijing tend to subordinate their development agendas to those larger goals, making them captive to the global rivalry between the superpowers, leading to zero-sum approaches. Thus, for example, the U.S. has criticised the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation for trying to sideline pre-existing U.S.-led initiatives, and China has pushed Mekong countries receiving its aid to accept Beijing’s vision for the region, termed a “community of common destiny”, to the exclusion of other initiatives.107
Some analysts see China-U.S. rivalry in the Mekong sub-region as “driving a wedge between mainland and maritime South East Asia” – since Beijing’s growing economic and diplomatic influence has led some Mekong countries, notably Cambodia and Laos, to rein in their criticism of China when maritime disputes are discussed in regional forums like the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) – and potentially being as consequential as the South China Sea dispute, with “sentiment growing in the region that because ASEAN focused so much on the ‘sea’, it forgot about the ‘land’”.108
Big-power competition is an obstacle to U.S.-China cooperation on issues of shared concern in the region, such as organised crime.
This big-power competition is an obstacle to U.S.-China cooperation on issues of shared concern in the region, such as organised crime. For example, U.S. officials, members of Congress and experts close to the U.S. government are often vocal in criticising China for not doing enough to combat crime, whether it is the export of precursor chemicals used to produce synthetic opioids such as fentanyl that are trafficked to the U.S.; the export of precursor chemicals for the production of heroin and methamphetamine in the Mekong sub-region; or money laundering and other illicit activities by transnational criminal gangs with links to Chinese nationals.109 For its part, China complains – with some justification – that these criticisms fail to acknowledge actions that it is taking to address these issues. It also points out that critics deliberately conflate the Chinese state with criminals who are Chinese nationals or of Chinese ethnicity, as part of an effort to smear China.110
Such competitive dynamics serve to undermine vital cooperation. For example, Thai authorities have established an operations and intelligence centre in northern Thailand, focused on transnational organised crime in the Mekong, inviting a range of international partners to take part in the centre’s work, including Mekong states, the U.S. and other Western countries.111 As a Mekong riparian state, China is eligible to take part, but it has reportedly not done so, due to the prominent involvement of the U.S.112
In another example, on 7 July the Biden administration launched a Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats to “prevent illicit drug manufacturing, detect emerging drug threats, disrupt trafficking, address illicit finance, and respond to public safety and public health impacts”.113 Although mainly aimed at addressing illicit fentanyl trafficking to the U.S., the focus of the initiative was broadened to synthetic drugs more generally, in order to secure the more active support of U.S. allies such as Thailand and the Philippines, whose primary concern is methamphetamine.114 U.S. officials say China has been invited to join, although an expert Crisis Group spoke to suggested that Beijing was unlikely to do so if it saw the forum as a vehicle for criticising China over illicit fentanyl.
The upshot is that the U.S. would be wise to engage in less finger-pointing and ensure that the initiative includes issues important to China, such as ketamine.115 This approach – toning down accusatory rhetoric and working on issues of shared concern – could be adopted more generally to facilitate U.S.-China cooperation on organised crime.
C.
China’s Outsized Influence
China has more influence than any other country in the Golden Triangle. Yet it has a complicated agenda – including the importance it attaches to maintaining good relations with the Myanmar armed groups along its border – that keeps it from doing all it could to rein in transnational crime.
1.
China in the Trans-Salween
China’s own development path was based on the idea that economic growth would create stability, and stability on the border with Myanmar is a key objective for Beijing. Since the collapse of the Chinese-backed communist insurgency in northern Myanmar in 1989, Shan State’s economy has become bound up with that of south-western China.116 As the connections multiply, the area is being pulled further into China’s orbit – due partly to the sheer size of China’s economy but also to a Chinese policy of using economic engagement as a means of achieving strategic goals. Over recent years, apart from a hiatus due to COVID-19, Chinese investment has surged: huge plantations growing everything from watermelons to bananas to rubber have been established to serve the Chinese market and cross-border trade volumes have skyrocketed.117 Transport infrastructure has improved to accommodate the increased flows, which also facilitates illicit trade.118
One of the biggest challenges to tackling transnational crime in the region is the enclaves, in Trans-Salween and elsewhere in Myanmar, controlled by non-state armed groups, who monetise their quasi-autonomy by collaborating with transnational criminal organisations (see Section IV above). China has much greater influence over many of these groups than the Myanmar military does, particularly in the enclaves along its border in Trans-Salween, controlled by the Kokang BGF, the UWSA and the NDAA (Mongla).
Beyond economic relations, Beijing has cultivated political ties with [non-state] armed groups ... giving it significant leverage for limiting armed conflict on its border.
Beyond economic relations, Beijing has cultivated political ties with these armed groups, some of which it also directly or indirectly supplies with weapons, giving it significant leverage for limiting armed conflict on its border. Just in the last few months, Deng Xijun, the Chinese special envoy for Myanmar, has met with these groups twice (in December 2022 and February 2023).119 Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang also made a rare visit to the Myanmar frontier in Yunnan province prior to his May 2023 trip to Naypyitaw, calling for a “clear and stable” border.120
Keeping fighting away from its border through statecraft is a higher priority for Beijing than stamping out crime. When it comes to illicit activities, Beijing’s view – right or wrong – is that economic development tends to promote stability, even when it includes criminal activities that cause it problems.121 Thus, China tends to balance its action toward such criminal activities with its other objectives, including maintaining a peaceful border and influence over armed groups. Nevertheless, it has occasionally demonstrated its coercive capacity when persuasion proved insufficient, for example by closing its border with enclaves controlled by these groups in order to stop the flow of people, goods and services (including electricity and telecommunications) that those territories rely on.
Away from its border, China deploys other methods. In Shwe Kokko, on the Thai border in Kayin State’s Myawaddy township, China has no direct leverage, and so has used more coercive methods to crack down on criminal activities of particular concern, such as online casinos targeting mainland Chinese gamblers and scam operations. Thus, it asked Thai authorities to arrest the zone’s chairman, She Zhijiang, which they did in 2022.122 China has also sent half a dozen police officers on a months-long deployment to a task force in Mae Sot, Thailand, close to Shwe Kokko.123 The task force is targeting scam centres that are detaining scores of Chinese workers as well as those of other nationalities.124 Chinese envoys have also pressed the regime in Naypyitaw to do more to tackle the problem, in coordination with Beijing and Bangkok.125
2.
Beijing, Vientiane and the Golden Triangle SEZ
China also exerts considerable influence over the Golden Triangle SEZ in Laos. Although it is controlled by private commercial entities, the quasi-autonomous regulation of the SEZ, and its Chinese character, mean that it can be exploited by Beijing for intelligence gathering and power projection.126 Beijing also has sway over both the SEZ’s Chinese promoter, Zhao Wei, and the Lao state. While Laos is not a client state of China – the two countries have a history of strained relations in the 1970s and 1980s, and analysts describe Laos as playing off China, Vietnam and Thailand – Beijing does exercise significant clout with its small neighbour, in part because of Laos’s huge public debt to China.127
Still, Laos appears to be a willing partner, having made a deliberate choice in agreeing to the establishment of the Golden Triangle SEZ and its subsequent expansion. One reason may be that Lao elites feel they profit from the arrangement.128 Thus, while the SEZ appears to be an example of “sovereignty for sale”, the Lao authorities may not see it as such.129 Rather, they are likely to view the SEZ as having provided economic benefits to the country and development opportunities to a poor province, lengthening the state’s reach.130
To some extent, this assessment may be correct. At the macro level, investment and foreign visitors flowing into the SEZ have no doubt helped boost Laos’s foreign currency reserves and its ability to service a huge external debt.131 In addition, since the SEZ was launched, Bokeo has gone from an impoverished agrarian frontier province over which Vientiane’s writ hardly extended, to a more prosperous area with modern infrastructure. Indeed, Bokeo has experienced the steepest reductions in poverty of any Lao province since 2013, going from one of the poorest in the country to one of the best-off.132
The reality, however, is that residents of Bokeo province perceive drug use, crime and inequality to have risen. Local people interviewed by Crisis Group acknowledged that the SEZ has brought better infrastructure, jobs and other economic opportunities, but still expressed resentment at the illegal activities they saw taking place in the zone, the growing problem of drug addiction (and more generally the erosion of community cohesion and cultural values) and the very visible economic disparities.133 In the longer term, quasi-autonomous enclaves such as the Golden Triangle SEZ corrode state institutions and the rule of law, with local but also regional consequences.134 For the time being, Laos appears to be discounting these costs because of the gains coming from the arrangement, whereas Beijing is using its leverage over Laos and the SEZ’s operators to deal with its most serious concerns about criminal enterprises, like the scam centres, without losing the benefits that also accrue to it from the zone.
Normally, these issues might attract Washington’s attention, but the U.S. has played its hand cautiously. Although the U.S. has applied sanctions to the Golden Triangle SEZ, Washington has also been mindful of China’s delicate relationship with Laos in deciding how much pressure to apply to Vientiane. Indeed, it is partly due to U.S., Thai and Vietnamese concerns about pushing Laos more firmly into China’s embrace that Washington has opted not to lean too hard on the government – for example, by not extending Treasury sanctions on the Golden Triangle SEZ to cover Lao entities (such as state banks), even though the state is an equity holder in the SEZ.135
VI.
Recommendations
There are no easy solutions to the problem of sophisticated, extremely lucrative criminality in jurisdictions – both state and non-state – with weak enforcement capacity and high susceptibility to corruption or collusion. The sums of money at stake are larger than some of the region’s national economies.136 While it is conceivable that concerted action in a single jurisdiction could achieve progress, the criminal networks involved have shown that they have the capacity to quickly shift operations to another nearby jurisdiction when under threat. A coordinated regional approach with enhanced political leadership is therefore indispensable.
It is clear that taking a narrow security and criminal justice approach to these issues is insufficient, since such methods mainly addresses the problem’s short-term symptoms without tackling the underlying causes in governance, social, economic and political factors. Dealing with transnational crime in this manner can lead to an over-reliance on repressive measures – such as increased surveillance, restrictive border controls and police raids – that are often ineffective. The security-centred approach may be particularly inadequate when countries act unilaterally, thereby hindering international cooperation.
Because the challenge is so multi-dimensional, a wide range of expertise will be required to address it. Multilateral intelligence sharing, joint law enforcement operations and multi-agency collaboration are likely to be more effective than stove-piped efforts. While police action and criminal justice are undoubtedly necessary, policymakers in Mekong countries need to involve other agencies including those with jurisdiction over customs, immigration, finance and trade. In this way, illicit financial flows can be flagged more effectively and money laundering schemes better identified. Coordinated action across jurisdictions can help prevent crime syndicates from engaging in regulatory arbitrage. The difficulty of the problem, and the coordination challenges it entails, require it to be a political priority for countries in the region.
Given the scale of the problem, regional governments need increased support from other countries, particularly the U.S. and China. Unfortunately, the intensity level of big-power rivalry is standing in the way. U.S.-China competition in the Indo-Pacific broadly, and in the Mekong sub-region more narrowly, inhibits cooperation and evidence-based policy approaches, with the two powers focused on outdoing each other rather than collaborating to solve problems. Such zero-sum behaviour may be unavoidable against the current geopolitical backdrop, but it is important to insulate these transnational challenges from the bigger picture as much as possible. So far, there has been a failure on all sides to do so.
The U.S. and China should ideally set aside their geopolitical rivalry when it comes to cooperating in combating transnational crime in the Mekong.
While this scenario may be somewhat aspirational, the U.S. and China should ideally set aside their geopolitical rivalry when it comes to cooperating in combating transnational crime in the Mekong. China could participate in the recently launched U.S. initiative on synthetic drugs. Both countries could also cooperate with Thailand’s operations and intelligence centre on transnational organised crime in the Mekong (see Section V.B above). The two powers could also foster enhanced regional cooperation by focusing on ways in which their respective Mekong cooperation platforms (the Mekong-U.S. partnership and the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation) could support complementary, mutually beneficial initiatives to tackle the underlying governance and socio-economic factors that allow organised crime to flourish. A good first step would be for both sides to share more information about their objectives and activities in the Mekong sub-region, both bilaterally and via their respective cooperation platforms.
For its part, China should adopt a more consistent approach to deterring crime in its neighbourhood, using its influence over regional governments and non-state actors to curtail such activities. So far, it has used this influence only when it has seen its national interests directly and significantly threatened – for example, in recent years pushing the Philippines and Cambodia to crack down on online gambling operations targeting mainland Chinese punters, and in recent months launching a diplomatic and law enforcement attempt to shut down online scam operations in South East Asia that have employed trafficked Chinese workers and targeted mainland Chinese victims.137 At the same time, it has turned a blind eye to much of the criminality in locations controlled by entities and individuals friendly to China, including the Golden Triangle SEZ and UWSA and NDAA enclaves in trans-Salween Shan State (see Sections IV and V.C above).
Finally, while efforts to tackle these criminal activities are essential, it is important to address their human impact. For example, there are thousands of people from various countries being held against their will and suffering often brutal treatment at the hands of scam centre operators in Myanmar, Laos and elsewhere in the region. Raids are often ineffective, as the criminal gangs running these centres receive advance warnings from corrupt officials.138 According to groups helping victims get away, the best means of securing the release of individual detainees is intervention by the person’s embassy in the relevant jurisdiction, once officials are aware of the individual’s plight.139 Countries where these scam centres operate, as well as neighbouring countries where victims may escape to and the victims’ own jurisdictions, should also refrain from charging freed forced labour victims for the crimes they were forced to commit, or for immigration violations, bearing in mind international norms on dealing with “forced criminality”.140
VII.
Conclusion
Myanmar’s Shan State and northern Laos’s Bokeo province have become a single, transnational zone of criminality that is largely beyond the reach of the two countries’ authorities. The Mekong River, which bisects the zone, is also an axis of geopolitical competition, complicating efforts to combat transnational criminal organisations operating in the region. The impact of this rampant illegality is significant. The illicit activities dwarf the legal economies of both Shan State and northern Laos in size. They entrench corruption, weaken governance institutions and deplete social capital. The consequences are felt not just across the region, but around the world.
Regional governments have thus far opted for criminal justice responses, but by focusing on often unilateral efforts, they are failing to address the full breadth of the challenge, much less the underlying governance and socio-economic factors that fuel this growing illicit economy. Given the adaptability of criminal networks, a coordinated regional approach involving intelligence sharing, joint operations and transnational multi-agency should be a top political priority for governments in the region. Ideally, China and the U.S. should support such a regional effort, setting aside their rivalry in order to tackle a phenomenon that has not just regional, but global, implications..."
Source/publisher:
International Crisis Group (Belgium)
Date of publication:
2023-08-18
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-18
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
“One Belt, One Road” initiative, Other Special Economic Zones, Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
2.78 MB (Original version) - 39 pages
more
Description:
"When the Taliban seized Kabul 10 months ago, Abdul Ahad Habibi was Afghanistan’s first secretary at the permanent mission in Geneva looking after its affairs in the World Trade Organization (WTO). Even after the change of guard, the Afghan diplomat with three of his colleagues continued to stay back in the Swiss town, claiming that they were the real representatives of Afghanistan.
While talking to ET, Habibi terms Taliban as “barbarians” who have been on a killing spree, terrorising those who were once part and parcel of former president Ashraf Ghani’s regime. He adds the world including India could have done more, but they will never recognise such rogues.
No wonder that, last month, he formally submitted the names of Afghan delegates who would be participating in the WTO’s 12th Ministerial Conference starting from June 11, arguing that the consensus-based multilateral organisation must not “delete one of its 164 members”. Afghanistan joined the multilateral body only in 2016 as its youngest member, the 164th.
“We are the true representatives of Afghanistan. The WTO too has given us access to various forums. For MC12 in particular, the problem occurred because Taliban also applied to participate in the June 11-15 global event,” Habibi says, adding how the WTO in an e-mail communication, dated June 8, clearly mentioned “you and another authority requested for participation”. “The other authority is the Taliban,” Habibi quips.
In a reply to ET’s query, WTO spokesman Daniel Pruzin confirms that no representative either from Afghanistan or Myanmar is given access to any negotiations at MC12. That means, two of WTO’s 164 member nations are missing from bustling meetings, conference halls and the so-called green room (an informal name of the director-general's conference room) where members scout for a middle ground.
Pruzin explains, “In light of competing claims for representation to the 12th WTO Ministerial Conference received from different Myanmar and Afghanistan parties, the WTO secretariat was not in a position to register or accredit any representative from either member for the 12th WTO Ministerial Conference,” he says, adding that it took into account the ongoing deferral of Myanmar and Afghanistan credentials in the UN General Assembly (UNGA) Credentials Committee, and the practice of other intergovernmental organizations when faced with similar situations of competing representation claims. Myanmar's military junta too is not recognised by the international community.
Habibi, which has been in Geneva since 2019 and is considered well-networked in the WTO, further says he made one last attempt to get into the MC12 as late as on June 13, but he failed to meet the higher ups.
Till Taliban usurped powers in Afghanistan in August 2021, Sayed Rahim Zaiwari was country's ambassador and permanent representative to WTO. But financial hardship forced him and several other diplomats to scout for new jobs. None of the diplomats returned to Afghanistan to work under the Taliban. Zaiwari, for instance, left for the US and managed a full-time job in a UN arm, Habibi informs. While in exile, Habibi now reports to Nasir Andisha, a deputy foreign minister in erstwhile Ghani regime, presently stationed in Geneva.
“We have no income, no privileges. We are somehow managing our finances by taking up odd jobs. We received our regular salary only till June 30, 2021 ( i.e., one and half months before Taliban takeover)”, says Habibi. “Yet we will triumph as the people of Afghanistan won’t accept barbarians for too long”..."
Source/publisher:
The Economic Times
Date of publication:
2022-06-14
Date of entry/update:
2022-06-14
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Language:
more
Description:
"OVERVIEW: According to the observations of Myanmar’s Department of Hydrology and Meteorology (DMH) at 1200 HRS UTC+7, the deep depression (INVEST 91B) over North Andaman Sea and adjoining Southeast Bay of Bengal has moved Northwards and is crossing to Ayeyarwady Region near Haiggyikyun. The deep depression (INVEST 91B) is coded BROWN Stage (storm is currently crossing Myanmar coasts) as per DMH.
INTENSITY: the deep depression (INVEST 91B) has estimated maximum sustained surface winds of 46-56 km/h (25-30 knots) (JTWC).
FORECAST: In the next 24 hours, the deep depression (INVEST 91B) is forecast to likely move Northwards along the Deltaic area near Pathein and reach the Southern Rakhine Coast (DMH). According to JTWC, landfall in Myanmar is imminent, so the window of opportunity for development is closing. Global models generally agree that INVEST 91B will continue to track northward over Myanmar and dissipate. Potential for the development for a significant tropical cyclone is downgraded to MEDIUM.
IMPACTS:
Fairly widespread rain or thundershowers in Naypyitaw, Lower Sagaing, Mandalay, Magway, Bago, Yangon, Ayeyarwady, Taninthayi Regions and Shan, Chin, Rakhine, Kayah, Kayin, Mon States with regionally and isolated heavy falls in some Regions and States during morning of 23 March.
Frequent squalls and rough seas off and along Myanmar coasts with waves reaching 2.74 – 3.96 m.
Strong winds when crossing Ayeyarwady Region near Hainggyikyun, maximum wind speed of INVEST 91B may reach 72.4-80.5 km/h (45-50 mph) in Ayeyarwady Region and 56.3-64.4 km/h (35-40 mph) in Yangon Region.
Storm surge 2.44 – 3.66 m high is possible in estuaries and tributaries at Pathein District, Labutta District, Myaungmya District, Maubin District, Phyarpon District, Ayeyarwady Region.
According to the ASEAN Disaster Monitoring and Response System (DMRS), rainfall on 22 March with maximum intensity up to 100 mm/day occurred in Ayeyawardy Region and Yangon Region.
ADVISORY: According to DMH, due to the deep depression (INVEST 91B), people should prepare for the impacts of rain or thundershowers with strong winds, lightning, possible flash floods especially in small streams and mountain streams, and landslides in the mountainous areas, as well as domestic flights, travellers, vessels and ships off and along the coasts of Myanmar.
PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE: the Department of Disaster Management (DDM) of Myanmar continue to disseminated to those potentially affected relevant information regarding the dangers and potential impacts of the tropical cyclone which is developing in the Bay of Bengal.
The AHA Centre will continue to monitor and issue necessary updates once more information from official sources becomes available..."
Source/publisher:
ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance
Date of publication:
2022-03-22
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-22
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
454.31 KB
more
Description:
"Paris, March 16, 2022 – On January 21, 2022, TotalEnergies announced its decision to withdraw from the Yadana field and from gas transportation company MGTC in Myanmar, both as operator and as shareholder, because the situation in this country no longer allowed TotalEnergies to make a sufficiently positive contribution. Since then, TotalEnergies has initiated a due diligence process to ensure a responsible withdrawal for its stakeholders in Myanmar, particularly its employees and the local communities that have been supported by TotalEnergies for many years through its role as an operator in the MGTC gas pipeline area.
On March 14, 2022, PTTEP International, a subsidiary of the Thai national energy company PTT, confirmed its willingness to take over as operator of Yadana and MGTC and, in line with this decision, to increase its direct stake in Yadana by taking over TotalEnergies’ equity share. Chevron has also decided to take over TotalEnergies’ equity share, thereby increasing its stake in Myanmar. As a reminder, in light of the exceptional situation, TotalEnergies has chosen to withdraw from Myanmar without seeking any financial compensation for its assets.
In addition, PTTEP has expressed its willingness to take on all staff currently employed by the TotalEnergies affiliate in Myanmar. TotalEnergies is working closely with PTTEP to ensure that the transition occurs in a fair and orderly manner. With respect to our employees who have been ensuring the safety and efficiency of operations in Myanmar since January 21, TotalEnergies will help all those who wish to transfer to the new operator and will ensure that they continue to be employed under the same conditions.
At the same time, TotalEnergies will work with PTTEP to ensure that the existing socio-economic development program led by TotalEnergies to support local communities living near the MGTC pipeline will continue after its withdrawal. To this end, TotalEnergies will allocate the resources necessary to a dedicated fund in order to contribute financially to the actions to be carried out by the future operator.
TotalEnergies' withdrawal from Yadana and MGTC will be effective at the latest at the expiry of the 6-month contractual period, i.e. July 20, 2022, giving the Company and PTTEP enough time to ensure the safe and orderly transfer of the operatorship while ensuring a fair transition for our key stakeholders, our employees and local communities where we operate..."
Source/publisher:
TotalEnergies
Date of publication:
2022-03-16
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-16
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Oil and gas, Business and the Military, Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy
Language:
more
Sub-title:
Corporate Accountability Myanmar (CAM) identifies the failures with Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) programs in Myanmar.
Description:
"After 30 years in Myanmar, Total is leaving the Yadana gas project in Tanintharyi region. Throughout the project, Total adopted a corporate social responsibility (CSR) strategy to improve its tarnished reputation associated with human rights violations committed by the Tatmadaw, which had been deployed to protect the project in the early 1990s.
