"The year was defined by the Rohingya crisis, which lingers on and remains un-resolved. The agreement signed by the governments of Myanmar and Bangladesh in November 2017 had several aborted starts in 2018. Both governments came under the pressure of China to deal with the repatriation of the Rohingya refugees bilaterally, without the involvement of other (international) parties. What was evi-dently a forced repatriation plan was eventually halted in November. The outcry of human rights and refugee organisations continued unabated, as did western outrage against State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, widely seen as callous and complicit in the military’s atrocities against the Rohingya. As ties with the United States worsened, ChIn response to the series of terrorist attacks in August 2017 by the Rohingya militant organisation named the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), the Myanmar military carried out what it termed ‘clearance operations’, which in the space of a few weeks in September, and involving mass rape, arson and indiscriminate killings, led to one of the greatest refugee crisis in recent decades.1 Approximately 750,000 Rohingya (representing the majority of this stateless, largely Muslim ethnic group) fled Rakhine state seeking refuge on the other side of the border, in the Chittagong district of eastern Bangladesh. The fallout within Bangladesh was that this impoverished South-East Asian country was confronted with a crisis withina’s economic clout in Myanmar was consolidated, as evidenced by the expansion of economic projects and Beijing’s leverage on Nay Pyi Taw during the crisis. At home, however, Suu Kyi remained personally popular. Despite some efforts at rebooting, her government’s performance has oscillated between ineptitude and incompetence. Some personnel reshuffles and new strategic plans notwithstanding, its shortcomings remain well-known, being plagued by personalisation, the central- isation of decision-making and over-reliance on loyalty, to the detriment of expertise and professionalism. The NLD’s cohabitation with the military has continued, but no open rifts have thus far surfaced.....Introduction: In response to the series of terrorist attacks in August 2017 by the Rohingya militant organisation named the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), the Myanmar military carried out what it termed ‘clearance operations’, which in the space of a few weeks in September, and involving mass rape, arson and indiscriminate killings, led to one of the greatest refugee crisis in recent decades.1 Approximately 750,000 Rohingya (representing the majority of this stateless, largely Muslim ethnic group) fled Rakhine state seeking refuge on the other side of the border, in the Chittagong district of eastern Bangladesh. The fallout within Bangladesh was that this impoverished South-East Asian country was confronted with a crisis with which it could barely cope. Within the borders of Myanmar, physical destruction across Rakhine state was observed, yet there was also widespread support across most segments of Myanmar society for the way in which the authorities handled the crisis. The agreement signed by the governments of Myanmar and Bangladesh in November 2017 went through several aborted starts in 2018. Both governments came under the pressure of China to deal with the repatriation of the Rohingya refugees bilaterally, without the involvement of other (international) parties. The outcry of human rights and refugee organisations continued unabated, as did western outrage against State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, widely seen as callous and complicit in the military’s atrocities against the Rohingya. Of course, dealing with the Rohingya crisis and the repatriation issue was not the only issue faced by the Myanmar government in 2018, but the fallout from the violence continued to cast a long and dark shadow on the country’s international image. Domestically, Aung San Suu Kyi remained personally popular, despite an overall poor government performance. Being about halfway into the National League for Democracy’s (NLD) term in office, it is now a good time to assess the performance of the government in terms of its domestic, economic and foreign policy. Its performance has been rather disappointing. Always bound to disappoint in light of the unrealistically high expectations that accompanied it, the government led defacto by Aung San Suu Kyi has combined ineptitude, centralisation and personalisation of decision-making. Substantial time has been spent on drawing up strategic plans, and less on actually building up human capacity, expertise and turning plans into practice. This article is structured as follows. First, it revisits developments in domestic policy. Stalled progress in the peace process and increasingly fraught relations with ethnic Rakhine suggest that despite some efforts at rebooting, transition has stalled.2 The subsequent section reviews the mixed picture insofar as the economy is concerned. Lastly, it examines how the country’s international ties have been affected by the crisis, enabling China to consolidate its already strong influence..."