"EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1. On 01 February 2021, the Myanmar’s miliary launched a coup against the civilian government, arresting Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and U Win Myint, along with other senior leaders of the ruling National League for Democracy, and declaring the results of the November 2020 general election invalid. What started as violence between the Tatmadaw and demonstrators quickly turned into brutal fighting in many parts of the country between the State Administration Council (SAC) and armed groups such as the Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) and the National Unity Government (NUG) and its armed wing the People’s Defence Force (PDF). 2. Cognizant of the far-reaching implications of Myanmar’s crisis on its own people and the region as a whole, ASEAN Leaders met on 24 April 2021 in Jakarta to discuss about the situation in Myanmar, and reached the Five-Point Consensus (5PC). To ensure full and effective implementation of the 5PC, Samdech Prime Minister went to Nay Pyi Taw on 7 January 2021 to meet with Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, and soon afterward, had two videoconferences to follow up on the outcomes of the visit. Moreover, he extensively consulted with his ASEAN colleagues and other world leaders, and also received calls and briefings from the international organizations including the United Nations Secretary General Special Envoy (UNSG SE). 3. Guided by the ASEAN Charter and the ASEAN’s principles, the Special Envoy of the ASEAN Chair (SEAC) paid two working visits to Myanmar to carry out his mandate as stipulated in the 5PC. Prior to each working visit, the SEAC always shared with his colleagues what he plans to do, and also sought their views on the best course of action to make progress. Moreover, the SEAC also had numerous meetings with external partners, the UNSG SE, Japan’s Special Envoy, UN Specialized Agencies, and other international organizations to receive updates and exchange views on how ASEAN and its partners can promote synergy and cooperation, especially in the area of humanitarian assistance. 4. Despite the complexity and difficulty of Myanmar’s political crisis, it is fair to say that the SEAC has managed to make some positive progress in the implementation of the 5PC, though not all points are moving at the same pace and scale. Since the beginning, Cambodia as the present ASEAN Chair and her Special Envoy prioritize immediate cessation of violence and ceasefire, and in all the engagements with the SAC, Samdech Prime Minister always urged for utmost restraint, and dialogue to start without delay. During the working visits, the SEAC extended this call to all armed groups including the NUG/PDF, because everyone has a share in inflicting harms and suffering on innocent people. 5. Given the SAC being the most powerful actor, the SEAC reminded his counterparts to double the efforts to end the violence, and suggested that they should deploy police instead of armed forces to maintain law and order, especially when civilians are involved. The SEAC also appealed to the EAOs and the political parties to commit to non-violent principle, and actively participate in ceasefire negotiation. In response, the SAC, the EAOs and the political parties have promised to do their utmost ability to achieve full cessation of violence, and they also shared that it was heartbroken to see this tragedy unfolding in their country. Besides heavy human costs, the SEAC emphasized that violence also undermines any efforts to begin a dialogue or even to deliver humanitarian assistance to those most in need. 6. The commencement of the political dialogue is the most difficult among the five points, and even Myanmar’s key actors themselves also thought that it is not yet the right time to bring everyone to the table. During the second working visit, the SEAC pressed Lieutenant General Yar Pyae on the possibility of a dialogue with the opposition, and he responded that it may happen but with 3 preconditions: (1) they do not seek to destroy the SAC, (2) they do not seek to replace the SAC, and (3) they agree to use the 2008 Constitution as the basis for talks. After months of intense shuttle diplomacy, the SEAC has finally managed to open a small window for dialogue. 7. The SEAC then tasked his office to share these preconditions with the NUG Foreign Minister Zin Mar Aung, and she responded by rejecting them, and offered her own preconditions, which aim to put the Tatmadaw under civilian control and send Senior General Min Aung Hlaing to prison. The differences between the SAC and the NUG are gulf apart, making any dialogue impossible, even at the technical level. However, the SEAC has not been discouraged by this lack of political will, and he continues to commence the dialogue process as soon as possible. Moreover, he has encouraged the SAC to engage with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, and not to dissolve her party, without which any democratic solutions will face credibility question. 