Assessment of hydropower projects in Burma/Myanmar

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Description: "Due to the negative development in Myanmar with deteriorating human rights situation and on the back of an enhanced human rights due diligence process, AFRY has decided to end its commitment in hydropower projects in Myanmar. Following the UN report: Situation of human rights in Myanmar since 1 February 2022, which was published in March 2023, AFRY has re-assessed its engagement in the country. The report concludes that the human rights situation has worsened during the last year and recommends that any engagement in Myanmar should undergo an enhanced human rights due diligence process. AFRY has been present in Myanmar for over twenty years, having worked on several hydropower projects, all aiming to accelerate the transition to a clean and stable energy system in the country. UN global development goal number seven declares that access to clean and affordable energy is key to the development of agriculture, business, communications, education, healthcare, and transportation. The lack of access to energy hinders economic and human development. In Myanmar, 30 percent of the population still lack access to energy. AFRY is currently involved in three hydropower projects in Myanmar, whereof one project is active. The contracts were signed before the military coup in February 2021 and AFRY has not signed any additional contracts after that. We have evaluated our presence in the country, international sanctions, the client with regards to the military regime, safety of our employees, environmental and social impact relating to the ongoing projects, and whether we are able to complete our engagement without being complicit or provide direct or indirect support of the military or other operations that violate human rights. Our conclusion is that AFRY has not contributed to any violations of human rights, we have ensured stronger safeguards for the environment through our engineering competence and the hydropower projects have contributed to a cleaner energy system. Nevertheless, AFRY’s assignments will be ended at the latest by the end of this year due to the negative development in the country, while we continue to monitor the situation closely..."
Source/publisher: AFRY (Sweden)
2023-04-21
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-28
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Description: "Swedish-Finnish engineering services supplier AFRY has withdrawn from Myanmar’s hydropower projects, citing the junta’s human rights abuses. The business cited last month’s UN report recommended that firms operating in Myanmar should study the junta’s rights record. AFRY has operated in Myanmar for over 20 years, working on 13 hydropower projects, including three incomplete schemes, the company stated on April 21. The Nordic firm was paid US$4.7 million in service fees for consulting on the Upper Yeywa and Middle Paunglaung projects from February 2021 to September 2022, according to Justice For Myanmar (JFM), based on leaked tax filings from the whistleblower website Distributed Denial of Secrets. The 280-megawatt Upper Yeywa dam project on the Namtu River was planned under the earlier military dictatorship in 2008 and has been opposed by residents for its devastating social and environmental impacts, lack of transparency, the threat to ancestral lands and for fuelling of conflict. In 2020 the Shan Human Rights Foundation documented rights violations by the military near the project, including extrajudicial killing and torture. The group called on foreign companies to withdraw from the project or risk complicity in atrocities. In December the Namtu River Protectors, a community network, warned that more than 40,000 residents would face flooding because of the project. The 152MW Middle Paunglaung River dam near Naypyidaw is also due to displace large numbers of villagers. JFM has called on AFRY and other companies involved to suspend work in Myanmar until the establishment of a federal democracy and called for them to explain their involvement with the regime. AFRY has been the engineering consultant for 13 hydropower projects in Myanmar and delivered in-house engineering service to the Nancho, Thaythay, Upper Yeywa, Kun and Upper Keng Tawng projects. Feasibility studies, detailed designs and construction services were also provided for the Deedoke, Shweli, Tamanthi, Middle Yeywa and Upper and Middle Paunglaung projects. It has also provided geological investigations, construction site supervision and advisory services for the junta’s Ministry of Electricity and Energy on transmission lines and thermal projects. “The contracts were signed before the military coup in February 2021 and AFRY has not signed any additional contracts after that. We have evaluated our presence in the country, international sanctions, the client with regards to the military regime, safety of our employees, environmental and social impact relating to the ongoing projects,” AFRY’s statement said. It said it has not contributed to any violations of human rights and it has ensured stronger environmental safeguards through its engineering competence while the hydropower projects have provided cleaner energy. “Nevertheless, AFRY’s assignments will be ended at the latest by the end of this year due to the negative development in the country, while we continue to monitor the situation closely,” the firm said..."
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Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2023-04-28
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-28
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Description: "Around 2018, residents living along the Yuam River in Northwest Thailand near the Thai-Myanmar border heard about renewed Thai government plans to dam the river and divert water to Central Thailand. Affected residents and civil society are concerned that the proposed Yuam River Water Diversion Project (hereafter, Yuam diversion) would have widespread negative social and environmental impacts, and damage the livelihoods of several resource-dependent communities. The Yuam diversion has met increasing resistance from affected communities, who argue their voices have been overlooked in decision-making. As Paiboon Hengsuwan argues, while Salween borderland communities generally oppose large dams and diversions due to concerns over resource access and control, they are not necessarily ‘anti-development’ and seek to shape development ‘on their own terms’, as we show in the case of the Yuam diversion. The transboundary Salween River commences in the Tibetan Plateau and runs through China and Myanmar, before forming the Thai-Myanmar border, and again flowing through Myanmar and into the Andaman Sea. The Yuam River flows from Northwest Thailand into the Salween River via the Moei River; both the Moei and Salween Rivers form stretches of the Thai-Myanmar border. The proposed Yuam dam site is around 14 kilometres from this border. Communities and civil society interviewees expressed concerns about the Yuam diversion’s cross-border implications, including for Karen spiritual and cultural values connected to the river, and for fish migrating between the Yuam and Salween Rivers. Despite this, downstream communities and relevant governing bodies in Myanmar have not been consulted. Large hydropower dams and water diversions have been proposed for more than four decades in the Salween River Basin. This includes hydropower dams proposed on the Salween mainstem, including Weigyi and Dagwin Dams on the river-border, and Hatgyi Dam in Karen State, with the latter dam reaching the EIA stage. These dams would affect, and are resisted by, riverine communities across both sides of the border. This includes ethnic Karen communities that reside on both sides of the border, which pre-dates the demarcation of the border during British colonial rule of Myanmar. Cross-border activism has been ongoing for decades in the Salween River Basin in response to proposed dams and diversions. For two decades, communities from Myanmar and Thailand, representing multiple ethnic groups and religions, have gathered along the Salween and its tributaries on the annual International Day of Action for Rivers (hereafter, March 14th Day) to celebrate and protect the river and natural environment, and oppose dams and diversions. However, since the February 2021 coup in Myanmar, violence and human rights abuses against civilians and activists have intensified, limiting such cross-border activism. Salween ‘borderland communities’ envision alternative forms of development to top-down authoritarian (hydro)development. For instance, the Salween Peace Park is a Karen-led initiative in Karen State and along Salween river-border that promotes conservation and community resource governance and control, including around the proposed Hatgyi Dam site. The Thai government has investigated transboundary water diversions from the Salween River Basin to Central Thailand since 1979, including from the Salween mainstem and tributary rivers such as the Yuam. In interviews, many older residents and activists recall hearing about these dams and diversions when they were young, with some resisting previous iterations. This includes Mae Lama Luang Dam on the Yuam River, which was proposed in the 1990s but never constructed due the project’s environmental impacts and resistance by affected communities, many of whom are now resisting the Yuam diversion. In 2016, the Thai government (re)examined several water diversion routes from the Salween River Basin to Bhumibol Dam, with the Yuam diversion emerging as the preferred option. The project is being developed by Thailand’s Royal Irrigation Department (RID). The Yuam diversion entails a 69.5-meter-high dam on the Yuam River, a water pumping station, and a 61-kilometer tunnel that would pass three Northern Thai provinces and several protected forest areas to divert water to Bhumibol Dam in the Chao Phraya River Basin. On 15 September 2021, this EIA was approved by Thailand’s National Environment Board (NEB). However, civil society and communities consider this EIA deeply flawed. While the project is estimated to cost 70 billion baht (US$2.1 billion) and take seven years to build, media outlets reported that a Chinese state-owned enterprise would build the project at around half the speed and cost, potentially as part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. However, evidence of this is yet to be made publicly available. Methodology The research presented here (2021-ongoing) is based on in-depth interviews with affected community members, civil society actors – including activists, NGO employees and academics – and state actors, which were conducted as part of Zali’s PhD research. Mueda was a research assistant and English-Thai-Karen interpreter for this research. Mueda is a Karen activist, and has worked as an environmental and human rights defender in the Salween River Basin for decades. She was born as a stateless person near the proposed Yuam dam site, and has long advocated for citizenship rights for stateless peoples in Thailand. Zali and Mueda’s research was undertaken in Ban Uun[1], a village located along the Yuam River and near the proposed dam site. Residents identify as Pwo Karen and Sgaw Karen, and rely on multiple seasonally-dependent livelihood strategies including collecting edible forest products (e.g., riverbank vegetables, mushrooms, konjac and more), fishing and labour migration. Many residents lack Thai citizenship and/or land titles, and many respondents reflected on how this limits their capacity to claim compensation and confidence to overtly challenge state-led development projects. Research was also conducted in Ban Lao, a Pwo Karen community located near the end of the tunnel. Residents’ livelihoods are based on longan farming and collecting forest products, and many do not have formal land titles. The community will be impacted by the dumping of soil and rock debris from tunnel construction on their farmlands and forests. Socioenvironmental impacts Affected residents are concerned about a range of social and environmental impacts that would damage resource-dependent livelihoods. This includes concerns that the project would exacerbate flooding during the rainy season, and cause deforestation, including in protected forest areas and spiritually-significant forests. The Yuam and Salween Rivers contain rich aquatic biodiversity, including many migratory fish species, and respondents were concerned that the dam would block fish migration, as one young Ban Uun resident explained: “If they block the river with a dam, those fish cannot migrate” (Interview, September 2021). Fish are essential to residents’ livelihoods, both for consumption, and as a source of protein and income. In addition, a fisheries expert at Maejo University, Chai, expressed concern that the diversion could transfer aquatic species from the Salween to the Chao Phraya Basin, which share only around six common fish species, with potentially damaging effects. More broadly, there is evidence of dams’ negative impacts on fish and riverine livelihoods. For instance, the World Commission on Dams (WCD) reported a 60-80% decline in fish catch and reduced fish species directly upstream from Thailand’s Pak Mun Dam on the Mun River in the Mekong River Basin following the dam’s completion in 1994, although multiple anthropogenic factors may have contributed to this. This dam generated widespread resistance and shaped the politics of large dam construction in Thailand, the region and globally. In their 2000 report reviewing large dams globally, the WCD outlined the need for free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) for communities affected by dams and development. A lack of FPIC in the development process for the Yuam diversion is a key reason behind community and civil society opposition to the project. Challenging the conditions of development Interviewees recounted several problems with the EIA process for the Yuam diversion, including a lack of meaningful public participation and FPIC. While numerous public hearings were conducted, participation was hindered in several ways. For instance, interviewees reported that public hearings were held in Central Thai language, and lacked translation into Karen languages, the primary languages of many affected residents. Many public hearings were held during the rainy season and/or under covid-19 restrictions, further hampering participation, particularly for remote communities. Significantly, residents and civil society were not given the opportunity to review, let alone contribute to, the EIA before it was approved by the NEB, directly going against the principles of FPIC. Civil society interviewees explained that the Office of Natural Resources and Environmental Policy and Planning (ONEP), the agency responsible for approving the EIA, requested more than 20,000 baht (US$600) to provide access to the EIA; they were only provided with a heavily redacted copy after the EIA was approved. Many residents reported that project proponents only promoted the project’s ‘benefits’ during public hearings, and residents felt their voices were not included in decision-making, as one older Ban Uun resident explained: “When local people raise our concerns, the government doesn’t provide a response … when people disagree with the project, the government doesn’t record it in the EIA” (Interview, September 2021). Respondents provided several examples of incorrect information that was included the EIA, as one village leader, Chet, from Ban Uun explained: “I did not provide any support to the EIA, I did not discuss this in detail, we just spoke quickly [with the EIA team]. But the RID claims that we [Chet and his wife] support the project” (Interview, January 2022). Others felt that they were misrepresented by the EIA team. For instance, the headperson of Ban Uun told me that in a public hearing, the EIA team asked people who disagree with the project to raise their hands, and “they took a photo, and said ‘these people agree with the project’” (Interview, July 2021). Meanwhile, the headperson of Ban Lao felt the community has been “tricked” as journalists “misrepresented that the villagers and said they agree with the project” when they do not (Interview, February 2022). The EIA became satirically referred to as #EIALaab (#อีไอเอร้านลาบ) following an incident where the RID invited civil society members to lunch at a laab (meat salad) restaurant, during which photographs were taken and used as ‘evidence’ of public consultation. #EIALaab was used widely on social media, particularly by youth (Figure 3), and interviewees would often refer to ‘EIA laab’ with laughter. In contrast, a Thai politician who supports the project claimed that the EIA “is very meticulous. The EIA shows that this project is feasible, and does not damage anybody” (Interview, March 2022). RID officers also emphasised that the EIA was “in-depth” and conducted “according to the law” and included solutions to mitigate the project’s impacts (Interview, March 2022). However, as outlined above, many respondents disagree with these claims. The EIA has become a key site of contestation, illustrating how resistance is not only to the project itself but people’s capacity to ‘have a say’ in development. Resisting the Yuam diversion All residents that we interviewed at both fieldsites disagree with the Yuam diversion. A few residents explained that they initially supported the project, because they believed government rhetoric that it would generate jobs and improve livelihoods, but changed their minds once they learned more about the project’s impacts. The youth are leading overt resistance to the Yuam diversion, including through protests and activities on March 14th. In Ban Uun, March 14th activities often include a buat pa (บวชป่า), or tree ordination ceremony, where residents, activists and visitors tie Buddhist monks’ orange robes around trees to bless and protect them, including from development. In recent years, this ceremony has been strategically held on a forested riverbank that would be damaged by the Yuam diversion. Several participants positioned buat pa as a way to oppose the Yuam diversion. Many older residents and activists have resisted previous proposals for dams and diversions, saw these projects and struggles as connected over time and generations. Alternative visions Salween communities oppose large dams and water diversions due to their negative ecological and livelihood impacts. As shown here, rather than being ‘anti-development’, these communities seek to shape and participate in development and articulate their own visions for water and natural resource governance. For instance, in a 2021 letter to ONEP, Yuam and Salween residents stated that: “We seek to be included by the state in decision-making to … preserve natural resources and to protect the Salween River Basin.” As one young woman from a border village along the Salween explained: “We do not oppose development, but it must be good development … we oppose those that create negative impacts” (Interview, March 2022). Interviewees articulated alternative visions for river governance beyond hydrodevelopment. From a policy perspective, a water resources expert from Kasetsart University argued that rather than build the expensive Yuam diversion, the government should improve the efficiency of the water supply network, as “we have about 40% of water loss in the irrigation system due to inefficiency” (Interview, September 2021). Youth from affected communities questioned why the government would invest such large sums of money into a mega-project that would damage their resource-dependent livelihoods and futures, and suggested that this money should instead be invested into projects that would benefit their communities, including health, education and environmental protection. Others highlighted the need to manage water from a more holistic perspective. An NGO employee who has worked on Mekong and Salween issues for decades highlighted the need to manage and “understand water in different dimensions” (Interview, May 2021), while Chai reflected that the RID only knows “how to block the water … they don’t understand about anything inside the water, or the people.” Rather than building damaging dams and diversions, residents and civil society actors envision alternative forms of resource governance that protects the environment and resource-dependent livelihoods, including the Salween Peace Park and community-managed riverine reserves along Salween tributaries in Thailand. While there have been discussions[2] about how the coup may spur on controversial projects including Hatgyi Dam amid escalating conflict in the Salween River Basin, it is also affecting the capacity of communities and civil society to gather together and envision alternative forms of transboundary water governance. Despite this, these actors are persisting with efforts to protect the Salween. On March 14th 2023, residents and activists again gathered along the Salween and its tributaries to oppose the Yuam diversion and other mega-projects proposed in the Basin..."
