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Description: A website related to the book of the same title edited by Mandy Sadan."This website contains some materials that are intended to illustrate or to extend some of the chapters in the book. More material will be added as time permits. You will find general information in About the Book; abstracts for each chapter, questions for further research and supporting documentation in Contents; you can Read the Introduction in full and download it; we also encourage ?Thinking about ...? how the issues raised in the book map onto bigger questions about how societies adapt themselves to war-peace transitions, with a particular emphasis on understanding history, experience, aesthetics and culture, and mobilities."
Creator/author: Mandy Sadan
Source/publisher: Mandy Sadan
Date of entry/update: 2018-01-24
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Description: "Ethnic conflict has dominated the political landscape of Burma (Myanmar) since independence from Great Britain in 1948. In the process, countless lives have been lost, many communities dislocated from their homes, and a country that was deemed to have the brightest future of any of its Asian neighbors at independence has stagnated to become one of the world’s poorest. In such state failures, tragedy is interwoven with irony. Burma, indeed, is the land where the anthropologist Edmund Leach carried out his ground-breaking studies into patterns of cultural inter-change among peoples. In essence, Leach concluded that ethnic and political identities are neither innate nor inflexible, but develop on the basis of understandings and cultural exchanges between different societies. Since this time, ethnic field research in Burma has come to a virtual halt. The world of Asian studies thus owes a profound debt of gratitude to Prof. Josef Silverstein. Since the 1950s, his writings on ethnic questions have stood out as a persistent – and often lone – beacon of concerned but independent analysis. At the beginning of the 21st century, his works are as pertinent as when he first began. Not only has he crystallized complex issues in understandable form, but he has done this in a language that has become common currency in many international understandings of the country and its challenges. A particular issue in Burmese politics over the past 60 years has been the lack of common forums or platforms where different parties and nationalities might equally work together. As Prof. Silverstein has described, underpinning these failures is the ‘dilemma of national unity’.1 Important ethnic questions date back to the pre-colonial past. But, in general, the modern roots of many problems can be found in the political divisions of Burma, under a diarchic system, between ‘Ministerial Burma’ and the ethnic minority ‘Frontier Areas Administration’ during British rule. Inter-communal relations were then exacerbated by conflict during the Second World War, and the challenge of national unity has remained evident in all political eras since Burma’s independence in 1948..."
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Source/publisher: The Burma Studies Group, Association of Asian Studies Conference (Washington D.C.)
2002-04-05
Date of entry/update: 2021-07-27
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "June 29th 2020 marks 25 years since the New Mon State Party (NMSP) agreed a ceasefire with the then State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) military government in Burma (as the country was officially called until 1989). The essays collected here reflect on the experiences of Mon communities and the NMSP, before and after the ceasefire. The NMSP and the (ex-Communist Party of Burma) United Wa State Army are among the few “ceasefire groups” of the 1990s which still have ceasefires. Other ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) were either forced in 2010 to become Myanmar Army-controlled Border Guard Forces (BGFs: e.g. most units of the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army) or Peoples Militias (pyithusit: e.g. the Pa-O National Organisation), or ceasefires broke down amid recrimination and return to largescale state violence against ethnic nationality communities (e.g. the Kachin Independence Organisation, whose 1994 ceasefire broke down after 17 years, in 2011). In contrast, other groups like the Karen National Union (KNU) continued the armed struggle for self-determination through the 1990s and 2000s, before agreeing a ceasefire with the U Thein Sein government in 2012. The NMSP ceasefire effectively broke down in 2010 under military government pressure to become a BGF. However, despite considerable tensions at the time, fighting did not break out again. The NMSP resisted pressure to transform into a BGF, and eventually confirmed a new bilateral ceasefire with the government in February 2012. Both the KNU (in 2015) and NMSP (in 2018) signed the multilateral Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA). Unfortunately, the NCA has largely failed. The hoped-for “Political Dialogue” has stalled, with the Myanmar government and armed forces (Tatmadaw) unwilling to allow necessary sub-national (ethnic community) consultations, or to accept EAO demands for meaningful federalism. Security elements of the NCA (the Joint Monitoring Committee) have been largely dysfunctional and/or dominated by the Tatmadaw. While key EAOs (including the NMSP) continue to deliver governance administration and services (e.g. health and education) in their areas of control and authority, the peace process has yet to provide a credible vehicle for delivering “Interim Arrangements”, despite these being mandated by the NCA (Chapter 6, Article 25). The four essays collected here discuss different aspects of the NMSP’s long struggle for Mon self-determination in the context of the 1995 ceasefire. Martin Smith and Ashley South are writers and analysts, who have studied Mon history and society since before the ceasefire. Martin offers a historical-cultural and political account of the Mon armed struggle, which frames the essays to follow. Ashley presents an assessment of the NMSP’s achievements and challenges since the ceasefire. Nai Kasauh Mon and Nai Banya Hongsar are civil society activists and authors. Nai Kasauh Mon provides a critical analysis of the ceasefire years, highlighting both successes and failures. And Nai Banya Hongsar discusses the challenges that the NMSP and Mon movement continue to face in a country still entrapped within a cycle of conflict and ceasefire..."
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Source/publisher: Covenant Institute via Myanmar Information Management Unit
2020-06-29
Date of entry/update: 2021-07-27
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Abstract: This article explains cross-border uses of force against ethnic armed groups along Myanmar’s bloody borders with China and Thailand. I trace the history of Burma’s ethnic disputes, its state-society relations, and the “modernization” of its military doctrine to understand how its state-building enterprise can shape the use of force along a state’s frontier. I treat each of the border regions as distinct subcategories to highlight variation in the micro-dynamics as well as types and conditions under which the use of state-orchestrated violence occurs. First, I point to the role of greater state-building – extractive, coercive, etc. – and how it influences the use of force along border regions. Second, I explore the modernization of Burma’s military and evolution of its doctrine – this includes early efforts by the tatmadaw’s post-1988 shift toward a more conventional counterinsurgency strategy. An implication of my theory is that more peaceful relations between states perversely can create the conditions for more cross-border violence, as there are greater opportunities for states to either “pool” border security or outsource the use of force to proxies or paramilitary forces.....Introduction: The world’s longest civil war rages on in the frontiers of Myanmar between a government historically dominated by its military and several bands of ethnic rebels, many of them seeking self-rule.1 At the same time, a number of other insurgencies, including one against a Muslim minority, the Rohingya, continue along Myanmar’s other frontier regions. Even as Myanmar begins to democratize, there has been little to no let-up in the violence along its periphery. To understand Myanmar’s use of force against these groups, one must understand the complicated origins of its military rule, its fitful attempts at state-building and shifts in its threat environment, both internal and external. This article posits that the Myanmar’s approach to counterinsurgency and application of force is a function of two simultaneous processes: First, the state under military rule has carried out aggressive state-building along its frontier as a way to further consolidate its boundaries, alternating between the use of local paramilitary forces and its own armed forces to quell these border regions, while purposely not eradicating these groups given that the military benefits from some level of a threat to legitimize its control.2 Simultaneously, Myanmar’s military (or tatmadaw) seeks to profit from cross-border trade (timber, jade, opium, etc.), both licit and illicit (see Lintner, 1999; Meehan, 2011). As a result, it has vacillated between military coercion and political accommodation as a means of bringing order to its frontiers while also enhancing its economy, capacity and legitimacy. To this day, these areas, hilly, remote, rich in natural resources and ethnic hodgepodges, have proved difficult to control and bring into the political fold. Second, Myanmar’s civil-military relations have gone through a series of institutional crises and challenges to the regime’s authority. Together with shifts in its threat environment, this has spurred on a modernization of its military doctrine (Maung Aung Myoe, 2009, pp. 16–46). During the first years of postcolonial rule (1948–1958), Myanmar’s military posture was based largely on fear of external invasion from China (ibid., p.11). Over the next few decades (1958–1988), its doctrine congealed around the threat of the country’s internal insurgency and ethnic armed actors along the periphery. Following 1988, military doctrine focused almost exclusively on modernization, as external threats took on renewed attention and the armed forces shifted towards a more conventional warfare stance (ibid., p. 11). Interestingly, its use of force against ethnic armed groups, even across borders into neighbouring states, would become more routinized as the military modernized itself after Ne Win stepped down in 1988. Part of this modernization process was to consolidate its borders and reduce the threat these groups posed while simultaneously guarding its border against conventional threats. The tatmadaw would rely increasingly on local border patrols, some of them comprising ethnic armed factions it was previously fighting. It was a counterinsurgency policy that mixed co-optation with coercion. Myanmar’s military rules over a fragmented society. The tatmadaw itself is riven by elite divisions, yet still rules as a leviathan-like entity. It views itself as a ‘modernizing’ force, despite claims to the contrary.3 The case of Myanmar reveals how military rulers, insulated from public opinion, perceive of state and non-state threats along its periphery, and how this perception shapes its military doctrine, at a time of rapid state-building. Its use of force is manifested by the centre’s exertions of greater control—economic, political and cultural—over its upland periphery.4 Despite greater civilian control, the government still retains a strong praetorian composition, which explains its aggressive use of force along its frontier (Ben-Eliezer,1997). Externally, despite relatively peaceful relations with its neighbouring states, and despite greater civilian control, Myanmar has taken a largely offensive approach to counterinsurgency, one that mixes conciliatory gestures to co-opt armed actors with the application of brute military force. This article argues that the peripheral threat is necessary for the tatmadaw’s claims to institutional authority and legitimacy, as well as for the military to profit from the booming economy along the border. The implications of my argument are that the state should have little incentive in seeing these areas become completely pacified and so will continue to wage a border war that mixes conventional counterinsurgency with political accommodation. This article proceeds as follows: First, I examine the country’s historical background of ethnic war, looking at the postcolonial roots of the conflict. Then, I discuss its early attempts at state-building, placing Myanmar in the larger literature. Next, I situate my case study in the broader literature on civil-military relations and explore the historical evolution of its military, how its military doctrine has evolved, and specifically its use of cross-border force against rebels in Thailand and China. I conclude with a recap of my theory.....Background of Ethnic Conflict in Myanmar: Myanmar is strategically located in Southeast Asia, wedged between two more powerful state rivals, China and India.5 It is a nation hemmed in by a horseshoe of hill country, ethnically diverse, impoverished and constituting what James Scott has referred to as a ‘negative space’ (Scott, 2009). The highlands of Kachin state along the northern Chinese border provide insurgents with a natural canopy to evade being targeted (Tucker, 2000). Likewise, the jungles between Myanmar and Thailand, rich in lumber and lucrative teal, are some of the world’s thickest. As John Seabury Thomson noted in 1957, ‘[The] topography of the country and its isolation from trade routes tended to make the [Burmese] people look inward rather than outward […]’ (Thomson, 1957, p. 269). That shapes the country’s view of itself in the wider region as well as its own poorly defined borders and helps explain why the country currently faces no fewer than a dozen armed ethnic conflicts. Besides the ethnically dominant Burman, which constitutes over two-thirds of the population, the government officially recognizes 135 distinct ethnic groups. Virtually all of the ethnic groups can be carved up further into various subgroups. The categories still in use today were mostly derived by the British administrators and missionaries, who made perceptions-based differentiations mostly based on a group’s language and culture. As one British official noted in 1931, ‘[S]ome of the races or tribes in Burma change their language almost as often as they change their clothes’ (Smith, 1991, p. 34). Interpreting Myanmar’s history by delineating it into various political-ethnic groups is problematic, if only because of these groups’ complex identities and overlapping cultures.6 Myanmar retains some of the strictest citizenship laws, which in theory require proof of ancestry present in Myanmar before arrival of the British in 1824. This has typically been a ploy to discriminate against non-Buddhist minorities, like the Rohingya, a Muslim minority not considered citizens of Myanmar (Tang, 2013)..."