Numerically the results of Total’s CSR program looked impressive, considering the amount of beneficiaries, the number of schools constructed, healthcare improvements, and the amount of money Total spent on it. However, the company failed to acknowledge the shortcomings and failures of its CSR programs that left lasting negative impacts on communities. Through covert interviews with local people in the project areas, we identified three main failures of Total’s CSR efforts: its creation of dependency, a lack of sustainability, and a lack of accountability. While Total’s CSR reports portray a positive narrative of their local impact, our findings depict a different story. Total serves as a case study to show that CSR projects often fail by design, leaving affected communities by the Yadana gas pipeline with grievances and without remedy.
Our methodology
During November 2021, Corporate Accountability Myanmar (CAM) spoke with 16 local people who reside throughout seven villages in the northwest of Ye Phyu Township, Dawei District, Tanintharyi Region where the Yadana Gas pipeline passed through: Kanbauk, Phaungtaw, Daminseik, Ohnbinkwin, Michaunglaung, Zardi, and Kalaingaung. The seven villages are among the 33 villages where Total’s CSR program ran (see Map 1). Among the 16 people interviewed, seven were former Total staff. Two respondents were from the village communication committee (VCC) and the village bank committee. These are committees that were created by Total to support their CSR efforts. The remaining seven respondents are villagers with no official connection to Total’s CSR program village committees. Six respondents are female, 10 are male. We could not travel to the seven affected villages due to security concerns so, instead, we spoke with them on the phone for about one hour per interview. We followed up on any information that needed clarification after transcribing them all. A desk review was conducted on CSR reports and strategies of Total and Chevron, as well as supporting literature on CSR and accountability issues.
The Yadana pipeline is one of three gas pipelines that runs through Tanintharyi region (Map 2). Map 2 shows that the three pipelines, the Yadana pipeline operated by Total, Yetakhon pipeline operated by Petronas and Zawtiga pipeline operated by PTTEP, run parallel passing through the region. As we will explain, some communities were affected by multiple projects at once.
Total’s tarnished reputation
In the early 1990s, Total entered Myanmar to extract gas from the Andaman sea with U.S based Unocal (now sold to Chevron). The Yadana gas field started production in 1998 and its shareholders were: Total (31.24%), Unocal/Chevron (28.26%), Thai state-owned PTT Exploration and Production (25.50%), and Myanmar state-owned Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise (15%). The Pipeline is managed by Mottama Gas Transportation Company (MGTC), consisting of the same shareholders.
Human rights violations associated with the construction of the pipeline infrastructure were well documented by a number of human rights organizations. These include Earth Rights International, International Federation of Human Rights Leagues, Investor Responsibility Research Centre, Mon Information Center, Karen Human Rights group, and Amnesty International. Ethnic armed organizations, like the Karen National Union and the New Mon State Party, have also spoken out against the Yadana pipeline. These organizations criticize the project for the displacement or forced relocation of villagers for pipeline construction, land grabbing, and forced labour. With the arrival of Tatmadaw forces to secure the area, villagers were forced to build barracks for soldiers, clean and maintain the areas around the camps. They had to work as conscripted porters, transport supplies from camp to camp, or carry equipment for the troops during military offensives. Villagers were also asked to contribute funds for military camp construction. Other forms of harassment villagers faced included rape, intimidation, the forcible conscription of youth into the Tatmadaw, the confiscation of civilian vehicles for military activities, and theft of domestic animals.[1] Total and Unocal faced several lawsuits in the US and French courts due to these human rights violations associated with the Yadana project. Unocal settled a lawsuit with fourteen plaintiffs from Myanmar in 2005. After that, Unocal was sold to Chevron. Total also settled a lawsuit out of court.
Total’s CSR program
After construction on the Yadana pipeline began in 1995, Total started its CSR program in 13 villages to improve its tarnished reputation. Total’s CSR activities focused on access to healthcare, education, skills development, and stimulating the local economy’s livestock and agriculture sectors. Total expanded its CSR activities over the years by adding microfinance and access to solar energy. The coverage reached 33 villages in 2012. The main CSR activities took place in the pipeline area directly implemented by Total, in addition to the national projects implemented in partnership with national and international organizations. In 2020, Total stopped its CSR activities due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Total invested US $51.9 million in the CSR program between 1995 and 2019. To protect the environment, since 1998 the CSR program has also played an active role in the Tanintharyi Nature Reserve Project (TNRP), located in the pipeline area. Total’s CSR team was comprised of 49 members, 23 being locals from the area. There were also volunteers, including members of the village communication committee and the village bank committee. These committees liaise between Total’s CSR members and villagers.
According to Total, the company “is committed to Corporate Social Responsibility as a core policy embedded in its operations.” Early on, its CSR projects “focused mainly on infrastructure and public health activities due to the needs of then very remote area where the services provided by the State were very limited.” It said the program gradually changed “towards the sustainable approach and community participation.” Total also declared that regular third-party impact assessments on the projects had been performed by Collaborative Learning and Action (CDA). and Myanmar Marketing, Research, and Development (MMRD). In 2014, a Stakeholder Relationship Management Exercise was done for the first time, and as the result, the “TEPM Stakeholder Holder Engagement Plan” was established and the CSR strategy was adjusted.
CSR results according to Total’s numbers
Total’s CSR reports describe in detail the number of beneficiaries, some of their stories, and improvements in health care and education the company accomplished in the pipeline area. For instance, in Dawei, 45 university students were provided scholarships every year. In Kanbauk, in 2019, Total hosted four interns from Dawei Technological University for the first time. In Yangon, the Yadana Welding Training Center offered the opportunity to acquire skills needed by industries in Myanmar.
When it came to support for healthcare, six doctors paid weekly visits to four health centers to support 71 community health mobilizers and village health workers and provided specific recommendations to their patients. The scope of those activities evolved from curing conditions to care and prevention of non-communicable diseases. Total also supported a program established by Helen Keller International (HKI) to reinforce the existing cataract surgery infrastructure to reduce blindness significantly: a 50% decrease by 2020. Via their microfinance program, in 2019, they supported 1,572 vulnerable individuals, of whom 87% were women. These results may look impressive, but they are outweighed by the negative impact of the Yadana pipeline, and problems caused by Total’s CSR activities themselves. These CSR reports only tell a small part of the story.
Villagers’ grievances towards Total’s CSR program
Despite the benefits accrued through these programs, when we spoke with local people, we found grievances that were unresolved and undisclosed in the CSR reports. The issues revealed during these interviews indicated that the Yadana CSR program was, by design, flawed. In the following sections, we will outline the ways that the Total CSR program failed in relation to its stated aim of empowering communities. We highlight three key findings. First, it creates dependency and lacks sustainability. Second, accountability was not embedded in the program. Third, the program failed to effectively engage with the affected community, and identify issues related to the pipeline project to ensure affected people and communities get remedy.
Creating dependency
Our research demonstrates that villagers became increasingly dependent on Total over the years, as they promised to provide services and infrastructure to villagers. Yet, Total did not fulfill the services that it claimed to provide and shifted its policy in the 2010s without adequately consulting with villagers.
One respondent noted that “since 1996, [the] company provided public services that the government needed to provide and CSR villages relied on the company rather than the government.” This created problems when the company shifted its policy in the late 2010s by moving away from taking on the duties of the government. It no longer engaged in projects like building school infrastructure, roads, and bridges. In Ohnbinkwin Village, one of the villages most affected by the company’s operations, villagers asked Total to improve the village road and rebuild the village entrance bridge, which had been damaged by a natural disaster. The company refused to provide financial assistance for these projects, and villagers protested against the company for not fulfilling their demand.
Villagers also expressed dissatisfaction regarding access to electricity. Villagers said since the 1990s, Total promised electricity for villages in Kanbauk area where the pipeline passed through. While electricity is the responsibility of the government, Total’s false promises aroused grievances. At that time, villages in Kanbauk area relied on private generators that distributed electricity from 6 pm and 9:30 pm and cost each household between MMK 3,000 to MMK 5,000. In 2009, Dawei Development Public Company Ltd began to provide 24-hour electricity to these villages. The electricity was generated by diesel and cost MMK 500 to 800 per unit. In 2017, the NLD government managed to reduce the electricity cost to MMK 200 in Dawei district by giving permission to Petron and Trans Company to generate electricity by using gas turbines, and the government negotiated to buy gas for the gas turbines from the Zawtika pipeline. This showed that false expectations created by the company only aroused the community’s mistrust of the company. By setting unfulfilled expectations and taking on the responsibility of the government, the company left the community dependent on the company for more than ten years. The community felt aggrieved at the company when these expectations were not met. The impact of dependency leads to an unsustainable pathway.
Lack of sustainability
Total’s CSR projects did not meet villagers’ actual needs or current economic realities in Myanmar. Due to mismatches with ground realities, some of its programs did not produce sustainable results. One respondent remarked that villagers see agricultural impacts as the most ineffective consequence of the project. One example is the introduction of new crops that did not match the on-the-ground reality, which ultimately damaged farmers’ incomes. In addition, introducing crops such as oil palm and rubber had a negative environmental impact, even though villagers’ plantations are relatively small compared with commercial oil palm plantations in Tanintharyi. One respondent noted that “although the company’s CSR team engaged with the village community, they put their own priorities first rather than what the community needed.”
For instance, in Thaechaung village, the Yadana CSR team encouraged villagers to clear villagers’ cashew nut orchards and grow oil palm plants. At the time, in the early 2000s, oil palm was backed by the government. The CSR team assumed that the palm oil manufacturing industry would grow and that this change would increase income for farmers. However, ten years later, Myanmar still exports raw palm oil products to Malaysia, where these materials are processed. Myanmar continues to import palm oil. As the result, villagers cleared those oil palm trees and grew rubber instead—a more profitable crop. In this case study, neither the company nor the villagers benefitted from the project. The respondents felt that both the company and villagers wasted their resources over the course of the project. This case shows that the CSR agriculture project led to unsustainable outcomes in terms of both its failure to produce long-term incomes for villagers and in terms of the adverse environmental effects of oil palm cultivation.
Lack of accountability for negative impacts of the pipeline project
Our research highlights three negative impacts of the Yadana pipeline, and the related Tanintharyi Nature Reserve, for which Total could have taken more accountability. Total responded to these negative impacts by introducing more CSR programs, without addressing the negative impacts of the pipeline.
Ineffective community engagement
In 2010, near the southern part of the coastal fishing village of Daminseik, the Yadana gas pipeline appeared on the beach, exposed due to water and wave erosion. To prevent further deterioration, Total built a wall with rocks. The structure was about seven miles tall and a half-mile in length from north-south. After that structure was built, around 2012-13, approximately 40 houses adjacent to the sea including the road were destroyed in a sea bank collapse. Villagers suspected it was due to the new structure Total built. The company refused the accusation and said that they studied the consequences before building the structure, and the collapse was due to climate change. Villagers also stated that they were unaware of consultations conducted before the construction of the structure.
Total’s response was to have their CSR team distribute basic household commodities and foods to affected households. As one respondent noted, “the company did whatever they thought was right without listening to the community.” Not only did Total neglect to consult the community being affected by the structure, they also failed to listen and refused to pay the compensation that villagers demanded after the harm was done.
Land loss and failure to restore livelihoods
Total gave lump sum compensation to villagers who lost their land in the 1990s as a result of the Yadana pipeline project. However, respondents said 90% of villagers who got compensation in Ohnbinkwin village became landless and jobless. Some respondents blamed those villagers for not saving the compensation money they were given. Some said villagers did not know how to manage the large sum of money. Others thought the company should have adopted a long-term plan to help those villagers so that they had some means of income generation.
The practice of giving away money as compensation without following any livelihood restoration plans fall short of international standards. According to the International Finance Corporation, livelihood restoration plans are necessary to ensure people who were dependent on the land for their whole life have the skills and the ability to change livelihoods. Otherwise, the same international standards suggest replacing the lost land with other land of equal value wherever possible to ensure affected villagers’ right to livelihoods is not impacted.
Total only understood their responsibility as being to compensate the villagers who lost their land. They valued this land in strictly financial terms. The company neglected its responsibility to ensure the pipeline project would not negatively impact those villagers whose long-term livelihoods were dependent on the lost land.
Impact on fishing
In villages like Kyaukthayan and Phyunet, where villagers fish by casting nets far out into the sea, issues with the villagers’ fishing nets becoming tangled with the pipelines caused damage to local livelihoods. In this area, the Yadana pipeline (operated by Total) intersects with two other pipelines: the Yetagun pipeline (operated by Petronas) and the Zawtika pipeline (operated by PTTEP) (see Map 2). The nets snagged on parts of the offshore pipeline infrastructures that had aged. Villagers then had to bear the cost of repairing the damage to their nets and mitigating the disruptions to their fishing activity. No pipeline operators took responsibility when complaints were lodged. According to the respondents, during the NLD government, civil society organizations and the media heard villagers’ voices and relevant authorities from the fishery department tried to solve the issue in 2019. However, Covid delayed their field visit.
In another case, villagers along the coast, who had, for generations, relied on fishing for their livelihoods were restricted from fishing during pipeline maintenance that lasted around one to two weeks per year. This led to a reduction in their income. Total, in Chapter 5 of the 2020 Universal Registration, under “non-financial performance: value creation for host regions,” mentions that “in Myanmar, the offshore pre-project baseline study detailed the issues relating to fisheries. It quantifies the potential impact on the entire fishing value chain for each village by category of fishermen and by type of fish caught and processed in the region.” However, on the ground, local respondents did not seem to be aware of this information.
Total and other pipeline operators neglected their responsibility to ensure that their operations did not adversely impact communities’ livelihoods, nor were they held accountable for incurring financial loss in those villages. CSR was designed to veil such negative impact and companies’ responsibilities to respect villagers’ rights to livelihood.
Environmental impacts of conservation projects
Respondents also raised concerns related to the Tanintharyi Natural Reserve (TNR). The TNR covers almost 420,000 acres in Yebyu and Dawei townships, bordering Mon State and Thailand. It is funded by the three pipeline operators in Tanintharyi: Total, operator of the Yadana gas project, Thai PTT Exploration and Production, operator of Zawtika gas project and Malaysian Petronas, operator of Yetagun gas project. The project is managed by the Myanmar government with technical support from the Wildlife Conservation Society.
The conservation area claims to compensate for the impacts of three gas pipelines, the Yadana, Yetagun and Zawtika. Despite that, respondents feel that the money invested in this project is a waste because of illegal logging and gold mining in the reserve area. Total reported that they provided USD 1.8 million to the TNRP during the 2013-2017 period as part of the Yadana CSR program. Respondents lodged a complaint about illegal logging and mining in the area with Total. However, Total responded that they can only provide financial assistance and that villagers have no right to interfere with the project’s activities. Some respondents assumed that the company might not have a say since the area is controlled by the Tatmadaw. Regardless, respondents said they still would like to see the company do something to prevent that issue by, for example, raising it with relevant stakeholders in the project so as to adopt measures to hold responsible parties accountable.
Others have already raised significant issues with the TNR including displacement, loss of livelihood, loss of traditional knowledge, practices and cultures, militarization and increased police presence, land dispossession, loss of landscape, and loss of sense of place due to a lack of consultation with Karen indigenous people in the area. The three pipeline operators did not consider the potential impact of the TNR on indigenous people. Due to a lack of meaningful and effective consultation with indigenous people in the area, the conservation project created negative externalities. As a result, the indigenous people lost forests and lands they had depended on for their livelihood, and their traditional cultures and practices. Troops deployed to the area to protect the conservation zone threatened their sense of security. Pipeline operators neglected these issues and failed to take responsibility for these impacts.
Conclusion
Ten years ago, in 2011, the UN issued its Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs). While reflecting on ten years of the UNGPs, the UN stated that they have shifted the focus from corporate philanthropy to accountability as an essential feature of responsible business. This implies that CSR programs should be an added value after meeting the threshold of ensuring accountability for any human rights issues associated with the project. However, the evidence we collected reveals that the Yadana CSR program produced negative impacts, despite Total’s stated commitments to CSR and responsible business practices.
Total and its partner, Chevron, claims that they are responsible companies––this may seem credible with the first glance at Total’s CSR results. However, our analysis shows that embedding CSR as a core policy without integrating accountability, sustainability, and access to remedy in its operations left affected people and communities with grievances and without remedy. Total failed to diligently identify these issues related to the operations of the Yadana pipeline project and did not address them adequately. They managed to keep their critics at bay by portraying only a positive narrative of their local impact. Our findings and analysis also imply similar issues with other oil operators still operating in Myanmar that have similar reputational issues.
Corporate Accountability Myanmar (CAM) is a group of local researchers formed in 2020 to conduct research on corporate accountability issues in Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
Tea Circle (Myanmar)
Date of publication:
2022-03-10
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-10
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Oil and gas, Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy, Business and the Military
Language:
more
Description:
"Acknowledgements:
To have completed such significant and thorough field research in Myanmar over the course
of an unprecedented transition certainly would not have been possible without support and
help from a great many people, and for that and many other things I am deeply grateful. First,
to my family and friends, who supported me throughout this process. Thanks to Sean Turnell,
my PhD supervisor, whose help and guidance throughout were essential. A number of people
provided useful insights and feedback on various parts of this work at various stages, too
many to name. Thanks also to Ian Holliday and Hong Kong University, whose annual
conference on Myanmar was an immensely useful experience in 2011, and was always a
source of useful feedback on my work. Lastly, thanks is also due to Macquarie University,
whose support for both the PhD and the fieldwork made this thesis possible.
In Myanmar, the list of people who I should acknowledge is long. First among those is Aung
Tun, from Myanmar Egress, who helped me oversee the quantitative business survey in
Myanmar and get permission to use the UMFCCI business list. The survey team, of five
enumerators from Myanmar Egress, was also essential in helping to carry out the survey.
Thanks go to the Union of Myanmar Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry,
who allowed the research team to survey their members for this project. Thanks go to the
over 200 businesses that were generous enough to give their time to talk to myself or one of
the survey team – learning about businesses in Myanmar would not have been possible
without this.
Thanks also go to The Asia Foundation and Myanmar Development Resource Institute –
Center for Economic and Social Development, who funded a separate work on subnational
governance of businesses completed by this author, including a range of fieldwork visits.
This fieldwork was the primary resource used in the February 2014 report, “Subnational
Governments and Business in Myanmar.” This researcher appreciates the support of both The
Asia Foundation and MDRI and their willingness to allow this research to be used in this PhD
with the appropriate acknowledgement. Thanks are also due to Linn Maung Maung, from
MDRI-CESD, who assisted greatly with that fieldwork and was the co-author on the
aforementioned report.
Needless to say there are many others who have influenced this work, through conversations
and writings. Thanks, then, to all those whose names I have neglected but whose influence I
have not..."
Source/publisher:
Jared Bissinger - MA (International Relations, Australian National University)
Date of publication:
2015-00-00
Date of entry/update:
2022-03-02
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Economic History, Business and the Military, Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy, Political, social and economic dimensions of investment in Burma
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
6.3 MB (Original version), 5.9 MB (Reduce version) - 312 pages
more
Description:
"(Singapore/Oslo, 17 January 2022) Telenor Group and Yoma Strategic have entered into an agreement to sell Telenor Group’s 51 percent share of Digital Money Myanmar Limited (“Wave Money”) for USD 53 million to Yoma MFS Holdings Pte. Ltd, a subsidiary of Yoma Strategic.
This subsidiary is to be funded by a consortium of investors led by Yoma Strategic which remains subject to completion and final funding. When the transaction is concluded, Yoma Strategic will become the largest and controlling shareholder of Wave Money, ensuring that the company continue operations and further extend its leading role in Myanmar’s fintech sector.
Wave Money is a leading provider of money transfer and digital payment solutions in Myanmar. The company was launched in November 2016 as a joint venture between Yoma Bank and Telenor Group, after the fintech pioneer was awarded a license to become the first non-bank institution to work under Myanmar’s new Mobile Financial Services Regulation.
In 2020, Wave Money processed a total of USD 8.7 billion in remittance and payments, which represented around 12 percent of Myanmar’s GDP. The company runs a network of more than 45,000 active agents or “Wave Shops” in urban and rural areas across 295 out of the 330 townships nationwide. The business has seen a significant recovery in volumes since June 2021 with the trend expected to continue.
“This acquisition reinforces Yoma Strategic’s desire to build a strong financial and technology ecosystem in the country over the long term. The digitization in the economy, in particular in financial services, has been remarkable for Myanmar. We are pleased that Wave Money has positively transformed the way of life of people in Myanmar, bringing financial inclusion to the mass,” says Melvyn Pun, CEO, Yoma Strategic.
“Telenor is proud to have been part of Wave Money’s journey to empower the people of Myanmar with country-wide access to financial services. We have worked in partnership with Yoma Strategic to ensure that anyone from anywhere can digitally send and receive money, make contactless and secure payments in-stores or online using the market leading mobile Wallet App of Wave Money. We are confident that Yoma have the commitment and vision to take Wave Money forward to the next level of driving financial inclusion”, says Lars Erik Tellmann, Head of Financial Services in Telenor Group.
The agreement between Yoma Strategic and Telenor Group completes the divestment process announced in June 2020. The transaction is subject to various conditions to be completed, among them regulatory approval from the Myanmar Central Bank..."
Source/publisher:
Telenor Group
Date of publication:
2022-01-17
Date of entry/update:
2022-01-18
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Language:
more
Description:
"Myanmar’s ongoing political turmoil and a rapidly-rising third wave of COVID-19 cases are severely impacting an economy that had already been weakened by the pandemic in 2020. The economy is expected to contract around 18 percent in Myanmar’s 2021 Fiscal Year (Oct 2020-Sep 2021), with damaging implications for lives, livelihoods, poverty and future growth, according to the World Bank’s Myanmar Economic Monitor, released today.
An 18 percent contraction, coming on top of weak growth in FY2020, would mean that the country’s economy is around 30 percent smaller than it would have been in the absence of COVID-19 and the military takeover of February 2021. Around 1 million jobs could be lost, and many other workers will experience a decline in their incomes due to reduced hours or wages. The share of Myanmar’s population living in poverty is likely to more than double by the beginning of 2022, compared to 2019 levels.
“The loss of jobs and income and heightened health and food security risks are compounding the welfare challenges faced by the poorest and most vulnerable, including those that were already hit hardest by the pandemic last year,” said Mariam Sherman, World Bank Country Director for Myanmar, Cambodia and Lao PDR.
Economic activity has been hit by reduced mobility and incomes, protests and labor shortages, as well as the ongoing disruption of critical business services, including logistics and telecommunications, and public services such as health and education. Despite bank branch re-openings and several interventions from the Central Bank of Myanmar, physical currency continues to be in short supply and access to banking and payment services remains limited. As of mid-July, the Myanmar kyat had depreciated by around 23 percent against the US dollar since late January, which combined with trade disruptions has led to rapid price increases for some imported products, including fuel. Farmers have been affected by lower wholesale prices for some crops, higher input prices, and limited access to credit.
Taken together, these shocks have weakened consumption, investment, and trade, and disrupted businesses’ operations and the supply of labor and inputs.
“While there were initial signs of stabilization in some areas in May and June, with mobility improving and logistics disruptions easing, overall economic activity remained very weak and a further contraction is likely from July onwards due to the recent surge in COVID-19 cases,” said Kim Alan Edwards, World Bank Senior Economist for Myanmar.