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Source/publisher: Tea Circle (Myanmar)
2023-04-03
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-03
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Sub-title: The role of transnational activism in promoting political reform
Description: "Introduction: On a remote stretch of the Salween River, between the proposed Dar Gwin and Wei Gyi hydropower dam sites and where it forms the border between Thailand and Myanmar (Burma), 1 sits the Ei Tu Hta camp for ethnic Karen internally displaced peoples (IDPs) in Karen National Union (KNU) controlled Myanmar. The family of Hsiplopo, the leader of this camp, live three hours walk away but he is unable to visit them because the tatmadaw, the Myanmar military with which the KNU has been engaged in the world's longest running civil war, have camps that are only two hours walk away. The camp is also built on steep hillsides, denuding the forest cover in the limited area available, and is unable to grow its own rice, relying instead on regular donations from the UN and other NGOs shipped upriver by longtail boat. 2 This type of human and environmental insecurity colours the daily existence of both the Karen people in this camp and many other ethnic minorities in Myanmar. Nevertheless, despite these conditions, Hsiplopo's commitment to a campaign against the proposed nearby dams is resolute: 'We don't want dams ... the military cannot build the dams because the KNU will not let them while the people do not want them.' 3 This stance reflects the opposition to the dams of many environmental activists and groups who inhabit the nebulous and dangerous borderlands regions of eastern Myanmar. It also represents a form of activated citizenship although the concept of citizenship for ethnic minorities in Myanmar is itself problematic as their relationship to the Myanmar state is often little more than one of oppression and conflict. Despite the civil conflict in these areas, and perhaps because of it, these activists often operate beyond the remit of the tatmadaw undertaking perilous work with the KNU to promote human and environmental security for ethnic minorities. As an activist from the Karen Environmental and Social Action Network (KESAN) explains: 'KESAN's programs are in the KNU area [in Myanmar] so we have a close relationship with the KNU leaders. ' 4 It can be difficult for environmental activists in the North, for whom this precarious existence is entirely foreign, to fully comprehend the existential struggle that dictates much environmental activism in the South, particularly under authoritarian regimes such as that of Myanmar, which has been dominated by the military since 1962. As a result, many Northern environment movements, and the American environment movement in particular, have been historically apolitical with the issues of 'human health, shelter, and food security' traditionally absent from their agendas (Doyle 2005, 26). This lack of political analysis on the issues of central importance to survival in the South and the movements they spawn is also reflected within many academic writings on environmental politics. Despite an increased focus on the environment in the last two decades, most approaches to environmental politics still examine predominantly ecological issues or regulatory regimes and focus particularly on the affluent states of the North (Howes 2005; Kutting 2000; Paehlke and Torgerson 2005). Although there has been increased attention on environmental movements in recent years, much of the material also focuses primarily on movements within the North (Carter 2007; Doherty 2002; Doyle 2000; Dryzek et al. 2003; Gottlieb 2005; Hutton and Connors 1999; Rootes 2007; Sandler and Pezzullo 2007; Shabecoff 1993). There has been some analysis of environn1ent movements in the South (Doherty 2006; Doherty and Doyle 2006; Doyle 2005; Duffy 2006; Dwivedi 1997, 2001 ), and various studies of transnational activism more generally ( della P01ta et al. 2006; Eschle and Maiguashca 2005; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Reitan 2007; Routledge et al. 2006; Rupert 2000), but only limited studies on how authoritarianism in the South specifically impacts on enviromnental activism (Doyle and Simpson 2006) or policy (Fredriksson and Wollscheid 2007). There are numerous studies that examine civil society under authoritarianism more broadly but these tend to focus on more traditional and formalised civil society organisations (Jamal 2007; Liverani 2008; Sater 2007). This chapter adds to this literature by delving more deeply into enviromnental politics under the military in Myanmar and examines the transnational campaigns against several proposed hydroelectric dams on the Salween River in eastern Myanmar. As transnational projects these dams are being undertaken by governments and transnational corporations (TNCs) but, as with most large energy projects in Myamnar, they are designed to export most of their electricity to either Thailand or China. Despite national elections in November 2010 that returned Myanmar to nominally civilian rule the 2008 constitution, on which the elections were based, provides for a continuing central role for the military in the country's governance (Holliday 2008). Although the election process was flawed, fraudulent and tightly controlled, with many generals from the former military regime, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), 5 merely stepping out of their uniforms to take up senior positions in the new government, there is little doubt that incremental change towards civilian rule is occurring and the potential for political discourse in Myamnar may well in1prove over time. While many exiled or human rights groups rightly point out that civil conflict and human rights abuses, particularly in the eastern border regions, continue,6 some analysts, such as the former International Labour Organization (ILO) Liaison Officer in Myanmar, Richard Horsey, are more optimistic about the 'new level of scrutiny' (Horsey 2011, 4) that has accompanied the new parliament. The current Liaison Officer, Steve Marshall, who is possibly more intimately involved with the new government than any other W estemer likewise argues that 'there is no doubt that the political landscape has changed' . 7 This top down political change has accompanied a less visible but nonetheless significant increase in domestic civil society activism in recent years and particularly since Cyclone Nargis in 2008 (Sabandar 2010; South 2004). The main beneficiaries of this opening have been humanitarian NGOs that have focused on emergency relief to natural disasters such as Nargis and Cyclone Giri in 2010, 8 but there has also been increased activity by environmental groups and NGOs. These groups, as with all those actors who wish to avoid sanction or imprisonment in Myanmar, engage in a certain amount of self-censorship to avoid overtly political critiques of the government but there is increasing space available for pursuing third sector environmental governance. This increased domestic activism has improved the prospects of collaboration between domestic and exiled groups with prominent domestic environmentalists running trainings on the border or in Thailand for exiled groups such as KESAN. 9 Regardless of recent changes, however, after five decades of authoritarian rule the local environmental movement remains embtyonic with significant limitations in experience and expertise. It has, therefore, been the transnational environment movement occupying Myanmar's borderlands that has provided the most fertile and important outlet for environmental activism and governance of large-scale hydropower projects in Myanmar. 10 This case study therefore suggests that, whereas hybrid regimes offer domestic spaces for political competition and therefore foster domestic civil society (Diamond 2002; Jayasuriya and Rodan 2007; Levitsky and Way 2002), traditional authoritarian regimes such as that which has afflicted Myanmar are more likely to create an activist diaspora, a dynamic transnational community of expatriates who engage in environmental activism in borderland regions or neighbouring countries. As this case study demonstrates, an activist diaspora tends to transcend ethnic divisions and therefore provides a multi-ethnic cohesion which is often absent from the broader exile community. As 'divide and conquer' has been one of the tatmadaw's main strategies in neutralising opposition by ethnic minorities, Myanmar's activist diaspora may contribute to more potent domestic social movements that promote democracy, human rights and environmental security in Myanmar..."
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Source/publisher: Adam Simpson
2013-00-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-07-05
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Sub-title: The Third Pole explores how the military coup will affect Chinese-backed dams along Southeast Asia’s last free-flowing river
Description: "Plans for seven Chinese-built dams along the Salween River have been a source of friction for Myanmar and China for some time. Prior to the military coup on 1 February, the elected party the National League for Democracy and grassroots campaigners were already locked in conflict. International isolation following the coup may now force the government to move closer to China than it would like, leaving indigenous groups more at risk. The future of dam building is now in the hands of General Min Aung Hlaing’s military regime. Last week, he met with State Administration Council members and departmental officials in Hpa-an, the state capital of Karen. Along with repeated claims of election fraud, he said that the Hatgyi hydropower plant will be built. He said nothing of the environmental concerns, only that “those objecting [to] the project for various reasons should understand the benefits.” In response, Saw Kyaw, brigadier general of the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army, told news website The Irrawaddy: “The entire Karen population oppose the dam. Peace has gone in the area now. If the hydropower project is to be implemented, only our people will suffer.” The Salween remains Southeast Asia’s longest free-flowing river in a region that has seen frenzied dam-building on the Mekong, upper Yangtze and other major waterways. It flows 3,289 kilometres from the Tibetan Plateau to the Andaman Sea near Myanmar’s border with Thailand. In China, it is known as the Nu River. Crossing into Myanmar, the Salween, or Thanlwin, snakes through ethnic minority lands in Shan, Kayah, Karen and Mon states. It is an artery for immense biodiversity, providing sustenance for millions of people in Myanmar’s conflict-ridden regions. The Hatgyi and Mong Ton dams are among the largest of seven mainstream dam projects planned by Chinese and Thai companies on the Salween. The 7,000-megawatt Mong Ton dam in Shan state is sponsored by Thailand’s EGAT and China Three Gorges Corporation, and could become Myanmar’s largest dam. Both Hatgyi and Mong Ton are in the planning stage. They would inundate land that is now home to villagers displaced by conflict in the late 1990s who have been unable to return. The Mong Ton site alone would displace at least 60,000. Civic protesters silenced The Save the Salween Network previously organised community resistance along the length of the river, using the International Day of Action for Rivers, 14 March, to amplify the opposition of different regions and ethnic groups in a unified protest. This year, activists along the upper and mid-reaches of the river in Shan state could not hold public events on 14 March. “In Karen state, the organisation was able to campaign, as it was in the area controlled by KNU [Karen National Union, a political organisation]. In southern Shan state, that would be too risky,” a spokesperson from Save the Salween Network told The Third Pole. The military coup has brought internet connectivity restrictions, a ban on international money transfers and continuing violence. Save the Salween Network continues to advocate for the river in whatever small ways remain. “Because we are not registered in the official registry, our… organisation is in a better position than others. We are off their radar. Despite this, I am in hiding,” the spokesperson said. Air strikes have been carried out in the Salween Peace Park, a grassroots conservation and indigenous people’s initiative. In March, Myanmar’s military launched the first air strikes on KNU territory in 20 years after rebels killed 10 soldiers, Reuters reported. Attacks continued through April and May, killing dozens and forcing thousands to flee. The military government has persisted in its claims of election fraud to little effect. Protests and violence continue across the country in the form of attacks on military positions and assassinations.....Waters rising:The current violence builds on disaffection between ethnic groups and the now-overthrown civilian government. “The NLD was so close to China and they did not share any information on any of the pursued projects,” so “ethnic people lost trust in this party,” the Save the Salween Network spokesperson said. However, he said he expects the military to continue the dam projects, “not just for the sake of generating electricity, but for the militarisation of the area. The flooded area will destroy the base area of ethnic armed [militias].” In the past the KNU has expressed strong opposition to dams, which has led to violence between the military, or Tatmadaw, and the KNU. Some major dam sites, in particular the Hatgyi dam, are on the internal border of KNU-controlled land. This is now the frontline of an escalating conflict. In Thailand, images have appeared of Tatmadaw camps ablaze from the Myanmar side of the Salween. These appear to confirm KNU claims of a successful 27 April attack. As dam sites become battle grounds, the river’s future depends on the outcome of the fighting along its lower reaches.....Who will build?: Six weeks after the military coup, the French energy company EDF suspended the USD 1.5-billion Shweli 3 hydropower dam project in response to the jailing of NLD leaders and shootings of protesters and journalists. Other international companies are likely to be equally reluctant. “Much depends on whether the junta manages to establish its effective control of the country,” said Sebastian Strangio, author of In the Dragon’s Shadow: Southeast Asia in the Chinese Century. He added: “Chinese firms, which are less susceptible to the reputational pressures of Western companies, will gradually move in to fill the vacuum.” Prior to the coup, U Aung Myint, general secretary of the Myanmar Renewable Energy Association, told The Third Pole: “Honestly, we want the government to cancel the agreements for big hydropower projects such as Myitsone and Tasang, but I think it will not happen for many reasons.”