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Source/publisher: 2018 SAGE Publications India via Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs
2018-00-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-06-24
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Description: "This regular update, covering humanitarian developments in conflict-affected areas from 24 April to 24 May, is produced by OCHA Myanmar in collaboration with the Inter-Cluster Coordination Group and UNHCR. The next update will be issued towards the end of June 2021.....HIGHLIGHTS: Around 46,000 people were displaced in the south-eastern part of Myanmar between April and May due to the conflict and insecurity, about 37,000 of them displaced in late May following the clashes in Kayah State. In Chin State, thousands have been internally displaced following an escalation of hostilities in the town of Mindat since 12 May. In northern Shan, clashes between the Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) and Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) and among EAOs continue and around 2,800 people were displaced in May. A total of 8,400 people who have fled since January 2021 remain displaced. In Kachin State, there has been no new displacement during the reporting period, despite the active armed conflict between the MAF and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA); about 8,500 people who fled insecurity since mid-March remain displaced. No new population displacement has been reported in Rakhine State. Cases of acute watery diarrhea (AWD) are reported in IDP camps in Mrauk-U, Paukaw and Sittwe townships. Humanitarian response remains severely constrained in all conflict-affected areas due to insecurity, banking disruptions, road blockages and pre-existing access challenges. Myanmar Humanitarian Fund First Standard Allocation of US$10 million launched on 13 May has been amended with an additional $0.35 million to scale up response in Chin State. A total of US$40.2 million has been mobilized under the 2021 Humanitarian Response Plan, which seeks $276.5 million to address the needs of around 1 million people in conflict-affected areas. This represents less than 15 per cent of the funds required. KEY FIGURES 85.9K people internally displaced in the South-east due to clashes and insecurity in 2021 15K people internally displaced in northern Shan due to armed clashes in 2021 10K people internally displaced in Kachin State due to armed clashes in 2021 10K people hosted in sites in Chin State and Magway Region due to hostilities in Mindat in May SITUATION OVERVIEW UPSURGE IN DISPLACEMENT IN THE SOUTH-EAST: Around 46,000 people were displaced in the southeastern part of the country between April and May, according to data obtained by UNHCR from various sources. This includes the displacement of an estimated 37,000 persons across 57 locations in Kayah State where violence had erupted in late May between the MAF and the Karenni Army, the armed wing of the Karenni National Progressive Party, as well as the Karenni People’s Defense Force, an armed group formed by civilian resistance fighters. There have been additional displacements, mainly in Kayin State due to insecurity and the clashes between the Karen National Liberation Army and the MAF. Around 45,000 people are currently internally displaced in Kayin State. The majority of them are hiding in jungles with some 8,000 sheltering in caves along Salween River at the border with Thailand. A further 3,900 people remain displaced in Mon State and Bago Region since February. This makes 85,900 the total number of people who have been internally displaced in the region due to armed clashes as well as insecurity as of 24 May. The internal displacement comes in addition to cross-border movement that remains fluid. Around 7,000 people from Kayin State have crossed the border to seek safety in Thailand since late March and some 1,000 remain in temporary areas in Mae Hong Son Province in Thailand as of 23 May, according to UNHCR. Humanitarian needs include food, shelter and access to hygiene and sanitation facilities. Additionally, there have been reports of cases of water-borne diseases among the displaced population in the jungle as result of extended lack of access to hygiene and sanitation facilities compounded by the early arrival of the rainy season. Local sources warn of a looming food security crisis if people are unable to return to their villages of origin to tend to their crops and livestock. Humanitarian partners are doing their best to respond to these needs, both within Myanmar and across the border. For example, in Kayah State, partners provided food and basic households items, child protection and health interventions to a small number of IDPs. However, access restrictions due to insecurity, road blockages, remote terrain, landmine contamination and other bureaucratic impediments continue to impede programme delivery across Kayah and elsewhere. INCREASING HUMANITARIAN NEEDS IN CHIN STATE: Thousands of people have been displaced following an escalation of violence between the MAF and the Chinland Defense Forces (CDF) in and around the town of Mindat in Chin State on 12 May. The MAF deployed heavy artillery, military helicopters and snipers to the area, and despite the reported retreat of the CDF the following day, the MAF reportedly continued its attacks, including against civilian areas and infrastructure in the town of Mindat, which is home to about 25,000 people (2014 data). Over 9,000 IDPs are currently hosted in 16 sites, mainly in churches and monasteries, in and around Mindat and 7 sites in Saw in Magway Region. Thousands more had reportedly fled to nearby forests and mountains in search of safety and protection. There are also reports of civilian casualties, damage to and occupation of civilian infrastructure, incidents of the MAF using civilians as human shields and alleged cases of sexual assault against women and girls. Clashes also occurred between the MAF and the CDF in Loklung Village near the capital city of Hakkha on 18 May. This has led to the displacement of around 1,000 people to neighboring villages, according to local partners. The displaced population and those who remain in town are in urgent need of food, water, medicine, shelter and protection services, such as gender-based violence and psychological support. Local communities and religious institutions are making efforts to provide humanitarian assistance; however, this is not reaching everyone in need. Access restrictions, including due to road blockages and insecurity, are complicating the efforts to verify the reports of displacement, casualties and other incidents, as well as assess needs and respond. The Myanmar Humanitarian Fund (MHF) is supporting an operational partner in Chin State to scale up response, by topping up with an additional funding an existing humanitarian programme. MORE PEOPLE DISPLACED IN NORTHERN SHAN: Population movement remains fluid in northern areas of Shan State with new displacements and small-scale returns reported on a regular basis. In Hsipaw Township, around 2,510 people fled from their homes to safe areas due to hostilities between the Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army and the allied forces of the Ta'ang National Liberation Army and the Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army on 18 May. Small-scale population movements were also reported in Nawnghkio and Namtu townships and over the course of May, 2,800 people were internally displaced due to various clashes. A total of 15,151 people have been internally displaced in northern Shan since the start of 2021. While almost half of them returned to their places of origin within weeks, some 8,400 people remain displaced in 34 sites in Hsipaw, Kyaukme, Momeik, Namtu, Namhkan and Nawghkio townships. The IDPs are unable to return due to damage to their property and livelihoods as well as insecurity and risks from landmine contamination. Humanitarian partners organized three missions to the displacement sites and protracted IDP camps over the course of May to assess people’s needs and strengthen response coordination. Despite some assistance provided by host communities and local partners, the needs of families newly displaced remain largely unmet. The IDPs currently require temporary shelter, food, basic household materials, including mosquito nets, blankets, and mats, as well as access to water and sanitation facilities. NO NEW DISPLACEMENT IN KACHIN DESPITE INSECURITY: There has been no new population displacement in Kachin during the reporting period. Close to 10,000 people have been displaced across Kachin State following the resumption of clashes in mid-March. While many have returned to their places of origin since then, over 8,500 people remain displaced in Bhamo, Hpakant, Injanyang, Momauk, Myitkyina, Sadung, Shwegu and Waingmaw townships. Local communities and operational partners are responding to the needs of newly displaced people; however, access challenges and insecurity are complicating these efforts. The security situation remains volatile in Kachin State, with regular armed clashes between the MAF and the KIA in several townships and general insecurity across the state. Hostilities were reported across as many as 13 townships; however, clashes were intense in Momauk Township in particular, where fighting around the Ah Law Bum mountain area, currently controlled by the KIA continues unabated, with reports of aerial strikes by the MAF and artillery shelling by both sides. Since March, over 100 armed engagements were reported across Kachin. According to public sources, 11 civilians were killed and 22 others injured between 11 March and 12 May. The details of these incidents could not be verified at the time of reporting due to access challenges. ACUTE WATERY DIARRHEA IN CENTRAL RAKHINE: AWD cases were reported in IDP camps in MraukU, Pauktaw and Sittwe townships with majority of cases affecting children under five. Based on available information, the cases were reported to be highest during the week of 3 May, with 1,200 cases, and majority reported from six IDP camps. Over 2,000 cases of AWD have so far been reported as of 25 May. The situation has started to stabilize as the number of cases started to go down since 16 May, following robust response by operational partners who are coordination with relevant entities to scale up awareness raising efforts of good hygiene, testing of water quality, chlorination of the boreholes, and cleaning of solid waste and disinfection of latrines. Disease surveillance is ongoing and operational hours of mobile clinics have been extended in certain camps with larger caseloads. Case investigation and laboratory sample collection were also conducted with relevant entities and findings were directly shared to frontline health partners for appropriate clinical management. NO NEW DIPLACEMENT IN RAKHINE: There has not been any new clashes between the MAF and the AA since November 2020 and no new displacement has been reported. Some small-scale returns among IDPs continue to take place in a number of townships. Close to 82,000 people remain displaced at 147 sites and 27 host communities in 10 townships across Rakhine State. This is in addition to 126,000 IDPs hosted in protracted camps established in 2012..."
Source/publisher: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (New York) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
2021-05-27
Date of entry/update: 2021-05-28
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Description: "While most media attention continues to focus on the domestic political problems that have engulfed the country since the 1 February military takeover, little has been said about continuing inter-ethnic fighting in Shan State between the Restoration Council Shan State (RCSS) the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP) and its ally the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA). A large part of the current discourse in relation to the military takeover suggests that armed ethnic organisations will be able to come together in a ‘Federal Army’ to free the people in the cities. But if there is one thing the continuous fighting in Shan State suggests is that there remains much discord between ethnic actors themselves. Clashes between the two Shan factions have been a constant and have also heavily involved the Ta’ang National Liberaion Army (TNLA) which has sided with the SSPP. In large part the increase in fighting was exacerbated in 2015 after the RCSS signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA). After the NCA was signed, the RCSS established bases in Namtu, Hsipaw and Kyaukme townships. The move sparked fighting between the RCSS and the Shan State Progress Party, which controlled some areas outside of major towns there, and the TNLA. Similarly, the SSPP also allied itself not only with the TNLA, but also the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and the then Kachin based Arakan Army (AA). Politically, the SSPP/SSA had no particular objective and instead sought guidance in such matters from the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD). However since the emergence of the TNLA, the SSPP seems to have allowed the Ta’ang group to hold major influence over the SSPP in its current strategy making processes. It also appears the TNLA’s territorial ambitions are perhaps driving, or at least adding to current hostilities with the RCSS in which the SSPP is playing a part. In 2018, media reported that the RCSS claimed it had the right to operate wherever there are ethnic Shan while the SSPP and TNLA say it belongs in the south of Shan State only. However, according to one individual close to the RCSS it had said that it will operate in every township outside the SelfAdministered Zones (SAZs) and Self-Administered Division (SAD). Meaning the TNLA should not operate outside the 2008 constitutionally mandated Namhsan and Mantong. If it wants to, it must be in agreement with the RCSS.1 The RCSS/SSA has maintained control in the north through its Brigade-701 in Muse District, Namkham Township. The claims to have set up Task Force 701 in 2006 after the PSLA was disarmed and SSA 3rd Brigade was ordered to move south of LashioMandalay Road. The TNLA claims the RCSS used its membership in the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement with the central government as justification for stationing fighters in the north of Shan State. 2 A claim the RCSS has vehemently denied.The TNLA has also accused it of not consulting them on territory demarcation or joint operations, obstructing established administrative structures of TNLA and SSPP and forced conscription on pretext of combating drug addiction. 3 For its part, the RCSS claims that local ethnic Shan in Northern Shan State invited them to set up bases in the area to protect them against TNLA oppression, which the SSPP allegedly failed to do due to its alliance with the TNLA against the Tatmadaw.4 Most recently, it has been suggested that one of the main reasons for the continuing conflict is the fact that Northern Shan State has become a key point for border trade between Myanmar and China, especially with China’s Belt and Road Initiative. China has plans to build a railway link to Myanmar. It has therefore been posited that the underlying reasons for continuing ethnic conflict is related now more to business interests and securing territorial gains rather than previous grievencies or ideological issues.5..."