The current third wave of COVID-19 is posing an immediate threat to lives, livelihoods, and the economy, especially given the lack of capacity in the public health system to adequately respond. While testing rates remain limited, extremely high positivity rates among those who have been tested indicate widespread community transmission. Combined with the impact of containment measures and precautionary behavior, this will amplify Myanmar’s economic challenges.
Over the longer term, recent events have the potential to jeopardize much of the development progress that has been made over the past decade. Significant impacts on investment, human capital accumulation, and the environment for doing business are likely to impair prospects for economic growth over the longer term..."
Source/publisher:
The World Bank (Washington, D.C.)
Date of publication:
2021-07-23
Date of entry/update:
2021-07-26
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
World Bank Group - Burma/Myanmar, Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy, COVID-19 (Coronavirus), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
Language:
more
Description:
"Myanmar Economy Expected to Contract by 18 Percent in FY2021: Report..."
Source/publisher:
The World Bank (Washington, D.C.)
Date of publication:
2021-07-26
Date of entry/update:
2021-07-26
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
World Bank Group - Burma/Myanmar, Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy, COVID-19 (Coronavirus), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
254.4 KB
Local URL:
more
Description:
"One hundred days after the coup, the junta has pushed the region’s fastest-growing economy into an economic and humanitarian disaster. The World Bank forecast shows that Myanmar's economy is expected to contract by 10% in 2021, a sharp difference from the previous prediction of 5.9% growth in October 2020. There is a possible banking crisis which leads to cash shortages, limited access to social welfare payments and international remittances. Last week, Myanmar Kyat hit one of its lowest compared to the USD.
The World Food Program also estimates that up to 3.4 million more people, particularly those in urban areas, will face hunger during the next six months. Price rises, hurting the poor and causing shortages of some essentials, including the costs of fuel and medicine.
The junta called to reopen colleges, universities and schools soon but many students and educators are boycotting. As a result, around 13,000 staff had been suspended by May 8. The junta also announced job vacancies for educational positions to replace striking staff.
Across Myanmar, the ordinary citizens have taken up any weapons available from air guns to traditional firearms and homemade bombs and arms have spread in Chin state, Sagaing, Magwe and Mandalay regions. Mindat township in Chin State reported more intensified fights between the civil resistance groups and the Myanmar military while clashes were reported in Myingyan township, Mandalay region and Tamu township, Sagaing region.
According to our information, at least 43 bomb blasts happened across Myanmar in the past week and many of them were in Yangon’s townships. It was reported that two people died and at least 21 people were injured.
Media reported the junta continued to conduct air strikes across the villages in Kachin, Kayin, and Shan states, leading to thousands of people fleeing their villages. The Ethnic Health Organizations (EHOs) called on the international community to provide direct support to the ethnic areas as international aid sent through central Myanmar was unable to reach EHOs. The media also reported that the IDPs in Momauk township, Kachin State are in desperate need for emergency support.
CSOs based in Thai-Myanmar border called authorities to consider measures for refugees on humanitarian principles and make an effort to monitor, assess the situation closely while consistently upholding both national security and humanitarian principles. They also urge Thai authorities to assess the situation comprehensively based on correct information and reliable sources.
A DVB reporter, Min Nyo was sentenced by a military court to three years in prison for his reporting. Three reporters from Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB) and two activists from Myanmar have been arrested in Thailand for illegal entry and face possible deportation. CSOs and foreign correspondents in Thailand urged the Thai authorities not to deport them back to Myanmar.
Thai prime minister and Foreign Minister met with the UN special envoy on Myanmar Christine Schraner Burgener to discuss the situation in Myanmar. The PM said he will not force those fleeing violence back to Myanmar. The National Unity Government also called for foreign countries to introduce and expand sanctions against the overseas relatives of Myanmar’s military council members.
As of May 16, a total of 3,998 people are currently under detention and among 92 are sentenced. 1,679 have been issued arrest warrants. Twenty were sentenced to death and 14 to three years imprisonment.
UEC member U Khin Maung Oo informed that there will be a coordination meeting with all the 91 political parties on 21 May and the main topic to discuss is about the use of the PR system. After the coup, the junta appointed UEC requested political parties to send the proposals on the PR system and some of the major parties such as NLD and SNLD rejected the proposal.
World religious leaders are giving special attention to Myanmar, Pope Francis offered a special mass for the people of Myanmar on Sunday, 16 May 2021..."
Source/publisher:
Asian Network for Free Elections (Bangkok)
Date of publication:
2021-05-18
Date of entry/update:
2021-06-27
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy, WFP (World Food Programme), Human Rights and international relations, National Unity Government (NUG), Burma: Internal displacement/forced migration of several ethnic groups., Humanitarian assistance - emergencies, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
234.43 KB
more
Description:
"Mr. Ralf Wintergerst , Mr. Klaus Josef Lutz and Mr. Christoph Lang,
It was with great appreciation that I noted your press release yesterday in which Giesecke+Devrient announced its decision to suspend all deliveries of raw materials, supplies and system components used in the production of Myanmar Kyat banknotes with immediate effect. I commend Giesecke+Devrient for taking this principled stand in response to ongoing crimes against humanity including the murder of peaceful civilians perpetrated by the illegitimate military junta. The people of Myanmar thank you for your leadership. I believe that actions such as this will deal a significant economic blow to the illegitimate military junta, and in doing so, will bring us one step closer to the junta’s inevitable collapse.
I also hope that the action taken by Giesecke+Devrient yesterday will create a ripple effect, encouraging more companies to take a similarly principled stand in support of the restoration of our people’s democratic rights and fundamental freedoms. I look forward to resuming our cooperation with Giesecke+Devrient when a legitimate civilian government returns to power. Sincerely, U Tin Tun Naing
Acting Minister of Investment and Foreign Economic Relations..."
Source/publisher:
Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH)
Date of entry/update:
2021-05-13
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), Political, social and economic dimensions of investment in Burma, Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
35.22 KB
more
Description:
"ရည်ညွှန်းချက်။ ။ ဂျာမနီနိုင်ငံအခြေစိုက် Giesecke+Devrient ကုမ္ပဏီ၏ ၃၁/၃/၂၀၂၁ ရက်စွဲပါ ကြေညာချက်
၁။ မြန်မာကျပ်ငွေ (ငွေစက္ကူ) ရိုက်နှိပ်ထုတ်ဝေရန် လိုအပ်သည့် ကုန်ကြမ်းပစ္စည်းများ၊ စက်ပစ္စည်းများ တင်ပို့ရောင်းချ ခြင်းအား ရပ်ဆိုင်းထားလိုက်ကြောင်း လူကြီးမင်းတို့ ကုမ္ပဏီမှ တရားဝင်ထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာလိုက်သည့် အတွက် အသိ အမှတ်ပြု ထောက်ခံကြိုဆိုပါသည်။
၂။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင် လတ်တလော ဖြစ်ပွားလျက်ရှိသည့် အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်အုပ်စု၏ အဆင်အခြင်မဲ့လုပ်ရပ်များ၊ ငြိမ်းချမ်း စွာဆန္ဒပြနေသည့် ပြည်သူလူထုအား အကြမ်းဖက်သတ်ဖြတ်နေမှုများအပေါ် လူကြီးမင်းတို့ ကုမ္ပဏီမှ ခိုင်မာ ပြတ်သားစွာ ဆန့်ကျင်ရပ်တည်လျက် အရေးယူဆောင်ရွက်ခဲ့သည့်အတွက် အထူးချီးကျူးလိုပါသည်။
၃။ မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထု အနေဖြင့်လည်း လူကြီးမင်းတို့၏ ရဲဝံ့မှန်ကန်သည့် ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်အပေါ် အလေးအနက် ကျေးဇူး တင် ဝမ်းမြောက်ကြောင်း ပြောကြားလိုပါသည်။
၄။ ထိုကဲ့သို့ တုန့်ပြန်အရေးယူ ဆောင်ရွက်မှုသည် တရားမဝင် အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်အုပ်စု ကျဆုံးရေးအတွက် ထိရောက် သည့် ခြေလှမ်းဖြစ်သည့်အပြင် ကြီးမားသည့် ထိုးနှက်ချက်တစ်ရပ်လည်း ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၅။ လူကြီးမင်းတို့၏ အရေးယူဆောင်ရွက်မှုမှ အစပြု၍ အခြားသော ကုမ္ပဏီများမှလည်း ခိုင်မာပြတ်သားသည့် ရပ်တည် ချက်များဖြင့် မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထု လိုလားတောင့်တနေသည့် ဒီမိုကရေစီ ပြန်လည်ရှင်သန်ဖွံ့ ဖြိုးလာစေရေး၊ အခြေခံ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးများ ပြန်လည်ရရှိရေးတိုက်ပွဲအား အထောက်အပံ့ကောင်းများ ဆောင်ကျဉ်းလာမည်ဟု အပြည့်အဝ ယုံကြည်ပါသည်။
၆။ တရားဝင်အရပ်သား အစိုးရအနေဖြင့် လူကြီးမင်းတို့၏ကုမ္ပဏီနှင့် ဂုဏ်သိက္ခာရှိသော စီးပွားရေး ပူးပေါင်းဆောင် ရွက်မှုအား မကြာခင် ပြန်လည်စတင်နိုင်မည်ဟု ယုံကြည်မျှော်လင့်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH)
Date of publication:
2021-04-01
Date of entry/update:
2021-05-13
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), Political, social and economic dimensions of investment in Burma, Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
293.21 KB
more
Description:
"Protected Areas are important tools for biodiversity conservation and sustainable development. Myanmar possesses 39 protected areas and 21 of these areas are declared as ecotourism sites. The study area, Lawkananda Wildlife Sanctuary is a designated
ecotourism site and is strategically located on the bank of Ayeyarwady River and in Bagan Area. The main objective of the study is to identify and evaluate the economic benefits of study area in term of non-consumptive values. Willingness-to-pay for park’s entrance fee
is analyzed by Contingent Valuation Method. Return-to-Zero Regression method is used to explore the influence characteristics on willingness-to-pay. The Spatial Statistics tools are applied to predict the existence-value of study park. The main findings are (i) the park has consumer surplus for entrance fee, (ii) the most influenced characteristics of visits on willingness-to-pay is Research Purpose, and (iii) the park is situated as the key dominant habitat hot spot. The researcher believes that this contribution will value to various stakeholders.....ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS: Firstly, I am most gratitude to Professor Dr. Khin Naing Oo, Rector of Yangon
University of Economics, and Professor Dr. Tun Aung, Pro-Rector of Yangon University of Economics for their kindly permission to conduct this study and to submit this paper. I am really thankful to Professor Dr. Thida Kyu, Director of Development Studies
Programme, Yangon University of Economics for her keen interest and support to carry out my study. I express my heartfelt thanks to Professor Dr. Ni Lar Myint Htoo, Professor from
Department of Economics, Yangon University of Economics, for her guidance throughout the study. This study could not be undertaken without support and encouragements of my supervisor, Dr. Kalya Kyaing (Consultant – National Specialist on Economics, Asia
Development Bank). Thus, I would like to convey my deepest gratitude to her. Then I would like to extend my sincere thanks to Daw Win Min Than (Retired Lecturer) and Dr. Naw Htee Mue Loe Htoo (Lecturer from Department of Economics, Yangon University of Economics) for their enthusiastic teaching and knowledge sharing
on Environmental and Natural Resource Economics.
I would like to express my special thanks to all professors, associated professors and lecturers for imparting of a great variety of knowledge and concepts of development during the study period of two years under EMDevS Programme. Finally, I would like to
express my thanks to all library staffs from Yangon University of Economics. I also offer my thanks to U Shwe Htay Aung (Warden of Lawkananda Wildlife Sanctuary) and Daw Kay Khine Oo (Assistant Lecturer, Yezin Agriculture University), who helped me to obtain required data and satellite images. I would like to appreciate to
Professor Dr. Win Tint (Retired Pro-Rector of Taungoo University), Professor Dr. Win Maung (Chairman, Myanmar’s Environment Institute) and Professor Dr. Htun Ko (Head of Department of Geography, University of Yangon) who shared their knowledge and
advised me for this study..."
Source/publisher:
Yangon University of Economics
Date of publication:
2017-08-00
Date of entry/update:
2021-05-07
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Economy: general, analytical, statistical (various sources), Economic Development, Sustainable development, Burma's economic relations with ASEAN, Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy, International Trade, Illegal Economy - general, National parks and protected areas, The forests of Burma/Myanmar - General, Fauna of Burma's forests, Forest policy in Burma/Myanmar
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
2.56 MB
more
Topic:
ADB, Amata Corporation, Asian Development Bank, Électricité de France, Coup, EDF, junta, Kirin, MEHL, military regime, Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited, National League for Democracy, NLD, Singapore, Toyota, World Bank
Topic:
ADB, Amata Corporation, Asian Development Bank, Électricité de France, Coup, EDF, junta, Kirin, MEHL, military regime, Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited, National League for Democracy, NLD, Singapore, Toyota, World Bank
Description:
"Before last year’s November election, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank predicted that Myanmar would bounce back strongly from the economic impact of the global COVID-19 pandemic, with the economy set to grow at around 6 percent in 2021.
In the immediate aftermath of the military’s Feb. 1 coup, junta leaders sought to keep the economy on track by presenting themselves as business-friendly and saying that economic policies would remain unchanged during the state of emergency. The junta even appointed some individuals to Myanmar’s key economic ministries who were already well-connected and well-known to the international community.
But now the World Bank’s latest forecast reveals that Myanmar’s economy is in dire jeopardy and is projected to contract by 10 percent this year due to the impact of the military takeover. 80 days after the coup, there are already many signs that the economy is in freefall, with new investment drying up, the withdrawal of existing investment and the halting of key international-backed infrastructure projects, as western countries sanction the military regime.
Western business groups including the United States, United Kingdom, European, Italian and French chambers of commerce rejected the regime’s invitation to meet with its cabinet members in March. Moreover, nearly 50 international companies including Coca-Cola, Telenor and Heineken, signed a joint statement expressing their deep concern over developments in Myanmar.
The impact of the coup has been to reverse the country’s economic reforms and the economic progress made during the last decade. The coup has pushed Myanmar—previously one of the region’s fastest-growing economies – back into dire poverty and left the economy on the brink of collapse. The Irrawaddy looks at what has happened to Myanmar’s economy since the military takeover and how that has impacted people across the country.....Number of new companies slumps: Company registration figures from the government investment agency, the Directorate of Investment and Company Administration (DICA), reveal a huge slump in the number of new companies being registered.
DICA data shows that the number of new registered companies was 1,373 in January, 188 in February and 163 in March. The figures reveal that the number of registered companies has declined nearly 87 percent compared with the same period last year. In 2020, under the National League for Democracy (NLD) government and even with the COVID-19 crisis, the number of new registered companies was 1,415 in January, 1,298 in February and 1,015 in March.....Internet restrictions cripple digital economy and Fintech market: The emerging digital economy and Fintech market collapsed after the military regime introduced large-scale internet restrictions across Myanmar. The internet blackouts have affected everything from mobile money to e-commerce and online food delivery services.
Access to mobile money services including Wave money and KZB pay has been crippled since March, when the regime blocked mobile internet and broadband services. E-commerce business is down by 75 percent, while online food delivery services nationwide are down 80 percent following the coup, according to reports. The result is that thousands of young people are now out of work.....Garment sector in jeopardy: The garment sector has also been paralyzed after the largest foreign brands halted orders over concern at the politically unstable situation, while deadly crackdowns in industrial areas have also forced factories to close down and workers to return to their hometowns.
Myanmar earned between US$4 billion and US$6 billion from cut, make and pack garment exports in 2020 and the industry employed 500,000 people before the coup. Now, over 80 percent of the garment sector has been forced to suspend operations since mid-February.
Labour organizations say that over one-third [200,000] of garment industry workers have lost their jobs since the junta launched deadly crackdowns on anti-coup protesters and imposed martial law in industrial areas.
Since the coup, the sector has also lost major foreign brands including Italy’s Benetton and Swedish Retailer H&M after they decided to pause new orders from Myanmar.
H & M, the world’s second-biggest fashion retailer, has had around 45 direct suppliers in Myanmar for the last seven years. But the company has suspended new orders, citing “practical difficulties and an unpredictable situation”.
Italy’s Benetton Group has also suspended all new orders from its suppliers in Myanmar, citing concerns over the increasing use of deadly violence against pro-democracy supporters.....Thousands of construction workers out of a job: Around 300,000 to 400,000 workers in the construction sector lost their jobs following the coup, according to the Construction Workers Union.
The union said that the political instability since the coup has forced a halt on all major infrastructure projects in Yangon, Myanmar’s commercial capital, including the Korean Industrial complex, the Japan-backed Yangon-Thanlyin Bridge and the extension of the Thilawa Special Economic Zone.....Stock trading at a record low: The value of shares traded on the Yangon Stock Exchange (YSX) in March declined to its lowest level in history following the coup, according to YSX records.
The records reveal that the value of stocks traded on the exchange in March was just 110 million kyats. In the same period last year, the value of stocks traded on the exchange peaked at 1.425 billion Kyats.
The value of stocks traded in February this year also dropped drastically compared with the figures in February 2020. YSX records show that 442 million kyats worth of shares were traded on the exchange in February, compared to 1.48 billion kyats traded in February 2020.....South Korea suspends finance for infrastructure projects: In response to the military coup, the South Korean government has decided to halt financing for Myanmar government infrastructure projects until next year, according to Korean media reports.
Korea’s Ministry of Economy and Finance has temporarily suspended financial support through its Economic Development Cooperation Fund (EDCF) for any new infrastructure projects by the military regime, according to the reports.
The Korean government set up the EDCF to provide support for industrial development and economic stability in developing countries and to promote economic cooperation between Korea and those countries.
The EDCF signed with the ousted NLD government to provide $1 billion worth of loans to Myanmar until 2022 to support industrialization and economic growth through various infrastructure projects. Under the agreement, the Export-Import Bank of Korea also agreed to support a nearly US$63 million loan to help Myanmar build a Korea-Myanmar Industrial Complex.....Banking and cash flow crisis: Myanmar’s banking system has been paralyzed since the coup as hundreds of branches of at least 31 local banks and 13 foreign ones have closed their doors due to staff strikes.
All banking services have been halted in the country except for mobile banking and ATM services. As a result almost all trading companies, especially those engaged in sea-bound trade, have been forced to halt operations, as the banks are unable to issue the documents needed to import and export goods. Companies are also struggling to pay salaries, as banks are not providing payroll services.
Businesses are also suffering from a cash shortage as bank branches have closed down and the regime has ordered limits on cash withdrawals for both individuals and companies.
Moreover, businesses have been constrained by cash shortages for months. Foreign businesses are also suffering from a money shortage as both cash withdrawals from the local bank and importing new funding from abroad has become difficult.
Under the previous government, the review process for new transactions from abroad took only a week. Currently, business people are not allowed to know how the review process works.....Foreign firms to exit: Large foreign firms are under pressure to pull out of any businesses which help bankroll the military regime, Australia’s Woodside Petroleum said it has decided to withdraw its 100-odd workers from an offshore drilling project in Myanmar.
The company said the move is a response to human rights violations following the coup, with Woodside saying that it will keep all business decisions under review until they see the future outlook for Myanmar and that political stability has improved.
The company completed pulling staff and machinery out of Myanmar in March.
South Korean Steel Makers Coated & Color Steel Co Ltd, an affiliate of POSCO, said that a plan is underway to end its joint venture with Myanmar Economic Holdings Public Co Ltd (MEHL), one of the country’s two military-controlled conglomerates.
The company is already discussing a plan to buy MEHL’s 30 percent stake so that it can continue operations as the sole owner. The joint venture company produces sheet metal for residential and factory roofing and made profits of around US$1.7 million in the last year.
The move came after the company came under pressure from human rights group in both Myanmar and Korea to end its ties with military-linked companies in Myanmar.....World Bank forecasts 10 percent slump in growth: Myanmar’s economic growth is set to shrink by 10 percent this financial year as military rule hammers one of the region’s fastest-growing economies, according to the World Bank.
The global financial institution forecast in December that Myanmar’s economy would start to recover from COVID-19 in March. But it said that since the coup Myanmar has been heavily affected by protests, strikes, military action, reductions in mobility and disruption to public services, like banking, logistics and internet access......ADB halts funding for government projects: One of the Myanmar’s biggest development partners, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), has also put on hold funding for Myanmar government development projects ranging from transport and energy, to education and information technology, following the lethal crackdowns on peaceful anti-regime protesters that have killed over 700 civilians.
The ADB said in a statement that it remains “deeply concerned about recent developments in Myanmar, especially the loss of life during civil protests”. The bank stated that the change in the country’s circumstances will have a serious impact on Myanmar’s economic and social development.
Under the latest loans agreement, the ADB approved a US$484 million loan in November 2020 to construct a new expressway connecting Bago Region and Mon State. Both areas lie along Japan’s planned East-West Economic Corridor, a grand infrastructure scheme for the Greater Mekong Subregion.....French energy giant halts hydropower project: French energy giant Électricité de France (EDF) has suspended a hydropower project worth more than US$1.5 billion in Myanmar’s Shan State over human rights concerns, as the military regime continues to use deadly force against anti-coup protesters across the country.
EDF said that it has halted development of the Shweli-3 Project, including the activities of its subcontractors. Led by EDF, the 671 MW project was being jointly developed with Japan’s Marubeni Corporation and the locally owned Myanmar Ayeyar Hinthar Company.
The companies received a Notice to Proceed in 2018 under the NLD government. It was expected to generate 3 billion kWh of electricity annually for the national grid and supply power to more than 8.5 million people nationwide.....Singapore’s businessman leaves: Prominent Singaporean businessman Lim Kaling has pulled out of a joint venture with ties to the Myanmar military-owned conglomerate MEHL.
One week after the military staged their coup and detained State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and President U Win Myint, Lim said that recent events in Myanmar had caused him “grave concern”.
Lim Kaling disposed of his one-third stake in the joint venture that owns RMH Singapore Pte Ltd. MEHL and RMH jointly operate Virginia Tobacco Co. Ltd. (VTCL). RMH owns a 49-percent stake in VTCL, while MEHL owns the remainder. It has been operated as a joint venture since 1993. VTCL has a virtual monopoly on the cigarette market in Myanmar, producing the country’s most popular cigarette brands, Red Ruby and Premium Gold.....Kirin cuts tie with Myanmar Military-owned firm: Five days after the coup, Japanese beverage giant Kirin cut ties with a Myanmar military-owned conglomerate saying it was deeply concerned by the recent actions of the military, which are against their standards and human rights policy.
Kirin Holdings Co. Ltd. announced that it would end its joint-venture partnership with MEHL. Kirin held 51 percent of both the Myanmar Brewery and Mandalay Brewery, with MEHL holding the rest.....World Bank halts payments to Myanmar: The World Bank, one of Myanmar’s largest development partners, announced that it had put a hold on disbursements for its existing development operations in the country in sectors ranging from electricity and education to technical assistance, following the military takeover.