.....Chinese companies feel the heat: The coup drew sanctions from other nations, yet China blocked condemnation at the UN and referred to the violent overthrow of the NLD government as a “cabinet reshuffle”. The comment was unpopular on the streets. The early days of the coup saw violence against Chinese-owned businesses and threats to Chinese-built pipelines, leading to pressure from China for the new military government to protect its assets. “Violence against Chinese economic interests in Myanmar, including the oil and gas pipelines that bisect the country, would set off alarm bells at the top levels of the Chinese government,” Strangio said. “Of course, any situation in which Chinese economic interests are coming under attack from anti-military protesters would also be one in which China’s hydropower interests would also be vulnerable to attack.”.....Unknown cost: Forgoing large hydropower projects on the mainstream Salween would avoid disruption to sediment distribution, aquatic ecology and local livelihoods, according to a 2018 International Finance Corporation strategic environmental assessment. However, the lack of studies on the Salween means there are many unknowns pertaining to environmental impacts. “Unfortunately, because we don’t have good baseline or historical data on either the fish or the fisheries, we may never know in quantitative terms what the impacts of the dams are,” said Aaron Koning, a freshwater ecologist and conservation scientist at the Nevada-based Global Water Center. Koning has spent seven years studying a grassroots network of community fish reserves in the Salween basin, and says hydropower dams could devastate the river’s ecology and fisheries. He worked with communities harvesting eels that migrate to the Indian Ocean to spawn; their life cycle would be upset by the Hatgyi dam, he says. “We don’t know much about the habitat requirements or migration patterns of most other Salween River fish species, some of which are endemic to the basin and found nowhere else on Earth,” Koning added. In the Mekong, Chinese-built dams have caused deep harm to fisheries.....Ignoring indigenous communities: China and Myanmar have been accused of ignoring ethnic groups when planning dams on the Salween. The people of the conflict-stricken river basin states of Shan, Karen and Kayah states have the most to lose from further hydropower projects. In Thailand, the Salween marks part of the border. Predominantly Karen ethnic communities living along the river, including refugees from Myanmar, rely heavily on its fisheries for nutritional security. There is little hope civil society can mount a defence of the Salween’s ecology, given the Tatmadaw’s crackdown on dissent with tacit approval from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The NLD had faced calls from local and international environmental groups to halt and suspend dam projects such as those at Myitsone and Mong Ton (locally called Tasang). The military government that has replaced it is unlikely to listen.....Infrastructure versus inclusion: The hydropower plans are promoted as a way of dealing with Myanmar’s low access to electricity. Almost 60% of the population has no access to electricity, and the NLD had planned for nationwide electrification by 2030. A great deal of this was supposed to be from hydropower. Nevertheless local opposition persisted, even though the Salween region is one of those most deprived. Many living on its banks rely on small rooftop solar panels that provide only a few hours of electricity a day. The National Electrification Plan’s first phase was set to end by mid-2021, U Maung Win, deputy director general of the Department of Rural Development, told The Third Pole prior to the coup, noting plans to provide electricity to 626,757 households in 5,080 villages far from the national grid. Energy needs in Myanmar are expected to rise 15-17% annually. Although sizeable, Mong Ton would only provide around 10% of its energy output to Myanmar, with Thailand, the main investor, buying the rest. U Aung Myint told The Third Pole that Myanmar already relies on hydropower for more than 60% of its electricity generation.....Marriage of convenience: The Mong Ton and Hatgyi dams – as well as Ywathit, Weigyi and others planned for the Salween – have varying levels of Chinese investment and construction involvement. The Chinese-funded Myitsone dam on the Irrawaddy in Kachin state has been a point of friction between China and Myanmar for more than a decade. The plan would have dammed a sacred river, flooded an area the size of Singapore, displaced thousands of people and devastated both fish and wildlife populations. After much lobbying from environmental and Kachin groups, Myanmar’s democratic government halted the Myitsone project but never cancelled it. Strangio said that if China believes that the junta will ultimately prevail over the protest movement, “then it will seek to work with the generals to advance long-standing strategic and economic goals in Myanmar.” That will lead the military government, possibly the one institution most suspicious of China, right into the arms of its northern neighbour. “In that event, continuing international opprobrium would likely force the Tatmadaw into a heavier reliance on China than it would be comfortable with, but if that is the price of staying in power, I suspect the marriage of convenience would hold,” Strangio said..."
Source/publisher: The Third Pole
2021-06-08
Date of entry/update: 2021-06-11
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Topic: China, large hydropower dams, limited statehood, Myanmar, Thailand, water governance
Topic: China, large hydropower dams, limited statehood, Myanmar, Thailand, water governance
Description: "Introduction: This paper examines how fragmented configura- tions of hybrid governance have emerged in the Salween River basin, and how these are (re) shaping local and transboundary water gover- nance. With headwaters in the Tibetan plateau, the Salween River1 mainstream flows down through China’s Yunnan Province to Shan, Karenni, Karen and Mon States in Myanmar, also in part bordering Thailand, and empties into the Andaman Sea. There are at least 16 major ethnic groups and over 10 million people living within the basin, and access to river-related resources are important for many of them for a range of rural livelihoods (Johnston et al., 2017). Viewing the Salween River as a transboundary commons, we put power relations at the centre of our analysis (Suhardiman et al., 2017a; Miller et al., 2019). This is salient given that in contrast to the adjacent Mekong River, where intergovernmental transboundary cooperation is guided, albeit imperfectly, by the Mekong River Commission (e.g. Kittikhoun and Staubli, 2018), in the case of the Salween River there is not a tri- lateral agreement between the three states. Fur- thermore, throughout the basin there are significant power asymmetries between actors, especially in Myanmar given that political authority is contested over at times overlapping territorial spaces (Götz and Middleton, 2020; Suhardiman et al., 2020). Overall, we argue that analysing institutional and actor network fragmentation across the basin with a focus on power relations – beyond property relations – is fundamental to understanding the sustenance and/or enclosure of the river as a transboundary commons. Based on this insight, and drawing on the analytical lenses of hybrid governance (Miller et al., 2019) and critical insti- tutionalism (Cleaver and de Koning, 2015), we suggest that hybrid networks can be strategically engaged – selectively linking state and non-state actors, especially community-based organisations and civil society – to connect parallel decision- making landscapes across scales, both spatially and temporally, with the goal of inclusively institutionalising the transboundary commons foregrounding social and ecological justice. In this paper we view the transboundary environ- mental commons beyond the conventional notion that focuses on ‘shared resources and environmental impacts that transcend national borders’ and that underpins the logic of the insti- tutionalization of transboundary environmental governance between states that may also involve other actors in collective action responses (Hirsch, 2020: 1). Aligned with Hirsch’s (2020: 2) critique and the need ‘to go beyond the country oriented scalar reference of conventional approaches to transboundary environmental governance ...,’ we emphasise the importance of unpacking the nested institutional arrangements, both formal and informal, the state and non-state actors involved and the power relations between them, to then move beyond a regional/inter- country analytical lens and urge the need for a transboundary environmental commons rooted in grassroots realities of people living along the river and the local commons..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Asia Pacific Viewpoint
2020-00-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-06-05
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: How national security concerns sealed the varying fates of Chinese investment projects in Myanmar.
Description: "Almost nine years have passed since the Thein Sein administration unilaterally announced the suspension of construction work on the Myitsone dam in September 2011. The building of the controversial hydroelectric dam is a gargantuan Chinese investment project in Myanmar, with an estimated total cost of $3.6 billion, and with a planned reservoir area larger than the size of Singapore. The suspension followed increasingly severe public protests in Myanmar expressing opposition to the Myitsone dam project. Naypyidaw credited the suspension decision to the “people’s will, and many analysts have thus attributed the unexpected suspension to the victory of popular anti-China sentiments and anti-dam movements, following Myanmar’s domestic political transition. If the “people’s will” really brought the Myitsone dam project to a halt, might other Chinese overseas projects be at risk of a similar fate? The dam project was not the only Chinese mega-project undergoing construction in Myanmar at that time. Two other multi-billion-dollar projects, namely, the Letpadaung copper mine project and the Sino-Myanmar oil and gas pipelines project, also encountered severe public opposition and pressure when Myanmar started its partial transition from military dictatorship to quasi-civilian semi-democracy. Although the three projects have similarities in terms of their design, implementation, and the public backlash they faced, the setbacks they experienced varied greatly. Since the Myitsone dam project was unilaterally suspended by former President Thein Sein, the construction work remains shelved without any renegotiation. In contrast, the Letpadaung copper mine project experienced a two-year suspension, investigation, and renegotiation before it resumed, while the Sino-Myanmar oil and gas pipelines project was never suspended and has been operational since the completion of construction work in 2015. To understand why these projects encountered varying degrees of success, it is necessary to take into account the contexts of the three consecutive Myanmar governments within which these projects were operational: the military government before the political transition in March 2011, the quasi-civilian government of Thein Sein from March 2011 to March 2016, and the National League for Democracy (NLD)-led government since then. Doing so reveals that the “people’s will” was not the primary reason why Thein Sein unilaterally suspended the Myitsone dam project. Rather, national security concerns led Myanmar’s leaders to make different decisions on similar projects under different contexts. The plans for all three projects were finalized between 2009 and 2010, when Myanmar was still ruled by the military junta, known as the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). Myanmar had experienced Western sanctions and isolation during the era of military dictatorship. China not only was Myanmar’s largest trading partner and foreign investor, but also became its biggest regime supporter in the international community at this time. The maintenance of a good relationship with China was one of the main priorities for Myanmar’s leadership, to ensure regime survival and national security. Thus, Myanmar satisfied China’s demands in this period because the cost of rejecting China was intolerable..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Diplomat" (Japan)
2020-07-22
Date of entry/update: 2020-07-22
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Chinese dams held back large amounts of water during a damaging drought in the countries downstream of the Mekong River – known as the Lancang in China – despite higher-than-average water levels upstream, according to a US research company. China’s government disputed the findings of the US-government funded study, saying there was low rainfall during last year’s monsoon season on its portion of the 4,350km (2,700 mile) river. The findings by Eyes on Earth, a research and consulting company specialising in water, could complicate tricky discussions between China and other Mekong countries on how to manage the river that supports 60 million people as it flows past Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and through Cambodia and Vietnam. Last year’s drought, which saw the Lower Mekong at its lowest levels in more than 50 years, devastated farmers and fishermen and saw the massive river recede to expose sandbanks along some stretches. At others the river turned from its usual murky brown to bright blue because the waters were so shallow..."
Source/publisher: "South China Morning Post" (Hong Kong)
2020-04-13
Date of entry/update: 2020-05-19
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "China on Thursday said it was helping its downstream neighbors cope with a prolonged drought by releasing more water from its dams on the Mekong River, adding it would consider sharing information on hydrology to provide further assistance in the future. The statement came as a new economic report predicted that the building of dams to harness hydropower on the Mekong River would reshape the economies of five countries along the waterway, fueling long-term inflation and dependence on China. The drought over the past year has severely hurt farming and fishing in Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, Myanmar and Vietnam, and many blame China’s 11 dams on the upper Mekong – which China calls the Lancang River – as well as climate change. Chinese State Councillor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi said a lack of rain was the main cause of the drought and said China had suffered from it too. “China has overcome its own difficulty and increased water outflow from the Lancang River to help Mekong countries mitigate the drought,” Wang told a meeting of the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) grouping..."
