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Conditions in Burma and U.S. Policy
- Subject: Conditions in Burma and U.S. Policy
- From: thuwai@xxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sun, 02 Jan 2000 14:24:00
Subject: Conditions in Burma and U.S. Policy Toward Burma ( March 28, 1999-Sept:28, 1999)
Dear Natters,
This is kind of late but we can review something for new
year 2000. Burma is reaching to the new millenium without any prospect for
the future. What kind of achievement that Burmese can get in the New
milllennium? U.S policy toward Burma is here below. Happy new millennium to
all of you.
Regards,
Ko Zaw Win
New York
Conditions in Burma and U.S. Policy Toward Burma
For the period March 28, 1999 - September 28, 1999
Plan for Implementation of Section 570 of Public Law 104-208
(Omnibus Appropriations Act, Fiscal Year 1997)
Submitted to the U.S. Congress, November 2, 1999
Released by the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, November 3, 1999
U.S. Department of State
The people of Burma continue to live under a highly repressive,
authoritarian military regime. The international community widely condemns
that regime for its serious human rights abuses. The State Peace and
Development Council (SPDC), Burma's ruling military junta since 1997, has
made no significant changes in the governing policies of its predecessor,
the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), which seized power in
1988.
The regime has made no progress in the past six months in moving toward
greater democratization, nor has it made any progress toward fundamental
improvement in the quality of life of the people of Burma. To the contrary,
conditions have worsened with the regime stepping up repression of the
National League for Democracy (NLD), Burma's largest opposition party, and
attacking its leader Aung San Suu Kyi, in the state-controlled press.
SPDC economic mismanagement, combined with residual effects from the Asian
financial crisis, has sent the Burmese economy into a downward spiral that
the regime appears unable to halt. Economic fundamentals have become
increasingly opaque as the government has ceased publishing data on the
money supply and foreign exchange reserves. The Government of Burma reported
to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in June that it had $350 million in
foreign exchange reserves as of April 1999. According to official figures,
annual inflation was 49 percent in 1998/99, although the actual rate is
likely higher. The Burmese kyat held steady due to administrative controls
on currency markets. After authorities increased electric bills eight-fold
for companies and individual consumers in March and April, power outages
decreased, although power supplies remain unreliable. Gasoline and diesel
fuel are rationed to three gallons per vehicle per day. Onerous trade
controls have made it difficult for international business to turn a profit.
The military junta continues to dominate the political, economic and social
life of the country in the same oppressive, heavy-handed way that it has
since seizing power in September 1988 after harshly suppressing massive
pro-democracy demonstrations.
U.S. policy towards Burma seeks progress in three key areas: democracy,
human rights, and counternarcotics. We have taken strong measures to
pressure the SPDC to end its repression and move towards democratic
government. The United States has suspended economic aid, withdrawn Burma
from the general system of preferences (GSP) and Overseas Private Investment
Corporation (OPIC) programs, implemented an arms embargo, blocked assistance
from international financial institutions, downgraded our representation
from Ambassador to Charge d'affaires, imposed visa restrictions on senior
officials and their families, and instituted a ban on new investment by U.S.
persons. Since 1989, the United States has been unable to certify that Burma
has cooperated in efforts against narcotics. We remain engaged in
multilateral diplomacy to encourage the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN), Japan, Korea, China, the European Union (EU), and other
nations to take similar steps and/or other actions to encourage progress by
the SPDC in these areas of key concern. The EU has renewed the range of
sanctions it implemented against Burma, including visa restrictions similar
to ours and the withdrawal of generalized system of preferences (GSP)
benefits. We have also continued to urge the Government of Japan to maintain
the suspension of much of its bilateral aid program, including large-scale
development assistance.
As a result of economic mismanagement by the regime, financial crisis in
much of Southeast Asia, and economic sanctions, approvals of new foreign
direct investment in Burma fell by 96 percent in 1998, and are unlikely to
pick up in the near term. Many foreign investors have withdrawn from Burma
due to the unfavorable political situation. The government has demonstrated
little will to rein in inflation-causing deficit spending or to implement
market-oriented reforms. In the past year the focus of economic policy has
been to support self-reliance and development of agriculture. The SPDC is
unlikely to develop the economy unless political developments in Burma
permit an easing of restrictions on lending by international financial
institutions.