The bank is involved in at least 24 ongoing projects in Myanmar worth billions of dollars, according to the World Bank’s development project list.....Singapore: wait and see: Singaporean conglomerate Sembcorp has decided to halt a plan to develop an industrial park in Yangon’s Hlegu Township.
Sembcorp President and CEO Wong Kim Yin told media that his company would wait until the political situation stabilizes, saying the company also needs to see how its customers respond as well.
The Myanmar-Singapore (Hlegu) Industrial Park is expected to be built on 436 hectares of land in Hlegu Township at an estimated cost of $230 million. The project received approval from the Myanmar Investment Commission in 2020.
The project was a joint development by Sembcorp CSSD Myanmar Co.—a subsidiary of Sembcorp Industries — and Myanmar’s Pahtama Group and Myanmar Agribusiness Public Corp. The development was a priority project under the ousted NLD government’s plan to secure foreign investment to mitigate the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on Myanmar’s economy......Toyota postpones plan to open new plant: Toyota, the world’s biggest car manufacturer, has delayed opening a vehicle production plant in the Thilawa Special Economic Zone (SEZ) on the outskirts of Yangon, with the company citing concerns over political instability following the coup.
Toyota Myanmar announced its plan to build the US$52.6 million production plant in 2019, and said it anticipated employing more than 150 staff in Myanmar. The company said in 2019 that it expected the plant to produce around 2,500 Hilux trucks annually, starting from 2021.....US$1 billion industrial complex halted: One day after the coup, work on a US$1 billion industrial hub project backed by the Amata Corporation, Thailand’s largest industrial estate developer, was suspended due to possible sanctions by Western countries.
Envisioned as an industrial complex on 2,000 acres of land near Laydaunkkan Village in East Dagon and South Dagon townships in Yangon, the project was one of a number launched by the former NLD government to mitigate the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on Myanmar’s economy.
The NLD government inaugurated the project in late December last year and it was expected to create 33,000 jobs, attract foreign investment and boost the Yangon Region’s industrial output and exports..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2021-04-22
Date of entry/update:
2021-04-22
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy, Banking, Business and the Military, The Burmese military's role in the economy, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
more
Sub-title:
Western trade groups spurn coup regime's advances but nation's top business organization continues to engage the generals
Description:
"Myanmar businesses are divided over how to respond to the new regime, even as the junta’s attempts to win legitimacy among investors have been rebuffed by major foreign business groups.
Western business groups, namely European, American, British, Italian and French chambers of commerce, rejected the regime’s invitation to meet on March 4. At the same time, major Asian business groups such as the Thai, Hong Kong, Japanese and Chinese have not released any statements of concern since the coup and lethal crackdown on protesters.
The Western chambers’ refusal comes at a time of widespread and rising condemnation against the regime’s brutal crackdown on unarmed protesting civilians, with more than 50 killed as of March 3, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP), an independent monitoring group.
Australian business group AustCham Myanmar said on Wednesday it has “serious concern over the increasing use of violence against the people campaigning for a return to democratic Government in Myanmar.”
Yangon, the commercial capital, saw at least up to 32 killed in North Okkalapa township alone, in the eastern part, with witnesses saying they heard what sounded like continuous machine gun fire. Photos in Mandalay have shown fighter jets in the sky, which many citizens assume is to strike fear. Live ammunition was used in seven cities on Wednesday including Yangon, Mandalay, Myingyan, Mawlamyine, Monywa, Pyin Oo Lwin and Hpakant, said AAPP.
“Myanmar will never be the same again,” Cardinal Charles Bo, the Catholic Church’s highest prelate in Myanmar, tweeted in response to the Wednesday massacre..."
Source/publisher:
"Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
Date of publication:
2021-03-06
Date of entry/update:
2021-03-07
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Freedom of opinion and expression: - the situation in Burma/Myanmar - reports, analyses, recommendations, Political role of the Tatmadaw, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy, Business and the Military
Language:
more
Sub-title:
Even Before Coup, Companies Should Have Cut Ties to Armed Forces
Description:
"The military coup in Myanmar this week should sound alarm bells in corporate boardrooms around the world. Since Myanmar’s transition from decades of military dictatorship to a civilian government began in 2011, transnational businesses have cautiously reentered the country. But the coup highlights the question company directors should already have been asking: “Is our company directly or indirectly funding the Myanmar military?”
The human rights, reputational, and legal risks of continuing to do business with Myanmar’s military are immense. The Tatmadaw, as it is known, has been accused of genocide and crimes against humanity against Rohingya Muslims, and war crimes against other ethnic minorities. And now it has overthrown a civilian government that won a massive re- election, with over 80 percent of the vote, in November 2020. Companies doing business in Myanmar have long had access to credible information about the military’s grave abuses and corruption. A 2019 United Nations report found that companies with commercial ties to the Myanmar’s military and its conglomerates, Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited (MEHL) and Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC), “are contributing to supporting the Tatmadaw’s financial capacity.” The report said these companies are at “high risk of contributing to or being linked to, violations of human rights law and international humanitarian law.” The UN team’s recommendation was clear: companies operating or investing in Myanmar should not do business with “the security forces of Myanmar, in particular the Tatmadaw, or any enterprise owned or controlled by them, including subsidiaries, or their individual members.”..."
Source/publisher:
"Human Rights Watch" (USA)
Date of publication:
2021-02-03
Date of entry/update:
2021-02-05
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy, Political role of the Tatmadaw, The 2020 General Elections in Burma/Myanmar, Burma/Myanmar's Foreign relations, general, Human Rights Watch Reports on Burma/Myanmar
Language:
more
Description:
"Bangladesh is interested in joining the India-Myanmar-Thailand (IMT) trilateral highway to enhance connectivity with Southeast Asia, which would open a new chapter in trans-border corridors in the Indo-Pacific region.
Dhaka’s expressed interest to join IMT — at a time when Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar or BCIM has made scant progress — during prime minister Sheikh Hasina’s virtual summit with her counterpart Narendra Modi on Thursday. She sought India’s support to enable Bangladesh to join the initiative, according to the joint statement issued at the end of the summit. The IMT highways is aimed at opening land gate to ASEAN and boost trade and commerce. India has also proposed extending the highway to Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. India has undertaken two projects in Myanmar under the 1,360-km IMT project that starts from Moreh in India to Mae Sot in Thailand through Myanmar. These are construction of the 120-km Kalewa-Yagyi road sections to highway standard and upgrading of 69 bridges and approach roads on the Tamu-Kyigone-Kalewa road section of 150 km. Bangladesh also wants trucks with its goods to enter Bhutan and Nepal through India and Hasina sought cooperation from Modi in this regard at the summit in what would promote Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal (BBIN) road connectivity as part of sub-regional cooperation, ET has learnt. At the summit Bangladesh and India discussed ways of cooperation to expand transportation solutions within BBIN region, apart from cooperation in cross-border energy trade.
To facilitate better connectivity and simplify movement of passengers and goods between both the countries, both leaders agreed to an early operationalization of the BBIN Motor Vehicles Agreement through expeditious signing of the Enabling MoU for Bangladesh, India and Nepal to commence the movement of goods and passengers, with provision for Bhutan to join at a later date..."
Source/publisher:
"The Economic Times" (India)
Date of publication:
2020-12-18
Date of entry/update:
2021-01-03
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy, Burma's economic relations with India, Burma's economic relations with Thailand, Bangladesh-Burma relations, India-Burma relations, Thailand-Burma relations
Language:
more
Description:
"To date, ASEAN has over 200,000 coronavirus infections across all 10 member states, with more than 6,000 fatalities as a result of the deadly disease. Although other regions such as Europe and the Americas have recorded more COVID-19 cases compared to Southeast Asia – the pandemic has still managed to ravage livelihoods and local industries in the latter region.
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has projected that growth in Southeast Asia will decelerate from 4.4 percent in 2019 to one percent this year before rebounding to 4.7 percent in 2021.
“The evolution of the global pandemic – and thus the outlook for the global and regional economy –is highly uncertain. Growth could turn out lower, and the recovery slower, than we are currently forecasting,” said Yasuyuki Sawada, ADB’s chief economist. For ASEAN member state Myanmar, despite the low reported cases of COVID-19 in the country which stands at 343 infections as of 23 July – the social and economic effects could be severe, noted the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
An IMF publication titled, ‘Six Charts on Myanmar's Economy in the Time of COVID-19’ states that the pandemic shock has affected the economy’s key growth engines. It explains that the kingdom has seen a sharp decline in exports, remittances, and tourist arrivals. At the same time, domestic economic activity has been constrained by strict measures to curb the virus. According to a recent report by the Myanmar Trade Promotion Organisation (MTPO), the tourism industry has been hit hardest by the pandemic, followed by the garment industry. Other sectors that have been feeling the pinch include the rubber export and manufacturing sectors.
Local media in the country reported that nearly one third of all companies in the country have temporarily shuttered due to the pandemic..."
Source/publisher:
"The ASEAN Post" (Malaysia)
Date of publication:
2020-07-24
Date of entry/update:
2020-07-24
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
COVID-19 (Coronavirus), Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy, ASEAN-Burma relations
Language:
more
Sub-title:
COVID-19 does not appear to have had a significant impact on monsoon planting for paddy despite some farmers facing financial difficulties, and the agriculture sector is expected to keep growing amid a slump in other parts of the economy.
Description:
"Myanmar’s most important crop – grown on roughly half of its arable land – appears to have emerged relatively unscathed from the coronavirus pandemic.
When the country’s first COVID-19 cases were reported on March 23, harvesting had begun for the summer rice crop; three months later, as efforts continue to keep the coronavirus under control, planting has begun for the monsoon crop.
Overall, the agriculture sector, which accounts for 22 percent of GDP and 38pc of employment, had been “resilient”, the World Bank said in its June Myanmar Economic Monitor, and is expected to grow by 0.7pc for the year.
This is mostly due to strong production of crops, such as rice, and beans and pulses, with COVID-19 inflicting a much greater impact on export-oriented agriculture sub-sectors, such as livestock, fisheries and fruit production.
A World Bank survey in May found that while agriculture firms were the most likely to have experienced cash-flow shortages and reduced access to credit due to COVID-19, just 6pc of them were forced to close. In contrast, 12pc of manufacturers, 15pc of retail and wholesale businesses and 39pc of service companies shut their doors.
But the impact of the virus remains a threat, says the Myanmar Rice Federation. It has asked the government to take a range of measures to strengthen the sector during the pandemic and beyond, including mitigating the impacts of climate change, particularly flooding, along with increasing financial and technical support. The government should ensure farmers have greater access to low-interest loans for buying inputs in order to ensure higher yields, the MRF said. It also urged greater flexibility on repayments so that farmers can wait a few months after the harvest, when overseas and domestic demand usually rises, rather than sell their crop at the same time to pay off debts, which pushes prices down.
“We want to work with the government to create a mechanism to [maintain price stability]; the situation requires smart intervention from the government,” said MRF chair U Ye Min Aung..."
Source/publisher:
"Frontier Myanmar" (Myanmar)
Date of publication:
2020-07-23
Date of entry/update:
2020-07-23
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Agriculture in Burma/Myanmar: general and research, Rice, Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy
Language:
more
Description:
"Pakistan-China Institute (PCI) convened the first ever Non-Governmental Online Conference on Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), of which CPEC is the flagship, which was attended by 8 countries. The conference, which lasted for 2 hours and 45 minutes, had participants from Pakistan, China, Nepal, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Kazakhstan, Myanmar & Sri Lanka. There was a wide-ranging discussion on different dimensions of BRI, which was followed by a 35-minute Question and Answer session.
Five key consensus areas regarding BRI emerged from the conference: The coronavirus crisis has underlined the need for global interdependence to forge closer cooperation to tackle common challenges; BRI is the way forward as it promotes regional connectivity, based on the principles of equality, reciprocity and mutual benefit while acclaiming CPEC as "BRI success story".
The propaganda about the so called 'Debt trap' was rejected by participants as in the case of Pakistan and Sri Lanka, total debt from China is a very small percentage of what is owed to other countries or multilateral institutions; 'New Cold War', demonization or stigmatizing any country using COVID19 as a political weapon or targeting BRI on geopolitical grounds were rejected; The India factor was recognized by countries like Nepal and Sri Lanka as they are neighbors and they would like good relations with both China and India and it was made clear that neither BRI is a military alliance nor it is directed either against India or against any Western country.
Senator Mushahid Hussain, in his opening remarks, termed BRI as the biggest and most significant Diplomatic and Developmental initiative of 21st century. He said that CPEC, as flagship of BRI, is already a success story and has entered its the second phase successfully. Energy and infrastructure projects have been completed on schedule, 75,000 Pakistanis have got jobs in BRI projects and 28,000 Pakistani students are studying in China.
He also thanked China for support to Pakistan during COVID-19 crisis and he mentioned the two resolutions passed by the Pakistan Senate, February 12 and May 14, in which the parliament of Pakistan appreciated China's role and support. Afghanistan’s former Ambassador to Pakistan and China, Janan Musazai, gave a specific five-point plan for Afghanistan’s role in BRI and he referred to CPEC as well, since Afghanistan can be a land bridge for connectivity and he said that China could facilitate to provide market access for BRI countries..."
Source/publisher:
"china.org.cn" (China)
Date of publication:
2020-07-10
Date of entry/update:
2020-07-10
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
“One Belt, One Road” initiative, Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy, COVID-19 (Coronavirus)
Language:
more
Sub-title:
A frontier economy, Myanmar experienced rapid growth as it opened up in the 2000s, with GDP growth rates among the highest in Asia. However, growth had already been slowing when the coronavirus shock hit in early 2020.
Description:
"Although officially recorded cases of COVID-19 in Myanmar remain low, the social and economic effects could be significant, given the externally IMF emergency financing of $356.5 million, along with external financing, the Debt Service Suspension Initiative, and continued capacity development, are alleviating the impact of COVID-19, while establishing the roots for more sustained and inclusive growth. The government’s COVID-19 Economic Relief Plan aims at minimizing the pandemic’s impact by stimulating the economy and boosting spending on health and social safety nets.
Six charts tell the story of Myanmar’s economy during the early months of the COVID-19 crisis:oriented economy, uneven social safety nets, and the fragile healthcare system. Compared to other countries in the region, Myanmar’s COVID-19 outbreak appears to be limited. The country reports about 300 confirmed cases despite its large population of 54 million, possibly reflecting limited testing capacity. The authorities implemented strict containment measures well before the case count picked up, including travel restrictions, closure of land borders, and bans on mass public gatherings, helping to flatten the curve of infections. The COVID-19 shock has affected the economy’s key growth engines. Myanmar has seen a sharp decline in exports, remittances, and tourist arrivals. At the same time, domestic economic activity has been constrained by measures taken to control the spread of the virus. Such disruptions have affected households and businesses, including in agriculture, which comprises a fifth of the economy and over half of employment. Furthermore, nearly four out of five workers in Myanmar are employed in the informal sector, with limited access to social safety nets. There is high uncertainty around growth in the short term, also reflecting the intensity and duration of containment measures, and the evolution of external conditions..."
Source/publisher:
"International Monetary Fund" (IMF) (Washington, D.C)
Date of publication:
2020-07-07
Date of entry/update:
2020-07-09
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy, Burma's economic relations with the region, Burma/Myanmar's Foreign relations, general
Language:
more
Sub-title:
The Ministry of Commerce will support banks in the provision of loans for planting Myanmar corn, demand for which is expected to rise in the coming years. The agreement was made between the ministry and the newly formed Myanmar Corn Industrial Association on June 26.
Description:
"“As we expect demand to be very high, the Ministry of Commerce accepted our request for it to provide government loans or connect us to the banks so that we can obtain the funding we need to expand the plantations,” said U Min Khang chair of the association.
There are about 1.9 million acres of corn plantations across the Ayeyarwady Region, Nay Pyi Taw, Shan State, Kayah State and Kayin State, yielding more than 3 million tonnes a year, according to last year’s data.
Domestic consumption is less than half of what is produced, with the other half of the crop exported mainly to Thailand. Myanmar is currently also the second largest exporter of corn in Asean.
Since the start of the 2019-20 fiscal year, demand for Myanmar corn has risen, particularly from Thailand, where demand for corn as industrial and animal feed is increasing.
According to the Ministry of Commerce, the country has already exported around 1.8 million tonnes of corn this year, which is about a million tonnes more compared to the same period last year. More than 60 percent was sold to Thailand..."
Source/publisher:
"Myanmar Times" (Myanmar)
Date of publication:
2020-06-28
Date of entry/update:
2020-06-29
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Language:
more
Description:
"The latest edition of the half yearly Myanmar Economic Monitor- June 2020 of the World Bank has devoted its analysis to the economic impact of COVID-19 and how to recover from the disruptions caused by the pandemic and associated measures for the prevention of its spread.
“The pandemic and associated containment measures are undermining aggregate demand, disrupting value chains, and reducing the labor supply, following strong activity in the first 5 months of the year”. The crisis has had an especially negative effect on wholesale and retail trade, tourism-related services, manufacturing and construction. Sectors like agriculture and telecommunications appear to have demonstrated resilience compared to others.
The pandemic has impacted the firms of all sectors (agriculture, industry and services) severely as per the survey conducted in May 2020 by the World Bank. About 16 percent of the firms it has surveyed reported closing their operations for an average of eight weeks due to the Covid-19 pandemic, but this figure rose to 39 percent among service sector firms. By contrast, just 12 percent of manufacturers and 6 percent of agricultural firms reported temporary closures. 89 percent of manufacturers reported a reduction in sales, compared to 75 percent of agricultural firms. Adaptation of firms to changing scenario in terms of production, sale and marketing strategies appear to be slow. And very few firms have applied to seek support from the government announced package of relief measures. This reflects the need for adopting an outreach strategy to support the firms in a more systematic way..."
Source/publisher:
"Mizzima" (Myanmar)
Date of publication:
2020-06-28
Date of entry/update:
2020-06-28
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Language:
more
Description:
"Syndicate Market Research has recently added the latest report, titled “Myanmar Automobile Market by Product Type (Alkaline Batteries, Acid Battery, Neutral Batteries, Organic Battery Electrolyte Solution), by Application (Passenger Vehicle, Commercial Vehicle) – Overall In-depth Analysis, Global Market Share, Top Trends, Professional & Technical Industry Insights 2020 – 2026“, which examines the overview of the various factors enabling growth and trends in the global industry. The global Myanmar Automobile market report portrays an in-depth analysis of the global Myanmar Automobile Market that assesses the market size and market estimation for the predicted period. The leading performers of the Myanmar Automobile Market are profiled in the report along with the systematic details referring to their revenue, segmentation, earlier improvements, product segmentation, and a complete outline of their businesses. This report covers the impact of the corona-virus on leading companies in the Myanmar Automobile sector and also gives a comprehensive study of Covid-19 impact analysis of the market
This report includes market status and forecast of global and major regions, with the introduction of vendors, regions, product types and end industries; and this report counts product types and end industries in global and major regions..."
Source/publisher:
"Cole of Duty"
Date of publication:
2020-06-27
Date of entry/update:
2020-06-27
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Language:
more
Sub-title:
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has approved a total of $356.5 million support for Myanmar as the country suffers from an ailing economy despite its low virus transmission cases.
Description:
"In a statement released on its website on Saturday, June 27, the IMF’s executive board said that it approved a disbursement of $118.8 million under the Rapid Credit Facility (RCF) and a purchase of $237.7 million under the Rapid Financing Instrument (RFI) for Myanmar.
“This will help meet the urgent balance-of-payments and fiscal needs arising from the COVID-19 (coronavirus disease-2019) pandemic, support the government’s plans to boost spending especially on health and social safety nets,” the IMF said.
Myanmar has so far recorded 293 confirmed cases, of which 215 have recovered while six others died. While the country was one of the countries in the Southeast Asian region with the lowest number of cases, its economy was severely affected by slow domestic demand that has disrupted households and businesses, including the agriculture sector which comprises a fifth of its economy and over half of employment.
“Domestic demand has weakened as the necessary measures to control a domestic outbreak have affected economic activities. As revenues fall and expenditures rise, the fiscal deficit is increasing, putting pressure on funding and public debt,” the IMF said.
“The external position is deteriorating due to the collapse in global demand for garments and gas, weak tourism and remittance inflows and lower foreign direct investment,” it added..."
Source/publisher:
"ASEAN Economist"
Date of publication:
2020-06-27
Date of entry/update:
2020-06-27
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy, Burma/Myanmar's Foreign relations, general
Language:
more
Description:
"Myanmar has attracted over 4.4 billion U.S. dollars of foreign investments as of third quarter of this fiscal year (FY) 2019-2020 and is expected to reach its target, state-run media reported on Saturday.
Myanmar set its target of foreign direct investments (FDI) to 5.8 billion U.S. dollars in present FY 2019-2020 which lasts from October, 2019 to September 2020.
"We only need 1.4 billion U.S. dollars to meet our target. We need to make sure to follow our guidelines such as less economic impact by the COVID-19 pandemic, encouragement through COVID-19 Economic Relief Plan, giving priority to creating job opportunities and paying attention by the government over the recovery of the economic impact by the pandemic," Director-General U Thant Sin Lwin of the Directorate of Investment and Company Administration (DICA) was quoted as saying.
During the COVID-19 period, some existing investment businesses have increased capital amount of investment while new investments are flowing into the country, he said.
During the first nine months of this FY, power sector attracted most foreign investments, accounting for 25 percent of total inward investments..."
Source/publisher:
"Xinhua" (China)
Date of publication:
2020-06-27
Date of entry/update:
2020-06-27
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy, Political, social and economic dimensions of investment in Burma, COVID-19 (Coronavirus)
Language:
more
Description:
" The Myanmar government has provided 31.8 billion kyats (22 million U.S. dollars) loans to the most vulnerable business affected by the COVID-19, an official from the Ministry of Planning, Finance and Industry told a press briefing on Wednesday.
"Under the country's COVID-19 Economic Relief Plan, the loans had been given out as of June 18 to 832 vulnerable businesses in the garment manufacturing sector, hotels and tourism as well as small and medium enterprises (SMEs) at 1 percent interest rate with one-year period," said Maung Maung Win, deputy minister of Planning, Finance and Industry.
Meanwhile, the government will also provide 50,000 kyats (35.7 U.S. dollars) loans per acre as COVID-19 Special Relief loans to the local farmers at 5 percent annual interest rate starting this month to mitigate the impact of the pandemic on the agricultural sector, he said.
It was learnt that a total of 600 billion kyats (428 million U.S. dollars) special relief loans will be given out for 12 million acres until September along with annual monsoon agricultural loans to the farmers.
Myanmar has reported 293 confirmed cases of COVID-19 with six deaths as of Wednesday, according to the Ministry of Health and Sports..."
Source/publisher:
"Xinhua" (China)
Date of publication:
2020-06-24
Date of entry/update:
2020-06-25
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Language:
more
Sub-title:
Revenue from Myanmar's fruit exports have reached US$370 million in the current fiscal year, which is on par with revenues generated over the same period in the previous fiscal year despite COVID-19, according to the Myanmar Fruit, Flower and Vegetable Producer and Exporter Association.