Source/publisher: Euro Burma Office
2021-05-27
Date of entry/update: 2021-05-27
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Toppled democratic leader makes clear in a military court appearance that she and her party represent Myanmar's agitated people
Description: "Myanmar’s deposed and detained leader Aung San Suu Kyi appeared in court on Monday, her first public appearance since a February 1 military coup toppled her elected government and set off waves of popular dissent and resistance. Although it was only a first 30-minute hearing, the legal process could lead to her eventual imprisonment and the dissolution of her political party, the National League for Democracy (NLD). Suu Kyi stands accused by the military of several charges ranging from possession of illegally imported walkie-talkies to violating the 1923 colonial-era Official Secrets Act. But the reality, most Myanmar observers say, is that the top brass wants to punish the government she led since 2016 and nullify the outcome of the November 2020 election where the NLD scored yet another landslide victory, as it did in 2015 and 1990. The military’s accusations of electoral fraud are not what independent, international election observers saw when they monitored the poll last year. With the military now firmly in charge of the country’s central institutions since the coup, the eventual outcome of the court cases against Suu Kyi is not in doubt – she will inevitably be found guilty and banned from politics. That, in turn, could set the stage for new elections rigged in favor of the military and without the participation of the NLD. Those verdicts, whenever they are handed down, will surely spark more furious unrest in a country that has descended into chaos and anarchy since the military made the fateful decision to seize power on the day a newly elected parliament was scheduled to meet for the first time in Naypyitaw. The coup has also restored Myanmar to pariah status internationally, with Western criticism and sanctions heaped on the coup makers. At the same time, coup leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing is coming under fire from within the military — not because of the power grab as such, but for his inability to consolidate it. Internally, he has reportedly been mocked as only being good at making donations to pagodas and for being “the prince of bangs and pots”, a reference to the way people across the country are venting their anger at the coup by banging pots and pans. The coup was immediately met by massive demonstrations all over Myanmar, with pro-democracy protesters often waving Suu Kyi’s image on banners and signs, and has been followed by a fierce response from the military. More than 800 protesters and bystanders have been killed and about 4,000 people detained since the putsch. And the violence and persecution are far from over. What began as peaceful protests have morphed into violent clashes between the military, the police and anti-coup activists who in some places have organized their own armed bands. In Kayah state in the east armed partisans overran and burned down a police station on May 23. According to the Kantarawaddy Times, a local website, at least 15 policemen were killed in the raid and four captured alive. Twenty-six Myanmar army soldiers have reportedly been killed elsewhere in Kayah state over the past few days. The same news source reported that one resistance fighter was killed and five wounded during the clash. In Mindat in the west, resistance fighters armed with hunting rifles and homemade guns took over the town before the military responded with heavy artillery and fire from helicopters. Elsewhere in Myanmar, bombings are becoming daily occurrences and the targets are military-controlled banks, companies and local governmental offices. A huge fire raged at a government building in the northern city of Myitkyina in Kachin state on May 23. On the same day, a bomb exploded in front of the municipal office and explosions as well as gunfire could be heard in Sanchaung in the country’s largest city and commercial capital Yangon. Apart from igniting armed resistance by locally raised and previously unknown forces, the war between ethnic armed groups in Kayin and Kachin states and the Myanmar military, known as the Tatmadaw, has flared anew. In Kayin state, more than 20,000 people have had to flee the fighting while the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) has overrun a number of army positions and police stations, most recently in Hkamti in northern Sagaing Division on May 22. Airbases in Meiktila, Magwe and Toungoo have come under rocket attacks in what appears to be ethnic rebels working with urban dissidents. Among those arrested by junta forces are journalists, activists, health workers and teachers who have taken part in protests against the coup. According to a May 23 Reuters report quoting an official of the teachers’ federation who declined to give his name for fear of reprisals, 125,000 school teachers of the country’s total of 430,000 have been suspended. The number of doctors and nurses who have lost their jobs is not known, but is thought to be considerable. Many educated people, fearing arrests, have managed to leave the country leading to yet another brain drain, similar to those after the first military takeover in 1962 and the crushing of a pro-democracy uprising in 1988. The country could tilt towards further anomie without a circuit breaker. Banks are not functioning and the economy is in a shambles amid countrywide strikes and unrest. There are rising reports of soldiers and police seemingly at random breaking into people’s homes, destroying furniture and stealing whatever they can lay their hands on. Other reports indicate that soldiers and policemen have been given methamphetamine pills to jack them up before being deployed to crack down on protesters, which could explain their often erratic and wildly violent behavior. The only statement that came out of the May 24 court hearing was that a defiant Suu Kyi said that the NLD “was established by the people so the party will be there as long as the people are.” It’s impossible to predict how that short utterance from the country’s iconic democratic leader will impact or ignite an already volatile situation on the ground. What is clear, however, is that she acknowledged her followers are now pitted against the military, an institution she had tried to accommodate and work with while in power. It’s also clear that whatever sympathy and support the public may have had for the Tatmadaw are long gone as soldiers rampage, kill and loot with increasingly reckless abandon – a point that some say may be forming schisms in the military. If Min Aung Hlaing is eventually replaced, which is still far from certain, it doesn’t mean his successor would take a more conciliatory approach to the country’s civilian leaders, including Suu Kyi, and her affiliated pro-democracy movement. But as long as he remains in place and Suu Kyi is in the dock on trumped-up charges, Myanmar’s people-versus-the military struggle will likely accelerate and spread..."
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Source/publisher: "Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
2021-05-24
Date of entry/update: 2021-05-25
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Michael Lidauer explores electoral politics in Myanmar: The Tatmadaw sought to legitimise the 1 February 2021 coup d’état – which occurred hours before the newly elected parliament was about to convene – with one key narrative: that the November 2020 elections were marred by widespread fraud.[1] To counter this argument, twelve civil society organisations released a statement four days prior to the coup, declaring that “the elections were credible and reflected the will of the majority voters” (PACE 2021). Indeed, no evidence has become available that any electoral materials were tampered with.....The electoral narrative of the coup: The Tatmadaw has commented on weaknesses in the electoral process at several times before and even more so after the elections, referring inter alia to the question of organising elections under the conditions of Covid-19 and inconsistencies in the voter lists. Before the electoral campaign period, in August 2020, the Commander-in-Chief discussed with a delegation of political parties their concerns (The Irrawaddy, 15 August 2020). Although accepting the election results immediately after election day, the military fielded numerous objections regarding the elections and rejected the results during the weeks leading to the coup, and recapitulate this in their public communications (cf. Tea Circle Oxford, 9 March 2021). It ultimately blamed the government, not only the election administration, for shortcomings.[2] Apart from the President, the State Counsellor and other governmental protagonists, the Union Election Commission (UEC) Chairman and members were arrested, and a new commission was appointed few days after the coup. In fact, the UEC became the single-most targeted institution with arrests and interrogations (AAPP 2021). Since then, the newly appointed UEC – headed by the same Chairman who was in charge of organising the 2010 elections – appears to build a body of evidence to substantiate the military’s claims of electoral fraud with publications about voter list data and ballots used in the 2020 elections in the Global New Light of Myanmar which yet await a closer analysis. Given the unfolding dramatic events of civilian resistance, heavy-handed responses by the security apparatus, and the struggle for international recognition of legitimate actors, this appears of a lesser significance in the current situation. However, the underlying electoral narrative is likely to become reinvigorated if the Tatmadaw keeps to the idea of organising fresh elections, as announced in the Five-Point Road Map of the State Administration Council, coupled with proposals to change the electoral system. This article seeks to look beyond claims of manipulation and provide more nuanced perspectives. While the elections have generated credible results, there were nevertheless a number of challenges related to long-standing weaknesses in the legal framework, political competition, and the dynamics generated by the Covid-19 pandemic, all of which are important to keep in mind for a more comprehensive understanding of the recent electoral process. What is more, the organisation of elections reveals frictions in civil-military relations among Burmese elites from which ethnic minorities suffer as a consequence. As Myanmar people on all fronts oppose a new military regime and as the armed forces exercise their powers against the population, this article aims to recollect some elements of the electoral process preceding the coup, in the hopes of contributing to an understanding of the ongoing situation and of gathering lessons learned for times when elections in Myanmar will again be under scrutiny. One such element is the cancellation of elections in parts of the country, a complex phenomenon that defies a simplistic explanation. Its analysis helps to understand majority-minority as well as civil-military relations even beyond the electoral process. Ahead of election day, on 8 November 2020, the polls were locally cancelled in many more locations than during previous elections, which resulted in disenfranchisement, political controversies, and diminished trust in the election administration (cf. ANFREL 2021: 45-51). However, while disenfranchisement was much debated, it was not a new phenomenon.....Varieties of disenfranchisement: In Myanmar, electoral disenfranchisement pertains to multiple processes of exclusion from the ballot, affecting people in various ways. These systemic deficiencies have been part of the electoral legal framework since long and were no novelty to the 2020 elections. Disenfranchisement extends inter alia to voters who are not at their place of residence at the time of the elections but elsewhere in the country or abroad. This may concern the diaspora, refugees, migrant workers, students or other travellers, although procedures exist for those who are temporarily registered at a new place and could therefore “transfer” their ballot. Persons who are forcibly displaced by conflict (namely internally displaced persons, or IDPs) often cannot take part in the polls, as authorities repeatedly failed to develop and implement a consistent and effective policy for IDP inclusion at the ballot box. Voting for IDPs was discussed ahead of the 2015 general elections, but was largely overlooked by national and international audiences, whose attention focused on the overall success of the election and its result, leading to a peaceful transition of power to a government led by the National League for Democracy. More debated – but not significantly tainting the perceptions of an overall well-run process at that time either – was the legal disenfranchisement of predominantly Muslim voters and candidates, preceding the mass exodus of the Rohingya to Bangladesh in 2017. The highly contentious Rakhine State politics during the last term ultimately altered how Myanmar was seen in the world. The recently published article “Boundary Making in Myanmar’s Electoral Process: Where elections do not take place” discusses both the processes of “legal denial” for Muslim voters and candidates as well as the lack of voting opportunities for IDPs during the 2015 elections. It is part of the forthcoming Modern Asian Studies Special Issue on “Border Governance: Reframing Political Transition in Myanmar and Beyond”, edited by Kirsten McConnachie, Elaine Lynn-Ee Ho and Helene Kyed. The article also discusses election cancellations, which occurred ahead of the general elections in 2010 and 2015, but did not stir much controversy at that time. Despite affecting approximately half a million voters in 2015 – the phenomenon of election cancellations remained little understood. However, without further specifications in the legal framework and without transparent criteria for cancelling or postponing the polls, election cancellations occurred again in 2020, but this time attracted much more attention and controversial debates.....Election cancellations in 2020: Myanmar’s legislation allows for localised election postponements due to risk of violence or natural disasters. While such decisions are usually informed by state institutions in the security sector and by election sub-commissions, the ultimate authority to cancel and postpone elections lies with the Union Election Commission.[3] The UEC is the constitutionally mandated body tasked with organising and overseeing elections. The UEC Chairperson and commissioners are appointed by the President. In addition to a permanent secretariat in Nay Pyi Taw, there are sub-commissions at state/region, district and township level. At the local level, the UEC relies strongly on personnel from other state institutions including from the General Administration Department (GAD) which until 2019 was under the authority of the military-led Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA) and only then became part of the Ministry of the Union Government under civilian administration (cf. Lidauer and Saphy 2014; Renshaw and Lidauer forthcoming). The cancellation or postponement of elections has different electoral consequences, depending on the size of the administrative unit concerned. Vacant seats in the legislature occur only where elections are cancelled for entire constituencies; in this case the need for by-elections arises. Conversely, the partial cancellation of elections in a number of wards or village tracts smaller than a constituency does not translate into vacant seats, but leads to the disenfranchisement of voters residing in the cancelled areas, as the election goes ahead regardless of their participation (Lidauer 2021). Vacant seats in the hluttaws at national level proportionally increase the voting powers of military representatives for whom 25 per cent of the seats are reserved.[4] On 16 October, the UEC announced the cancellation of elections in a number of electoral constituencies where “free and fair elections cannot be held” (UEC Announcement 192/2020). While this timing and reasoning followed the pattern of similar announcements in 2015, the scale of these cancellations was unprecedented. Elections were cancelled for nine entire townships in Rakhine State and six entire townships in Shan State, as well as for 581 additional wards and village tracts in these States together with Kachin, Kayin and Mon States and Bago Region.