Measuring Progress Toward Democratization:
During the current review period (March-September 1999), the ruling junta
showed no sign of willingness to cede its hold on absolute power. The regime
refuses to recognize the results of the free and fair 1990 elections, in
which the National League for Democracy (NLD) won a vast majority of both
the popular vote and the parliamentary seats. The generals further refuse to
negotiate with pro-democracy forces and ethnic groups for a genuine
political settlement to allow a return to the rule of law and respect for
basic human rights.
The government claims that the military-dominated National Convention is an
appropriate forum for dialogue with the NLD and parties representing the
country's ethnic minorities. But the National Convention, a body ostensibly
tasked since 1993 with drafting a new constitution, is not a democratic
forum as currently structured. Although the NLD initially participated, the
Convention was overwhelmingly made up of delegates hand-picked by the junta,
which carefully stage-managed the proceedings and ignored even limited
opposition views. The regime appeared determined to draft a constitution
that would ensure a dominant role for the military forces in the country's
future political structure. The NLD withdrew from the National Convention in
November 1995 because of the undemocratic nature of the institution and was
formally ejected by the SLORC in December of that year. The Convention has
not met since mid-1996, and the SPDC's current plans for the body remain
unclear.
In September 1998 the SPDC rounded up almost 1,000 opposition party members,
including 200 members-elect of Parliament, and detained them without filing
charges in so-called police "guesthouses." These detentions came in response
to the NLD's announcement that it would seek to convene the Parliament,
elected in 1990, but never allowed to convene. After keeping the NLD members
and parliamentarians in arbitrary detention for more than six months, the
SPDC began releasing them. A core group of about two dozen members of
Parliament, including Speaker-designate Dr. Saw Mra Aung, remain in
detention. The regime allows families to visit members of this group once a
fortnight.
In September 1998 the NLD formed the "Committee Representing the People's
Parliament" (CRPP) to fulfill the role of the Parliament elected in 1990,
but never recognized by the regime. The CRPP began to approve and reject
laws passed by the military government. The SPDC viewed the CRPP as an
attempt to create a parallel government and launched a concerted effort to
dismantle the NLD. As of September 1999, the SPDC had announced the closure
of over 50 NLD party offices and the resignation of over 34,000 NLD members
and orchestrated recall drives against 45 Members of Parliament-elect. These
actions, combined with the detentions described above, have crippled the
NLD's nationwide organizational capacity. Throughout late 1998 and early
1999, the SPDC organized mass rallies denouncing Aung San Suu Kyi and the
NLD in each State and Division. The state-controlled media accompanied these
rallies with virulent personal attacks on Aung San Suu Kyi. In the past six
months, the public rallies have ceased. However, the personal attacks on
Aung San Suu Kyi have continued, as have the recall drives against
parliamentarians who refuse to resign.
In January 1999, reportedly more than 200 Rangoon University students were
each sentenced to 14 years in prison for staging nonviolent demonstrations
against the regime the previous year. Numerous NLD leaders were also
convicted and sentenced to long prison terms. On the positive side, in
January and in February the government released two political prisoners
before the end of their scheduled terms of incarceration. The releases came
shortly after visiting U.S. Congressman Tony Hall raised these cases with
senior Burmese government officials.
Burma is the world's leading producer of illicit opium, accounting for about
90 percent of Southeast Asian production and about half of the world's
supply. Methamphetamine production and distribution from Burma is also
becoming an increasing problem. The Burmese government has expanded its
counternarcotics efforts over the past few years. Methamphetamine seizures
tripled from 1997 to 1998 and continue to increase in 1999. During the first
quarter of this year, methamphetamine seizures totaled 1.8 million tablets.
Significant declines in both poppy cultivation and opium production have
been recorded for the second straight year. Through a combination of drought
and eradication efforts, poppy cultivation estimates for 1999 show a 31
percent decline over 1998. Reduced cultivation will result in a 38 percent
decline in opium production. Analysts fear that cultivation may return to
past levels or increase when the drought ends. Given the size of the
narcotics problem in Burma, much more needs to be done. Part of the problem
is that the Burmese government does not control many of the ethnic groups
that traffic in drugs. Nevertheless, the government also needs to make a
greater effort at interdiction. While there is no evidence that the
government is involved on an institutional level in the drug trade, there
are reports that corrupt army personnel in outlying areas may be aiding the
traffickers. The government implicitly tolerates continued involvement in
drug trafficking by ethnic insurgents who have signed cease-fire agreements.
These cease-fires have the practical effect of condoning money laundering as
the government also encourages former drug traffickers to invest their
ill-gotten gains in the legitimate economy.