Source/publisher: "National Post" (Canada)
2020-02-20
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-22
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "China has had a setback in its infrastructure building along the Mekong River after Thailand cancelled a project on the vital Southeast Asian waterway. But observers say that without more coordination between downstream countries, China’s influence in the region will continue to go unchallenged. In a win for locals and activists concerned about the ecosystem and their livelihoods, Thailand’s cabinet called off the Lancang-Mekong Navigation Channel Improvement Project – also known as the Mekong “rapids blasting” project – along its border with Laos. Proposed back in 2000, the project aimed to blast and dredge parts of the Mekong riverbed to remove rapids so that it could be used by cargo ships, creating a link from China’s southwestern province of Yunnan to ports in Thailand, Laos and the rest of Southeast Asia. But it drew strong opposition from local communities along the river and environmentalists, who feared it would destroy the already fragile ecosystem and would only benefit Chinese. The decision two weeks ago came as a prolonged drought has seen the river drop to its lowest levels in 100 years, depleting fish stocks in downstream communities...."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "South China Morning Post" (Hong Kong)
2020-02-22
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-22
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Myanmar is caught between a rock and a hard place. As the government seeks to pick up the pace of development, electrical power is needed and hydropower is touted as an “environmentally-friendly” solution in order to switch on the lights. But there are a number of problems with how this process is being handled and the negative effects that big dams typically could have on the country’s rivers and water supply. DAM BUILDERS VS DAM BUSTERS Dam builders face dam busters when it comes to the pros and cons of dams as a way to harness the power of Mother Nature. Hydropower and dams are touted by people in the industry as an answer to power and also a way to control rivers that tend to flood. Yet the standoff over the Chinese-run $3.6 billion Myitsone Dam project in Kachin State alerts us to the public opposition to the building of dams – and in this particular case, the questions over who was going to get most of the power, given the original plan to send most of the electricity to China, while Myanmar is thirsty for electricity. Interestingly, the Myitsone Dam was not mentioned publicly during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s recent state visit to Myanmar. A raft of close to three dozen development projects mostly linked to Xi’s Belt and Road Initiative were signed. But the Myitsone Dam was noticeable by its absence from the list, despite Xi being the main Chinese official, in his role as Vice President, to push for the signing of the deal back in 2009..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Mizzima" (Myanmar)
2020-02-08
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-08
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Two hydropower dam projects proposed on the Laymyo River in Chin and Rakhine states would negatively affect more than 20,000 people, according to Chin Rivers Watch (CRW). The dams on the Laymyo—one near Ko Phe She village in Chin State’s Paletwa Township and one near Sai Din village in Rakhine State’s Mrauk-U Township—have been under consideration since 2007. They were initially backed by neighboring Bangladesh, and set to be built by the Chinese company Datang. The projects were put on pause in 2014. In 2016, after the current National League for Democracy government came to power, the French government allocated US$1 million for a feasibility study on the Laymyo dams, which was carried out by the Belgian-French company Tractebel-Engie. In a press conference in Yangon on November 4, CRW representatives said that the feasibility study had again been resumed. CRW secretary Mang Za Hkop said that the pursuit of such mega development projects was inappropriately given the current political circumstances in Burma. “We don’t want the government to start projects like this until protection laws have been drawn up for ethnic rights and citizens’ rights,” Mang Za Hkop, the CRW secretary, said..."
Source/publisher: "Network Media Group" (Thailand)
2019-11-07
Date of entry/update: 2019-11-08
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Upper House MP J Yaw Wu from the National Unity Party representing Kachin State Consitiuency-1revealed he refused to accept the bribe from the Chinese Power Investment (CPI) Compnay in order to keep silent about the Myitsone Dam Project, at a press conference at Real Link Hotel in Yankin Township in Yangon on January 26. On September 23, 2011, MP J Yaw Wu remonstrated against the Myitsone Dam project as a MP from the constituency-12 in Kachin State in the time of the Thein Sein Administration. He sent the remonstration letter to former President Thein Sein via Upper House Speaker Khin Aung Myint. He was re-elected Upper House MP of the Kachin State Constituency-1 in the 2015 General Election. “I don’t remember the date. In around December 2011, they (CPI) met with me. The delegation included the GM and the female secretary. The GM is a female. The GM herself can speak Myanmar language. The GM said the company paid too much money to the heads of the State. But she did not talk to me like so. First she asked my bank accounts. But I have no bank account. They said they want to put money into the bank account. They asked me to extend a helping hand. They said they would start lobbying to resume the Myitsone dam project. They urged me to keep silent about the Myitsone Dam project..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Eleven Media Group" (Myanmar)
2019-01-27
Date of entry/update: 2019-10-28
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Religious leaders from the Buddhist, Catholic and Muslim communities in Myanmar have joined the chorus of opposition to the Myitsone Dam, a Chinese-backed hydropower project on the Irrawaddy River, as Aung San Su Kyi’s government faces a decision on the U.S. $3.6 billion project. Aung San Suu Kyi is expected to travel to Beijing at the end of this month to attend China’s Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation. She and her ministers have been tightlipped on the fate of the dam in Kachin State, which was suspended in 2011, but they face strong Chinese pressure to resume construction. The Venerable U Seindita, a Buddhist monk from Asia Light Monastery and promoter of interfaith harmony in Myanmar, said the Myitsone dam project should be cancelled permanently. “With regard to Myitsone dam, former president U Thein Sein promised to suspend the construction during his five years tenure and he actually made it happen,” he said. “Now, the National League for Democracy (NLD) government should be trying to cancel the project permanently. They should not postpone the decision to cancel this project and pass this project on to the next government,” the monk added..."
Source/publisher: "Radio Free Asia (RFA)" (USA)
2019-04-19
Date of entry/update: 2019-10-28
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, in Beijing this week for the Belt and Road Forum, finds herself in a much weaker negotiating position than on her last visit to China in 2017.
Description: "With Myanmar’s diplomatic isolation, stalled peace process and lacklustre economy, Daw Suu has far fewer cards in her hands. Beijing is Myanmar’s key “defender” in the United Nations at a time when the government’s handling of the Rakhine crisis and the recent jailing of two Reuters journalists have eroded its standing in the international community. China currently also accounts for a quarter of all approved foreign investments in the country. In Beijing, the State Counsellor is expected to discuss the highly controversial Myitsone dam project with her Chinese counterparts. The US$3.6 billion, 6000MW dam, backed by China’s State Power Investment Corporation (SPIC), was suspended by then-President U Thein Sein in 2011, owing to widespread domestic opposition. Recent developments suggest Daw Suu is under pressure from the Chinese to resuscitate the dam. As I’ve argued, resumption would place her National League for Democracy party at risk in next year’s General Election. Just this week, thousands of people in Kachin’s Waingmaw township protested against Myitsone. In Bago Region recently, Daw Suu told local residents to think about the project from “a wider perspective.” She should explain what she meant by that, and say what other factors are taken into account. For starters, transparency is essential. For example, officials of SPIC have been urging the Myanmar government to publicly disclose details of the Myitsone contract since June 2016. And this is not the only enterprise which needs to come clean..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Myanmar Times" (Myanmar)
2019-04-26
Date of entry/update: 2019-10-28
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Amid growing public concern about Chinese-backed development projects in Myanmar, State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi will leave for Beijing late this month to attend the second Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) summit. During her meeting with the Chinese President Xi Jinping there, she is quite likely to discuss the Myitsone Dam, the most controversial Chinese project in the country so far. As well the Myitsone dam, another important China-backed development project is now underway on the shore of Bay of Bengal in Myanmar’s western state of Rakhine. Prior to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s visit to China, The Irrawaddy talks to Bertil Linter, a Swedish journalist and author who has been covering Myanmar and Southeast Asia for nearly four decades, on China’s major involvement—from development projects to the peace process—in the country. The momentum to cancel the Myitsone dam is building in Myanmar. This coincides with State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s upcoming visit to China where she will attend the second BRI summit. She has been very vague about her stance on the dam and some articles written by the NLD (National League for Democracy) party members have been indicating that the dam should get the go-ahead. Government leaders are suggesting the dam is downsized or relocated. Moreover, several projects which the current government has agreed to implement with China have not been disclosed to the public. What is your opinion on this? I believe Daw Aung San Suu Kyi must be aware of the fact that it would be political suicide to agree on a resumption of the Myitsone project. With elections coming up next year, any Myanmar politician would have to think carefully before agreeing to such a controversial, and hugely unpopular, project like this one. We all remember how much she was against it when she was in opposition. Why does she appear to have softened her stance on the matter? That’s a question that should be posed to her..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2019-04-08
Date of entry/update: 2019-10-28
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "If Myitsone issue fails to be resolved after a long delay, it will seriously hurt the confidence of Chinese entrepreneurs in investing in Myanmar. Therefore, China and Myanmar are in close consultation on the issue of Myitsone hydropower project to find out a proper solution acceptable to both sides as soon as possible, said Mr. Hong Liang, Chinese Ambassador to Myanmar. Mr. Hong Liang, Chinese Ambassador to Myanmar, visited Myitkyina and met with leaders of political parties and social organizations in Kachin State on 28 and 29 December 2018. On the economic and trade cooperation between China and Kachin State, Ambassador Hong Liang said that in accordance with the consensus reached by the state leaders of the two countries, China and Myanmar are jointly building the Belt and Road and China-Myanmar Economic Corridor. Kachin State is adjacent to China, acting as an important hub of China-Myanmar Economic Corridor. At present, the two sides are planning to build Houqiao-Kanpitetee China-Myanmar border economic cooperation zone and an industrial park in Myitkyina. China and Myanmar are also actively pushing forward the connectivity of railways, highways and power grids, which will bring enormous opportunities for the economic and social development of Kachin State. Ambassador Hong Liang said that currently one of the difficulties facing China-Myanmar cooperation is the issue of Myitsone hydropower project, which has been put on hold for seven years. If this issue fails to be resolved after a long delay, it will seriously hurt the confidence of Chinese entrepreneurs in investing in Myanmar. In addition to that, Myanmar’s economic and social development and the building of China-Myanmar Economic Corridor require sufficient electricity supply. To this end, China and Myanmar are in close consultation on the issue of Myitsone hydropower project to find out a proper solution acceptable to both sides as soon as possible. In this connection, support from the people of Kachin State would be highly valued..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Eleven Media Group" (Myanmar)
2019-01-14
Date of entry/update: 2019-10-27
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "The Myitsone Dam, the largest of seven hydropower projects planned on the Upper Irrawaddy, has been shrouded in controversy since it was first mooted in 2009 when Myanmar was under military junta rule. Estimated at an initial cost of US$3.6 billion, the project was announced as a joint venture between the China Power Investment Corporation (CPIC; now State Power Investment Corporation) and Myanmar conglomerate Asia World Company. However, in a move that surprised observers, shortly after coming to power in 2011 then President U Thein Sein announced the project would be suspended for the remainder of his term. At the time Lu Qizhou, president of CPIC, told Chinese media that he was “totally astonished” by the decision. The issue has now been pushed onto the agenda of Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD), which took power in 2016, but a decision has still not been made about the future of Myitsone..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "South China Morning Post" (Hong Kong)
2019-10-21
Date of entry/update: 2019-10-27
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Local people living in areas that would be affected by proposed hydropower dams on the Namtu/Myitnge River in northern Shan State protested on Thursday against a meeting held to discuss the impact of the project. The meeting took place at the Mountain Star Hotel in the state capital Taunggyi and was organized by the International Finance Corporation (IFC), a member of the World Bank Group headquartered in Washington, D.C. “We oppose the IFC meeting because there are still many clashes in the area where they want to build the dams,” said protester Nang Lao Kham, who is a resident of Panglong, a village on the bank of the Namtu River. According to Nang Lao Kham, the protesters sent an open letter to the IFC to highlight three reasons that local people are opposed to the project. “There is still a conflict going on in northern Shan State, so this is not the right time to build a hydropower dam. Also, only the authorities from Naypyitaw have any decision-making power over the project—our own state chief minister has no say, and neither do the people of Shan State. And dam construction will damage the environment, which will cause local people to suffer,” said Nang Lao Kham..."
Source/publisher: "Network Media Group" (Thailand)
2019-09-14
Date of entry/update: 2019-10-22
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Locals in northern Shan State’s Hsipaw Township say that they are ready to stand against a planned hydropower dam on the Nam Ma River because of its potential impact on their livelihoods and environment. The Yangon-based Unienergy Co. Ltd. plans to build a dam at the junction of the Nam Ma and Nam Paung rivers near Hseng Liang village in Hsipaw Township. Company representatives went to the area on October 10 to discuss the highly contested project with villagers, who blocked them from entering their village and in turn protested the dam. “If they build a hydropower dam, orange farms and many trees which are nearby the river will be gone underwater,” Sai Thein Myint, who lives in the Nam Ma area, told NMG. “Many local people who are living on the banks of Nam Ma River will have to relocate their homes. I am sure these houses will be underwater after the completion of the dam construction.” Locals said they had no desire to meet with Unienergy company staff and stand by their position against the project..."
Source/publisher: "Network Media Group" (Thailand)
2019-10-12
Date of entry/update: 2019-10-20
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "The National Network for the Total Shutdown of Myitsone Dam Project yesterday called on the government to transparently publicize the Myitsone Dam contract within one month and to officially allow copying the contract. The network urged the government to public this contract between May 28 to June 28. The future tasks have been discussed if the government fails to make it public. Officials of the network did not reveal the ways of how to proceed, said Lawyer Kyi Myint, a member of the network. There are distrusts and hatreds between the citizens, those who signed the contract, China, the existing government, parliaments and the ministries. The showcase of the contract would amount to promoting the democratic rights of the people. Section 390 under Chapter-8 of the Constitution, the network is working on the complete cancellation of Myitsone Dam Project. The network was formed on May 2. The message I would like to convey to the State is that the President, the State Counsellor and parliaments are urged to recognize our desires and inclusiveness as our country is a democratic country. The people said that it is difficult to cancel the Myitsone Dam project. It is not difficult. Our country and people will make decision from the national interest point of view, said Zaw Yan, the spokesperson of the Network..."