[5] The cancellations resulted in 15 vacant seats in the Pyithu Hluttaw (nine in Rakhine, six in Shan), seven vacant seats in the Amyotha Hluttaw (all Rakhine), as well as 32 vacant seats in states’ legislatures (20 in Rakhine, 12 in Shan). Based on data shared by the UEC, over 1.2 to 1.3 million voters did not have the opportunity to vote as a result of the cancellations, and 189 candidates (who had already started campaigning) lost the possibility to contest these elections.....Reasons and reactions: These decisions caused strong reactions among political parties and civil society organisations, with allegations of gerrymandering in Rakhine State. Several parties questioned the UEC’s impartiality in this process, demanded more transparency and consultations, called for ethnic voting rights to be protected, and for the decisions to be reconsidered. On 27 October, eleven days after the first announcement, the UEC made further cancellations public, notably for Paletwa township in Chin State[6] – raising the overall number of constituencies without elections to 54 – and revoked some of the earlier decisions. These additional announcements did not help to improve perceptions and trust in the UEC, but hardened the belief that its decisions would favour the incumbent. The UEC decisions were criticised both for cancelling elections in some areas and for going ahead in others. In various areas, elections were in fact cancelled for different reasons, although on the same legal basis. The cancellation of four entire townships that form part of the Wa Self-administered Zone, and its ally in Mongla township – resulting in five vacant Pyithu Hluttaw seats and ten vacant State Hluttaw seats respectively – had been expected, as elections did also not take place there in 2010 and 2015. These are areas without any Myanmar governmental administration to prepare for elections, where a voter list had not been established, and no candidates had been enlisted. The cancelled areas in Kachin State, Karen State and Eastern Bago Region (including one village tract of Mon State) followed a similar logic, as all these areas pertained to ceasefire areas under full or mixed control of ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) and have changed little since 2015, but did not result in vacant seats in any hluttaw. In Kachin State, elections were cancelled in fewer village tracts than in 2015 in a number of townships. In Kayin State, unlike in 2015, no elections were cancelled in Hlaingbwe township, and the cancelled areas were significantly reduced in Kyainseikgyi township. This was reportedly a result of negotiations between candidates and the election administration. Partial election cancellations also occurred across Shan State. In southern Shan State, elections were cancelled entirely for Mongkaing township, where several EAOs are present. In northern Shan State, partial cancellations coincided with locations where armed conflict or tensions between the Tatmadaw, EAOs, and local militia had occurred. Kyaukme and Tangyan townships stood out with new cancelled areas while others were similar to 2015. In eastern Shan State, the cancelled areas corresponded to territories where the government has historically a weak presence. In Rakhine State, where election cancellations were new, they were all argued for on the basis of security threats resulting from ongoing armed conflict between the Tatmadaw and the Arakan Army (AA). This included entire townships that ethnic parties and candidates considered safe, such as Pauktaw and Ponnagyun, and partial cancellations in other townships where only voters in small urban areas remained eligible to elect their respective representatives, such as in Taungup, Kyauk Phyu and Ann townships.[7] Widely held assumptions that all these cancellations would result in electoral outcomes favouring the NLD proved incorrect; in fact, ethnic parties secured the majority of elected seats in the Rakhine State Hluttaw despite the cancellations. The partial election cancellations in Paletwa township in Chin State, affecting a total of five electoral constituencies,[8] were also contentious.....High-level public disputes over the election cancellations: The UEC’s decision-making process regarding the election cancellations became a public point of controversy at a high political level, involving the Office of the President and the Tatmadaw, and resulting in mutual accusations of shortcomings between the military and civilian leadership. The UEC stated that several governmental offices, including MoHA and the Ministry of Defence, were consulted to arrive at the decisions where elections should be postponed. The Tatmadaw, while maintaining that the UEC is the only authority to decide whether to hold elections or not, outlined that the UEC’s announcements did not reflect the military’s advice (Eleven, 20 October 2020). In fact, this issue – touching upon civilian administrative authority but also upon questions of security, the Tatmadaw’s domain – was not the first point in time that saw military discontent with the electoral process, but brought tensions between the civilian government and the armed forces in particular to the fore. These discussions exacerbated ethnic parties’ frustrations about the exclusion of their voters from the elections.....Impact on Rakhine State: In the immediate aftermath of the elections, the AA and Tatmadaw became unlikely allies in demanding that the cancelled polls should take place before the formation of the new hluttaws. In mid-December, this demand was supported by the President, and the Rakhine State sub-commission reportedly started preparations for by-elections (Radio Free Asia, 15 December 2020). For the AA, this was an opportunity to broaden their bargaining powers and increase their legitimacy. On the side of the Tatmadaw, the push for elections in Rakhine State was also interpreted as part of larger efforts to discredit the overall electoral process (The Irrawaddy, 20 January 2021). It was nevertheless unlikely that these elections would have taken place in the immediate aftermath, since, following amendments to the electoral laws in 2016 and 2019, by-elections for vacant seats cannot take place one year after and one year before general elections. In that context, by-elections seemed unlikely to happen before April-May 2022. In the interim, the postponement of elections in Rakhine State appeared to generate an unexpected opportunity for a truce between the Tatmadaw and the AA (ICG, 23 December 2020); fighting ceased and tens of thousands were reportedly able to return home. In mid-January, the Rakhine State Hluttaw passed a proposal to urge the government to remove the “terrorist” designation of the AA. This designation, in place since March 2020, had been seen as an impediment to ceasefire negotiations. With an unusual expression of solidarity, Rakhine and Rohingya communities issued a joint declaration of mutual respect that emphasized not only elections for those areas where they were cancelled, but also for the Rohingya (Rohingya Today, 18 January 2021).....Reflecting on the elections in the light of the coup: All interpretations about reasons for the cancellations and effects of vacant seats as well as speculations about early by-elections and any opportunities that may have come from this situation were overtaken by the coup d’état of 1 February. Portraying itself as the guardian of electoral democracy, the military leadership deployed a narrative of electoral fraud to justify its takeover. The public controversies around the election cancellations were one element in a longer process of discrediting the 2020 elections. The issue of election cancellations demonstrates that the 2020 electoral process has seen a number of challenges, inter alia related to decision making process in the state administration. Although the final decision about election cancellations remains with the UEC, sub-national offices charged with informing these decisions were reporting within different hierarchies in the context of electoral security, turning decisions on localised election cancellations into an area of civil-military co-ownership and co-dependency. The process of election cancellations in 2020 illustrates the problematic nature of this co-ownership, which did not occur as such in 2015 when the leadership of the election management body had more direct communication channels with the security apparatus. As a consequence, the situation resulted in opportunities to criticize the UEC, despite the fact that similar cancellations had occurred in previous elections albeit at different scale. The cancellations shed light on loopholes in the system – here, the lack of clear procedures for postponing the polls – that were present both in the 2015 and the 2020 elections, and show how weaknesses in the regulatory framework for elections amplified the opposition between the civilian and military parts of the State ahead of the coup d’état, with detrimental effects on ethnic minorities. Now is not the time to strive for electoral reforms, but debates about elections and suffrage rights in Myanmar are essential and will eventually return. At that time, the transparency and process of any necessary election cancellations should be enhanced with clear communications and consistent criteria for such decisions, alongside other issues pertaining to electoral integrity, accountability and inclusion that will be important to address..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Tea Circle" (Myanmar)
2021-05-19
Date of entry/update: 2021-05-19
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Spokesperson for the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights: Rupert Colville
Description: "More than 100 days after the coup in Myanmar, the military authorities are showing no sign of letting up in their brutal crackdown on opponents in a bid to consolidate their hold on power. At the same time, there is no weakening of the resolve of the civil disobedience movement and other facets of opposition to the coup leaders. As of 10 May, credible sources indicate that the security forces, using unnecessary, disproportionate and lethal force to suppress demonstrations and other forms of public participation, have killed at least 782 individuals since the coup on 1 February. While much of the world's attention has been on the number of peaceful protesters and bystanders killed by the security forces, the authorities continue to commit other gross human rights violations against the people of Myanmar. There are daily raids on private homes and offices, and more than 3,740 people are currently in detention. We are deeply alarmed that the whereabouts and fate of hundreds of these individuals are unknown. These are situations that may amount to enforced disappearances. Of those in custody, the vast majority have not been brought before a judge, while most of the 86 people prosecuted thus far have been tried in secret, with limited or no access to any form of legal counsel. Military tribunals and courts martial have been established in several townships in which martial law was declared. At least 25 individuals have received the death sentence to date – some 20 of whom were tried in absentia. Over the past month, the military leadership has issued over 1,561 arrest warrants targeting civil society activists, trade unionists, journalists, academics, public personalities and online voices, so driving the vast majority of them underground. To intensify pressure, the military authorities have resorted to taking relatives of wanted people into custody to force them to turn themselves in to the police. The military authorities are also stepping up their efforts to pressure civil servants back to work. In recent weeks, the coup leadership has dismissed, removed, or suspended more than 3,000 civil servants – nearly 70 per cent of those targeted have been women. Those suspended include 990 university professors, researchers and assistants who in the last few days have been suspended for failing to report to work. There are reports that up to 11,000 more educational workers were suspended on Monday. We are also deeply concerned about the situation of people fleeing persecution, especially human rights defenders and journalists. As the armed conflicts between the Tatmadaw and some of the ethnic armed organizations, particularly in Kachin and Kayin states, have intensified, people seeking protection are being forced to consider seeking safety outside the country. When they do so, they should receive such protection and support from Myanmar's neighbours. It is clear that there needs to be greater international involvement to prevent the human rights situation in Myanmar from deteriorating further. Despite the five-point plan agreed at the ASEAN leaders' meeting on 24 April, the Myanmar military leadership has shown no sign of abiding by it. We call on ASEAN to react quickly and to intensify its actions to ensure the military keeps to these commitments and to hold them accountable for failing to do so..."
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Source/publisher: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (Geneva)
2021-05-11
Date of entry/update: 2021-05-11
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Description: "On Feb. 1, 2021, the Myanmar military – the Tatmadaw – shattered the all too brief effort to transition to democracy in Myanmar. Over the past two and a half months, the Tatmadaw has continued its illegitimate effort to undermine the democratic elections from last year and prevent the elected government from taking power. In the face of mass popular opposition and international condemnation, the military has only escalated its use of violence against its own population – systematically stripping away rights and violently attacking protestors and dissidents, reportedly killing over 700 civilians as of Apr. 20, 2021, and detaining more than 3,000. Despite the continued threats and extreme violence, the people of Myanmar have stood their ground and refused to be silenced. On Apr. 16, opponents of the coup from across the political spectrum announced the formation of a National Unity Government (NUG) to resist the military. Just as importantly, the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), a grassroots movement aimed at disrupting state functions and crippling the economy in order to undermine the military’s attempt to rule, has been hugely successful in galvanizing collective action since early February. In addition to the tens of thousands of CDM participants walking out of their private and public sector positions, protests across the country have seen massive youth engagement on a scale not seen in a generation. The organizing power has been impressive. Social media platforms like Facebook, Twitter, and TikTok have been used to spread awareness and coordinate protests, strikes, and other forms of peaceful resistance. The military has taken notice of the CDM’s power, issuing threats against young people protesting and shooting indiscriminately at protestors of all ages, including children. Parallel movements have arisen in areas like neighboring Thailand, with Thai youth protesting their own authoritarian government in solidarity with activists from Myanmar. Today we launch a Just Security series that will take a deep dive into the situation in Myanmar. The series will provide insights that put the coup and civilian response into historical and modern context, deepen unexplored angles on the current crises, and survey possibilities and ways forward over the next six months to a year. This series also aims to elevate policy discussions on a number of issues, ranging from peace and accountability to religion and democracy, asking: What is happening now and why? Within the series, contributions from authors from Myanmar and others working closely on the situation will explore topics such as youth leadership in the CDM and protests, domestic and international solidarity, environmental concerns, the dissolution of rule of law in Myanmar, and what the coup means for ongoing international accountability efforts. Below, we offer an overview of the major themes of the series, along with a timeline of the struggle for democracy in Myanmar. The current uprising against military rule must be understood in the context of these decades-long struggles for peace, democracy, accountability, and justice..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Just Security (New York)
2021-04-26
Date of entry/update: 2021-05-10
Grouping: Individual Documents