Description:
"This was due to higher demand from China for good quality Myanmar bananas produced from local tissue culture, which offset a decline in exports of other fruits like watermelons and cucumbers.
In fact, if it wasn't for COVID-19, Myanmar could have enjoyed a net increase in fruit export revenues this year if proper storage facilities had been available at the Myanmar-China border to store fruits while traders waited to clear longer procedures and other delays due to the pandemic. "Our fruit export income would have increased by a lot more if we had a better system to manage wastage at the border. Currently, about 80 percent of locally produced fruit has gone to waste as a result of disruptions from COVID-19," said Daw Sandar Myo, secretary of the association.
Fruits are mainly exported to China at the border. Before COVID-19, watermelons and cucumbers were the main fruit exports and revenue had been on the rise each year due to increasing demand.
This year, the decline in exports of watermelons and cucumbers was offset by a surge in demand for bananas at the start of the year, said U Khin Maung Lwin, assistant secretary of the Ministry of Commerce..."
Source/publisher:
"Myanmar Times" (Myanmar)
Date of publication:
2020-06-23
Date of entry/update:
2020-06-24
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy, International Trade, COVID-19 (Coronavirus)
Language:
more
Description:
"Sign up here for our daily coronavirus newsletter on what you need to know, and subscribe to our Covid-19 podcast for the latest news and analysis.
Myanmar’s de facto leader Aung San Suu Kyi said the most severe economic impact from the novel coronavirus outbreak is expected in the final four months of this year.
“We’d like to reassure the people that we’re well prepared to address the impacts,” Suu Kyi said in a panel discussion via video conference on Tuesday. “We believe we’ll be able to overcome them through inclusive cooperation.”
The Southeast Asian nation is due to receive $1.25 billion in emergency loans from international organizations, Thaung Tun, investment and foreign economic relations minister, said in the same panel..."
Source/publisher:
"Bloomberg News" (New York)
Date of publication:
2020-06-16
Date of entry/update:
2020-06-20
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Language:
more
Description:
""When the lockdown occurred, we saw very, very quickly that refugees ... lost their jobs," the UNHCR's Gillian Triggs told an online discussion hosted by the Thomson Reuters Foundation on challenges facing refugees in the COVID-19 era.
Half of refugees in Lebanon and Colombia have lost their income source, and almost two thirds of recently settled refugees in the United States may have lost their jobs, panelists said.
The pandemic has also increased xenophobia and discrimination and led to a big rise in evictions, added Triggs, the UNHCR's Assistant High Commissioner for Protection.
She said refugees must be included in national health systems, not just for their own safety but for everyone's. "If one person is sick with COVID, we all are," she added.
Gideon Maltz, executive director of the Tent Partnership for Refugees comprising more than 100 major companies, said some businesses were already taking action to help refugees.
In the Netherlands, electronics giant Philips is supporting an initiative hiring refugees to produce masks from filter material used in its vacuum cleaner bags.
It is producing 150,000 masks a week, Philips said.
"Businesses have a vital role to play," said Maltz. "There's a huge opportunity for all of them to step up."
Prior to COVID, he said companies like IKEA and Starbucks had already made their hiring process more inclusive.
Five countries account for two-thirds of the world's refugees: Syria, Venezuela, Afghanistan, South Sudan and Myanmar. Most refugees seek asylum in a neighbouring country.
Maltz urged governments to use taxes and other incentives to encourage businesses to employ refugees.
Maltz suggested the European Union could give Turkey preferential access for its agricultural products if it helped Syrian refugees to work in the sector..."
Source/publisher:
World Economic Forum (Switzerland)
Date of publication:
2020-06-19
Date of entry/update:
2020-06-20
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Language:
more
Description:
" The battle for control of Irrawaddy Green Towers could lead to a rare acquisition financing in Myanmar and the country’s largest-ever syndicated loan.
International banks are discussing a US$300m-$400m loan with shortlisted bidders that include private equity firm CVC Capital Partners and edotco Group, a unit of Malaysia’s Axiata Group. The preferred bidder is expected to be picked by early July.
A financing of that size would be Myanmar’s largest syndicated loan and only the second leveraged buyout in the country, if a financial sponsor emerges victorious.
The loan will test liquidity for a market that is seldom on the radar for lenders, many of which don’t have country limits for Myanmar.
“Country limits will present a key challenge for the debt financing,” said a Singapore-based senior loans banker. “It might not be easy to put this together.”
The sale of IGT comes in a subdued period for mergers and acquisitions in Asia Pacific as a result of the coronavirus pandemic. That could encourage lenders to add to their exposure given that an IGT financing is likely to pay higher yields than those that are found elsewhere in Asia.
This year, some borrowers from Myanmar have raised club loans totalling US$370m from half a dozen Asian banks, for property sector credits such as Kajima Myanmar Holding and conglomerate Shwe Taung Group..."
Source/publisher:
"Reuters" (UK)
Date of publication:
2020-06-19
Date of entry/update:
2020-06-19
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Language:
more
Description:
"Investment capital of over 4.10 billion U.S. dollars from permitted foreign enterprises have entered Myanmar in eight months of present fiscal year (FY) 2019-2020 stating in October, according to figures issued by the Directorate of Investment and Company Administration (DICA) on Monday.
The Myanmar Investment Commission (MIC) gave the go-ahead to 178 foreign investment enterprises from Oct. 1, 2019 to May 31 of this FY.
During the period, power sector attracted most investment capital with over 1.67 billion U.S. dollars, followed by real estate and manufacturing sectors.
From FY 1988-89 to FY 2019-20, the MIC gave the nod to 2,015 foreign enterprises, with investment capital of over 85.9 billion U.S. dollars.
Power sector took 26.60 percent of foreign investment, followed by oil and gas sector with 26.51 percent and manufacturing with 14.11 percent, respectively.
Singapore, China and Thailand are top leading investors in Myanmar.
Regionally, the Yangon region attracts 60 percent of investment from both home and abroad, followed by Mandalay region with 30 percent and the rest flowed into other regions and states.
The new Myanmar Companies Law, which was enforced in August 2018, provides tax exemption and relief to investors depending on the development of the regions and states, allowing investors in far-flung areas to enjoy tax breaks of up to seven years..."
Source/publisher:
"Xinhua" (China)
Date of publication:
2020-06-15
Date of entry/update:
2020-06-15
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy, Political, social and economic dimensions of investment in Burma
Language:
more
Sub-title:
Foreign investor interest in the garment manufacturing sector is still strong despite a fall in the volume of garment exports in fiscal 2019-20, according to the government.
Description:
"Of the 178 foreign enterprises endorsed by the Myanmar Investment Commission (MIC) and permitted to invest in Myanmar between October 1 and May 31, more than three quarters channeled capital into the manufacturing sector, according to the Directorate of Investment and Company Administration (DICA). The data showed that the new investors include garment manufacturers.
The MIC will prioritise investments in garment manufacturing going forward as these are labour intensive industries likely to create a large number of jobs, Director General of DICA U Thant Sin Lwin told state media. Manufacturers that are able to produce face masks and other personal protective equipment related to COVID-19 will also be given priority.
Enquiries from investors are still flowing in even though garment exports fell to just US$2.7 billion between October 1, 2019 and May 31, representing a $24 million decline from the same period a year before due to order cancellations from the EU as a result of COVID-19, according to U Khin Maung Lwin, assistant secretary of the Ministry of Commerce.
This has also led to a rising number of disputes between employers and their employees as factories are forced to lay off or close. The industry hires up to 700,000 predominantly female workers across 600 factories, according to data provided by the EU.
Disruptions to the Myanmar garment sector first started in February, when raw material imports from China became sporadic as a result of COVID-19 closures and lockdowns. Things got worse after the coronavirus was declared a global pandemic by the World Health Organisation on March 11, with order delays and cancellations from major export countries like the EU becoming more frequent..."
Source/publisher:
"Myanmar Times" (Myanmar)
Date of publication:
2020-06-14
Date of entry/update:
2020-06-14
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy, Burma/Myanmar's Foreign relations, general
Language:
more
Description:
"C aterpillar Inc, Komatsu Ltd and Volvo AB - leading providers of machinery to Myanmar’s jade mines - have done little to address warnings about rampant abuses in the multibillion-dollar industry they supply, a Swedish charity said on Wednesday.
Stockholm-based Swedwatch, which focuses on business activities in developing countries, said the three firms still dominate the machinery market in Hpakant, a mining township in the restive Kachin state that supplies 90% of the world’s jade.
Myanmar’s poorly regulated jade mines help finance a long-running conflict between the army and armed ethnic groups, and the report said the industry contributed to land degradation, water pollution and landslides that kill hundreds of people each year.
“The global mining machinery companies’ seemingly blatant lack of safeguards in response to this context is a matter of serious urgency,” Swedwatch said in a report.
It said U.S. machine maker Caterpillar and Japan’s Komatsu “still have not attempted to identify the negative human rights impacts related to their products in Myanmar”.
Volvo did engage human rights consultants to conduct due diligence following an initial report by the charity in 2018. The Swedish company said the probe had absolved it of any responsibility.
“As a machinery provider, we do not believe we are responsible for human rights violations ... where our products are not directly responsible for the harm caused,” spokeswoman Anna Abenius told the Thomson Reuters Foundation..."
Source/publisher:
"Reuters" (UK)
Date of publication:
2020-06-10
Date of entry/update:
2020-06-10
Grouping:
Individual Documents
more
Description:
"Myanmar's foreign trade reached over 24.5 billion U.S. dollars in the first eight months of the present fiscal year (FY) 2019-2020, according to figures released by the Commerce Ministry on Thursday.
From Oct. 1, 2019 to May 22, 2020, the export value registered over 11.5 billion U.S. dollars while the import value was over 13 billion U.S. dollars.
The country's trade deficit of present FY was over 1.52 billion U.S. dollars, up from over 874 million U.S. dollars compared to the corresponding period of the last FY.
During the eight-month period of the current fiscal year, Myanmar's manufacturing goods were exported with value of over 5.98 billion U.S. dollars while over 5 billion U.S. dollars worth of capital goods were imported to the country, the ministry's figure showed.
Myanmar's agricultural products, animal products, marine products minerals, forest products, manufacturing goods and others are exported while the country imports capital goods, intermediate goods and consumer goods.
About 80 percent of the country's foreign trade is done through sea route and its border trade is conducted with neighboring China, Thailand, Bangladesh and India..."
Source/publisher:
"Xinhua" (China)
Date of publication:
2020-06-04
Date of entry/update:
2020-06-04
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Border Trade - general, Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy, China-Burma-India relations
Language:
more
Description:
"Campaigners in the Tanintharyi region of southern Myanmar have urged international donors to support community conservation efforts, rather than what they see as a top-down approach that excludes indigenous groups. Campaigners in the Tanintharyi region of southern Myanmar have urged international donors to support community conservation efforts, rather than what they see as a top-down approach that excludes indigenous groups.
Supporters of the Conservation Alliance of Tanintharyi (CAT) are opposing a $21 million development project, called Ridge to Reef, backed by the Myanmar government, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), The Global Environment Facility (GEF) and Fauna & Flora International (FFI).
FOOD & AGRICULTURE
Myanmar risks losing forests to oil palm
Read now
In a report released on Friday, CAT documents resistance in local communities to the imposition of protected areas, as well as their ongoing efforts to protect fish breeding grounds and water catchment areas, along with establishing their own protected community forests..."
Source/publisher:
"Eco-Business"
Date of publication:
2020-05-28
Date of entry/update:
2020-05-28
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy, Sustainable/alternative development in and for Burma
Language:
more
Description:
"Myanmar's Ministry of Commerce is striving to implement a guideline for the better e-commerce system in the country, a government official told E-commerce Virtual Conference on Thursday.
"It is a good time to carry out the process for further development of e-commerce system as the mobile penetration is over 100 percent now in the country," said U Aung Htoo, Deputy Minister of Commerce.
The move comes as the Commerce Ministry has been tasked with facilitating trade, stabilizing prices and providing emergency food under the country's COVID-19 Economic Relief Plan (CERP).
Currently, most of the e-commerce businesses are operating informally and the main goal of the ministry is to establish a secure and regulated trading system on the internet in the country, he said.
"The growth of e-commerce business in Myanmar will help to boost the communications between traders and customers and also to connect businesses both locally and internationally," he added.
It is also learnt that the Commerce Ministry supported the establishment of Digital Economy Association and E-commerce Association so as to develop e-commerce system in the country..."
Source/publisher:
"Xinhua" (China)
Date of publication:
2020-05-28
Date of entry/update:
2020-05-28
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Language:
more
Sub-title:
The white-listing of imported liquor follows years of intense lobbying by foreign producers, but hopes for a reduction in smuggled spirits may be frustrated by high import taxes.
Description:
"Myanmar has ended a decades-old ban on liquor imports but high taxes mean the measure may not be enough to stem illicit trade in foreign spirits – at least in the short term.
The Ministry of Commerce on May 25 issued a notification removing liquor from a list of items that are banned from import, as well as a notification outlining procedures for companies to legally import foreign alcohol into the country.
The policy change is intended to meet market demand, ensure customers can access quality products, control illegal imports and increase tax revenues, the notification says.
The decision to open up the market is considered a significant reform, particularly given the widespread nature of smuggling and concerns about consumer safety. Support independent journalism in Myanmar. Sign up to be a Frontier member.
Mr Cedric Retailleau, managing director for Southeast Asia at French drinks giant Pernod Ricard, said the May 25 notifications were “an important step” and the company would continue to engage with the government to encourage further market liberalisation.
“Progressive, step-by-step liberalisation of international spirits into Myanmar will be crucial to further tackling and reducing illicit trade and mitigating public health risks,” he said.
But the impact of the move may be limited initially because the notification blocks the import of any products with a value of less than US$8 a litre in order to protect local producers. Combined with customs duties and other taxes, a one-litre bottle of legally imported spirits will cost at least $20 a litre – approximately double the smuggled products available openly on the market..."
Source/publisher:
"Frontier Myanmar" (Myanmar)
Date of publication:
2020-05-27
Date of entry/update:
2020-05-27
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Language:
more
Sub-title:
In an effort to meet the current exigencies faced by Myanmar as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Myanmar Government had, on 27 April 2020, launched the COVID-19 Economic Relief Plan. The COVID-19 Economic Relief Plan comprises seven goals, 10 strategies, 36 action plans and 76 actions, each with an estimated timeline and designated authority in charge, covering a range of fiscal and social measures.
Description:
"In brief
In an effort to meet the current exigencies faced by Myanmar as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Myanmar Government had, on 27 April 2020, launched the COVID-19 Economic Relief Plan (CERP). The CERP comprises seven goals, 10 strategies, 36 action plans and 76 actions, each with an estimated timeline and designated authority in charge, covering a range of fiscal and social measures.
Key Takeaways
Businesses in Myanmar should consider the various financing options and tax deferrals/waivers that may be applicable to their operations but also be mindful of possible conditions attached to those relief measures. For example, it appears that companies applying for loans under the government credit guarantee scheme would have to undertake to retain or rehire their employees but there are currently scant details on whether the employers can adjust the salaries or the moratorium period in which they are prohibited from dismissing their employees.
Foreign investors who have been looking at the Myanmar market may take the opportunity to seek fast-track approvals of their investments into the country, in particular for reputable international firms as well as companies in the promoted areas of renewable energy and strategic infrastructure, delivery and logistics services, healthcare, including the manufacturing of medical-related products, and digital payment services..."
Source/publisher:
"Global Compliance News"
Date of publication:
2020-05-18
Date of entry/update:
2020-05-27
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Language:
more
Description:
"The power sector topped Myanmar's foreign direct investment (FDI) with over 1 billion U.S. dollars of investment capital from six permitted foreign enterprises in first seven months of current fiscal year (FY) 2019-2020, government figures showed Monday.
As of April 30 of present FY, Myanmar attracted a total of over 3.35 billion U.S. dollars' foreign investment, according to figures released by Myanmar's Directorate of Investment and Company Administration (DICA) on Monday.
According to DICA's figures, the real estate sector stood second with 895 million U.S. dollars, followed by the manufacturing sector with 544 million U.S. dollars and others.
From FY 1988-1989 to April 30 of FY 2019-2020, which started in October, 26.07 percent of foreign investment flowed into the country's power sector with capital of over 22.2 billion U.S. dollars, the DICA's figures said.
In last FY 2018-2019, total annual FDI in the country amounted over 4.15 billion U.S. dollars..."
Source/publisher:
"Xinhua" (China)
Date of publication:
2020-05-25
Date of entry/update:
2020-05-25
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy, Political, social and economic dimensions of investment in Burma, Burma/Myanmar's Foreign relations, general
Language:
more
Description:
"Ant Financial, the Chinese operator of Alipay, announced its plans to invest US$73.5 million for a minority stake in Digital Money Myanmar Limited, a fintech company based in Myanmar locally known as Wave Money, the companies announced in a press release.
Wave Money, a mobile financial services provider, allows users to send and receive money through a network of more than 57,000 agents or “Wave Shops” distributed across urban and rural areas covering approximately 89 percent of the country.
Wave Money, a joint venture between Norway’s Telenor and the local Yoma Group through its Yoma Strategic and Yoma Bank group companies, aims to to promote financial inclusion for the underbanked communities in Myanmar in order to reach the government stated goal of increasing financial inclusion in the country from its current 48 percent to 60 percent by 2020. As part of the partnership, Wave Money will leverage Ant Group’s experience in mobile payment platforms to improve its capabilities, give users a smoother experience and to offer services that better address the needs of users in Myanmar.
In a country where only about 25 percent of the population has access to a bank account, “Myanmar is ready for mass adoption of digital payments with a connected population and high smartphone penetration. This partnership will be transformative for Wave Money and Myanmar,” said Brad Jones, Wave Money’s CEO in a statement released on Monday (18 May)..."
Source/publisher:
"The ASEAN Post" (Malaysia)
Date of publication:
2020-05-21
Date of entry/update:
2020-05-24
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy, Economy: general, analytical, statistical (various sources)
Language:
more
Description:
"Myanmar State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi is scrambling to roll out Covid-19 relief measures in a race to prevent businesses and banks from collapsing under the weight of the global pandemic.
In late April, her government issued a 15-page “Covid-19 Economic Relief Plan” which broadly outlined its responses to the pandemic, though without committing to an overall cost or details on how the plan will be implemented.
So far the impact of the pandemic has been mostly economic in Myanmar. As of May 14, the country had recorded only 181 Covid-19 cases and six deaths, though there is widespread skepticism about the figures due to a lack of testing. The government was earlier widely criticized for claiming there were no cases in the country.
Deputy Finance Minister Set Aung indicated the relief package would inject the kyat equivalent of around US$2 billion into the local economy, representing between 3-4% of gross domestic product (GDP).
The stimulus package will be funded by budget reallocations, central bank financing and assistance from international financial institutions, authorities said..."
Source/publisher:
"Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
Date of publication:
2020-05-14
Date of entry/update:
2020-05-15
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Burma's economic relations with the region, Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy
Language:
more
Description:
"Ardeth Thawnghmung’s new book, Everyday Economic Survival in Myanmar is an engaging read, particularly for those working in livelihoods or microfinance in the INGO sector, for international donor agencies creating strategies for lending, grants, or programming in Myanmar, or for anyone interested in Myanmar’s informal economy. Thawnghmung’s focus on the coping strategies employed by everyday Myanmar people across the country draws on Kerkvliet’s ‘everyday politics’, Scott’s ‘everyday resistance’, and Thawnghmung’s earlier work. Thawnghmung uses Hirschman’s (1970) framework of loyalty, voice, and exit and an adaptation of Scott’s (1985) passive resistance (“indirect, frequent, and often uncoordinated acts of resistance”, p. 11) to frame and analyze various coping strategies found in Myanmar. She calls this the LPVE framework (loyalty, passive resistance, voice, and exit).
Yet, her approach is multidisciplinary, incorporating political, economic, social, and psychological coping strategies, turning the focus from politics to survival. For those familiar with her earlier work on authoritarianism and state legitimacy (2004) and the politics of “quotidian matters” (2011), by turning to the study of everyday survival, Thawnghmung is yet again pushing our conceptions of “the political” in Myanmar. Thawnghmung’s work emphasizes that the ways in which people make choices and decisions about how to make ends meet is integral to the functioning of politics and authority..."
Source/publisher:
"Teacircleoxford" (Myanmar)
Date of publication:
2020-03-05
Date of entry/update:
2020-05-03
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Economy: general, analytical, statistical (various sources), Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy
Language:
more
Sub-title:
Due for release in the coming days, the COVID-19 Comprehensive Response Plan will include new economic stimulus measures and increased funding for the health sector, as well as detail on how the plan can be funded.
Description:
"The government is set to unveil a COVID-19 response plan that will expand economic stimulus and social protection measures while also boosting healthcare spending to better prepare the country for an expected rise in coronavirus cases.
The COVID-19 Comprehensive Response Plan is likely to be released in the coming days, Frontier understands, with the government only waiting for development partners to provide feedback on the final draft.
The plan is being kept under tight wraps, with multilateral institutions such as the World Bank – which was heavily involved in drafting the plan – and bilateral donors like the United States, the European Union and Australia, which were all consulted heavily, refusing to comment.
Ministry of Planning, Finance and Industry officials who led the drafting process did not respond to requests for interview, while ministry spokesperson and permanent secretary U Tun Tun Naing said he had no specific information on the plan.
Support independent journalism in Myanmar. Sign up to be a Frontier member.
Multiple sources familiar with the final draft of the COVID-19 Comprehensive Response Plan told Frontier it provides a coherent picture of the government’s economic plans and will make it easier for development partners to contribute through grants and loans..."
Source/publisher:
"Frontier Myanmar"
Date of publication:
2020-04-26
Date of entry/update:
2020-04-28
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Language:
more
Sub-title:
Myanmar looks to East Asian states to support an ailing economy amid the pandemic.
Description:
"Myanmar has seen a moderate domestic impact from the global COVID-19 outbreak, recording just 85 cases as of April 17. However, the country’s reliance on international trade, investment, and technology means it will face near- and medium-term economic challenges that it is inadequately equipped to deal with alone.
Export volumes for simple manufactured goods have seen the biggest impact. The garment sector, which employs over 700,000 workers and accounts for $4.6 billion in export revenue — or 10 percent of all exports — has faced both supply and demand shocks. China supplies 90 percent of raw materials for the sector; however, exports to Myanmar were halted between January and March. Just as supplies were returning to normal in April, demand for Myanmar garment products collapsed.
Myanmar exports 70 percent of such products to European countries, most of which have been enforcing lockdowns and closing nonessential retail stores. As a result, 25,000 workers from over 40 garment factories have been laid off in Myanmar so far. Recognizing the hardship this is causing, the European Union on April 9 announced a 5 million euro ($5.46 million) aid package for garment workers..."
Source/publisher:
"The Diplomat" (Japan)
Date of publication:
2020-04-17
Date of entry/update:
2020-04-23
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Language:
more
Sub-title:
As Xi connects the region, Philippines weighs 'shutdown' risk
Description:
"Philippine Senator Sherwin Gatchalian has not been sleeping well.
"It is very difficult for us to sleep every night without lingering fears," he said in early February, as he presided over an investigation into potential security risks stemming from Chinese part-ownership of his country's power grid operator.