Source/publisher: "Eleven Media Group" (Myanmar)
2019-05-29
Date of entry/update: 2019-10-15
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Political and religious leaders in Myanmar’s Kachin state have hit back at apparent efforts by Beijing to breathe new life into a controversial China-funded dam project as the Southeast Asian nation comes under fire from the West over its treatment of the Rohingya Muslims. In a joint statement released on Monday, three ethnic Kachin political parties said they were seeking the “permanent suspension” of the US$3.6 billion Myitsone Dam project, which has been on hold since 2011 but had been slated for completion this year. “This is the people’s desire. We won’t change our policy on the Myitsone hydropower dam,” Gumgrawng Awng Hkam, chairman of the Kachin Democratic Party, told Myanmar’s Network Media Group..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "South China Morning Post" (Hong Kong)
2019-01-20
Date of entry/update: 2019-10-03
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Senior officials from China’s Yunnan province once again pressured Kachin religious leaders to support the revival of the controversial Myitsone hydropower project at a meeting last week in the Chinese border town of Ruili, an influential Kachin religious leader told The Irrawaddy. At the meeting between top Yunnan leaders and representatives of the Kachin Baptist Convention (KBC) on Friday, the Chinese officials said Chinese President Xi Jinping was a strong supporter of the Myitsone Dam project. “They said it would be better if we accept the Myitsone project, as it would bring benefits to the [local] people,” said KBC president Rev. Hkalam Samson. Located at the confluence of the two rivers that form Myanmar’s “lifeline”, the Irrawaddy River, the US$3.6-billion (nearly 5.5 trillion kyats) project was suspended by then-president U Thein Sein in 2011 amid a widespread public outcry over the dam’s potentially serious social and environmental impacts. However, it came under the spotlight again when Chinese Ambassador Hong Liang claimed after a visit to Kachin State at the end of December that the Kachin people were not opposed to its resumption..."
Source/publisher: "Belt & Road News" (China)
2019-03-07
Date of entry/update: 2019-10-01
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Amid increasing pressure from China to resume the controversial Myitsone Dam project, the State Counsellor has promised that her government will make a final decision on the dam based upon political, economic and environmental considerations, and vowed to make public the details of the decision. When asked her opinion of the Myitsone Dam project at a meeting with local residents in Pyay, Bago Region on Thursday, State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi said, “I would like you to think about the project from a wider perspective.” She said, “We should not think based on one perspective. If we think from only one perspective, we could make the wrong decision.” The State Counsellor said the final decision would have to be politically, socially, economically and environmentally sound and sustainable. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi did not offer her own stance on whether the dam project should be scrapped, nor did she say when a decision would be made. However, she said her government should not abolish projects approved by a previous government just because it did not comply with the current administration’s policies. If government of the day were to break promises made by previous governments, the country would lose credibility, she said. She added that her government would make decisions transparently, not only when it comes to the Myitsone project, but also on other projects..."
Source/publisher: "Belt & Road News" (China)
2019-03-15
Date of entry/update: 2019-09-28
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "China’s policy towards the Myitsone dam issue has experienced several major changes since Myanmar suspended the controversial project in September 2011. At first, Beijing overtly asked the Myanmar government to promote the implementation of big projects in Myanmar and the Myitsone dam was included. Yet, Beijing adopted a pragmatic attitude towards the Myitsone issue after Myanmar’s National League for Democracy (NLD) took office in April 2016, in which it pursued for Myanmar’s compensation for reneging on the terms of the contract rather than simply resuming the project. The main reasons for China’s softened position on the Myitsone issue are the following: first, Yunnan, the main buyer of the electricity from Myitsone dam, now has an oversupply of electricity and needs to export its growing electricity holding to ease the excess hydropower capacity. Second, China fully realizes that there would be strong national resistance against the Myanmar government’s decision to revive the Myitsone project. Third, China is anxious about Myanmar’s swing to the US due to their disputes over the Myitsone issue. Fourth, China wants to implement other projects at the expense of cooling down the Myitsone dam. Fifth, China is waiting for an opportunity to resolve the Myitsone issue. Yet, China seems to has renewed hope that the Myitsone dam would be restarted as the bilateral ties with Myanmar has been on the upswing since the Rohingya refugee crisis in the mid-2017. During a visit to Kachin in December 2018, China’s ambassador to Myanmar Hong Liang said the Myitsone dam was crucial for both Beijing and Naypyidaw, and that any further delays could hamper bilateral relations. Then, in January 2019, a statement published by the Chinese Embassy in Yangon said “If this issue fails to be resolved... it will seriously hurt the confidence of Chinese entrepreneurs to invest in Myanmar... the two sides should find an acceptable solution as soon as possible”. It also claimed that Kachin political leaders and social organizations have a “positive attitude” toward the dam, leading to a widespread speculation that China wants to revive the controversial project. Why China is so keen to revive the Myitsone dam now? Four reasons could explain China’s significant change in the Myitsone issue. First and foremost, China tries to move forward the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) by resuming the Myitsone project. As Joe Kumbun, who is a local analyst based in Kachin, said China attempts to provide full electricity to the Economic Cooperation Zone along the Myanmar-China border and the industrial zones in northern Kachin, the key elements of CMEC and BRI, through restarting the Myitsone dam. Second, China tries to revive the Myitsone dam and push forward with others projects by using it as support for Myanmar in the face of mounting international pressures over the Rohingya crisis. Third, China is getting upset because the Myanmar government has hung up the Myitsone dam for seven years and dragged its heels on the resolution to the Myitsone issue. Fourth, China is increasingly concerned about the serious consequences of the Myitsone project in the general election in Myanmar in 2020. In other words, the Myitsone dam might be a focus in the coming elections and be manipulated by the West to undermine the warm relations between China and Myanmar. Given the factors discussed above, China wants to address the Myitsone issue as soon as possible, thus removing the main barrier in their bilateral ties and promoting the economic cooperation between the two countries..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Burma Rivers Network" (Myanmar)
2019-04-01
Date of entry/update: 2019-09-26
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Myanmar’s former military junta inked the $3.6 billion deal for the hydropower project located on the Irrawaddy River in 2009, according to Reuters, with Myanmar’s military linked Asia World Co. and China’s State Owned utility company China Power Investment Corp. tasked with its construction. Work on the dam was suspended in September 2011 by then Myanmar’s President Thein Sein after public protests. At the time, Aung San Suu Kyi, before she became the leader of the current quasi-civilian Government in Myanmar, was one of the voices of opposition. Suu Kyi once said the dam would threaten the flow of the Irrawaddy River, and force the relocation of more than 10,000 people from 63 nearby villages, according to Reuters. But after Suu Kyi became head of the ruling National League for Democracy party and the effective prime minister of the country, Beijing began to exact pressure to resume the dam’s construction. In June 2016, a delegation headed by China’s Ambassador to Myanmar travelled to Kachin to lobby for restarting the dam project, according to news magazine Frontier Myanmar. Most recently, in November 2018, the magazine reported that the Chinese regime wanted the project to be packaged as part of its One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative, and conveyed the message that other OBOR projects in Myanmar’s wouldn’t proceed unless the dam is restarted..."
Source/publisher: "Belt & Road News" (China)
2019-04-25
Date of entry/update: 2019-09-25
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Myanmar’s Kachin state has been rocked by huge protests this week against the US $ 3.6 billon Myitsone dam project to be entirely financed by China. The biggest protest rally took place in Manaw Park in the state capital town of Myitkyina of Kachin state on Thursday after more than 10,000 people from different parts of the state marched into Myitkyina. The protesters, mostly from Myitkyiba and Waingmaw townships, were led by Kachin political and civil society groups, religious leaders from the powerful Baptist Church and the Buddhist Sangha and the local youth groups. They called for a complete halt to the China-financed work on the Myitsone dam on the Ayeyarwady (Irrawaddy) River. The protests have been provoked by reports of fresh Chinese attempts to pressurize the Aung San Suu Kyi led NLD government to resume the 6000 MW hydel project..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Northeast Now" (India)
2019-02-08
Date of entry/update: 2019-09-21
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Chinese companies are pushing to resume destructive dam projects, ignoring a key assessment
Description: "Much media attention in Myanmar is focussed on China’s apparent efforts to revive the stalled Myitsone dam, its role in advising the Myanmar government on developing a new hydropower strategy white paper, and the implications of these developments for the adoption of the World Bank-led strategic environmental assessment of Myanmar’s hydropower sector, which was released in late 2018. The debate appears to revolve around the assumption that the country must choose between a strategy for large hydropower development supported by western donors and the World Bank or one supported by China. While its contents are unknown, there is concern that the white paper may push forward highly environmentally and socially destructive projects such as the Myitsone dam and the series of mega dams proposed for the Salween River main stem (also known as Thanlwin), each involving Chinese companies and financiers. But is this assumption right? The long-awaited environmental assessment recommended not building dams on the main stem of five major river basins, including the Ayeyarwady and Salween. This would remove the controversial Myitsone and the Salween main stem dams from Myanmar’s energy development plans, which have been fiercely opposed by civil society groups. Government adoption of this recommendation would reflect sound science on the adverse ecological impacts of large hydropower dams on mainstream river systems and provide critical recognition of the multiple values – ecological, social, economic and cultural – delivered by these rivers..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "thethirdpole.net"
2019-03-13
Date of entry/update: 2019-09-19
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "After heavily investing in the Myitsone Dam, China re-engages discussions about resuming construction of the project stalled for many years. The Chinese ambassador for Burma pressed to restart a contentious hydro-power dam project during a recent meeting with important Kachin political leaders in northern Myanmar. “The Chinese ambassador said China wants to resume construction of the Myitsone hydropower dam construction, since it’s already heavily invested in the project,” said U Kwam Gowng Awng Kham, chairman for Kachin Democratic Party. Planned near Myitkyina, the capital of Kachin State, the dam project has been a massive undertaking by the Chinese government, U Kwam Gowng Awng Kham said. With its suspension, China is going to keep trying to reboot the project. The previous Thein Sein government suspended it in 2011 after the project received widespread opposition. If it’s completed it would generate 6,000 megawatts, making it the fifteenth largest dam in the world. Most of the dam’s output would be sent to China. It would cause extensive flooding, and because it’s planned on a fault line, there are legitimate fears an earthquake could damage it causing flooding that would inundate neighboring Kachin State capital, Myitkyina. Since the NLD government came to power, China has been pushing for State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi to restart the project. The objective of the Myitsone hydropower dam is for regional development, said U Kwam Gowng Awng Kham, but the negative impact a mega project of this kind will have on the environment would be huge. This is why Kachin and so many others across the country have been against it from the start..."
Source/publisher: "BNI Multimedia Group" via Network Media Group (Canada)
2019-01-07
Date of entry/update: 2019-09-19
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language:
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Topic: Tanintharyi River, Karen, Karen National Union, International Finance Corporation, Myanmar, Environment
Topic: Tanintharyi River, Karen, Karen National Union, International Finance Corporation, Myanmar, Environment
Description: "The lack of transparency surrounding plans to construct dams on the Tanintharyi River in southern Myanmar, and the impact it will have on the livelihoods of the Karen – the area’s indigenous people – is set to add more tension to an area already filled with strife. While there are 18 Memorandums of Understanding (MoU) for dams on the Tanintharyi River – one of southern Myanmar’s largest free-flowing waterways – local communities have received no information on their location, size or status according to a report by three civil society groups last week; Candle Light Youth Group, Southern Youth and Tarkapaw Youth Group. The report titled ‘Blocking a Bloodline: Indigenous Communities along the Tanintharyi River Fear the Impact of Large-Scale Dams’ also notes that 32,008 people from 76 villages living directly along the river depend on it as a vital source of food, water, transportation and cultural expression – all of which are at risk due to plans to build a 1,040 megawatt (MW) hydropower project by Thai-owned Greater Mekong Sub-region Power Public Co Ltd (GMS)..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The ASEAN Post"
2019-08-15
Date of entry/update: 2019-09-18
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Kachin civil society organizations are preparing to hold a public protest on Thursday in the Kachin State capital of Myitkyina against the proposed Myitsone dam. Tsaji, from the Kachin Development Network Group, said they are calling for participation from people from diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds in a statewide protest of the Myitsone hydropower project, which would dam the confluence of the Irrawaddy River. "All of us need to participate in a public protest against the Myitsone dam. We have a duty to protect the mother Irrawaddy River,” he told KNG. Chinese ambassador H.E. Hong Liang met Kachin leaders and locals in the Kachin State capital of Myitkyina in December of last year. The Chinese embassy in Yangon then released a controversial statement describing the meeting on January 13. The embassy’s statement said, “the Kachin ethnic people in Kachin State do not oppose the Myitsone hydropower dam project. The organizations and people who oppose the dam project are outsiders.” Tsaji said that the protest is being held to show that this statement “is completely wrong” and continue to call for the “permanent halt” of the Myitsone dam. An expected 10,000 people will join Thursday’s protest on the Manau festival grounds in Myitkyina. Mung Ra, a pastor with the Kachin Baptist Convention living in Mali Yang internally displaced people’s camp, said he will join the demonstration on behalf of those who were forced to move to make way for the dam project..."