The United States recognizes that serious political and human rights
concerns preclude our working directly with the regime in Burma. The United
States also remains concerned about the potential damage that opium
cultivation in Burma can inflict on the United States and the rest of the
world. Against this backdrop, we have supported a small non-governmental
program in Burma, the Old Soldiers Project of 101 Veterans, Inc., to replace
opium poppy cultivation with substitute, economically-viable alternative
crops. Despite impressive strides in a short period of time, the Burmese
government suspended the Old Soldiers project in September 1998. After the
regime suspended the program, the United States worked with the UN Drug
Control Program (UNDCP) to keep the project operating under UNDCP auspices,
but the government rejected the proposal. We continue to work with UNDCP and
through other channels to try to convince the Burmese government to reverse
its decision.
In further support of our counternarcotics efforts, we have encouraged the
(United Nations) UN to develop programs to assist the Wa and Kachin ethnic
minority areas as well as joint programs with Thailand and China. The bulk
of the UN effort has focused on developing a program in a key opium
cultivating area in the Wa region. This $15 million program, managed by the
UNDCP, builds on a small pilot program that resulted in the elimination of
opium cultivation in the project area. The program specifically provides
development and demand reduction assistance directly to the inhabitants of
three townships in the Wa region, without going through the government. On
the development side, UNDCP is providing support to the farming community
and extensive infrastructure and extension services support. Provisions for
developing hospitals and clinics are also included, as are demand reduction
programs. UNDCP has begun developing two pilot programs, one in the Wa
region and one in the Kokang area, targeting poppy cultivation.
The United States and other donors worked with UNDCP over a long period to
develop a program with reasonable benchmarks and effective oversight. We
have also insisted that the UN continuously apprise the National League for
Democracy and Aung San Suu Kyi of its program. She has not objected to the
program, but wants to be sure that the regime derives no moral or material
support from it. Since 1994, the United States Government has earmarked
$6.05 million of our contribution to UNDCP for the Wa project. The funding
goes to UNDCP and the project in the affected area, not to the Burmese
government.
Measuring Progress on Improving the Quality of Life:
During the review period, the quality of life of the average Burmese citizen
continued to worsen. The SPDC's severe violations of human rights continued.
There continue to be credible reports, particularly from ethnic minority
insurgent-dominated areas along the Thai border, that soldiers have
committed serious human rights abuses, including rape, forced porterage, and
extrajudicial killing. Disappearances continue, and members of the security
forces beat and otherwise abuse detainees. Most adherents of all religions
duly registered with the authorities generally enjoyed freedom to worship as
they choose; however, the government imposed some restrictions on certain
religious minorities. Arbitrary arrests and detentions of those who express
dissenting political views continue. As of September 1999, hundreds, if not
more, of political prisoners remained in detention, including more than two
dozen members of Parliament elected in 1990. Prison conditions remained
deplorable, and prisoners were subjected to a lack of food and adequate
medical care. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) began
making prison visits in May 1999. As of September, the ICRC reported it had
seen over 18,000 prisoners, including 800 political detainees. ICRC
officials reported they were allowed to interview prisoners privately and to
conduct complete inspections of the facilities they visited.
The SPDC reinforces its rule via a pervasive security apparatus controlled
by military intelligence which sharply restricts basic,
internationally-recognized human rights to free speech, press, assembly, and
association. Political party activity remains severely restricted. The
activities of the NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi are monitored and circumscribed
by the regime. Since late 1996, the SPDC has put up blockades in front of
Aung San Suu Kyi's house to block gatherings in the street and prevent her
from addressing party supporters. The regime has allowed the NLD to hold
several gatherings inside Aung San Suu Kyi's compound, usually on national
holidays, but often restricts the participation of observers and
journalists. The regime allowed the NLD to hold party congresses within the
compound in May and September 1997. Since September 1998, the NLD has ceased
holding large gatherings at the compound, since many key NLD members remain
in detention. The SPDC has allowed the NLD to hold events at party
headquarters, but the regime continues to resort to tactics designed to
intimidate those attending the events as they did, for example, on July 17
when they harassed or blocked party members from attending an event
commemorating Martyrs Day.
In response to street protests by large groups of students in November and
December 1996, the SLORC closed the nation's schools and universities. The
SPDC finally reopened primary and secondary schools in August 1997 and some
lower technical institutes in March 1998. Some universities were briefly
reopened in July 1998 to allow previously enrolled students to take final
exams and graduate. Medical schools were reopened in 1998 and remain open as
of March 1999. Over the past eleven years of SLORC/SPDC rule, universities
have been open for undergraduate students for a total period of
two-and-a-half years. More than 300,000 students are waiting for the
universities to reopen in order to continue their studies.