The Philippines is far from the only country running on China-backed electricity. As a complement to President Xi Jinping's signature Belt and Road infrastructure initiative, Beijing is pushing what it calls Global Energy Interconnection -- a vision of a multi-trillion-dollar worldwide electricity network.
China already has a number of power lines connected to other countries, including Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam, while lines into Thailand, Pakistan and Bangladesh are under consideration. For emerging economies hampered by chronic electricity shortages, such investments may be a blessing.
Critics, however, worry that China's expanding presence in regional power grids could leave partner countries vulnerable.
Xi himself proposed Global Energy Interconnection in 2015 at the United Nations Sustainable Development Summit, as a way to meet the world's demand for clean power. Like the Belt and Road itself, China frames the concept as beneficial for everyone. "It increases mutual trust in politics and creates a new pattern of energy security featuring cooperation, mutual benefit and win-win results," says the website of the Global Energy Interconnection Development and Cooperation Organization, or GEIDCO, the body leading the charge..."
Source/publisher:
"Nikkei Asian Review" (Japan)
Date of publication:
2020-03-03
Date of entry/update:
2020-03-03
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
“One Belt, One Road” initiative, Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy, Burma/Myanmar's Foreign relations, general
Language:
more
Description:
"China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is nothing if not vague. Is it a blanket term for all Chinese overseas economic, social and political activities? Is it a specific set of coordinated policy that’s exclusive to Beijing-led international endeavors? What projects are officially Belt and Road? Where do the corridors actually go? What countries are truly participating? Nearly seven years into the initiative, we are still asking these questions as Beijing attempts to wrangle back its message from private firms and enterprising governments that have unscrupulously been using the Belt and Road brand for their own gains, dragging its reputation through the proverbial mud and putting the future of the initiative in jeopardy. The Belt and Road was announced in 2013 as an economic development initiative that would create new trade corridors across Asia, Europe and Africa, positioning China at the top of the geo-economic food chain, while providing mutual benefit to participants all the way down the line. Beyond that vague rendering, the rest was left to conjecture, with a large degree of meaning lost between China’s struggles to explain the initiative and the West’s inability to comprehend it.“I think the difference among policy makers is one of the biggest challenges of the Belt and Road,” said Moritz Rudolf, a China researcher, lawyer, and founder of Eurasia Bridges. “For the Chinese side it's unclear why the West doesn’t understand what they are doing and from the Western side it's ‘this is nothing because it doesn't follow our procedures that we know about.’”..."
Source/publisher:
"Forbes" (USA)
Date of publication:
2020-02-28
Date of entry/update:
2020-03-03
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
“One Belt, One Road” initiative, Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy, China-Burma relations
Language:
more
Description:
"Myanmar has exported over 1.19 million tons of rice and broken rice in first five months of present fiscal year (FY) 2019-2020, according to the latest figures released by Myanmar Rice Federation on Saturday.
From Oct.1, 2019 to Feb. 7 of this FY, the country earned over 343.6 million U.S. dollars from the export of 838,672 tons of rice and 356,370 tons of broken rice.
During the period, 86.32 percent of rice and broken rice export was done through sea route.
Meanwhile, demand for Myanmar's rice and broken rice from neighbouring countries including China accounted for over 27 percent of the export.
Myanmar has set a target to export 2.5 million tons of rice in present fiscal year which will end on Sept. 30, 2020.
In previous FY 2018-2019, the country exported over 2.35 million tons of rice and broken rice with over 709.6 million U.S. dollars' export revenue..."
Source/publisher:
"Xinhua" (China)
Date of publication:
2020-02-29
Date of entry/update:
2020-03-01
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Language:
more
Sub-title:
China’s overseas projects funded by debt from its own infrastructure banks are now viewed with trepidation, by both recipient countries for the potential debt trap.
Description:
"Global business and strategy analysts will be watching with keen interest any attempts US President Donald Trump makes to convince India to join its ambitious plan to counter China’s ‘Silk Route’ programme of port and highway constructions. Last November, the US, Japan and Australia unveiled the ‘Blue Dot’ infrastructure network, ostensibly to certify and promote infrastructure development, but in reality, it was to take on China’s BRI (Belt and Road Initiative) that is currently building a chain of roads and ports connecting most of the world to Beijing. The Western alternative has been in the making for some time as nations have voiced alarm at the cheque-book diplomacy of China through its BRI projects and their security ramifications. Soon after Blue Dot’s launch, US Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross lost no time in pointing out that American direct investment into Asia had topped $1.6 trillion and that “our numbers will only get bigger”. It was quickly noted by China’s Global Times, which said, “Although China was not mentioned by name, it’s widely suspected that Washington’s new plan is directed against the China proposed BRI.” China’s pique is natural as analysts say Blue Dot could be backed with funding by Japan’s JICA and America’s newly founded International Development Finance Corporation and Ausaid, not to mention a host of global development finance windows backed by the West..."
Source/publisher:
"The New Indian Express" (India)
Date of publication:
2020-02-25
Date of entry/update:
2020-02-25
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
“One Belt, One Road” initiative, Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy, China-Burma-India relations, China-Burma-US relations
Language:
more
Description:
"Power sector attracted over 1 billion U.S. dollars of investment capital from six permitted foreign enterprises in first four months of current fiscal year (FY) 2019-2020 which started in October, according to figures released by Myanmar's Directorate of Investment and Company Administration (DICA).
As of Jan. 31, Myanmar's power sector topped the list with most investment capital, followed by real estate and manufacturing sectors.
From FY 1988-1989 to Jan. 31 of FY 2019-2020, 26.4 percent of foreign investment flowed into the country's power sector with capital of over 22.2 billion U.S. dollars, the DICA's figures said.
Meanwhile, Myanmar Investment Commission (MIC) allowed 106 enterprises with a total of 2.08 billion U.S. dollars of investment capital as of Jan. 31 of present FY 2019-2020..."
Source/publisher:
"Xinhua" (China)
Date of publication:
2020-02-24
Date of entry/update:
2020-02-24
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy, Political, social and economic dimensions of investment in Burma, Burma/Myanmar's Foreign relations, general
Language:
more
Description:
"The six Mekong-Lancang Cooperation (MLC) countries agreed on the need to elevate their cooperation from rapid-expansion to a comprehensive stage as their foreign ministers met in Vientiane on Thursday.
The ministers of the MLC member countries - China, Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam – reached the agreement at their fifth meeting, Chinese State Councilor and Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi told a press conference shortly after the meeting.
Participants welcomed the recommendation by the Global Centre for Mekong Study that the MLC countries jointly create the Mekong-Lancang Economic Development Belt.
The ministers reaffirmed the need to further enhance regional connectivity by jointly promoting the MLC Economic Development Belt and to explore the possibility of synergising the MLC Plan of Action on Connectivity with global transport infrastructure – the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the Master Plan on Asean Connectivity (MPAC) 2025, and the Asean-China New Western Land-Sea Corridor..."
Source/publisher:
Eleven Media Group (Myanmar)
Date of publication:
2020-02-23
Date of entry/update:
2020-02-23
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
“One Belt, One Road” initiative, Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy, Burma/Myanmar's Foreign relations, general
Language:
more
Description:
"Military enterprises, ostensibly set up to feed and supply soldiers,were some of the earliest and largest Burmese commercialconglomerates, established in the 1950s. Union Myanmar EconomicHoldings Limited (UMEHL) and Myanmar Economic Corporation
(MEC) are two profit-seeking military enterprises established by
the military after the dissolution of the Burma Socialist Programme Party in 1988, which remain central players in Myanmar’s post-2011 economy.• Military conglomerates are a major source of off-budget revenuefor the military and a main employer of retired soldiers. Yet
few veterans receive more than a small piece of the profits
from UMEHL. The vast bulk of formal dividends instead
disproportionately benefit higher ranking officers and institutions
within the Tatmadaw. Military capitalism entrenches the autonomy of the Tatmadawfrom civilian oversight. Despite this, obligatory or semi-coerced
contributions from active-duty soldiers are a source of cash fow for
UMEHL, effectively constituting a transfer from the government
budget to the military’s off-budget entities. The most significant
source of livelihoods support for most veterans is the service pension dispersed by the Ministry of Finance and Planning (MoPF).• Despite delivering suboptimal welfare outcomes for most soldiers
and veterans while eroding the legitimacy of ceasefires, successive
governments since 1988, including Aung San Suu Kyi’s NationalLeague for Democracy (NLD) administration, have entrenched military capitalism by encouraging commercial activities of armed
groups that enter into ceasefire agreements..."
Source/publisher:
Yusof Ishak Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS)
Date of publication:
2019-02-00
Date of entry/update:
2020-02-23
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, The Military's political role, Peace processes, ceasefires and ceasefire talks (websites, documents, reports and studies), Armed conflict and peace-building in Burma - theoretical, strategic and general, Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
1.55 MB (49 pages)
more
Description:
"Myanmar's Yangon Region Investment Committee (YRIC) recently approved 16 foreign investment businesses for the region, according to the Directorate of Investment and Company Administration (DICA) on Sunday (Feb 23).
A total of US$28.507mil of foreign investments from China, Seychelles and Estonia as well as 3 billion Kyats (US2mil) from one local enterprise engaged the region's manufacturing sector and other services, creating over 8,900 job opportunities for local citizens.
Yangon region absorbs 60% of country's investment from both home and abroad, followed by Mandalay region with % and the rest flows into other regions and states.
Myanmar attracted over US$20.8bil foreign investments as of Jan 31, the first four months of the current fiscal year 2019-2020, according to the DICA's figures.
The new Myanmar Companies Law which started to enforce on Aug. 1, 2018 allows foreign investors to take up 35 percent in local companies..."
Source/publisher:
"The Star Online" (Selangor)
Date of publication:
2020-02-23
Date of entry/update:
2020-02-23
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Lists, Directories of Foreign Companies in Burma, Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy, Burma/Myanmar's Foreign relations, general
Language:
more
Description:
" Myanmar's trade through sea routes registered over US$10.4bil in the first five months of the present fiscal year (FY) 2019-2020, which started in October, according to figures released by the Commerce Ministry on Saturday (Feb 22).
The country fetched over US$4.14bil from maritime export while its import shared over US$6.33bil as of Feb 14 this FY.
This fiscal year's sea trade saw a significant increase by over US$1.58bil, compared to the same period of the last fiscal year 2018-2019, the ministry's figures showed.
Approximately 80% of Myanmar's foreign trade is done through sea-borne trade and its border trade is conducted with neighbouring countries -- China, Thailand, India and Bangladesh, respectively.
From Oc. 1, 2019 to Feb. 14 of this FY, the country's foreign trade totalled over US$14.5bil with over US$6.76bil in export and US7.77bil in import..."
Source/publisher:
"The Star Online" (Selangor)
Date of publication:
2020-02-22
Date of entry/update:
2020-02-23
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
International Trade, Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy, Burma/Myanmar's Foreign relations, general
Language:
more
Description:
"Myanmar exported about 12,000 tons of rice to Asia, about 6,000 tons of rice to European Union (EU) and over 14,000 tons of rice to Africa between February 2 and 8, according to the Ministry of Commerce.
It exported over 32,000 tons of rice worth US$10.021 million through maritime trade. It is less than over 1,500 tons of rice compared with last week's export.
Myanmar exported about 1,200 tons of broken rice to Asia, over 9,100 tons of broken rice to the EU, about 3,200 tons of broken rice to Africa, 250 tons of broken rice to the United Arab Emirates and over 300 tons of Gibraltar in that period. It is more than 2,800 tons of broken rice compared with last week's export.
Myanmar exported about 3,000 tons of rice worth US$0.821 million through border trade centers in Myanmar-China border from February 1 to 7. About 2,300 tons of rice is exported through Muse 105-mile trade center, about 270 tons of rice through Chinshwehaw border trade center and about 370 tons of rice through Lweje border trade center. It is more than 400 tons of rice compared with last week's export...."
Source/publisher:
Eleven Media Group (Myanmar)
Date of publication:
2020-02-21
Date of entry/update:
2020-02-22
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy, International Trade, Burma/Myanmar's Foreign relations, general
Language:
more
Description:
"Myanmar Investment Commission (MIC) recently approved 12 investment enterprises from home and abroad, said a release from the Directorate of Investment and Company Administration (DICA) late Friday.
The enterprises, which will create over 6,600 job opportunities for Myanmar citizens, were permitted at the commission's recent meeting.
With investment capital of 501.9 million U.S. dollars and 73.4 billion kyats (48.9 million U.S. dollars), the permitted enterprises are engaged in the country's manufacturing, other services sectors and hotel sectors, respectively.
As of Dec. 31, 2019, Singapore, China and Thailand were the leading investors in Myanmar. Meanwhile, oil and gas, power and manufacturing sectors were the top three sectors in the list with most foreign investments.
From FY 1988-89 to Dec. 31 of FY 2019-20, the foreign investments in 1,909 permitted projects have reached over 83 billion U.S. dollars in the country..."
Source/publisher:
"Xinhua" (China)
Date of publication:
2020-02-15
Date of entry/update:
2020-02-15
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Lists, Directories of Foreign Companies in Burma, Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy, Burma/Myanmar's Foreign relations, general
Language:
more
Description:
"Myanmar earned over 907 million U.S. dollars from mineral export in the first four months of present fiscal year (FY) 2019-2020 which started in October, according to figures of the Ministry of Commerce on Tuesday.
This figure increased by 579 million U.S. dollars, compared to the same period of last FY 2018-2019 when it fetched over 328 million U.S. dollars.
During the period, the mineral sector ranked the third place with most export value, following the manufacturing and agriculture sectors among other export.
Meanwhile, the country's export value totaled over 6.1 billion U.S. dollars from Oct. 1, 2019 to Jan. 31, the ministry's figures said.
Myanmar mainly exports agricultural products, animal products, marine products, minerals, forest products, manufacturing goods and others to foreign trade partner countries..."
Source/publisher:
"Xinhua" (China)
Date of publication:
2020-02-11
Date of entry/update:
2020-02-13
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy, International Trade, Burma/Myanmar's Foreign relations, general
Language:
more
Description:
"Myanmar will take measures to ensure that overseas demand for locally made goods remains elevated even as cheaper imports from the region are expected to rise now that the country will participate further in the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). This should also keep the country’s trade deficit, which was down to US$627 million in fiscal 2019-20 from US$5.2 billion in fiscal 2016-17, stable. Under AFTA, Myanmar is expected to substantially lower the import duties for a list of goods to as little as zero and no more than 5 percent.
“Custom duties will be nearly zero due to AFTA and ASEAN countries are already taking advantage of the opportunity to export more goods to Myanmar. We have in place the Import Protection Law to ensure local manufacturers are not threatened,” said U Aung Htoo, deputy commerce minister. The Import Protection Law gives Myanmar the right to raise duties for a period of three years on imported goods that severely affect or threaten local manufacturer. The law also covers trade under AFTA, the Myanmar Times understands.
Some traders have voiced their approval over the changing trade environment. Daw Yin Yin Moe, CEO of Hla Yin Moe, a textile and garment company, said that over the past five years her company was able to import industrial apparatus and machineries..."
Source/publisher:
"Myanmar Times" (Myanmar)
Date of publication:
2020-02-13
Date of entry/update:
2020-02-13
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
International Trade, Burma's economic relations with ASEAN, Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy, Burma/Myanmar's Foreign relations, general
Language:
more
Description:
"The energy security concerns of Thailand, India and China greatly
determine their relations with Myanmar. In principle, India and China
have pledged to cooperate in the field of energy security in order to avoid
costly rivalries. In practice, however, commentators expect that the two oilimporting giants will find it more or less impossible to avoid such rivalries.
In relation to Myanmar, this seems difficult indeed. The immediate issue
is competition between India and China over building a pipeline to transport natural gas from Shwe, a gas field off the coast of Myanmar’s Arakan
state. In March 2007, it became clear that China will further consolidate its
ties with Myanmar by building a gas pipeline from the Burmese coast to
Kunming, the capital of China’s Yunnan province. India’s pipeline plans,
negotiated for several years, were finally rejected by the Burmese regime.
A South Korean offer to construct a liquefied natural gas (LNG) facility in Myanmar was also turned down. The Chinese plans include an oil pipeline
as well, probably running parallel to the gas pipeline and intended to carry
Persian Gulf crude oil shipped by tanker to a connecting Burmese port
facility. This makes sense considering the oft-cited Chinese argument that
an oil pipeline through Myanmar will enhance China’s energy security by
serving as an alternative oil supply route bypassing the Strait of Malacca, a
waterway of crucial importance for the provision of oil and other necessities
to China, Taiwan, South Korea and Japan..."
Source/publisher:
"Strategic Analysis"
Date of publication:
2007-07-04
Date of entry/update:
2020-02-11
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy, Oil and gas, Burma's economic relations with ASEAN, Burma/Myanmar's Foreign relations, general
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
133.07 KB (20 pages)
more
Description:
"The focus of this article is two-pronged. First, it highlights China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ (OBOR) initiative
as a Eurasia-centred project that, distinct from the twentieth-century Eurasianism, aims to introduce a new
comprehensive integrationist agenda to the Eurasian strategic landscape. Second, it compares the US-led EuroAtlanticism and the emerging Eurasianism, holding that while the former has historically stressed security over
development (development is seen as contingent on the establishment of a hard security regime), the latter
prioritises development over security (security is viewed as contingent on the establishment of an inclusive
economic regime). Thus, this research argues that, if implemented successfully, OBOR could challenge EuroAtlanticism as the long-held normative paradigm of interstate relations by offering a systemic alternative.
EURASIANISM IS A CENTURY-OLD IDEA. EMERGING IN THE early 1920s and largely nurtured
by the Russian immigrants settled in Europe, the concept, despite its various interpretations
along different political and ideological lines, laid claim ‘to represent some unique synthesis
of European and Asian principles’ (Bassin 2008, p. 281), defining Russia ‘not as a European
and not as an Asian country; … as a third, special continent of Slav–Turkic cohabitation that
bears the imprint of the great empires that have ruled over its expanses—from the Mongolian
to the Russian’ (Laruelle 2009, p. 94).1
Although the Eurasian doctrine did not assume itself
as a unified ideology but rather evolved into a multitude of different forms (Laruelle 2015),
early Eurasianism in general argued a particular geographic, linguistical, ethno-cultural, and
philosophical identity for Russia distinct from both Europe and Asia (Shlapentokh 1997,
pp. 130–31; Senderov 2009, p. 25; Mileski 2015, pp. 177–79). However, despite the fact that
early Eurasianist thought envisioned a unique political and philosophical space for Russia,
it also ‘developed a positive but general discourse about the Orient’, holding that ‘Russia
should be closer to Asia than to Europe’ (Laruelle 2004, p. 116). During the Cold War, under
the weight of deep ideological confrontation with the West, the Eurasianist thought took a
further Orientalist inclination, emphasising cultural and ideological differences from Europe
(Von Hagen 2004, p. 450). Especially with the emergence of NATO and the expansion of
US- and Soviet-led camps ‘beyond the original arenas of Europe and Asia’, the militarised This research was sponsored by the International Postdoctoral Exchange Programme of Shandong University..."
Source/publisher:
Europe-Asia Studies via Academia.edu (USA)
Date of publication:
2018-03-09
Date of entry/update:
2020-02-10
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
“One Belt, One Road” initiative, Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy, China-Burma relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
722.68 KB
more
Description:
"The “New Silk Road”, also known as the “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR) initiative or Belt and
Road Initiative (BRI), is a development strategy proposed by China, which aims to foster the
economic cooperation and connectivity mostly between Eurasian countries.
1 The initiative is
named after the “Silk Road”, an ancient route of 6,437 kilometer in length, that dates back to
the Western Han Dynasty (206 BC – 220 AD) and used to connect regions of East Asia with
the Middle East and Europe, prospering numerous Eurasian civilizations for centuries.2
Therefore, with the implementation of the “New Silk Road” strategy, China aims to revive the
2.000-year-old network by investing on some serious infrastructure projects throughout the
whole route, that largely resembles the legendary “Silk Road”. The promotion of regional
economic development, the economic benefits for the countries involved and the tightening of
the cultural ties of the participants, are the main goals of the OBOR initiative, in other words,
OBOR is based on a win-win development strategy for the countries that are located throughout
the path of the “New Silk Road”.3 The first signs of OBOR were brought to the surface during the Olympics of 2008. However,
China’s ambitious plan was first stated on 2013, by the Chinese President Xi Jinping, the 5th
president of China. The OBOR project consist of two different “routes”, one land route and a
maritime one, that both begin and end in China’s territory. The first route (Silk Road Economic
Belt) begins from Xi’an in Central China and leads to Northern Europe up to Rotterdam (busiest
port in Europe), coming all the way from Central Asia, the Middle East, Eastern Europe and
Russia and the center of Europe. On the other hand, the maritime route (the 21st Century
Maritime Silk Road) connects the Mediterranean Sea with the South China Sea, in a long route
that comes through the Suez Canal, the Indian Ocean, the Malacca strait, etc. It is estimated
that approximately 65-70 countries and a total of 4,4 billion people (as much as the 60% of
global population) will benefit from the participation in the OBOR project that will require at
least 30-35 years to be completed..."
Source/publisher:
KEDISA via Academia.edu (USA)
Date of publication:
2017-00-00
Date of entry/update:
2020-02-10
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
“One Belt, One Road” initiative, Burma's economic relations with China, Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy, China-Burma relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
904.15 KB
more
Description:
"French business people interested in Myanmar called on State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi on February 5, the State Counsellor Office reported.
The State Counsellor received the MEDEF International business delegation at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Nay Pyi Taw.. The meeting was also attended by Union Minister for Planning, Finance and Industry Soe Win, Union Minister for Investment and Foreign Economic Relations Thaung Tun, Union Minister for International Cooperation Kyaw Tin and senior officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Investment and Foreign Economic Relations.
The MEDEF International is a non-profit organization representing French business confederation. The visiting French business delegation comprised 28 members from French international companies eying investment in Myanmar, the State Counsellor Office reported..."
Source/publisher:
"The Star Online" (Selangor)
Date of publication:
2020-02-07
Date of entry/update:
2020-02-08
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Language:
more
Description:
"Myanmar earned US$300.366 million from 1.047 million tons of rice and broken rice exports from October 1 to January 17 in this fiscal year, according to Myanmar Rice Federation (MRF).
It earned about US$220 million from over seven million tons of rice export to 56 countries in that period and over US$80 million from over 300,000 tons of broken rice export in the same period, it said.
It earned over US$39 million from over 150,000 tons of rice and broken rice exports through border routes in that period. It is over 14 per cent of total rice and broken rice exports. It earned over US$260 million from over 890,000 tons of rice and broken rice exports through maritime routes in that period. They are over 14 and 85 per cents of total rice and broken rice exports respectively.
Myanmar exported 2.355 million tons of rice and broken rice and earned US$709.693 million in 2018-19 FY, announced the MRF.
Myanmar is using border trade routes and maritime trade routes to export rice and broken rice exports..."