8. As stated in the 5PC, the SEAC has always involved the Secretary-General of ASEAN in every important activity including his working visits to Myanmar, and has also been in regular contact with the Secretary-General of ASEAN to seek his view on a wide range of issues and to receive his updates on the progress of the humanitarian assistance to Myanmar. In facilitating mediation of the dialogue process, the SEAC met with 7 EAOs, who are the signatories to the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, to underscore the need for all concerned parties to participate in peace talks. In response, they were strongly supportive of the SEAC’s views, and also pledged to make a dialogue work in the interests of their people. 9. Moreover, the SEAC also had meetings with 8 political parties, 7 of which won votes during the 2020 general election, and he shared with them that he is always ready to facilitate a dialogue among concerned parties, if requested. These political parties pledged their full support to the SEAC, and took turn to offer their perspectives on the current situations in Myanmar and how to solve them. Acknowledging the critical role of external partners, especially Myanmar’s immediate neighbours, the SEAC has often provided them with updates of his efforts, sought their view on the situation on the ground, and listened to their recommendations when applicable. 3 10. Humanitarian assistance has always been at the heart of Cambodia’s approach to address the political crisis in Myanmar because peace talk can take time, but saving life cannot wait. Even before taking over the ASEAN Chairmanship, Cambodia already provided the people of Myanmar with medical supplies, financial resources, and vaccines bilaterally and through ASEAN mechanism. The SEAC has also made a lot of efforts to mobilize additional supports for Myanmar, and as a result, 3 million doses of vaccines together with many other medical supplies were donated by external partners. Despite not being clearly specified in the 5PC, the SEAC has worked tirelessly to facilitate, coordinate and support the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Myanmar. 11. In May 2022, he co-chaired with the Secretary-General of ASEAN the Consultative Meeting on ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance to Myanmar, bringing together a wide range of stakeholders and leading to the adoption of two important frameworks, namely Joint Ministry of Health-Partners Vaccines Administration Framework and Humanitarian Assistance Delivery Arrangement Framework. The SEAC has also managed to secure commitments from the SAC in addressing operational challenges facing the AHA Centre and other international organizations, and expanding access to more states and regions. Moreover, he has also facilitated the conduct of the Joint Needs Assessment, especially in pushing for the inclusion of areas requested by the AHA Centre, and representatives of the UN OCHA and WFP as observers. 12. Meeting all concerned parties is also one of the SEAC’s top priorities. During the working visit to Myanmar, besides his engagements with senior representatives of the SAC, he also met with 7 EAOs that remain signatories to the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, and 8 political parties, 7 of which won votes during the 2020 general election. The SEAC has also demanded to engage with the EAOs that are now fighting the SAC, and 4 political parties that are now under the inspection of the Union Election Commission. The request to meet Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and U Win Myint has always been on the agenda of the SEAC, but the SAC has taken strong position on this matter, suggesting that it can only be considered upon the completion of their legal proceedings. 13. Benefiting from numerous meetings and conversations with many interlocutors inside and outside of Myanmar, and for the purpose of facilitating and supporting the works of the incoming Special Envoy, the SEAC wish to make 7-point suggestions: (1) the 5PC should be accompanied by a concrete implementation plan, (2) conditions applied to the SAC should also be applied to all concerned parties, (3) ASEAN needs to press the SAC, the NUG and other parties to compromise on their preconditions, (4) concerned parties need to be clearly identified and defined, (5) restoring normal engagements with Myanmar should be based on the progress of the implementation of the 5PC, not on other factors that are outside this framework, (6) the roles of the Special Envoy of the ASEAN Chair in humanitarian assistance should be added to the 5PC or the implementation plan, and (7) the Secretary-General of ASEAN and the AHA Centre should be empowered with an appropriate degree of autonomy for a specific period of time..."