Category: Anti-coup protesters, Spring Revolution, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, Freedom of opinion and expression: - the situation in Burma/Myanmar - reports, analyses, recommendations, Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association, violations of, Right to Life: reports of violations in Burma, Freedom of Movement, violations of in Burma/Myanmar, Human Rights Defenders, Racial or ethnic discrimination in Burma: reports of violations against several groups, Discrimination against the Rohingya, International Criminal Court, Several Groups, Rohingya (cultural, political etc.), International Court of Justice (ICJ) - General, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, National Unity Government (NUG), Various groups, Political History, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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Description: "Madam Chairperson, Your Excellencies, Thank you all so much for giving me floor to share the message from inside Burma/Myanmar to the world. • On February 1, the Myanmar Military led by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing unleashed an attack of systematic and targeted violence against the citizens of Myanmar. This orchestrated program of armed violence has brought suffering and devastation to civilians across my entire country. From north to south, from east to west, this choreographed dance of death planned by the Myanmar Military has also caused human, political, economic, and social chaos. The military has murdered at least 600 individuals just for peacefully protesting against the military’s misconduct. It is important to highlight the excessive use of force and violence by the security forces against the non-violence pro-democracy movement (also known as/ Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM)). Thousands of my fellow countrymen and women are still unlawfully detained, incommunicado and without any due process rights. This includes civilian political leaders. • Today, before this session starts, the military forces used lethal force, live munitions and even RPGs to attack the civilian population in Bago Township. The ambulances are not allowed to enter to the area even though there have been dozens of civilian fatalities. • In the last two weeks, the Tatmadaw has also escalated its armed violence, in different ethnic states including Karen, Shan, and Kachin. The military also used airstrike in such ethnic area. Additionally, the Tatmadaw also redeployed forces to Rakhine state after the Brotherhood Alliance including Arakan Army (AA) issued a statement criticizing the killing of peaceful civilian protesters. • Aside from the systematic violent attacks by the military that target ordinary people, the military high command overseeing this carnage - now trying to whitewash itself by using the name Tatmadaw’s State Administration Council (SAC) - has been implementing aggressive tactics such as cutting off internet connection, arbitrary arrests and unlawful detention..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH)
2021-04-09
Date of entry/update: 2021-05-10
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Topic: Health, Logistics and Telecommunications, Protection and Human Rights, Shelter and Non-Food Items
Topic: Health, Logistics and Telecommunications, Protection and Human Rights, Shelter and Non-Food Items
Description: "KEY DISPLACEMENT FIGURES: 10,000 Estimated refugee movements to neighbouring countries since 1 February 2021 980,000 Refugees and asylum-seekers from Myanmar in neighbouring countries as of 31 December 2020 50,000 Estimated internal displacement within Myanmar since 1 February 2021 370,000 Estimated internally displaced persons (IDPs) within Myanmar as of 31 December 2020.....HIGHLIGHTS:Since the military takeover in Myanmar on 1 February 2021, widespread violence against civilians across the country and the resumption and intensification of clashes between the Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) and ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) in border areas has forcibly displaced thousands of people within Myanmar and to neighbouring countries. Approximately 50,000 people have been displaced internally, these include an estimated 40,000 in southeastern Myanmar and 9,000 in Kachin and northern Shan states. Some 5,000 refugees crossed into Thailand in March and April, most of whom subsequently returned to Myanmar, and an estimated 4,000 to 6,000 refugees have sought safety in India. As those displaced since 1 February are fleeing persecution or generalized violence and events seriously disturbing public order, UNHCR calls on countries across the region to offer refuge and protection to all individuals from Myanmar seeking safety. Humanitarian actors should be granted access to them to assess and respond to their needs.....RESPONSE: In Myanmar, the deteriorating security environment has exacerbated the precarious humanitarian situation that prevailed even before the military takeover. It has impeded the ability of affected populations to seek safety and access urgent life-saving assistance, including the stateless or internally displaced persons (IDPs) who were already in need of protection and assistance prior to 1 February. Although UNHCR has been able to continue field activities in Rakhine, Kachin and northern Shan States—such as needs assessments, quick impact projects and distribution of core relief items (CRIs)—humanitarian actors face increasing security, logistics and supply chain challenges. In southeast Myanmar, for example, UNHCR activities have been curtailed by security constraints, though UNHCR and partners have maintained communication channels with IDPs through community-based mechanisms and have distributed CRIs to IDPs in Kayin State. In India, UNHCR estimates that 4,000-6,000 refugees from Myanmar have entered the border states of Mizoram and Manipur since early March. UNHCR does not have access to the border areas, but local charity organizations and individuals have come forward to provide life-saving assistance to new arrivals. Some 190 have moved onward to New Delhi, where UNHCR is assessing their needs and has begun registering and providing basic assistance to them. UNHCR has offered its support to the Government of India in protection and humanitarian coordination and response to new arrivals from Myanmar. In Thailand, following the arrival in late March of some 2,800 refugees in Mae Hong Son province and their subsequent return to Myanmar, some 2,300 people crossed again on 27 April due to an outbreak of fighting and are currently hosted in safety areas managed by the Royal Thai Army. UNHCR has advocated for access to the population and offered support to the Royal Thai Government’s efforts to respond to further displacement from Myanmar and address refugees’ protection needs. The Government is preparing “holding areas” for receiving new arrivals in provinces along the Thai-Myanmar border. UNHCR has not had access to new arrivals, but has undertaken preparedness actions, including the prepositioning of CRIs for up to 5,000 households, to help ensure that any Government-led response in those areas will be complemented in a timely and coordinated manner. The humanitarian community already present in the nine temporary shelters for some 92,000 Myanmar refugees who fled previous waves of displacement—UNHCR, IOM and a consortium of NGOs—has established a multi-sector coordination mechanism to respond to humanitarian needs for new arrivals..."
Source/publisher: UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva) via Reliefweb (New York)
2021-05-06
Date of entry/update: 2021-05-07
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Size: 3.63 MB
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Description: "With a vast ethnic and cultural diversity,1 as well as high levels of poverty, Myanmar has witnessed the emergence of a myriad of armed non-state actors (ANSAs), which have splintered and morphed over time, and has subnational tensions arising from tremendous distinctive dynamics. The majority of such actors, known as ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), have primarily pursued a high level of autonomy along with the recognition of identity and rights. These claims have been ongoing since before the colonial period, intensifying after independence in 1948 and still persisting in 2017. The 1980s and 90s saw important progress towards peace, with several ceasefire deals and the creation of the Border Guard Forces (BGFs) following plans for demobilization. Yet, these deals have all failed and have, therefore, generated the proliferation of ANSAs. It was not until 2015 that the government of Aung San Suu Kyi achieved the signing of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA); however, this process has failed to be inclusive, leaving aside key actors after the government imposed restrictions for its signature and as a result, have maintained their armed confrontation. Myanmar is composed of seven states, seven regions, six selfadministered zones (or divisions) and one union territory.2 One of the seven states, Rakhine (situated on the west coast of the country), is the site of ongoing tensions between the Myanmar armed forces and the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA). Violence escalated sharply from October 2016, when ARSA first attacked, and continued to spiral, with the last military crackdown on 25 August 2017. Thus, in order to understand the complex setting in Myanmar, it is crucial to outline the dynamics of these longterm tensions, while focusing on the latest developments in Rakhine state and the challenges these give rise to..."
Source/publisher: Geneva Academy Of International Humanitarian Law And Human Rights (Geneva)
2017-12-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-05-06
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Burma has a quasi-parliamentary system of government in which the national parliament selects the president and constitutional provisions grant one-quarter of parliamentary seats to active-duty military appointees. The military also has the authority to appoint the ministers of defense, home affairs, and border affairs and one of two vice presidents, as well as to assume power over all branches of the government should the president declare a national state of emergency. In 2015 the country held nationwide parliamentary elections that the public widely accepted as a credible reflection of the will of the people. The National League for Democracy (NLD) party leader Aung San Suu Kyi was the civilian government’s de facto leader and, due to constitutional provisions preventing her from becoming president, remained in the position of state counsellor. The Myanmar Police Force (MPF), under the Ministry of Home Affairs (led by an active-duty general), is responsible for internal security. The Border Guard Police is administratively part of the MPF but operationally distinct. The armed forces under the Ministry of Defense are responsible for external security but are also engaged extensively in internal security, including combat against ethnic armed groups. Under the constitution civilian authorities have no authority over the security forces; the armed forces commander in chief, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, maintained effective control over the security forces. Extreme repression of and discrimination against the minority Rohingya population, who are predominantly Muslim, continued in Rakhine State. Intense fighting between the military and the ethnic-Rakhine Arakan Army (AA) that escalated in January displaced thousands more civilians, further disrupted humanitarian access to vulnerable populations, and resulted in serious abuses of civilian populations. Fighting between the military and ethnic armed groups in northern Shan State, as well as fighting there among ethnic armed groups, temporarily displaced thousands of persons and resulted in abuses, including reports of civilian deaths and forced recruitment by the ethnic armed groups. Significant human rights issues included: reports of extrajudicial and arbitrary killings by security forces; enforced disappearance by security forces; torture and rape and other forms of sexual violence by security forces; arbitrary detention by the government; harsh and sometimes life-threatening prison conditions; political prisoners; arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy; significant problems with the independence of the judiciary; severe restrictions on free expression including arbitrary arrest and prosecution of journalists, and criminal libel laws; substantial interference with the rights of peaceful assembly and freedom of association, including arrests of peaceful protesters and restrictions on civil society activity; severe restrictions on religious freedom; significant restrictions on freedom of movement, in particular for Rohingya; significant acts of corruption by some officials; some unlawful recruitment and use of child soldiers; trafficking in persons; crimes involving violence or threats targeting members of national, ethnic, and religious minorities; laws criminalizing consensual same-sex sexual conduct between adults, although those laws were rarely enforced; and the use of forced and child labor..."
Source/publisher: [US] Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor
2019-00-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-05-02
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Size: 351.45 KB
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Sub-title: Unclaimed attacks on military airbases signal a possible spread of civil war from remote frontier areas to urban centers
Description: "No group has yet claimed responsibility for several, almost simultaneous attacks on military targets in central Myanmar, including air bases recently used to target ethnic armed groups in the nation’s frontier areas. Security analysts, however, believe the shadowy attacks are likely the work of an alliance between ethnic rebels and urban-based pro-democracy dissidents, with the former providing the explosives and the latter knowledge of local conditions in the Myanmar heartland. If that assessment is accurate and the hits were not isolated incidents, it could mean that Myanmar’s long-running, low-intensity civil wars are spreading from ethnic minority areas in the nation’s periphery to major cities and towns. Three months after top generals seized power from a popularly elected government and despite the fact that military and police have gunned down over 750 and arrested well over 4,000 protesters, people are still bravely taking to the streets to vent their anger with the coup. The ongoing popular resistance underscores what is by now widely seen as perhaps the most unsuccessful coup in modern Asian history. That could yet spell ill for coup leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, who has stuck stubbornly to his guns amid rising international condemnation that is deeply isolating the country. There are certain indications provided confidentially to Asia Times by military insiders that veterans of previous ruling juntas, namely the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) and State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), are growing wary of Min Aung Hlaing’s perceived as ineffective and polarizing actions and tactics. Recent developments, including the attacks on military airbases, have opened a Pandora’s box of possibilities and scenarios that were largely unforeseen when the tanks rolled into the main city of Yangon three months ago and scores of elected MPs and other politicians were arrested and detained in the capital Naypyitaw. Those include a wider civil war in the nation’s central region heartland, including near the generals’ bunker-like capital at Naypyidaw. On April 29, unidentified militants fired rockets at air force bases in Magwe and Meiktila in central Myanmar. Another explosion detonated at a Myanmar Army weapons storage facility near Bago city, about 70 kilometers north of Yangon. Those attacks came after intense fighting between the Myanmar military, known as Tatmadaw, and ethnic rebels from the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) on the border with Thailand. The shadowy unclaimed attacks on airbases also coincided with intensified battles with the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) in the country’s far north, where many pro-democracy activists have sought refuge after bloody crackdowns in urban areas. The Tatmadaw’s attacks have been marked by airstrikes on rebel targets which have included civilian villages. That’s caused the recent displacement of more than 25,000 villagers in Kayin state and at least 5,000 in Kachin state. That adds to the tens of thousands who fled their homes amid earlier fighting in the areas. Long-time observers of Myanmar’s politics have privately drawn parallels between current events and what happened after an even bloodier coup in 1988, when thousands of dissidents also took to the hills and jungles after the Tatmadaw crushed another nationwide, pro-democracy uprising. But, they note, there are fundamental differences between the events of 1988 and current developments. In 1988, young urban dissidents formed the All Burma Students’ Democratic Front (ABSDF), donned uniforms and fought alongside ethnic rebels in the frontier