Source/publisher: "BNI Multimedia Group" via Kachin News Group
2019-02-06
Date of entry/update: 2019-09-15
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Topic: Myitsone Dam, hydropower, China, foreign investment, protests, Anti-Adhamma Committee
Topic: Myitsone Dam, hydropower, China, foreign investment, protests, Anti-Adhamma Committee
Description: "Politicians, activists and civil society representatives will gather in Yangon on April 1 to expand their campaign against the Chinese-backed Myitsone Dam, leaders of the movement said at a small protest in Yangon on Monday. U Aung Soe Myint, a leader of the movement, told Frontier the group had invited NGOs, political parties and environmental experts from every state and region to come together in opposition to the multi-billion dollar project. “We have also invited National League for Democracy officials and NLD members of parliament, but I am not sure whether or not they will attend,” Aung Soe Myint, who is also the vice chair of the People’s Party in Mandalay, said at the 50-person demonstration in downtown Yangon on Monday afternoon. The group will form an executive committee at the meeting, he said, and will devise strategies for campaigning against the dam. U Myat Kyaw, a leader of the Anti-Adhamma Committee, a liberal Buddhist group that opposes ultra-nationalists, said at the protest that the people of Myanmar should not stay silent over the future of the mega-project, which was suspended in 2011 by President U Thein Sein in response to a growing national opposition movement. Public concerns include large-scale displacement and loss of livelihoods, the destruction of cultural heritage and environmental degradation. Myat Kyaw said it was time to unite against the damming of the Ayeyarwady River. Amid increasing pressure from China to restart the project, he said Myitsone would only be cancelled if Myanmar presented a united front, and suggested that the government needed the support of the people to stand up to China..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Frontier Myanmar"
2019-03-25
Date of entry/update: 2019-09-15
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Topic: China, Myitsone Dam,India, foreign investment, international relations, conflict
Sub-title: If China and India seek sustainable development in Myanmar, they should engage more locally and listen to the voices of affected communities. For China, this starts with the Myitsone Dam.
Topic: China, Myitsone Dam,India, foreign investment, international relations, conflict
Description: "MYANMAR HAS two major assets that interest China: access to the Indian Ocean and plentiful natural resources. During the rule of Myanmar’s military junta, 1988-2011, China won access to both by protecting the regime from the impact of sanctions and condemnation by Western countries. Under President U Thein Sein’s transitional, military-backed government, beginning in 2011, Myanmar moved closer to Western powers, seeking to lessen the country’s dependence on its giant neighbour to the north. Many observers assumed that, under a National League for Democracy-led, semi-civilian government, the pivot away from China would continue . However, since 2016, when the NLD took office, China has increased its influence in Myanmar, in large part because of the country’s renewed isolation over the Rohingya crisis. In Kachin State, which borders China to the north and east, the consequences of this shift are profound. China has had direct access to the Indian Ocean since 2013, when a gas pipeline that spans Myanmar became operational. The 2,520-kilometre pipeline starts from Kyaukphyu in Rakhine State on Myanmar’s western coast, enters China from Shan State at Ruili in Yunnan Province and ends at Guigang in the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region. A parallel crude oil pipeline that stops at Kunming began operating in 2017. As well as their economic value, these projects give China long-term leverage over Myanmar. Since 2017, the government has come under renewed international pressure over the widespread and systematic abuses perpetrated by the Tatmadaw against the Rohingya population in northern Rakhine State. More than 700,000 civilians fled across the border to Bangladesh, which is now home to more than a million Rohingya refugees. Through its veto powers at the United Nations Security Council, China has protected Myanmar by blocking moves to penalise the government. While there have been many losers in the Rohingya crisis, China has been a clear winner. The Tatmadaw has also done well out of it; the NLD-led civilian government, much less so..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Frontier Myanmar"
2019-03-01
Date of entry/update: 2019-09-09
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Three ethnic Kachin political parties said on Monday they sought the “permanent suspension” of the multi-billion dollar Myitsone Dam, discrediting a Chinese embassy statement that implied support for the divisive project among the state’s political leaders. Manam Tu Ja, chair of the Kachin State Democracy Party, told Frontier that the statement, which was signed by the KSDP, the Kachin Democratic Party and the Unity and Democracy Party, is a clarification of their position aimed at the Kachin people. It could also help the Chinese embassy to understand the wishes and policies of the three parties, he said. “We have no plan yet to respond directly to the Chinese embassy because some [other] parties in Kachin could have said that they support the project,” he said. The embassy’s statement on January 13 concerned a December visit by Chinese ambassador Mr Hong Liang to Myitkyina, the Kachin State capital, where he held discussions with political leaders and social organisations on the peace process and IDP resettlement, the anti-drug campaign in northern Myanmar, and investment. Kachin political leaders and social organisations had a “positive attitude” towards the 6000-megawatt Myitsone Dam, the statement said. It said they assured Hong Liang that “local people of Kachin State do not oppose the Myitsone hydropower project; It is some individuals and social organizations from outside that oppose the project”. But Reverend Hkalam Samson, chair of the Kachin Baptist Convention, who met Hong Liang during the visit, told Frontier that the statement was untrue..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Frontier Myanmar"
2019-01-14
Date of entry/update: 2019-09-09
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Topic: Myitsone Dam, Kachin State, hydropower, China, SPIC, foreign investment, Belt and Road Initiative, Ayeyarwady River, protests
Topic: Myitsone Dam, Kachin State, hydropower, China, SPIC, foreign investment, Belt and Road Initiative, Ayeyarwady River, protests
Description: " Thousands of people in northern Myanmar took to the streets on Monday to protest against the proposed reinstatement of a Chinese-backed mega-dam they say will cause huge environmental damage and bring little benefit to the country. The protest came just days ahead of a trip by civilian leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi to Beijing for a summit on China's Belt and Road Initiative. Myanmar's former military junta signed a 2009 deal with Beijing to construct the Myitsone dam in Kachin State. But public anger rose to the surface as the country started to transition towards democracy and the US$3.6 billion project was mothballed two years later. If the 6,000 megawatt dam were built on the country's famed Ayeyarwady River, it would flood an area the size of Singapore, displacing tens of thousands. Now China is increasing pressure on its southern neighbour to revive the controversial project. On Monday protesters marched through the Kachin town of Waingmaw, some 50 kilometres (31 miles) from the proposed site of the dam, brandishing banners reading "No Myitsone Dam" and calling for the river to "flow freely forever". "Myitsone is our inheritance from our ancestors and we cannot lose it," protester Tang Gun told AFP by phone. He said more than 4,000 people took part in the march while several thousand more had signed a petition pledging their support for the protest..."
Source/publisher: "Frontier Myanmar" via AFP
2019-04-23
Date of entry/update: 2019-09-09
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Topic: Dam Kachin Myanmar Myitsone Dam
Sub-title: The government of Myanmar is working to restart the controversial Myitsone dam project in Kachin State. It doesn’t bode well for the ongoing peace process.
Topic: Dam Kachin Myanmar Myitsone Dam
Description: "Following Myanmar State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi’s attendance at China’s Belt and Road Initiative forum on April 25, the government is working with Beijing to revive the Myitsone hydropower project. Myitsone is a Chinese-backed dam proposed for the Irrawaddy River that was suspended in September 2011 due to popular opposition. State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi originally opposed the US$3.6 billion dam. She supported a community campaign to stop the project due to its environmental and social impact. This opposition eventually caused then-president Thein Sein to suspend the 6,000 MW project. Recently, Suu Kyi changed her rhetoric, encouraging local Kachin communities who would be impacted by the dam “to think [about the project] from a wider perspective.” Local Kachin communities still oppose Myitsone – demonstrations against the dam drew thousands of supporters in February and again in April. However, China has continued its efforts to revive the project, claiming late last year that the Kachin population was supportive. The Myanmar government is indicating that it may be willing to prioritize the dam, a key piece of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), over lasting peace and equitable development in Kachin. Suu Kyi has shifted her stance on the economic, social and environmental disaster that is Myitsone..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "ASEAN Today"
2019-04-29
Date of entry/update: 2019-09-08
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Thousands of people marched peacefully in the Kachin State capital Myitkyina on Thursday against the Myitsone Dam, raising their voices in unison to the words, “Our rights! We don’t want it!” The two-hour march began at 9am at the Kachin National Manau Park and progressed through the commercial heart of the city. The crowd, estimated by participants at around 7,000, held handwritten posters and vinyl banners with slogans including “Dams on the Irrawaddy will cut off Burma’s Lifeblood,” “Let displaced villagers return home now,” and “Cancel all dams on the Irrawaddy and its tributaries.” Demonstrators comprised a broad spectrum of civil society, including students, elders, church leaders, activists, internally displaced people, and those relocated from their villages for the project. A joint venture signed in 2009 between China’s State Power Investment Corporation, Myanmar’s military junta and conglomerate Asia World envisaged a series of seven hydroelectric dams that would be built on the N’Mai and Mali rivers, including at the confluence about 26 miles north of Myitkyina where the Ayeyarwady River begins. In 2011, President U Thein Sein suspended the project in response to a growing national resistance movement. Public concerns included large-scale displacement and loss of livelihoods, the destruction of cultural heritage and environmental degradation..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Frontier Myanmar"
2019-02-08
Date of entry/update: 2019-09-06
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "This History Thread is about the mighty rivers that have defined Myanmar (Burma.) North-south river valley geology shaped regional history. #Rivers, their tributaries & watersheds continue to have enormous political, agricultural & environmental importance. #dams #biodiversity From 12th C. BCE populations migrated along #Irrawaddy (Ayeyarwady), #Chindwin, #Salween river valleys to settle in lands that are now known as Myanmar (Burma.) Powerful dynasties rose and fell along the Irrawaddy, including Pyu, Pagan, Ava. British made river port Rangoon (Yangon) colonial capital in 1853. Burma became “rice bowl of Asia” under their exploitation especially in fertile Irrawaddy Delta. River inundation/irrigation can augment monsoon rain for wet rice cultivation. Padi harvest transported by river..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Project Maje"
2019-05-22
Date of entry/update: 2019-09-02
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Non-governmental organizations, political parties, and environmental experts from every state and region in Myanmar have been invited to come together in opposition to the China-financed Myitsone Hydropower Dam project, Frontier Myanmar magazine reported. So far, only 44 percent of households in Myanmar have access to electricity. Addressing a nationwide power shortage, Myanmar's government has set a target to increase the figure to 50 percent by the end of 2019 and 75 percent by the end of 2025. According to rough estimates, the design installed capacity of the dam was 6,000 megawatts, with the annual generation capacity tripling the annual power consumption of Myanmar in 2011. That means initially Myanmar's domestic market could not consume the total generation capacity of the dam. But as the domestic demand for power consumption rises in Myanmar, it is likely the Myitsone Hydropower Dam project would supply 100 percent of its electricity to the Myanmar market. Relevant research shows that the building of the Myitsone Hydropower Dam will improve the traditional way of living of locals who rely on agriculture and hunting and contribute to ecological protection. The protest against the Myitsone Hydropower Dam is not conducive to reaching these goals. Some politicians and environmental experts who have participated in the campaign enjoy priority use of electricity, but their protests against the dam leave many others to live in the dark..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Burma Rivers Network" via Global Times
2019-04-03
Date of entry/update: 2019-09-01
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language:
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Description: "Though Myanmar officials have expressed their appreciation for the benefits of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Chinese analysts noted that more practical outcomes should be delivered apart from optimistic plans, as some BRI projects still face uncertainty in the Southeast Asian country. A positive momentum to further promote the implementation of the China-proposed initiative in Myanmar has been seen recently, analysts said. During a visit to the China-Myanmar border in Southwest China’s Yunnan Province from Saturday to Monday, Chinese State Councillor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi stressed that the stability of border areas is directly related to joint efforts to promote cooperation under the initiative. Also on Monday, Myanmar State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi said BRI could bring opportunities to Myanmar and the region, at the first meeting of the steering committee for the implementation of tasks relating to the initiative, the Xinhua News Agency reported..."