Source/publisher:
Eleven Media Group (Myanmar)
Date of publication:
2020-02-07
Date of entry/update:
2020-02-07
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
International Trade, Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy, Burma/Myanmar's Foreign relations, general
Language:
more
Sub-title:
Local liquor manufacturers are struggling to stay profitable as competition from illegal importers continues eat into their margins, said U Soe Lwin, chair of The Myanmar Liquor Association (MLA). Legally imported liquors and spirits like whiskeys, rum and gin are taxed upon entry and this is passed on to consumers.
Description:
"“The total tax payable for our industry has increased to K200 billion for the 2019-20 year of assessment. The amount of taxes paid by this industry is rising by 25 percent to 30pc every year,” said U Htay Lwin, general secretary of the MLA. Illegal distributors, however, escape taxes and are able to sell liquor at lower prices in the black market.
Imports of spirits are tightly restricted in Myanmar and it wasn’t until late 2015 that permitted the import of wines was permitted. However, only hotels and duty-free outlets have been allowed to import spirits and beer thus far. This has led to the proliferation of illegal imports, mostly at the border. The government is in the process of enacting laws intended to relax Myanmar’s existing ban on alcohol imports. Work on a draft legislation has moved to the attorney general for approval, after which it would be presented to the cabinet, according to the commerce ministry.
U Win Thaw, a secretary of the MLA, said the main problem with the impending relaxation of the new import policy is that it does not address the black market situation where alcohol is smuggled through our borders without being taxed.
He added that the legislation should not only formalise, but level the playing field between local producers and foreign liquor importers.
Locally produced liquor brands include High Class, Glan Master and Grand Royal whiskies as well as Mandalay Rum..."
Source/publisher:
"Myanmar Times" (Myanmar)
Date of publication:
2020-02-05
Date of entry/update:
2020-02-05
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
International Trade, Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy, Food Security - Specialised organisations and mechanisms, Burma/Myanmar's Foreign relations, general
Language:
more
Sub-title:
Tech giant establishes affiliate company with investments to improve telco infrastructure
Description:
"NTT Myanmar is officially in business following a multimillion-dollar capital investment, a new wholesale government licence and the opening of an office in Yangon.
Operating as an affiliate company of NTT, the technology provider has secured a business-to-business wholesale licence from The Ministry of Commerce to offer technology solutions and managed services to enterprise clients following a capital investment of US$5 million.
This is backed by an investment of US$400 million - revealed in December 2019 - to commence the construction of a ‘MIST’ large-capacity submarine communications cable between Singapore, Myanmar and India (Mumbai and Chennai). The construction is part of a strategic joint venture for international submarine cables in Southeast Asia, with Orient Link, to improve data speed and reduce latency..."
Source/publisher:
"Channel Asia" (Singapore)
Date of publication:
2020-02-03
Date of entry/update:
2020-02-03
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy, Political, social and economic dimensions of investment in Burma, Burma/Myanmar's Foreign relations, general
Language:
more
Description:
""Paukphaw”, which literally means born together, implying not only a shared destiny but racial kinship, was reinforced through strong political and economic bonds between Myanmar and China last week. Xi Jinping became the first Chinese leader to visit Nay Pyi Taw on a hugely significant state visit ( January 17-18) since Jiang Zemin back in 2001. The event received not more than a modicum of interest here, but it could have a serious geopolitical impact on India.
If India is concerned about the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, it now has more reason to worry about CMEC (China-Myanmar Economic Corridor) that just moved from being a concept to reality. The CMEC is less about oil and gas — there are pipelines running through Myanmar already — and more about reducing dependence on the Malacca Straits and access to the Bay of Bengal and Indian Ocean.
The CMEC includes the Kyaukphyu deep-sea port in the troubled Rakhine state along with a special economic zone (SEZ), the China-Myanmar border economic zone (the two countries share a 2,200 km-long border) and the newly announced Yangon urban development project (which is still at MoU stage)..."
Source/publisher:
"The Economic Times" (India)
Date of publication:
2020-01-26
Date of entry/update:
2020-02-02
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Burma's economic relations with India, Burma's economic relations with China, Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy, China-Burma-India relations
Language:
more
Topic:
The Automotive Association of Myanmar (AAM), European Chamber of Commerce (EuroCham) and other vehicle industry bodies are voicing their opposition to a plan announced by the Ministry of Commerce that would see the providing of vehicle import permits to senior governments officials as an incentive.
Topic:
The Automotive Association of Myanmar (AAM), European Chamber of Commerce (EuroCham) and other vehicle industry bodies are voicing their opposition to a plan announced by the Ministry of Commerce that would see the providing of vehicle import permits to senior governments officials as an incentive.
Description:
"Representatives of the British Chamber of Myanmar, European Chamber of Myanmar, Delegation of German Industry and Commerce in Myanmar, EuroCham Myanmar Automotive Advocacy Group and AAM held a joint press conference on the issue yesterday in Yangon. On January 2, the Ministry of Commerce announced that senior government officials, such as directors general, deputy directors general, and those with a minimum of 25 years of excellent service, would be given import permits for vehicles as rewards for their work.
The vehicles approved for import would be determined by the ministry on a yearly basis and would be allowed into the country directly without going through a showroom or car dealership. “If the government goes ahead with this plan, it will affect the whole automotive industry greatly. The image of the industry in Myanmar, which is heavily dependent on foreign investment, will not be good,” said Mr Peter Beynon, chair of the British Chamber of Commerce Myanmar.
Following the announcement of the plan, the AAM wrote to the Ministry of Commerce asking that the plan be reviewed or shelved. The AAM said the plan would raise feelings on unfairness among people who have to pay taxes to the government for the cars they buy through ordinary channels and also cause price instability in the local car market.
The AAM further stated that the plan would damage companies assembling vehicles for sale in the local market, and car sales centres owned by local companies..."
Source/publisher:
"Myanmar Times" (Myanmar)
Date of publication:
2020-01-30
Date of entry/update:
2020-02-01
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy, International Trade, Burma/Myanmar's Foreign relations, general
Language:
more
Sub-title:
The Ministry of Investment and Foreign Economic Relations this month announced tax exemptions for investments in selected sectors in all 14 states and regions in Myanmar and the Nay Pyi Taw Union Territory.
Description:
"The key investment sectors in Myanmar’s states and regions are mainly agriculture, manufacturing and infrastructure. Now, the government is expanding the areas of investment for businesses to five priority sectors and streamlining the process in the states and regions. The top five priority investment sectors in Chin State are hotels and tourism, power, agriculture and its related services, livestock production and breeding, and urban development and industrial zone. Any investment in these sectors qualifies for seven years of tax exemption.
“Some projects which generate above 30 MW of electricity are progressing with negotiations ongoing between the Ministry of Electricity and Energy and investors,’’ U Soe Htet, the Minister for Chin State Development Affairs, Electricity and Industry, told The Myanmar Times. Chin State has only two investment projects and ranks lowest where investment in this country is concerned.
The top five priority investment sectors in Kayah State are hotels and tourism, agriculture and its related services, manufacturing, power, and mining..."
Source/publisher:
"Myanmar Times" (Myanmar)
Date of publication:
2020-01-28
Date of entry/update:
2020-02-01
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Economy of non-Burman groups in several States of Burma, Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy, Burma/Myanmar's Foreign relations, general
Language:
more
Sub-title:
China’s banks supporting BRI projects should apply environmental risk-management policies and oversight, says Divya Narain
Description:
"China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is intended to catalyse the economies of countries around the globe.
Yet BRI projects overlap some of the most ecologically fragile places on earth. The multi-trillion-dollar initiative – to build transcontinental networks of roads, railways and ports, studded with dams, mines, power plants, and solar and wind farms – has its environmental impacts. These include air and water pollution, soil contamination and erosion, habitat and wildlife loss.
For project developers and funders, failure to address these impacts can translate into regulatory and reputational risks. So they need to take mitigation seriously.
Risks confronting developers can include penalties, legal action and backlash from communities causing project delays and even closures. According to a 2018 study, 14% of BRI projects in 66 countries have faced some kind of local pushback..."
Source/publisher:
"Chinadialogue" (China)
Date of publication:
2020-01-30
Date of entry/update:
2020-01-31
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
“One Belt, One Road” initiative, Burma's economic relations with China, Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy, China-Burma relations
Language:
more
Description:
" Myanmar attracted investment capital of over 1.83 billion U.S. dollars from permitted foreign enterprises in first quarter of present fiscal year 2019-2020 which started in October last year, said a release issued by the Directorate of Investment and Company Administration (DICA) on Tuesday.
From Oct. 1, 2019 to Jan. 24 of this FY, the Myanmar Investment Commission (MIC) gave the nod to 100 foreign enterprises.
At a recent meeting of the commission earlier this month, a total of 23 foreign enterprises with investment capital of over 433.8 million U.S. dollars were approved by the MIC.
Creating 11,951 local employment opportunities, the investments from the recently approved enterprises entered the country’s power, real estate, livestock and fisheries and manufacturing sectors, respectively. Meanwhile, the MIC gave the green light to 39 Myanmar citizen investment enterprises with over 647.6 billion kyats (431.7 million U.S. dollars) as of Jan. 24 in present FY 2019-2020..."
Source/publisher:
"Xinhua" (China)
Date of publication:
2020-01-28
Date of entry/update:
2020-01-29
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy, Political, social and economic dimensions of investment in Burma, Burma/Myanmar's Foreign relations, general
Language:
more
Sub-title:
The pacts were signed during president Xi Jinping’s two-day visit to Myanmar, a first by a Chinese president in almost two decades...This will give a significant push to China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative to which Myanmar had signed onto in 2018 amid lack of investments from western countries.
Description:
"China and Myanmar, over the weekend, signed 33 bilateral agreements that are expected to strengthen ties between India’s eastern neighbor and Beijing.
The accords include those to construct a rail link and a deep-sea port – part of a China-Myanmar-Economic Corridor – that runs from China’s south-western region to the Bay of Bengal. This will give a significant push to China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative to which Myanmar had signed onto in 2018 amid lack of investments from western countries.
The pacts were signed during president Xi Jinping’s two-day visit to Myanmar, a first by a Chinese president in almost two decades. Xi’s visit to Myanmar was also his first abroad in the 2020 calendar year.
The pacts were signed against the backdrop of Myanmar State Councilor Aung San Suu Kyi coming under increasing pressure from Western countries over its crackdown on Rohingya Muslims. A Myanmar military campaign in 2017-18 caused some 730,000 Rohingyas from Rakhine state to flee to Bangladesh. In December, Nobel Laureate Suu Kyi defended her country’s human rights record vis a vis the Rohingyas at a hearing at the Hague-based International Court of Justice and a ruling in expected this month..."
Source/publisher:
"livemint" (New Delhi)
Date of publication:
2020-01-20
Date of entry/update:
2020-01-20
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
China-Burma-India relations, Burma's economic relations with China, Burma's economic relations with India, Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy, “One Belt, One Road” initiative
Language:
more
Sub-title:
Chinese president’s two-day trip comes as nations mark 70 years of diplomatic ties...US sanctions on Myanmar’s military leaders over alleged ‘serious human rights abuses’ described as a blow to Southeast Asian nation’s dignity.
Description:
"Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Myanmar this week is special in several ways. It is Xi’s first overseas trip of the year and the first visit to the Southeast Asian country by a Chinese president since 2001. This year also marks the 70th anniversary of formal diplomatic ties between the two countries.
A recent Xinhua commentary said that “a good neighbour is better than a far dwelling relative”, referring to China’s ties with Myanmar. Some observers view geopolitics concerning Myanmar in black-and-white terms: a National League for Democracy (NLD) government would lead to closer ties with the West and less so with China. The Rakhine issue effectively put paid to such earlier prognosis. If anything, there has yet to be any respite to the general downturn in relations between Myanmar and the West. In fact, the situation has worsened.
Following a round of sanctions by Western powers in 2018, the US treasury department last month imposed new sanctions against Myanmar’s top military leaders over alleged “serious human rights abuses”, a move that Myanmar’s military (the Tatmadaw) criticised as “targeted political pressure” which “hurt the dignity” of the military. A month earlier, the Tatmadaw was accused by the US of possessing chemical weapons..."
Source/publisher:
"South China Morning Post" (Hong Kong)
Date of publication:
2020-01-19
Date of entry/update:
2020-01-19
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
China-Burma-US relations, Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy, Burma's economic relations with China, “One Belt, One Road” initiative, Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first)
Language:
more
Description:
"Myanmar’s efforts to reverse a legacy of isolation began with the quasi-civilian government led by then-president U Thein Sein. From 2011–2015, his government undertook a series of political, economic and social reforms that built the foundation for future democratic development. Key reform initiatives under his administration included renewed engagement with ethnic armed forces, a relaxation of press censorship, liberalisation of the telecommunications sector, increased autonomy of the Central Bank of Myanmar and improvement of the budgetary and taxation system. The government also attempted to improve private sector development by reducing red tape to ease business costs and attract foreign investment.
During U Thein Sein’s presidential term, Myanmar became one of the fastest growing economies in ASEAN, with an average growth rate of 7.3 per cent. The country also achieved the Human Development Index’s medium-ranked member status.
Major challenges remain despite these positive developments: land disputes, informal settlements in cities, inadequate basic infrastructure and most importantly an unstable political situation due to conflict in Rakhine, Shan and Kachin states.
The political landscape of Myanmar changed dramatically after the second general election in 2015 when Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) won a majority of seats in the people’s parliament, national parliaments and sub-national parliaments.
The new government was immediately confronted by existing and new challenges. A few months before the elections, 12 out of 14 regions and states were affected by flooding that damaged 1.9 million acres of farmland causing the price of rice to increase. A 20 per cent drop in net inflow of FDI and a growth rate sinking to 5.9 per cent (from the average 7.3 per cent growth rate of president U Thein Sein’s administration) also made 2016 a difficult year for the new government..."
Source/publisher:
"East Asia Forum" (Australia)
Date of publication:
2020-01-17
Date of entry/update:
2020-01-18
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Development in Myanmar - various texts, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy, Burma/Myanmar's Foreign relations, general
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
35.7 KB
more
Description:
"Myanmar’s economy continues to show resilience despite the ongoing global slowdown and domestic uncertainties, according to a new World Bank report released today.
The Myanmar Economic Monitor for December 2019 estimates that Myanmar’s economy grew at 6.3 percent in 2018-19, marginally higher than 6.2 percent in 2017-18. Economic growth is expected to reach 6.4 percent in 2019-20, helped by growing investment in the transport and telecommunications sector and planned infrastructure spending by the government before the 2020 elections.
The service sector is the main driver of growth in Myanmar and is expected to grow by 8.4 percent in 2018-19. A slow recovery in tourism related services is offset by robust growth in wholesale and retail trade. The industrial sector is expected to grow by 6.4 percent, on the back of strong manufacturing growth offsetting slower growth in construction. Despite seasonal floods and volatile demand, agriculture output growth is projected to be stable at 1.6 percent, with greater diversification in production and export destinations, but remains below potential..."
Source/publisher:
"Modern Diplomacy"
Date of publication:
2020-01-18
Date of entry/update:
2020-01-18
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
General reports and articles, Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy, Burma/Myanmar's Foreign relations, general
Language:
more
Description:
"Myanmar exported about 30,000 tons of rice worth US$8.8 million through maritime trade from December 22 to 27, according to figures from Ministry of Commerce.
About 8,000 tons of rice is exported to Asian countries and about 3,000 tons of rice is exported to EU countries. About 18,000 tons of rice is exported to African countries and 25 tons of rice is exported to a new market, Puerto Rico.
It exported about US$2 million worth of over 6,600 tons of rice to China and Thailand via border trade centers, according to the ministry.
Myanmar exported over 3,500 tons of rice from Muse 105-mile border trade center, about 600 tons of rice from Chinshwehaw border trade center, about 1,400 tons of rice from Lweje border trade center, about 80 tons of rice from Kanpikete border trade center and more than 1,100 tons of rice from Techilek border trade center..."
Source/publisher:
Eleven Media Group (Myanmar)
Date of publication:
2020-01-14
Date of entry/update:
2020-01-14
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
International Trade, Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy, Burma/Myanmar's Foreign relations, general
Language:
more
Description:
"The U.S. government will take steps next week to limit the export of artificial intelligence (AI) software. The decision by the Trump administration comes at a time when powerful rival nations, such as China, are becoming increasingly dominant in the field. The move is meant to keep certain sensitive technologies from falling into the hands of those nations.
The new rule goes into effect on January 6, 2020, and it will be aimed at certain companies that export geospatial imagery software from the United States. Those companies will be required to apply for a license to export it. The only exception is that a license will not be required to export to Canada.
The new measure was the first of its kind to be finalized by the Commerce Department under a mandate from a 2018 law passed by Congress. That law updated arms controls to include emerging technology.
The new rules will likely have an effect on a growing part of the tech industry. These algorithms are currently being used in order to analyze satellite images of crops, trade patterns and other changes within the economy and environment.
Chinese companies are responsible for having exported artificial intelligence surveillance technology to over 60 countries. Some of those countries have dismal human rights records and include Iran, Myanmar, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe..."
Source/publisher:
"Unite.ai"
Date of publication:
2020-01-05
Date of entry/update:
2020-01-13
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy, International Trade, China-Burma-US relations
Language:
more
Description:
"Upon his visit to Laos in November 2017, Xi Jinping wrote in an open letter, published in English and Lao in Laotian mainstream media, that “there is a high degree of complementarity between China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the strategy of Laos to transform itself from a landlocked to a land-linked country.”
He further described the China-Laos Railway, the flagship of the BRI in Laos, as "(t)he transportation artillery that will drive the development of Laos (and that) is a dream coming true.”
These lines point to two central features of China’s BRI. One is its embracing of the “Chinese Dream”, already extended as China’s “Asia-Pacific Dream”; the second is, more importantly, its discursive power of scripting China’s geopolitical and economic interests in the rhetoric of its partners’ national development strategies.
As the land-linked strategy has been already advertised by the Laotian government for more than two decades, the BRI in Laos is, rather than breaking new ground, an intensified and accelerated continuation of already existing development strategies and policies..."
Source/publisher:
"The Business Times" (Singapore)
Date of publication:
2020-01-13
Date of entry/update:
2020-01-13
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
“One Belt, One Road” initiative, Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy, Burma's economic relations with China, Burma/Myanmar's Foreign relations, general
Language:
more
Sub-title:
Far from the front lines of the US-China trade war, the resource-rich Kachin is the scene of a familiar struggle for influence between the two superpowers...China has invested heavily, but for some locals development has come at a cost
Description:
"While the US-China trade war plays to the audience on the global stage, behind the scenes the two superpowers are engaged in a unique tug of war for influence in one of the world’s more remote corners.
Myitkyina, the capital of Myanmar’s Kachin State about 1,200km north of Yangon, rarely features on tourist bucket lists. Despite its verdant scenery and dynamic culture and traditions, it suffers from high rates of poverty and drug addiction, and has been the scene of a conflict between the Kachin Independence Army and the Myanmar military which has displaced an estimated 100,000 people since a 17-year ceasefire collapsed in 2011. Yet recently not one, but two high-profile visitors arrived in the space of just days.
US Ambassador to Myanmar Scot Marciel and a delegation from the US Embassy held a Myitkyina Road Show in November that included a jobs and opportunities fair, a workshop with the agricultural sector, and a meeting with veterans who fought alongside US troops in World War II. Marciel said the embassy wanted to work with the Kachin people “in support of freedom, democracy, human rights and economic progress”, and that the US was “committed to implementing development programmes in an open, transparent manner … to listen and learn”..."
Source/publisher:
"South China Morning Post" (Hong Kong)
Date of publication:
2020-01-12
Date of entry/update:
2020-01-12
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
China-Burma-US relations, “One Belt, One Road” initiative, International Trade, Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy, Kachin State
Language:
more
Topic:
Economy, Markets, ASEAN +3 Macroeconomic Research Office, Tourism, E-Commerce, Myanmar
Topic:
Economy, Markets, ASEAN +3 Macroeconomic Research Office, Tourism, E-Commerce, Myanmar
Description:
"The ASEAN Post recently published an article on whether 2020 will be a good year for Myanmar’s economy. That article noted that the ASEAN +3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO) had given Myanmar’s economy a positive outlook for the fiscal year of 2019 to 2020; expecting it to expand by 7.1 percent up from 6.8 percent in the previous fiscal year. However, there may be some events that could act as obstacles to this growth.
The positive outlook is largely thanks to reform momentum, improving business sentiments, growth in manufacturing, tourism related expansion and stronger fiscal spending. According to AMRO, the five key sectors with growth potential in Myanmar this year are (1) the tourism industry, (2) property, (3) insurance, (4) digital transactions and (5) the stock exchange business. However, according to reports, economists have noted that the downside is the ongoing Rakhine crisis as well as the lawsuit filed against Myanmar in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) by Gambia, which could tarnish the country’s image as an investment destination. One of the five key growth sectors this could clearly impact is the tourism industry.
Myanmar has taken several measures to attract tourists. Among these measures are relaxed visa requirements. Aside from that, there have also been a slew of new flight routes coming in and out of Myanmar and neighbouring countries including India, China, Cambodia, and Thailand all throughout last year..."
Source/publisher:
"The ASEAN Post" (Malaysia)
Date of publication:
2020-01-12
Date of entry/update:
2020-01-12
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Burma's economic relations with ASEAN, Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy, ASEAN-Burma relations, Sustainable development, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
more
Description:
"During three months of the current fiscal year, Myanmar earned over 250 million US dollars from the exports of around 900,000 tons of rice and broken rice, according to Myanmar Rice Federation.
Till December 27 of 2019-20 FY, Myanmar exported 894,889.703 tons of rice and broken rice worth 256.452 million US dollars.
During this period, Myanmar exported over 600,000 tons of rice worth over 180 million US dollars to 53 countries and around 290,000 tons of broken rice worth over 75 million US dollars, to 45 countries.
Myanmar exports rice to the EU and Africa via sea route and China via Muse border trade. During three months, Myanmar earned over 34 million US dollars from exports of over 130,000 tons of rice and broken rice via border trade. Border trade accounted for 15 per cent of the total rice export.
Myanmar earned over 220 million US dollars from exports of over 760,000 tons of rice and broken rice via sea route. It made up over 85 per cent of the total rice export.
In 2018-19 FY, Myanmar earned 709.693 million US dollars from exports of 2.355 tons of rice and broken rice, according to the MRF.
In 2017-18 FY, Myanmar’s rice exports reached a record high within over 50 years, with the exports of nearly 3.6 million tons of rice and broken rice..."
Source/publisher:
Eleven Media Group (Myanmar)
Date of publication:
2020-01-12
Date of entry/update:
2020-01-12
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Language:
more
Description:
"The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China’s scheme to boost global connectivity and market integration principally through the export of its infrastructure development capabilities, is redefining Southeast Asia’s economic and security environment. Although the BRI risks the usual pathologies of large-scale infrastructure development—corruption, environmental degradation, social instability, and debt—it also promises an array of economic benefits to the region’s diverse economies, not least by addressing the region’s massive infrastructure deficit and potentially jump-starting industrialization in less developed countries there.
Over the first five years of the initiative, more than $500 billion in BRI-related capital has flowed into Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam alone. Much of this capital comes from Chinese sources for developing transportation links. These links, like the pan-Asia railway network, will connect to Chinese cities—one of the many ways the BRI is weaving the Chinese and regional economies and societies together..."