areas. At that time, it was much easier to acquire weapons from grey Thai arms markets and dissident groups had ready sanctuaries — and even offices — in neighboring Thailand. However, improved relations between the Thai and Myanmar militaries coupled with severe entry restrictions into Thailand caused by the Covid-19 pandemic have at least so far kept the dissidents on the Myanmar side of the border. The old ABSDF exists now only in name as most of its cadres have either surrendered or been resettled in third countries. The ABSDF’s ultimately failed uprising could explain why the new ethnic-urban alliance has taken on a different and potentially more explosive form. Indeed, recent developments seem to signal the beginning of hitherto unseen urban warfare, which the Tatmadaw is ill-equipped to handle. Apart from the obvious alliances between informal groups of pro-democracy activists and ethnic rebels, local resistance forces have already emerged in Sagaing Region and Chin state. Reports indicate similar forces are coalescing in Mon state and Mandalay Region. Social media posts show those local partisans are equipped with hunting rifles and homemade explosives but have nonetheless been able to inflict significant casualties on the police and military, including in Kalay in Sagaing Region. In nearby Chin state, a new force called the Chinland Defense Force reportedly killed 15 junta troops in their area. Shadowy bomb and Molotov cocktail attacks have been reported against police stations in Yangon, Mandalay and Monywa. At the same time, the Tatmadaw must contend with battle-hardened ethnic armies. In the country’s far north, there have been over 50 clashes since Kachin rebels overran and captured a Tatmadaw outpost on the strategic Alawbum mountain near the Chinese border on March 25. Airstrikes have failed to dislodge the KIA, which has carried out subsequent attacks near the Hpakant jade mines in western Kachin state and north of Sumprabum in the state’s north. In Kayin State, the Free Burma Rangers nongovernmental organization reports daily fights between the Tatmadaw and KNLA, despite the fact the two sides entered a ceasefire agreement in October 2015. That agreement, which included the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS) and eight smaller, rather insignificant groups, was termed a “Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement” (NCA), although it was neither nationwide nor led to even a semblance of peace in frontier areas. Although the KNLA and the KIA have sided openly with Myanmar’s until now peaceful Civil Disobedience Movement, other ethnic groups have been less supportive. In a March 27 interview with Reuters, RCSS chairman Yawd Serk said his group would not stand by idly if the junta’s forces continue to kill protesters but his vow hasn’t been followed up with any clear action. On the contrary, the RCSS has been fighting a rival Shan group, the Shan State Army of the Shan State Progress Party and its ethnic Palaung allies in the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) for control of areas in northern Shan state. Myanmar’s most powerful ethnic army, the 20,000-30,000 strong United Wa State Army (UWSA), has remained conspicuously silent since the coup. Not all Wa agree with the stance: Ten Wa civil society organizations signed on March 25 a written, urgent plea to the UWSA and its political wing the United Wa State Party to say something. That hasn’t happened though, probably because the UWSA is so closely allied with China’s security services, which do not want to get involved with Myanmar’s anti-coup movement. Protesters have targeted Beijing’s perceived support of the regime at the United Nations. Several Chinese factories were torched in Yangon in one spasm of violence. The 7,000-strong Arakan Army (AA) in Rakhine state, one of Myanmar’s most powerful rebel armies, which has killed hundreds of Tatmadaw soldiers in recent fighting, has taken a more surprising stance. It entered into ceasefire talks with the Tatmadaw in November last year and was taken off its list of “terrorist” organizations soon after the February 1 coup. Its leader, Twan Mrat Naing, said on April 16 at the UWSA’s Panghsang headquarters that the ousted National League for Democracy government claimed that it would create a federal union with equal rights for all nationalities but failed to deliver on the promise. With that view, it’s doubtful the AA will join any grand alliance between urban dissidents and ethnic armies. Even without a unified ethnic resistance, there is still a chance that the Tatmadaw’s old guard could move to break the stalemate by pressuring or even trying to overthrow Min Aung Hlaing and his top deputies before the situation deteriorates further. The SLORC and SPDC were likewise brutal outfits and no friends of democracy, but former junta chief and commander-in-chief Senior General Than Shwe did initiate liberal reforms that led to a more open society and vastly improved relations with the West and wider world before stepping aside in 2010. Than Shwe is now in his late 80s and political analysts in Myanmar believe that the current chaos is hardly the kind of legacy he would want to leave behind. Whether the aging general has the wherewithal, influence or inclination to try to rein in Min Aung Hlaing is unknown, but the anarchy unleashed by his coup is clearly not in the military establishment’s short or long-term interests..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
2021-05-01
Date of entry/update: 2021-05-02
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Description: "The pro democracy unity government in Myanmar which includes members of Aung San #Su​ Kyi's party, says it will not enter talks until the junta releases all political prisoners. Souteast Asias regional bloc has been holding talks with the leaders of the miltiary who seized power on February 1st. Since then massive protests have been held against the coup, hundreds of civilians have been killed and many more arrested. Wai Hnin Pwint Thon campaigns officer at #Burma​ Campaign UK, and the daughter of a man currently serving a 65-year jail sentence in Myanmar for his part in the 2007 protests gave us her talke on the current situation. She says negotiations will have to happen but that talking with the #Myanmar​ military is futile..."
Source/publisher: "France24" ( Paris)
2021-04-28
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-29
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Sub-title: While the world gasps at the Myanmar military's brutal crackdown, there is little hope for a soldier-led mutiny or countercoup
Description: "A military coup that overthrows a democratically elected government and sparks three months of nationwide protests and strikes. More than 700 people including children as young as five shot and killed as security forces fire into crowds of anti-military demonstrators. Thousands of people, among them not only politicians, activists and journalists but also some of the nation’s best-known singers, movie stars and celebrities arrested on various trumped-up charges. An economy on its knees with non-performing banks and foreign investors running for the exits. Such a litany would normally be enough to bring down any coup-installed government through a counter-coup or some other action by a military’s top brass who could see the self-defeatism of trying to cling to power when nearly the entire population is opposed to your takeover and rule. But not in Myanmar. Instead, the military and its controlled police seem prepared to do whatever it takes to preserve its democracy-suspending power grab. So far, there have been no signs of substantial cracks or divisions within the security establishment apart from a handful of policemen who have fled to rebel-held territories near the Thai border or across the border into neighboring northeastern India. But is Myanmar’s military truly full of spineless, mindless yes-men, or is there something else that holds the institution together in the face of massive local resistance and rising international condemnation? The simplistic explanation, put forth mostly by foreign security analysts, is that the Myanmar military, known as the Tatmadaw, is a battle-hardened force that has been fighting against an array of political and ethnic rebels continuously for more than 70 years. Myanmar’s civil wars broke out shortly after independence was achieved from Britain in 1948. Before that, an army founded by independence hero Aung San had fought alongside the Japanese military against the British and then, at the end of World War II, allied themselves with the British and turned against the Japanese. Consequently, the Tatmadaw sees itself as the true defender of the nation’s independence and the only force that can hold the ethnically diverse and politically divided country together. But that analysis misses the enigma of military power in Myanmar. Although Aung San’s daughter and coup-toppled democratic leader Aung San Suu Kyi once referred to the Tatmadaw as “my father’s army”, the military force which fought during World War II had little in common with the army that emerged after independence. Because of post-war agreements with the British, most of the old fighters were demobilized and turned into a militia known as the People’s Volunteer Organization (PVO) which, in turn, resorted to armed struggle against the government because it saw independence as a sham that perpetuated colonial rule. By then, Aung San had been assassinated and of the legendary “Thirty Comrades” who had followed him to Japan to receive military training before the Japanese invasion of Myanmar in 1942, only three remained in the Tatmadaw in the 1950s, including army chief General Ne Win, who eventually seized power in a 1962 coup, the first absolute military-takeover in Myanmar, then known as Burma. By the 1950s, Myanmar’s civil wars were more or less over, with the rebel Karen National Union (KNU) and Communist Party of Burma (CPB) pushed back into remote areas. Persistent internal political turmoil, though, led to the formation of a caretaker government led by Ne Win, which was in power from 1958 to 1960. Rather than fighting the rebels, Ne Win and his 4th Burma Rifles spent the latter part of the 1950s building up a power base — and a business empire that in many ways endures today — centered around their regiment. In 1958, it published a document called “The National Ideology of the Defense Services” which strikingly resembles the dwifungsi, or dual function, doctrine of the Indonesian army that stated that the military has both a defense and social-political role. Ne Win also established an entity called the Defense Services Institute. (DSI), which soon controlled vital sectors of Myanmar’s economy. It had its own retail stores in Yangon and elsewhere it controlled the lucrative importation of coal for the railroads, electric supplies and inland water transport. DSI even established an external shipping line, the Five Star Line, and took over an English-owned bank and renamed it the Ava Bank. A newspaper, the Guardian, and a publishing house were also controlled by DSI. Meanwhile, the once-tiny Myanmar Army, perhaps as few as 2,000 men in 1949, grew steadily in strength and importance. By the late 1950s, Ne Win had more than 40,000 soldiers under his command. The army was becoming a state within the state, but few Myanmars, the vast majority of whom had faith in the nation’s then democratic system, constitution and rule of law, paid much attention until New Win seized power in 1962. Significantly, the junta that overthrew a democratically elected government introduced a new economic system called “the Burmese Way to Socialism.” But rather than establishing a socialist regime reminiscent of those in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union or China, Ne Win’s rendition meant that everything was nationalized and taken over by 23 military-run state corporations. Military coups were not uncommon in Asia at that time, but the difference in Myanmar was that the military seized not only political but also economic power. While the economies of Thailand and Indonesia, for instance, blossomed because the military entered into marriages of convenience with indigenous plutocracies, Ne Win took Myanmar in a completely different direction. The old business community, which was mainly of Indian and Chinese origin, had their properties and assets seized by the military, driving hundreds of thousands out of Myanmar into India, Southeast Asia or Taiwan. But if the 1962 coup had been meant to squash what was left of the insurgents, it turned out to be counterproductive. A rebellion broke out among the Kachin in 1961 in areas of northern Shan state. After 1962, it spread to Kachin state and the Kachin Independence Army took over most of the state. An even smaller rebellion among the Shan, which broke out in 1958, escalated into full-scale war as several bands grouped together to form the Shan State Army in 1964. The Burmese Way to Socialism had, hardly surprisingly, led to economic collapse — and a flourishing black market with neighboring Thailand. The KNU, which controlled the border areas, collected taxes on that trade, and was able to buy modern guns from the Thai black market. And, most devastatingly, China decided to give all-out support to the CPB, including modern, sophisticated weaponry of kinds that the old forces in central Myanmar never possessed. Thus, the new power structure that emerged in Myanmar after 1962 had more to do with preserving an order that hugely privileged the military in an otherwise collapsing society than the fact that officers had seen fierce combat. That new order had a very narrow base, consisting of men from Ne Win’s own regiment, the 4th Burma Rifles. And Ne Win himself was probably the least battle-hardened senior officer in the Tatmadaw as he arguably spent more time gambling at horse races than on the battlefield. Actually, the country’s most battle-hardened officers – among them the popular Brigadier Kyaw Zaw, who was purged in the late 1950s, later joined the CPB and ended his life in exile in China, and General Tin Oo, who fought in several frontier areas and in 1988 became one of the leaders of the then newly-established National League for Democracy (NLD) – did not become killers of civilians. Rather, it was Ne Win loyalists who opened fire on demonstrating students in 1962, on students and workers in the mid-1970s, and then the massacres in 1988, when thousands of pro-democracy protesters were gunned down in the streets of Yangon and elsewhere. Ne Win and his men from the 4th Burma Rifles remained in power until after the events of 1988, when somewhat younger officers took over. Ne Win’s legacy was finally dismantled in 2002, when he died and his relatives were purged allegedly for plotting against the then-military government. But the system he created lives on today. The military became the ruling class, which enjoyed privileges denied ordinary citizens. It had its own schools and hospitals and it was rare for someone who did not come from a military family to get a job in the government. The new army that emerged after 1962 also included a series of Light Infantry Divisions, which became notorious for their brutality when fighting rebels and suppressing civil movements in urban areas, as they did in 1988 and are doing once again in the wake of the February 1 coup. The Burmese Way to Socialism was abolished after the 1988 uprising, but the military retained an important role in the semi-capitalist system that succeeded it. While Ne Win had his DSI, Myanmar’s new military leaders established powerful companies like the Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings and the Myanmar Economic Corporation, which currently have vast holdings across the economy. As such, the very concept of the 1958 declaration and the 1962 coup has not been abandoned but rather reshaped: the military should have a defense function as well as playing social, political and economic roles. Whether Suu Kyi and her NLD aimed to roll back those roles and holdings in a second elected term is an open and important question. Suu Kyi largely refrained from challenging the Tatmadaw’s political and economic power in her first term, but the NLD’s overwhelming election win last November – which coup-makers claim without evidence was fraudulent – gave her a strong mandate to push for more democratic change. Top brass leaders also likely feared the risk of retribution for their many crimes. All senior Tatmadaw officers know where the skeletons are buried of past atrocities, both in ethnic minority areas and now also in urban centers home to the middle class. The current commander-in-chief, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, is now widely loathed across the population for his regime’s ruthless post-coup clampdown. He and his associates know by now that they either maintain power or land in prison — or worse. But it is a combination of those fears, deeply entrenched economic interests and a dual-function ideology that holds the Tatmadaw so tightly together, not some underlying sense of patriotism or because officers have been hardened through battles in the field. And that explains why no cracks have or are likely to emerge in the Tatmadaw, despite the brutal, irrational and seemingly self-defeating orders being handed down by officers and carried out by unswervingly obedient foot soldiers..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