Thousands of citizens of Burma remain in exile because of fear of
persecution and poor economic conditions, placing a major burden upon
neighboring countries. About 21,000 Rohingya Muslims from Arakan State
remain in camps in Bangladesh. A few thousand students and dissidents remain
in exile in Thailand. Approximately 119,000 individuals now reside in ethnic
minority camps along the Thai-Burma border, among them thousands of new
arrivals driven out by army attacks in the areas controlled by the Karen and
Karenni ethnic minorities. According to reliable reports, there may be more
than one million Burmese internally displaced by such army attacks.
Burma is a poor country, with an average per capita GDP of approximately USD
$406 at a trade-weighted exchange rate, perhaps double that in terms of
purchasing power parity. Progress on market reforms has been mixed and
uneven. Beginning in 1988 the government partly opened the economy to permit
expansion of the private sector and to attract foreign investment. Though
modest economic improvement ensued, rampant inflation has eroded real
economic gains for the vast majority of the population. There is reason to
believe that money laundering is a significant factor in the overall economy
given the fact that the government encourages former traffickers to invest
their funds in Burma. The pace of economic reform has slowed since 1993, and
major obstacles to further reform persist. These include disproportionately
large military spending, extensive overt and covert state involvement in
economic activity, excessive state monopolization of leading exports, a
bloated bureaucracy prone to arbitrary and opaque governance, and poor
education and physical infrastructure. In addition, due to international
opposition and to the SPDC's unwillingness to cooperate fully with the
international financial institutions, access to external credit from the
IMF, World Bank, and Asian Development Bank continues to be blocked. In
September 1998 the World Bank announced that Burma had defaulted on its loan
repayments.
After rapid market depreciation in 1997 of the Burmese kyat, from ks.
150/dollar to ks. 370/dollar, the local currency has stabilized at around
ks. 350/dollar. Rather than reflecting an actual strengthening of the
currency, local analysts believe the steady position of the kyat rate is due
to narrow usage of foreign exchange and administrative controls imposed on
the foreign currency markets. The official exchange rate of ks. 6/dollar is
still used by the state sector to its advantage. In an effort to shore up
scarce foreign exchange reserves, the government imposed strict import and
remittance controls on the private sector in 1997 permitting companies to
remit only $50,000 in profits. In 1998, the government further increased
restrictions by limiting foreign exchange transactions to two state banks
and by requiring that the content of imported goods be 80 percent
"essential" items. Imports of most consumer foodstuffs were banned. These
restrictions remain in place. Many foreign traders and investors still
operating in Burma note that the sum total of these controls is untenable
and business will decline inevitably as a result.
The government restricts worker rights and uses forced labor on a widespread
basis. The use of porters by the army, with attendant mistreatment, illness,
and even death for those compelled to serve, remains a common practice. The
use of forced labor on some infrastructure development projects appeared to
be lessening following the issuance of directives in 1995 to end the
practice of forced civilian labor. The military authorities nonetheless
continue to force ordinary citizens (including women and children) to
"contribute" their labor, often under harsh working conditions, on
construction projects in many parts of the country. Some of these projects,
such as the moat of the Mandalay palace, were undertaken to promote tourism
to the country. In the past few years, the military has begun using soldiers
instead of civilians on certain infrastructure projects. Child labor
continues to be a serious problem.
As a largely underdeveloped country, Burma, with a rapid population growth
rate, faces increasing pressure on environmental quality. Although the
government has taken some steps to stem widespread clear-cutting, Burma's
large tracts of remaining tropical forest remain under intense commercial
exploitation. Some non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have charged that
Burma's teak forests in the Thai-Burma border area are being rapidly
destroyed by clear-cutting and deforestation, including by ethnic insurgent
groups in league with foreigners. Because of the severe restrictions on
Embassy travel to outlying parts of Burma, it is difficult to document the
overall extent of the problem.
The poor quality of life is also reflected in rising drug abuse. Burmese
estimates put the addict population at approximately 60,000, but UNDCP and
NGOs working in the health sector estimate the actual number is at least
five times that figure. Intravenous use of heroin is contributing to the
rapid spread of HIV/AIDS. While official statistics released in 1997 show
over 10,000 HIV-infected people, and about 2,000 AIDS patients,
international organizations estimate that at least one million Burmese may
be HIV-infected. Drug treatment services are not reaching most drug users
because of a lack of facilities and a lack of properly trained personnel.
