"Notwithstanding the junta propaganda newspapers’ misleading reports about a state of “normality” prevailing, the Myanmar military is in the grip of a deepening crisis. It has lost vast swathes of territory in northern Shan as well as Rakhine, Chin and Karenni (Kayah) states to ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) over the past four months. In Kachin, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) is attacking Waingmaw, a town across the Irrawaddy River from the state capital, Myitkyina. In Karen State, Karen resistance forces have taken control of trunk roads. Meanwhile, the Karen State Border Guard Force has broken away from the Myanmar military. Three of the signatories to the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA)—the Karen National Union, the Chin National Front and the All Burma Students’ Democratic Front—have been fighting the regime since the coup. Earlier this year, another NCA signatory, the Pa-O National Liberation Organization (PNLO), took up arms against the regime, seizing control of Hsi Hseng town in Shan State. A splinter group from another signatory, the New Mon State Party, has also declared war against the military dictatorship. Both on their own and in cooperation with EAOs, People’s Defense Force (PDF) groups are fighting the regime in Kachin, Chin, northern Shan, Karen, Karenni and Mon states and in Sagaing, Magwe, Mandalay, Bago, Tanintharyi and Yangon regions. Despite their widespread presence, however, they are still too poorly equipped to deal the regime a hard blow. Recent junta responses The regime recently activated the national conscription law, which allows the military to call up men aged 18-35 and women aged 18-27 to serve in the military for two to five years. The age limit rises to 45 for men and 35 for women who have professional skills in fields such as medicine or engineering. The junta’s spokesman said some 5,000 people would be drafted starting from April. Reports of arbitrary arrests of young people across the country suggest that the regime is determined to recruit more troops by any means. Also noteworthy was the large number of troops the regime devoted to retaking Kawlin Town in Sagaing Region from the KIA and the parallel National Unity Government (NUG). In Rakhine and Karenni, many towns have fallen to resistance forces, which are now threatening those states’ capitals. But while the regime has barely sent in any reinforcements to defend those towns, it deployed between 800 and 1,000 troops to attack Kawlin. The regime announced it had retaken the town after 15 days of fighting. So, why was the depleted military willing to expend so much manpower to take back Kawlin? Quite possibly it saw a high propaganda value in being able to claim that it can subdue the PDF in the key resistance stronghold of Sagaing Region. The victory may also give the regime a bargaining chip if there is a need to hold talks with the NUG and the PDF. Is dialogue likely? Myanmar’s military is both mentally and physically exhausted now, having fought on multiple fronts over the past three years. It is facing a serious shortage of personnel after being hit by casualties, desertions and a recruitment crisis. Normally, new recruits undergo six months of military training, but the regime said it would only spend three months training the new draftees. But recruitment alone will not be enough; there is a need to reorganize the combat units that have been left in disarray due to mass surrenders, casualties and other factors, and this will take time. With combat-hardened battalions and divisions having collapsed in the face of the ongoing revolt, draftees sent to the front after just three months of training will surely buckle in no time. For example, in Shan State’s Pa-O region, the regime has heavily armed pro-military Pa-O National Organization militias, but they are no match for the PNLO and its allies, which have seized Hsi Hseng. China is deeply involved in Myanmar’s peace process, having brokered a ceasefire in northern Shan State between the regime and a military alliance of three EAOs. But ultimately peace talks cannot be successful without the NUG and the PDF, which the regime has declared terrorist organizations. Both China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), as well as Western countries, are aware of that. So far, the regime has consistently rejected talks with the NUG. Now, however, with the regime seriously depleted after three years of war and its own peace talks having totally failed to dissuade the EAOs from fighting, a meeting with the NUG is not out of the question. The regime sent a bureaucrat to a meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers in Laos in January—a sign that it is planning to make concessions. ASEAN has barred junta generals from its key meetings over their failure to implement a peace plan agreed with the regional bloc two months after the coup. ASEAN has a policy of inviting Myanmar to send what it calls “non-political” representatives instead, but the junta had previously declined, furious over what it sees as ASEAN interference in its internal affairs. One of the requirements of the five-point peace plan is that a dialogue be held involving all of the stakeholders in the crisis. The regime might now be prepared to yield to this demand, and hold talks with the NUG and EAOs—if only to buy time so that it can recuperate. So, when the regime decided to retake Kawlin, it did so not for purely military reasons, but with the political objective of gaining a bargaining chip in any potential dialogue with the NUG. Dialogue is an inevitable part of armed revolution. Myanmar’s modern history is characterized by alternate fighting and dialogue. EAOs have long experience of dialogue. Though talks have never delivered results, the groups do not shun the idea of meeting around a table. While engaging in dialogue, they continue to expand their arsenals and consolidate control over their territory. Compared with the EAOs, the NUG and PDF have less experience with this process of fighting and periodically engaging in dialogue even as clashes continue. The NUG and PDF should be prepared for the regime to switch to a strategy in which it may try to buy time and find a way out of its current crisis. As long as military leaders are in power, it is unlikely that the country’s problems will be solved around a table. In Myanmar, political dialogue is nothing more than a game in which players make moves in an effort to gain advantages. The NUG needs to act shrewdly to handle any such possible moves by the regime. There is a need to defeat the junta not only on the battlefield, but on other fronts as well..."