2021-04-20
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-23
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Description: "Myanmar faces a number of significant stabilisation challenges including frequent natural disasters, environmental challenges and organised crime, in addition to the challenges associated with a nascent democratisation process. This report, however, focuses exclusively on violent conflict and displacement. Myanmar has been afflicted by armed conflict since independence. During the 1960s-1980s, a number of armed groups were able to establish ‘effectively independent micro-states’ (EC, 2016, p. 3). These had their own ‘rudimentary’ governments, service provision, and foreign policies (EC, 2016, p. 3). This situation persists in some parts of Myanmar (EC, 2016, p. 3). The communities currently most at risk of, and affected by, conflict and violence are those living in the Kokang Self-Administered Zone and in other parts of northern Shan State. Other affected communities include those living in Kachin, Rakhine, Chin and Kayin States. The community most affected by the threat of forced displacement is the Rohingya, a Muslim ethnic group, in Rakhine State. The nature of conflict in these areas ranges from occasional to frequent clashes between armed groups and government forces. In addition to armed conflict, Rakhine State suffers from tensions between the Muslim and Buddhist communities. There were more than 700,000 internally displaced people (IDPs) in Myanmar in 2016 (McConnachie, 2016, p. 4). Moreover, more than 128,000 refugees from Myanmar were living in Thailand in 2014 (UNICEF, 2014, p. 3). According to UNICEF, displacement can constitute a driver of conflict, depending on whether it is forced or not, and on the extent to which host communities are prepared for IDPs. Women and children are reportedly disproportionately affected by migration and displacement, and make up the majority of those who are IDPs and refugees (ibid). The literature identifies a number of sources of resilience in Myanmar, which include:  Institutionalisation of peace-making: Both the previous and current governments declared their commitment to ending conflict in Myanmar. A number of peace initiatives and inter-faith dialogues have taken place in order to mitigate tensions and conflict in the country.  Economy: Myanmar’s economy has considerable potential. A number of economic reforms have been undertaken and economic growth is strong, although it has been slowing recently.  Strengthened civil society: The previous government’s decision to allow issue-driven CSOs to operate in Myanmar has led to a proliferation of such organisations.  Education: The previous government undertook steps to reform the education system in Myanmar in a bid to end discrimination against ethnic minorities.  Release of political prisoners: A significant number of political prisoners have been released since the new National League for Democracy (NLD) led government came to power.  Increased press freedom: Extensive media reform has resulted in a proliferation of ‘alternative’ information and has rendered the government subject to increased scrutiny. The literature identifies a number of policy options for mitigating tensions in Myanmar. International actors could potentially provide support and assistance in a number of areas. These include technical support for the conclusion, implementation and monitoring of ceasefire agreements, and support for an inclusive national political dialogue. They also include various forms of assistance for recovery and development, as well as support for educational reform. There is a sizeable body of literature on Myanmar’s stabilisation challenges. This consists of a mixture of peer-reviewed journal articles, policy briefs, and reports by NGOs and international organisations. While gender is not addressed in all of the papers reviewed for the purposes of this report, a number of papers do look at gender, specifically in the context of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), and in the context of peace-making and peacebuilding..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Governance and Social Development Resource Centre
2017-05-02
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-21
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Description: "The current tripartite (government/Tatmadaw, EAOs, and political parties) Framework for Political Dialogue in the peace process was based on an assumption of ethnic unity, not to mention, a unified stance between the government and Tatmadaw, and amongst the political parties. However, this unity remains more of an ideal in all three cases, rather than an actuality. It was widely expected that the EAOs would at least have similar aspirations on what the future federal union would look like. But past years have shown that this assumption was inaccurate. The more substantive and detailed the negotiations have become, the more divided and fragmented the EAOs have turned out to be. This fragmentation could not only be seen between the different EAOs (horizontal fragmentation) but also potentially within the EAOs (vertical fragmentation). At the horizontal level, different factions have emerged indicating the groups’ different interests and the different realities each group is trying to cope with. Particularly, the division is clear between the Ethnic Armed Organisation – Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement Signatory groups (EAO NCA-S) and the EAO NCA Non-Signatory groups (EAO NCA-NS), currently consisting of the Northern Alliance, and the Karenni National Progress Party (KNPP). Horizontal Fragmentation – NCA Non-Signatories: Within the Northern Alliance (NA) 1, federalism is not a key issue. The United Wa State Army (UWSA) and the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA – Mong La) have never articulated a desire for federalism. In fact, the two organizations, the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP), and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (originally formed in 1989, forcibly disbanded by the Tatmadaw and its proxy in 2009, and re-emerged in 2014), which is a member of the NA’s splinter Three Brotherhood Alliance, are offshoots of the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) which collapsed in 1989. The UWSA and NDAA managed to not only continue operating but to also secure their territories through a ceasefire (‘gentlemen’s agreement’) brokered by intelligence chief Khin Nyunt. Rather than a federal Union, the UWSA would likely be more comfortable with a one-country, twosystems arrangement – a reverse of the China-Hong Kong situation where a Communist country tolerates a democratic enclave, i.e., a democratic country tolerating a Communist enclave. Chinese officials have informally suggested that unless and until the Myanmar economy catches up with that of Wa State, they do not see how Wa State could integrate into the Myanmar system. In the case of Hong Kong, China’s economy has caught up with that of Hong Kong, and the process of trying to integrate the democratic enclave into the main system has begun. Given their background, the NDAA and the MNDAA might have similar aspirations albeit with less chance of succeeding. The situation of the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP), however, may be more complicated. Its ideology may be more aligned with its three ex-CPB colleagues, but it cannot afford to be seen as not supporting the cause of Shan nationalism. If it did, it would lose popular support to its competitor, the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), which in its opinion is using its legal status in the peace process (and NCA) with the government to encroach on both its territory and legitimacy. The Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) which like the UWSA enjoyed from 1995, 17 years of a pretty autonomous existence until 2011, might like a similar arrangement but not being Communist, it does not enjoy the same kind of patronage from China as the USWA does. And with the Kachin State being a signatory of the original 1947 Panglong Agreement, the KIO has thrown in its lot with the groups demanding ‘genuine’ federalism. However, what constitutes ‘genuine’ federalism is a point of contention. Not being an NCA signatory, it is also hampered in trying to ensure that its version of ‘genuine’ federalism is reflected in the 21st Century Panglong peace talks. Unlike its ‘big brothers’ in the NA, the Arakan Army (formed in 2009) and a member of the NAsplinter, the Three Brotherhood Alliance, is demanding confederate status for Rakhine State,2 The position on federalism of the remaining NA member, the Ta-ang National Liberation Army (current iteration formed in 2009 with military activities starting 2011), is unclear. It definitely wants equality and autonomy for the Ta-ang people, but how that can be achieved within a federal system and within Shan State where the Ta-ang people live, has not yet been articulated or made public. It is also continuing to clash with both the Tatmadaw and the RCSS. The last NCA Non-Signatory, the Karenni National Progress Party (KNPP), has also like the KIO, thrown in its lot with the groups demanding ‘genuine’ federalism. However, in terms of its true aspiration, the KNPP harks back to 1875 when the British recognized the sovereignty of the Karenni States. Recognizing the difficulty of claiming independence, ‘genuine’ federalism is seen as the next best-case scenario, however, it would likely opt for confederation like the AA if that option were open. But not being an NCA signatory, like the KIO, it is also hampered in trying to ensure that its version of ‘genuine’ federalism or confederation is reflected in the 21st Century Panglong peace talks..."
Source/publisher: Euro Burma Office
2020-08-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-12
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Moving forward after the election
Description: "After the Myanmar peace process had been deadlocked from the end of 2018 until the beginning of 2020 the Government of Aung San Suu Kyi along with the military and a number of armed ethnic organisations (EAOs) were able to hold another Union Peace Conference 21st Century Panglong (UPC) from 17-19 August 2020. State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi had made resolving peace with the many armed ethnic groups in the country a priority after coming to power in 2015. And both the State Counsellor and Commanderin-Chief of the armed forces, Snr. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing had voiced an opinion that talks must restart prior to the 2020 general election. Several criticisms have been made about the results of the UPC which saw representatives from all 10 Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement-signatory EAOs participate. Invitations had also been offered to non-signatory EAOs from Kachin (KIA), Wa (UWSA), Kokang (MNDAA), Mong La (NDAA), and Shan (SSPP) in the northeast, but all declined due to the exclusion of the Arakan Army (AA) which the government has designated a terrorist organisation. Regardless, the talks continued with the adoption of a further 20 principles for the Union Accords (UA), and an agreement among the parties to continue formal peace talks with the incoming government in 2021. While some believe there were no substantive results from the UPC, 1 the fact is that the UPC meeting has led to the reinvigoration of a stalled peace process and allowed further time for EAOs to reconsider their position in moving forward. At least one participant, Sai Leng from the Restoration Council Shan State Army, pointed out that, It is meaningful to agree on how to build a federal union beyond 2020. We also agreed on some guiding principles of building the federal union, such as power-sharing between Union and States,2 Similarly, the State Counsellor said the peace process was now back on track and the principles signed were “more sincere and have more substance.”3 Lieutenant General Yar Pyae, the military delegate and chairman of the Joint Monitoring Committee on the nationwide ceasefire, Now we can draw a conclusion that countless negotiations have reduced the mistrust that has been deep-rooted on both sides . . . [stakeholders] should not leave the negotiation table, whatever the reason.4 According to one EAO advisor, one of the more important points was that, Part 3.3 (a) Power, resource, tax and finance will be divided between the Union and regions/states in line with the federal system (official translation). But he also noted, [But] Some observers have pointed out that it was only a repetition of UA#1 (political sector) 4 (d). But according to the negotiators, the difference is the emphasis shown here, which was not in UA#1. Therefore, they [ethnic leaders] say, the key to a federal union is now open. Accordingly, it can be regarded as a second breakthrough after the NCA.5 Another negotiator in the talks had suggested that the talks were ‘more disappointing’ but expressed the desire to move forward regardless.6..."
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Source/publisher: Euro Burma Office
2020-11-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-12
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Sub-title: Despite her promise to welcome new voices into the peace process, many fine-grained obstacles to progress remain.
Description: "In a New Year’s address to the nation on January 1, Myanmar’s State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi promised to take a new approach to long-delayed peace negotiations aimed at ending the country’s tangled web of civil conflicts. According to a report in The Irrawaddy, Aung San Suu Kyi, whose second five-year term begins in March, announced plans for a “New Peace Architecture,” which would welcome participation by political groups, civil society organizations, and the public. She said that the aim was to broaden the scope of who had a say in the ongoing talks, with the hope of consolidating inter-ethnic trust and inducing more ethnic armed groups to join the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) in time for the 75th anniversary of Myanmar’s independence in January 2023. “We recognize the important role of public participation [in the peace process],” Myanmar’s leader said, according to The Irrawaddy. “This depends on how much we can pave the way for all stakeholders to participate.” The NCA was signed in late 2015 between the Myanmar government and eight ethnic rebel organizations, while two more joined in February 2018. But the peace process continues to exclude some of the country’s largest and most prominent armed rebel groups, and since the signing of the NCA, fighting with some of them has reached levels not seen in years..."
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Source/publisher: "The Diplomat" (Japan)
2021-01-07
Date of entry/update: 2021-01-08
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Description: "Leaders of ethnic Mon and Karen armed organizations have agreed to cease fighting after holding a meeting on Wednesday to discuss a recent flare-up of clashes in southern Karen State. Representatives of the New Mon State Party (NMSP) and the Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army (KNU/KNLA) agreed to seek solutions to their disputes through dialogue. “We agreed to stop further clashes. We also agreed to solve problems through dialogue. We are going to explain our agreement to the ground-level forces. Today, we also agreed to live in unity,” Lt-Col M. Seik Chan, the commander of the NMSP’s Battalion 5, told NMG. According to the lieutenant colonel, leaders from both groups ordered their forces to retreat from the location of the recent clashes. Fighting between the NMSP and KNU occurred in Balae Donfive village in Payathonsu sub-township on October 17 and 21. Representatives from the KNLA Brigade 6 and NMSP’s headquarters held three meetings and observed the location of the clashes. “Both sides need to follow our agreement. If we do that, we can avoid further clashes. Both sides have a responsibility,” Lt-Col Saw Shwe Win, commander of the KNLA’s Battalion 16, told NMG..."