Source/publisher: "Belt & Road News"
2019-02-23
Date of entry/update: 2019-08-30
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language:
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Description: "More than 8,000 residents of Waingmaw township in Myanmar’s Kachin state protested on Monday to call for a complete halt to the controversial Myitsone dam project, urging government action ahead of a visit to Beijing at the end of this month by national leader Aung San Suu Kyi. Construction of the Chinese-backed U.S. $3.6 billion hydropower project on the Irrawaddy River in Kachin state, begun in 2009, has stalled since 2011 because of concerns over potential flooding and other environmental impacts and anger that 90 percent of its electricity would be exported to China. Suspension of the project has dismayed China, which has been pushing Aung San Suu Kyi’s ruling National League for Democracy government to allow the hydropower project to resume, arguing that Chinese companies have already invested heavily in it. Aung San Suu Kyi has been tight lipped on the fate of the project, but said in mid-March that it is important for her government to uphold investment projects approved by previous administrations or risk being perceived by investors as unreliable. Others have raised concerns that Myanmar would have to pay large compensation to China if the project is scrapped..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "RFA"
2019-04-22
Date of entry/update: 2019-08-24
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language:
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Description: "Following the Chinese ambassador to Myanmar Hong Liang’s Myitkyina visit that took place from 28 to 29 December 2018, where he met leaders of political parties and social organizations in Kachin State, news have been making the rounds that the ambassador has been bossy and even intimidating when interacting with the Kachin leaders during his visit. Reportedly, during the visit, ambassador Hong Liang met with chairman of the Kachin State Democracy Party (KSDP) Manam Tu Ja, chairman of the Unity and Democracy Party of Kachin State (UDP-KS) U Hkyet Hting Nan, chairman of the Kachin Democracy Party (KDP) Gumgrawng Awng Hkam, chairman of the Lisu National Development Party U Si Phar Lar Lu (U Shwe Minn), chairman of the Shan Ethnic Affairs Society (Northern Myanmar) U Sai San Wae and chairman of the Kachin Baptist Convention Hkalam Samson. According to the The Irrawaddy report on January 9, when the Chinese ambassador met Gumgrawng Awng Hkam and Rev. Hkalam Samson respectively at Palm Spring Hotel in Myitkyina, he warned them not to be so cordial and friendly with western diplomats, otherwise they would face serious consequences. Both claimed that the ambassador briefed them in a bossy manner, warning them not to oppose Chinese projects in Kachin State, including the controversial Myitsone hydro-power project. The meeting with the Chinese ambassador came after the US and UK ambassadors visited Kachin State. During their meetings in Myitkyina with Kachin political leaders and other prominent members of the Kachin community, both ambassadors discussed the peace process, the safe return of internally displaced persons (IDPs), promotion of education and health and free and fair elections. Both Gumgrawng Awng Hkam and Rev. Hkalam Samson attended those meetings. Consequently, Kachin politicians invited the ambassadors to open liaison offices in Myitkyina in order to promote relations..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "BNI Multimedia Group"
2019-01-16
Date of entry/update: 2019-08-21
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language:
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Description: "Following the Chinese ambassador to Myanmar Hong Liang’s Myitkyina visit that took place from 28 to 29 December 2018, where he met leaders of political parties and social organizations in Kachin State, news have been making the rounds that the ambassador has been bossy and even intimidating when interacting with the Kachin leaders during his visit. Reportedly, during the visit, ambassador Hong Liang met with chairman of the Kachin State Democracy Party (KSDP) Manam Tu Ja, chairman of the Unity and Democracy Party of Kachin State (UDP-KS) U Hkyet Hting Nan, chairman of the Kachin Democracy Party (KDP) Gumgrawng Awng Hkam, chairman of the Lisu National Development Party U Si Phar Lar Lu (U Shwe Minn), chairman of the Shan Ethnic Affairs Society (Northern Myanmar) U Sai San Wae and chairman of the Kachin Baptist Convention Hkalam Samson. According to the The Irrawaddy report on January 9, when the Chinese ambassador met Gumgrawng Awng Hkam and Rev. Hkalam Samson respectively at Palm Spring Hotel in Myitkyina, he warned them not to be so cordial and friendly with western diplomats, otherwise they would face serious consequences. Both claimed that the ambassador briefed them in a bossy manner, warning them not to oppose Chinese projects in Kachin State, including the controversial Myitsone hydro-power project. The meeting with the Chinese ambassador came after the US and UK ambassadors visited Kachin State. During their meetings in Myitkyina with Kachin political leaders and other prominent members of the Kachin community, both ambassadors discussed the peace process, the safe return of internally displaced persons (IDPs), promotion of education and health and free and fair elections. Both Gumgrawng Awng Hkam and Rev. Hkalam Samson attended those meetings. Consequently, Kachin politicians invited the ambassadors to open liaison offices in Myitkyina in order to promote relations..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "BNI Multimedia Group"
2019-01-16
Date of entry/update: 2019-08-21
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language:
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Sub-title: Some worry that despite financial and social costs, much of the electricity proposed dam will generate will be exported.
Description: "Myanmar government officials claim a hydroelectricity project along the Tanintharyi River could significantly benefit the Southeast Asian nation. But new research by a trio of human rights organisations offers a dark contrast to that bright picture. Almost 7,000 people could be displaced if a dam is built along the river, according to a joint report, Blocking a Bloodline, by Candle Light, Southern Youth, and the Tarkapaw Youth Group. "These approximately 7,000 people will lose everything they know, including their way of life, community and kinship, ancestral history, local use of natural resources, and their lands," Human Rights Watch's Asia Deputy Director Phil Robertson wrote in an email to Al Jazeera. "If this [project] goes forward, [the villagers] will mark the first day of their displacement as the start of the worst period of their lives, when their rights were trod on by the Myanmar government and they were shuffled off to a wholly inadequate resettlement area where quality land, water, services, and support are entirely lacking." The reports suggest the project will alter the livelihoods of the Karen, the area's indigenous people. This dam could "irreversibly alter the lives of up to 32,000 people living along it," the authors write. They predict that not only could up to 32 upstream villages be displaced, but 58,500 hectares of land would likely be destroyed..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Al Jazeera"
2019-08-14
Date of entry/update: 2019-08-18
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language:
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Sub-title: Indigenous people called for a large dam project to be halted on the Tanintharyi River, based on the findings of two reports released by local people on Friday.
Description: "The devastating impact that a proposed 1040-megawatt dam would have on the river and the communities along it were outlined in the report, “Blocking a Bloodline: Indigenous Communities along the Tanintharyi River Fear the Impact of Large-Scale Dams.” Naw Paw Say Wah, director of Candle Light, said they estimate that construction of the dam could displace up to 7000 people in 32 villages along the upstream reaches of the Tanintharyi River. “This dam will also have serious effects on the lives and livelihoods of over 23,000 people who live downstream of the proposed project,” she added. The dam proposal put forward by Thai-owned GMS Co., along with 17 other dam proposals on the river have been developed without the free, prior and informed consent of indigenous communities, and threaten to destroy their primary source of water, food and transportation, according to the reports. The report, based on surveys of over 1200 people living along the Tanintharyi River, highlights the importance of the river to community livelihoods, access to water, transportation and cultural practices. It presents the impact that the dam proposals would have on the lives of indigenous people, forests and biodiversity, and the future of peace and stability in the region. “We local people must be included in all decision-making regarding our territories because we have the knowledge and ability to manage our own resources,” said U Ye Aung, a member of Rays of Kamoethway Indigenous People and Nature..."
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Source/publisher: "Myanmar Times"
2019-08-14
Date of entry/update: 2019-08-14
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "YANGON — Plans to build dams on the Tanintharyi River would affect about 32,000 people in communities that have never been adequately consulted, according to a report by three Karen civil society groups that calls for a halt to the projects. The report says there are 18 memorandums of understanding to build dams on the river, but “local communities have received no information on their location, size or status”. It calls on the Tanintharyi regional government to provide full information to affected communities and civil society about the planned dams, which it says could also have a catastrophic impact on aquatic ecosystems and vast pristine forests, and pose a threat to the peace process. The report, Blocking a bloodline: Indigenous communities along the Tanintharyi River fear the impact of large scale dams, compiled by the Candle Light Youth Group, Southern Youth and Tarkapaw Youth Group, was released in Yangon on August 9 to mark the International Day of the World’s Indigenous Peoples. The waterway, one of southern Myanmar’s largest free-flowing rivers, forms at the confluence of the Ban and Kamoethway rivers in Tanintharyi’s Dawei District and flows along the Tanintharyi Valley before emptying into the Andaman Sea at Myeik. The river is the bloodline of 32,008 people from 6,118 households, who live in 76 villages along its banks and depend on it as a vital source of food, water and transportation, the report says..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Frontier Myanmar"
2019-08-09
Date of entry/update: 2019-08-12
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Myanmar, the largest country in Southeast Asia, has the least developed economy in the region (UNDP 2013)1 despite having some abundant natural resources and a relatively low population density. The current level of development is illustrated by Myanmar’s substantial shortfall in energy supply, with only 33% of households connected to grid electricity supply. Recognising that access to electricity is an important pillar in raising livelihoods (particularly in rural areas where 70% of Myanmar’s poor live) and achieving broad economic development, the Government of Myanmar (GoM) aims to rapidly increase power generation and electrification across the country over the next 10-20 years to provide affordable and reliable energy. Key sector targets include increasing national generation capacity by 500-1,000 MW per year over the next 10 years to reach 16,665 MW of installed capacity, and increasing the electrification rate to 75% by 2021/2022, then to 100% by 2030, and increasing increase energy exports to increase foreign exchange earnings. To meet these targets the government is considering a mix of power generation options, including gas, hydropower and other renewable energy alternatives. Given that the country is rich in hydropower resources, being home to major river basins and high annual rainfall in most areas, hydropower looms as an important contributor to the provision of affordable electricity. Almost the entire Ayeyarwady River Basin (91%, covering ~372,907km2 ) lies within Myanmar, as well as close to half of the Thanlwin basin (42%, covering ~127,745km2 ) and a small area of the Mekong basin (2.7%, covering ~ 22,070 km2 ). In addition, the Sittaung River Basin and the Rakhine and Tanintharyi coastal basins are other notable resources. But these substantial aquatic resources provide a range of essential ecosystem services that will be lost or degraded by inappropriate large-scale hydropower development, including maintaining river ecological and geomorphic processes, and providing important livelihood resources, therefore hydropower development must be sustainable. Hydropower development is at an early stage in Myanmar, with 29 hydropower projects (HPPs) greater than 10 MW capacity in operation, totalling 3,298 MW installed capacity, while an additional six HPPs are under construction with an installed capacity of 1,564 MW, the largest being the 1,050 MW Shweli 3 hydropower plant in the Ayeyarwady Basin (Figure 1.1). In contrast, GoM has received proposals for the development of a further 51 hydropower projects totalling 42,968 MW. There are also an additional 18 sites have been identified for potential hydropower development by state/regional governments totalling 994 MW. The sector is moving towards larger projects and away from Government-dominated development towards being driven by private enterprise..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: World Bank
2019-01-30
Date of entry/update: 2019-07-12
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "This chapter outlines the status of hydropower development in in Myanmar. In absence of a hydropower policy or plan in Myanmar, the Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) will assess the existing hydropower plants and planned projects in the major river basins and sub-basins. Sixteen years after the World’s first hydropower plant was commissioned in 1882 in Wisconsin, USA, the first hydropower plant in Myanmar was built on the Yeni River with an installed capacity of 460 kilowatt (kW). Only in 1960 was the first large hydropower plant completed in Myanmar, the first phase of the 168 megawatts (MW) Baluchaung II hydropower plant, taking advantage of part of the available 650-meter (m) head at Lawpita Falls in the Thanlwin Basin south of Loikaw in Shan State. Development of large hydropower power continued, accelerating after 2000, and has now reached about 3,331 MW, including small and mini hydropower plants. Twenty-nine power plants are in the range 10 MW - 790 MW, totalling 3,298 MW (Figure 1.1). Of the 29 power plants already operating, twelve have been built by the Ministry of Electricity and Energy (MoEE, 1,474 MW), three by the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation (MoALI, 144 MW) and seven by MoEE and MoALI in cooperation (492 MW). A further four have been built by Myanmar private developers, and three by foreign developers in joint venture with MoEE. Thirteen of the dams already built by MoEE and MoALI are multipurpose dams with irrigation and hydropower (12 MW - 280 MW) being the main uses of the dam. Figure 1.2 shows the locations of existing hydropower plant and planned hydropower projects..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: World Bank
