Table of contents: Foreword; Introduction; 1. European Union?s foreign policy, human rights and economics. 1.1. European Union?s promotion of human rights. 1.2. Legal base of sanctions in the European Union?s foreign policy. 2. Burma/Myanmar?s political history. 2.1. Ethnic composition of Burma/Myanmar. 2.2. Colonial past. 2.3. Post-colonial context. 2.4. The emergence of the Burmese democratic movement. 2.5. Military rule. 3. The European Union?s response. 3.1. Resolutions concerning the junta. 3.2. Aid campaign for up-rooted people and against AIDS? spread. 4. The internationalisation of the Burma/Myanmar?s issue. 4.1. Non-states actors. 4.2. Big powers and neighbours states? positions. 4.3. Intergovernmental institutions. 5. Sanctions in international relations: analysis of the European Union?s strategy. 5.1. Objectives: the choice of targeted or ?smart? sanctions. 5.2. Methods of application. 5.3. Assessment of the sanction?s effectiveness. Conclusion. Bibliography. Acknowledgements. Appendix... Conclusion: "In the light of what have been said, many would have come to think that the European Union policy toward Burma/Myanmar is driven more by a desire to show to the international community that something is being done, than to genuinely address particularity of the Burmese issue. Indeed, the European Union is trading with many countries with questionable human rights records. Few of them are actually sanctioned by the European Union. This could be explained by their relative geo-strategic importance for the European Union, as it is the case for Pakistan for instance. On the contrary, Burma/Myanmar does not bear any particular value of this kind. Thus, it represents an easy means for the European Union to attest its ?pro-active? attitude towards those who violate human rights. Nonetheless, the Burmese democratic movement is pushing for sanctions. Therefore, their interest could match those of the European Union. However, the sanctions implemented are by far too soft to provide and do not provide the strong incentive needed to persuade the junta to give up power. The European Union explains its weak attitude by humanitarian considerations: soft sanctions are thought to spare civilians, already affected by the junta?s mismanagement. However, as the NLD and some organisations, such as the Euro-Burma Office, suggest that the people cannot be affected by tougher economic sanctions, such as the import ban proposed by the US senate. Indeed, the Burmese economy chiefly relies on agriculture, with most of the population living on their own crops. Tourism, commercial and banking sectors that would be affected by economic and financial sanctions are all linked to the junta, if not state-owned. The European Union is well aware of these elements. Therefore, one could argue that the main reason for maintaining soft sanctions is related to trade considerations. We have showed indeed that imports from Burma/Myanmar to the European Union have sharply increased over the past years. Economic imperatives are thus the chief justification for the European Union inconsistent policy toward Rangoon. It clarifies the European Union attitude in the Massachusetts case, and the lack of cooperation with influent international actors, especially the United States. This tendency is particularly regrettable, as cooperation is a key requirement of sanctions? effectiveness. Dealing with Burma/Myanmar democratic process entails more than lips-services. ?Although most pro-sanction policies have a consistent objective in demanding a move towards democratic change, the exact mechanism for attaining these goals is less clear. The objectives of enhancing human rights and democracy are clearly enunciated in the US and EU?s positions but such abstract goals need to be operationalised. In other words, these positions need to be more oriented towards facilitating a focused objective rather than mere signalling of moral disapproval. By establishing a clear operational goal in place, disincentive polices could articulate specific but feasible objectives or benchmarks that signal the regime a clear message of what not to do, how to behave and which to concede.? Conclusively, the European Union policy is lacking of coherence and clarity, as far as the objectives of promoting democracy and human rights in Burma/Myanmar are concerned. The European Union did not shape its policy relatively to the specificity of the Burmese regime, held by a cohesive military elite who have been carried out a stable dictatorship for more than four decades. However, if the real aim of the European Union was to signal its own humanistic behaviour, the consequent instrumentalisation of the Burmese issue is a success. The European Union bears a significant potential of action on the junta, through trade and international bodies? fora. One can therefore hope that the Community is soon going to use its influence with more determination..."