Source/publisher: "Network Media Group" (Thailand)
2019-10-24
Date of entry/update: 2019-10-25
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Clashes broke out between the New Mon State Party (NMSP) and the Karen National Union (KNU) on Thursday morning in two locations in Tanintharyi Region’s Dawei District, according to NMSP sources. “Clashes broke out in Balae Donfive and the Ye Chaung Hpyar area,” NMSP central committee member Nai Lawi Mon told NMG, adding that the clash in Ye Chaung Hypar was “minor” and that he was still awaiting a field report on the fighting in Balae Donfive. Padoh Win Khine, a liaison officer in the KNU’s Brigade 4 Myeik-Dawei liaison office, said that a clash occurred in the KNU’s Brigade 6 area, but that he did not know further details. “It was not a face-to-face clash,” he told NMG, adding that it was possibly in the Ye Chaung Hpyar area. Padoh Win Khine added that other armed groups were active in the area, as well, and may have been involved. The NMSP alleged that the KNU attacked their base camps in the two locations. At the time of reporting, NMG could not independently confirm how the clashes began..."
Source/publisher: "Network Media Group" (Thailand)
2019-10-18
Date of entry/update: 2019-10-19
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "(ခ့ၣ်အဲၣ်ယူၣ်)ကညီဒီကလုာ်စၢဖှိၣ်ကရၢ မုၢ်တြီၢ်ကီၢ်ရ့ၣ် တၢ်ပၢ ဟီၣ်က၀ီၤ တၢ်လီၢ်တနီၤအပူၤ တနံၣ်အံၤ၂၀၁၉နံၣ်လါယနူၤအါရံၤအပူၤ(KNLA)သုးမုၢ်ဒိၣ်ဒီးကီၢ်ပယီၤသုးမုၢ်ဒိၣ်တဖၣ်အဘၢၣ်စၢၤတၢ်ခးလိာ်သးက့ၤကဲထီၣ်(၂)ဘျီအဂ့ၢ်(KNLA)သုးက့(၅)ၦၤဘၣ်မူဘၣ်ဒါတဖၣ်စံး၀ဲန့ၣ်လီၤႉ တၢ်ခးလိာ်အသးန့ၣ် ဖဲလါယနူၤအါရံၤ(၅)သီ တဘျီဒီး ဖဲ(၁၃)သီန့ၣ် တဘျီခီဖျိတၢ်ခီပတာ်၀ဲတၢ်ပာ်ပနီၣ်လီၢ်အဃိ တၢ်ခးလိာ်သးကဲထီၣ်အဂ့ၢ်(ခ့ၣ်အဲၣ်ယူၣ်)သုးက့(၅) သုးဂ့ၢ်၀ီခိၣ် သုးခိၣ်ဒိၣ်ဖိ စီၤကျၢၤဒိၣ်စံးဘၣ် ခ့ၣ်အဲးစံၣ်ကညီတၢ်ကစီၣ်န့ၣ်လီၤႉ..."
Creator/author: KIC
Source/publisher: KIC (Karen Information Center)
2019-01-24
Date of entry/update: 2019-02-18
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: Sgaw Karen
Font: Unicode
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Description: ''When President Thein Sein assumed office in 2011, the international community rushed to assist Myanmar’s democratization and its efforts to resolve the many armed conflicts that have fractured the state for 70 years. Fast-forward to 2019, however, and the giddy excitement of successful elections and ambitious peace negotiations has faded. While millions of aid dollars have been spent on peacebuilding, we face a sobering reality. Conflict is currently increasing in Rakhine and Shan States. The formal peace process is on life support. Where do we go from here? How do we foster dialogue between Myanmar’s warring factions that will lead to a peaceful and functioning state for all?...''
Creator/author: Nicola Williams
Source/publisher: Asia Foundation
2019-01-30
Date of entry/update: 2019-02-08
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: English
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Description: ''The Karen National Union (KNU) has denied allegations by the Myanmar military that it is extorting money from civilians, and rejected the Army’s characterization of clashes between it and government troops as an effort to expand its area of control. Separately, the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) issued its own rebuttal of the military’s recent claims against EAOs, saying it did not accept the terms of the military’s four-month truce. The Myanmar military (or Tatmadaw) included its complaints against the KNU in a statement released Friday in which it accused ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) of burdening the public by continuing to recruit and extort civilians and expand their territories. In addition to the KNU, it mentioned all of the EAOs based in northeast Myanmar, including the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), Ta’ang Nationalities Liberation Army, Arakan Army, Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, Shan State Progressive Party/Shan State Army North, Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army South and Pa-Oh National Liberation Organization. It accused them of destabilizing the region and violating the terms of the truce...''
Creator/author: Nyein Nyein
Source/publisher: The Irrawaddy
2019-01-28
Date of entry/update: 2019-01-28
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: English
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Description: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS: "...This report provides evidence that the Burma Army is committing war crimes ? in particular torture, shelling of civilian targets, and enslavement of civilians as porters and human shields -- on a widespread, systematic scale during its ongoing offensives in Ta?ang areas of northern Shan State. The fact that the crimes are being committed with complete impunity, not only by locally based battalions, but increasingly by battalions deployed under combat divisions deployed from central Burma, indicates clearly that the crimes are being authorized from the central command. TWO is gravely concerned that the Burma Army, which remains exempt from civilian oversight under the current constitution, is not only continuing its offensives in the ethnic areas in defiance of the ?peace process”, but is also systematically committing war crimes against the ethnic peoples in flagrant violation of international humanitarian law. It is urgently needed for the National League for Democracy (NLD) to act to curb the military?s power, its criminal practices and impunity. Simply sharing power with the Burma Army under the current government will only maintain the military status quo, perpetuating the war and condemning the ethnic peoples to untold ongoing suffering..."
Source/publisher: Ta?ang Women?s Organization (TWO)
2016-06-28
Date of entry/update: 2016-06-29
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: English
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Description: "Tar Aik Bong is a leader of the Ta?ang (Palaung) people, one of Burma?s ethnic nationalities that continues a daily struggle for survival in largely inaccessible areas in northern Shan State. He joined the Ta?ang liberation movement in 1987, and currently serves as Chairman of Palaung State Liberation Front (PSLF) and Head of the military commission of Ta?ang National Liberation Army (TNLA). TNLA is one of the few ethnic armies that continues to fight against the Burma army and vows not to lay down arms until equal rights and a lasting political solution is achieved. TNLA fights to ?obtain freedom for all Ta?ang nationals from oppression, to form Ta?ang autonomous regions that guarantee democracy and human rights, to oppose and fight against dictatorship and any form of racial discrimination, to attain national equality and self-determination and to establish a genuine Federal Union that guarantees Ta?ang autonomy and to eliminate cultivation, production, sale and use of narcotics.” Tar Aik Bong is also a member of the ethnic alliance United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC) council and Foreign Affairs Department. In an exclusive interview with Burma Link, Tar Aik Bong talks about the causes and current situation of the Ta?ang conflict, the role of the UNFC, and the brutal tactics that the Burmese military uses against Ta?ang civilians in order to cut the opposition movement. Tar Aik Bong also discusses the Burmese military?s instrumental role in the epidemic drug usage in Ta?ang areas, and TNLA?s plan to eradicate the drugs."
Source/publisher: Burma Link
2014-11-11
Date of entry/update: 2016-03-18
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: English
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Description: Listening to Voices: Myanmar Foot Soldiers Speak - မြန်မာ့ခြေလျှင်တင်သားများ ဖွင့်ဟပြောဆိုသံများအား နားထောင်ခြင်း.....စာတမ်းအကျဉ်းချုပ်: "ဤပုံနှိပ်ထုတ်ေ ဝ မှုသည် တိုင်းရင်းသား လက်နက်ကိုင်အဖွဲ့ ( ၆ ) ခုမှ ခြေလျင်တပ်သားများ၏ စကား သံများအား ဖွင့်လှစ်ထုတ်ဖော် ပြီး ၊ မြန်မာ့ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးလုပ်ငန်းစဉ် နှင့်ထိုသူတို့၏ အနာဂါတ် ဆိုင်ရာလိုအပ်ချက်များ၊ ကြောင့်ကြမှုများ နှင့်စိန်ခေါ်မှုအခက်အခဲများ အား မီးမောင်းထိုးပြသခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။ 1 ဤစီမံကိန်းသည် နားထောင်ခြင်းနည်းပညာ / ဥပဒေဿကိုအသုံးပြု၍ ၊ ြ မန်မာနိုင်ငံလုံးဆိုင်ရာ ကျောင်းသားများ ဒီမိုကရက်တစ် တပ်ဦး (ABSDF) ၊ ချင်းအမျိုးသားတပ်ဦး (CNF) ၊ ကချင်လွတ်မြောက်ရေးအဖွဲ့အစည်း (KIO) ၊ ကရင်အမျိုးသားအစည်းအရုံး (KNU) ၊ ကရင်နီအ မျိုးသားတိုးတက်ရေးပါတီ (KNPP) နှင့် မွန်ပြည်သစ်ပါတီ ( NMSP) တို့မှခြေလျင်တပ်သား ၁၀၀ တို့ဖြင့်နားထောင်ခြင်းစကားစမည် ဝ ိုင်းများ စီစဉ်ပြုလုပ်ခဲ့သည်။ ထိုစကား ဝ ိုင်းများမှ အဓိကအကြောင်းအရာခေါင်းစဉ်များ နှင့် အများလက်ခံေ သာ အကြောင်းအရာတို့အား ဖော်ထုတ်ခဲ့ကြပြီး ၊ အောက်တွ င်ပါ ဝ င်မည့်အခန်းများတွင် အသေးစိတ်ဖော်ပြမည်ဖြစ်သည်။ ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးနှင့် ပဋိပက္ခအရေးလေ့လာမှုစင်တာ ( CPCS ) သည် မြန်မာပြည် ပဋိပက္ခအတွင်းပါ ဝ င်သော လက်နက်ကိုင်အဖွဲ့များနှင့် ၎င်းအဖွဲ့များမှပုဂ္ဂိုလ်များအကြား မတူကွဲပြားသော စကား သံ တို့အား အသိအမှတ်ပြု လျက်ရှိပါသည်။ နားထောင်ခြင်းန ည်းပညာ သည် လူပုဂ္ဂိုလ်များ၏အကြံဉာဏ်များအကြား ၊ အများလက်ခံ သောအကြောင်းအရာများသာမက ၊ ကွဲပြားခြားနားသောအကြောင်းအရာများအား ရှာဖွေဖော်ထုတ်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။ ဤနည်းပညာကိုအသုံးပြုကာ NSAG များမှအကြံဉာဏ်များအား စုဆောင်းခြင်းအားဖြင့် အဖွဲ့များအကြားရှိ အများလက်ခံေ သာအကြောင်းအရာများ နှင့် ကွဲပြားခြားနားချက်များအား မီးမောင်းထိုးပြသနိုင်ခွင့်ရရှိခဲ့ပြီး ၊ ထိုအကြောင်းအရာများအား ဤစာအုပ်၏ေ နာက်ဆုံး အခန်း ရှိ အဖွဲ့များ ဖွင့်ဟပြောြ ကား ချက် အကျဉ်းချုပ် များ၌ အသေးစိတ်ဖော်ပြထားပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher: Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies (CPCS)
2014-04-00
Date of entry/update: 2015-09-27
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: Burmese (မြန်မာဘာသာ)
Format : pdf
Size: 1.72 MB
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Description: "Soldiers explained that mutual respect between all parties is needed for the peace process to be successful. Mutual respect was often mentioned in relation to the need for adherence to ceasefire agreements, reports of breaches to ceasefire agreements and concerns about the sincerity of the peace process. Generally, foot soldiers identified the need for all parties to respect the terms and conditions of agreements equally. Soldiers expressed a desire to create stronger links between what is discussed and agreed upon in peace/ceasefire agreements and implementation. Specific points of contention included soldiers carrying arms outside of their demarcated territory when agreements restricted this movement. Soldiers voiced a need for Tatmadaw soldiers to ask permission before entering their territory. One KNU soldier expressed: ?Tatmadaw soldiers bring arms when they come into our regions. Don?t we have the right to hold arms? We follow the rules”..."
Source/publisher: Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies (CPCS)
2014-04-00
Date of entry/update: 2015-09-27
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: English
Format : pdf
Size: 746.52 KB
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