2019-01-30
Date of entry/update: 2019-07-12
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "The aim of social and livelihood baseline report is to provide background information for an enhanced understanding by decision makers and other stakeholders of the range of stakeholder values and priorities that need to be taken into account in formulating the sustainable hydropower development pathway. Selected policies, plans and priorities for social issues and livelihoods are briefly described. These include: 20-year National Comprehensive Development Plan 2011-2031 (NCDP); Comprehensive Development Vision of 2010-35; 2nd 5-Year National Plan from 2016-17 to 2020-21; Framework for Economic and Social Reforms" (FESR); National Social Protection Strategic Plan; and National Urban System of Myanmar and the Urban Development Prioritization. National Strategic Plan for the Advancement of Women. National Land Use Policy (NLUP). Demographics, urbanization, migration are relevant for hydropower sector planning as they are issues that sets the backdrop for energy demand assessment and broader energy supply planning. By 2040, the population is forecast to be 62.8 million. The annual population growth rate has decreased from 2.1 in 1985 to 0.9 in 2015. The average household size, indicating degree of modernization, is significantly higher in predominantly ethnic minority areas than in Barma dominated areas. Population density, indicating general pressure on, and demand for resources, is significantly lower in predominantly ethnic minority areas. Two million people live outside Myanmar (2014), 70% in Thailand. 1.2 million are men. The largest numbers of emigrants are from Mon, Kayin, Shan, Bago and Rakhine. Employment and search for employment is the main driver of migration. The urban growth rate is at 2.5%, rural growth rate 0% (2015). There is strong rural to urban migration with Yangon and Mandalay being the main centres of attraction. Yangon has 4.7 million people (36% of urban population), while Mandalay has a population of 1.2 million (9%). 40% of the town population live in towns with between 25,000 and 250,000 people and 25% of the town population live in around 100 towns of less than 100,000 people. Occupations and livelihoods are relevant for potential impacts on livelihoods that are directly dependent on rivers and related natural resources. However, Census 2014 aggregate occupations in agriculture, forestry and fishing into one category, and this constrains the analysis of livelihoods that are mainly dependent on river resources. The largest category in Census 2014 data on ‘usual activities’ of people is ‘own account worker’ (‘self-employed’). A measure of the dependence on rivers for livelihoods is attempted through the proxy indicator of ownership to boats, which was included in the Census 2014. Poverty, vulnerability to flooding, food security: hydropower plants’ potential direct impacts on poor people can be significant with both negative and positive effects. The latest nation-wide poverty data from 2010 are sample based not allowing for basin level analysis. The poverty incidence decreased between 2005 and 2010 in all State/Regions, except Chin urban. However, many households fluctuate around the poverty line and temporary, or transitory poverty, affected 28% of all households vs. 10% of all households that are chronically poor between 2005-2010. Transitory poverty is linked to the extensive dependence of the majority of the population on agriculture and natural resources with the associated vulnerability to floods and droughts, storms and diseases. The potential for flood protection measures is an important consideration in Myanmar. Between 1970 and 2016, 12.4 million people were affected by floods; of these 11.2 million were affected by riverine floods in 15 events. Large parts of rural Myanmar are still vulnerable to food insecurity especially caused by natural disasters. About half a million people were in need of food assistance in Myanmar in January 2017. 35% of children under the age of five suffer chronic malnutrition. Vulnerabilities with direct linkages to hydropower development include: storm surge, flood, drought, earthquake and landslides. Other vulnerabilities include under-and malnutrition and trafficking/migration..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: World Bank
2019-01-30
Date of entry/update: 2019-07-12
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Format : pdf
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Description: အဓိကကျသော အချက်အလက်များ အကျဉ်းချုပ် 4 အစီရင်ခံစာပြုစုပုံ နည်းလမ်းများ 5 အသုံးပြုထားသော ဝေါဟာရနှင့် အတိုကောက် အသုံးအနှုန်းများ 6 မြေပုံနှင့် အချက်အလက်ပြ ဇယားကွက်များ 7 မြေပုံ (၁) KHRG သုတေသနပြုသည့် နယ်မြေဧရိယာ 7 မြေပုံ(၂) မြန်မာပြည်အရှေ့တောင်ပိုင်းရှိ အဆိုပြုထားသည့်ရေကာတာနှင့် ဆောက်လုပ်ပြီးစီးခဲ့သော ရေကာတာများ 8 ဇယားကွက်(၁)သုတေသနဧရိယာအတွင်းရှိဆောက်လုပ်ရန်စီစဉ်ထားသည့်ရေကာတာနှင့် ဆောက်လုပ်ပြီးစီးခဲ့ သောရေကာတာများ 9 မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ ရေအားလျှပ်စစ်ဖွံ့ဖြိုးရေး မဟာစီမံကိန်းများ 9 ရေကာတာစီမံကိန်းများနှင့် လူမှုဘဝ ထိခိုက်နိုင်ခြင်းများ 11 မြေယာများ ဆုံးရှုံးခံရနိုင်ခြင်း 11 ရေလွမ်းနိုင်ခြင်း၊အသက်မွေးဝမ်းကြောင်းထိခိုက်နိုင်ခြင်းနှင့် လျော်ကြေးငွေမရရှိခြင်း 12 ဇယား(၂)ရေကာတာတည်ဆောက်ခဲ့ခြင်းကြောင့်မြေယာသိမ်းဆည်းခြင်းနှင့်ရေလွမ်းမိုးခြင်း 12 နေရပ်ရွှေ့ပြောင်းခံရနိုင်ခြင်း 13 ညှိနှိုင်းဆွေးနွေးမှုများတွင် ပါဝင်ခွင့်အားနည်းခြင်း 13 ပြန်လည်အစားထိုးမရနိုင်သော ဆုံးရှုံးနစ်နာမှုများ 14 တရားမျှတမှုမရှိသော လျော်ကြေး 14 ဇယား(၃)ရေကာတာစီမံကိန်းကြောင့် အဓမ္မ နေရပ်ရွှေ့ပြောင်း နေထိုင်ရခြင်း 15 လက်နက်ကိုင်တိုက်ပွဲနှင့် မိုင်းအန္တရာယ်များ 16 အကျိုးအမြတ်ခွဲဝေပေးခြင်း ယန္တရားများထားရှိရန် ပျက်ကွက်ခြင်း 17 မြန်မာပြည်တွင်း သဘာဝပတ်ဝန်းကျင်နှင့် လူမှုဘဝ ကာကွယ်မှုအခြေအနေ - ခြုံငုံသုံးသပ်ချက် 18 မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ ပတ်ဝန်းကျင်ထိခိုက်မှု ဆန်းစစ်ခြင်း ဥပဒေလုပ်ထုံးလုပ်နည်းဆိုင်ရာ လုပ်ငန်းစဉ် 18 ဇယား(၄) ရေအားလျှပ်စစ် စီမံကိန်းများအတွက် ပတ်ဝန်းကျင်ထိခိုက်မှုဆိုင်ရာ ဆန်းစစ်လေ့လာချက် (EIA) နှင့် ကနဦး ပတ်ဝန်းကျင်ဆန်းစစ်ချက် (IEE) တို့၏ ဆန်းစစ်ချက် အဆင့်များ 19 မြန်မာ့ ရေအားလျှပ်စစ် စီမံအုပ်ချုပ်မှုအောက်ရှိ ပတ်ဝန်းကျင်ထိခိုက်မှု ဆန်းစစ်လေ့လာချက် 20 အကြံပြုချက်များ 23 မြန်မာအစိုးရအတွက် အကြံပြုချက်များ 23 ရေအားလျှပ်စစ်စီမံကိန်းများတွင် ပါဝင်သော ကုမ္ပဏီများအတွက် အကြံပြုချက်များ 25 ပါဝင်လုပ်ဆောင် သူများအားလုံးအတွက် အကြံပြုချက်များ 27 ဓာတ်ပုံမှတ်တမ်းများ 28 မာတိကာ / 5 / နိဒါန်း အဓိကကျသော အချက်အလက်များ အကျဉ်းချုပ် မြန်မာပြည် အရှေ့တောင်ပိုင်း အထူးသဖြင့် ဝေးလံခေါင်ဖျားသော ကျေးလက်ဒေသ၊ ပဋိပက္ခ ဖြစ်ပွားခဲ့သော ထိုင်းနိုင်ငံ1 နယ်စပ်နှင့် နီးသောဒေသများတွင် လျှပ်စစ်ဓာတ်အား ရရှိမှုနှုန်းသည် အနိမ့်ဆုံး ဒေသများထဲမှ တစ်ခု အပါအဝင်ဖြစ်သည်။ မြန်မာ့အမျိုးသား လျှပ်စစ်ဓာတ်အား ရရှိရေး စီမံကိန်း (NEP) သည် ၂၀၃၀2ခုနှစ်တွင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံရှိ အိမ်ထောင်စုအားလုံး လျှပ်စစ်ဓါတ်အား ရရှိရန် စီမံချက်ထားရှိပါသည်။ အမျိုးသား လျှပ်စစ်ဓါတ်အား ရရှိရေးစီမံကိန်းနှင့် အခြားအမျိုးသားဖွံ့ဖြိုးတိုးတက်ရေး၏ ရည်မှန်းချက်အား အကောင်အထည်ဖော်ဆောင်ရွက် နိုင်ရန် မြန်မာ့စွမ်းအင်မဟာစီမံကိန်း (Myamar Energy Master Plan) မှ လျှပ်စစ်ဓါတ်အားလိုအပ်မှုအတွက် ၂၀၃၀3 ခုနှစ်အထိ နှစ်စဉ်နှစ်တိုင်း လျှပ်စစ်ရရှိမှု ၁၀ ရာခိုင်နှုန်း တိုးမြှင့်သွားမည် ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ဤအနာဂတ်လိုအပ် ချက်ကို ဖြည့်ဆည်းနိုင်ရန် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသည် စွမ်းအင်ထုတ်လုပ်မှုကို တိုးချဲ့ရပါမည်။ လက်ရှိတွင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ လျှပ်စစ်စွမ်းအင်သုံးစွဲလည်ပတ်မှုနှုန်း၏ သုံးပုံ နှစ်ပုံသည် ရေအားလျှပ်စစ်အားဖြင့် လည်ပတ်နေပါသည်4။မြန်မာ့ စွမ်းအင်ပင်မစီမံကိန်း (အမျိုးသားစွမ်းအင်စီမံခန့်ခွဲရေးကော်မတီ)နှင့် မြန်မာပြည်တွင်းရှိ အခြားရွေးချယ်စရာလျှပ် စစ်ကဏ္ဍဖွံ့ဖြိုးတိုးတက်မှု လျာထားသည့်နည်းလမ်းများသည် ၂၀၅၀ ခုနှစ်အထိ ရေ
Source/publisher: Karen Human Rights Group, Karen Rivers Watch
2018-06-00
Date of entry/update: 2018-07-25
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: Executive summary: "In Southeast Myanmar, electrification rates are among the lowest in the country, particularly in rural, conflict-affected areas near the border of Thailand.(1) Myanmar?s ambitious National Electrification Plan (NEP) aims to provide electricity access to all Myanmar households by 2030.(2) In response to the NEP and other national development goals, Myanmar?s Energy Master Plan (MEMP) projects electricity demand to rise by 10 percent annually through 2030.(3) To meet future demands, Myanmar must expand its energy infrastructure. Currently, hydropower comprises two-thirds of Myanmar?s electricity generation capacity.(4) Both the MEMP and alternative visions of electricity infrastructure development in Myanmar rely on hydropower as a key source of electricity through 2050, and include provisions for the export of hydropower to neighboring countries.(5) Myanmar needs to acknowledge and address a number of salient concerns if it is going to use hydropower to meet its future electricity needs. Most of Myanmar?s abundant hydropower resources are located in ethnic areas, particularly Kayin, Kayah, Kachin, and Shan States, all of which are sites of ongoing ethnic conflicts and armed tension.(6) In many cases, development of large dams in ethnic areas has resulted in conflict, severe social and environmental impacts for local communities and human rights violations.(7) The overwhelming majority (42 of 50) of large hydropower projects planned in Myanmar in recent years have been situated in ethnic areas.(8) With many more projects slated for development in these areas, this report highlights how hydropower projects impact ethnic communities in Southeast Myanmar. This report aims to encourage reforms in the hydropower sector by building comprehensive recommendations for policymakers and hydropower developers. The report supports recommendations using the results of new research highlighting how hydropower projects have impacted ethnic communities in Southeast Myanmar. Report commentary assesses the degree to which Myanmar?s legal and regulatory frameworks measure up against international best standards and practices for hydropower governance. The report concludes with comprehensive recommendations on how to strengthen these national frameworks in order to provide greater social and environmental safeguards for rural ethnic communities impacted by hydropower dams."
Source/publisher: Karen HumanRights Group, Karen Rivers Watch
2018-06-00
Date of entry/update: 2018-07-25
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf pdf
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Description: Executive Summary: "This report examines hydropower development in Myanmar to explore a fundamental challenge: how can governments make informed decisions about infrastructure development that will deliver the broadest range of benefits to their people over the long run? Hydropower provides a clear example of this challenge. For many countries, hydropower is a strategic resource that could increase energy supply at low costs and make important contributions to water resources management and development objectives (potential ?co-benefits” of hydropower development and management). However, current approaches to hydropower development often fail to achieve this potential for broad benefits and incur high environmental and social costs. Decisions are often made at the scale of individual projects without a comprehensive understanding of how these projects fit within the larger context of both infrastructure systems and social and environmental resources. Short-term and project-focused decisions are not likely to produce hydropower systems that can fulfill their potential to achieve broad benefits and balanced development. This is because they will be systems in name only. In reality, they are groups of individual projects that are not well coordinated, miss opportunities for more optimal designs, and often cause high social and environmental costs—contributing to conflict and uncertainty for future investment. Most governments do not have a process in place to plan true systems and to strategically select projects that are in the best public interest. We explore two broad hypotheses. First, hydropower planning at a system scale can help governments, developers and other stakeholders find better-balanced solutions with lower impacts and conflicts. Second, countries can adopt system-scale approaches in ways that avoid creating unacceptable burdens or delays. In summary, we propose that a systematic and comprehensive approach to hydropower planning and system design can help countries deliver better development outcomes for their people. We tested these hypotheses by developing an illustrative framework for hydropower planning and investment in Myanmar. HYDROPOWER IN MYANMAR Myanmar is a lower middle-income country with a large deficit in power supply. Only one-third of the population has access to electricity and lack of power constrains efforts to overcome poverty. At the same time, the country has a large undeveloped hydropower potential, estimated at 100 gigawatts (GW), some of which could be used to satisfy its own demand while some could be sold as energy exports to generate revenue for the country. Myanmar?s rivers provide a range of other benefits and resources. Rivers such as the Irrawaddy support productive fisheries, and Myanmar ranks fourth in the world in terms of inland fisheries capture. Nationally, freshwater fish harvests produce over 1.3 millions tons per year and employs approximately 1.5 million people. Irrigation, water supply, and navigation are other importhant uses of the water in the country?s rivers. About 506 freshwater fish species have been recorded within Myanmar, 56 of which are endemic..."
Source/publisher: The Nature Conservancy, WWF and The University of Manchester for DFID
2016-00-00
Date of entry/update: 2016-07-04
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: English
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Description: "The momentous transformation of Myanmar?s political and economic landscape, which began in 2010, has created many investment opportunities, particularly in the hydropower sector. Myanmar is uniquely fortunate to have growing electricity demand both domestically and from its neighbours, eager to buy clean power, as well as a wealth of potential hydropower resources. Rapid economic growth is being experienced across nearly every sector, with a significant focus on energy and infrastructure. According to the International Monetary Fund, GDP per capita in Myanmar as of October 2013 was US$ 1040, an increase of 20 per cent since 2012. In addition, pledged foreign direct investment in Myanmar is also at record levels, exceeding US$ 44 billion in 2013 and showing no signs of slowing."
Creator/author: D. Doran, M. Christensen, T. Aye
Source/publisher: International Journal of Hydropower and Dams, Volume 21, Issue 3, 2014
2014-00-00
Date of entry/update: 2016-02-23
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: English
Format : pdf
Size: 579.68 KB
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