Addiction and the spread of HIV/AIDS have become cross-border problems of
concern to China as well, particularly in Yunnan province, on Burma's
northern border.
Development of a Multilateral Strategy:
The goals of U.S. policy toward Burma are progress toward democracy,
improved human rights, and more effective counternarcotics efforts. Absent
national reconciliation, Burma will not be able to adequately address the
many severe problems it faces, including narcotics trafficking and abuse,
low levels of education and poor economic performance.
The United States actively works to promote international pressure on the
SPDC for a meaningful dialogue on a democratic transition and an improved
human rights climate. We are pursuing a multilateral strategy to seek
improvement in our key areas of concern. We continue to consult about Burma
regularly and at senior levels with leaders of the ASEAN nations, Japan,
Korea, the European Union, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and other
countries having major trading and investment interests in Burma. At the
same time, we urge them to press Burma for progress in the counternarcotics
area, in particular to curb drug production and trafficking. These efforts
have helped build and maintain strong international pressure on the military
regime.
We support the UN's "good offices" approach to encouraging dialogue between
the regime and the democratic opposition as a means of achieving a peaceful
transition to civilian rule. We welcome the continued engagement of the UN
Secretary General and his senior representatives in this effort. UN Special
Envoy for Burma Alvaro de Soto can play a valuable role by encouraging the
SPDC to initiate a genuine dialogue with the democratic opposition,
including Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD.
The key to progress toward democracy and human rights is, first and
foremost, direct negotiations about the political future of the country
among the SPDC, the NLD, and the ethnic minorities. In all our public and
private messages to the SPDC, leaders of third countries, and other
interested parties, we stress the importance of beginning such talks as the
key to achieving significant progress in Burma. At the same time, we urge
them to press Burma for progress in the counternarcotics area. We work
closely with countries in Asia and Europe to press the SPDC to begin talks.
In response, leaders from the ASEAN nations, Japan, Australia, Canada, and
the European Union have urged the regime, both publicly and privately, to
move to dialogue with the democratic opposition and to curb drug production
and trafficking.
In order to urge the SPDC to make progress in our areas of concern, we have
taken a number of steps: suspending economic aid, withdrawing GSP and OPIC,
implementing an arms embargo, blocking assistance from international
financial institutions, downgrading our representation from Ambassador to
Charge d'affaires, imposing visa restrictions on senior regime leaders and
their families, and implementing a ban on new investment by U.S. persons. We
likewise have encouraged ASEAN, Japan, the EU, and other nations to take
similar steps and other actions to encourage progress by the SPDC in these
areas of key concern. Many nations join us in our arms embargo, including
European countries, Canada, Australia, Japan and Korea. The EU limits its
assistance to Burma to humanitarian aid. Our efforts in the international
financial institutions continue to be successful in blocking loans to the
regime, which is probably the single most effective sanction against the
regime. Since 1988 we have taken an active role in pressing for strong human
rights resolutions on Burma at the United Nations General Assembly and the
UN Human Rights Commission, as well as having worked vigorously in the
International Labor Organization (ILO) to condemn the lack of freedom of
association for workers and the use of forced labor by the SPDC. In June,
with our support, the ILO took the unprecedented step of banning Burma from
attending ILO meetings and receiving technical assistance due to its forced
labor practices.
In 1996, at our urging, the EU and associated European states joined us in
imposing a ban on visas for high-level SPDC and military officials and their
families. In addition, the European Union and Canada withdrew GSP trade
benefits from Burma's agricultural and industrial products in March and
August 1997, respectively, bringing their trade policies more in line with
the U.S. withholding of GSP. In October 1998, the EU broadened its visa ban
to include high-level tourism officials and urged EU citizens to defer
vacation travel to Burma.
ASEAN shares many of our goals with regard to Burma, but we disagree on the
means to achieve those goals. Many members of ASEAN believe that
"constructive engagement" of the SPDC is the most effective way to promote
positive change in Burma. We will continue to raise our strong concerns
about the situation in Burma with ASEAN and urge continued steps by ASEAN
leaders to encourage progress by the SPDC. Secretary Albright has used and
will continue to use multilateral meetings, including the ASEAN Regional
Forum and Post-Ministerial Conference, to directly press the Burmese for
positive change in the presence of fellow ASEAN members.
[end of document]
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