Source/publisher:
"Carnegie Endowment for International Peace" (Washington, D.C)
Date of publication:
2019-10-10
Date of entry/update:
2020-01-11
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
“One Belt, One Road” initiative, Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy, China-Burma relations
Language:
more
Description:
"Myanmar Investment Commission (MIC) recently approved six more investment enterprises from both home and abroad, said a release from the Directorate of Investment and Company Administration (DICA) on Saturday.
The enterprises, which will create over 1,300 local employment opportunities, were given the go-ahead at the commission's meeting held on Friday.
With investment capital of 257.8 million U.S. dollars and 60.2 billion kyats (40.1 million U.S. dollars), the permitted enterprises engaged in the country's power, manufacturing, hotel and other services sectors, respectively.
Meanwhile, the commission approved 39 foreign enterprises with investment capital of over 1 billion U.S. dollars in first two months of present fiscal year 2019-2020 which started in October, the DICA's figures said..."
Source/publisher:
"Xinhua" (China)
Date of publication:
2020-01-11
Date of entry/update:
2020-01-11
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy, Political, social and economic dimensions of investment in Burma, Burma/Myanmar's Foreign relations, general
Language:
more
Sub-title:
Myanmar witnessed an economic slowdown in fiscal 2019, with GDP growth downgraded to 6.5 percent from 6.8pc in 2018, and foreign direct investments (FDI) hitting just 70pc of official targets. The economy also took a hit from slowing global growth and uncertainty arising from the trade war between China and the US.
Description:
"But the Myanmar government also took progressive measures to boost the economy. It led further liberalisation in various sectors of the economy and took steps to address the country’s power shortage. It also announced new tax reductions and reliefs aimed at boosting state coffers and economic activity, garnering applause from the business community.
During the year, the government took efforts to attract FDI in spite of the ongoing Rakhine crisis and lawsuit filed against Myanmar in the International Court of Justice by Gambia, which tarnished the country’s image as an investment destination. Among them were a string of investment forums held in the states and regions, which were aimed at drawing investors to rural areas like Rakhine and Chin.
Here are the top ten events in business and investments that shaped the Myanmar economy in 2019: 1. Insurance sector liberalised
Five insurance firms – British Prudential, Japanese Dai-ichi Life, Hong Kong AIA, US Chubb and Canadian Manulife – finally received licenses to operate in Myanmar in late November after a two-year delay.
In addition, six insurance JVs of foreign and local firms also received the green light. The three JVs for non-life insurance are AYA Myanmar General Insurance and Sompo Japan Nipponkoa Insurance; Grand Guardian General Insurance and Tokio Marine & Nichido Fire Insurance; and IKBZ Insurance and Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance..."
Source/publisher:
"Myanmar Times" (Myanmar)
Date of publication:
2019-12-31
Date of entry/update:
2020-01-11
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy, Economic Development, Burma/Myanmar's Foreign relations, general
Language:
more
Description:
" Myanmar earned over 2.49 billion U.S. dollars from export of finished industrial goods in the first three months of present fiscal year (FY) 2019-2020 which started in October, according to figures from the Commerce Ministry on Thursday.
As of Dec. 27 of this FY, the export of finished industrial goods or manufacturing goods export topped the list among other export products.
This FY's figures increased by over 718.5 million U.S. dollars, compared to the same period of last FY 2018-2019 when it fetched over 1.77 billion U.S. dollars.
Myanmar mainly exports agricultural products, animal products, marine products, minerals, forest products, manufacturing goods and others to foreign trade partner countries.
During the period, the country's export totaled over 4.56 billion U.S. dollars while its import shared over 4.57 billion U.S. dollars, the ministry's figures said..."
Source/publisher:
"Xinhua" (China)
Date of publication:
2020-01-09
Date of entry/update:
2020-01-10
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy, International Trade, Burma/Myanmar's Foreign relations, general
Language:
more
Sub-title:
Total/Woodside Energy’s block A-6 project in the Rakhine basin offshore Myanmar will be the country’s first ultra-deepwater development.
Description:
"Total/Woodside Energy’s block A-6 project in the Rakhine basin offshore Myanmar will be the country’s first ultra-deepwater development.
The block covers an area close to 10,000 sq km (3,861 sq mi) in water depths of up to 2,300 m (7,546 ft).
Woodside has a 40% interest in the joint venture and is the technical joint operator for exploration and appraisal operations.
MPRL E&P with 20% is also a joint operator. Total, which has a 40% interest, will assume operatorship during the development phase. According to Woodside, the partners aim to start front-end engineering design during the second half of this year.
Since 2018 when the Shwe Yee Htun-2 discovery well delivered 40 m (131 ft) of net gas pay, five more wells have been drilled, all encountering gas. Woodside estimates the combined resource at 67 MMboe..."
Source/publisher:
"Offshore Oil and Gas Magazine"
Date of publication:
2020-01-09
Date of entry/update:
2020-01-10
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first), Oil and gas, Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy
Language:
more
Description:
"Myanmar has potential investments from Hong Kong and ASEAN countries such as Singapore and Thailand in 2019-20 FY, according to the Ministry of Investment and Foreign Economic Relations.
Among ASEAN countries, Singapore, Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, Brunei, Cambodia and Laos made investments in Myanmar.
A total of 50 countries invested in 1,876 businesses in 12 sectors from 1988 to November 2019 and the total investment is about US$83 billion.
In that period, the investment amount of nine ASEAN countries is over US$38 billion and it is over 46 per cent of total foreign investment.
The investment amount of ASEAN countries are as per following: over US$22 billion from Singapore, over 11 billion from Thailand, over 2 billion from Vietnam, about 2 billion from Malaysia, over US$270 million from Indonesia, about US$150 million from Philippines, over US$120 million from Brunei, over US$24 million from Cambodia and about one million from Laos..."
Source/publisher:
"Eleven Media Group" (Myanmar)
Date of publication:
2020-01-08
Date of entry/update:
2020-01-09
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Burma's economic relations with ASEAN, Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy, ASEAN-Burma relations
Language:
more
Sub-title:
American apathy in world affairs may be the silver bullet that hands-off systemic leadership to the Chinese. With growing structural capacities, China is able to propagate a new means of conducting world politics, one of a distinctly authoritarian variant.
Description:
"China’s successful economic and geopolitical rise has positioned Beijing to push an agenda that is antithetical to America’s political and economic liberal order. China is no longer a rising power, but rather a peer competitor with the United States fighting to maximize security and global clout. Meanwhile, the United States remains distracted by domestic political polarization and protracted foreign wars. What does this lack of American engagement and increasing Chinese ambition mean for the global order? This is not another piece on America’s “lost hegemony.” Instead, it is representative of aggressive Chinese ambition and coercive economic diplomacy. Perhaps a more relevant scenario to explore would be: if China rolled tanks into Hong Kong tomorrow to quell the persisting pro-democracy demonstrations, how would the international community react? Would the United States be able to draw a red line for China?..."
Source/publisher:
"The National Interest" (USA)
Date of publication:
2020-01-06
Date of entry/update:
2020-01-08
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
“One Belt, One Road” initiative, Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy, China-Burma-US relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
more
Description:
"Myanmar earned over 59.4 billion kyats (39.6 million U.S. dollars) from a gems and jade sale event which was concluded on Tuesday, an official of Myanma Gems Enterprise (MGE) told media.
The gems and jade sale event, kicked off in capital city Nay Pyi Taw on Jan. 2, was organized by the Myanma Gems Enterprise (MGE) under the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation.
A total of 3,491 jade lots and nine gem lots were sold at the event, with 2,023 merchants in attendance, said General Manager Thet Khaing.
All 25 state-owned jade lots were sold out at the event and fetched about 450 million kyats (300,000 U.S. dollars), he added.
The last gems and jade sale, which was held in June 2019, fetched 60.89 billion kyats (40.6 million U.S. dollars) from the sale of 49 gems lots and 3,011 jade lots, with 2,010 local merchants in attendance..."
Source/publisher:
"Xinhua" (China)
Date of publication:
2020-01-07
Date of entry/update:
2020-01-08
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Language:
more
Description:
"ECONOMIC growth in Myanmar may be held back by uncertainty ahead of the 2020 elections, the International Monetary Fund revealed.
Foreign direct investment inflows and project approvals, it warns, remain lower than in recent years because large projects have been completed and foreign investors remain cautious ahead of the polls scheduled next year.
The IMF, after the annual Article IV consultations in the country, however, sees the economy continuing to grow steadily, according to The Myanmar Times.
“For 2019-20, growth is expected to be broadly stable, with higher government spending largely offset by pre-election uncertainty and weaker private demand,” the fund said in a statement.
It, however, reiterated warnings made last April that “risks are tilted to the downside” and cited concerns over fallout from the Rakhine crisis and weaknesses in the banking sector.
"On the domestic front, growth could underperform if fiscal spending does not accelerate sufficiently. Delayed restructuring and recapitalisation of the banking system could increase systemic risks with large macro financial spillovers.
"A deterioration of the security situation and continued humanitarian issues in Rakhine could weigh on sentiment,” the IMF said in the statement issued following a visit by its team of economists..."
Source/publisher:
"New Straits Times" (Malaysia)
Date of publication:
2019-12-27
Date of entry/update:
2020-01-08
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Economic Development, Sustainable development, Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy, The 2020 General Elections in Burma/Myanmar
Language:
more
Topic:
Economy, Markets, ASEAN +3 Macroeconomic Research Office, Tourism, E-Commerce, Myanmar
Topic:
Economy, Markets, ASEAN +3 Macroeconomic Research Office, Tourism, E-Commerce, Myanmar
Description:
"It was reported recently that the ASEAN +3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO) had given Myanmar’s economy a positive outlook for the fiscal year of 2019 to 2020, expecting it to expand by 7.1 percent up from 6.8 percent in the previous fiscal year. This is largely thanks to reform momentum, improving business sentiments, growth in manufacturing, tourism related expansion and stronger fiscal spending.
According to AMRO, the five key sectors with growth potential in Myanmar this year are (1) the tourism industry, (2) property, (3) insurance, (4) digital transactions and (5) the stock exchange business.
Looking at the tourism industry, several measures have been taken to attract tourists. Among these measures is the easing up on visa requirements. Beginning 1 October last year, tourists from Australia, Germany, Italy, Spain, Switzerland and Russia were given visas on arrival for US$50 each at Yangon, Mandalay and Nay Pyi Taw international airports. Even more recently, on 1 January, the government of Myanmar relaxed its visa regulations for five more countries. Travellers from the Czech Republic, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Hungary and Austria will be given visas on arrival when entering the country for the next three years.
There have also been a slew of new flight routes coming in and out of Myanmar and neighbouring countries including India, China, Cambodia, and Thailand all throughout 2019..."
Source/publisher:
"The ASEAN Post" (Malaysia)
Date of publication:
2020-01-08
Date of entry/update:
2020-01-08
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Burma's economic relations with ASEAN, Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy, Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy, Sustainable/ethical/responsible tourism (Burma/Myanmar), ASEAN-Burma relations, Burma/Myanmar's Foreign relations, general
Language:
more
Sub-title:
Ironically, the solutions proposed by the BRI contradict China’s own development model.
Description:
"China’s top leaders have recently begun to tout China’s own development success as an example for others to replicate. Former Chinese Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs He Yafei, for example, has claimed that “the success of the ‘Chinese model’ … offers other developing countries an option different from the ‘American model’ for economic development.” In his address to the 19th Chinese Communist Party Congress in October 2017, President Xi Jinping argued that China’s successful development experience was “blazing a new trail for other developing countries to achieve modernization.”
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), launched in 2013, is commonly viewed as the primary vehicle for promoting a China model of development. Encompassing 123 countries, the BRI commits China to provide $1 trillion in financing over the next decade for hundreds of infrastructure projects – roads, railways, ports, pipelines, electrical grids, and energy plants – designed to connect both land and maritime networks stretching from Southeast Asia to Europe..."
Source/publisher:
"The Diplomat" (Japan)
Date of publication:
2019-12-17
Date of entry/update:
2020-01-06
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
“One Belt, One Road” initiative, Burma's economic relations with China, Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy, China-Burma relations
Language:
more
Sub-title:
Part two of this series looks at American pressure on Chinese outward foreign direct investment.
Description:
"The United States has long been concerned about Chinese outward foreign direct investment (COFDI). Even so, U.S. angst has reached new heights during President Donald Trump’s tenure in office. Under his administration, the United States has launched a three-pronged war against COFDI. The first prong entails a harsher environment for COFDI in the United States. The second encompasses maneuvers against COFDI overseas. And the third involves steps to disrupt the progress of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
The first prong has been primarily evidenced by the expansion of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS)’s role in reviewing FDI. It has been reflected, too, by the 2018 passage of the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRMMA). Notably, FIRMMA changed the ownership standard triggering CFIUS reviews from 10 percent of voting shares to one focused more on decision-making abilities/control and also expanded CFIUS’s ambit to cover FDI in critical infrastructure and real estate near sensitive locations like military bases. Recently, Congress passed the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act, which hits COFDI in the United States directly by forbidding the use of federal funds to purchase rail cars and buses from Chinese-controlled firms. The White House has not publicly pilloried COFDI in the United States, but prominent members of the U.S. Congress continue to warn vociferously about its risks..."
Source/publisher:
"The Diplomat" (Japan)
Date of publication:
2019-01-03
Date of entry/update:
2020-01-06
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
“One Belt, One Road” initiative, Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy, Burma's economic relations with China, China-Burma relations
Language:
more
Sub-title:
But manufacturing activity across Asia showed signs of recovery as recent survey data indicated growth in late 2019.
Description:
"China's factory activity expanded at a slower clip in December, pulling back from a three-year high the previous month as new orders softened, a private survey showed on Thursday.
But business confidence shot up amid thawing trade tensions with the United States, offering some support for the cooling economy. Beijing and Washington agreed last month on an initial deal that will de-escalate their prolonged trade war.
More:
Date set for US-China trade deal sends world markets to new high
Singapore slump: Economic growth falls in 2019 on trade woes
Hong Kong economy to shrink in fourth quarter, says finance chief
The Caixin/Markit Manufacturing Purchasing Managers' Index (PMI) for December eased to 51.5 from 51.8 the previous month missing analysts' expectations that the reading would hold steady. But it remained above the 50-mark that separates expansion from contraction for the fifth straight month..."
Source/publisher:
"Al Jazeera" (Qatar)
Date of publication:
2020-01-02
Date of entry/update:
2020-01-05
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Burma's economic relations with China, Burma's economic relations with the USA, Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy, Burma/Myanmar's Foreign relations, general
Language:
more
Description:
"Japan will launch a 390 million yen ($3.6 million) project in May in Myanmar to boost irrigation and agricultural management as part of efforts to increase productivity and eradicate poverty in the Southeast Asian country.
Development of the agriculture promotion system, the improvement of the rice value chain, among other things, will be conducted in six townships in the Shwebo district of the Sagaing region, home to some of the largest irrigated farmland in Myanmar.
The Japan International Cooperation Agency and the Myanmar government signed an agreement for the project in the Myanmar capital Naypyitaw last week.
The two sides also aim to secure a stable water source by establishing a water management organization for farmers and improve profitably by obtaining a geographical indication tag for Shwebo Pawsan, a high-end variety of local rice.
The project, designed to improve the income and management skills of farmers, runs from May 2020 to November 2024, according to JICA..."
Source/publisher:
"Japan Today" (Japan)
Date of publication:
2019-12-31
Date of entry/update:
2020-01-05
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Japan-Burma relations, Sustainable agriculture - global and regional, Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy
Language:
more
Description:
"The economy in Myanmar in the fiscal year of 2019-2020 was given a positive outlook by the Asean+3 Macroeconomic Research Office.
It is expected to expand by 7.1 per cent, up from 6.8 per cent in the previous fiscal year, buoyed by reform momentum, improving business sentiments, growth in manufacturing, tourism related expansion and stronger fiscal spending.
Directorate of Investment and Company Administration director-general U Thant Sin Lwin said foreign direct investments was also expected to pick up and align with the government estimates for the fiscal year 2019-2020, according to the Myanmar Times.
Business and economists said the downside is the ongoing Rakhine crisis and lawsuit filed against Myanmar in the International Court of Justice by Gambia, which could tarnish the country’s image as an investment destination.
Myanmar is also expected to hold a general election in 2020, and many investors will wait and see how things unfold in the political economy before investing further in the country this year.
This year, five key sectors with growth potentials are the tourism industry, property, insurance, digital transactions and the stock exchange business..."
Source/publisher:
"New Straits Times" (Malaysia)
Date of publication:
2020-01-02
Date of entry/update:
2020-01-05
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Language:
more
Description:
"Myanmar exported over 9,000 tons of rice worth over US$2 million within two weeks, from December 14 to 20, through border trade centers in China and Thailand borders, announced the Ministry of Commerce.
It exported over 5,500 tons of rice from Muse 105 mile border trade center, about 400 tons of rice from the Chinshwehaw border trade center, over 1,300 tons of rice from the Lweje border trade center and about 2,000 tons of rice from Techilek border trade center.
Myanmar also exported over 40,000 tons of rice worth over US$12.5 million from December 15 to 21 via maritime trade routes. It exported about 16,000 tons of rice to Asia countries, about 5,700 tons of rice to EU countries and over 20,000 tons of rice to African countries.
Myanmar earned over US$65 million from over 220,000 tons of rice and broken rice export about one month of this fiscal year and it earned US$21 million more in compared with the same period in the last fiscal year, said Assistant Secretary Khin Maung Lwin of the ministry..."
Source/publisher:
"Eleven Media Group" (Myanmar)
Date of publication:
2019-01-03
Date of entry/update:
2020-01-05
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Border Trade with China, Border Trade with Thailand, Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy
Language:
more
Description:
"With gross domestic product (GDP) growth consistently above 5 percent throughout this decade, and in double digits for much of the previous decade, Myanmar has been one of South East Asia’s fastest-growing economies for quite some time. What’s more, this newly liberalised nation is being touted to likely continue growing expeditiously well into the 2020s. That said, recent years have seen Myanmar’s growth showing a distinct sign of waning from its once lofty heights: Some believe this ongoing slowdown may continue over the next few years. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), for instance, recently stated that Myanmar’s economy appears to be losing momentum. “Myanmar’s economy is expected to gain steam over the medium term albeit at a somewhat slower pace than previously envisaged and subject to greater downside risks” was the IMF Executive Board’s recent assessment. Part of the concern over Myanmar’s economic outlook is directed at the National League for Democracy (NLD) government, which came to power in 2016 after a thumping election victory put an end to decades of military rule. But since then, the NLD has come in for much criticism for the economy’s overall performance, as well as the slow pace at which reforms are being enacted that would enable Myanmar to make the full transition into a liberalised market economy.
Perhaps the economic underperformance of recent years is understandable. After all, achieving peace in all regions of the nation continues to remain elusive, meaning that the government has been primarily focused on reconciliation before it can move ahead with other priorities, such as bringing about economic prosperity. Even today, tensions persist, not only between the NLD and the military but also between the military and armed ethnic groups in various parts of the country..."
Source/publisher:
"International Banker"
Date of publication:
2019-06-26
Date of entry/update:
2019-12-16
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy, Banking, Burma/Myanmar's Foreign relations, general
Language:
more
Description:
"The Future of the Myanmar Defense Industry – Market Attractiveness, Competitive Landscape and Forecasts to 2022, published by Strategic Defence Intelligence, provides readers with detailed analysis of both historic and forecast defense industry values, factors influencing demand, the challenges faced by industry participants, analysis of industry leading companies, and key news. This report offers detailed analysis of the Myanmar defense industry with market size forecasts covering the next five years. This report will also analyze factors that influence demand for the industry, key market trends, and challenges faced by industry participants.
In particular, it provides an in-depth analysis of the following –
– The Myanmar defense industry market size and drivers: detailed analysis of the Myanmar defense industry during 2018-2022, including highlights of the demand drivers and growth stimulators for the industry. It also provides a snapshot of the country’s expenditure and modernization patterns
– Budget allocation and key challenges: insights into procurement schedules formulated within the country and a breakdown of the defense budget. It also details the key challenges faced by defense market participants within the country
– Porter’s Five Force analysis of the Myanmar defense industry: analysis of the market characteristics by determining the bargaining power of suppliers, bargaining power of buyers, threat of substitution, intensity of rivalry, and barriers to entry
– Import and Export Dynamics: analysis of prevalent trends in the country’s imports and exports over the last five years
– Market opportunities: details of the top five defense investment opportunities over the next 10 years
– Competitive landscape and strategic insights: analysis of the competitive landscape of the Myanmar defense industry. It provides an overview of key players, together with insights such as key alliances, strategic initiatives, and a brief financial analysis..."
Source/publisher:
"Orbis" (New York) via "News Tribune" (Duluth)
Date of publication:
2019-12-16
Date of entry/update:
2019-12-16
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Language:
more
Sub-title:
Many problems can be sheeted home Aung San Suu Kyi – even if there are few critics willing to suggest alternatives.
Description:
"Talking to business owners across a variety of sectors in Yangon in January this year, the mood was universally glum.
Big-spending Western tourists were staying away in droves, concerned over human rights abuses. Bureaucratic red tape was clogging up business and investment, and the country remains a logistics nightmare. More than halfway through its five-year term, it is clear Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) was chronically under-prepared for government and has strikingly failed to get a grip on the economy. Yet Myanmar’s increasingly troubled economy tends to get overlooked, amid the armed conflicts that could tear the country apart. In particular, headlines are dominated by the Rohingya tragedy that has seen more than 700,000 flee to Bangladesh, and the ongoing civil war across Kachin and Shan states in the north of the country.
The World Bank, in its half-yearly update on Myanmar in December, cited softening consumption, slowing investment. and rising production-cost pressure from fuel price increases and the depreciation of the local currency, the Kyat, which has fallen by 16% against the US dollar in the past 12 months. Myanmar’s GDP growth is also forecast to fall, while almost every other measure of economic activity is also softening. The risks, the World Bank says, are all on the downside..."
Source/publisher:
"The Interpreter"
Date of publication:
2019-02-16
Date of entry/update:
2019-12-16
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy, Burma/Myanmar's Foreign relations, general
Language:
more
Description:
"Myanmar authorities sent 30,841 migrant workers to work in foreign countries in November, according to a release from the Information Ministry on Friday.
In November alone, 21,405 workers were sent to Thailand while 8,440 workers to Malaysia and 591 to Japan.
Also, 230 workers were sent to South Korea, 83 to Jordan, 61 to Singapore, 24 to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and seven to Qatar, respectively.
During the period, a total of 24,268 local employments were also offered by the Ministry of Labor, Immigration and Population and of them, 23,943 workers engaged in private sector.
The ministry has been offering local and foreign employment opportunities to local people through online labor exchange management system, with an aim to promote development of the country and help local people increase their incomes..."
Source/publisher:
"Xinhua" (China)
Date of publication:
2019-12-13
Date of entry/update:
2019-12-14
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Labour migration: global and regional studies, Migrant workers from Burma : general and mixed articles and reports, Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy
Language:
more