"Executive Summary: The Myanmar Interim Arrangements Research Project (MIARP) was funded by the Joint Peace Fund (JPF)1 , and implemented between October 2017 and October 2018. Researchers spoke to more than 450 people in Shan, Karen/Kayin and Mon States, Tanintharyi Region, Naypyidaw, Yangon and Thailand, including confict-affected communities, representatives of Myanmar government and Army, leaders and members of Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs), civil society organisations (CSOs), political parties, diplomats and donors, and international aid workers and analysts. The term “Interim Arrangements” (ၾကားကာလအတြ߾္းေࠀာ߾္ရြက္ရ မည့္အ߿ီအ߿ဥ္မ်ား) is a contested concept, meaning different things to different stakeholders. The MIARP adopted the following working defnition of Interim Arrangements: “Service delivery and governance in confictaffected areas, including the relationship between EAOs and government systems, during the period between initial ceasefres and a comprehensive political settlement.” Interim Arrangement refers to EAOs’ governance functions, administrative authority and service delivery systems. The issue of which geographic areas are covered by Interim Arrangements is problematic. The Myanmar Army has pressed to restrict EAOs’ service delivery and governance functions to areas under armed groups’ exclusive control (which in most cases have not yet been demarcated); on the ground however, EAOs’ infuence and delivery of services and governance functions extend into areas where political and military authority is mixed, and contested with the government and Tatmadaw. In principle, the “interim” period extends until a comprehensive political settlement has been implemented, which given recent setbacks in the peace process may take many years to achieve. In the meantime, recognition of Interim Arrangements refects the government’s acknowledgement of key EAOs’ political legitimacy and administrative responsibilities - at least, for those groups which have signed the Nationwide Ceasefre Agreement (NCA). One of the key recommendations of this report is to support EAOs to exercise governance and administrative authority in a responsible and accountable manner. The only offcial text referring to Interim Arrangements is the October 2015 NCA. However, Interim Arrangements are relevant in areas where EAOs have not signed the NCA, and furthermore the NCA text fails to cover the full range of meanings associated with the term. Although Interim Arrangements are about more than the NCA, Chapter 6 (Article 25) of this agreement does recognize the roles of signatory EAOs in the felds of health, education, development, environmental conservation and natural resource management, preservation and promotion of ethnic cultures and languages, security and the rule of law, and illicit drug eradication. The NCA allows EAOs to receive international aid, in coordination with the government. However, with no agreed mechanism for addressing these goals through the peace process architecture, the NCA has had limited impacts on improving confict-affected communities’ access to equitable and effective governance and services. Furthermore, on the ground in southeast Myanmar, government offcials seem to regard EAOs primarily as service delivery actors, and/ or private companies, rather than legitimate governance and administrative actors. For many years, Myanmar’s larger EAOs have taken on governance and administration roles in their areas of control, often delivering a wide range of services in partnership with CSOs. In the southeast, groups like the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), Karen National Union (KNU) and New Mon State Party (NMSP) are de-facto governments in relatively small pockets of territory. They also have infuence and provide some services in wider areas of “mixed administration”, where EAO authority overlaps with that of the government and Myanmar Army. Between them for example, these three EAOs administer or support more than 2,000 schools, providing ethnic language teaching to vulnerable children who would otherwise often be denied an education. They also work with local partners to provide health services, access to justice and other public goods.2 Similar arrangements exist in other parts of the country, both in ceasefre areas where EAOs have not signed the NCA, and in areas of on-going armed confict. For example, across much of Kachin and northern Shan States, the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) and other EAOs provide elements of governance, and life-saving if under resourced services to Internally Displaced People (IDPs) and other highly vulnerable communities. There are three principal rationales for supporting Interim Arrangements: 1. Effective Interim Arrangements will provide the best outcomes for vulnerable and marginalised communities in confict-affected areas. Rather than reinventing the wheel, existing EAO and CSO service delivery systems should be supported on a case-by-case basis, recognising best practice (an “appreciative inquiry” approach). Meeting the government’s targets for school enrolment and universal health coverage for example, will depend on the work of EAOs and affliated civil society actors, who should be seen as partners in meeting critical needs and achieving development goals. Chapter 3 explores how these issues play out in relation to specifc sectors and issues. 2. Several of Myanmar’s EAOs (including NCA signatory and non-signatory groups) enjoy long-standing political legitimacy among the communities they seek to represent. Supporting EAO governance regimes will counter perceptions of the peace process as a vehicle for state penetration into previously autonomous areas, displacing existing EAO authorities and services, without consulting local stakeholders. In order to be confict-sensitive, aid should be delivered in ways that do not undermine systems associated with EAOs, to the beneft of the government (which is a party to the confict). Timely peace dividends can best be provided to vulnerable and marginalized communities by working with existing and trusted local service delivery systems. 3. Interim Arrangements could be a key element in building “federalism from below” in Myanmar, supporting effective local governance through equitable practices of self-determination. The administrative functions and services provided by key EAOs (and their civil society partners) should be regarded as the building blocks of federalism in Myanmar - a political solution to decades of armed confict which key stakeholders have endorsed. It will be very diffcult for confict-affected parts of Myanmar to move from the current mixture of service delivery systems and governance regimes towards a formalized (federal) system, without better coordination, and substantial political and technical negotiations. However, given the slow pace of the peace process since 2016, Interim Arrangements have been given relatively little attention. Given that the Political Dialogue element of the peace process appears stalled, it could be useful to identify a small number of political priorities, to help deliver on ethnic stakeholders’ key aims. These could be negotiated by EAOs (and political parties) in a „fast track“ manner, resulting in a Union Peace Accord that benefts both the government and ethnic stakeholders. Areas for possible progress include education and language policy (recognition of and funding for EAOs’ extensive school systems; “mother tongue” teaching in government schools); land issues (recognition of land title documents provided by EAOs; revision of unjust land laws; compensation and restitution for people who have had their land unfairly taken); equitable natural resource management; and addressing forced displacement – i.e. Interim Arrangements. This would not prevent ethnic stakeholders from continuing to campaign for federalism, including changes to the 2008 Constitution..."